Chapter XIII: M. Grévy's Presidency (1)

(1878-1879)

The event in 1878 which aroused more interest in France than the Berlin Congress or anything else, was the holding of the great Exhibition in Paris, which not only demonstrated to the world the recovery of France from the disasters of 1870-71, but had the beneficial effect of improving Anglo-French relations. It was universally acknowledged that nothing had contributed more to the success of the Exhibition than the hearty co-operation given from first to last by England, and in this connection the services rendered by the Prince of Wales were of conspicuous value. His Royal Highness had come to Paris early in the year to press forward the preparations of the British section; he was present at each important phase of the Exhibition; he attended unremittingly at the office of the British Royal Commission, and was assiduous in transacting business there with the French Exhibition authorities as well as with the British and Colonial Commissioners and exhibitors. These visible proofs of the Prince's interest in their great undertaking were by no means lost upon the French, and the judgment and tact which he displayed, whenever opportunities arose for impressing upon the French people the cordial feeling entertained by himself and by his country towards France, produced an excellent political effect.

The Exhibition naturally threw upon the Embassy an immense amount of extra labour, consisting largely of social work, and one of the most brilliant social functions of the year was a ball at the British Embassy attended by the Prince and Princess of Wales, at which the various hostile sections of the French political world met, on that occasion only, in temporary harmony.

The general success of the Exhibition and the prominence of English participation inspired Queen Victoria with the desire to pay a very private visit to Paris, accompanied by Princess Beatrice and a small suite, towards the beginning of August. So anxious was she to maintain secrecy that the only person in England to whom her intention was confided, was Lord Beaconsfield, and Lord Lyons was enjoined not to say a word about it to any one, but to inform her confidentially whether she could visit the Exhibition without being mobbed; whether the heat was likely to be intense; and whether there was any danger to be apprehended from Socialists--the term Socialist doubtless including, in the Royal vocabulary, Anarchists, Terrorists, and Revolutionaries in general. Incidentally, too, she expressed a wish to hear the Ambassador's opinion of the Treaty of Berlin.

Lord Lyons answered the first queries satisfactorily, but it was characteristic of him that, even to his sovereign, he declined to commit himself to an opinion on the policy of his official chief. 'Lord Lyons was always of opinion that Your Majesty's Representative at the Congress should be a Cabinet Minister, and he rejoiced very much when he heard that Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury had been appointed. He has no detailed or authentic information of the proceedings of the Congress, but so far as he can judge at present, he has every hope that the results will be satisfactory to Your Majesty.'

A long series of letters followed, and after much hesitation, the Queen finally abandoned her intention, the prospect of hot weather apparently proving to be too great a deterrent. One singular incident in the correspondence, which was conducted with much secrecy, was that a letter from Lord Lyons went all the way to New York before reaching its destination at Balmoral--an error for which some one presumably suffered.

During the autumn and winter of 1878, constant discussions took place between the English and French Governments on the subject of questions connected with Egypt and Tunis, and it was again thought at one time that a French _coup_ was in contemplation as a reply to the Anglo-Turkish Convention. The New Year was signalized by the denunciation of the Commercial Treaty. In announcing this intelligence, Lord Lyons said that his only surprise was that the existing Treaty had lasted so long, and that he did not consider it advisable to make any attempt to conceal annoyance about it. The treaty of 1860 had been made from political motives, and our best chance of being decently treated commercially lay in the dislike of the French to placing themselves on bad terms with us. 'This is the policy Gambetta avows. As for any Free Trade feeling in France, that is absolutely a broken reed for us to lean upon.'

In January, 1879, senatorial elections took place which resulted in large Republican gains, and it seemed probable that the existing Moderate Ministry might not last much longer. It was generally expected that when the Chambers met, there would be a great struggle on the part of the advanced Left for all the lucrative and important posts, and there were the usual fears of mob rule which prevailed whenever a partial or entire change of Ministry was imminent. The prospect of losing Waddington as Foreign Minister drew from Lord Salisbury a characteristic expression of regret: 'I suppose M. Waddington is likely to be a transitory phenomenon, if the papers are to be believed. I am sorry for it; for he suits us much better than some converted Legitimist with an historic name, whose policy I suppose will be a compound of Louis XIV. and 1791.'

Waddington was not to go yet, however, and Lord Lyons complained that he made his life a burden to him in connection with the proceedings of the British Consul General at Tunis--an aged official who did not view the spirited French policy there with any friendly eye, and whose removal the French Government ardently desired. As a general massacre of aged official innocents was contemplated shortly by the British Foreign Office, a somewhat ignominious compromise was offered in the shape of an early retirement of this particular official under an age limit. The French intentions with regard to Tunis had by this time become quite evident, and the unfortunate Bey found it extremely difficult to prevent excuses being found for active intervention in the shape of naval demonstrations and so forth; it being well known that Marshal MacMahon and other military men were extremely eager to annex the country at the first opportunity.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, Jan. 14, 1879.

I should be very sorry to do anything disagreeable to the
French with regard to Tunis. It is the place about which they are
most susceptible at this moment, and the irritation they would feel
at any interference with them there, would overpower, at all events
for the time, all considerations of the general advantages of being
well with England.

When I said that I saw no reason for hiding any displeasure we
might feel at the denunciation of the Commercial Treaties and at
the manner in which it was done, I meant that we should not abstain
from direct expressions of dissatisfaction at the thing itself.

My notion is that if we take it too quietly, the
Protectionists will be able to make the Chambers believe that they
can do what they like about the Tariff, and need not fear any
resentment from England. I think that if it can be managed, it
will be advisable to put it out of the power of the ministers to
say that the denunciation has been well received by the English
Government, and has produced no bad impression upon it. In order to
effect this, I should be glad that something unmistakable on the
point should be said in a written communication. If, as I suppose,
Montebello's[21] answer to your note declares that the intention
is to denounce the Treaties one and all, then the rejoinder which
you must make in order to _prendre acte_ of the denunciation
would afford a natural opportunity of expressing annoyance and
apprehension. This is what was in my mind when I wrote.

There are many members in the Chamber who would deprecate
anything likely to produce coolness between France and England,
and it is not desirable to leave the Protectionists the means
of asserting that there is no danger that a restrictive tariff
would do this. But the feeling is a vague one, and it would be
weakened by endeavours to define it sharply, or to appeal to it too
pointedly.

Gambetta holds that the true policy of France is to cultivate
the friendship of England and not to loosen the tie of France upon
her by instructions injurious to her commerce. He is in particular
very much afraid of the feeling in favour of the Empire which would
be revived in the wine-growing districts, if under the Republic the
English wine duties became less favourable to French wines.

The game of the Protectionists is to put the duties in the
general tariff as high as they dare, without provoking retaliation;
and the general tariff once passed, to declare that it is the
latest expression of the will of the country, and that the
Government has no right to relax it by treaty, unless by way of
barter, in return for great concessions made to France.

In the mean time matters may possibly in some measure
be modified, as regards commercial policy by changes in the
Government, but the modification in this respect would scarcely be
very great.

The 'groups,' as they are called, of the Left have been
endeavouring to get the ministers to negotiate with them before
the Chambers met. They want, now the Chambers have met, to reduce
the Ministers to absolute dependence on Parliamentary Committees.
The Ministers are acting properly and constitutionally. They
decline to be dictated to by groups and committees, and they intend
to announce their programme from the Tribune, and to call for a
vote of confidence or want of confidence, from both Chambers.
Waddington, when I saw him yesterday, was very confident of
success. They have found it necessary to sacrifice the Minister
of War, who, among other defects was entirely inefficient in the
Tribune, but Waddington did not anticipate any other changes in the
Cabinet. He said that Gambetta had promised the Government his full
and cordial support.

To pass from Paris, or rather from Versailles to
Constantinople, I will give you for what it may be worth, a story
which has been brought to the Embassy by a person who has sometimes
shown himself to be well informed with regard to what is passing
at the Porte. He affirms that a compact has been made between
Khaireddin and Osman Pashas to dethrone Sultan Abdul Hamid and set
aside the Othman family altogether as effete and half insane. This
being done, a member of a family established at Konia is, according
to my informant, to be declared Sultan.

I have often heard of the Konia family as having a sort of
pretention to the throne, as descending from Seljuk Sultans or some
other dynasty overthrown by Othman or his successors.

Abdul Hamid does not generally leave his Grand Viziers in
office long enough for them to be able to mature a 'conspiracy
against him.'

In January a prolonged struggle took place between the Ministry and the Left, chiefly over the burning question of Government officials, and the alleged unwillingness to introduce really Republican measures; and before the end of the month Marshal MacMahon and his Prime Minister, M. Dufaure tendered their resignations. It was well known that the Marshal was anxious to take this course, and he followed the advice of his friends in choosing, as his reason for resigning, his inability to concur in a measure which deprived some officers of high rank of their military commands. When, therefore, he was confronted with the alternative of signing the decree removing his old companions in arms, or of resigning himself, he replied that Ministers would have to look out for another President, and M. Grévy, a comparatively moderate Liberal, was elected in his place by a large majority. The 'transitory phenomenon,' M. Waddington, however, remained in office and indeed became head of a new Administration, but it was felt that this arrangement was merely temporary. Power had really passed into the hands of Gambetta, and although he contented himself, for the time being, with the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies, there was nothing to prevent him from establishing himself in office, whenever he should think that the opportune moment had arrived; since, unlike the Speakership in England, the Presidency of the Chamber is looked upon in France as the road to the highest Ministerial rank.

In consequence of the election of a new President of the Republic in the person of M. Grévy, the question arose as to whether the Foreign Representatives should receive fresh credentials, and the action of Prince Bismarck in this connection caused fresh discord amongst leading French politicians. When M. Waddington was at Berlin, he had made a very favourable impression upon the Chancellor, and as he himself subsequently informed me, Bismarck had taken great pains to be civil to him, and to manifest that especial confidence which takes the form of abusing other people--notably Prince Gortschakoff. He now took the opportunity to inform M. Waddington that he entertained such remarkable esteem for him, that he had advised the Emperor to dispense with any new letter of credence, a proceeding which infuriated Gambetta and disposed him to upset Waddington at an early date. 'Altogether there seems an impression,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'that the new Ministry will not last long. Gambetta does not like either Grévy or Waddington. Waddington has yet to show that he has the staff of a Prime Minister in him. He has not hitherto been a very ready or a very effective speaker. He is even said to have a slight English accent in speaking French. I don't believe any one ever perceived this who did not know beforehand that he had had an English education. But this English education certainly has had the effect of preventing him having exactly French modes of thought and French ways, and thus he is not always completely in tune with the feelings of his hearers in Parliament.'

_William Henry Waddington_

LONDON: EDWARD ARNOLD]

It was a common charge made against the late M. Waddington by his opponents that he spoke French with an English, and English with a French accent. As a matter of fact, he was a perfect specimen of a bilinguist, and would have passed as a native of either nation.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Feb. 11, 1879.

Fournier's[22] vagaries are becoming very dangerous, but we
are in a state of anarchy here. The Ministry is composed in general
of men of respectable character and respectable abilities; but
there is no one of them who has hitherto obtained any great hold
on the Chambers or on the country. Their proper game would be to
try and form a Liberal-Conservative party of the Centre Gauche,
the Centre Droit, and the Gauche Républicaine, with whose support
and that of the country at large, they might keep the Ultra Reds
in check. Hitherto they have not shown that there is stuff enough
in them for this, but then they have hardly had a chance. They
have made a weak compromise on the Amnesty Question, but if they
get a good majority on that question, they might start afresh and
show what is in them. So far they are looked upon by most people
as warming pans for Gambetta and his followers: and I have been
assured that some of the French Representatives abroad do not
hesitate to communicate with Gambetta behind Waddington's back.

I must confess that, contrary to my wont, I am rather gloomy
about the state of things here. The relaxation of the efficiency
of the police is undeniable. This was one of the symptoms of the
decay of the Empire. The Gendarmerie is being tampered with. Recent
measures seem to increase the opportunities for disturbances, and
diminish the means of dealing with them. I do not see where, in
the present Government, resistance to disorder is to come from in
an emergency. But I will not croak. Waddington and his colleagues
may steady themselves in office and restore authority yet, but they
have not much time to lose.

Waddington would be the safest Minister we could have in
Eastern Affairs, if he made his subordinates abroad obey him.
Gambetta might be more friendly in commercial matters and more
ready to be an active ally in the East, but he would expect a
recompense in the West, and might be a dangerous friend who would
require careful 'watching.'

Poor M. Waddington's prospects were not improved by a trivial but untoward incident in the Chamber. In the course of one of his first speeches as Prime Minister 'a great deal of laughter is said to have been produced by his dropping some of the sheets of his written speech over the edge of the Tribune, and having to wait till they were picked up'--an incident which serves to show the more generous spirit of the British politician, since a recent Prime Minister was in the habit of delivering soul-stirring orations by the same method, without evoking any disrespectful criticism on the part of his opponents.

Towards the end of February a crisis in Egypt rendered it necessary for the British and French Governments to have recourse to joint action for the purpose of protecting their interests.

As the result of a Commission of Inquiry in 1878, the Khedive Ismail, who had long boasted that Egypt was practically a European state, accepted the position of a Constitutional Ruler, with Nubar Pasha as his Prime Minister, Mr. Rivers Wilson[23] as Minister of Finance, and a Frenchman, M. de Blignières, as Minister of Public Works. It was in the highest degree improbable that a man of his intriguing and ambitious character would submit permanently to any such restraint, and before long he succeeded in working upon the disaffection of those persons whose privileges were threatened or affected by European control, to such an extent that, by organizing a military riot, he was able to force Nubar Pasha to resign on February 20, 1879. At the same time he demanded much greater powers for himself, including the right to preside over the Cabinet, and to have all measures submitted to his approval--demands which were strongly resisted by his European Ministers, who invoked the support of their Governments.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, Feb. 21, 1879.

I have just received your telegram announcing your concurrence
in Waddington's draft instructions to Cairo, and I shall
communicate it to him forthwith.

Waddington seemed quite firm on the point of not allowing
the Khedive to resume his personal power, and would no doubt be
ready to join in any practical steps for that purpose; but in
the meantime it may be feared that His Highness is consolidating
his resumption of power. Waddington looks upon the whole affair
as a simple manoevre of the Khedive to upset the new system of
government. It does not in fact seem likely that so arrant a
coward would have risked his own precious person, if he had not
had a pretty good understanding with the rioters. Public opinion
in France would, I think, support Waddington in taking strong
measures. There does not seem to be any one but Nubar of position
enough to be a Prime Minister of any independence; Waddington
seemed fully aware that if the Khedive is present at the council of
Ministers, no Egyptian Minister will open his lips.

Godeaux telegraphed last night that order having been
restored, the presence of a ship of war at Alexandria might not be
necessary, but Waddington thought on the contrary that it would
be 'essential in order to produce a salutary impression on the
Khedive, and keep him in some check.'

Nubar Pasha was regarded as English and anti-French, and his fall was, therefore, received at Paris with some degree of complacency; but the feeling was not sufficiently strong to make the Government hold out against his restoration to office, should that be considered necessary for the purpose of checking the Khedive, and the tendency was to make no suggestions and to wait for the lead of England, it being understood that both Governments were resolved not to consent to any change of the political system in Egypt.

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

March 1, 1879.

* * * * *

As to Egypt, I gather from your telegram to-day that
Waddington looks on our message to Vivian[24] as in the nature of
an ultimatum, and he is puzzled what we are to do next if it should
be rejected. We do not in the least look on it as an ultimatum, and
it is not so phrased. We may well receive either from the Khedive
or the Agents some alternative proposal which may be discussed,
and perhaps hammered into an acceptable arrangement at least for
a time. But in any case our position cannot be worse here than if
we had acquiesced at once in the results of the conspiracy against
Nubar; while the chances are that it will enable us to arrive at
some plan for partially curbing the Khedive, which at all events
shall partially disguise the check we have undoubtedly received.
The causes are obscure. It is evident there has been imprudence. I
wish I could be quite satisfied there has been perfect loyalty.

Writing a day or two later, Lord Salisbury explained that he was in some difficulty, as Mr. Vivian and Mr. Rivers Wilson held different opinions. The former wanted to conciliate the Khedive by not forcing upon him the restoration of Nubar, while Mr. Rivers Wilson strongly insisted upon his return. Lord Salisbury himself was inclined to the latter course because 'otherwise the Khedive will be like a horse who has succeeded in beating his rider, and will never be safe for that rider to mount again,' but eventually decided against it. From the following letter it looks as if the retirement of the hapless British Representative at Tunis was intended as a peace offering to the cause of Anglo-French joint action in Egypt.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

March 6, 1879.

It is better always to get the credit of one's good actions,
which are naturally few. Will you kindly tell M. Waddington in the
most unofficial way in the world that----having returned himself as
67 years of age (he entered the service 55 years ago, and therefore
must have begun his public labours at a precocious age) we have
suppressed the Consulate General of Tunis, and that there will
henceforth be a man on reduced salary, a consul or agent, after the
close of this month.

I think the French will find difficulties enough with Italy if
they ever try to increase their influence in Tunis; but that is no
affair of ours. We have hot water enough elsewhere without desiring
to boil any in Tunis.

One good turn deserves another, and I hope Waddington will
feel himself bound to keep his agents from Anglophobia in Turkey.

The Egyptian compromise will do very well for the time. It
seems doubtful whether Nubar is worth anything now. An Oriental
does not easily pluck up a spirit when he has once been beaten, and
Nubar is reported to have told friends in England that he knew that
whenever the Khedive had done with him there was a cup of coffee
waiting for him.

The compromise referred to took the form of a new Egyptian Ministry containing the two English and French representatives, and nominally presided over by the Khedive's eldest son, Prince Tewfik. The experiment, however, of trying to keep a Ministry in office in spite of the opposition of the chief of the State did not last long, for in April the irrepressible Khedive dismissed his Ministers and installed Cherif Pasha as Prime Minister. This spirited action caused M. Waddington much perplexity, as he did not believe that French public opinion would allow him to take a slap in the face quietly from the Khedive. The French bondholders were too influential to think of throwing them over, and then there was the Crédit Foncier, a more or less Government establishment, which no French Government could allow to come to grief. There was a keen desire to maintain the concert between England and France on Egyptian affairs, but if the bondholders suspected that England was likely to be lukewarm on their behalf, there was a strong probability that the French Government might be forced to act alone in the enforcement of French claims. Lord Salisbury on his side was naturally reluctant to be identified with the bondholders' cause.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

April 10, 1879.

I see by your telegrams which have arrived to-day that M.
Waddington suggests as a means of coercion against the Khedive that
MM. Rothschild should refuse to pay him the balance of the loan.
Mr. Rivers Wilson had made the same suggestion to the Baron. But
the latter, in a message sent yesterday through his son, repudiated
any idea of such a proceeding as dishonourable, and attributed the
suggestion to momentary excitement.

With respect to the second idea, the only question is whether
the Sultan will ever summon up courage to take such a step, and
if he does, whether he can enforce it. If it can be done quite
smoothly, _perhaps_ it would be the best course; but I speak with
some doubt.

It may be quite tolerable and even agreeable to the French
Government to go into partnership with the bondholders; or rather
to act as sheriffs' officer for them. But to us it is a new and
very embarrassing sensation. Egypt never can prosper so long as
some 25 per cent. of her revenue goes in paying interest on her
debt. We have no wish to part company with France: still less do we
mean that France should acquire in Egypt any special ascendency;
but subject to these two considerations I should be glad to be free
of the companionship of the bondholders.

M. Waddington's 'second idea' evidently referred to the deposing of the Khedive by means of the Sultan; but his difficulty lay in the old French jealousy of the Porte exercising influence over the internal affairs of Egypt, and during the reign of Sultan Abdul Aziz the consequence of that influence had certainly been a constant drain of money from Cairo to Constantinople. One suggestion was that the Sultan should summon the Khedive to come to Constantinople to do homage, a ceremony which he had never yet performed, and a refusal to obey would have made him a rebel in the Sultan's eyes; but the objection to this course was that the Khedive might, if he went, take large sums of money with him and so propitiate his suzerain.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

April 16, 1879.

Waddington's policy is not very intelligible. I suppose it
is a compromise between a sense of the danger of doing anything
strong, and of the necessity of satisfying the Crédit Foncier.
In the despatch which you will receive we have done our best to
accommodate ourselves to Waddington's view, without taking up a
wholly untenable position.

There is one thing which it is necessary not to forget, though
I could not mention it in the despatch. We have very different
audiences to please; and though we may agree upon the actual
intimation to be given to the Khedive and the Sultan respectively,
the argument leading up to those communications cannot in both
cases be precisely the same. We must lay stress on separate points,
and the argument derived from the Khedive's application for a
European Minister must be treated differently by the two Powers,
as the circumstances were not similar. We should therefore avoid
identic notes, though we may make a concerted representation.

The communication to the Porte had better be indiscreetly
communicated to the Khedive's agent there, who is an intelligent
man. It may only result in producing a very heavy payment to the
Porte. But that, under existing circumstances, will itself be of
advantage.

I suppose that Waddington means to upset the Ottoman Bank
project as a retort for the failure of Tocqueville's.

What does he think of Martino's share in the recent Egyptian
crisis? Italy is likely to be a plague to all of us.

In France there was a violent party, more or less supported by Gambetta, which desired to send some energetic Agent to Egypt who would bully the Khedive successfully. Unfortunately, such energetic agents were extremely likely to quarrel with their British colleagues, whereas M. Waddington, who was peaceably disposed, wished to appoint quiet and unobtrusive representatives who would work harmoniously, and implicitly follow their instructions. There was, however, some excuse for the men of action, as a very well-founded suspicion prevailed in Paris that the Russians, and even the Germans, were busy at Rome inciting the Italians to make trouble for England and France at Cairo. Moreover, Gambetta and his friends believed, probably with reason, that the Khedive would never have gone so far in defying England and France if he had not felt that he was backed up by other Powers, as well as by Italy.

Mr. Vivian, the British agent in Cairo, who had been summoned to London, returned to his post at the end of April bearing a note, the gist of which was, that the two Governments, in view of the iniquities of the Khedive, 'reserved to themselves an entire liberty of appreciation and action in defending their interests in Egypt, and in seeking the arrangements best calculated to secure the good government and prosperity of the country.' In other words, the Khedive was warned that he had better be careful; but there was, so far, no hint of deposition.

In Lord Salisbury's letter to Lord Lyons, enclosing a copy of the above note, there is an interesting personal opinion on the question of governing Orientals by Europeans. 'With all these Oriental populations I suspect that the _rôle_ of Europeans should in the main be confined to positions of criticism and control. They can only govern after absolute conquest, and then expensively. The difficulty of governing without conquest is, of course, enormously increased when two nationalities have to be provided for, and two Governments to be consulted.'

The period following the return of Mr. Vivian to his post was marked by a violent and entirely unreasonable campaign against England in the French press, it being thought, for some unknown reason, that France had been abandoned, and M. Waddington took the somewhat unusual course of sending a message to Lord Salisbury through Mr. Rivers Wilson, instead of communicating in the ordinary manner.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

May 21, 1879.

On Monday Rivers Wilson sent me word that he had a message
to deliver to me from Waddington. Accordingly I asked him to come
and see me yesterday to deliver it. It was to the effect that
Waddington was willing and anxious to move the Porte to dethrone
the Khedive, if England would join in this step. I represented
that there were three difficulties. The Sultan might not assent:
if he did, the Khedive might not yield. If the latter did yield,
the successor might be either feeble or bad, and we should be
called upon to support him in one case, and replace him in the
other. To the first objection Wilson replied that Waddington had no
apprehensions as to the Sultan's consent; to the second he (Wilson)
and every person who knew Egypt well, did not doubt that the moment
a Firman was issued, the Khedive would fall; as to the third, he
could only say that Prince Tewfik was a compendium of the cardinal
virtues.

If Waddington did not communicate his proposal to you, I am
obliged to consider what possible motive he could have had for
taking this circuitous route, unless he meant to disavow the offer
later on. If he says nothing to you about it, it may be worth while
to sound him.

If there were no France in the way, I should be disposed to
give no reply to the Khedive's note we received by the last mail,
or at least only to say that since the dismissal of the English
Minister, the Khedive's finance had become so hopelessly tangled,
partly owing to his extravagance, partly to the conflict with
other Powers into which the decree of April 22nd has brought him,
that we must reserve our judgment with respect to all questions
of financial control till the position of affairs had become
more intelligible. I think that on some such plea as that we
might stand by and look on for a few months till the Khedive
has knocked himself to pieces, which he inevitably will do. The
fiscal condition is now so hopeless that I am rather grateful to
the Khedive for refusing to put it into the hands of an English
Minister. I doubt whether any European can now undertake it
without discredit, until the country has gone into liquidation.
The disproportion between the debt and the revenue--joined to
the difficulties which have now been raised by the action of the
courts and the attitude of the other Powers, makes effective or
even humane government hopeless till there has been a bankruptcy.
But then that would not suit a purely Bourse policy like that of
France. We must take notice of this difference of the French view,
and we may have to modify our policy accordingly; for we cannot
allow France to go on alone, and we will not part company with her
if we can possibly help it. But in this state of our relative views
and wishes, it is already for us to wait, and for her to propose.
If left alone, our disposition would be to find an excuse for
waiting, and if we move it will be because France is urging us. We
should therefore naturally wait till France made a proposal to us,
and should be inclined to cross-examine her as to what will be
her next move after that, in the various contingencies which may
result from the course they propose. I think, however, you might
open communications by mentioning, quite unofficially, how much
pain the articles in the _République Française_ and the _Débuts_
have given us. To ordinary papers we should of course have paid no
attention; but one of them is, or was till very recently, edited
by a gentleman in the French Foreign Office; the other is in part
the property of a Minister. We are utterly unable to understand on
what foundation the reproaches rest that we have shown reserves
and hesitations in the pursuit of the joint Egyptian policy. On
the contrary, if we had occupied towards France the position which
Servia occupies towards Russia, our compliance could hardly have
been more exact. But this outbreak of causeless wrath justifies us
in asking what France wants, and what she complains of.

You will of course say as much of this, or as much more as
you may think wise. But it may be as well to show that we are
not insensible to this attempt to work Parliament against us
by revelations or communications on matters which the French
Government themselves have charged us to treat as confidential.

The attacks on England in the French press were not inspired, as Lord Salisbury supposed, by the French Foreign Office, but by Gambetta, who desired a strong policy in Egypt and seized the opportunity to fall upon Waddington. The latter, however, by this time had made up his mind as to what should be done.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, May 22, 1879.

As you will have seen by my telegram, what Waddington said
to me yesterday was, that there appeared to him to be only two
alternatives with regard to the Egyptian question--to depose the
Khedive or to establish a Control. He talked a good deal more
about the Control than the deposition; but when I asked him if
this meant that the Control was the alternative he preferred, he
declined to express any preference for the one or the other. If we
are to wait until he has devised measures (and this is what he told
me he was about) for establishing an efficacious control we need
not fear being called upon to act in a hurry. I quite agree with
you that we cannot let France go on alone in Egypt; for if we do,
she may go lengths which will produce something a great deal more
dangerous than a mere coolness between us. French power and French
feeling are very different from what they were some years ago,
when the French would have let us do almost anything we chose in
Egypt, if we would have taken care of the interests of the French
bondholders.

Nothing can be plainer than Lord Salisbury's desire to act in concert with France, and to have regard to French interests in Egypt, but the constant attacks made upon British policy and the persistent hostility of French agents, not only in Egypt, but elsewhere, rendered the task anything but easy. Gambetta's hostility was partly due to the fact that he was an enthusiastic Phil-Hellene, and considered that not enough was being done for Greece in the way of procuring for her accessions of territory at the expense of Turkey. It is as well to point out that, whereas the Turks had been compelled to cede territory to States with which they had been at war, they were at this time being pressed to cede territory to Greece because that Power had remained at peace.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

June 6, 1879.

The recent course of the French newspapers which have the
credit of being inspired by Gambetta and Léon Say is certainly a
puzzle. Looking over the course of negotiations between us and
Waddington on Egypt, I should find it very difficult to say which
of the two Governments had pulled the other on, and which had
dragged the other back. As far as any important negotiations go,
I should say that we had been a shade more in favour of active
measures than the other side. The two newspapers in question
are evidently well informed; and therefore their assumption
that we have prevented the French from acting must be put on
for a purpose; what purpose it is difficult to say. The most
obvious solution--bearing in mind the English friendships of the
two statesmen concerned--is that the whole movement is meant
to operate on English internal politics, and not on European
politics at all: and this view is supported by the use which has
actually been made of the controversy here. The incident is common
enough in diplomatic history: but it has always been bitterly
resented by the Government which is the subject of that species
of attack. But in this case there is some doubt as to how far
Waddington is implicated. Nothing is more difficult to deal with
than a 'Marionette Government,' because the marionettes are not
responsible, and you cannot get at the man who pulls the strings.
There is one spot in the diplomatic battlefield--almost the only
one--where we have been exposed to risk, and have consequently
been anxious--the Balkan Peninsula: and on this we have been
systematically opposed by France. Ring, Coutouly and Fournier have
played us every kind of trick. But all the time, nothing could
have been more unexceptionable than Waddington's language and
instructions. So it is with this newspaper warfare. The secondary
agents, who are popularly supposed to act from inspiration are
undisguisedly hostile. Waddington's demeanour all the time is
imperturbably friendly. Is it helplessness, or bad faith? The
question is one of considerable practical importance: for if we are
to measure the co-operation of France by the action of Fournier and
Gambetta, we shall do wisely to retire, gently but effectually,
from a perilous partnership. And it is impossible to ignore this
aspect of the case in considering the precise line to be pursued in
the two pending questions of Greece and Egypt.

Our object in Egypt, ever since we promised some four years
ago not to take it, is to see that our own interests are not
injured and that French interests receive adequate, but not
excessive consideration. If, however, Gambetta means mischief, it
may be wise for us to seek the protection of English interests
only, and leave the French to take care of themselves. This would
be done by pushing forward the other Powers. Their interference
would be fatal to Egyptian solvency, and consequently to
French bondholders. But it would be as fatal a bar to French
preponderance as the plan of duplicating all appointments, and
as none of these great Powers are naval, we could look after
the Canal just as easily if they were masters in Egypt, as
under the present Anglo-French system. If the French are really
friends, the Anglo-French system may be maintained in spite of
many inconveniences in order to cement that friendship. But if
Gambetta and Fournier are to be taken as the directing force in
French politics, the Anglo-French system is merely a make-believe,
and will only draw us into a succession of crises in which we
shall probably be outwitted. This dilemma merits very careful
consideration. Greece is a less important and more transitory
affair. In order to avoid division in the Congress we went rather
further than we thought quite wise; and we have no wish to go
further still. Of course, abstractedly, it would be much better
that all the Hellenic populations should be under a Hellenic ruler.
But Turkey is still a fact of which account must be taken; and the
danger of Turkey resisting is very serious. The fact that Greece
has not won this territory as prize of war, nor earned it as the
consideration of any service done, but is to gain it merely by her
skill in singing diplomatic dithyrambics, appears to irritate the
Turks intensely. It is not our present policy to adopt a course
which shall induce the Sultan to listen to the Russian proposals
which are so freely placed before him. We would not therefore,
in any case, take a leading part in pressing the cession on him.
But we doubt extremely the wisdom of exciting anew the Moslem
fanaticism, by demanding a town to which the Albanians attach so
much importance as Janina. However, in this question we should
have been a good deal influenced by the wishes of France, if we
could have thought that by exalting the influence of Fournier we
were strengthening a friend. But can we do so?

There was, in reality, no foundation for Lord Salisbury's suspicions that Gambetta and his allies were seeking to interfere in British internal politics. The objectionable articles were written under an erroneous impression that France had been outwitted, and that Mr. Vivian, in pursuance of secret instructions from his Government, was working for the failure of the joint Anglo-French administration in Egypt and for the establishment of exclusive British influence. But as the attacks in the French press mainly took the form of abusing England for not agreeing to energetic proposals made by the French Government, it was a legitimate grievance against M. Waddington that he never took any steps whatever to contradict this perfectly baseless accusation. As for the conduct of French agents who were continually intriguing against their English colleagues, it is probable that M. Waddington was able to exercise little or no control over them, and it has already been mentioned that some of them were in the habit of corresponding directly with Gambetta behind the back of their official chief. Lord Lyons, who naturally was anxious to make things as easy for the French as possible, recommended that the vanity and susceptibility of French diplomatists abroad and of the public at home, should be studied as much as possible, since there was a universal feeling that France was now too strong to play a secondary part anywhere, and that sacrifices on our part were preferable to allowing her to throw herself into the arms of Russia. Lord Salisbury therefore persevered in the difficult task of endeavouring to co-operate cordially with the French Government, and M. Waddington applied himself to elaborating the scheme of Dual Control which was eventually adopted. Meanwhile it had become apparent that, in order to obtain anything like a successful result, the Khedive Ismail must be got rid of somehow, a course which was urged not only by Gambetta, but by the French Agent at Cairo. Joint efforts were made by the French and British Agents to induce him to abdicate in favour of Prince Tewfik, which were seconded by the representations of Germany and Austria; but these were of no avail, and the Gordian knot was not cut until the Sultan suddenly intervened on June 26. On that day a telegram arrived from Constantinople, deposing Ismail by Imperial Iradé, and conferring the Government of Egypt upon his eldest son Prince Tewfik, who was at once proclaimed Khedive without any disturbance of tranquillity.

The action of the Sultan was not only sudden but unexpected, and Lord Salisbury at once took steps to assure the French Government that it was not due to the instigation of Her Majesty's Government.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

June 26, 1879.

Pray assure M. Waddington that the Turkish move reported
to-day does not proceed in any way from our suggestion. We have
only urged in the very strongest terms that the Sultan should not
interfere with what we were doing in Cairo. But the Sultan seems to
have been perfectly resolved to have a finger in the pie; and as he
was not allowed to interfere to save the Khedive, he indemnified
himself by interfering to upset him.

I am not specially in love with the Firman of 1873, which
I see the Sultan has revoked. But I am afraid it will annoy
Waddington, and therefore I am anxious he should be well convinced
we had no hand in it.

Now it is done, the wisest course we can take is to accept it,
and devote our energies to procuring any new Firman that may be
necessary to the present state of Egyptian finances. I don't think
it will be any great evil if their power of raising armaments is
limited. But on all this I should like to have Waddington's opinion.

M. Waddington was a sensible man, and therefore there was no difficulty in convincing him that England was not responsible for the Sultan's action; but French opinion generally was incredulous, and it was believed that the deposition of Ismail was the result of the rivalry at Constantinople between the French and British Ambassadors. The latter was unjustly suspected of a desire to reduce Egypt to the condition of a Turkish Pashalic, and it was obvious that the revocation of the Firman indicated the intention of the Sultan to reassert his influence over Egypt in a manner which French policy had consistently opposed. Although, therefore, the Sultan's action had delivered both England and France from a highly embarrassing situation, and had been taken at a most opportune moment, it was considered advisable, instead of expressing gratitude, to criticise adversely the form of the Imperial Iradé, and to insist upon the issue of another.

What was, however, of really more essential importance than the somewhat remote fear of Turkish interference was the question of how the Dual Control was to be effectively established.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

July 7, 1879.

Our perplexity as to the effect of the Firman has received
a rather comical solution. No such Firman exists. An 'Iradé' is
merely the Sultan's signature; and that was only given to the
telegraphic message deposing Ismail. So that the revocation of the
Firman of 1873 has not taken place, and the discussion as to the
exact meaning of such a revocation seems to be premature. All that
we now have to do is to prevent, if we can, any Firman at all being
issued to Tewfik, and then every one will be happy.

Tewfik is resolved to begin the Liquidation at once; and if
it be true that interest is rolling up at the rate of £80,000 a
month, there is good cause for his desire to hurry it. But the
Controllers will hardly be enough. We want to have some hold over
the government of Egypt, though we do not want to assume any
overt responsibility. The great object seems to me to be to have
representatives inside the offices who shall be able to report
what the Government are doing to the Agents, and shall be able to
give advice to the Government in accordance with the instructions
of the Agents. If you have a European Minister, the Agent must
be suppressed. I despair of making two talented Englishmen work
side by side, without subordinating one to the other; and if we
must choose between Agent and Minister as a vehicle of English
influence, the former seems to me the easier to work with. He is
not quasi-independent, and therefore will obey orders. He occupies
a recognized and traditional position and therefore excites no
jealousy either among Moslems or other Christian Powers; and he
cannot be dismissed; and if his advice is not taken, or applied
badly, the country he serves is not in the eyes of the world
primarily responsible. The case on the other side is that the
European Minister has more power. But has he? What power did Wilson
enjoy? The only power Europeans can enjoy at Cairo rests on the
fear which their Governments may happen to inspire, and this fear
will operate as strongly through an Agent as through a Minister.
We do not put European Ministers even into the Governments of
dependent Indian Provinces: and there we have, what we cannot have
in Egypt for a long time, 'bayonets to sit upon.'

We have made the mistake in Egypt and elsewhere, of
underrating the vitality of the Moslem feeling. I am afraid M.
Waddington is doing so with respect to Greece.

Another letter deals further with the question of Control, and contains some interesting reflections on moral influence.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

July 15, 1879.

I am very much of the opinion that the Control should take
the form of inspection. It is the only form of Control likely to
be effective. Actual authority we cannot exercise. We tried to do
it through the European Ministers, but when the stress came, the
disbanded officers proved to us that two pairs of arms are not much
use against two thousand. The only form of Control we have is that
which is called moral influence--which in practice is a combination
of menace, objurgation, and worry. In this we are still supreme
and have many modes of applying it--diplomatic notes, consular
interviews, newspapers, blue books. We must devote ourselves to the
perfecting of this weapon. And, obviously, the first condition of
its use is complete knowledge of what is going in.

The exchange, therefore, of nominal authority for real
inspectionship is a step in the right direction. It is facing
facts. We must exert ourselves to open to these inspectors every
avenue of information; and we must have a certain number of
sub-inspectors paid by Egypt, who shall travel about, collecting
information. It is essential, of course, that these last should
know the language.

The division of the jurisdiction of the two inspectors is
a serious puzzle. Upper and Lower Egypt certainly will not do,
unless we have Lower Egypt. I had thought of a North and South
division--the Nile--starting at Damietta. But I know Vivian does
not like this; moreover I see difficulties about handing over
Alexandria to the French.

Waddington's proposal for a rotatory jurisdiction sounds odd.
What would he think of it as applied to any other department of
life--Ambassadors, Bishops, or Ministers? I suppose the frequency
of what they call a 'Prefectoral Movement' in France has put it
into his head.

Would it be possible to fuse them into a board, giving them
a native colleague to be chosen by themselves, and then decide
by majority? I have spoken to Baring[25] about the Commission of
Liquidation. I doubt his accepting the Control, though I think he
would the Liquidation.

As to the Firman, we are agreed as to the limitation of
armaments. I should be glad to see loans forbidden altogether.
To an Oriental ruler they are like firewater to the Red Indians.
I should be glad to see a declaration that the Powers would not
recognize or encourage the payment of any loan contracted by the
Egyptian Government after this date. They are not wanted to meet
any present stress; but the fellaheen are already loaded with quite
as heavy a weight as they can bear.