Chapter XVII: The Last Year's Work (2)

Sir Henry Drummond Wolff was at this time at Constantinople endeavouring to negotiate the Convention with regard to the evacuation of Egypt, and the French and Russian Embassies were actively engaged in the senseless opposition which eventually prevented the ratification of the Convention. The above letter from Lord Salisbury is an additional proof of the honest desire of the British Government to carry out the rash undertakings which had been given in the past.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, Feb. 25, 1887.

The general feeling here seems to be that war has been
escaped, but still there is a good deal of discontent against the
foreign policy of the Goblet Cabinet. It seems to be considered
that the understanding between Italy, Austria, and Germany is as
good as made, and that the result of it will be to put an end to
any fear of war between Russia and Austria. On the other hand, it
is thought that Russia will feel it too necessary to watch Germany
for it to be prudent of her to make an alliance with France, while
without the alliance of Russia, France of course cannot face
Germany, particularly as she has almost hostility to expect from
Italy and no great sympathy to look for from England. The policy
which has thus isolated France from the other Powers is seen to
have been a mistake, and there seems to be a disposition to throw
the blame on the Goblet Ministry. If the Goblet Ministry should
fall, it is not improbable that the new Government might take
the line of being conciliatory to the neighbouring countries and
to Italy and England in particular. I am not very sanguine about
this, but if in the meantime no irritating questions come to excite
public opinion against us, there may possibly be a chance that
a change of Ministry here would make our relations with France
smoother.

My hopes that a change towards England may be in contemplation
have perhaps been strengthened by a visit which I have just had
from a person wholly unconnected with the French Ministry who
evidently came to ascertain what were the particular points with
regard to which the relations between France and England might be
improved. I said that instead of thwarting us in our endeavours
to improve the condition of Egypt and put it in a state to stand
alone, the French might help us; and they could not expect
comfortable relations with us if they endeavoured to stir up other
Powers to make difficulties with us about Egypt. I mentioned also
the New Hebrides question, which most certainly ought and might
be settled at once. I alluded also to those various matters all
over the world which might be treated in a cordial and not in an
antagonistic spirit.

P.S.--I have strong reasons for thinking it very important
that Waddington should not have the least inkling of my having had
the above interview, or any communication of the kind.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

Feb. 26, 1887.

I will not mention to Waddington the interview which you have
had as to English grounds of complaint. I have not seen him for ten
days: he must have taken huff at something.

I think, as the French are coming to their senses, it might be
well to mention unofficially to Flourens that I am quite ready to
resume the negotiations about the Suez Canal; and that I have good
hope of bringing it to a successful issue, but that I am hindered
by the flag that is floating at Dongorita, and by the delay of the
French in performing their promises as regards the New Hebrides. We
are being a good deal reproached here, on account of our apparent
submission to this breach of faith. If these two matters are
corrected, I shall find it possible, and shall be very glad to
renew the Suez Canal discussion either at Paris or here.

I have seen Karolyi to-day--an unusual occurrence--and for the
first time have had the admission from him that a war with Russia
was not an impossible contingency.

The Russians are very quiet; and the negotiations about
Bulgaria do not really advance a bit.

M. Flourens, in spite of his complete inexperience, seems to have realized the simple fact that it was not advisable to quarrel with England just at the moment when relations with Germany were in a critical condition; but unhappily the public did not appear to be in an accommodating mood. The statements published in the English press respecting the Drummond Wolff mission had caused great irritation, and what was perhaps more serious, had alarmed the French again about the security of the coupons. As long as they felt sure that the coupons would be paid regularly, and that there was no fear of future reduction, they were reasonably patient, unless some specially severe blow, such as a reduction of the numbers and salaries of French officials, as compared with English, was struck at their _amour propre_. Now, however, they were beset with the fear that, under what they considered to be English mismanagement, they were about to lose their money as well as their influence.

In March the Goblet Ministry was already in difficulties, and it was believed that Freycinet was likely to return to power, although what the precise advantages were of these continual changes, no one was capable of explaining.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

March 8, 1887.

By taking credit to himself at the expense of his
predecessors, in the interpellation yesterday, Goblet has stirred
up the bile of a large party in the Chamber, and the determination
to turn his Cabinet out, if possible, has revived with fresh
vigour. It is supposed that the attempts will be made as soon as
the Corn Duties Bill is disposed of. It seems to be thought that,
if it succeeds, Freycinet must be Prime Minister; but there appears
to be a strong feeling against his having the Foreign Office again.
He is thought to have got France into uncomfortable relations with
many of his neighbours. In the treatment of the Egyptian question
he is believed to have sacrificed cordiality with England to a
desire to regain the popularity he had lost by the policy which
led to England's occupying her present position in Egypt; while
his attempt to get up an opposition to England on the part of the
European Powers and his worrying way of dealing himself with the
British Government about Egypt, are thought simply to have excited
public opinion on both sides of the Channel and to have provoked
ill will, without in the least improving the position of France.
There can be no doubt that Freycinet looked upon a success with
regard to Egypt as a personal necessity for himself, and was much
influenced in his policy towards England by this feeling.

It is apprehended that unless the _prestige_ of Boulanger is
put on high again by strong language from Germany, there will be no
difficulty in obtaining, as a matter of course, his fall, with the
rest of the Cabinet of which he is a part. M. Grévy is believed to
be very anxious to be rid of him.

I hear on good authority that the Russians have been trying
again, though without success, to come to a special understanding
with the French Government.

To say that M. Grévy was very anxious to be rid of Boulanger was probably an understatement, for he could not conceivably have desired anything so ardently. But the 'Music Hall St. Arnaud' was by no means at the end of his tether, and had contrived to advertise himself by egregious conduct with regard to the Army Committee of the Chamber of Deputies. That Committee had drawn up a military Bill, based upon three years' service, and Boulanger, on the pretext that it was 'not sufficiently faithful to democratic principles,' had, without consulting any of his colleagues, written a letter condemning the provisions of the bill and proposing something quite different. This letter was thoughtfully communicated to the press before it reached the Committee, and the outraged members of the Committee as well as his colleagues were at last goaded into resistance. The Chamber condemned the attitude of the General towards the sacrosanct representatives of the nation; the General himself beat a hasty and prudent retreat under cover of an apology; the Moderate Republicans denounced him as a would-be dictator, and the Ultra-Radicals accused him of cowardice in consequence of his apology. Most men under the circumstances would have felt disposed to resign office, but in the case of Boulanger it was probably immaterial to him whether he was blamed or praised, so long as he could keep his name before the public.

It was, and probably is still, a regulation in the British Diplomatic Service, that its members should retire at the age of seventy, and, as a rule, an Ambassador who had attained that age, usually considered himself fit to discharge his duties for a further period. Lord Lyons, however, was an exception. His seventieth birthday fell due in April, and a month beforehand he wrote to announce that he wished to resign.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, March 22, 1887.

Towards the end of the next month, the time will come when
I shall be superannuated, and I feel very strongly that it will
not come too soon. It will not be without a pang that I shall
find myself no longer a diplomatic servant of the Queen, who has
ever received my endeavours to obtain her approval with the most
generous indulgence. But the labour and responsibility of this post
are becoming too much for me, and I shall be anxious to be relieved
from them when the time fixed by the regulations arrives.

I need not assure you that I shall much regret the termination
of the official connexion with you from which I have derived so
much satisfaction.

It may not unfairly be presumed that resignations of important official posts are habitually welcomed by Governments, as they not only remedy stagnation in the public service, but frequently provide opportunities for political patronage. It is plain, however, that the prospect of losing Lord Lyons was looked upon by Lord Salisbury as a genuine misfortune, and he did his best to induce him to reconsider his decision.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

March 26, 1887.

I have considered your letter of the 22nd, stating that you
felt very strongly that the time of your superannuation would not
come too soon; and though it was a matter of very deep regret to me
to receive such an announcement from you, it was not altogether a
matter of surprise; for I remembered the language you had used to
me when I tried to induce you to join us as Foreign Secretary last
July.

The loss which the Diplomatic Service will suffer by your
retirement will be profound, and, for the time, hardly possible to
repair. Your presence at Paris gave to the public mind a sense of
security which was the result of a long experience of your powers,
and which no one else is in a position to inspire.

In face of the expressions in your letter I feel as if I were
almost presuming in suggesting any alternative course of action.
But it struck me that possibly you might be willing to make your
official career terminate with the end of your current appointment,
rather than with the precise date of superannuation. The effect of
this would be to prolong your stay at Paris till next December.

My reasons from a public point of view will, I hope, strike
you at once. We are passing through a very anxious European crisis.
If any fateful decisions are taken this year, it will be within the
next three or four months. It will add very much to our anxiety to
know that the reins at Paris are in new hands, which have never
held them before. This mere fact may even be an element of danger.
The avalanche hangs so loosely, that any additional sensation or
uneasiness may displace it. If we could avoid a change till the
winter it would be a great public advantage, even if the change
should be inevitable.

I hope you will forgive me for having pressed this on you in
the interests of the public service. Whatever your decision may be,
I give you the warmest thanks for the kind and loyal support which
you have always given to the policy which it has been my duty to
carry out.

An appeal of this kind from an official chief could not well be disregarded, setting aside the fact that but few officials can have experienced the compliment of being assured that their continued service was essential to the peace of Europe. With well justified misgivings, Lord Lyons therefore consented to remain on until the end of the year, knowing perfectly well that his physical energies were on the point of exhaustion.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, March 29, 1887.

I am deeply touched by your letter of the 26th, and I feel
that, after what you say in it, I should be extremely ungrateful if
I were not ready to sacrifice a great deal to meet your views.

For my own part I feel that the work and responsibility here
are an increasing strain both upon my mind and upon my bodily
health, and I am beset with misgivings lest, even in ordinary
times, I may be unable to discharge my duties with energy and
efficiency, and lest, in an emergency calling for much labour,
I may break down altogether. This being the case, it would
undoubtedly be a great relief and comfort to me to retire on
becoming superannuated towards the end of next month.

Begging you to take the misgivings into full consideration,
and to be sure that they have not been conceived without good
reason, and that they are strongly and very seriously felt by
me, I place myself in your hands. If after giving full weight to
them, you still think that it would be a satisfaction to you that
I should continue to hold this post till the winter, and that it
would be a great public advantage to avoid a change till that time,
I am ready to stay on, and trusting to your indulgence to do my
best.

I should, of course, look upon it as quite settled that in any
case I should retire at latest when my current appointment comes to
an end at the close of the present year.

If you wish me to hold on, I must ask you what, if any,
announcement respecting my retirement should be made. Up to this
time I have simply stated to people who have questioned me,
that nothing was definitely settled. I did not mention to any
one my intention to write my letter of the 22nd expressing to
you my wish to retire, nor have I made any one acquainted with
my having written it, except of course Sheffield, who, as my
private secretary, made a copy of it for me to keep. The question,
therefore, as to announcing my retirement remains intact.

I cannot conclude without once more saying how much I am
gratified by the appreciation of my services expressed in your
letter, and how truly I feel the kindness shown by it.

The offer was accepted by Lord Salisbury in singularly flattering terms, Queen Victoria also expressing much satisfaction at the consent of the Ambassador to remain at his post. From Lord Salisbury's language, it might be inferred that he was in some doubt as to whether his own tenure of office was likely to be prolonged.

I have had no hesitation in availing myself of your kind
consent--though you seemed to doubt whether on reflection I should
do so. Of course I fully understand that you do not feel equal to
the amount of exertion which you would take in a more favourable
condition of health. But this circumstance will not detract
from the great value of your counsel and judgment, nor from the
authority which by so many years of experience you have acquired.

I quite understand that towards the close of the session of
Parliament you will require the holiday you have been accustomed
to take in recent years. I hope also to get to a bath at that
time--whether I am in office or not.

Why Lord Salisbury should have spoken so doubtfully is not clear, unless instinct warned him of Miss Cass, who was the first to strike a blow at the Unionist administration. At the end of March there reappeared the mysterious emissary who has been already mentioned. There are no means of actually establishing his identity, but there can be little doubt that it was M. de Chaudordy, who represented the French Foreign Office at Tours and Bordeaux during the war. M. de Chaudordy had made friends with Lord Salisbury at the time of the Constantinople Conference in 1876, and he was, therefore, a suitable person to utilize for the purpose of making advances towards a better understanding between the two Governments.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, March 29, 1887.

In a private letter which I wrote to you on the 25th of last
month, I mentioned that I had received a visit from a person wholly
unconnected officially with the French Government, who appeared to
have come to ascertain what were the particular points with regard
to which the relations between the English and French Governments
might be improved. The same person has been to me again to-day,
and has only just left me. This time he did not conceal that it
was after being in communication with Flourens that he came. He
enlarged on the embarrassing and indeed dangerous position in which
France was placed by the adherence of Italy to the Austro-German
Alliance, and said that M. Flourens was ready to make almost any
sacrifice to secure the good will of England. I said that there
could be no great difficulty in this, if only France would abstain
from irritating opposition to us, and would settle promptly and
satisfactorily outstanding questions. My visitor answered that
Flourens conceived that he had sent conciliatory instructions
to Waddington which would settle these questions, and that both
Waddington and Florian[46] (who had come on leave) reported that
there was decidedly a _détente_ in the strain which had existed in
the Anglo-French relations. I said that I was delighted to hear it,
and that it showed how ready you were to welcome all conciliatory
overtures. My friend seemed on this occasion, as on the last, to
wish me to tell him some special thing which Flourens might do
to please you. I said that I should at any rate mention a thing
which he might do to avoid displeasing you. He might prevent the
French setting up an opposition to financial proposals in Egypt in
cases in which all the other Powers were ready to agree. My friend
spoke of Flourens's readiness to give to Russia on the Bulgarian
question advice which you might suggest, and he mentioned various
things which he thought M. Flourens might be ready to do to please
England. These things appeared to me to be rather too grand and
too vague in character to be very practical. I said, however, that
I would always bear in mind what he had told me of M. Flourens's
good dispositions, and would speak frankly and unreservedly to the
Minister whenever I could make a suggestion as to the means of
acting upon those dispositions in a manner to be satisfactory to
England.

The conclusions I drew from the conversation of Flourens's
friend were that the French are horribly afraid of our being led
to join the Italo-Austro-German Alliance, and that they have been
urged by Russia to exert themselves to prevent this. I do not
conceive that the French expect to induce us to join them against
the Germans and the German Alliance. What they want is to feel sure
that we shall not join the others against France and Russia.

It is somewhat curious that M. Flourens, who was evidently desirous of establishing better relations with England, should have selected an unofficial person for communication, rather than approach the Ambassador himself; but perhaps, being quite ignorant of diplomatic usage, he considered it necessary to shroud his action in mystery. The Triple Alliance dated in reality from 1882, Italy having joined the Austro-German Alliance in that year; but a new Treaty had been signed in the month of February, 1887, and caused the French to feel a well-justified alarm. In fact, their position was anything but a happy one, for it was generally believed that the Emperor Alexander III. had resolved, since the abortive attempt on his life, that he would never ally himself with Revolutionists, and that he considered the French to be arch-Revolutionists. Perhaps this belief may have accounted in some measure for Flourens's amiable professions towards England.

In the month of April there occurred one of those incidents which are the despair of peaceably minded politicians and the delight of sensational journalism and of adventurers of the Boulanger type. A certain M. Schnaebelé, a French Commissaire de Police, was induced to cross the German frontier, and thereupon was arrested and imprisoned. The act had the appearance of provocation and naturally caused a prodigious uproar in France; Flourens endeavouring to settle the matter diplomatically and Boulanger seizing the opportunity to display patriotic truculence.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, April 26, 1887.

So far as one can judge at present the French are irritated
beyond measure by the arrest at Pagny, but generally they still
shrink from war. It will not, I conceive, be difficult for
Bismarck to keep at peace with them, if he really wishes to do so.
The danger is that they are persuaded that he is only looking out
for a pretext, and that however much they may now give way, he will
be bent upon humiliating them till they _must_ resent and resist.
I don't see that so far the German Government have treated the
Pagny affair as if they wished to make a quarrel of it. The German
_Chargé d'Affaires_ has taken many messages from Berlin to Flourens
in the sense that if Schnaebelé shall prove to have been arrested
on German soil, all satisfaction shall be given. But, then, in the
Press of the two countries a controversy is raging as to which side
of the frontier he was arrested on, and as to whether or no he was
inveigled over the frontier.

The French undoubtedly shrink from war, but they do not
shrink from it as much as they did ten years ago; and if the press
should get up a loud popular cry, there is no Government strength
to resist it. I conceive that at this moment the Government is
pacific, and that it does not believe the army to be yet ready.
But if, as is no doubt the case, the Germans also believe that the
French army is not as ready now as it will be two or three years
hence, they may be impatient to begin. In the mean time, so far
as I can make out, the Pagny affair is being treated by the two
Governments with each other, in correct form diplomatically, and
without any apparent willingness to embitter matters. I cannot say
as much for the press on either side, though there are symptoms of
prudence and caution in the moderate French papers.

The Schnaebelé incident was disposed of by his release from prison and transfer to another post at Lyons; but the agitation did not subside readily, and a bill brought in by Boulanger to mobilize an army corps caused much disquietude at the German Embassy. It was now generally known that Bismarck considered Boulanger a danger and desired his removal from the War Office; but the very knowledge of this feeling and the support accorded to him by the League of Patriots and other noisy organizations rendered this step all the more difficult.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, May 13, 1887.

I have not heard of any new incident between France and
Germany, but the suspicion and susceptibility with which the two
nations, and indeed the two Governments, regard each other, are
certainly not diminishing.

In France home politics are in so peculiar a state as to be
positively disquieting. The Budget Committee and the Ministry have
come to an open breach, and the Committee intend to propose to
the Chamber a resolution which apparently must, if carried, turn
out the Goblet Cabinet. This the Chamber would be willing enough
to do, if it could see its way to forming another Government. The
plan would be to form a Ministry with Freycinet as Prime Minister,
but not as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and without Boulanger.
But then they are afraid to try and upset Boulanger, while they
feel that to form a new Government and put Boulanger in it would
be, or might be, taken in Germany as a plain indication that they
are warlike at heart. It is an emergency in which the Chief of
the State should exert himself; but Grévy's caution has become
something very like lethargy. In the mean time they are letting
Boulanger grow up into a personage whose position may be a danger
to the Republic at home, even if it does not embroil the country
in a foreign war. The redeeming point in all this is that the
Government does seem to feel that it would not do to be upon bad
terms with England, and that it would be wise to be conciliatory
toward us.

The Goblet Ministry soon found itself in hopeless difficulty over the Budget, and it was plain that another aimless change of men was inevitable. Goblet's Government had lasted for five months (inclusive of a prolonged recess), and the real question of interest was whether Boulanger was to be a member of the new Government or not. If he was included in it, it was apprehended that the suspicions of Germany would be aggravated; and on the other hand, it was doubtful whether any Government could be formed without him. An ultra-patriotic demonstration in Paris against German music, in the shape of Wagner's operas, was eloquent of the state of feeling between the two nations at the time, and the Government found that the only course open to them was to close the theatre where the obnoxious productions were to have appeared.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, May 20, 1887.

Freycinet appears to have agreed with Grévy to try and form a
Cabinet and to be hard at work at the task. Of course the question
is whether Boulanger is or is not to be in the new Cabinet? It was
believed this morning that Grévy and Freycinet had decided upon
offering to keep him as Minister of War. As the day has gone on,
however, the belief has gained ground that Freycinet has not found
colleagues willing to run the risk of war which the maintenance
of Boulanger would produce, and that he is to propose to Grévy a
Cabinet from which Boulanger is to be excluded. He is, however,
to make it an essential condition with Grévy that he is to have
the power to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies in his hands, as
without this power he does not feel able to form a Cabinet without
Boulanger, or indeed any Cabinet at all. In the mean time the
Reds are getting up in all directions addresses and petitions in
favour of Boulanger, with a view to forcing Grévy's and Freycinet's
hands and working on their fears. If Boulanger is got rid of, the
immediate danger of war will probably be escaped for the moment.
Boulanger's own character, and the position in which he has placed
himself, make him threatening to peace; and the opinion held of him
in Germany and the irritation felt against him there make him still
more dangerous.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, May 24, 1887.

The last news is supposed to be that Floquet, the President
of the Chamber, has undertaken the task of forming a Ministry,
and that he will keep many of the outgoing Ministers, Boulanger
included. The goings and comings at the Elysée; the singular
selections of men to be Prime Ministers, or quasi Prime Ministers,
and the apparent want of firmness and inability to exercise any
influence on the part of the President of the Republic, have
certainly not increased the reputation of M. Grévy. Floquet will,
I suppose, be unacceptable to Russia, for the Russians have always
ostentatiously kept up the show of resentment against him for the
cry, offensive to the Emperor Alexander II., which he raised when
that monarch visited the Palais de Justice during the Exhibition
of 1867. Boulanger has lately declared that he does not want to
continue to be Minister, but that if he is Minister, he will,
whatever Germany may say, continue his mobilization scheme, and not
relax in his preparations to resist an attack from Germany, and to
avert the necessity of submitting to humiliation.

I think, in fact, that things look very bad for France both
at home and abroad. I can only hope that as the phases of the
Ministerial crisis change from hour to hour, you may receive by
telegraph some more satisfactory news before you get this letter.

In course of time a new Ministry was formed under M. Rouvier, and the important fact attaching to it was that Boulanger had been got rid of. Otherwise there was nothing much to distinguish the new Ministers from the old, and they seemed disposed to angle for popularity in the country much in the same way as Freycinet and Goblet.

The object of removing Boulanger had been to reassure and placate Germany, but no sooner had this been done, than the Government appeared to feel alarmed at the danger of incurring unpopularity in the country, and hastily announced that the new Minister of War would continue to follow in the footsteps of his predecessor.

Again, it had been understood that one of the objects of the new Government would be to put an end to the isolation of France by placing itself on more cordial terms with the neighbouring nations and especially with England; but what it appeared anxious to profess, was the intention of stoutly refusing to accept or even acquiesce in the Anglo-Turkish Convention respecting Egypt. All this, as Lord Lyons observed, might proceed in great measure from ignorance and inexperience, and might be mitigated by the knowledge of affairs and sense of responsibility which accompany office, but still it was disquieting: all the more disquieting, because the French Foreign Minister never failed to intimate that France would never be a party to an arrangement which would confer upon England an international right to re-occupy Egypt under certain circumstances after evacuation, whilst France was to be formally excluded from enjoying an equal right.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, July 12, 1887.

Baron Alphonse de Rothschild came to see me this afternoon,
and told me that the last accounts he had received from Berlin
caused him to feel more than usual alarm as to the feelings of
Prince Bismarck and of the Germans in general towards France. They
did not indeed imply that Germany was actually contemplating any
immediate declaration of war, but they did show that in Germany
war with France was regarded as a contingency that could not be
long postponed, and of which the postponement was not desirable
for German interests. The Germans did not seem to be prepared to
incur the opprobrium of Europe by attacking France without having
the appearance of a good reason for doing so, but they did seem to
be looking out impatiently for a plausible pretext for a rupture;
far from being sorry, they would be very glad if France would
furnish them with such a pretext. Prince Bismarck was evidently
not disposed to facilitate the task of M. Rouvier's Government,
notwithstanding the pledges it had given of its desire for peace
abroad, and the efforts it was making to promote moderation at home.

Baron de Rothschild had, he told me, seen M. Rouvier to-day
and made all this known to him. He had pointed out to him the
danger which arose from the sort of coalition against France of
the Powers of Europe, had dwelt on the importance of making almost
any sacrifice to break up this coalition, and had especially urged
the imprudence of allowing coldness, if not ill-will, to subsist
between France and England.

M. Rouvier had expressed an anxious desire to establish
cordial relations with England.

Baron de Rothschild had answered that the time had come
to show this by acts, and had strongly pressed M. Rouvier to
settle without any delay the outstanding questions which produced
irritation between the two countries. M. Rouvier had expressed his
intention to do so, and Baron de Rothschild had reason to believe
that this was also the desire and intention of M. Flourens.

I said that I heard this with great pleasure, and that
I had received with much satisfaction assurances to the same
effect respecting M. Flourens's sentiments, which had come to me
indirectly through various channels. I must, however, confess that
I had not found in M. Flourens himself any disposition to push
assurance to this effect beyond generalities. I had not seen any
strong practical instances of a desire on his part to give a speedy
and satisfactory solution to outstanding questions.

Baron de Rothschild observed that what he had said on this
point to M. Rouvier had appeared to make a considerable impression
on him.

I said that it so happened that I should in all probability
have the means of testing this almost immediately. I had in fact
only yesterday strongly urged M. Flourens to close a question, that
of the New Hebrides, which was creating suspicion and annoyance to
England and causing great inconvenience in consequence of the very
strong feeling about it which prevailed in the colonies. The two
Governments were entirely in accord in principle upon it, and in
fact it was only kept open by the pertinacity with which the French
Government delayed to take the formal step necessary for closing it.

Baron de Rothschild went on to tell me that in speaking of
the relations with England, M. Rouvier alluded to the convention
negotiated by Sir Drummond Wolff at Constantinople, and said that
he did not see why it should produce any lasting disagreement
between France and England. Whether it was ratified or not, France
might be as conciliatory as possible towards England in dealing
with the matter in future. In answer I suppose to a remark from
Baron de Rothschild, M. Rouvier would seem to have said that the
Comte de Montebello[47] appeared to have gone far beyond his
instructions in the language he had used to the Porte.

I asked Baron de Rothschild whether M. Rouvier had also
said that the Comte de Montebello had received any check or
discouragement from the Government at Paris.

Passing on from this, Baron de Rothschild told me that before
concluding the conversation, he had pointed out to M. Rouvier that
the great addition of strength which the Ministry had received
from the vote of the Chamber yesterday, would enable them to act
with more independence and vigour, and that they might now settle
questions with England, and establish good relations with her
without being under the constant fear of a check in the Chamber of
Deputies.

There can be no doubt that, in fact, the position of the
Rouvier Ministry has been immensely strengthened by the large vote
they obtained yesterday on the interpellation put forward against
them on the subject of Monarchical and Clerical intrigues. It is
earnestly to be hoped, for their own sakes, and for the sake of
France, that they will turn it to account in order to pursue a more
reasonable and conciliatory policy towards England, and to take
stronger and more effectual means of preserving order in Paris. The
riot at the Lyons railway station seems to have done Boulangism
harm even among the ultra-Radicals, and to have been the main cause
of Boulanger's having been thrown over by Radical speakers in the
Chamber yesterday. But it is a very dangerous thing to give the
Paris mob its head.

M. Rouvier's friendly assurances with regard to England had, of course, been imparted to the Baron in order that they might be communicated to the British Embassy, but the action of the French Government appeared to have very little in common with them; nor was there any reason to assume that Montebello was exceeding his instructions in opposing at Constantinople the ratification of the Anglo-Turkish Convention with regard to Egypt. The egregious action which forced the Sultan to withhold his consent to the Convention, and thereby perpetuated the British occupation of Egypt, was not the result of the unauthorized proceedings of the French Ambassador, but the consequence of the deliberately considered joint policy of the French and Russian Governments. Incidentally, it may be pointed out that the fruitless attempt to negotiate the Convention was yet another convincing proof of the absolute honesty of British policy with regard to Egypt, and the following letter from Lord Salisbury shows no satisfaction at the frustration of Sir H. Drummond Wolff's mission.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

July 20, 1887.

I am afraid the temper of the French will not make the
settlement of the Egyptian question more easy. I do not now see how
we are to devise any middle terms that will satisfy them. We cannot
leave the Khedive to take his chance of foreign attack, or native
riot. The French refuse to let us exercise the necessary powers
of defence unless we do it by continuing our military occupation.
I see nothing for it but to sit still and drift awhile: a little
further on in the history of Europe the conditions may be changed,
and we may be able to get some agreement arrived at which will
justify evacuation. Till then we must simply refuse to evacuate.
Our relations with France are not pleasant at present. There are
five or six different places where we are at odds:--

1. She has destroyed the Convention at Constantinople.

2. She will allow no Press Law to pass.

3. She is trying to back out of the arrangement on the Somali
coast.

4. She still occupies the New Hebrides.

5. She destroys our fishing tackle, etc.

6. She is trying to elbow us out of at least two
unpronounceable places on the West Coast of Africa.

Can you wonder that there is, to my eyes, a silver lining even
to the great black cloud of a Franco-German War?

On account of the tension existing between France and Germany, and of the agitation produced by the transfer of Boulanger to a command at Clermont-Ferrand, it was feared that the National Fête of July 14 would be marked by serious disturbances; these fears were happily not realized, although Boulanger's departure from Paris a few days earlier had formed the pretext for a display of embarrassing Jingoism. The French Government were so apprehensive of an anti-German demonstration, that, although Count Münster received the usual invitation to attend the Longchamps Review, M. Flourens privately begged him to absent himself, and the two German military attachés, instead of joining the War Minister's Staff in uniform, went to the Diplomatic Tribune in plain clothes.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, July 15, 1887.

The National Fête of yesterday passed off quietly enough.
There are said to have been cries in various places of 'Vive
Boulanger,' and 'À bas Grévy,' but nowhere was there anything which
assumed anything like the proportions of a demonstration. There do
not appear to have been any cries at all in the army.

The low French papers keep up a constant fire of scurrilous
language against the Germans and even against the Germany Embassy.
This sort of thing seems to be taken more seriously and to cause
more irritation in Germany than it would in most countries. Count
Münster naturally enough did not come to the President's stand, to
which he and the other Ambassadors were as usual invited to see
the Review. The German military attachés did not go in uniform
with the staff of the Minister of War, but saw the Review from the
Diplomatic Tribune in plain clothes. In fact, ill will between
France and Germany seems to be on the increase. It looks as if the
Germans would really be glad to find a fair pretext for going to
war with France. On the other hand, Boulangism, which is now the
French term for Jingoism, spreads, especially amongst the reckless
Radicals and enemies of the present Ministry. And even among the
better classes, warlike language and, to some degree, a warlike
spirit grows up with a new generation, which has had no practical
acquaintance with war. Abject fear of the German armies is being
succeeded by overweening confidence in themselves.

The present Ministry seem to have been afraid of unpopularity
if they abandoned altogether Boulanger's absurd mobilization
scheme. The Germans seem to be taking this quietly. Perhaps they
look on with satisfaction at the French incurring an immense
expenditure for an experiment apparently without any practical use
from a military point of view. Perhaps they believe, as many people
do here, that the Chambers will never really vote the money.

It is supposed that the session will be over next week, and I
trust that then you will be disposed to receive an application from
me for leave. I am getting quite knocked up by the Paris summer,
and am in urgent need of rest and country air.

The foregoing letter was one of the last communications received from Lord Lyons at Paris, and his official career practically terminated a few days later, when he left on leave, destined never to return to the post which he had so long occupied, for the unfavourable view which he held with regard to his physical condition was only too completely justified.

He appears to have passed the months of August and September quietly with his near relatives in Sussex. Towards the end of October he must have learnt with some surprise that, whereas in March he had been most urgently begged by Lord Salisbury to remain at his post until the end of the year, a successor to him, in the person of Lord Lytton, had been appointed, and that there was no necessity for him to return to Paris. If he, as would have been the case with most people, really felt aggrieved at this change of circumstances, there is no trace of resentment shown in his correspondence. On the contrary, he warmly welcomed the new appointment, and at once set about making arrangements for his successor's convenience. On November 1, he made a formal application to be permitted to resign his appointment, was created an Earl, and the few remaining letters (the latest bearing the date of November 20) deal with business details, and unostentatious acts of kindness to various persons who had been in his service or otherwise connected with him. The very last of all was a characteristic communication to Sir Edwin Egerton, the Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, respecting the payment of the fire insurance premium on the Embassy.

The close of his life was destined to coincide dramatically with the close of his official career. Intellectually there were no signs of decay; but physically he was even more worn out than he realized himself. On November 28, whilst staying at Norfolk House, he was stricken with paralysis, and a week later he was dead, without having in the meanwhile recovered consciousness. Thus the end came at a moment singularly appropriate to his well ordered existence, and to no one could the time-honoured Latin epitaph have been applied with greater accuracy.

In an earlier portion of this work some attempt has been made to portray Lord Lyons's personality and to explain the causes of his success as a diplomatist, but the best criterion of the man is to be found in his letters, which have been reproduced verbatim, and may be said to constitute a condensed record of the most interesting episodes in English diplomatic history during a space of nearly thirty years. Throughout this long series there is hardly to be found an unnecessary sentence or even a redundant epithet; there is a total absence of any straining after effect, of exaggeration, of personal animosity or predilection, or of any desire to gain his ends by intrigue or trickery. On the other hand, they are marked by profound mastery of detail, sound judgment, inexhaustible patience, an almost inhuman impartiality, and an obviously single-minded desire to do his best for his country as one of its most responsible representatives. Such, then, was the character of the man, and the general public is probably quite unconscious of the inestimable value to the country of officials of this particular type.

It was Lord Lyons's fate twice to represent this country at most critical periods during wars, in the course of which, England, while desiring to observe the strictest neutrality, aroused the bitterest hostility on the part of the belligerents. In spite of untiring efforts he had the mortification of seeing the relations of England, first with the United States and then with France, gradually deteriorate, and never experienced the satisfaction, which no one would have appreciated more highly than himself, of seeing those unfriendly relations converted into the condition which now happily prevails; but it may be fairly said of him that no one ever laboured more assiduously and efficiently to promote peace and good will between England and her neighbours; that he never made either an enemy or apparently a mistake, and that no other diplomatist of his day enjoyed to an equal degree the confidence of his chiefs, and the regard of his subordinates. Overshadowed by more brilliant and interesting personalities, the unobtrusive services of Lord Lyons are unknown to the rising generation, and probably forgotten by many of those who have reached middle age; but in the opinion of the statesman who amongst living Englishmen is the most competent to judge, he was the greatest Ambassador who has represented this country in modern times, and by those whose privilege it was to serve under him, his memory will ever be held in affectionate remembrance.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 44: Lord Salisbury had taken over the Foreign Office upon the death of Lord Iddesleigh on January 12, 1887.]

[Footnote 45: Dongorita. A town on the Somali coast.]

[Footnote 46: Secretary of French Embassy at London.]

[Footnote 47: French Ambassador at Constantinople.]