Chapter X: The Third Republic (2)

So that nothing is done and nothing will be done before Arnim
returns to Paris. He has no sailing orders yet and seems well
amused here.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Mr. Odo Russell._

Paris, May 7, 1872.

Many thanks for your interesting letter.

Arnim's account of public opinion at Berlin entirely confirms
that which you give, only he says Bismarck would be personally
willing to come to an arrangement with France for payment of the
milliards and the evacuation of the territory, but that he will not
run any risk of injuring his own position by opposing either Moltke
or public opinion on this point.

I don't think the Germans need the least fear the French
attacking them for many years to come. The notion of coming now
to destroy France utterly, in order to prevent her ever in the
dim future being able to revenge herself, seems simply atrocious.
The French are so foolish in their boasts, and the Germans so
thin-skinned, that I am afraid of mischief.

I should doubt Bismarck's being wise in setting himself in
open hostility to the Vatican. The favour of the Holy See is seldom
of any practical use, so far as obtaining acts in its favour, to a
Protestant or even to a Roman Catholic Government; but the simple
fact of being notoriously in antagonism to it, brings a vast amount
of opposition and ill-will on a Government that has Catholic
subjects. The fear of this country's being able at this moment
to work the Catholic element in Germany or elsewhere against the
German Emperor appears to me to be chimerical.

I wish the Germans would get their milliards as fast as they
can, and go: then Europe might settle down, and they need not be
alarmed about French vengeance, or grudge the French the poor
consolation of talking about it.

Arnim was a good deal struck by the decline in Thiers's
vigour, since he took leave of him before his journey to Rome, but
he saw Thiers some days ago, when the little President was at his
worst.

* * * * *

_Mr. Odo Russell to Lord Lyons._

British Embassy, Berlin, May 11, 1872.

I have nothing new to say about the relations of France and
Germany, but my friends here seem so alarmed at the idea that
France cannot pay the much longed for three milliards, that if
Thiers really does pay them, all the rest will be forgiven and
forgotten, and the withdrawal of the German troops will then be
impatiently called for. Like yourself I write the impressions of
the moment and am not answerable for future changes of public
opinion. Clearly the thing to be desired for the peace of the world
is the payment by France and the withdrawal by Germany, after which
a normal state of things can be hoped for--not before.

The Pope, to my mind, has made a mistake in declining to
receive Hohenlohe. He ought to have accepted and in return sent a
Nuncio to Berlin, thereby selling Bismarck, and controlling his
German Bishops and the Döllinger movement.

Bismarck is going away on leave to Varzin. He is so irritable
and nervous that he can do no good here at present, and rest is
essential to him.

Your letter of the 7th is most useful to me, many thanks for
it. I shall not fail to keep you as well informed as I can.

In reality, the Germans made little difficulty about the arrangements for the payment of the indemnity and evacuation of French territory, and early in July Thiers was able to state confidently that he felt certain of being able to pay the whole of the indemnity by March, 1874, and that he had only obtained an additional year's grace in order to guard against accidents.

A curious incident which occurred in July, 1872, showed how, if sufficient ingenuity be employed, a trivial personal question may be turned to important political use. The Comte de Vogué, French Ambassador at Constantinople, who possessed little or no diplomatic experience, before proceeding on leave from his post, had an audience of the Sultan. The Sultan received him standing, and began to talk, when Vogué interrupted His Majesty, and begged to be allowed to sit down, as other Ambassadors had been accustomed to do, according to him, on similar occasions. What the Sultan actually did at the moment was not disclosed, but he took dire offence, and telegrams began to pour in upon the Turkish Ambassador at Paris desiring him to represent to the French Government that if Vogué came back his position would be very unpleasant--intimating in fact that his return to Constantinople must be prevented. The French Foreign Minister, however, refused this satisfaction to the Sultan, and the Turkish Ambassador in his perplexity sought the advice of Lord Lyons, who preached conciliation, and urged that, at all events, no steps ought to be taken until Vogué had arrived at Paris, and was able to give his version of the incident. The French, naturally enough, were at that moment peculiarly susceptible on all such matters, and more reluctant to make a concession than if they were still on their former pinnacle of grandeur at Constantinople, although Vogué was clearly in the wrong, for Lord Lyons admitted that he had himself never been asked to sit. The importance of the incident consisted in the fact that it gave an opportunity of cultivating the goodwill of Russia, as the traditional enemy of Turkey. No Frenchman had ever lost sight of the hope that some day or other an ally against Germany might be found in Russia, and there were not wanting signs of a reciprocal feeling on the part of the latter. It had, for instance, been the subject of much remark, that the Russian Ambassador at Paris, Prince Orloff, had recently been making immense efforts to become popular with all classes of the French: Legitimists, Orleanists, Imperialists, Republicans, and especially newspaper writers of all shades of politics. As it was well known that neither Prince nor Princess Orloff were really fond of society, these efforts were almost overdone, but nevertheless they met with a hearty response everywhere, from Thiers downwards, for all Frenchmen were eagerly hoping for a quarrel between Russia and Germany, and were ready to throw themselves into the arms of the former in that hope. Russia, on her side, was clearly not unwilling to cultivate a friendship which cost nothing, and might conceivably be of considerable profit.

On November 5 the new Anglo-French Commercial Treaty was signed, indignant British Free Traders striving to console themselves with the thought that France would soon discover the error of her ways and cease to lag behind the rest of the civilized world in her economic heresy.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Nov. 12, 1872.

I saw Thiers on Friday after I wrote to you on that day; and
I dined with him on Saturday. He looked remarkably well, and was
in high spirits and in great good humour, as he ought to be, with
us. He spoke, as indeed he always does, as if he felt quite sure
that he should have his own way with the Assembly in all things.
As regards the organic measures, he talked as if the fight would
be entirely with the Right; but both sections of the Left have
declared against organic changes to be made by this Assembly. I
suppose, however, Thiers is pretty sure to get his own powers
prolonged for four years certain, and this is what he cares about.

I do not, however, find in my Austrian, German, and Russian
colleagues so unqualified an acquiescence in Thiers remaining
in power as they professed before I went away. It is said that
the three Emperors at Berlin were alarmed at the prospect of the
definitive establishment of any Republic, and still more so at
the apparent tendency of M. Thiers's policy to leave the country
to drift into a Red Republic, whenever he quitted the scene.
However this may be, there is certainly a change in the language
of their Representatives here, not very marked, but nevertheless
quite perceptible. Orloff in particular talks as if an immediate
Imperialist restoration were not only desirable but probable. If he
really thinks it probable, he is almost alone in the opinion.

The Prince de Joinville, who came to see me yesterday,
said that he had been a great deal about in the country, and
that he found everywhere an absolute indifference to persons
and dynasties, and a simple cry for any Government which would
efficiently protect property. He thought that Thiers would be
supported for this reason, but that whatever institutions might
be nominally established, they would last only as long as Thiers
himself did, and that afterwards everything would be in question,
and the country probably divide itself into two great parties,
Conservatives and Reds, between whom there would be a fierce
struggle notwithstanding the great numerical superiority of the
former.

In the absence of exciting internal topics, the year closed with a slight sensation provided by Gramont, who, it might have been supposed, would have preferred not to court further notoriety. Count Beust had recently asserted that he had warned France against expecting help from Austria in the event of a war with Prussia. Gramont replied by publishing a letter in which the following statement occurred. 'L'Autriche considère la cause de la France comme la sienne, et contribuera au succès de ses armes dans les limites du possible.' This quotation was supposed to be taken from a letter from Beust to Metternich, dated July 20, 1870 (the day after the declaration of war), and left by Metternich with Gramont, who took a copy and returned the original. Metternich was believed to have shown the letter also to the Emperor Napoleon and to Ollivier. The letter was represented as going on to say that the neutrality proclaimed by Austria was merely a blind to conceal her armaments, and that she was only waiting till the advance of winter rendered it impossible for Russia to concentrate her forces.

It was generally believed that there was plenty of evidence that an offensive and defensive alliance was in course of negotiation between France and Austria in 1869, though no treaty was signed, and the record appears to have consisted in letters exchanged between the two Emperors, but as Gramont had nothing more than a copy of a letter from Beust to Metternich his evidence was legally defective, whatever its moral value, and it was questionable whether as an ex-Minister he had any right to disclose such secrets.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Dec. 31, 1872.

Gramont's further revelations confirm what I told you in my
letter of the 24th. The question is becoming tiresome. I conceive
there is no doubt that Beust at Vienna, and Metternich here,
fanned the flame of French discontent after Sadowa, with a view
to avenging themselves when Austria and France should be ready,
and circumstances favourable. I think also that Gramont came back
from Vienna full of Beust's warlike ideas, and very well inclined
to carry them out. What exchange of letters may have taken place
between the two Emperors, or what record of any kind there may be
of engagements between the two countries to help one another, it is
more difficult to say.

The assertion is that after war had been declared, Austria
engaged to move on the 15th September. Others say that she also
required that France should have an army in Baden.

This is not inconsistent with her having dissuaded France from
war in July, 1870, when she knew positively it would be premature
for herself, and probably had some suspicion that France was also
not really prepared.

Early in January, 1873, the Emperor Napoleon died at Chiselhurst. The view of Thiers was that this event would render the Bonapartists, for the time, more turbulent and less dangerous. He believed that the Emperor's personal influence had been used to quiet the impatience of his followers, while, on the other hand, his death removed the only member of the family who was popular enough in France to be a formidable candidate. Thiers's childish susceptibility with regard to the Bonapartists showed itself in his expressed hope that the Emperor's death would be followed by the disappearance of the public sympathy in England with the family in its misfortunes.

The opinions of Thiers seem to have been generally prevalent. The Emperor was remarkably kind and courteous to all who approached him; he was a firm friend; not, as a rule, an implacable enemy, and he inspired no small number of people with a warm attachment to him personally. He was also generally popular, and the glittering prosperity of the early part of his reign was attributed by a large part of the common people to his own genius and merits, while they were prone to consider that its disastrous close was due to treason. No other member of the family excited feelings of the same kind, and in France a cause was always so largely identified with an individual that there was no doubt that the hold of the Imperialists upon the country was largely weakened by the loss of their chief.

It is perhaps worth noting that Lord Lyons, although it was notoriously difficult to extract any such opinions from him, did in after years admit reluctantly to me, that although he liked Napoleon III. personally, he had always put a low estimate upon his capacity.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Jan. 31, 1873.

I cannot say that the political atmosphere grows clearer. The
Right are in their hearts as anxious as ever to depose Thiers.
They believe as firmly as ever that if he makes the new elections,
he will have a Chamber, not only of Republicans, but of very
advanced Republicans. They see that all their little endeavours to
restrain him and to establish ministerial responsibility will have
no political effect. The death of the Emperor has not strengthened
Thiers's position with regard to the Right. On the contrary,
they are less disposed to bear with him since the removal of the
candidate for the Throne of whom they were most afraid, and from
whom they justly thought that Thiers would make every effort to
shield them. They are consequently, even more than they usually
are, employed in casting about for something to put in Thiers's
place. The Fusion is again 'almost' made, and MacMahon is again
talked of as ready to take the Government during the transition
from the Republic to the King.

Orloff, the Russian Ambassador, propounded to me to-day a plan
of his own for preventing conflicts between Russia and England
in Central Asia. So far as I understood it, it was that England
and Russia should enter into a strict alliance, should encourage
and protect, by force of arms, commerce between their Asiatic
Dominions, and unite them at once by a railroad. He said there
was a Russian company already formed which desired to connect the
Russian railway system with the Anglo-Indian railways. He told me
that Brünnow was always writing that war between England and Russia
was imminent and that England was preparing for it. If Brünnow's
vaticinations are believed, they may perhaps have a not unwholesome
effect upon the Russian Government.

Prince Orloff seems to have had in contemplation that Trans-Persian Railway which has met with the approval of the Russian and British Governments at the present day. The Russian advance in Central Asia in 1872 and 1873 had been the subject of various perfectly futile representations on the part of Her Majesty's Government, but Baron Brünnow must have been a singularly credulous diplomatist if he really believed that we were making preparations for a war with Russia or any one else.

If Orloff with prophetic insight foresaw a Trans-Persian Railway, Thiers might be acclaimed as being the first person to suggest the project of the Triple Entente between England, France, and Russia. Strangely enough it was the affairs of Spain that put this notion into his head, the idea prevalent in France being that Germany was bent on making that country a dangerous neighbour to France, and bestowing a Hohenzollern prince upon her as sovereign. The prospect of an 'Iberic Union,' which was being discussed at the time, was considered to be exceptionally threatening to France, and Thiers had had quite enough of united states on the French frontier.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, March 4, 1873.

M. Thiers spoke to me last night very confidentially about
Spain and Portugal. The Spanish question was, he said, becoming so
serious that it could hardly be considered an internal question.
Among other things, the independence of Portugal was at stake. Now,
in his opinion, the best chance of avoiding a collision between the
Powers of Europe would be that England, France, and Russia should
come to an understanding on the subject. He did not think that
there would be any difficulty in effecting such an understanding;
and indeed he had reason to believe that Russia was at this moment
particularly well disposed to act in concert with England. He was
far from being so absurd as to propose a new Holy Alliance; indeed,
he desired to avoid all show and ostentation--indeed all publicity.
He simply wished that, without any parade, the three Powers he had
named should concert measures in order to avert events which might
imperil the peace of Europe. After some further conversation, he
observed that it would be impossible to avert a collision, if the
Peninsula were formed into one Iberic state with a Hohenzollern for
a monarch.

I did not invite M. Thiers to state more definitely in what
form he proposed that the understanding between France, Russia, and
England should be effected, or what combined action he proposed
they should adopt. I thought indeed that it would be very dangerous
for France to enter into any sort of an alliance with Foreign
Powers against Germany at this moment, and that the smallest result
might be to delay the evacuation of French territory. Nor indeed
did I know that there was any evidence that Germany was actively
pursuing designs in Spain in such a way and to such a degree,
as would render it proper or advantageous to try the hazardous
experiment of undertaking to settle a European question without
her, not to say in spite of her.

I consequently only listened to what M. Thiers said. He
concluded by telling me to treat his idea as most strictly
confidential and to confide it only to your ear in a whisper.

As regards the state of Spain, M. Thiers said that he believed
the Federal Party was after all the party of order; that at all
events it was predominant in all the outer circumference of
Spain; that the Unitarians existed only in Madrid and the central
provinces, and that the North was Carlist or Federal. This being
the case, his advice to the Government of Madrid had been to make
concessions to the Federals. He did not think that, if properly
managed, their pretensions would go much beyond what was called in
France 'decentralisation administrative.'

The view of the Federals being the party of order in Spain
was new to me, but M. Thiers was beset by a host of deputies and I
could not continue the conversation.

A letter from Lord Odo Russell[6] to Lord Lyons admirably defines the attitude of Germany, and is an exceptionally lucid summary of Bismarckian policy in general.

* * * * *

British Embassy, Berlin, March 14, 1873.

Thanks for yours of the 4th instant.

As regards Spain, Thiers, and Bismarck I cannot add anything
more definite or more precise. Bismarck and the Emperor William
are so far satisfied that the Republic will make room for the
Alphonsists so that they can afford to wait and look on.

What Bismarck intends for Spain later, no one can guess, but
clearly nothing favourable or agreeable to France.

The two great objects of Bismarck's policy are:

(1) The supremacy of Germany in Europe and of the German race
in the world.

(2) The neutralization of the influence and power of the Latin
race in France and elsewhere.

To obtain these objects he will go any lengths while he lives,
so that we must be prepared for surprises in the future.

A change has come over the Emperor and his military advisers
in regard to the evacuation of French territory, as you have seen
by his speech on opening the German Parliament.

His Majesty is now prepared to withdraw his garrison as soon
as the fifth and last milliard shall have been paid by Paris and
received at Berlin.

So that if it is true that Thiers proposes to pay the fifth
milliard in monthly instalments of 250,000,000 fs. beginning from
the 1st of June, the evacuation might be expected in October and
France be relieved of her nightmare.

This I look upon as a most desirable object. It appears to
me that the re-establishment of the future balance of power in
Europe on a general peace footing, is _the_ thing Diplomacy should
work for, and that nothing can be done so long as the Germans have
not got their French gold, and the French got rid of their German
soldiers.

The Germans, as you know, look upon the war of revenge as
unavoidable and are making immense preparations for it.

Germany is in reality a great camp ready to break up for any
war at a week's notice with a million of men.

We are out of favour with the Germans for preferring the old
French alliance to a new German one, as our commercial policy is
said to prove, and this impression has been lately confirmed by
Thiers's _exposé des motifs_.

Thiers is again out of favour at Berlin, because the Russian
Government has warned the German Government that Thiers is working
to draw Russia into the Anglo-French Alliance contrary to their
wishes. I believe myself that the alliance or understanding between
Russia and Germany, Gortschakoff and Bismarck is real, intimate, and
sincere; and that they have agreed to preserve Austria so long as
she obeys and serves them, but woe to Austria if ever she attempts
to be independent!

Then the German and Slav elements she is composed of, will be
made to gravitate towards their natural centres, leaving Hungary
and her dependencies as a semi-oriental vassal of Germany and
Russia. However, those are things of the future, at present I can
think of nothing but the crisis at home and the deep regret I feel
at losing my kind benefactor Lord Granville as a chief. My only
consolation is that he will the sooner return to power as our
Premier, for he is clearly the man of the future.

I hope you will write again occasionally.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord O. Russell._

Paris, April 8, 1873.

Many thanks for your most interesting letter of the 14th. I
entirely agree with you that the one object of diplomacy should be
to re-establish the balance of power in Europe on a peace footing.
The payment of the indemnity and the departure of the German troops
from France are of course necessary to the commencement of anything
like a normal state of things. The French all more or less brood
over the hope of vengeance, and the Germans give them credit for
being even more bent upon revenge than they really are. So Germany
keeps up an enormous army, and France strains every nerve to raise
one; and what can diplomatists do?

In Germany they seem to attach a great deal more than due
importance to the Commercial Treaty, as a sign of a tendency
towards a renewal of the Anglo-French Alliance. But then the
Germans have always been more angry with us for not helping to blot
France out of Europe than the French have been with us for not
helping them out of the scrape they got into by their own fault.
Germans and French are to my mind alike unreasonable, but we only
suffer the ordinary fate of neutrals.

Thiers professes to have no thought of forming any alliance at
present; and to consider that it would be absurd of France to try
for more at this moment than to ward off great questions, and live
as harmoniously as she can with all Foreign Powers, without showing
a preference to any. This is no doubt the wise and sensible policy.
Thiers certainly acts upon it so far as England is concerned. Does
he also act upon it as regards Russia? I cannot say. I think there
is a little coquetry between him and the Russians.

Lord Granville appears to have sent through the Duchesse de Galliera a private message warning Thiers of the dangers of his advances to Russia; but the latter asserted that although the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been directed to maintain the most cordial relations with the Russian Government, matters had not gone further than that, and that he had made no communications which he should object to Germany knowing of. Thiers's tenure of power was, however, destined shortly to come to an end. On May 24, the veteran who had rendered such invaluable services to the country was defeated by a combination of opponents, and Marshal MacMahon became President of the Republic in his stead. The change of Government was received quietly by the country; the elaborate precautions which had been taken in case of disorder proved superfluous, and the funds rose on the assumption that the Marshal was to prove to be the new saviour of society. MacMahon, who had reluctantly accepted the honour thrust upon him, was generally regarded as a French General Monk, but which of the three pretenders was to be his Charles the Second remained a matter of complete uncertainty. The fickle crowd hastened to prostrate itself before the rising sun, and the first reception held by the new President at Versailles constituted a veritable triumph; swarms of people of all sorts attending, particularly those members of smart society who had long deserted the salons of the Préfecture. Amongst the throng were particularly noticeable the Duc d'Aumale and his brothers, wearing uniform and the red ribands which they had never been known to display before. All looked smooth and tranquil, as it usually did at the beginning; but the Government so far had not done anything beyond changing Prefects and Procureurs. The political situation, for the time being, might be summed up in the phrase that the French preferred to have at their head a man _qui monte à cheval_, rather than a man _qui monte à la tribune_.

Although the dismissal of Thiers savoured of ingratitude, it was not altogether unfortunate for him that he had quitted office at that particular moment, for little doubt was felt that, with or without any error of policy on his own part, the country was gradually drifting towards communism. At any rate, he could compare with just pride the state in which he left France to the state in which he found her. Although the last German soldier had not yet left French soil, the credit of the liberation of the country was due to him, and by his financial operations, successful beyond all expectations, he had not only paid off four milliards, but provided the funds for discharging the fifth, and so admirably conducted the negotiations that the German Government was willing to withdraw the rest of the occupying force.

The fall of Thiers caused searchings of heart at Berlin, and a conversation with Count Arnim, the German Ambassador at Paris, in June showed that the German Government regarded MacMahon with anything but favour. Arnim stated that displeasure had been felt at Berlin, both at language held by the Marshal before his appointment, and at his neglect in his former position to act with proper courtesy towards the Emperor's Ambassador in France. The German Government did not doubt that the remainder of the indemnity would be paid, but Thiers indulged less than other Frenchmen in hostile feelings towards Germany, and he and a few of the people about him seemed to be the only Frenchmen who could bring themselves to act with propriety and civility in their relations with Germans. In fact, Thiers's foreign policy had been wise and conciliatory, but as for his internal policy, he, Count Arnim, avowed that he entirely concurred in the opinion that it would have thrown the country in a short time into the hands of the Red Republicans.

The unfortunate Arnim was apparently at this time unconscious of his impending doom, although, as the following interesting letter from Lord Odo Russell to Lord Lyons shows, his fate had been sealed months before.

* * * * *

_British Embassy, Berlin, Jan. 18, 1873._

What I have to say to-day grieves me to the soul, because it
goes against my excellent friend and landlord Harry Arnim.

Said friend, it is said, could not resist the temptation of
turning an honest penny in the great War Indemnity Loan at Paris,
and the Jew Banker he employed, called Hanseman, let it out to
Bismarck, who could not understand how Arnim was rich enough to buy
estates in Silesia and houses in Berlin.

Now Bismarck, who is tired of Arnim, and thinks him a rising
rival, will make use of this discovery with the Emperor whenever he
wants to upset Arnim and send a new man to Paris.

He thinks him a rising rival because Arnim went to Baden
last autumn and advised the Emperor, behind Bismarck's back, to
go in for an Orleanist Monarchy and drop Thiers, in opposition to
Bismarck's policy, who wishes to drop all Pretenders and uphold
Thiers as long as he lives.

Besides which Arnim hinted at a readiness to take office at
home if Bismarck came to grief.

The Emperor is fond of Arnim and listened with complacency and
told Bismarck when he returned from Varzin,--Bismarck has vowed
revenge! I have not written all this home because it would serve
no purpose yet,--but it may be useful to you as a peep behind the
curtain. Meanwhile Bismarck has appointed one of his _secret_
agents as Commercial Secretary to the Paris Embassy to watch Arnim.
His name is Lindau and as he is a very able man and an old friend
of mine, I have given him a letter to you. He might become useful
some day.

Let me add _in confidence_ that he corresponds privately and
secretly with Bismarck behind Arnim's back.

* * * * *

It will be observed that the views expressed by Arnim to Lord Lyons in June are not altogether consistent with those attributed to him in the above letter, but Lord Odo Russell's opinion that his implacable chief would crush him at the first opportunity was only too well justified before long.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: June, 1871.]

[Footnote 2: German Ambassador at Paris.]

[Footnote 3: Foreign Minister in succession to M. Jules Favre.]

[Footnote 4: Subsequently Lord Ampthill.]

[Footnote 5: French Ambassador at Berlin.]

[Footnote 6: Formerly Mr. Odo Russell.]