Chapter XII: The Eastern Question (2)

If it eventually became necessary for England to take active steps to secure her interests in the East, it was quite clear that no assistance whatever could be expected from France. M. Waddington took an early opportunity to assure Lord Lyons most emphatically that France wanted nothing for herself, and that she desired no acquisition of territory either in the Mediterranean or elsewhere; but whilst he disclaimed any desire of this nature, he showed in a most unmistakeable manner that an occupation of Egypt by England would create a bitter feeling in France which would long impair the friendly relations between the two countries. Speaking most confidentially, M. Waddington said that it was all important to France that England and Russia should not be involved in hostilities, and that France should not be left _tête-à-tête_ with Prince Bismarck, whether the latter played the part of an enemy or a tempter. In fact, the French Government, like its predecessor, was disquieted by a notion that Bismarck intended to propose to France some arrangement respecting Belgium and Holland, which would dismember those States, assigning of course to Germany the lion's share of the spoils, and it seemed to be apprehended that France would be called upon to choose between acquiescing in such an arrangement or incurring the active enmity of Germany. The fear of the French that they might become involved was so strong that Waddington was alarmed even at the idea of committing his Government to the British declaration as to the invalidity of treaties concluded without the participation of the Powers; but, in spite of this timorous spirit, and although the Treaty of San Stefano was not signed until March 3, Lord Derby informed Lord Lyons on February 2, that, the support of Austria having been obtained, Her Majesty's Government were determined to secure a Conference, and it was hoped that Italy and France would also exercise at least a benevolent neutrality. The uncertainty of the position was shown in Lord Derby's language with regard to Constantinople. 'I hardly know what will happen if the Russians insist on showing themselves at Constantinople. It is not a case we could make a _casus belli_ of, but I think it would in that case be desirable that the Neutral Powers should be present too--that is their fleets--both as a demonstration, and to keep order if necessary. The war being over, such a proceeding could not be misconstrued, as it certainly would have been before. All this, however, is uncertain.'

Judging by subsequent experiences, Lord Derby would have spent a long time in securing the presence of the International fleets at Constantinople, and would have experienced still more trouble in persuading them to take any action. The Russians fortunately stopped short of Constantinople, and a Conference being now a practical certainty, Lord Lyons was invited to act as the British representative.

* * * * *

_Lord Derby to Lord Lyons._

February 6, 1878.

The Conference will probably come off, and it may come off
soon, though there is a chance of delay from differences as to the
place of meeting.

I find the feeling of the Cabinet unanimous, and I fully share
it, that you are the fittest person to attend the Conference on
our behalf. Indeed, I know of no one in whom I should have equal
confidence for a duty of that kind. Nothing has been said to the
Queen, but I have no doubt of Her Majesty's consent.

May I ask you if, considering the importance and difficulty
of the work, you will be prepared to sacrifice your personal
convenience so far as to accept the office if offered? I fear the
sacrifice will be considerable, but let up hope that the result
will repay your trouble.

To most people, an invitation of this character, conveyed in so flattering a manner, would have had an irresistible attraction; but Lord Lyons was one of those persons to whom notoriety was indifferent, if not obnoxious, and who much preferred to confine himself to doing his own business in a practical and unostentatious spirit. He, however, felt it his duty to accept, hoping vainly all the time that the Conference would never take place at all.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Paris, Feb. 8, 1878.

I wish to offer you my best thanks for your letter of the day
before yesterday. Your proposal to appoint me to represent England
at the Conference is very flattering in itself, and nothing could
be more gratifying than the terms in which it is made.

You were so kind as to speak of the sacrifice of my personal
convenience, but that consideration I will set entirely aside.
There are feelings of much greater weight which make me shrink from
the task, and it appears to me to be a task peculiarly difficult,
and one of which the result is, to say the least, extremely
doubtful. I may say, too, without any affectation of modesty, that
I do not think myself well qualified for it.

Still these are after all personal considerations which I
ought not to allow to interfere with any public duty which I may be
called upon to discharge. If therefore the Queen and the Government
should determine upon entrusting this mission to me, I should
undertake it heartily and zealously, and do my best to justify
their confidence.

Of course nothing can be settled until we know the rank and
number of the Plenipotentiaries of other Powers, the place of
meeting, and other particulars, which may have a material influence
in the selection of the Representative or Representatives of Her
Majesty.

If however the progress of events should ultimately lead to my
being chosen, I should be very grateful if you would allow me the
opportunity of conferring with you upon various matters, before any
definite arrangements are made. There is one to which I attach so
much importance that I will mention it at once. I trust that you
will allow me to choose myself the staff to accompany me on the
occasion. My efficiency and comfort would depend mainly on this.

Apart from a disinclination to leave his own work, Lord Lyons probably considered that the outlook for England at a Conference was by no means reassuring. The issue of the Conference really depended upon the military position in which England and Austria would apparently stand, should the Conference itself break up _rê infectâ_, and at the end of February the English position looked to be none too favourable, for it depended upon the fleet having access to the Black Sea. If we were able to stop the Russian communications by sea, the Russians would be at the mercy of Austria by land, supposing Andrassy's boasts to be well founded; but we had no absolute security against the Russians occupying Gallipoli at any moment, and no semblance of a security of their not occupying the Black Sea exit of the Bosphorus, for the Turks were at their mercy, and, as pointed out by Mr. Layard, they were quite capable of making any arrangement with Russia, since they considered that they had been betrayed and abandoned by England. Neither, it might be added, was there any security that Austria would stand firm, for there was always the chance of her being bought off with Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Paris, Feb. 26, 1878.

As to the Conference itself all seems more than ever in doubt.
Unless the Austrians are determined to go to war and are visibly
ready, and unless we are equally determined and equally ready on
our side, and unless the Russians are convinced of this, there can
be no chance of their making any concessions. Then, what will the
Austrians want? To bolster up the Turks, to waste energy in trying
to place under them again this or that district delivered by the
Russians, would be a very losing game. There must, I suppose,
be some new Principality or Principalities. If anything like a
national feeling and a national Government can be established in
them, their danger will be from Russia, and Russia will become
their natural enemy, unless they are thrown into her arms by a
hostility on the part of Austria, which will make them feel that
Russia alone is their defence against Turkey. Then there are the
Straits, and the difficulty of placing the Turks, or whoever is
to hold them, in a position to guard them against a Russian _coup
de main_ at least. Ignatieff seems to be already working the
connection between Egypt and the Porte, with a view to getting
money out of Egypt for Russia. I am inclined to think that the more
radically Egypt is severed from the Porte, and the less our free
action with regard to it is hampered by collective guarantees or
collective Protectorates the safer we shall be.

The correctness of these views has since been amply demonstrated by the history of the Balkan States. The opinion about Egypt, however, was probably not at all to the taste of Lord Derby, who appeared to rejoice in divided responsibility.

Lord Lyons himself was summoned to London early in March in order to confer with the Government respecting his procedure at Berlin, and judging from his letters to various correspondents, the course which Her Majesty's Government proposed to adopt was in a state of considerable uncertainty. It was, however, a source of much satisfaction to him that he would have the co-operation of Lord Odo Russell, who was an intimate friend, and in whose judgment he felt complete confidence. He also got his way about his staff, which was to include amongst others, Malet, Sheffield, and Mr. (now Sir William) Barrington.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Odo Russell._

London, March 13, 1878.

My only comfort about this awful Congress or Conference is
that you will be my partner in it. I hope, if it does come off
after all, that we may get over it without doing harm to our
country or to ourselves. I wanted them to set me aside and take
advantage of the transfer to Berlin to put it into your hands;
and I still think this would be the best plan; but they say that
after their announcement of my appointment to Parliament, they
cannot cancel it. Sir Robert Peel has moved a resolution that I am
not a fit person to represent England at the Conference. I shall
console myself if he carries it. He grounds his motion upon 'my
well-known opinions.' I suppose he takes my opinions from a wholly
unauthorized and incorrect account of them which appeared in a
letter in the _Daily Telegraph_ yesterday. Some people suppose he
wrote the letter himself in order to have a peg to hang his motion
on. I don't think your difficulties at the Conference will arise
from strong preconceived opinions of mine. I shall try and get our
instructions made as precise as possible. Could you give me some
hints as to the particular points which should be decided before we
begin? You will know how far certain solutions in our sense will be
feasible or not. It is worse than useless that we should be told to
aim at impossibilities, and have to yield: though there may be of
course conditions, which if not admitted, will render it necessary
for us to retire from the Conference altogether.

I am sure you will be the greatest help and comfort to me, and
I hope I may be a help to you. Please tell me anything you wish me
to do or say here.

Lord Odo Russell appears to have been equally in the dark as to the intended policy of Her Majesty's Government.

* * * * *

_Lord Odo Russell to Lord Lyons._

Berlin, March 16, 1878.

The feelings you express concerning the Conference are so
entirely my own that I need say no more, and only hope that Lord
Derby will give you a better qualified assistant than I can be with
regard to Oriental Affairs, of which I do not really know enough to
be of any use to you or to the country, beside such authorities as
Ignatieff, Lobanoff, Calice, Radowitz, Busch, etc., etc.

You ask if I could give you some hints as to the particular
points which should be decided before you begin.

I would do so with the greatest pleasure, if I only knew what
the policy of Her Majesty's Government is likely to be in Congress.
All I know about it at present is contained in Lord Derby's
despatch of May 6, and as far as Constantinople and the Straits are
concerned, I fancy Russia will be conciliatory.

You ask further how far certain solutions in our sense will be
feasible or not.

I wish I could answer your question, but can only beg of
you to tell me first whether we accept the consequences of our
neutrality, or whether we contest them: whether we are going
to reject the Turko-Russian Treaty, as we rejected the Berlin
Memorandum, or whether we are going to accept now what we refused
then.

Russia is now in possession of Turkey. Germany supports Russia.

France and Italy have no wish to quarrel with Russia or
Germany, and will not offer any serious opposition to the
Turko-Russian Treaty.

Austria may object to two things: the proposed limits of
Bulgaria, and the prolonged occupation of Russian troops.

If Russia is well disposed, she will consent to a smaller
Bulgaria and to a shorter occupation.

If she doesn't, Austria must choose between a diplomatic
defeat, a compromise, or war to turn Russia out of Bulgaria.
Bismarck will exert all his personal influence in favour of a
compromise to keep the three Emperors' Alliance together before
Europe in Conference assembled.

The annexation of Armenia and the war indemnity are questions
which Russia will scarcely consent to submit to the Congress at all.

What then is our attitude to be? Please let me know as soon as
you can, and I will do my best to answer your questions.

If we go in for Greek interests we shall have the cordial
support of Germany and Austria, I think--but Greek interests are
in direct opposition to Turkish interests, if I am not greatly
mistaken.

On hearing of your appointment I wrote to you to congratulate
myself and to beg of you to grant us the happiness of taking up
your quarters at the Embassy, and also to advise you to bring a
numerous and efficient staff, as I have not hands enough at Berlin
for an emergency.

The letters of Lord Odo Russell at this period show that he was completely in the dark as to the intentions of Her Majesty's Government, and that he was quite unable to get any answer as to what was to be their policy with regard to the Treaty of San Stefano. He himself was convinced that the three Empires had already settled what the result of the Congress was to be, and that they simply intended to communicate it to Greece, Roumania, and other Powers for whom they wished to manifest their contempt, such as France and England, _à prendre ou à laisser_. Under these circumstances, it became doubtful whether it was worth while for England to go into a Conference at all and court unnecessary humiliation, serious as the responsibility would be if such a course were decided upon.

There can be no doubt that much of the prevailing uncertainty was due to Lord Derby, who with great difficulty had contrived to keep pace with his more enterprising colleagues, and whose over-cautious temperament had prevented the adoption of any really definite policy. But Lord Derby, unable to stand the shock of seeing a few thousand Indian troops sent to the Mediterranean, resigned office on March 28, and the advent of Lord Salisbury at the Foreign Office marked a new departure in British Foreign Policy.

Lord Salisbury's circular of April 1, 1878, was intended to show that the Treaty of San Stefano threatened the interests of Europe, and that the whole, and not parts of it, as proposed by Russia, should be submitted to the Congress. It pointed out that the creation of a big Bulgaria, stretching over the greater part of the Balkan Peninsula, and with ports on the Black Sea and the Ægean, would give Russia a predominant influence; that the proposed annexations in Asia Minor would give Russia control over political and commercial conditions in that region, and that the exaction of an indemnity which it was impossible for Turkey to provide, would enable Russia either to exact further cessions of territory or to impose any other conditions which might be thought advisable. The logic was sound, and at all events Lord Salisbury succeeded in producing a definite British policy, which his predecessor had signally failed to do.

When Lord Lyons returned to Paris at the beginning of April the question of whether there was to be a Congress or not was still in suspense. French opinion was rather more in favour of England on the Eastern Question than had been expected, but there was no sign of anything more than passive sympathy, and Waddington, who was particularly sensitive on the subject, intimated, not obscurely, that the good will of France depended upon England not acting independently of her in Egypt. It looked, in fact, as if England would be left to bell the cat, although Lord Salisbury's circular, as was generally admitted, had immensely raised British prestige on the continent. The suspicion felt in France as to Russian intentions was shown by the failure of agents of the Russian Government to negotiate a loan at Paris for thirty millions sterling, and Lord Salisbury's letters in the early part of April show that, while there were symptoms of yielding in Europe, there appeared to be no prospect of those concessions with regard to Asia Minor to which Her Majesty's Government attached great importance.

On the whole, the French Government was apparently anxious to act as far as possible with England, without committing itself too much, since the idea of a Russian naval station in the Mediterranean was highly obnoxious; but Waddington was hampered, amongst other causes, by the proceedings of Gambetta, who was disporting himself in some of the European capitals with the object of forming, or appearing to form, relations with foreign statesmen, which would enable him to put forward a claim to become eventually Minister for Foreign Affairs. Waddington always in private repudiated responsibility for what Gambetta said or did, but the latter was now so important a personage that it was necessary to keep on good terms with him and to submit to a patronage which must have been irksome to French Ministers.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, April 24, 1878.

The negotiations for the simultaneous withdrawal of the fleet
and army from Constantinople proceed very slowly. We are making
no difficulties, but the Russians cannot make up their minds about
details, and are probably trying to screw some concessions out of
the luckless Turks. I shall be very glad to see the arrangement
succeed, because our fleet is doing no possible good there at this
moment. Whatever value it had, disappeared as soon as the peace was
signed. But as the Russians seem to be afraid of it, we must make
the most of it. Possibly, in their secret hearts, they entertain
very much the same opinion as to the position of their armies.

The general negotiations do not improve. Russia gives me the
impression of a Government desperately anxious for peace, and
driven on by some fate towards war. Andrassy undoubtedly means to
have Bosnia; but whether he will be satisfied with that I am not
so certain. It is a possible policy for him to throw the Danube
over altogether; to secure an outlet for his produce by a railway
to Salonika, and to accept a simultaneous extension southward in
parallel lines of Austrian and Russian possession--whether in the
form of actual territory, or of vassal states. In that case, he
will throw us over, and his course will be easy enough if he can
square the Hungarians. But that may be a difficulty. Do you gather
any information about his objects?

Is it your impression--as it is mine--that the French are
supremely anxious to push us into war?

Lord Lyons's reply to these inquiries gives the reasons why the French views with regard to an Anglo-Russian conflict had undergone an alteration.

* * * * *

Paris, April 26, 1878.

I owe you many thanks for your letter of the day before
yesterday.

You ask me whether it is my impression that the French are
extremely anxious to push us into war.

Confidence in their returning military strength, and the
apparent success of their endeavours to conciliate Germany have
calmed their fears of Bismarck. They are no longer nervously
desirous that the forces of England should be kept in the west,
as a necessary check upon the great Chancellor's supposed designs
upon Holland, upon Belgium, or upon France herself. On the other
hand, they have given up counting upon Russia as an ally against
Germany, and have abandoned Décazes's policy of courting her and
espousing her interests. The result of all this is that they are
willing enough that the main force of England should be employed at
a distance from home.

They have been reassured about Egypt, and they think that if
England is engaged in hostilities with Russia, she will be less
disposed and less able to interfere with France or to separate from
her in Egyptian affairs. They have lost their great fear, which was
that England, instead of opposing Russia, would seek a compensation
for herself in the annexation of Egypt. Thus another of the reasons
which made them desire that England should abstain from all action
has disappeared.

There are, moreover, the patriots, who look far ahead, who do
positively desire that England should go to war with Russia. Their
calculation is that Austria and Italy would sooner or later be
drawn into the war on the English side, and that then, Germany and
Russia being isolated, France might join the rest of Europe against
them, and recover Alsace and Lorraine. These are said to be the
views of Gambetta and his friends.

There is, however, one feeling which pervades the great
mass of Frenchmen. They wish England to take the chestnuts out
of the fire for them. They are quite determined not to go to war
themselves for anything less than Alsace and Lorraine, but they do
wish to exclude Russia from the Mediterranean, and they are very
willing that the danger and the burthen of effecting this should be
incurred by England.

With these views their newspapers go on patting us on the
back, and may continue to do so, as long as we seem to be ready to
act alone; but they would change their note, if they saw any risk
of France being drawn into the war with us, until _after_ Austria
and Italy had joined us.

I know of nothing to confirm Odo Russell's information that
in return for the consent of Germany and Russia to exclude Egypt,
etc., from the deliberations of the Congress, Waddington engaged to
support Germany and Russia in everything else. What appeared on the
surface was that this exclusion was made openly by France a _sine
qua non_ of her attending the Congress, that she communicated the
condition simultaneously to all the Powers, and did not at all ask
for the assent to it as a concession. If there is only Bismarckian
authority for the bargain stated to have been made by Waddington
with Germany and Russia, I think it _mérite confirmation_. The one
object of Bismarck seems always to be to sow dissensions between
France and any other Power that she may seem to be approaching.

Notwithstanding the Comte de St. Vallier's assertion to Odo
Russell, Mr. Adams is quite certain that it was M. de St. Vallier
himself who reported to Mr. Waddington that Odo had communicated
to the Emperor William, Prince Bismarck, etc., a telegram from Mr.
Adams on the subject of the sympathies of France with England.
In fact Mr. Waddington who is an old schoolfellow and friend of
Mr. Adams, read to him parts of the private letter from M. de St.
Vallier in which the report was contained, and indeed one of the
phrases he cited from the letter was _le telegramme Adams_ as the
source of the communication made by Odo Russell.

The Prince of Wales arrived this morning and I have been all
the afternoon at the Exhibition with him, which obliges me to write
in such haste, that I cannot be brief.

I have just seen Hobart Pasha, who goes on to England
to-morrow morning and will try to see you.

I doubt whether Waddington or the Austrian Ambassador here get
any information about Andrassy's real views and objects.

The Russians seem to be hard at work trying to make the
execution of the Treaty of San Stefano a _fait accompli_. _Beati
possidentes._

Lord Salisbury's suspicions as to the pressure being put upon the unfortunate Turks by the Russians were confirmed by an interesting letter from Mr. Layard to Lord Lyons, in which the much-denounced Abdul Hamid appears in quite a new light.

* * * * *

Constantinople, May 1, 1878.

I am not surprised that Waddington should care nothing about
Armenia. The question is a purely English one, but to us a vital
one. The Treaty of San Stefano puts the whole of Asia Minor
virtually at the mercy of Russia and insures her influence over
Mesopotamia and perhaps ultimately over Syria, which would probably
not be pleasant to the French. This immense addition to the power
of Russia in Asia, and the command that she obtains, if the Treaty
be carried out, of routes to India and Central Asia, is a matter
of serious import to England. But probably there is no European
Power which does not envy us the possession of India, and would
not secretly rejoice at the prospect of our losing it. I believe
this feeling to be particularly strong with Frenchmen. But if we
intend to preserve our Empire as it now is, we must be prepared to
deal with this question of Russian aggrandisement in Asia Minor and
drive them back. Our only way of doing so, is by making use of the
Mussulman population. The idea of an autonomous Christian Armenia
to form a barrier to Russian advance is one of those absurdities
which are cropping up daily amongst our sentimental politicians,
who know nothing of the matters upon which they pretend to lay down
the law.

The Grand Duke Nicholas, before going, made an ultimate
attempt to bully the Sultan into surrendering Shumla, Varna and
Batoum; but His Majesty held firm and His Imperial Highness failed
to get a promise out of him on the subject. It is curious that
whilst our ignorant and unscrupulous newspaper correspondents are
systematically writing down the Sultan and denouncing him as a poor
weak creature incapable of having an opinion of his own, he has
shown far more firmness than any of his Ministers. Had it not been
for him, it is highly probable that the ironclads would have been
given over to the Russians, and more than probable that the Grand
Duke would have been allowed to occupy Buyuk Dere and the entrance
to the Bosphorus. The Russians threaten to seize Varna, Shumla
and Batoum by force, but I much doubt whether they will venture
to do so, as right is not on their side. Shumla and Varna are not
to be given up to Russia, but to the Bulgarian Principality when
constituted: and the arrangements for the final settlement of the
Russian frontier in Asia are to be made within six months of the
conclusion of the 'definitive' not the 'preliminary' Treaty.

I am anxiously waiting to hear whether the simultaneous
withdrawal of our fleet and the Russian forces can be arranged. It
is of the utmost importance to the Turks to get the Russians away
from San Stefano, but I cannot understand how the Russians could
consent to give up so advantageous a position, unless they found
that if they remained there they would be exposed to considerable
danger from a joint attack by the English fleet and the Turkish
forces.

Layard, who was a fighting diplomatist, and possessed the rare quality of knowing what he wanted, had long chafed at the irresolute action of the British Government, and was all in favour of making a resolute stand against Russian aggression. Throughout the war, he had continually complained of the apathy and indecision of the British Cabinet, and attributed these deficiencies to divided counsels and to the advanced age of Lord Beaconsfield. Now, with Lord Salisbury installed at the Foreign Office, he plucked up hope again.

'Salisbury,' he wrote to Lord Lyons, 'seems to know what he
wants--which is a great contrast to his predecessor. If he is firm,
we shall, I think, triumph in the end, and remove a great danger
from Europe and ourselves. Were it not for that double-dealing,
untrustworthy fellow Andrassy, we might perhaps accomplish all
that we require without war. Andrassy's proceedings give rise to a
strong suspicion that the secret understanding between the three
Emperors still exists. The Sultan is persuaded of it, and I have
found that his instinct in such matters is usually right.'

On May 11, Lord Salisbury wrote to Lord Lyons saying that Count Münster (German Ambassador in London) had assured him that the object upon which the French were bent in the Mediterranean was Tunis. 'Do you hear anything of the sort?' he asked Lord Lyons, and added the highly important statement: 'It is of course an extension of French territory and influence of which we should not have the slightest jealousy or fear. But I am not assuming in any way that the Porte would wish to give it up. I should only like to have your opinion how far France would wish to have it.'

To this Lord Lyons replied:--

Ever since I can remember, the Italians have suspected the
French, and the French have suspected the Italians of designs upon
Tunis. Bismarck's mention of it at this moment is probably only
one of his usual devices to sow distrust of France. I have never
found that the acquisition of Tunis recommended itself to French
imagination, and I don't believe it would be taken as anything like
a set-off against English acquisitions in Egypt or Syria. I believe
our principal interest in Tunis arises from its being a source
of supply of provisions to Malta. When Décazes wished to set us
against the supposed Italian designs upon it, he used to talk of
its being dangerous to us to have Malta in a vice between Sicily
and an Italian Tunis, but it never seemed to me that the peril was
very clear.

* * * * *

England is very popular here at this moment, and the Prince of
Wales's visit has been a principal cause of this, but the French
have no intention to fight with us or for us. They back us up in
asserting the sanctity of Treaties, and they certainly desire that
the _status quo_ may be maintained in the Mediterranean, until
France is a little stronger.

It will be remembered that only a few years earlier the German Government had informed the French Government through Count Arnim that it would not tolerate the establishment of anything in the nature of a French Protectorate in Tunis; so that if the French were now really entertaining any designs of that nature, it was pretty obvious that it could only be the result of a hint from Berlin. The question of Tunis, however, was shortly overshadowed by greater issues. On May 16, Lord Salisbury transmitted to Paris a long document which formed the basis of the so-called Anglo-Turkish Convention. The proposals embodied subsequently in the convention were contained in a private letter to Mr. Layard, dated May 10, and the latter was directed not to proceed with the negotiations until further instructions were received, as the necessity for the convention depended upon the nature of the reply which Count Schouvaloff was to bring back from St. Petersburg. Whatever may have been said at the time in denunciation of the occupation of Cyprus and the Asia Minor Protectorate, it can hardly be denied that Lord Salisbury had a good case logically, as is shown by the following letter.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

May 22, 1878.

Until I see Schouvaloff to-morrow I shall know little of the
probabilities of our acting on that private letter to Layard of
last week, of which I sent you a copy. If, however, we do so, it
seems to me that we have a very good logical case--Is logic any use
in diplomacy?--against any objections the French may raise.

By the Tripartite Treaty of April 25, 1856, we had a right to
call on them to help us in restraining Russia from appropriating
Turkish territory. They have loudly and constantly asserted that
no military action is to be expected on their part. In Europe we
can meet the consequences of that desertion by the help of Austria,
Greece, the Rhodope mountaineers and others. But in Asia we are
abandoned wholly to ourselves. The French have left us to face and
guard against the consequences of that Russian encroachment which
they undertook to join with us in resisting. Does it lie in their
mouth, if we say that such encroachments, if persisted in, require
special precautions? that we cannot turn the Russians out by
ourselves, and that abandoned by our ally, who should have made the
task easy to us, we have no choice except to mount guard over the
endangered territory and take up the positions requisite for doing
so with effect? I do not see what answer the French would have.

But you will probably reply that my reasoning is idle trouble,
because logic is of _no_ use in diplomacy.

The French would have had no real cause for complaint if they had discovered the contents of the proposed Anglo-Turkish Convention, for as Lord Salisbury had already pointed out, he had been careful 'to turn the eyes of desire away from Syria,' the only portion of Asia Minor in which France was interested; but Waddington had been making declarations against any of the Powers helping themselves to Turkish territory, and although these declarations were meant only to apply to Bosnia and Herzegovina, he would probably have used much the same language if he had learnt that England was thinking of occupying any portion of the Turkish Empire. Logic may not be of much use in diplomacy, but it is of still less use in influencing public opinion, and an appeal to the Tripartite Treaty, after it had been set aside so long, would have come rather late in the day. As, however, the necessity for providing for British interests and British safety in Asia was indisputable, Lord Salisbury was justified in contending that those Powers who disliked the only methods which were within our reach, should give us such help as would enable us to dispense with them.

Upon the return of Schouvaloff from St. Petersburg, it turned out, as Lord Salisbury had anticipated, that Russia was prepared to make concessions in Europe, but scarcely any in Asia. Layard was, therefore, directed to negotiate the Anglo-Turkish Convention.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, May 29, 1878.

I send you two memoranda, or rather two separate versions
of the same paper, which will explain fully the nature of the
propositions which Schouvaloff brought back to me, and the extent
to which we have been able to accept his proposals. The upshot of
the matter has been that the Czar yields substantially all we want
in Bulgaria and as to the Greek provinces, but sticks to his text
as to Montenegro, Bessarabia, and the Armenian conquests, except
Bayazid.

I have informed Schouvaloff that against these Asiatic
acquisitions it will be necessary for us to take precautions; and
while taking from him a formal engagement that Russia will not
extend her position in Turkey in Asia, we shall ourselves give to
Turkey a guarantee to the same effect. We shall accept these terms
as soon as he receives from St. Petersburg authority to take them
in the redaction on which we have ultimately agreed. At the same
time we have taken our measures to secure ourselves against the
consequences of the Asiatic advance. Layard received on Saturday
telegraphic directions in the sense of the private letter which I
addressed to him a fortnight ago, and of which I sent you a copy,
and with great vigour and skill he procured the signature of an
agreement on Sunday last. We do not intend that this fact shall be
made public until the Congress, as the agreement is made wholly
conditional on the retention of Batoum and Kars. But whether we
shall succeed in these good intentions remains to be seen. Our past
performances in that line do not justify any very sanguine hope.

As there seems no chance of the Porte ceding Bosnia, and as
it is necessary to keep Austria with us in the Congress, we have
offered to support her in any proposal she makes in Congress on the
subject of Bosnia, if she will support us in questions concerning
the limits of occupation and organization of Bulgaria. It is not
necessary to tell Waddington this, but, as we have advanced a step
since he last asked us the question, it is important to avoid
language inconsistent with it.

One cannot help suspecting Lord Salisbury's sense of humour as being responsible for the stipulation, that, if the Russians abandoned to the Turks their conquests from them in Asia Minor, the occupation of Cyprus should come to an end and the Anglo-Turkish Convention become null and void. On the following day (May 30), the so-called Anglo-Russian agreement was signed, and the enterprising Mr. Marvin, who had been temporarily employed at the Foreign Office on the cheap, handed it over to the _Globe_ newspaper, thus creating a political sensation of the first order.

The agreement with Russia being now completed, and an invitation to the Congress in suitable terms having been accepted, Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury decided to go to Berlin themselves, instead of sending Lord Lyons.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

June 5, 1878.

I feel that I owe you many apologies for my rudeness in not
writing to you on Saturday night to announce to you the decision
of the Cabinet--and to thank you for the very kind and cordial
way you had placed yourself at our disposition in the spring to
perform what was a very ugly duty. The Cabinet was rushed to the
decision which it took, partly by the consideration to which you
advert, that the threads of the last two months' negociations were
more completely in our hands than by any process of communication
they could be in yours--but also by the fact that we have dangerous
questions looming at Paris--and we cannot afford to have you absent
from your post.

My excuse for my negligence is the prosaic one that I had
not a moment of time. The agonies of a man who has to finish a
difficult negociation, and at the same time to entertain four
royalties in a country house can be better imagined than described.

The Convention at Constantinople has been signed with
expression of lively gratitude on the Sultan's part. I am sorry
that your impressions of the mood in which the French are likely
to receive the news when published, are still so gloomy. However,
we must hope for the best. We have assembled a powerful fleet at
Portsmouth and we shall have six or seven first-rate ironclads to
do what may be necessary in the Mediterranean, besides smaller
ships. And our relations with Bismarck are particularly good. So I
hope our friends at Paris will confine themselves to epigram.

If we can, we shall keep the matter secret till we get at
Congress to the part of the Treaty of San Stefano (Art. XIX) which
concerns the Asiatic annexations. I do not know whether d'Harcourt
has any inkling, but ever since his return from Paris his manner
has changed.

Lord Lyons hailed the decision of Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury as a 'deliverance from a nightmare which had weighed upon him since March,' and found a sympathizer in Lord Odo Russell, who had never expected much good from the Congress if the Three Emperors' League was revived, and who doubted whether the British public would be contented with an amended San Stefano Treaty. The probable action of Waddington, who was to be the French representative at Berlin, is foreshadowed in the following letter.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, June 4, 1878.

I am very glad that you and Lord Beaconsfield have determined
to go yourselves to the Congress. The matters to be treated are too
grave to be left to subordinates, and they could hardly be treated
properly by any one who had not had a minute acquaintance day by
day with the recent communications with Russia and Austria.

Waddington will, I think, be a satisfactory colleague in some
respects, but in others I am afraid you will have difficulties with
him. His English blood and his English education tell both ways.
On the one hand, he is more straightforward than most Frenchmen;
he understands and shares many English feelings, and he sees the
force of English arguments, or perhaps I should rather say, of
arguments put forward in an English way. But, on the other hand, he
feels strongly the necessity of guarding against the tendency in
France to suspect him of an English bias. He will be disposed to
join in resistance to exaggerated Russian pretensions with regard
to Roumelia and the Danube. His personal sentiments are strongly
in favour of Greece. He has a certain sympathy with Christian as
against Mussulman, but he does not carry this to an immoderate or
unpractical extent. There is, however, one point on which you may
find him very stiff. He is most strongly opposed to any change in
the relative position of the Great Powers in the Mediterranean,
and he would, I am afraid, be quite as unwilling to see England
extend her influence in that sea, as he would be to see Russia do
so. It is in order to prevent any alteration in the _statu quo_ in
the Mediterranean, more than from any other reason, that he has
made the participation of France in the Congress conditional on
the exclusion of all questions not directly arising out of the war
between Russia and Turkey, and has positively mentioned Syria and
Egypt as countries to be excluded from the discussion. He would
not perhaps be disinclined to let these questions come up, if he
thought he should obtain the support of other Powers in resisting
any change made outside of the Congress.

At any rate, public feeling in France would probably be too
strong to allow him to acquiesce in any redistribution of territory
or influence in favour of England. But I expressed my opinion on
this point so fully to you and Lord Beaconsfield in the interview I
had with you just before I left England, that I have nothing more
to say about it. The horrible event[19] which took place at Berlin
the day before yesterday has, however, thrown so strong a light
upon one phase of French opinion, that I feel bound to direct your
attention to it. It seems very shocking that while the Emperor
William is suffering from the wounds so wickedly inflicted, people
here should be speculating upon the consequences of their being
fatal, but so it is. The French believe that the maintenance of
the present military system in Germany depends upon the Emperor
William, and that even if His Majesty's successor had the same
determination as His Majesty himself to keep it up, public opinion
in the country would make it impossible for him to do so. What
foundation there may be for this supposition, I do not pretend to
determine; but that it influences the French is certain. Anything
which makes them believe the life of the Emperor to be precarious,
diminishes the restraint which the fear of Germany imposes upon
them, and renders them more stiff in asserting their own views and
pretensions, and less averse from contemplating the possibility of
supporting them by more than words.

There are, in my opinion, strong arguments to be brought in
favour of our taking measures to be in a position to resist Russia
by our own means, if other Powers will give us no help in doing
so; but as you said in a former letter, logic is perhaps not of
much use in diplomacy, and seems to me to be of still less use
in influencing public opinion. I doubt our logic doing much to
reconcile the French to our exercising a separate protection over
Turkey in Asia, or occupying a Turkish island in the Mediterranean.
I am afraid you will think I have become more nervous than
ever, and more prone to the common error among diplomatists of
exaggerating the importance of the country in which they are
themselves stationed, but anyhow I have not seen any reason to
change my views as to the feelings prevalent in France.

The Parliamentary session at Versailles is about to close.
Thanks to the Exhibition, it has been a very tranquil one, but we
must be on the look-out for squalls when the Chamber meets again
in the autumn. Gambetta has hitherto restrained his followers from
opposing the Ministry, and from proposing radical measures, but it
is doubtful whether he will be able, even if willing, to restrain
them after the end of the Exhibition. Some unexpected incident
might even produce a crisis before. At any rate the elections of
a portion of the Senate, which will take place early next year,
may remove the check which the Conservative majority in that House
has hitherto put upon the Chamber of Deputies. The Marshal does
not talk of making any more attempts at resisting the will of the
majority, but I understand that he does not talk very seriously of
retiring as soon as the election is over.

It may perhaps be worth while to mention that Waddington finds
the influence of Gambetta over the Government very irksome, and is
not fond of having it alluded to.

The Congress met at Berlin in the middle of June, and the awkward question of whether Waddington should be informed of the Anglo-Turkish Convention or not was debated. Lord Lyons knew perfectly well that the French would be furious when they heard of it, and that the greater the surprise, the greater would be their indignation. The lines laid down for Waddington's guidance at the Congress were that France desired:

1. Peace.

2. Neutrality.

3. The necessity of the consent of all the Powers to any modifications of the Treaties.

4. The exclusion of Egypt, Syria, the Holy Places, and other topics foreign to the Russo-Turkish War.

These points were certainly not favourable to England receiving any support from France in defending her menaced interests in Asia Minor, as the absolute neutrality of France was the point most insisted upon. In fact France was so obviously anxious to stand aloof, that one suggestion was made that she should be asked to co-operate with us in Asia Minor on the assumption that such co-operation was sure to be refused. This, however, was considered to be too hazardous a course, and it was eventually decided to say nothing to Waddington for the time being, lest he should make the Anglo-Turkish Convention an excuse for not attending the Congress at all. The secret, unlike the Anglo-Russian agreement, seems to have been well kept, and cannot have been known to the Russians, or they would have utilized it for the purpose of sowing discord between the British and French representatives. Finally, on July 6, Lord Salisbury told the whole story to Waddington in a private letter.

In this letter Lord Salisbury pointed out that, as far as the Russian annexations in Asia Minor were concerned, we were in a completely isolated condition, since Austria was only willing to take part in restoring the Porte to a certain independence in Europe, while France had clearly intimated that she had no intention of engaging in war for the purpose of maintaining the stipulations of the Treaty of 1856. The result was that England was compelled to act alone, as her interests were too great to allow the _status quo_ in Asia Minor to be completely destroyed, and consequently the onerous obligation of a defensive alliance with Turkey had been undertaken in order to provide against future Russian annexations beyond the frontier assigned under the present negotiations at Berlin. As this engagement could not be carried out from such a distance as Malta, the Sultan had made over Cyprus to England during such period as the defensive alliance might last. The conditional nature of the Convention, and the restraint shown by Her Majesty's Government in rejecting more tempting and advantageous offers are dealt with in the following passages.

We have entered into an agreement which is now embodied in a
formal Convention at Constantinople, that whenever the Russians
shall, for whatever reason, return to their Asiatic frontier as
it existed before the last war, we will immediately evacuate
the island; and that intermediately we will annually pay the
Sultan whatever is ascertained to be the surplus of revenue over
expenditure.

I am telling Your Excellency no secret when I say that we have
been very earnestly pressed, by advisers of no mean authority, to
occupy Egypt--or at least to take the borders of the Suez Canal.
Such an operation might have been very suitable for our interests
and would have presented no material difficulties.

No policy of this kind however was entertained by Her
Majesty's Government. We had received an intimation from the French
Government that any such proceeding would be very unwelcome to the
French people, and we could not but feel the reasonableness of
their objection under existing circumstances.

We have therefore turned a deaf ear to all suggestions of that
kind.

We have been likewise recommended to occupy some port on the
coast of Syria, such as Alexandretta, but we felt that, however
carefully guarded, such a proceeding might, in the present
condition of opinion with respect to the Ottoman Empire, be
construed as indicating an intention to acquire territory on the
mainland of Western Asia; and we did not desire to be suspected
of designs which will be wholly absent from our thoughts. We have
therefore preferred to accept from the Sultan the provisional
occupation of a position less advantageous indeed, but still
sufficient for the purpose, and not exposed to the inconveniences
I have mentioned. How long we shall stay there I cannot tell. But
I think there is just ground of hope that the Russians will find
in a short time that the territory they have acquired is costly
and unproductive; that the chances of making it a stepping-stone
to further conquests is cut off, and that they will abandon it as
a useless acquisition. In that case our _raison d'être_ at Cyprus
will be gone and we shall retire.

I have adopted this form of conveying the matter to you, as
the Convention being entirely within the Treaty competence of
the two Powers, requires no official communication. But it would
have been inconsistent with the feelings of friendship existing
between our two countries, and with my gratitude for your courteous
procedure towards me personally, to have allowed you to hear it
first from any other source.

There can be little doubt as to the identity of the 'advisers of no mean authority,' for Bismarck had been urging upon England for some time the occupation of Egypt, obviously with the main intention of creating discord with France, and Her Majesty's Government deserved all the credit claimed by Lord Salisbury for resisting these overtures. It is, however, somewhat difficult to follow Lord Salisbury's reasonings for preferring Cyprus to Alexandretta. It was plain that the occupation of either of these places would cause irritation, and as subsequent events have shown, Cyprus has never been of much use to us, and besides being crushed under the burden of the tribute annually paid to the Turkish Government, is inhabited chiefly by Greeks who do not appear to thoroughly appreciate British rule. Alexandretta, on the other hand, might, under our control, have developed into a highly important seaport and become the starting-place for the Bagdad railway; whereas, as a matter of fact, it has now practically passed into the hands of the Germans.