Chapter XII: The Eastern Question (3)

M. Waddington did not remain long in sole possession of his exclusive information, for on July 8, the Anglo-Turkish Convention was made known to the world, and the general impression produced was that Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury had effected a brilliant _coup_. In France, however, the news caused quite unjustifiable indignation, and the prudent Lord Lyons telegraphed to Lord Salisbury on July 10, advising him to get the final acts of the Congress signed as quickly as possible, lest Waddington should be directed to come away without putting his name to anything.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, July 12, 1878.

Your telegram of last night was a great relief to me, but I
shall not feel quite happy till I hear that all is actually signed.
I am happy to find that Gambetta and the Ministerial Parties, who
are violent on the subject of the Convention, are not having things
all their own way in the press. No newspaper can be said to defend
England altogether, but the more sensible papers are against any
active opposition on the part of France. Gambetta and Waddington
are not friends, and Gambetta will no doubt attack Waddington and
try to upset him. This may lead to serious difficulties in France.

It is no use to shut one's eyes to the fact that at this
moment, there is a great and general irritation in France against
England. It is too soon to foresee what turn public opinion will
take eventually, but at the present moment, we must not forget to
take this irritation into account in our dealings with this country.

The general feeling was so unsatisfactory, that he felt compelled to write to Mr. Knollys[20] urging that the Prince of Wales, who was acting as President of the British Section of the International Exhibition, should postpone a contemplated visit to Paris, and enclosing articles in the press of an abominable character directed against His Royal Highness. Irritation over the Anglo-Turkish Convention was not confined to one party, but existed in every class from the _haute société_ downwards. The Conservatives and their press utilized it as a means of attacking the Republic, complained of the effacement of France, and asserted that she had been duped by her former ally, while the Republican opposition, headed by Gambetta, charged Waddington with having made a shameful surrender to England.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, July 16, 1878.

The first explosion of French wrath, on the appearance of
the Convention of the 4th of June, was even more violent than I
anticipated. It was well that you had the Minister for Foreign
Affairs under _your_ influence, and at a distance from that of
the excited spirits here. Now the first force of the eruption is
spent and the lava cooled down. I am afraid only on the surface,
but any way, it must be the surface which cools first. At all
events the strong language is in great measure abandoned. In the
first place, as no one now recommends any immediate action on the
part of France, the French are beginning to see that they cut a
sorry figure by barking without biting. In the second place, they
conceive that the alliance of the Three Empires is as close as
ever, and they think that if they quarrel with England, they will
be giving a triumph to Bismarck and find themselves face to face
with him without any friend on their side. Lastly, I would fain
hope that some of them are beginning to take a really reasonable
view of things, and to see that we had absolutely nothing left for
it, but to act for ourselves, as they would not or could not help
us.

Still we shall have some trouble with them, and shall probably
find them for some time suspicious, jealous, and hard to deal with.

Egypt may be our first difficulty. With or without a hint
from home, French agents there will be seeking to trip us up. It
seems to me that our task there will be a delicate one. On the one
hand, it will no doubt be desirable to soothe French vanity as far
as possible; but, on the other hand, anything like a defeat or a
retreat in Egypt, might very much impair the prestige which the
position which we have taken with regard to Asia has given us.
I wish Rivers Wilson had already been installed as Minister of
Finance when the Convention of the 4th June was made public.

Another ticklish question is that of the Newfoundland
Fisheries. I am very anxious to know what, if anything, passed
between you and Waddington on the subject at Berlin. The present
moment does not seem a very happy one for resuming negotiations,
and at all events it might be well to keep the matter, if possible,
in the calm atmosphere of London, and at a distance from the heat
of the political weather here.

I have been indirectly in communication with Gambetta, and
have reason to hope he is being brought, or is coming of himself,
round about the Convention. What I am immediately afraid of is
his nevertheless trying to upset Waddington. I should regret
Waddington's fall on all grounds, and it would be extremely awkward
to have a successor in the office brought in on the pretext that
Waddington had not been stiff enough with regard to England. The
candidates for his place are said to be Freycinet, the present
Minister of Public Works, who was Gambetta's Sub-Minister for War
in 1870 and 1871; M. Duclerc, one of the Vice-Presidents of the
Senate, who passes for a moderate man, but who has no knowledge of
foreign affairs, and Gambetta himself. I suppose, however, Gambetta
would be an impossibility with the Marshal, and that he himself
would feel that he was compromising his prospect of greater things
hereafter, by taking a subordinate office now.

M. Waddington, upon his return from Berlin, realizing doubtless that his position had been shaken, though from no fault of his own, intimated his intention of writing a despatch in which Her Majesty's Government would be called upon to give to the French certain assurances with regard to Egypt and Tunis. As it was desirable that this request should not be made in too peremptory a manner, he was exhorted to make his communication in such a way as would make it easy for Her Majesty's Government to return a cordial answer. The difficulty about giving the assurances was pointed out by Lord Salisbury.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, July 20, 1878.

What M. Waddington said to you is very much what he said to me
at Berlin, though the lurid touches about war have been filled in
afterwards.

The precise answer to be given to his promised despatch must
of course depend very much on the terms in which it is framed. But
he may be certain that we shall answer it not only with the desire
of cultivating to the utmost possible extent our good relations
with France, but also with the aim of making his own personal task
more easy, as far as it is in our power to contribute to that
result.

The matter to which he has called your attention, as he did
ours at Berlin, was difficult to make the subject of binding
assurances, because the contingencies under which those assurances
would receive a practical application are difficult to foresee.

If France occupied Tunis to-morrow, we should not even
remonstrate. But to promise that publicly would be a little
difficult, because we must avoid giving away other people's
property without their consent, and also because it is no business
of ours to pronounce beforehand on the considerations which Italy
would probably advance upon that subject. In the same way, with
respect to Egypt, we have stated distinctly more than once that we
do not entertain any intention of occupying it; and that statement
we are perfectly willing to renew. But, having done that, and
having expressed our anxiety to work with France in Egypt, we
have said as much as would be seemly or possible. We can hardly
pledge the Khedive as to what he means to do, without in reality
assuming a voice in his concerns which we do not, according to any
international right, possess.

These considerations make me rather anxious that M. Waddington
in his proposed despatch should avoid putting categorical questions
which we might not be able to answer precisely as he wishes,
and yet which we could not avoid answering without seeming to
exhibit precisely that coolness which he very properly and justly
deprecates, and any appearance of which we are as anxious as he is
to avoid. I think that his despatch--if I might suggest it--would
more properly take the form of a statement, in general terms, of
the territorial points on the African coast in which France takes
an interest, leaving us to make such assurances as we think we can
properly give, and which we will certainly make as cordial as we
can.

To French influence in Egypt we do not offer any objection;
and we have never taken any step calculated to oust it. But any
detailed engagements as to questions of administration could
not be taken without imprudence; for each step must be taken as
the necessity for it arises. The two great points are to keep
the Khedive on the throne, and to get the financial obligations
satisfied. For these objects, the two countries will, I hope,
co-operate heartily.

I am a little anxious as to the form he gives his despatch,
for if he makes it too peremptory, he may produce that very
appearance of estrangement which it is our common object to avoid.

I will write to you more fully about the Newfoundland
Fisheries when I have had time to study the papers. My
conversations with him have put me fully in possession of the
French case. I am not so certain that I know all the points of the
English case.

An opportunity fortunately occurred of conciliating one personage who might have given a great deal of trouble, and afforded an instance of the influence which can occasionally be brought to bear upon advanced democrats when judiciously applied.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, July 21, 1878.

The Prince of Wales leaves Paris for London to-night. As his
arrival at Paris to attend the English concerts at the Exhibition
had been publicly announced, I did not think that it would be
advisable that it should be postponed, but I have been a little
nervous about it. So far however there has been no contretemps, and
the visit has been politically useful.

The Prince invited Gambetta to breakfast with him yesterday.
It was His Royal Highness's own idea, but I thought it judicious.
I have not the least doubt that if the Prince of Wales had not
been civil to Gambetta, the Russian Embassy would have asked any
Grand Duke who came here to show him particular attention, in order
to bring him over to Russia. The success of such a manoeuvre has I
think been effectually guarded against.

Gambetta appears to have spoken to the Prince strongly in
favour of an alliance between France and England--to have declared
himself more or less reconciled to the Convention of June 4th--and
to have spoken in the most disparaging terms, not so much of the
Foreign Policy of Russia, as of the institutions, the Government,
and the administration of that country. I hear from other quarters
that Gambetta was extremely pleased with the interview. I am
assured also that the Prince of Wales acquitted himself with great
skill. The Prince thought, and so did I, that it was better that
I should not be at the breakfast. The Embassy was represented by
Sheffield. The occasion of the invitation to Gambetta was his
having been very obliging and useful in matters connected with the
Exhibition.

To-day Waddington met the Prince of Wales at luncheon at the
Embassy.

So far, then, things look well, but I am assured the calm
does not extend far below the surface. Gambetta has the southern
temperament, and his language is a good deal influenced by the
impression of the moment. He has postponed, but he has not really
given up, his attack on Waddington. He will still, if he continues
in his present mood, try to turn him out in October, when the
Chambers reassemble.

The thing which would have most effect in reconciling the
French to our acquisition and protectorate, would be to make them
practically advantageous to the holders of Turkish and Egyptian
Bonds.

When M. Waddington eventually presented his despatch, or rather despatches, for there were two, they were apparently found unobjectionable in tone; but on the ground that the one referring to Tunis was not 'couched in more diplomatic language,' it was suggested to him that he should rewrite it in language more suitable for publication subsequently; this he declined to do, but promised not to publish it at all. The chief object presumably of these communications was: in the first place to obtain assurances from England with regard to Egypt, and in the second place to make Lord Salisbury's statement about Tunis appear as an invitation to the French to appropriate that country. M. Waddington, quite naturally, did not wish it to be thought that he had come back empty handed from Berlin at a time when the Great Christian Powers were helping themselves liberally at the Turk's expense.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

July 24, 1878.

Waddington's two despatches were left with me yesterday. They
are very friendly in tone and will not, I think, be difficult to
answer. The answers however must be delayed some days, as the
Cabinet does not meet till Saturday.

Intermediately, I demur a little to the quotations that he
makes from my conversation. The general tenor is quite accurate,
but his vivacious French by no means renders the tone of my
communication, and what is of more importance, to the rights and
claims of other Powers, Turkey and Italy especially. What I told
him was that if a state of things should arise in which there was
no other obstacle to his occupying Tunis but our objection, that
objection would not be made. I made the observation for the purpose
of showing him that we had no Mediterranean aspirations--and did
not desire to disturb the balance of power in that sea. Our eyes
were bent wholly on the East. But he makes me talk of Tunis and
Carthage as if they had been my own personal property and I was
making him a liberal wedding present.

I do not know whether he will be inclined to put his
quotations from my conversations into a more general form. I think
it will save the possibility of misunderstanding later; and will
also dispense with the necessity of a correction on my part, as he
has reported the general drift and terms of my observations with
perfect fidelity.

The reception of the Anglo-Turkish Convention in France may be said to have been the first of a series of difficulties which unfortunately impaired the relations between France and England during many years, but which have now happily almost entirely disappeared. The irritation aroused in France was completely unjustified, and almost incapable of explanation, unless the secrecy which surrounded the negotiation of the Convention may be considered an adequate cause. No French interests were prejudicially affected; and the maintenance of secrecy really relieved France from a considerable difficulty, for a premature disclosure might have prevented the participation of France in the Congress; but oddly enough, the Anglo-Turkish Convention appeared to be the only matter relating to the Congress in which the French took any interest, and so much indignation did some patriots show that it was even seriously suggested that by way of inflicting a surprise upon England, France should seize Chios, or Rhodes, or Crete. In fact, at one time, Crete appeared to possess considerably greater attractions than Tunis, in spite of the latter's proximity to Algeria.

Probably the real explanation of this display of temper was that the French felt their strength to be returning, and were in no mood to put up with what they erroneously considered to be a slight, whether intentional or unintentional.

One frantic jeremiad from Constantinople over the Treaty of Berlin may be quoted before the subject is dismissed. Layard, who had been already greatly scandalized by the publication of the Anglo-Russian agreement, wrote:--

What do you think of the Treaty of Berlin? It appears to
me that if ever an apple of discord was thrown amongst nations,
this is the one. I see in it the elements of future wars and
disorders without number, and an upsetting of all the principles
of justice and right which have hitherto governed the relations
and intercourse of states. Force and fraud have triumphed, and
when Turkey has been completely destroyed and cut up under the new
system, it will probably be applied with similar successful results
to other countries. Russia has gained, with the assistance of
Germany, all and more than she wanted, and the interests of England
and of other Powers were sacrificed in order to enable Bismarck
to recruit his beery stomach by drinking some mineral waters.
It is all very well to sit round a green table and to cut up an
Empire on a map. It is a very different thing to put what has been
so easily settled into execution. I anticipate no end of trouble
and bloodshed for years to come in this unhappy country. We have
not yet recovered here from the effect of the publication of the
unfortunate memorandum which so completely destroyed the great and
commanding position that we had acquired.

There is not much here about Peace with Honour.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 17: Jan. 7, 1876.]

[Footnote 18: Jan. 24, 1877.]

[Footnote 19: Nobiling's attempt to assassinate the German Emperor.]

[Footnote 20: Now Viscount Knollys.]