Chapter XIV: The Revival of France (1)

(1880-1881)

The General Election in England which took place in March, 1880, resulted not only in the rout of the Conservative Party, but in the reversal of the Foreign Policy of Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury, and necessitated the withdrawal of Sir Henry Layard from Constantinople, while Lord Lytton, whose Afghan policy had been furiously denounced by the Liberal Party, sent in his resignation. It is worthy of note that Lord Lyons, whom no one could accuse of Jingo tendencies, and whose opinion was certainly a very much better one than that of most of Lord Lytton's critics, was emphatically in favour of the latter's Afghan policy. Writing to Lady Lytton on January 8, 1879, he had expressed himself as follows:--

I have never had the least misgiving about Lytton's policy
with regard to Afghanistan, and I was always sure it would be
wisely carried into execution. I am only too thankful that we
have a spirited Viceroy. You can hardly form an idea of the
advantage our reputation has derived, all over Europe, from the
Afghan campaign, and you have seen enough of diplomacy to know how
much success in all questions of Foreign Policy depends upon the
prestige of the country one represents.

Sir Henry Layard had incurred even greater execration than Lord Lytton in the eyes of the Liberal Party, because he was considered to have been deeply committed to what was described as the Pro-Turkish policy of the Conservative Government, although his inexpiable offence seems to have consisted chiefly in strenuous and unavailing efforts to induce the Turks to put their house in order. During his stay at Constantinople he had been greatly hampered by the consistent opposition of his French colleague, M. Fournier, whose great object it appeared to be to thwart English action whenever opportunity occurred. The French Government, which professed great anxiety to act in harmony with England, upon ascertaining that Sir Henry Layard was to be replaced by Mr. Goschen,[29] withdrew Fournier and appointed M. Tissot in his place.

A change in the French Embassy in London was also imminent, and the circumstances attending the appointment of a new Ambassador were not devoid of humour.

Admiral Pothuau, the Ambassador under the Waddington régime, had been forced to retire, probably much against his inclination, and it was considered that M. Léon Say would make an excellent representative, more especially as he passed as that _rara avis_, a French Free Trader; but M. Say shortly after accepting the appointment was elected President of the Senate, and therefore forced to resign. To find a satisfactory successor was apparently not so simple a matter as might have been assumed. Nothing could have been more correct than M. de Freycinet's ideal of a French Ambassador in London: 'a man possessing the full confidence and sharing the sentiments of his Government; not so much of a politician as to be thinking more of establishing his own political position at home than of following his instructions: a man who would stay long at the post, and desire to stay there; who would form personal friendships with English Statesmen, and improve good relations and soften asperities by personal influence. A man calculated to take a part in a society like that of London, and who would not be out of place at a Court--a man who would have a wife with the same qualities--finally, a man not unaccustomed to diplomatic business and diligent and accurate in transacting it.' When, however, the question passed from the abstract to the concrete, M. de Freycinet's ideas ceased to flow so freely, and he seemed utterly at a loss to find the ideal being which his imagination had sketched, although he mentioned M. Challemel Lacour--as a man who would not do. In spite, however, of M. Challemel Lacour being in M. de Freycinet's opinion a man 'who would not do,' it was evident that he had a powerful backing, for an emissary from the French Foreign Office shortly made his appearance at the Embassy and intimated in so many words that the appointment of M. Challemel Lacour would be agreeable to Gambetta. That no doubt was a considerable advantage, but M. Challemel Lacour by no means corresponded to M. de Freycinet's ideal representative, being a man of unconciliatory character and particularly notorious on account of a speech which he had once made, in which, alluding to political opponents, he had used the words _Fusillez moi ces gens là!_ an expression which was continually being quoted against him. In the meanwhile, however, M. de Freycinet had had an inspiration, and sent for Lord Lyons to tell him that he had discovered just the right man for the place. Unfortunately, this personage was married to a lady whose antecedents were not considered to be satisfactory, and it became necessary to intimate that under the circumstances the appointment would not be favourably received in England.

'Freycinet was dreadfully put out,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'when he
found that the appointment was impossible. He complained chiefly
of Léon Say for having brought him into the difficulty, by first
accepting the London Embassy and then standing for the Presidency
of the Senate.

'Léon Say's picture of the lady is about as much like what she
was when I last saw her a few years ago, as Challemel Lacour is
like Freycinet's ideal of a French Ambassador in London.'

The appointment of M. Challemel Lacour was persisted in, and gave rise to some very disagreeable discussions in the House of Commons. Doubtless much of the abuse of M. Challemel Lacour was undeserved, but whatever his political capacity, he was not remarkable for urbanity.

On the occasion of a big official dinner at the Paris Embassy, when requested to take in the absolutely unexceptionable and agreeable wife of one of his principal ministerial colleagues, he replied with an emphatic '_Jamais!_' which precluded any further discussion.

The question of diplomatic appointments recalls the fact that it was about this time that my connection with Lord Lyons first began, through becoming a member of his staff, and that it may be appropriate to say something about his habits and personal characteristics.

Lord Lyons, who was then more than sixty years of age, was a big, heavily built man, whose appearance in no respect suggested the diplomatist of fiction, and who rather resembled the conventional British squire as depicted by Leech; and the chief characteristic of his somewhat homely features was a small piercing eye which nothing seemed to escape, from the most unimportant clerical error to a minute detail in a lady's dress. As compared with the ordinary English diplomatist, his knowledge of foreign languages, without being exceptional, was thoroughly adequate. He, of course, spoke French with perfect facility, and it is probable that he wrote it with greater correctness than many Frenchmen, having a complete mastery both of the grammar and of all the complicated expressions which are made use of in correspondence. He was also equally at home in Italian; had a knowledge of German, and was well acquainted with modern Greek. In addition, he was a fair classical scholar, and a peculiarly retentive memory enabled him, unlike most people, to remember much of what he had read. His manner, at first sight, seemed somewhat alarming, and he was altogether a person with whom no one would have felt disposed to take a liberty, but the alarming impression, which was solely due to shyness, wore off with closer acquaintance as the natural kindliness of his disposition revealed itself, and one of the excellent traits in his character was, that he never formed a favourable or unfavourable opinion of any one in a hurry, but invariably waited for the test of time. The result was, in almost every case, that the more he saw of people the more he liked them and the more reluctant he became to part with men who had been associated with him for any length of time. The position which he occupied in British diplomacy during the twenty years which he spent at Paris may, without exaggeration be described as unique. No other man stood on quite the same footing, though it would be idle to deny that there were some who were perhaps more brilliant. But the implicit confidence which successive Foreign Secretaries placed in Lord Lyons's judgment was based upon the knowledge that his opinions were sound, unprejudiced, disinterested, and only formed after the most conscientious investigations. 'I never volunteer advice,' he used to remark, and it was perhaps for that very reason that his opinion was so frequently sought by the Foreign Office. In fact so much importance was attached to his views that he was occasionally asked to give his opinion upon subjects of which he had no knowledge whatever, ranging from the defence of Canada to the minimum dress allowance required by the wife of a British Ambassador at Paris. As he had no intention of seeking a consort himself, and as he had no intention, either, of resigning his post, the latter inquiry (which was made in 1870) appears somewhat superfluous; but, it may be worth noting, that as the result of conscientious researches, he reported that £1000 a year was considered to be necessary.

As to his merits as a chief, every one who had ever been associated with him was of the same opinion, and it was generally held at the Foreign Office that service under him at the Paris Embassy was a liberal education in itself. It may be doubted, however, whether his capacity and love of work were not to some extent a disadvantage to his subordinates, since his industry was so great that it left them comparatively little responsible work to do. At the Paris Embassy the ordinary routine work is probably greater than at any other Embassy with the exception of Constantinople, but there was scarcely anything, however trivial, which he did not attend to himself. It is believed in some quarters that an Ambassador leads a dignified, luxurious and comparatively unoccupied life, but that was emphatically not the case with Lord Lyons. He rose early and began the day by carefully studying the more serious French newspapers; the whole of the time up to luncheon was spent in writing or reading despatches, or attending to the various small questions which were continually occurring. In the afternoon he worked again until about 3 or 4 p.m., and then usually went to see the French Foreign Minister or paid official calls in connection with current business. Upon his return he worked again until dinner unless interrupted by visitors, who were often of a tedious and uninteresting type, and it not infrequently happened that telegrams would arrive at a comparatively late hour of the night which it was necessary to deal with immediately. All correspondence which arrived at the Embassy, no matter from how insignificant a source, was attended to by him personally, and elaborate directions given with regard to the replies, which were invariably sent with the least possible delay. His industry was only equalled by an almost preternatural caution, which showed itself in a variety of ways. The reluctance to give advice has already been noticed, but his excessive caution showed itself not only in writing, but in conversation, and even amongst intimates he rarely expressed opinions on men or things which it would have been unsafe to quote in public, although his conversation was marked by much dry and original humour of that elusive character which cannot be described on paper. It was practically impossible to catch him napping. 'The Juarez (Mexican Revolutionary) Minister having left his card upon me without any official designation, I have returned a card also without an official designation,' he wrote from Washington in 1859. His reticence during the prolonged _Trent_ crisis has already been commented upon. 'I received by the last mail,' he wrote to Sir Henry Elliot in 1867, 'a letter from Hussein Khan, containing nothing but complimentary expressions. Not wishing to be outdone in civility, I have written a reply in the same strain. It has, however, occurred to me as just possible that Hussein Khan may desire to appear to be in correspondence with me for some particular object, and that there may be something which has occurred since I saw him, which might render it advisable that he should not be in correspondence with me. Accordingly I send my letter herewith open to you. If you see any reason, however slight, for not forwarding it, please destroy it, and take an opportunity of telling Hussein Khan that I asked you to thank him for his letter to me.' It will be remembered that even Queen Victoria was unable to draw him successfully on the subject of the Treaty of Berlin. Similar instances might be quoted indefinitely, and as an illustration of his caution in private life it may be mentioned that he never stirred a yard outside the house without a passport. A man of this temperament was not likely to make mistakes, and it is a remarkable fact that throughout a correspondence extending over something like forty years, there is not to be found a single expression in any official communication addressed to him which could by any stretch of the imagination be described as a censure or even as a criticism of his proceedings.

As for the pleasures of the world, they hardly seemed to exist for him, but the ordinary human weaknesses, which were chiefly non-existent in his case, he regarded with an indulgent and even benevolent eye. He used to repeat with much glee that the chief entry upon his _dossier_ at the Paris Préfecture de Police consisted of the words: _On ne lui connait pas de vice_, and this concise statement may be said to have been literally true. He had never been in debt, never gambled, never quarrelled, never, as far as was known, ever been in love, although it was a mistake to suppose that the opposite sex possessed no attractions for him. Nor did he possess the resources available to the ordinary man, for he cared nothing for sport, had probably never played a game in his life, and detested exercise and outdoor life. The surprising thing was that he contrived to keep his health, as although a total abstainer, he was a large eater, and never took the slightest exercise. In fact, during the last five or six years of his life he probably never walked further than the English Church in the Rue d'Aguesseau, which was within a hundred yards of the Embassy. 'Abstinence and exercise,' he used to say, 'were the only two things that disagreed with him.'

The natural shyness of his disposition prevented him from deriving much real enjoyment from what is generally described as society, but all the social duties of an Ambassador were discharged in a manner which evoked universal approval. The entertainments at the Embassy consisted chiefly of dinners, which were remarkable for their excellence, and invitations to which were highly prized by all sections of French society. Nothing, in fact, could exceed the dignity or the faultless taste of the Embassy arrangements, and not only were Lord Lyons's entertainments renowned, but his horses and carriages were, even in Paris, noticeably amongst the very best, it being one of his strongest convictions that the British representative should always make an imposing appearance. But his hospitality was no matter of mere show; every night the unmarried secretaries were asked to dine with him unless otherwise engaged; and it was upon these occasions that he used to appear at his best; obviously finding more pleasure in their society than in that of any one else with the exception of his own relatives. Affection, indeed, for his relatives was one of his most marked characteristics, and it is highly probable that his devotion to his sister, the Duchess of Norfolk, and to her sons and daughters, was one of the causes of his not marrying; anyhow there was no further question of marrying after the failure of the determined attempt made upon him by an exalted personage, which has already been mentioned.

His temper was singularly equable, and during his long stay in Paris it was said that upon two occasions only was he known to have broken out; once, when at a review at Longchamps, the Diplomatic Corps were allotted an inferior position, and once upon an occasion when his coachman appeared wearing trousers instead of top boots and breeches. These ebullitions were due to the fact that he attached enormous importance to all the outward signs of official representation, and strongly resented anything which bore in any degree the nature of a slight. In his capacity as a private individual he was the most modest and unostentatious of men, and it is recorded, as an instance of his shyness, that he once passed a week at Woburn without ever leaving the precincts of the garden, because he was so much embarrassed by the salutations of an adjacent lodge keeper.

It might have been supposed that a man of this unimaginative and eminently judicial character would have failed to secure the regard of his subordinates, however highly he might be esteemed by Cabinets and Foreign Secretaries. As a matter of fact, probably no chief ever enjoyed greater popularity, which was due to a variety of causes. He was essentially a kind-hearted man, his correspondence abounds with instances of help given to persons who had been in his employment in any capacity, however humble; of opportune assistance rendered to other persons who had been unlucky in their public careers, and of recommendations of men whose services appeared to deserve recognition. And in spite of his apparently detached nature, he took the warmest interest in all those who were connected with him officially, and invariably showed the utmost consideration, not only for their feelings, but for their personal convenience. Thus, unlike some distinguished diplomatists, one of his great objects was to save his staff unnecessary work; he never put obstacles in the way of persons desiring leave, and every afternoon at the earliest possible moment, in order to release the Chancery, he used to send across the welcome written message: 'I have nothing more for to-day,' although that by no means signified that his own labours were concluded. Hardworking himself, he expected his secretaries and attachés to do their share, and it was only when they conspicuously failed, that he showed any sign of severity. During his long career it fell to his lot to administer many reprimands, but these were invariably so just and unavoidable, that the culprits seldom, if ever, felt any sense of resentment, and he always made a point of obliterating as soon as possible, any disagreeable incident of this nature. The consequence was that he had no enemies, and no one who was ever associated with him, has, so far as is known, ever had anything but good to say of him. Another excellent feature in his character was that he always made the best of his subordinates instead of searching for their weak points; however unpromising the material, he generally succeeded in effecting a marked improvement, and whenever any one who had been with him left for another post, he never failed to draw special attention to such good qualities as he appeared to possess with the view of assisting him in his future career. Perhaps I may be pardoned for interposing a personal testimonial, upon the occasion of a temporary transfer to Berne, which may serve as an example amongst many others.

* * * * *

Paris, May 15, 1883.

MY DEAR ADAMS,[30]

I have settled that Legh is to be at Berne on the 28th, and I
hope you will like him. He is clever and well informed, though some
people think he does not look it.

It need scarcely be added that many of the communications of this nature are of a more elaborate character, and refer to persons who now occupy distinguished positions in the British Diplomatic Service. As Lord Lyons grew older he became more and more reluctant to part with men whom he knew well, and it was pathetic to witness the obvious sorrow which he felt at their departure.

Paris has always been the most coveted post on the Continent, and in addition to the social attractions of the place, the Embassy enjoyed the reputation of carrying on its business in an efficient manner chiefly owing to the qualities of the Ambassador. The reputation was well deserved, and I can only recall one serious _lâche_, not devoid, however, of humour, as to which I was unjustly alleged to be the culprit. At a moment when critical negotiations respecting intervention in Egypt were proceeding with the French Government, a member of the Embassy had an extremely confidential conversation with an important French Cabinet Minister, in the course of which the Minister criticized in very uncomplimentary terms his Ministerial colleagues, and the conversation was immediately embodied in a confidential despatch to the British Foreign Office. The following morning a much agitated Chef de Cabinet appeared at the Chancery, bearing the despatch, and announced that he 'thought that some mistake had occurred, as the despatch had been received by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.' To the general consternation, it now became evident that the despatch, instead of being placed in the Foreign Office bag, had found its way into a lithographed envelope addressed to the _Ministre des Affaires Etrangères_, and the whole horrid mystery was laid bare. The question arose whether Lord Lyons should be told or not; the arguments of fear prevailed; the French Minister behaved in an honourable manner and kept silence, and Lord Lyons, fortunately for all concerned, never heard of an incident which he would have looked upon as little short of a calamity.

The only possible criticism that could be brought against Lord Lyons as an Ambassador would be that he led too narrow a life, and moved in too restricted a circle. Day after day and week after week he led the same existence; even his holidays were laid out on the same mechanical principle; every year he left his post, much about the same date, took the waters at some spa, and then proceeded on a round of visits in England, chiefly at the country houses of the governing families, such as Knowsley, Chatsworth, Woburn, and Hatfield, but always including a prolonged stay with his relatives at Arundel. He was essentially a diplomatist of the old type, consorting entirely in Paris with the official classes, the Faubourg, and the Haute Finance; keeping the press at arm's length, avoiding everything which did not come within the scope of his duties, and confining himself strictly to his own business. The modern developments of diplomacy; the use of the press, the hasty missions of amateur diplomatists, the gushing speeches which are apparently now considered to be obligatory upon the professional diplomatist--all this would have been hateful and perhaps impossible to a man who could boast that he had spent five years in America without making a speech or taking a drink. But in an impartial survey of the twenty-eight years which Lord Lyons spent at Washington, Constantinople, and Paris, it would be rash to assert that any other man would, under similar circumstances, have retained to an equal extent the confidence of successive British Governments and the esteem and friendship of the long series of Foreign Ministers with whom he was called upon to negotiate questions often of the most vital importance.[31]

The main interest in foreign politics in the summer of 1880 lay in the Balkan Peninsula. Mr. Goschen had been sent out to Constantinople in the place of Sir Henry Layard, and Her Majesty's Government were endeavouring energetically to force the Porte to carry out the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin with regard to the rectification of the Montenegrin and Greek frontiers. The Greek Frontier Question made little way, and the Gladstone Government in their diplomatic campaign on behalf of the Greeks met with little encouragement or support from the other Powers, not even excepting France, who had always been the leading advocate of Greek claims. When M. de Freycinet was asked what he was prepared to do if the Turks resolved to defy the Conference which was then sitting, nothing more satisfactory could be got out of him than: _nous marcherons avec vous_, or _nous ne marcherons pas sans vous_, and to the question whether he would go far if necessary, he only made the cryptic reply, _peut-être bien_. The British Government were hankering after a naval demonstration, and it was disheartening to work with so pusillanimous a comrade.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, June 21, 1880.

In answer to your private and personal letter of the day
before yesterday, I may say that I am not much afraid of the
French not being willing to go as far as we are willing to go in
coercing the Turks, if they set Europe at defiance about the Greek
Frontier. Freycinet seems to shrink from the idea that actual
coercion may be required, but his only distinct limit to the action
of France is that she will not do more than England.

I myself very much doubt whether the Turks will yield anything
to naval or other demonstrations, unless they are quite sure that
these demonstrations are the prelude to the actual use of force,
and it will not be easy to get them to believe this, unless we are
ourselves quite sure that that is what we mean.

Supposing we pushed demonstrations to the point of forcing
the Dardanelles, and sending the allied fleets to Constantinople,
we might produce a revolution, without obtaining the cession of
the territory to Greece. If the populations are in parts really
unwilling, the central government may be truly unable to compel
them to give in.

Supposing the Greek troops (_par impossible_) be defeated
either by the Turkish troops or by recalcitrant Albanians, the
ships of the Powers might not be able to do much to get them out of
the scrape.

I am very far from meaning to say, in answer to your question
as to the mildest and safest form of coercion, that it would
consist in moving troops to occupy the territory. To do so would
be neither mild nor safe, nor easy to arrange. But I am afraid
we shall find that in the end the treatment must be topical, and
that if the Greeks cannot take possession for themselves, we shall
hardly be able to obtain it for them by pressure exercised at
Constantinople only.

A rendezvous of the fleets at Corfu might have a good effect
on the Albanians, and perhaps increase the chance of the Greeks not
being seriously resisted.

I see Goschen suggests that the decision of the Conference
should be announced to the Porte by an identic note. I think a
collective note would have more effect and be more appropriate.

The Turks, however dense they may be in other respects, are usually intelligent enough to perceive whether the Powers are in earnest or not, and as no Government except the British felt much enthusiasm for either the Greek or the Montenegrin cause, they showed no signs of giving way.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, July 2, 1880.

I am afraid it does not look as if the Turks were going to
yield to the moral force of United Europe. Léon Say and Montebello
seem to hold even less resolute language to you than Freycinet
does to me. Did the King of Greece understand Gambetta to say
that France, with or without the co-operation of other Powers,
would support Greece with troops? Freycinet will no doubt do
whatever Gambetta tells him, but one of the inconveniences of the
power behind the Government greater than the Government, is that
Gambetta does not talk as cautiously as he would if he felt direct
responsibility. No power except Russia seems to be willing to bell
the cat. France seems to be the only one that has in abundance the
three elements--men, ships, and money. Freycinet always says he
will do anything with us, but nothing alone, and does not seem much
more willing than Austria to look the chance of having to use force
in the face.

I do not see much prospect of an immediate diplomatic lull,
and I very much want one because it is of importance to my health
(at least the doctors say so) to get away, but I conclude that I
ought not to shrink from going through the national Festival of the
14th July, and that I should do what is to be done at least as well
as any of my colleagues.

Reviews, it may be said, were functions which he abhorred beyond all others.

The King of Greece was in Paris at the time, vainly trying to stir up Gambetta to come to his assistance, although Gambetta in conversation with Sheffield expressed strong opinions as to the desirability of France and England acting energetically in concert, and even professed himself in favour of their making a joint demonstration at Constantinople, and landing troops there if necessary. Upon the same occasion he betrayed his gross ignorance of English politics by lamenting that Lord Beaconsfield had not postponed the dissolution until the autumn, 'when he would have been certain of success.'

Freycinet, however, remained deaf to Lord Granville's appeals, even when the latter reproached him with the humiliating position in which France would be placed by abandoning a question which she had made her own, and when the British Government proposed a naval demonstration in favour of the Prince of Montenegro, made all sorts of excuses for evading it if possible.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, July 13, 1880.

I was more displeased than disappointed by the refusal of
the French to join in the naval demonstration in favour of the
Prince of Montenegro. They always try to act with Germany and
have a horror of sending away a ship or a man unless Germany does
the same: such is their confidence in the friendship they profess
to believe in, that they want always to be ready at the shortest
notice to attack their friend or to defend themselves from him.
They are also, no doubt, jealous of any separate help to Montenegro
which does not explicitly pledge the Powers to action in the Greek
Question also.

I quite agree with you that separate threats from the
French to the Porte about Greece (however incorrect their acting
separately may be) are more likely to do good than harm. One Power
in earnest would frighten the Porte more than the six, if the
Porte were convinced that the five others would not restrain the
energetic one.

During the next three months the Sultan, single handed, conducted a campaign against the six Great Powers, which, as will be seen, nearly ended in success; and it must, in fairness, be admitted that there was a good deal to be said from the Turkish point of view. The Powers were engaged in endeavouring to force the Porte to comply with conditions directly or indirectly resulting from the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin. But no steps whatever were taken, or ever have been taken, to force other States to comply with stipulations which appeared to be disagreeable to them. The right of the Sultan, which had been secured to him under the Treaty, to occupy Eastern Roumelia, remained in reality an empty phrase: the Bulgarian fortresses which were to have been demolished, remained untouched, the tribute due from Bulgaria remained unpaid, and there was no indication of an intention to reinstate the unfortunate Mussulmans who, as the result of the war, had been driven away from their homes, and had been despoiled of their property by their new Christian masters. Neither could it be justly maintained that, in agreeing to a rectification of the Greek frontier at Berlin, the Turks had recognized the right of the Greeks to annex a territory equal in extent to half of the Greek Kingdom. Added to this, were the difficulty and the humiliation involved in surrendering against their will, a large number of Mussulman subjects. The difficulty had in fact proved insurmountable in the case of Montenegro, and the Albanians who were in the first instance allotted to Montenegro offered so successful a resistance that the original plan was abandoned, and after much negotiation, the Porte accepted 'in principle' the cession of the Dulcigno district as an alternative. But the concession of anything 'in principle' by the Turks, usually means something quite different from the usual interpretation of that expression, and the Sultan succeeded in organizing a highly successful so-called Albanian League, and ably supported by a resourceful local Pasha, contrived by various expedients to delay the surrender of Dulcigno for so long that it began to look as if it would never take place at all. Finally, the resources of diplomacy becoming exhausted, a policy of coercion was decided upon, and an international fleet assembled off the coast of Albania in the month of September, under the command of Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour.[32] Each power signed a declaration of disinterestedness and a pledge not to acquire territory, but the hollow nature of this imposing manifestation was betrayed by a provision that no troops were to be landed, and the Sultan, who probably had some inkling of the situation, still refused to give way. A bombardment of Dulcigno would presumably have left him philosophically indifferent.

As the Dulcigno demonstration did not appear likely to produce any satisfactory result, the British Government decided upon the hazardous step of proposing the seizure of Smyrna, that being considered the most efficacious means of coercing the Turks and of preventing the concert of the Great Powers from becoming the laughing stock of Europe. This step was evidently taken chiefly at the instigation of Mr. Gladstone, and the letters of Lord Granville bear witness to the extreme anxiety which he felt as to the result. No encouragement whatever was received from France; the timorous Freycinet having in the meanwhile been succeeded at the Foreign Office by the equally timorous Barthélemy St. Hilaire, an aged survival of the Louis Philippe period.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Oct. 4, 1880.

Barthélemy St. Hilaire's answer about the Greek Frontier does
not look as if we should receive any energetic help from France
towards obtaining the settlement of that or any other question
in the East. The answer was all ready cut and dried, and the
declaration as to France sticking to the Concert, but not taking
any initiative, had been made before to my colleagues. A more
experienced diplomatist would have acknowledged more elaborately
your courtesy in offering to communicate first with France, before
addressing the other cabinets on the Greek Frontier affair.

The fact is that the present Cabinet is still more frightened
than the last by the disapproval which has been manifested by
all parties in France of even the little that has already been
done. With regard to this, M. St. Hilaire made a remark to me
yesterday which seems to be true enough. France, he said, has quite
recovered her financial strength, and in great measure her military
strength, but the _moral_ of the people is not yet _relevé_.
They are horribly afraid of another war and consequently utterly
averse from anything like a risky or energetic policy. Another
popular sentiment, which is extremely inconvenient just now, is the
feeling that France made the Crimean War _pour les beaux yeux de
l'Angleterre_ and had better not repeat the experiment. Altogether
I am afraid France will be a trouble, not a help to us, and I am a
good deal put out about it.

Barthélemy St. Hilaire talked to me a long time about
Gambetta, with whom he described himself as very intimate. He
described Gambetta as having a naturally generous nature, as being
somewhat impulsive and incautious, but at the same time somewhat
'Genoese.' He said that if I took opportunities of associating with
him, I should find his character an interesting study. The study
will not be a new one to me, and I am not sure that too apparent an
intimacy between me and Gambetta would be viewed without jealousy.

M. Jules Ferry, the new Prime Minister, was no more amenable than his colleague.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Oct. 8, 1880.

As to the French agreeing to the Smyrna proposal, I cannot
prognosticate favourably. I had a long conversation yesterday
with Jules Ferry, the Prime Minister. I seemed to make some
impression by urging that to break up the European Concert now
would be to keep the questions open, with all their inconveniences
and all their dangers, for an indefinite time. He also admitted
the many advantages of the Smyrna plan, and was quite unable to
suggest any other course of action so likely to bring the Sultan
to reason without inconvenient consequences. But he perpetually
reverted to the argument that it would be going too near war to be
admissible under the French Constitution, and that the Chambers
on that account would call the Ministers severely to task. The
argument from the Constitution seems to me almost absurd, but it
is constantly used already in the press, and will no doubt be used
hereafter in the Chambers. The fact is that Jules Ferry and his
colleagues are horribly afraid of the effect which they believe any
action on their part would produce on public opinion and on the
Chamber.

I have seen B. St. Hilaire this afternoon. I went over with
him the same ground I had gone over with Jules Ferry yesterday, but
with much the same result. He told me that the question had been
discussed in the Cabinet this morning and was to be discussed in
another Cabinet to-morrow. Perhaps they would not like to stay out
in the cold if Germany and Austria came in, but I am afraid they
will certainly not say 'yes,' though they may say 'no' before those
Powers have given their answer. They seem to argue from the delay
of the German Government, that Bismarck is against the proposal.
Orloff, my Russian colleague, tells me that he is strongly urging
the French to agree. Beust and Radowitz (the German) talk as if
they themselves thought well of the Smyrna plan, but say they have
heard nothing from their Governments.

I spoke to B. St. Hilaire about your reasons for communicating
first with him about the Greek Question, and he sent with effusion
the message of thanks which he ought to have sent at first.

Choiseul is applying with vigour the _épuration_ system to
the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service. He seems to have
dismissed some very good men in both. Des Michels is one of his
victims, and to-day he has decapitated the head of the Commercial
Department.

I think it better not to communicate at present the draft
instructions to the Admiral. They would, I think, be seized upon as
arguments that the occupation of Smyrna would be an act of war.

Her Majesty's Government were in effect in a very bad mess. The Smyrna proposal had received no real support from any Power. Bismarck had announced that the so-called Eastern Question was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian Grenadier, and nothing was to be expected from him. The same thing applied to Austria; neither Italy nor Russia were to be relied upon, and France was unwilling and unenterprising. No wonder that Lord Granville felt singularly uncomfortable: the Concert of Europe, as he expressed it, had 'gone to the devil,' no one was going to help him, and unless within a few days the Turks yielded, the British Government would be confronted with the alternatives of seizing Smyrna single handed or of confessing defeat and abandoning the contest. Lord Granville himself was in favour of the latter course, as being logical, and the natural consequence of the action of the other Powers, who would neither agree to the English proposals nor propose anything themselves. Mr. Gladstone, on the other hand, was apparently all for going on and acting as the mandatory of Europe, and as he usually got his way, it is possible that this dangerous course might have been adopted; but in the very nick of time, just at the moment when the situation looked to be at its worst, the Sultan suddenly gave way and announced that Dulcigno should be handed over to the Montenegrins. What brought about this sudden decision has always remained more or less of a mystery, but there is no proof that the proposed seizure of Smyrna (which would have probably inconvenienced European interests quite as much as the Sultan) was the deciding factor. According to the late Lord Goschen, who was in as good a position to know the real facts as any one else, the sudden surrender of the Sultan was caused by a Havas Agency telegram from Paris; but the contents of this communication have never been divulged, and Lord Goschen himself never ascertained what they were. The surrender of Dulcigno, which took place in November, terminated the crisis and enabled the Gladstone Government to claim a striking if lucky success for their own particular sample of spirited Foreign Policy.

In the year 1880 the relations between the Liberal Government and the Irish Nationalists were the reverse of cordial, and a good many inquiries used to come from the Foreign Office respecting alleged Irish plots and conspiracies at Paris with requests that the French police authorities should be asked to give their assistance. These requests Lord Lyons was in the habit of discouraging as much as possible, partly from an ingrained dislike to being involved in any secret and equivocal transactions, and partly because he knew that if the French police gave their assistance in tracking down Irish conspirators, they would certainly expect reciprocity in regard to Bonapartists and other opponents of the existing system of Government at that time residing in England. For these reasons he always urged that the English police authorities should communicate direct with the French police authorities without using the Embassy as an intermediary. But the efforts of the Gladstone Government were not confined to endeavouring to check Irish plot by means of the police, and an attempt was made to restrain the turbulent bishops and priests engaged in the Home Rule agitation by applying pressure upon them from Rome. The credit of this expedient seems to have been chiefly due to the active and enterprising cleric, Monsignor Czacki, who was acting as Nuncio at Paris, and who appears to have conceived the idea that if the Pope could be persuaded to intervene on the side of the British Government, it might be possible to re-establish regular diplomatic relations between England and the Papacy. As far back as December, 1879, Monsignor Czacki had made certain overtures, but they met with no attention from Lord Salisbury.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, June 18, 1880.

Last October a very quiet, not to say dull, old Italian
prelate was succeeded here as Papal Nuncio by a very active,
talkative and agreeable Pole, Monsignor Czacki.

At the beginning of December Monsignor Czacki came to me and
told me that he had received a letter from Ireland accompanied by,
or referring to, letters from very important people, among which
was, he said, one from you. He had in consequence written to the
Pope, and the Pope had written to the Irish Bishops to exhort them
to do all in their power to restrain their flocks from taking
part in violent or seditious proceedings. Monsignor Czacki asked
me whether the state of affairs in Ireland was at the moment so
serious as to render it advisable that the Pope should repeat these
exhortations to the Irish Bishops. I made a somewhat banal answer
to the effect that though there were no grounds for feeling alarm
as to the ultimate issue of what was going on, there was good
reason that those who possessed influence there should use it for
the prevention of crime and outrage, and also of turbulence and
disorder.

I reported what has passed in a private letter to Lord
Salisbury, but I received no answer from him, and I heard no more
of the matter till yesterday.

Yesterday, however, Monsignor Czacki came to see me and
showed me a letter he had received a few days before from Lord
Emly. The letter said that previous intervention had produced the
best results, that several Bishops had denounced the agitation in
the strongest terms, but that unfortunately the Socialists were
publicly supported by various Bishops. It mentioned that the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Meath, and the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Cashel had manifested their sympathy with Mr. Parnell, and that the
Roman Catholic Bishop of Kilmore had himself recommended Mr. Biggar
to the electors as a candidate. The letter begged Monsignor Czacki
to intervene again, but it made the request only from Lord Emly
himself, without any allusion to you or to any other person, as
being cognizant of it.

Monsignor Czacki said that he entirely sympathized with the
views of the writer and intended to send the letter to Rome; and he
proceeded to ask me whether I would authorize him to say that he
had shown it to me and that he sent it with my approval.

It seemed to me that this would be bringing the thing much too
near Her Majesty's Government for it to be right for me to assent
to it without knowing your wishes.

I confess this mode of communicating with the Vatican does
not commend itself to my judgment, and that it seems to me that it
might lead to awkwardness and interfere with better means you have
of communicating with the Pope, if you wish to communicate with
His Holiness at all. At the same time I was not absolutely sure
that you might not think there might be some convenience in having
this channel open. I did not therefore rebuff Monsignor Czacki, but
without giving any hint that I should refer to you, said simply
that I would think about what he had said.

He is very fond of enlarging academically upon the advantages
England would derive from entering into regular diplomatic
relations with the Holy See, or if that were impossible, from
re-establishing an unofficial agent at Rome.

You will gather from all this that Monsignor Czacki is not
altogether disinclined to be busy.

The energetic Nuncio returned to the subject at the close of the year.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Dec. 31, 1880.

You may remember that in June last I gave you in a private
letter a long account of a conversation which Monsignor Czacki, the
Papal Nuncio here, had volunteered to have with me on Irish affairs.

Monsignor Czacki came to see me three days ago, and enlarged
on the great advantage to the cause of order and tranquillity in
Ireland it would be for the Pope to pronounce an authoritative
condemnation of the wicked acts perpetrated in that country. He
hinted that the Pope had been misled by some of the Irish Bishops
who had recently been at Rome, and he dwelt on the inconvenience
which arose from the British Government's having no channel of its
own through which to communicate direct with His Holiness.

On the last occasion Monsignor Czacki offered to be himself
a channel of communication. He did not repeat this offer, but
his object in what he had said appeared to be to lead up again
to the question of the establishment of regular diplomatic
relations between England and the Vatican, or if that could not be
immediately, then to the return to Rome of an unofficial agent, in
the same position that was occupied by Odo Russell, and before him,
by me. He told me he spoke entirely of his own accord, but that he
was sure that Pope Leo XIII. would most willingly receive even an
unofficial agent.

Monsignor Czacki is a very great talker, which makes it easy
to say very little in answer to him, and I took full advantage of
the facility for being conveniently silent which this afforded me.

The impression he left upon me was that for some reason or
other the authorities at the Vatican decidedly wish to have some
sort of agent there, from whom they could receive information
respecting the views of the British Government upon the accuracy of
which they could fully rely.

I don't think that if it had depended on me I should have
discontinued the unofficial agent, awkward as the position had been
made by the presence of the Italian Government and of a regular
British Embassy. But to establish one now would be a question of
far greater difficulty than to have kept one going.

Whether influenced by Monsignor Czacki or not, Her Majesty's Government sent Mr. Errington, a Liberal Member of Parliament, to Rome in an ambiguous capacity which was loudly denounced in the House of Commons both by Home Rulers and by fervent Protestants, and in the course of one of the discussions on the subject, Mr. Gladstone informed an astonished audience that there was all the difference in the world between an Agent and an 'Agente.'

The French Municipal Elections which took place in January, 1881, produced a reassuring impression throughout the country, as both the extreme parties were decisively defeated, and the effect was largely to increase the power and influence of Gambetta, who was now in the enviable position of being able to make or unmake Ministries, and who at the opening of the Chambers made a kind of 'speech from the throne' which considerably perturbed the uninspiring President Grévy.

Everything that Gambetta now said was of importance, and his views on the European situation were ascertained in the usual manner through Sheffield.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Feb. 8, 1881.

Gambetta asked Sheffield to breakfast on Saturday, and as
usual talked freely to him.

He appeared to think that the three Emperors had come to
an understanding with each other, and that whatever might be
their plans, it was certain that they would not be beneficial
to French interests. According to him, it was with the Emperors
not a question of the position of their Empires, but of their
own individual positions. They were opposed to liberal views and
liberal institutions. They were intent upon doing whatever would be
most hurtful to the prestige and success of the Republic in France.
They were, in fact, reconstituting the Holy Alliance.

At this moment France was unfortunately powerless. Until the
General Election had taken place, her destinies must be at the
mercy of any old women who were employed as stopgaps in ephemeral
ministries. Since Barthélemy St. Hilaire had been in office he had
only seen him once. He knew nothing or next to nothing of what went
on at the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, and what little he did
know, he disapproved. 'Que voulez vous,' he said: 'nobody will do
anything to commit himself in any way, pending the uncertainty of
the elections.'

He seemed well informed about Egyptian affairs. He praised
Malet and said de Ring was entirely in the wrong in his quarrel
with de Blignières, which was very injurious to the calm direction
of Egyptian affairs. He expressed an intention to urge the
immediate recall of de Ring.

I mark this letter private because we should get into a great
scrape and close a very convenient channel of communication if
Gambetta found that he was quoted or that his sayings transpired in
any way.

The interest of the year 1881 lies in the fact that it makes a fresh departure in French foreign policy and the abandonment of the retiring and timorous attitude which had prevailed ever since the war with Germany. The first State to experience the inconvenience of this new development was Tunis, and early in the year it became evident that a very acute Tunis question was imminent. The trouble began over a large property known as the Enfida Estate. This property was sold to an important French financial association, but upon the sale becoming known, a certain Mr. Levy, a Maltese British subject, put in a claim of pre-emption under Tunisian Law, and it was believed by the French that he had been instigated by the Italians, and was merely utilized by them as a convenient means of obstructing French enterprise. The dispute over the Enfida Estate rose to such proportions that a French ironclad, the _Friedland_, was sent to Tunis in February, and the British Government, who were bound to make a show of defending the interests of Mr. Levy, in spite of his dubious position, followed suit with H.M.S. _Thunderer_. Both vessels were soon withdrawn, but before long it was generally believed that a French invasion of the country was contemplated.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Feb. 25, 1881.