Chapter XII: The Eastern Question (1)

(1876-1878)

In January, 1876, the gradual spread of the insurrection in Turkey led to the concoction by the three Imperial Powers of the so-called 'Andrassy Note,' and the great question was whether England would consent to take part in its presentation, in view of her traditional attitude towards Turkey. Lord Derby, in a letter to Lord Lyons, stated that Bismarck was very anxious that we should do so, and explained that although 'one can trust none of these Governments, it is as well to give them credit for acting honestly until the reverse is proved,' and he was therefore in favour of such a course himself. In a letter[17] addressed to Mr. Disraeli, asking for his views on the subject, Lord Derby remarked that: "It is too late to stand on the dignity and independence of the Sultan; a Sovereign who can neither keep the peace at home, nor pay his debts, must expect to submit to some disagreeable consequences." Lord Lyons, on being consulted, concurred with Lord Derby's views.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Paris, Jan. 14, 1876.

I hardly see how England is to avoid supporting the Andrassy
Note. If we stand aloof we shall stand alone. If our secession
produces no effect and the Turks still accept, we shall be in
the same foolish position France was in 1840; with this serious
inconvenience, that if the Andrassy plan fails in pacifying the
Herzegovina, we shall be blamed for the failure, as having caused
it by breaking up the unanimity of Europe. If the Turks do not
accept, they will be ready enough to throw the responsibility upon
us, and to call upon us to get them out of the scrape into which
they will get with the other Powers. I think that by consenting we
should leave the Powers least excuse for attacking Turkey, or at
all events, least excuse for pushing on without consulting us. I
should not be for qualifying our support too much, for, if we do,
the failure of the plan, which is in my opinion more than probable,
will still be attributed to us, and a support, given as it were
against our will, and restricted to the least possible amount, will
be treated very much as opposition. I say all this because you ask
me to tell you what I think: but there are two important elements
for forming an opinion which I lack. I mean a knowledge of public
opinion in England, and a knowledge of the real feelings of the
three Empires towards each other.

The despatch from Odo Russell looks as if Bismarck was
preparing for the possibility of a quarrel with Russia. Ever since
1870 he has been very naturally trying to turn every opportunity
of dividing England from France to account. But since you joined
Russia in insisting upon peace last year, and still more since
the purchase of the Suez Canal shares, he has no doubt formed a
higher opinion of England, and conceived the idea that she still
has the will and the means to play a foremost part in European
politics. Like everybody else, he feels sure that if there is a
quarrel between Russia and Germany, France will side with Russia.
In order to prevent his enemy being all powerful at sea, he must
have the English fleet not merely neutral, but on his side. The
only advantage he can offer to England is support on the Eastern
Question, and it is on this question that he would have the best
chance of embroiling her with Russia. What part he means Austria to
play, I find it more difficult to guess. That he intends some day,
and by some means, to annex German Austria to the German Empire I
make no doubt, but I suppose he is in no hurry to add so large a
Roman Catholic and Southern population to the electors of the Diet
of the Empire.

The worst service we could render France at present would
be to set up a separate understanding with her in opposition to
Germany.

The French Government was desperately anxious that England should not separate herself from the other Powers, partly from fear that such action would cause European complications, and partly because it was particularly desirous of getting credit with Russia for having brought English opinion round to Russian views. Her Majesty's Government finally decided to join in the Andrassy Note, although it would appear from Lord Derby's language, that the Cabinet were not unanimous on the question.

Meanwhile French internal politics remained in the same confused and unsatisfactory state which had prevailed for so long. The divisions amongst the Conservatives had made Monarchical Government in any form impossible, and yet they refused to acquiesce, even temporarily, in the moderate form of Republic which had been established, and seemed bent upon doing all they could to exchange their King Log for a King Stork in the shape of a Red Republic. The elections which took place in the beginning of the year 1876 resulted in large Republican majorities both in the Senate and in the Chamber, and in the case of the former, this result was singularly unfortunate for Marshal MacMahon, as it deprived him of the power of forcing a dissolution. A letter from Lord Lyons to the Prince of Wales, who was on his way back from India, summarizes the French internal situation.

* * * * *

Paris, March 7, 1876.

I cannot give your Royal Highness a very satisfactory
account of French politics, although I do not take so gloomy a
view of them as many Frenchmen do. The large number of advanced
Republicans in the new Chamber of Deputies, the not inconsiderable
number of Ultra-Radicals, and the complete defeat of the Moderate
Conservatives in the Elections not unnaturally frighten the upper
classes of Frenchmen. But in fact so many of the members are quite
new men, that one cannot foresee how parties will group themselves.
The Chambers meet to-morrow, and in about a month's time it will
be possible to form an opinion as to how things are likely to go.
So long as Marshal MacMahon is at the head of the State and of the
army, there can be no fear of any serious disturbance of material
order; and if he is at the same time firm and conciliatory with the
new Chamber, and willing to take a Ministry from the more moderate
members of the majority, he will very probably be rewarded by
finding how tame demagogues can become in office. I understand the
Marshal insists upon having Ministers of War and Foreign Affairs
whom he knows and in whom he has confidence, but that he is willing
to let the other Departments be filled by men taken in the ordinary
way from the majority.

So far we have not this year been disturbed, as we were
last spring, by rumours of war, and agriculture and commerce are
flourishing in France, and the revenue goes on increasing.

Of the Egyptian Financial Question Your Royal Highness
will learn all particulars on the spot. Neither that, nor the
Herzegovina question are settled at this moment, but we must hope
that they are on the eve of being settled.

One of the new features in the French political situation was the recovery by Gambetta of his former influence, and as he was now a person of considerable influence, Sheffield was utilized for the purpose of eliciting his views. The late Mr. George Sheffield, who acted as Lord Lyons's private secretary for over twenty years, was a well-known figure in the political and social world of Paris, and included in his acquaintance most people both there and in London who were worth knowing. Not only did he enjoy much personal popularity, but as he was known to be completely in Lord Lyons's confidence, he was the recipient of much confidential information, and generally believed to be a model of discretion. One of his peculiarities was that, in spite of much practice, he spoke very imperfect French with an atrocious accent, but this circumstance never appeared to prejudice him in any way, and it may incidentally be noted that the possession of what is called a good French accent is a much overrated accomplishment in France itself. Frenchmen rarely wish to listen; they desire to talk themselves and to be listened to; to them, as a rule, a foreigner is a foreigner and nothing more, and whether he speaks French well or ill, they seldom notice and rarely care.

Gambetta, having secured a listener in the person of Sheffield, was no doubt delighted to expound his views on the situation. First of all, speaking on the subject of Bonapartist successes at the elections, he said that Bonapartism would die out as soon as it was realized that a moderate Republic was firmly established. He expressed great delight at the fall of Thiers (Thiers had once described him as a _fou furieux_), and said that under him no real self-acting Republic could ever have been formed, that it would have fallen to pieces at his death, and indeed that the best thing Thiers could do for the Republic would be to die. For Marshal MacMahon's entourage he had a great dislike, but for the Marshal himself much respect, and he aspired to be Prime Minister under him--a post to which he considered that he was fully entitled, but which the Décazes, Broglie, the Marshal's secretaries and the Maréchale and her friends would do their best to prevent him obtaining. He professed confidence in being able to keep the extreme Radicals in order; said that the Red Flag was as obnoxious to him as the White Flag; that he was not inclined to grant a general amnesty to the Communists, and that he would not agree to the re-establishment of the National Guard. He also professed himself to be in favour of Free Trade, and asserted that the commercial Treaty concluded by Napoleon III. accounted for many of the Bonapartist successes.

Gambetta's aspiration of serving under the Marshal was never fulfilled, the above-mentioned entourage being presumably too strong for him; but the upper classes in France continued to look forward to the future with undiminished apprehension. French capital, reversing the present process, began to pour steadily into England, and it was stated that the rich Radicals were not the last in sending their money abroad.

'Marshal MacMahon's position,' wrote Lord Lyons at the end
of March, 'does not improve. He has so little political knowledge
or ability that, as events have shown, he exercises little or no
personal influence in politics. There is also a jealousy springing
up with regard to Emmanuel d'Harcourt and other people about him
who are supposed to direct his political conduct. The officers
now at the head of the army would follow the Marshal very far in
any Conservative direction, but it may be questioned whether they
would submit patiently to being placed under a Radical Minister
of War--Gambetta for instance. It is the Marshal's political
intelligence that is doubted. No one has a word to say against his
disinterestedness, his honour, or his courage.'

Marshal MacMahon, a simple and amiable soldier, who knew nothing about politics, was credited with an overwhelming admiration for the capacity of his private secretary, Emmanuel d'Harcourt. Upon one occasion, the question of applying for the extradition of a criminal who had fled to America was being discussed in his presence. 'Well,' said the Marshal, 'we must telegraph at once to San Francisco.' 'Pardon, M. le Maréchal,' interposed d'Harcourt, 'Washington, not San Francisco, is the capital of the United States.' The Marshal was so astounded at the profundity of his private secretary's knowledge that he was only able to ejaculate: '_Ce diable d'Harcourt! il sait tout!_'

Many stories were told of his engaging simplicity of character, of which the following will serve as an instance. Upon one occasion he was inspecting a military academy, and was informed that there was present a young Arab chieftain of distinguished lineage to whom it would be desirable to address some words of encouragement. The young man was brought up, whereupon the following brief colloquy ensued:--

Marshal: '_Ah! c'est vous qui êtes le nègre?_'

Arab Chief: '_Oui, M. le Maréchal._'

Marshal: '_Eh bien, mon garçon, continuez!_'

By a curious combination of circumstances, Marshal MacMahon, with his inadequate political and intellectual equipment, was still able for some time to fill the place of a constitutional sovereign, and virtually the French were living under a constitutional Monarchy, with an Executive possessing large powers, rather than under a Republic. This state of things, however, could not last for long, and it seemed as if the choice lay between the youthful Prince Imperial and the establishment of a really Radical Republic.

In one respect the French had every reason to congratulate themselves, namely, upon the re-organization of their army, and some of the political consequences which were likely to result from this increased and increasing military strength are pointed out in the following letter.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Paris, Sept. 26, 1876.

As soon as General Conolly finishes his visits to the Autumn
Manoeuvres and makes his reports, it may perhaps be desirable for
me to send you some observations on the political consequences of
the great progress the French Army is making. All the officers of
Foreign Armies and the English officers especially who have been
out with the French troops this autumn, seem to agree in regarding
the improvement as being undoubted and very considerable. In short,
it may not unreasonably be expected that in about three years from
this time, the French Army will be in such a state, that France
will count for as much or nearly as much, in the balance of power
in Europe, as she did before 1870.

The different phases of public opinion since the peace of
1871 may be described as follows. At first, rage and mortification
produced a wild and unreasoning cry for revenge. This was followed
by a depression almost amounting to despair. In this state of
things the rumours of an intended attack by Germany in 1875
produced nearly a panic. Since that time hope and confidence have
gradually returned. The general sentiment now is that France is
safely 'biding her time.'

Under the influence of this sentiment, the French acquiesce
patiently in the present apparent eclipse of French power; they
disapprove of any attempt on the part of the Government to put
itself prominently forward in European politics; they desire to
preserve peace and tranquillity in Europe at almost any price; they
wish to disarm suspicion, and to be allowed three or four years
more to recruit their strength. Their policy consequently is to
adjourn as far as possible all questions.

Their ultimate object in all they do, is to recover their lost
Provinces; but however confident they may be of recovering in a
few years their old position in the world, I do not believe that
they contemplate, as the immediate result, an attack upon Germany.
I do not think that they at all foresee a time at which they could
run the risk of making such an attack singlehanded. What they do
intend, is to put forward with vigour their own views with regard
to the numerous questions they now leave more or less in abeyance,
and to contract if possible foreign alliances on equal terms.

One of the questions with regard to which they will be
disposed to change their tone very considerably will be that of
Egypt.

Another may possibly be that of the Newfoundland Fisheries, if
we do not succeed in effecting some sort of settlement of it in the
meantime.

A third may be the extension of their possessions in Cochin
China, and of their protectorate of Annam.

With regard to alliances, that which they will first seek
will no doubt be the alliance of Russia, and in a case of great
emergency, they would make great sacrifices of Western interests to
obtain it.

They will desire to keep on good terms with England, so far
at all events as to avoid throwing her into the arms of Germany,
but as they are not likely to conceive hopes of obtaining effectual
assistance from England towards recovering Alsace and Lorraine,
they will not be so eager for an English as a Russian alliance.

Another contingency to be kept in view is that a new President
or a new Dynasty, desirous of consolidating themselves by a little
military glory, may be led to direct an attack upon whatever
quarter it may be easiest to do so.

I will not however go on with mere speculations of this kind.
Of the truth of the conclusions to which I have come, I entertain
very little doubt. In two or three years France will not be in the
same accommodating frame of mind in which she is now, and will
have very much more powerful means than she has now of enforcing
attention to her wishes. All questions therefore in which the
influence of France is hostile, should be settled as quickly as
possible. The restoration of the strength of France may be found
useful in redressing the balance of power, but, anyhow, it should
be taken into account in all political calculations.

It was not long before these anticipations were justified, but for the present, relations between England and France remained on a friendly footing, no doubt much to Bismarck's displeasure, who, at this period, was continually urging us to take Egypt and not to do anything else. As a matter of fact, if we had seized Egypt in 1876, it would not have had the immediate effect of embroiling us with France. On the contrary, all those who had a pecuniary interest in Egypt thought that they would gain by our taking possession of the county, while the great majority of Frenchmen looked upon the thing as inevitable, and thought it better to put a good face upon the matter. Any contradiction of the supposed English designs upon Egypt, however sincere and positive, met with no credence at all.

There is an instructive extract on the subject, contained in a letter of Lord Derby of December 6, 1876.

It is evidently useless to say that we don't want Egypt and
don't intend to take it: we must leave our friends to be convinced
by the event. I have no doubt that everybody out of France would
be glad that we should seize the country. Russia would like it, as
making us an accomplice in her plans. Germany would like it still
more, as ensuring our being on uncomfortable terms with France
for some years to come. Italy would see in it a precedent and a
justification for seizing Tunis; Spain, the same, in regard to
Morocco. But you may be assured that we have no such designs and
are not going to run into adventures of this kind.

There can be no possible doubt as to Lord Derby's sincerity; indeed, he was so constitutionally averse from an adventurous foreign policy, that a year or two later, Lord Salisbury said of his ex-colleague that he could never have brought himself to annex the Isle of Man. It is interesting to note that, in the above forecast of international brigandage, Tunis and not Tripoli was allotted to Italy, the designs of France in the former direction not apparently being suspected.

Before the end of 1876 the experiment of trying to work the institutions of a Constitutional Monarchy in France under an elective chief magistrate had very nearly come to a deadlock. The Left were determined to get real power into their hands and not to allow themselves to be thwarted by the conservative tendencies of the Marshal and his personal friends. On the one hand, the Marshal stoutly maintained that he would have Ministers of his own choice in the Departments of War and Foreign Affairs, whereas the Left, so long as they had a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, were, under Constitutional Government, clearly entitled to decide the matter. But the question was complicated, because the Marshal, as well as the Ministers, was in a position to resort to resignation of office, and a severe Ministerial crisis ensued. Ultimately, the Marshal succeeded in keeping his Minister of War and his Minister for Foreign Affairs, but he was forced to accept, as Prime Minister, M. Jules Simon. The latter, although an able and conciliatory man, had been a member of the Revolutionary Government of National Defence, and having been forced to yield so far to his opponents, it seemed not improbable that the Marshal before long would be obliged to have recourse to Gambetta himself. Gambetta, as has been shown, had lately become much more moderate in his views, but in the opinion of many people he still represented the Red Spectre, and it was believed that his assumption of office would mean Communism, Socialism, equal division of property, judges appointed by election for short periods, the prohibition of marriage, and the suppression of religion. The desire of the Bonapartists was that the Government should fall into the hands of the extreme Left, in the hope that the people, from fear of the above contingencies, would clamour for the Empire; but what was more remarkable was, that many Orleanists as well as moderate and timid Conservatives wished to drive the Marshal to a dissolution in the hope of a reaction. There could have been no better proof of their short-sightedness and incapacity, for the mass of the electors were not in the least likely to make fine distinctions, and if really afraid of the Republic would certainly vote for nothing short of the Empire.

The Conference which had assembled at Constantinople in the autumn in the hope of settling the Eastern Question, with Lord Salisbury as one of the British representatives, broke up in January, 1877, and it became clear that war between Russia and Turkey was unavoidable. Lord Derby, who was the reverse of sanguine by temperament, had never entertained any hopes of its success, and was quite determined that, whatever happened, there should be no British intervention. 'I am amused,' he wrote to Lord Odo Russell,[18] 'by your description of the Russo-German suspicions entertained against us; these fellows make us act as they would act in our place. They can neither deal straightforwardly themselves, nor give anybody else credit for doing so.

'If you are asked what steps England is going to take next, your true answer should be "none." We shall wait, say little, and pledge ourselves to nothing.'

The break up of the Conference filled the French with alarm.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Paris, Feb. 5, 1877.

It is believed here that Bismarck is determined to produce at
least such a scare as he did two years ago, if not to do more. The
idea provokes some anger, but more fear. Nevertheless, the danger
is greater now than it was last time; for although France is very
far from being ready for even a defensive war, she does feel so
much stronger than she did in 1875, as not to be willing to bear
quite as much from Germany as she would have borne then.

The impressions prevalent here are:

That Bismarck is very much disappointed by the result of the
Constantinople Conference, which he had hoped would have ended by
setting all Europe by the ears.

That he is very much irritated by the cordiality which existed
between the English, French, and Russian Plenipotentiaries, and by
the considerable part taken by Chaudordy in the proceedings.

That he is very much annoyed by the number of Socialist votes
given in the recent German elections, and is eager to destroy Paris
as the hotbed of socialism.

That he wants a cry to make the Germans pay their taxes
willingly.

That he looks with an evil eye upon the material prosperity of
France.

That he considers the Exhibition of 1878 as a sort of defiance
of Germany, and is ready to go great lengths to prevent its taking
place.

These are French views, not mine; but I do agree with the
conclusion which the greater and the wiser part of the French
nation draw from them: namely that it behoves France to be more
than ever prudent and cautious, and more than ever careful not to
give Germany any pretext for a quarrel.

France is certainly not at all likely to oppose Russia in
anything that country may undertake in the East; but she is still
less likely to give her any military assistance there. She might
not be able to resist the bait, if Russia held it out, of an
offensive and defensive alliance against Germany, but in that
case she would more than ever want her own forces on this side of
Germany. This contingency, however, is too improbable to be worth
considering.

It is quite true that France has a large force on her Eastern
Frontier, and that she is hard at work there, but considering the
difficulty of guarding that frontier, such as it has been left by
the Treaty of 1871, her objects may well be supposed to be purely
defensive.

Lord Salisbury is to arrive this evening and to go on to
London without stopping.

It is interesting to note that Lord Salisbury, while at Constantinople, formed a very poor opinion of the capacity of Sultan Abdul Hamid--an opinion which he must have had occasion to revise later on. 'Salisbury reports ill of the new Sultan; calls him a poor weak creature, from whom no help is to be expected. But his judgment is the result of a single interview.' So wrote Lord Derby to Lord Odo Russell.

The French representative, Chaudordy, had been very active; his zeal had alarmed his own countrymen, and was supposed to have aroused the indignation of Bismarck, but one of the singular features of the Constantinople Conference seems to have been the action of the representatives of the small Powers such as Spain, Belgium, and Holland, who did their utmost, and not entirely without effect, to spirit the Turks up to resistance. In March there was much coming and going at Paris on the part of Ignatieff and Schouvaloff, who were thought to be endeavouring to secure what Russia wanted without war, and the former proceeded on a special mission to London, but the negotiations with the Turks broke down, and war was declared before the end of April. Letters from Lord Derby describing the state of feeling in England dwell upon the action of Gladstone, who, according to Schouvaloff, 'was much more Russian than the Russian Government,' and whose language was, 'only suited to a Panslavonic Society.'

The outbreak of the war between Russia and Turkey was extremely distasteful to the French for various reasons. They were convinced that it had been instigated by Bismarck, and that it would result in the overwhelming preponderance of Germany on the continent, and were equally convinced that it would lead to a great extension of English influence in the Mediterranean including an occupation of Egypt; consequently, Décazes, who was anything but a straightforward politician, and anxious beyond everything to hunt with the Russian hounds, and run with the English hare, was constantly expressing fears that if an English force was sent to the East, the opportunity would at once be seized by Bismarck for falling upon France. A congenial opportunity for this intriguer arose over the question whether Egypt should be called upon to render pecuniary and military assistance to Turkey, and an unsuccessful attempt was made to persuade the Khedive that if he refused to comply, he would be protected. By these means Décazes would have secured the treble advantage of making himself agreeable to Russia, of pleasing the French bondholders, and, to a certain degree, of thwarting England in Egypt. Unluckily for him, the scheme miscarried; but in spite of ardent professions of neutrality, he contrived to render services to Russia which were of some considerable service.

He used his influence to obtain a loan for her in Paris; his agents in Egypt supported the Russian threats to blockade the Suez Canal, and the effect of the Franco-Russian understanding was to force Germany to make greater sacrifices in order to retain the friendship of Russia by furthering Russian policy in the East. One of the methods by which the Germans sought to ingratiate themselves with Russia took the remarkable form of insisting (as the British Ambassador at Constantinople pointed out) that Russian subjects who remained in Turkey during the war, should not only be entitled to remain there undisturbed, but permitted to enjoy all the privileges of the capitulations, this being apparently the German conception of neutrality.

The double game which Décazes was playing was not, however, popular in France. It was felt that his intrigues with Russia tended to throw England into the arms of Germany, and his enemies asserted that he was too fond of speculation to be a thoroughly satisfactory Minister. However, an internal political crisis of an exceptionally important nature in May diverted French attention from all foreign questions for the time being.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Paris, May 16, 1877.

The Marshal has been getting more and more uncomfortable about
M. Jules Simon's giving way in the Chamber of Deputies to the more
advanced Left, and now, as you will have learnt from my telegrams,
he has turned him out. It is believed that if matters came to
extremities, the Marshal will bring out a thoroughly reactionary
Ministry which he has _in petto_. The Duc de Broglie, Prime
Minister, General Ducrot, Minister of War, and so on. This would
necessitate a dissolution, for which the consent of the Senate
would be necessary. But it is very doubtful whether the country is
ripe for anything of the kind, and whether the result might not be
the return of a still more radical Chamber than the present; and
then either the Marshal must retire and hand the Government over to
Gambetta or some one still more advanced in opinion, or make a real
_coup d'état_ by means of the army.

However he will no doubt try to form a Ministry rather more
Conservative than the last and still able to get on somehow with
the present Chamber of Deputies; but this will be difficult.

One of the Marshal's grounds of dissatisfaction with M. Jules
Simon was that he would not, or could not, get from the Chamber
powers which would enable the Government to restrain the press from
attacking Germany in the dangerous manner in which it has written
against that country lately.

The action of the Marshal in turning out Jules Simon, who was supported by a majority in a recently elected Chamber, and replacing him by the Duc de Broglie, who was extremely unpopular, might well be described as a very strong measure. Décazes, who was supposed to be in the plot, remained in office, and there was therefore not much probability of a change in foreign policy; but it was evident that there were now only two real parties in France--the Republicans and the Bonapartists. The possible restoration of the Empire filled with dismay Lord Derby, who considered that the last six years had witnessed a great purification both of public and private life in France, and that if the French were going back to a 'Government of adventurers, adventuresses, and priests,' it would be a grave misfortune for Europe; and he was most anxious to let it be known that there was no sympathy in England for Bonapartist intrigues.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Paris, May 18, 1877.

There are of course among the Right, many who, wisely or
unwisely, rejoice that Marshal MacMahon has broken with the Left,
but there is hardly any one who does not think the moment ill
chosen, the reasons assigned insufficient, and the mode adopted
unskilful. Décazes is represented, or misrepresented, as having
been at the bottom of the whole thing.

He came up to me last night, and asked if I had not something
to say to him about the sentiments he had expressed to me with
regard to the dangers to English interests in Western Europe. He
also expressed anxiety to know how the question of the wine duties
was getting on in England. He is, I suppose, anxious to have
something to show that he is successful in cultivating intimate
relations with England.

While he seems so desirous of frightening us about Holland,
he shows no inclination to admit that we have any interests at
all in the East. In fact his plan seems to be to involve us in a
quarrel with Germany, while he keeps safely aloof: to curry favour
with Russia by taking to himself the credit of keeping our forces
out of the East; to prevent any increase of our power in the
Mediterranean, and to be well with us, but, if possible, better
still with Russia. Still, on the whole, I am glad he remains in.
I should not have been sorry to have Broglie himself as Minister
for Foreign Affairs, but we might have a much more embarrassing
Minister than Décazes, and he is easy going and conciliatory in
most matters. Only we must not be surprised if he repeats to
Russia, and Russia repeats to Germany, anything likely to impair
our relations with Germany.

The other Ministers would almost seem to have been chosen
for the express purpose of defying the majority of the Chamber.
Broglie, of whom I have a high opinion, is especially unpopular.
I suppose the notion has been to put as far as possible
representatives of all shades of the Right into the Cabinet, in
order to be able to form a coalition strong enough to obtain a vote
in the Senate for dissolution. It is not certain that such a vote
could be carried, the Conservative majority in the Senate being
only 2 or 3 on ordinary occasions.

Décazes took advantage of the occasion actually to suggest a secret alliance with England for the protection of Holland and Belgium, and stated that if it were ever signed, he should communicate to no single person except the Marshal himself. It is hardly credible that he could have been in earnest in making this suggestion, for not only are Foreign Secretaries not in the habit of making secret treaties unknown to their chiefs and colleagues, but Lord Derby was the last person who would be likely to enter into an enterprise of this description. In the meanwhile Bismarck, as an impartial friend, was warning Lord Odo Russell that Décazes was only waiting for an opportunity to throw England over, in order to prove his devotion to Russia, and there was little doubt as to which alliance he would prefer if he could have his choice.

Exercising his right, Marshal MacMahon prorogued the Chambers, and it being foreseen that there would be a general election in the autumn, his Government set to work at once in preparing for the fight by getting rid of as many Republican functionaries as possible, in accordance with well-established custom.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Paris, May 25, 1877.

Neither the private history of the dismissal of Jules Simon,
nor the attitude of the successful party, is calculated to give one
good hope for the future.

The Marshal is supposed to have been mainly influenced by M.
de St. Paul, a Bonapartist and intimate friend of his, of whom
he sees a great deal; by Monsignor Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans;
by the aides-de-camp and people about him, and (it is whispered)
by Madame la Maréchale. Fourtou may have been in the plot, but I
believe Broglie was taken by surprise. Décazes wanted to get rid
of Jules Simon and Martel, but to put temporarily in their places
some members of the Left, who would have got on for a time with
the Chamber. Jules Simon had proved a complete failure as Prime
Minister; he had neither the confidence of the Marshal nor even
that of the Cabinet, and he had lost all influence in the Chamber.
He would very soon have fallen of himself if he had been left alone.

The language of the Right tends to accredit the supposition
which will be most fatal to them in the country. They speak and
act as if the question was one between the aristocracy and the
canaille. In fact they wound the sentiment of equality which is
the strongest political and social sentiment in France, and
consequently the present crisis is beginning to be looked upon as
the last struggle of the old society against the new.

As regards the great question as to what is to be done when
the Marshal finds himself finally defeated by the Chamber, the
party now triumphant talk of the use of military force. The Marshal
has often declared to his friends that nothing shall induce him to
resort to an extralegal use of force, but the wilder spirits of the
party say that if the Marshal will not use the army, a general will
be found with less scruple, and they hint at Ducrot. But this would
be falling into the most fatal of all systems, that of military
_pronunciamentos_. The Marshal himself might do a great deal with
the army, and would probably keep it together, but it does not
by any means follow that any one general seizing power in Paris
would be submitted to by the rest. It is believed that even now,
General Berthaut, the Minister of War, was with difficulty induced
to remain in office, and yielded only to the Marshal's special
request, on condition that he should be relieved in the autumn.

It is however to be hoped that all this talk about military
_coups d'état_ is simply talk; and that we shall get out of this
difficulty quietly at last. In the meantime the upper ten thousand
in Paris are indulging themselves in all sorts of illusions, and
the Paris shopkeepers are dreaming of the restoration of a Court
and of a great expenditure on luxuries.

The Chambers met again in June, and although the country was perfectly quiet, the scenes which took place in the Chamber of Deputies were a sufficient indication of the fury with which the politicians regarded each other. The violent and disorderly conduct was chiefly on the side of the Right, there being a certain number of Bonapartists who provoked disturbances with the object of discrediting Parliamentary Government as much as possible.

On the other hand even the moderate men on the Left began to talk of revolutionary measures to be adopted when they got back into power again, such as the suspension of the irremovability of judges, the impeachment of Ministers, and the dissolution of religious congregations. On June 22, the dissolution was voted by the Senate by a majority of twenty. It was decided that the elections should be held in three months' time, and both parties made their preparations for an uncompromising fight, Marshal MacMahon beginning the campaign with an order of the day to the army which smacked disagreeably of a _coup d'état_, not to say a _pronunciamento_. Subsequently, having been assured of the support of the Comte de Chambord--a somewhat questionable advantage--he proceeded on an electoral tour in the South.

The general election took place in October, and resulted in the crushing defeat of the Marshal and his Ministers in spite of the labours of prefects, magistrates, mayors, policemen, and priests, who had all been temporarily converted into electioneering agents. The exasperation of parties reached an almost unprecedented point, and Décazes admitted that the country was in a state of moral civil war. The partisans of the Government talked of a second dissolution, of proclaiming a state of siege during the new elections and conducting them with even more administrative vigour than the last. The Republicans announced their determination to annul the elections of all the official candidates and to impeach the Ministers and even the Marshal himself, if he did not retire or name a Ministry having their confidence. As for the Marshal himself, he found little support at this crisis from the monarchical parties, except on the part of the Orleanists, who saw that he must be kept in at all hazards; but the Orleanists had recognized that France, for the moment at least, was Republican, and their press owned openly that to persist in Personal Government instead of reverting to Constitutional Government was to march to certain disaster. The Marshal, in fact, found himself confronted with two alternatives: either he must accept Gambetta's demand to submit or resign; or he must run the risk of getting rid of his difficulties by means of a _coup d'état_.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Paris, Oct. 26, 1877.

The prospect does not grow clearer, though I see, or at all
events like to fancy I see, a cooling down of the fury which
prevailed a week ago.

The Marshal is supposed to be a man of one idea, and his one
idea at the present moment is said to be that he is bound to remain
at his post.

This idea might lead him to name a Ministry from the majority,
but then he would have to dismiss all the Fourtou prefects, whom he
solemnly promised to stand by.

On the other hand, the idea might carry him on to a _coup
d'état_.

The plan devised by his opponents, and indeed by some of his
friends, for getting him out of the scrape, is that the Senate
should refuse to support him in extreme measures, and that he
should then declare (which would indeed be true) that he had never
promised to stay in opposition to both branches of the Legislature.

Communications which have been going on between the Elysée
and the Duc d'Audiffret Pasquier, the President of the Senate, are
said to have shown that the Senate cannot be depended upon either
to vote a second dissolution, or to carry on the Government in
conjunction with the Marshal, and without the Chamber of Deputies.

I register as rumours, strongly requiring confirmation, that
the Marshal has summoned the Chasseurs d'Afrique to reinforce the
garrison of Paris; that in consequence of disagreements between
Grévy and Gambetta, the Republicans offer the Presidency of the
Republic to General Chanzy, the Governor-General of Algeria; that
the more moderate Liberals have hopes of bringing in the Duc
d'Aumale as President, if MacMahon should actually retire.

As the population is disarmed and there is no National Guard,
there can be no need to increase the numbers of the garrison of
Paris. If any fresh troops were really brought up, it would be from
mistrust of the spirit of those already here.

Gambetta must have departed very far from his usual political
tact, if he has set up claims in opposition to Grévy. Grévy would
be quite alarming enough, and to establish the doctrine that the
President must be a general would bring France to the level of a
South American Republic.

It would be a curious result of an election, in which the
Orleans or Right Centre Party has met with a signal defeat, that an
Orleans Prince should be placed at the head of the State.

The proper course for the Marshal to have adopted was to have accepted the position of a Constitutional President; to have appointed a Ministry which would have obtained a majority in the Chamber; and to have restrained it from excesses by the exercise of his legitimate authority, and by means of the power of the Senate. Instead of this, however, he first attempted to form a Ministry of the same colour as the old one; then tried to meet the Chamber with his old Ministers, and finally fell back upon perfectly unknown people who carried no weight at all, and who professed to represent no party. To this Ministry the Chamber refused to pay any attention, and after many threats in the Elysée organs to violate all laws; to collect and spend money without the sanction of Parliament, to suppress newspapers, and to proclaim a state of siege, the Marshal surrendered ignominiously in December, and accepted a Ministry in which M. Dufaure was President of the Council, and M. Waddington, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Thus, what should have been a natural and proper consequence of the elections was converted into an humiliating defeat, and there had been such a series of solemn declarations, none of them adhered to, that all confidence in the Marshal had disappeared. Of the more important members of the new Government, M. Dufaure was a lawyer with Conservative leanings. M. Waddington, who had been educated at Rugby and Cambridge, was intimate with Lord Lyons and the Embassy generally, but it was doubtful whether his connection with England would prove an advantage, as he might find it necessary to demonstrate that he was not too English. M. Léon Say, the Minister of Finance, was supposed to be a Free Trader; and M. de Freycinet, who was destined to take part in many subsequent administrations, had been Gambetta's Under-Secretary of State for War, and was looked upon as Gambetta's representative in the Cabinet.

On December 17, MacMahon gave Lord Lyons his version of the history of the crisis.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Dec. 18, 1877.

I went to the weekly evening party at the Elysée last
Saturday. The Marshal took me aside, saying: 'I want to tell you
why I did it.' He proceeded to tell me that he had been led to
remain in office and make a Parliamentary Ministry, by a warning he
had received from abroad that if he retired, or if he established
a clerical Ministry, war would be the inevitable consequence.

So far the Marshal: what follows may be mere gossip.

On the afternoon of December 12, the Marshal had quite
determined _d'aller jusqu'au bout_; either to obtain from the
Senate a dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, or to give in his
resignation. He was in consultation with General Rochebouet, who
was at the time Prime Minister, about drawing up a message in this
sense, when a letter was brought in, the bearer of which sent in
a message begging that the Marshal would receive him at once. The
letter was either written by the German Emperor, or at all events
it convinced the Marshal that the bearer was sent to give him a
message direct from His Imperial Majesty. The Marshal accordingly
received him alone, and he said he was a Prussian officer who had
been sent by the Emperor to entreat the Marshal to remain at the
head of the Republic, at all risks, and on any conditions; and
not to establish a Government which could be represented as being
clerical. The message is said to have represented that the Emperor
himself was most anxious for peace, but that he should not be able
to restrain 'other people,' if a clerical or a radical Government
were allowed to be established in France.

This sounds so like gossip that I should hardly have thought
it worth while to repeat it, if it had not tallied rather curiously
with the statement the Marshal himself volunteered to make to me
about his motives.

The 'other people' are supposed to be neither more nor
less than one other person--Prince Bismarck--and the message is
represented as having been sent by the Emperor William without the
knowledge of the Chancellor, or of the German Ambassador here.

Prince Bismarck's enemies, and they are of course numerous
enough here, like to argue from appearances that he has quite lost
the confidence of the Emperor, and some of them, who profess to
have peculiar means of obtaining information, say that he made
three conditions with the Emperor, as those on which alone he could
continue to serve him. 1st, that he should have _carte blanche_ in
the Government; 2nd, that the Empress should reside at Coblentz
or Baden rather than at Berlin; and 3rd, that certain people, of
whom he gave a list, should be removed from Court. As a natural
consequence, Bismarck's illness is attributed to his not having
obtained the consent of his Imperial Master to his conditions; and
it is said that he will not recover until his terms are complied
with. This story of the conditions appears to me to be a very
outrageous one, and I am quite unable to say whether there is any
admixture of truth in it. Those who recount it, love to draw from
it prognostications of the fall of the Great Chancellor.

Whether the story of the Marshal's mysterious visitor was true or not, his defeat marked a decisive epoch in French internal politics; the Republic was now firmly established and cannot be said to have been in any dangers since, unless the vagaries of the impostor Boulanger be excepted.

Ever since the beginning of the war between Russia and Turkey, Lord Derby had continually asserted that it was practically no concern of ours, and that he was quite determined not to be drawn into any intervention whatsoever. But as the Turkish resistance collapsed, and as it became more and more evident that there was nothing to prevent the Russians from exacting any terms they chose, unless some form of intervention took place, Her Majesty's Government decided to call Parliament together. Lord Derby was anxious to explain that this action had no sinister significance.

* * * * *

_Lord Derby to Lord Lyons._

Dec. 21, 1877.

You are not unlikely to be asked the meaning of Parliament
being called together earlier than usual. The explanation is
simple. We see a growing excitement on the question of the war; we
are menaced by an agitation friendly but troublesome, having for
object to drive us into war, and with a counter movement on the
other side. We think that much useless talk will be stopped; the
real opinion of the country be tested, and the Ministry relieved
from the annoyance of perpetual criticism which it cannot reply
to, if every peer and M.P. can say what he has got to say at
Westminster, rather than at a county dinner or borough meeting.

Those who have confidence in us will not be sorry to hear our
views explained by ourselves; those who have not, will have no
further opportunity of talking mysteriously about the country being
committed to this, that, or the other, without Parliament having a
voice in the matter. For it is clear that if we meant to act on our
own responsibility, and leave Parliament no choice except to ratify
or to condemn what we had done, we should not shorten by one-half
the interval that remains during which only such action is possible.

It is possible that there may be in France some renewal of
suspicions as to English designs on Egypt. If so, you may dispel
them by the most decided language you can use. We want nothing and
will take nothing from Egypt except what we have already, and what
other Powers share equally with us. We shall continue to work in
harmony with the French, and hope and expect the same from them.

Lord Derby was the most cautious and unenterprising of men, and he already perhaps felt some suspicions as to the soundness of his colleagues in the Cabinet; but the assurance to be given to the French Government with regard to Egypt seems, on the face of it, somewhat gratuitous, if not rash. The situation in Turkey might have resulted in our being forced to go to Egypt at short notice, and only five years later he, Lord Derby, found himself a member of a Liberal Government which had been forced to adopt that very course.

When the British Parliament met in January, the war was already practically ended, and the commissioners were treating for an armistice and for the preliminaries of peace. The Queen's Speech announced that although neither the Russians nor the Turks had infringed the conditions on which the neutrality of England depended, it might be necessary to ask for money and to take precautions, and on January 23, the Mediterranean fleet was ordered to pass the Dardanelles and to proceed to Constantinople. This action brought about the resignation of both Lord Derby and Lord Carnarvon, but upon the countermanding of the order to the fleet, Lord Derby resumed office. On January 28, the basis of the peace negotiations having been communicated, the Government asked for a vote of six millions, and in consequence of alarming intelligence, received from Mr. Layard the British Ambassador at Constantinople, the fleet was again ordered definitely to proceed to that city. Political excitement reached its climax, and light-hearted Jingoes, quite incapable of realizing the inadequacy of British military resources, proclaimed their readiness to fight any possible adversary.