Chapter X: The Third Republic (1)

(1871-1873)

Strictly speaking, the existence of the National Assembly which had been summoned to ratify the Preliminaries of Peace, had now[1] come to an end, but under prevailing circumstances, it was more convenient to ignore Constitutional technicalities, and the Government proceeded to carry on the business of the country on the basis of a Republic. Thiers had been elected Chief of the Executive, and it was astonishing how rapidly his liking for a Republic increased since he had become the head of one. It was now part of his task to check the too reactionary tendencies of the Assembly and to preserve that form of government which was supposed to divide Frenchmen the least. The feeling against the Government of National Defence was as strong as ever, and the elections of some of the Orleans princes gave rise to inconvenient demonstrations on the part of their political supporters, who pressed for the repeal of the law disqualifying that family. Thiers realized plainly enough that the revival of this demand was premature, and would only add to the general confusion, and had therefore induced the princes to absent themselves from Bordeaux, but the question could no longer be avoided.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, June 6, 1871.

Thiers has been hard at work 'lobbying,' as the Americans
say, but could not come to any settlement with the Assembly,
and so begged them to postpone the question of the elections of
the Princes of Orleans till the day after to-morrow. One of the
plans proposed was that the provisional state of things should
be formally continued for two years, by conferring his present
powers on Thiers for that period. This would, it was hoped, keep
the Republicans quiet and allay the impatience of the monarchical
parties, by giving them a fixed time to look forward to. But this,
it seems, the majority in the Assembly would not promise to vote.
On the other hand, Thiers is said to be afraid of having the Duc
d'Aumale and perhaps Prince Napoleon also, speaking against him
in the Assembly, and attacking him and each other outside. Then
comes the doubt as to the extent to which the fusion between the
Comte de Chambord and the other Princes, or rather that between
their respective parties, really goes. Altogether nothing can be
less encouraging than the prospect. The Duc d'Aumale, as Lieutenant
Général du Royaume, to prepare the way for the Comte de Chambord,
is, for the moment, the favourite combination. In the meantime
Thiers has thrown a sop to the majority by putting an Orleanist
into the Home Office. The idea at Versailles yesterday was that
Thiers and the Assembly would come to a compromise on the basis
that the Orleans elections should be confirmed, but with a preamble
repeating that nothing done was to be held to prejudge the question
of the definitive government of France.

When the question came up, Thiers yielded on the point of the admission of the Princes, and the majority were highly pleased at having extorted this concession. Lord Lyons, dining at Thiers's house at Versailles, a few days after the debate in the Assembly, met there the German General von Fabrice, the Prince de Joinville, the Duc d'Aumale, and the Duc de Chartres, and mentions the significant fact that M. and Madame Thiers and the rest of the company treated these Princes with even more than the usual respect shown to Royal personages. In private conversation Thiers expressed great confidence in soon getting the Germans out of the Paris forts, but both he and Jules Favre complained that Bismarck was a very bad creditor, and insisted upon having his first half-milliard by the end of the month: in fact, the Germans were so clamorous for payment that they hardly seemed to realize how anxious the French were to get rid of them, and that if the money was not immediately forthcoming, it was only because it was impossible to produce it.

What was of more immediate concern to the British Government than either the payment of the indemnity or the future of the Orleans princes, was the prospect of a new Commercial Treaty. This was sufficiently unpromising. Lord Lyons had pointed out during the Empire period, that under a Constitutional _régime_ in France, we were not likely to enjoy such favourable commercial conditions as under personal government, and the more liberal the composition of a French Government, the more Protectionist appeared to be its policy. Thiers himself was an ardent Protectionist, quite unamenable to the blandishments of British Free Traders, who always appear to hold that man was made for Free Trade, instead of Free Trade for man, and the Finance Minister, Pouyer Quertier, entertained the same views as his chief. But, even if the Emperor were to come back, it was more than doubtful whether he would venture to maintain the existing Commercial Treaty as it stood, and there was every probability that the Bordeaux wine people and other so-called French Free Traders would turn Protectionist as soon as they realized that there was no prospect of British retaliation. What cut Lord Lyons (an orthodox Free Trader) to the heart, was that, just as the French manufacturers had got over the shock of the sudden introduction of Free Trade under the Empire and had adapted themselves to the new system, everything should be thrown back again. It was likely, indeed, that there would be some opposition to Thiers's Protectionist taxes, but he knew well enough that there were not a sufficient number of Free Traders in the Assembly, or in the country, to make any effective resistance to the Government. When approached on the subject, the French Ministers asserted that all they wanted was to increase the revenue, and that all they demanded from England was to be allowed to raise their tariff with this view only, whereas, in their hearts, they meant Protection pure and simple. Lord Lyons's personal view was that England would be better off if the Treaty was reduced to little more than a most favoured nation clause. 'The only element for negotiation with the school of political economy now predominant here,' he sadly remarked, 'would be a threat of retaliation, and this we cannot use.' It will be found subsequently that this was the one predominant factor in all commercial negotiations between the two Governments.

A long conversation with Thiers, who was pressing for a definite reply from Her Majesty's Government on the subject of a new Treaty showed that matters from the British point of view were as unsatisfactory as they well could be. Thiers, whose language respecting England was courteous and friendly, made it clear that Her Majesty's Government must choose between the proposed modifications in the tariff and the unconditional denunciation of the whole Treaty, and that if the Treaty were denounced, England must not expect, after its expiration, to be placed upon the footing of the most favoured nation. He considered that he had a right to denounce the Treaty at once, but had no wish to act in an unfriendly spirit, and had therefore refrained from doing so, and although he and his colleagues considered that the existing Treaty was disadvantageous and even disastrous to France, they had never promoted any agitation against it, and had confined themselves to proposing modifications of the tariff, which their financial necessities and the state of the French manufacturing interests rendered indispensable. Coal and iron, which were articles of the greatest importance to England, were not touched, and all that had, in fact, been asked for was a moderate increase on the duties on textile fabrics. As for the French Free Traders, whatever misleading views they might put forward in London, their influence upon the Assembly would be imperceptible, and it remained therefore for Her Majesty's Government to decide whether they would agree to the changes he had proposed to them, or would give up altogether the benefits which England derived from the Treaty.

Thiers's real motive was disclosed later on, when, whilst asserting that he should always act in a friendly spirit towards England, he admitted that 'England was a much more formidable competitor in commerce than any other nation.' Concessions which might safely be made to other countries might very reasonably be withheld from her. For instance, privileges which might be safely granted to the Italian merchant navy might, if granted to Great Britain, produce a competition between English and French shipping very disadvantageous to France. It would also be certainly for the interest of France that she should furnish herself with colonial articles brought direct to her own ports rather than resort, as at present, to the depôts of such goods in Great Britain. Nothing could be further from his intentions than to be influenced by any spirit of retaliation, nor, if the Treaty should be denounced, would he, on that account, be less friendly to England in political matters; but it was evident that, in making his financial and commercial arrangements, the interests and necessities of France must be paramount. In conclusion he pressed for an immediate answer from Her Majesty's Government in order that the French Government might complete their plans, which were of urgent importance.

To the impartial observer the opinions expressed by Thiers seem to be logical, natural, and reasonable, unless the principle of looking after one's own interests is unreasonable; but to the ardent devotees of Free Trade, they must have appeared in the light of impiety. Lord Lyons, in reporting the interview, remarked that 'nothing could have been more unsatisfactory than Thiers's language,' and added significantly that he himself had managed to keep his temper.

Thiers did not get his definite answer, and the wrangle continued until in February, 1872, the French Government, with the general approval of the nation, gave notice of the termination of the Commercial Treaty of 1860.

The Bill abrogating the proscription of the French Royal families had been passed by the Assembly, and the elections of the Duc d'Aumale and the Prince de Joinville consequently declared valid, but these princes having established their rights, wisely remained in the background. Not so another illustrious Royalist, the Comte de Chambord. This prince, who was also included in the reversal of the disqualifying law, returned to France and issued a proclamation from the Château of Chambord in July which spread consternation in the Royalist camp. After explaining that his presence was only temporary and that he desired to create no embarrassment, he declared that he was prepared to govern on a broad basis of administrative decentralization, but that there were certain conditions to which he could not submit. If he were summoned to the throne he would accept, but he should retain his principles, and above all the White Flag which had been handed down to him by his ancestors. This announcement seemed, to say the least, premature, and the supporters of a Republic must have warmly congratulated themselves upon having to encounter an enemy who played so completely into their hands.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, July 11, 1871.

The Comte de Chambord seems to have upset the Legitimist
coach. The Legitimist Deputies have been obliged to repudiate
the White Flag, being sure that they could never be elected to a
new Chamber under that Banner, and of course fusion between the
Orleans Princes and their cousin is now out of the question.

Thiers said to me last night that he did not regard the
Comte de Chambord's declaration in favour of the White Flag as
irrevocable--and that it looked as if it had been made in a moment
of ill-temper. According to Thiers, both the Comte de Chambord and
the Comte de Paris eagerly desire to be kings--most people doubt,
however, whether the Comte de Chambord does really wish it. All
that has occurred tends to strengthen and prolong Thiers's hold on
power, and he is rejoicing accordingly. Indeed, there is hardly a
Frenchman who professes to doubt that Thiers's Government is the
only Government possible at the moment.

Gambetta is not considered by Thiers to be dangerous; he
declares that he will only maintain a constitutional or legal
opposition so long as the Government is Republican, and if he and
his supporters stick to this, Thiers will certainly have no great
cause to dread them. If Rouher had been elected he would have been
a formidable opponent, though he has been too much accustomed
to lead an applauding and acquiescing majority to be good at
speaking to a hostile audience. Thiers says that the rejection of
Rouher will be a good thing for his own health and repose, as he
should have found it very fatiguing to have to answer the great
Imperialist orator.

The hurry with which the new duties were rushed through
the Assembly on Saturday is disquieting. Thiers and Jules Favre
protest, however, that they are determined to do nothing irregular
regarding the Commercial Treaties. The Swiss Minister tells me his
Government is determined to insist upon the strict execution of
the Swiss Treaty, without admitting any alteration of the tariffs,
but then the Swiss Treaty does not expire for five or six years. I
take care to give no opinion as to what we shall or shall not do.
Thiers talked again last night of conferring with me soon about the
details of the changes. I am not very anxious that he should do so,
as confusion is much more likely than anything else to arise from
carrying on the discussion in both places at once.

Half my time is taken up with the affairs of the unfortunate
English prisoners. It is necessary to be cautious, for the French
Authorities are extremely touchy on the subject. There does not
appear to be any danger of their being executed, as fortunately
they are a very insignificant and unimportant set of insurgents,
if insurgents they were; but they are kept a long time without
examination, and some do run the risk of being shipped off to New
Caledonia.

The Comte de Chambord, having effectually destroyed the chances of his own party for the time being, now disappeared from the scene, and nothing more was heard of him or his White Flag for a considerable period.

The summer of 1871 did not pass without the old question of voting in the House of Lords cropping up again. In July, Lord Lyons received an intimation from the Liberal Whip that his vote was wanted on the following day, accompanied by a letter from Lord Granville in the same sense. He declined to come, on the same ground as formerly, viz. that he considered it advisable that a diplomatist should keep aloof from home politics, and also because he was extremely reluctant to give votes on questions of which he had little knowledge. The particular question involved was presumably a vote of censure on the Government in connection with the Army Purchase Bill, and he seems to have taken it for granted that Lord Granville would make no objection. A letter from the latter showed that he was mistaken.

* * * * *

_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, July 17, 1871.

I cannot agree with the principle you lay down--Lord Stuart,
my father, the late Lord Cowley, and Lord Normanby when Ambassador
at Paris used to vote when specially summoned. So did Lord Cowley,
although he served under successive Governments. So did Lord
Westmoreland and others. I find no recommendation of your principle
in the report of the Committee of the House of Commons, and
although Lord Derby may have given evidence in favour of it, his
father gave practical proof in several instances that he entirely
disagreed with it.

A Foreign Government can hardly believe in the confidential
relations of this Government and her Ambassador, if the latter
being a Peer abstains from supporting them when a vote of want of
confidence, or one amounting to it, is proposed against them.

Clarendon brought before the Cabinet your disinclination to
vote on the question of the Irish Church. They unanimously decided
that we had a claim upon you, and you were good enough to consent,
stating the grounds you mention in your letter of yesterday.

It is of course too late for any practical result to our
controversy as regards to-night, but I hope you will consider
that I have a claim on you for the future, when your vote is of
importance. I shall never ask you unnecessarily to come over.

An intimation of this kind from an official chief could not well be disregarded, but the reply to Lord Granville's letter is conclusive in its arguments.

* * * * *

Paris, July 27, 1871.

Your letter of the 17th about my voting in the House of Lords
goes farther than Lord Clarendon did on the previous occasion.
Lord Clarendon originally acquiesced in my not voting on the Irish
Church Bill, and when he subsequently begged me to come over,
unless I objected to the Bill, he founded his request principally
upon a strong opinion of Mr. Gladstone's that it was the duty of
a peer not to abstain from voting, and that every vote was of
consequence. On this ground he expressed a hope that I should come
over unless I was opposed to the Bill.

Of my predecessors, the only one who was in a position
resembling mine, was the present Lord Cowley; and certainly he will
always be a high authority with me.

I have been for more than thirty years, and I still am,
devoted to my own profession, and I am sure that if I can be of
any use in my generation, and do myself any credit, it must be
as a diplomatist. I have worked my way up in the regular course
of the profession, and have served under successive Governments,
both before and since I became a peer, without any reference to
home politics. In fact, I received my original appointment to the
service from Lord Palmerston; I was made paid attaché by Lord
Aberdeen; I was sent to Rome by Lord Russell; to Washington by Lord
Malmesbury; to Constantinople by Lord Russell; and finally to Paris
by Lord Derby. The appointment was given to me in the ordinary way
of advancement in my profession, and I was told afterwards by Lord
Clarendon that my being wholly unconnected with any party at home
had been considered to be a recommendation. I have myself always
thought that a regular diplomatist could only impair his efficiency
by taking part in home politics, and I have throughout acted upon
this conviction. During the thirteen years or thereabouts which
have elapsed since I succeeded to my father's peerage, I have given
only one vote in the House of Lords; the question, the Irish Church
vote, was one on which there really did seem to be a possibility
that the decision might turn upon one vote; and the question, as it
stood before the House, was hardly a party question.

In addition to all this, I must say that while I have a very
great reluctance to give blind votes, I do not wish to be diverted
from my diplomatic duties by having to attend to home questions;
also, I would rather give my whole energies to carrying out the
instructions of the Government abroad, without having continually
to consult my conscience about voting in the House of Lords.

I did not intend to have given you the trouble of reading
a long answer to your letter, but I have just received another
summons from Lord Bessborough. I hope, however, you will not press
me to come over to vote on Monday. You were at all events good
enough to say that you should never ask me to come unnecessarily;
but if, after considering my reasons, you insist upon my coming, I
must of course defer to your opinion and do what you desire.

It is difficult to believe that Lord Granville, who was one of the most amiable and considerate of men, was acting otherwise than under pressure in thus endeavouring to utilize an Ambassador as a party hack. His arguments certainly do not bear much investigation. If a foreign government could not feel any confidence in an Ambassador who failed to support his party by a vote in Parliament, what confidence could they possibly feel in him if his party were out of office, and he continued at his post under the orders of political opponents? If the Clarendon Cabinet really decided that they had a claim upon diplomatists as party men it only showed that they were conspicuously wanting in judgment and a prey to that dementia which occasionally seizes upon British statesmen when a division is impending. That state of mind is intelligible when a division in the House of Commons is concerned, but what passes comprehension is that pressure should be put upon members of the House of Lords to vote, whose abstention is obviously desirable, whilst scores of obscure peers are left unmolested. One peer's vote was as good as another's in 1871, just as it is now; but in the division on the vote of censure on the Army Purchase Bill only 244 peers voted out of a House containing about double that number.

Before long the question of the prolongation of Thiers's powers for a fixed period became the chief topic of interest. He was infinitely the most important personage in France, and a large number of members were desirous of placing him more or less in the position of a constitutional sovereign, and obliging him to take a Ministry from the majority in the Assembly. The majority in the Assembly not unnaturally thought that their ideas ought to prevail in the Government, and they resented being constantly threatened with the withdrawal of this indispensable man, an action which, it was thought, would amount to little short of a revolution. What they wanted, therefore, was to bestow a higher title upon him than Chief of the Executive Power, which would exclude him from coming in person to the Assembly; and it was only the difficulty of finding some one to take his place, and the desire to get the Germans out of the Paris forts that kept them quiet. Like many other eminent persons considered to be indispensable, Thiers now began to give out that he really desired to retire into private life, and that it was only the country which insisted upon his staying in office, while as a matter of fact, he was by no means as indifferent to power as he fancied himself to be. In the Chamber he damaged his reputation to some extent by displays of temper and threats of resignation, but there was never much doubt as to the prolongation of his powers.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Aug. 25, 1871.

Thiers quitted the Tribune in a pet yesterday, and the whole
series of events in the Assembly has very much lowered his credit.
In the one thing in which he was thought to be pre-eminent, the
art of managing a deliberative body, he completely failed: and his
first threatening to resign, and then coming back and half giving
in, has very much damaged him. Nevertheless the general opinion
is that the prolongation of his powers will pass, upon his making
it a condition, as a vote of confidence, of his remaining. But it
is difficult to believe, even if it be passed by a considerable
majority, that things can go on smoothly between him and the
Assembly very long. If any party had a leader and courage, it might
do almost anything in France at this moment.

Arnim[2] is expected on Saturday. I knew him years ago at
Rome. I doubt his being a conciliatory negotiator. The French
believe that Bismarck is so anxious to obtain commercial advantages
for Alsace, that he will give them great things in return. He
is supposed to wish, in the first place, to conciliate his new
subjects; and, in the second, to divert for a time from Germany
the torrent of Alsatian manufactures which would pour in if the
outlets into France were stopped up. The French hope to get the
Paris forts evacuated in return for a continuance of the free
entrance of Alsatian goods into France until the 1st of January,
and they even speculate upon getting the Prussians to evacuate
Champagne, and content themselves with keeping the army, which was
to have occupied it, inside the German frontier, the French paying
the expenses, as if it were still in France. All this to be given
in return for a prolongation of commercial privileges for Alsace.
It would be ungenerous of 'most favoured nations' to claim similar
privileges.

Thiers was too full of the events of the afternoon in the
Assembly to talk about the Commercial Treaty. I don't believe he
has brought the Committee round to his duties on raw materials.

At the end of August, the Assembly by a very large majority passed a bill conferring upon Thiers the title of President of the Republic and confirmed his powers for the duration of the existing Assembly, adopting at the same time a vote of confidence in him personally. The result of these proceedings was that the attempt to make a step towards the definite establishment of a Republic and to place Thiers as President for a term of years in a position independent of the Assembly, failed. The bill asserted what the Left had always denied, viz. the constituent power of the Assembly, and declared that the President was responsible to it. So far, it expressed the sentiments of the moderate men, and the minority was composed of extreme Legitimists and extreme Republicans. It also proved that Thiers was still held to be the indispensable man.

The Assembly, which had adjourned after the passing of the above-mentioned bill, met again in December, and was supposed to be more Conservative than ever, owing to the fear created by Radical progress in the country. Thiers's Presidential Message did not afford much satisfaction to the extreme partisans on either side, and it was evident that he did not desire any prompt solution of the Constitutional question, preferring to leave himself free, and not to be forced into taking any premature decision. As for the Legitimist, Orleanist, and Moderate Republican groups, their vacillation tended only to the advantage of two parties, the Bonapartists and the Red Republicans.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Dec. 26. 1871.

The New Year will open gloomily for France. The Germans appear
to be alarmed, or at all events irritated, by Thiers's military
boasts and military preparations. The boasts are certainly unwise,
and preparations or anything else which encourages the French
to expect to get off paying the three milliards are extremely
imprudent. The Germans mean to have their money and keep the
territory they have taken, and they say that they had better have
it out with France now that she is weak, than wait till she has
got strong again. The irritation of the French against the Germans
seems to grow, and the Germans are angry with the French for not
loving them, which after the conditions of peace, to say nothing of
the events of the war, seems somewhat unreasonable.

Thiers so far holds his own, and no party seems willing to
displace him, while no party agrees with him. The one thing in
which men of all parties seem to agree is in abusing Thiers, and
I must say that a good deal of the abuse is exceedingly unjust.
But with the members of the Assembly in this inflammable state of
feeling towards him, an unexpected spark may at any moment make
them flare up and turn him out almost before they are aware of
it. The general idea is that the Assembly would appoint the Duc
d'Aumale to succeed him; the acceptance of the Duc d'Aumale by
the country would depend upon the amount of vigour he showed in
putting down illegal opposition by force. There are members of the
Assembly who wish to declare that in case of Thiers's abdication
or dethronement, the President of the Assembly is to exercise the
Executive Power. This is with a view of bringing forward Grévy, who
is an honourable, moderate man, but an old thoroughbred Republican.
The immediate event people are looking forward to with interest
and anxiety is the election of a deputy for Paris on the 7th of
next month. No one will be surprised if a Red is returned, in
consequence of the men of order declining to vote. The Legitimists
and the Orleanists seem to be at daggers drawn again.

Arnim says that Bismarck's fierce despatch was partly intended
to strengthen Thiers's hands in resisting violence against the
Germans. If this is so, the ferocity went too far beyond the mark
to be successful, great as the provocation on the French side was.

I will write a mild disclaimer of the accuracy of Jules
Favre's accounts of his communications with me. There is no _malus
animus_, I think, in them. My Russian and Italian colleagues are
very much annoyed by the language he attributes to them.

The fierce despatch referred was a harsh communication from Bismarck complaining of the recent acquittal of some Frenchmen who had assassinated German soldiers of the army of occupation.

At the close of 1871, the Bonapartist Party, although scarcely represented in the Assembly, appeared to be that which caused the Government the most anxiety. That party had undoubtedly made progress in the country; it held out the hope of a vigorous and determined maintenance of public order, and a vast number of Frenchmen were so much out of heart, so wearied and disgusted by the results of the attempts at political liberty, and so much afraid of the triumph of the Commune, that they were prepared to sacrifice anything in order to be assured of peace and tranquillity. The peasants, shopkeepers, and even many of the workmen in the towns, sighed for the material prosperity of the Empire. They believed that the Emperor had been betrayed by his Ministers and Generals, and were willing to excuse his personal share even in the capitulation of Sedan. If more confidence could have been felt in his health and personal energy, the advocates of a restoration of the Empire would have been still more numerous. As it was, a great mass of the ignorant and the timid were in favour of it, and it was the opinion of so impartial an observer as the British Ambassador, that if a free vote could have been taken under universal suffrage a majority would probably have been obtained for the re-establishment upon the throne of Napoleon III. If the Imperialists could by any means have seized upon the executive Government and so directed the operations of a plébiscite, there was little doubt as to their securing the usual millions of votes under that process. With them, as with the other parties, the difficulty lay in bringing about such a crisis as would enable them to act, and the Emperor himself was disinclined to take any adventurous step.

The Legitimists had the advantage of holding to a definite principle, but it was a principle which carried little weight in the country in general. Their chief, the Comte de Chambord, had shown himself to be so impracticable, that it really seemed doubtful whether he wished to mount the throne, and the party had more members in the existing Assembly than it was likely to obtain if a fresh general election took place; added to which it had quarrelled with the Orleanists, a union with whom was essential to the attainment of any practical end.

The Orleanists were weakened by their dissensions with the Legitimists and discouraged by what they considered the want of energy and enterprise of the Princes of the family. The members of the Orleans party suffered from the want of a definite principle, and consisted chiefly of educated and enlightened men who held to Constitutional Monarchy and Parliamentary Government; in reality they were a fluctuating body willing to accept any Government giving a promise of order and political liberty.

The moderate Republicans included in their ranks many honest and respected men, but they had to contend with the extreme unpopularity of the Government of National Defence in which they had formed the chief part, and although the existing Government was nominally based upon their principles, they did not appear to be gaining ground. The extreme Republicans endeavoured to make up by violence what they wanted in numerical strength, and as they saw no prospect of obtaining office in a regular manner, founded their hopes upon seizing power at a critical moment with the help of the Paris mob.

Amidst this collection of parties stood Thiers's Government, supported heartily by none, but accepted by all. By skilful management, by yielding where resistance appeared hopeless, and by obtaining votes sometimes from one side of the Assembly, and sometimes from the other, Thiers had carried many points to which he attached importance, and had never yet found himself in a minority. His Government was avowedly a temporary expedient, resting upon a compromise between all parties, or rather upon the adjournment of all constitutional questions. To the monarchical parties which formed the majority of the Assembly, Thiers's apparent adoption of the Republican system rendered him especially obnoxious. On the other hand, the Republicans were dissatisfied because, the whole weight of the Government was not unscrupulously used for the purpose of establishing a Republic permanently, with or without the consent of the people.

On the centralization of the administration, on military organization, on finance, and on other matters, Thiers's personal views were widely different from those generally prevalent in the Assembly, and there was plenty of censure and criticism of him in private; but no one party saw its way to ensuring its own triumph, and all were weighed down by the necessity of maintaining endurable relations with Germany. In forming such relations, Thiers had shown great skill and obtained considerable success in his arduous task. Bismarck, in imposing the hardest possible conditions of peace, had acted avowedly on the principle that it was hopeless to conciliate France, and that the only security for Germany lay in weakening her as much as possible. This policy having been carried out, the German public and the German press appeared to be quite surprised that France was slow to be reconciled to her conquerors, and even to doubt whether already France was not too strong for their safety. The apparent recovery of the French finances may well have surprised them disagreeably, but Thiers was not over careful to avoid increasing their distrust. His intention to create a larger army than France had ever maintained before, and his frequent praises of the army he already possessed, was not reassuring to them. It was, therefore, not altogether surprising that they should have felt some doubts as to the consequences of finding themselves confronted by an immense army, when they called upon France to pay the remaining three milliards in 1874. Nevertheless the German Government had expressed its confidence in Thiers, and it would have been almost impossible for any new Government to have placed matters on as tolerable a footing.

All things considered, therefore, it seemed not improbable that the existing Government might last for some time, although its life was somewhat precarious, since it was liable to be upset by commotions and conspiracies, and having no existence apart from Thiers, its duration was bound to depend on the health and strength of a man nearly seventy-four years old.

In January, 1872, Thiers, in consequence of a dispute in the Chamber over the question of a tax on raw materials, tendered his resignation, but was persuaded with some difficulty to reconsider it. 'I have never known the French so depressed and so out of heart about their internal affairs,' wrote Lord Lyons. 'They don't believe Thiers can go on much longer, and they see nothing but confusion if he is turned out. The Legitimists and Orleanists are now trying for fusion. They are attempting to draw up a constitution on which they can all agree, and which, when drawn up, is to be offered to the Comte de Chambord, and if refused by him, then to the Comte de Paris. I hear they have not yet been able to come to an understanding on the first article. It all tends to raise the Bonapartists. Many people expect to hear any morning of a coup by which Thiers and the Assembly will be deposed, and an _appel au peuple_, made to end in a restoration of the Empire.' Probably it was the knowledge of a Bonapartist reaction in the country that led Thiers to make a singularly foolish complaint against an alleged military demonstration in England in favour of the ex-Emperor.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Feb. 9, 1872.

M. Thiers said to me yesterday at Versailles that he had
been told that a general of the name of Wood had marched 6000 of
Her Majesty's troops to Chislehurst to be reviewed by the Emperor
Napoleon.

M. Thiers went on to say that no one could appreciate more
highly than he did the noble and generous hospitality which England
extended to political exiles, and that he had indeed profited by
it in his own person. He admired also the jealousy with which the
English nation regarded all attempts from abroad to interfere with
the free exercise of this hospitality. He should never complain
of due respect being shown to a Sovereign Family in adversity. But
he thought that there was some limit to be observed in the matter.
For instance, he himself, while on the best terms with the reigning
dynasty in Spain, still always treated the Queen Isabella, who was
in France, with great respect and deference. Nevertheless, when Her
Majesty had expressed a desire to go to live at Pau, he had felt it
to be his duty to ask her very courteously to select a residence at
a greater distance from the frontier of Spain. In this, as in all
matters, he felt that consideration for the exiles must be tempered
by a due respect for the recognized Government of their country.
Now if the Emperor Napoleon should choose to be present at a review
of British troops, there could be no objection to his being treated
with all the courtesy due to a head which had worn a crown. It was,
however, a different thing to march troops to his residence to hold
a review there in his honour.

Thiers had not taken the trouble to substantiate his ridiculous complaint, and his action was an instance of the extreme gullibility of even the most intelligent French statesmen, where foreign countries are concerned, and so perturbed was the French Government at the idea of a Bonapartist restoration, that according to Captain Hotham, British Consul at Calais, two gunboats, the _Cuvier_ and _Faon_, were at that time actually employed in patrolling the coast between St. Malo and Dunkirk with a view to preventing a possible landing of the Emperor Napoleon. A little later, the Duc de Broglie, French Ambassador in London, made a tactless remonstrance to Lord Granville with regard to the presence of the Emperor and Empress at Buckingham Palace, on the occasion of a National Thanksgiving held to celebrate the recovery of the Prince of Wales from a dangerous illness.

* * * * *

_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, March 1, 1872.

The Duc de Broglie told me to-day that he had been rather
surprised when he heard of the Emperor and Empress having been at
Buckingham Palace on so public an occasion as that of last Tuesday,
that I had not mentioned it to him on Monday afternoon, when we had
had a long conversation. It would have enabled him to write to M.
de Rémusat,[3] and thus have prevented any of the effect which a
sudden announcement in the papers might create in France.

I told him that I had not been consulted and did not know the
fact of the invitation when I saw him, and that if I had, I should
probably have mentioned it to him, although not a subject about
which I should have written.

I should have explained to him that it was an act of courtesy
of the Queen to those with whom she had been on friendly relations,
and that it was analogous to many acts of courtesy shown by the
Queen to the Orleanist Princes.

He laid stress on the publicity of the occasion, and on the
few opportunities which he, as Ambassador, had of seeing the Queen,
of which he made no complaint; but it made any attentions to the
Emperor on public occasions more marked. He was afraid that the
announcement would produce considerable effect, not upon statesmen,
but upon the press in France.

I repeated that the admission of the Emperor and Empress had
no political significance, but had been in pursuance with the
long-established habit of the Queen to show personal courtesy
to Foreign Princes with whom she had been formerly on friendly
relations.

The fall of the Finance Minister, Pouyer Quertier, in the spring had given rise to hopes that the French commercial policy would become more liberal, but the letters quoted below show how powerless were the arguments of the British Government and how completely wasted upon the French Ministers were the lamentations of the British free traders, and their prognostications of ruin to those who were not sufficiently enlightened to adopt their policy.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, March 5, 1872.

I suppose Pouyer Quertier is really out, but we see so many
changes from hour to hour in resolutions here, that I shall not
report it officially until his successor is gazetted. We cannot
have a more Protectionist successor; but, after all, no one is so
bigoted a Protectionist as Thiers himself.

Nevertheless the change of Minister will give a chance or an
excuse for a change of policy to some extent. I think that with a
view to this some stronger expression of displeasure, or rather
perhaps of regret than we have hitherto ventured upon, might have
a good effect. The new Minister and perhaps even Thiers himself
might be struck by a report from Broglie that you had put strongly
before him the impossibility, whatever efforts the Government might
make, of preventing public opinion in England becoming hostile to
France if the present commercial policy is persisted in. It is in
fact plain that there is no probability of France obtaining the
concessions from the Treaty Powers, on which Thiers professed to
reckon. The result already is that, whatever may have been the
intention, the Mercantile Marine Law is in practice a blow which
falls on England, and not on other European Powers. Unless the
French Government means to give us a real most favoured nation
clause, the result of denouncing our treaty will be to place us,
when it expires, at a special disadvantage as compared with other
nations. And what it now asks us to effect by negotiation, is to
hasten the moment at which it can accomplish this. It is quite idle
to talk of special friendship for us, when its measures practically
treat us much worse than they do the Germans. M. de Rémusat and
some other people are fond of saying that it is quite impossible
that France could bear to see two nations so friendly as Belgium
and England placed exceptionally in a position inferior to Germany.
But France seems to bear this with great equanimity so far as our
merchant navy is concerned.

The demand we have made to be exempted from the _surtaxes de
pavillon_ under our most favoured nation clause would give the
French Government a means of remedying the injustice _if it wished
to do so_. At any rate some strong expressions of discontent on
our part might increase the disinclination of the Assembly and
some members of the Government to insist on imposing the duties on
the raw materials. It would be very convenient if there were some
retaliatory measures to which we could resort, without injuring
ourselves or departing from our own Free Trade principles. The
French Government grossly abuses, in order to influence the
Assembly, our assurances of unimpaired good will, and reluctance
to retaliate; and so, in my opinion, is preparing the way for the
real diminution of good will which its success in carrying its
protectionist measures, to our special injury, must produce in the
end.

The present Government of France does not gain strength; far
from it. The Imperialists are gaining strength, as people become
more and more afraid of the Reds, and feel less and less confidence
in the power either of Thiers, or the Comte de Chambord, or the
Comte de Paris, to keep them down. The end will probably be brought
about by some accident when it is least expected. It would not be
wise to leave out of the calculation of possibilities, the chance
of Thiers's Government dragging on for some time yet, and it would
be very difficult to predict what will succeed it. At present the
Legitimists and Orleanists seem to have lost, and to be daily
losing prestige, and naturally enough, to be bringing down with
them the Assembly in which they are or were a majority.

Perhaps I ought to say that the despatch which I send you
to-day about the sojourn of our Royal Family in the South of
France applies exclusively to them. Everybody knows or ought to
know that affairs are uncertain in France, but I should not think
it necessary or proper to warn private people against coming to
France or staying there. The conspicuous position of members
of the Royal Family increase the risk of their being placed in
awkward circumstances, and circumstances which would be of little
consequence in the case of private people, would be very serious
and embarrassing if they affected members of the Royal Family of
England.

The last passage referred to a stay at Nice contemplated by the Prince of Wales. In the event of any change of Government, it was always feared that disorders would take place in the southern towns of France.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, March 14, 1872.

The commercial disputes with the French Government which, as
you know, I always apprehended, are coming thick upon us. I foresaw
what was coming and begged Thiers, Rémusat and other members of
the Government over and over again to guard against vexations in
the execution of the Treaty while it lasted. I make little doubt,
notwithstanding, that all these violent and unfair proceedings are
prompted, not checked, from Paris.

The Spaniards have found out the only way to deal with the
Protectionist spirit here. The slightest hint at retaliation would
have such an effect in the Assembly as to stop the onward career of
illiberality. As things now are, the extortioners have the game in
their own hands. They levy what duty they please, and pay just as
much or as little attention as may suit them, to our remonstrances.
It is a very disagreeable affair for one who, like myself, is
really anxious that there should be good feeling between the two
countries. We are in a fix. On the one hand, we cannot, without
injuring ourselves and abandoning our principles, retaliate; and
on the other hand, while they feel sure we shall do no more than
remonstrate, the Protectionist officials will care very little.
If indeed the general opinion is to be relied upon, the present
Government and its chief may come down with a crash at any moment,
but I don't know whether a change would benefit us commercially.

Lord Lyons, like Lord Granville and other English public men and officials of the day, was a Free Trader, as has already been stated. But it would be difficult for the most ardent Protectionist to make out a stronger case against the helplessness of a Free Trade policy when negotiating with a foreign Government than is disclosed in these letters, and there are any number of others all in the same strain. All the protestations of goodwill, of sympathy, and benefit to the human race, etc., were, and presumably are still, a pure waste of time when addressed to a country about to frame a tariff in accordance with its own interests, unless the threat of retaliation is used in order to retain some bargaining power, as apparently the Spaniards had already discovered.

It has already been stated that Thiers's plans of military re-organization and his somewhat imprudent language had caused some agitation in Germany, and when the German Ambassador, Count Arnim, returned to his post at Paris in the spring of 1872, it was freely rumoured that he was the bearer of remarkably unpleasant communications. These apprehensions turned out to be exaggerated, and Thiers in conversation always assumed a lamb-like attitude of peace. He denied that the Germans had addressed any representations to him, said that all suspicions against him were grossly unjust, that it would be absolute madness for France to think of going to war, and that, for his part, the keystone of all his foreign policy was peace. As for his army reform schemes, he was a much misunderstood man. He was undoubtedly reorganizing the military forces of France, and it was his duty to place them upon a respectable footing, and so provide a guarantee for peace. It was, however, quite false to say that he was arming, for that term implied that he was making preparations for war, and that he was putting the army into a condition to pass at once from a state of peace to a state of war. He was doing nothing of the sort; on the contrary, his efforts were directed to obtaining the evacuation of the territory, by providing for the payment of the war indemnity to Germany, and it could hardly be supposed that if he were meditating a renewal of the contest, he would begin by making over three milliards to her.

From Arnim's language, it appeared that the German public was irritated and alarmed at the perpetual harping of the French upon the word 'Revenge,' and that the German military men (the _militaires_ who were always so convenient to Bismarck for purposes of argument) conceived that the best guarantee for peace would be to keep their soldiers as long as possible within a few days' march of Paris.

The German fears were, no doubt, greatly exaggerated, but if they existed at all they were largely due to Thiers's own language, who, while not talking indeed of immediate revenge, was fond of boasting of the strength and efficiency of the French army, and even of affirming that it was at that very moment equal to cope with the Germans. That he was conscious of having created suspicion may be inferred from the fact that when the Prince of Wales passed through Paris on his way from Nice to Germany, he begged H.R.H. to use his influence at the Court of Berlin to impress upon the Emperor and all who were of importance there, that the French Government, and the President himself in particular, desired peace above all things, and were resolved to maintain it. A letter from the British Ambassador at Berlin throws some light upon the prevalent German feeling.

* * * * *

_Mr. Odo Russell[4] to Lord Lyons._

British Embassy, Berlin, April 27, 1872.

Since your letter of the 9th inst. reached me feelings have
changed in Berlin.

Thiers's Army bill and Speech have irritated the Emperor,
Bismarck and indeed everybody.

The Generals tell the Emperor it would be better to fight
France before she is ready than after; but Bismarck, who scorns the
Generals, advises the Emperor to fight France _morally_ through
Rome and the Catholic alliances against United Germany.

Although he denies it, Bismarck probably caused those violent
articles against Thiers to appear in the English newspapers, and he
tells everybody that Thiers has lost his esteem and may lose his
support. The next grievance they are getting up against him is that
he is supposed to have made offers through Le Flô to Russia against
Germany.

In short, from having liked him and praised him and wished for
him, they are now tired of him and think him a traitor because he
tries to reform the French Army on too large a scale!

Gontaut[5] does not appear to do anything beyond play the
agreeable, which he does perfectly, and every one likes him. But
it is said that _Agents_, financial Agents I presume, are employed
by Thiers to communicate through Jewish Bankers here indirectly
with Bismarck. Through these agents Thiers is supposed to propose
arrangements for an early payment of the 3 milliards and an early
withdrawal of the German troops of occupation,--the payment
to be effected by foreign loans and the guarantee of European
Bankers,--in paper not in gold. Bismarck has not yet pronounced
definitely, but the Emperor William won't hear of shortening the
occupation of France. Indeed, he regrets he cannot by Treaty leave
his soldiers longer still as a guarantee of peace while he lives,
for he is most anxious to die at peace with all the world.