Chapter XVII: The Last Year's Work (1)

(1886-1887)

The sudden and unexpected declaration in September of the Union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia which caused so much perturbation in Europe, and resulted in a war between Servia and Bulgaria, left the French quite indifferent; but the imminence of hostilities between England and Burmah provoked French ill-humour, which was all the more inexcusable because no protest had ever been made against French proceedings in Tonquin and Madagascar. The truth was that the Burmese resistance to the Indian Government was largely due to French encouragement. As far back as 1883 a Burmese Mission had arrived in Paris, and kept studiously aloof from the British Embassy; and although every opportunity had been taken to impress upon the French Government the peculiar relations between Burmah and British India, there was not the least doubt that the object of the Burmese had been to obtain from the French Government such a Treaty as would enable them to appeal to France in the event of their being involved in difficulties with England. How much encouragement they actually received is not known, but it was probably sufficient to effect their undoing.

The papers are abusing us about Burmah, and being quite
innocent of any aggression themselves in that part of the world,
are horrified at our holding our own there. Nevertheless, I hope
the Indian Government will finish the thing out of hand, for an
ugly state of feeling about it is growing up here.

The rapidity with which the operations against Burmah were conducted left nothing to be desired. The campaign was over within a few weeks; on January 1, 1886, the annexation of Burmah was proclaimed, and the affairs of that country ceased to be of any further interest to the French Government.

Lord Salisbury's tenure of the Foreign Office, which had been marked by so successful a policy that even Mr. Gladstone had expressed satisfaction, came to an end early in 1886, and he was succeeded by Lord Rosebery. 'The irony of events,' wrote the latter to Lord Lyons, 'has sent me to the Foreign Office, and one of the incidents of this which is most agreeable to me, is that it brings me into close relations with yourself.'

Although the Paris press had circulated a ridiculous fiction that Lord Rosebery (presumably because he was personally acquainted with Bismarck) was anti-French by inclination, the change of Government in England was received in France with perfect equanimity, as had been the case in the previous autumn.

The new Foreign Secretary, however, could not fail to be painfully impressed by the unsatisfactory feeling which obviously existed in France towards England, and found it difficult of explanation.

* * * * *

_Lord Rosebery to Lord Lyons._

March 3, 1886.

I am rather anxious about the attitude of the French. In
my short tenure of office they have brought up three or four
questions, all in the highest degree distasteful to us.

1. The Consul at Suakim: as to which they say, with accuracy
which is disputed, that they had gone too far and could not
withdraw the appointment.

2. Arbitration on the Somali coast troubles: as to which they
declare that Salisbury promised it, which Salisbury, I understand,
denies.

3. The revival of the Suez Canal Commission.

4. The announcement made to me by Waddington yesterday that
they should be obliged shortly to send a cargo of recidivists to
the Isle of Pines. I remonstrated strongly with him, and indeed
I cannot foresee all the consequences, should they carry their
intention into effect. One, however, I do clearly perceive, which
is that we should have to denounce the Postal Convention of 1856,
which gives the Messageries privileges in Australian ports, which
could not be sustained, and which the colonists would not for a
moment, under such circumstances, respect.

But these are details. What I want to point out is the
apparent animus displayed in these different proceedings. I shall
not mention them to my colleagues until I hear your view of them,
and anything you may be able to collect on the subject.

What does it all mean? These things did not occur during the
late Government? Are they directed against the new Administration?
I cannot view them as a chapter of accidents.

As for myself, I have entered upon this office with the most
sincere wish to be friendly with France. There can be no earthly
reason why we should not be so. It is a pity, therefore, that our
cordiality should be poisoned at its source.

I wish you would let me know what you think of all this. You
can pick up much directly, and perhaps even more indirectly, on
these points. Pray forgive the length of this letter.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Rosebery._

Paris, March 5, 1886.

I have naturally been on the watch since you came into office
for indications of the feelings of the French Government respecting
the change. In answer to your letter of the day before yesterday,
asking my opinion, I can only say that I think the French are quite
as well disposed towards the new Government as they were to the
late one--indeed, of the two, I should say better. We come so much
into contact with the French all over the globe that questions
more or less unpleasant are always arising in smaller or greater
numbers, according to circumstances; and French feeling is in a
chronic state of irritability about Egypt.

The four subjects you mention are certainly annoying, but I do
not believe that the French proceedings respecting them have been
actuated by any animus against the present English Ministry.

I shall be somewhat staggered in this opinion, however, if the
French Government proposes to substitute arbitration by any third
Power for the understanding that the Somali coast questions shall
be treated by friendly negotiations between the two Governments,
and that meanwhile the _status quo_ shall not be disturbed. With a
view to proceeding with the negotiation, M. Waddington proposed to
Lord Salisbury on Jan. 20th, and by a written note the next day,
that an inquiry should be made on the spot by two Commissioners,
one English and one French. Lord Salisbury received the verbal
proposal favourably, but did not at the moment give a definitive
answer.

The proposal to reassemble the Suez Canal Commission is simply
the renewal of a proposal made by M. Waddington to Lord Salisbury
at the beginning of January.

The most serious of the affairs you mention appears to me to
be the imminent despatch of a cargo of _récidivistes_ to the Isle
of Pines. I have seen from the beginning the importance of this
_récidiviste_ question as regards public feeling in Australia,
and there is hardly any question about which I have taken so much
trouble. I have attacked successive French Ministers upon it in
season and out of season, but I have never succeeded in obtaining
any promise that _récidivistes_ should not be sent to the Pacific.
As I reported to you, I remonstrated with Freycinet about the
intention actually to send off a batch, as soon as I became aware
of it. I did not perceive any difference in his manner or language
from what they had been when some other Ministers had been in
office in England, but my remonstrances were equally ineffectual. I
am glad you had an opportunity of speaking strongly to Waddington.
I see troubles ahead, for the Australians have before now
threatened to pass Dominion laws against French ships found to have
escaped convicts on board, which seem to go a good deal beyond
international usage, not to say law.

It is time, however, for me to wind up this long story. My
answer to your question is that I am far from thinking that there
is any _malus animus_ against Her Majesty's present Government on
the part of Freycinet and his Cabinet. Nor do I know that there is
more than the usual irritability towards England among the French
public; but still I feel strongly that it behoves us to tread
cautiously as well as firmly, when we are coming upon French ground.

The spring of 1886 was noticeable for another Government onslaught upon such members of ex-reigning families as were then residing in France. Of these the most conspicuous were the Orleans Princes. There was nothing in their conduct to cause alarm to the Republic, as they confined themselves to taking part in social functions, at which they maintained a kind of semi-state, being always attended by ladies and gentlemen-in-waiting after the manner of recognized Royal personages. This innocent procedure was sufficient excuse to work up an agitation against them, and to introduce an Expulsion Bill.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Rosebery._

Paris, May 25, 1886.

The question of the day is the expulsion of the Princes. The
measure, if taken, will be quite unjustifiable, discreditable to
the Government, and, I should say, not at all injurious to the
cause of the victims. Considering the people and the institutions
with which they had to deal, the partisans of the Orleans Princes
have not been so prudent and correct as the Princes themselves.
They have gone about twitting the Republicans with weakness for
permitting the very mild demonstration made by the Royalists, and
declaring that such want of vigour was simply a sign of the decay
of the Republic.

* * * * *

The general opinion is that the Expulsion Bill will pass in
its present, or even in an aggravated form, and that if it does,
the Government will proceed to expel the Comte de Paris at least,
if not the Duc de Chartres, and some others. On the other hand, it
is not expected that the Bill confiscating the property, real and
personal, of the Orleans and Bonapartes will be adopted.

Much anxiety is felt respecting Boulanger's goings on with
respect to the army. He seems to think of nothing but currying
favour with the lowest ranks in the service, and with the mob
outside. It is believed by many people that he would not act
vigorously, as Minister of War, against any disturbances, but would
try to turn them to account and set up for himself as dictator or
what not.

The financial situation is very bad, and if common scandal is
to be listened to, the very short duration of French Ministries is
having the effect of making most of the individual Ministers very
unscrupulous and very impatient to make hay during the very short
time that the sun shines.

The above letter contains one of the first allusions to the enterprising impostor Boulanger, who very nearly succeeded in making history, and of whom much was to be heard for some considerable space of time. His popularity was due in great measure to the vague discontent which was then prevalent in France. People thought that they saw the same inefficiency in the Government, the same relaxation of authority, the same financial difficulties, and the same venality which marked the last days of the Second Empire. There seemed to be no individual, in or out of the Royal or Imperial Dynasties, capable of exciting any enthusiasm or of inspiring any confidence, and public feeling was in that state of lassitude and dissatisfaction which might give a reasonable chance for a bold stroke for power.

The scandalous Expulsion Bill passed both Chambers, and the Princes took their departure.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Rosebery._

Paris, June 25, 1886.

The departure of the Comte de Paris from Eu has been
accompanied by many very sad circumstances, but I cannot help
thinking that his political position is improved by his expulsion.
His own partisans are much pleased at its having elicited from
him a distinct assertion of a claim to the throne, and of a
determination to work for the restoration of monarchy.

It is less easy to give an opinion on the position of the
Princes who have remained in France. It seems to be hardly
compatible with dignity and comfort, considering the unabated
hostility to them of the Reds, who seem generally to end in
overpowering all generous and conservative feelings in the Chambers
and in the Government.

Prince Napoleon and his son Prince Victor went off in opposite
directions, one to Geneva, the other to Brussels. The departure of
neither seems to have made much apparent sensation in Paris when
it took place, but I am far from certain that Prince Victor is not
really a more formidable opponent to the Republic than is the Comte
de Paris.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Rosebery._

Paris, July 2, 1886.

* * * * *

The topic of the day here is the conduct of the Minister of
War, General Boulanger. He was supposed to be an Orleanist. Then
he went round to Clémençeau, and was put into Freycinet's Cabinet
as a representative of the Clémençeau party, which though not the
most Red in the Chamber, is more Red than the Freycinet section.
Since he has been in office Boulanger has lost no opportunity of
ingratiating himself with the Radicals, and he has been travelling
about the country making speeches, the object of which has
evidently been to gain personal popularity for himself without
regard to his colleagues.

He has also by degrees put creatures of his own into the
great military commands. A crisis was produced, during the last
few days, by his quarrelling with General Saussier, the military
Governor of Paris, and provoking him into resigning. He is also
said to have used strange language in the Council of Ministers. At
any rate, President Grévy and the Ministers seem to have thought
they would be more comfortable at Paris without having a satellite
of Boulanger as Governor, and they have insisted upon declining
Saussier's resignation. From the way people talk, one would think
that the questions were whether Boulanger is aiming at being a
Cromwell or a Monk, and if a Monk, which dynasty he will take up.

There is a good deal of alarm here about foreign affairs. The
reports of a large concentration of Russian troops in Bessarabia
are supposed to confirm other indications that Russia is meditating
a revenge for the check she has sustained with regard to Bulgaria.
This, it is supposed, must bring Austria into the field. Moreover,
Bismarck does not seem to be in an amiable mood towards France;
and with or without instigation from him, Germans talk as if war
was inevitable.

Then the Republic here has lasted sixteen years, and that is
about the time which it takes to make the French tired of a form of
Government. The Republic has not been successful financially, and
trade and agriculture are not prosperous, nor is the reputation of
the Republican administration high for purity or efficiency.

So there is plenty to croak about for those who are inclined
to croak.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Rosebery._

Paris, July 13, 1886.

The regular session of the French Chambers is to be closed the
day after to-morrow, and the Chambers are to spend to-morrow at
the Review at Longchamps, and I suppose to take part in the other
nuisances which makes Paris insupportable on a National Fête day.
I conclude the Chambers will come back in October for an extra
session as usual. In fact, they have not yet voted the Budget; or,
I had almost said, any useful measure. In Commercial matters and
indeed in everything relating to intercourse with other countries,
they have shown the narrowest and most exclusive spirit. Their
great feat has been the law for the persecution of the Princes,
which seems to be carried out as harshly as possible. I should
not have said that the literal wording of the law necessitated
or even justified the dismissal from the army of Princes who
already belonged to it, but I suppose that was the intention of
the legislators. The Duc d'Aumale's letter to the President is a
powerful document, but was sure to lead to his expulsion, and was
perhaps intended to have that effect.

Among people who ought to have good information from abroad,
the alarm as to a war this autumn seems stronger than among
the French politicians who confine themselves more closely to
considering French feeling at home. Certainly it comes round to
one in various ways from Germany that war is very generally
expected, or at all events talked of there. The accounts current
in Germany of supposed French provocations look as if there was
a party there trying to work up hostile feeling against France.
An alliance between France and Russia seems to be the bugbear. I
don't see symptoms at present of any war spirit in this country;
but of course a quarrel between Russia and Germany would be a great
temptation to French Chauvinism.

The abhorred annual fête of July 14, 1886, possessed an interest which had been wanting previously, and has never since been renewed. This was due to the presence of a number of troops at the Longchamps Review who had just returned from Tonquin, and to the excitement caused by the first appearance of Boulanger at a big military display in Paris. Notwithstanding the inflated rubbish which was published the next day in the French press, there could not be the least doubt that the Tonquin troops were received without the slightest enthusiasm. In Paris the very word 'Tonquin' was hated; the country was associated with loss of life, and with heavy taxation, and nothing could have expressed more eloquently the disenchantment produced by a Spirited Colonial Policy, than the chilling reception accorded to these returned soldiers. The enthusiasm which should have been bestowed upon these humble instruments was lavished upon the charlatan who at that moment was the most prominent and popular figure in the eye of the French public.

The military mountebank (aptly christened by Jules Ferry, 'a music hall St. Arnaud') had, with some foresight, provided himself with a high-actioned black circus horse, and those who were present on the occasion will never forget the moment when he advanced to salute the President, and other notabilities established in the official Tribune. Only a few days before, it was currently believed, he had terrified his ministerial colleagues by appearing at a Cabinet Council in uniform, and now as he pranced backwards or forwards on the circus horse and the public yelled their acclamations, President Grévy and the uninteresting crowd of bourgeois ministers and deputies who surrounded him, seemed visibly to quiver and flinch as shuddering memories of December 2 and other _coups d'état_ obtruded themselves upon their recollections.

From that day Boulanger became a dangerous man; the circus horse had done the trick; the general embodied in the public fancy the _clinquant_, for which the French had so long been sighing in secret; _l'homme qui monte à cheval_ in place of _l'homme qui monte à la tribune_, and for a long time he survived even that ridicule which in France is supposed to kill more effectively than elsewhere. Even when he engaged in a duel with an elderly and short-sighted civilian, M. Floquet, and was decisively worsted, he continued to remain a popular hero.

Lord Rosebery, upon whom the unreasonable ill-feeling then constantly shown by the French towards England had made a painful impression, had realized in May that the Gladstone Government was doomed, and had wisely decided in consequence that a process of marking time was preferable to embarking upon anything in the nature of a heroic policy. Upon his retirement and the formation of a new administration, Lord Lyons experienced what was probably the greatest surprise of his life in the shape of the following letter from Lord Salisbury. In order to reinforce its arguments the late Lord Currie, then Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, was sent over with it to Paris.

LONDON: EDWARD ARNOLD.]

* * * * *

Confidential. July 26, 1886.

I accepted yesterday the Queen's commission to form a
Government. It is a task full of difficulties; and I would have
gladly seen Lord Hartington undertake it. This, however, he could
not be induced to do; and the duty falls upon me. One of my first
thoughts is to provide a Foreign Secretary for the new Government:
for I could not, with any hope of carrying it through successfully,
repeat the experiment of last summer by uniting the Foreign
Secretaryship with the Premiership.

There is no one possessing the experience and knowledge of
Foreign Affairs which you have, and no one whose appointment would
exercise so great a moral authority in Europe. And we certainly
have not in our political ranks any one who could claim a tithe of
the fitness for the office which every one would acknowledge in
your case. I earnestly hope the proposal may be not unacceptable to
you. If that should happily be the case, a great difficulty in our
way will have been most successfully removed.

As there is much to be said on the matter which it would be
too long to write, Currie has very kindly undertaken to take this
letter over and discuss the matter with you. We have talked it over
very fully.

If you should be in need of any interval of repose, I could
easily take the seals for a few weeks.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris. July 27, 1886.

Currie brought me your letter early this morning. In answer to
it I sent you at 11.30 a.m. the following telegram:--

'I am very much gratified, and I am very grateful for the kind
consideration with which your proposal is accompanied, but my
age and the state of my health make it quite impossible for me to
undertake the office.'

I hope I need not assure you that I am fully sensible of the
kindness of your letter, and that if I cannot feel that I merit all
you say of me, I am at least grateful for your good opinion.

The truth is, that I could not now undertake new and laborious
duties with any confidence that I could discharge them efficiently.
I feel the need of rest, and I am not equal to beginning a new
life of hard work. I could not conscientiously assume the great
responsibility which would be thrown upon me.

If the post of Foreign Secretary has ever been offered during the last hundred years to any other person outside the ranks of orthodox party politicians the secret has been well kept, and it might perhaps be suggested that few people would be found with sufficient strength of mind to decline so glittering a prize. Lord Lyons, however, as is sufficiently evident, found no difficulty in at once deciding upon the refusal of an offer which the ordinary mediocrity would have accepted with avidity. In the above letter he founded his refusal upon grounds of age and ill-health, and in private he used to express the opinion that after the age of forty a man's faculties began and continued to deteriorate. But it is not in the least likely that he would have accepted the honour which it was proposed to bestow upon him, at any period of his life. His extreme modesty and diffidence have already been dwelt upon, but a more valuable quality than these is a man's realization of his own limitations, and it is probable that Lord Lyons, by the exercise of his exceptionally impartial judgment, was able to form a more correct opinion as to his own potentialities than Lord Salisbury. A thorough and profound knowledge of foreign politics is not the sole necessary qualification of an English Foreign Secretary; had such been the case, Lord Lyons would have been an ideal occupant of the post; but in England, where the value of Ministers is gauged chiefly by the fallacious test of oratorical capacity, the Foreign Secretary is constantly obliged to make speeches in defence of or in explanation of his policy, and although the House of Lords is the most long-suffering and good-natured assembly in the world, it would have been no easy task for a man of sixty-nine, who had never put two sentences together in public, to suddenly appear in Parliament as the representative of one of the most important departments, to say nothing of public meetings, deputations, banquets, etc. It may also be doubted whether, in spite of his many admirable qualities, he was really adapted for the post. All his life, he had been merely an instrument--a highly efficient instrument--of the existing Government, and had received instructions, which had invariably been carried out with singular skill and intelligence. But the responsibility had not been his, and as Foreign Secretary the initiative as well as the responsibility which would have rested upon him might have imposed too formidable a strain upon one of so cautious a temperament. Taking into consideration these doubts, his advanced age, failing health, and the effect of depression caused by the recent death of his much loved sister, the Dowager Duchess of Norfolk, the refusal of the Foreign Office by Lord Lyons was only an additional instance of that robust common sense which was one of his most pronounced characteristics. Lord Rosebery, at all events, thought that he had decided wisely.

* * * * *

_Lord Rosebery to Lord Lyons._

Dalmeny, Aug. 10, 1886.

As my Foreign Office episode is at an end, I write a line of
good-bye, not as a Minister, but on the footing of what I hope I
may call friendship.

My six months' experience has led me to the conviction that
our relations with France are really more troublesome than with
any other Power. She is always wanting something of us which it is
impossible to give her, and she then says plaintively, 'You never
do anything for me.' She is quite oblivious of the fact that she
never loses the opportunity of playing us a trick. Witness the
secret expedition to the New Hebrides. Nothing would have induced
me to go on with any one of the negotiations with Waddington until
they had removed their troops from those islands. Whenever he asked
for an answer about anything, I always turned the conversation
round to that interesting spot.

With this conviction, therefore, it has been a great comfort
to feel that you were at Paris.

I am not surprised that you did not care about my succession!
It is a weary post.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Rosebery._

Heron's Ghyll, Uckfield, Aug. 17, 1886.

Your friendly letter has followed me here and has much
gratified me.

I think you must look back with great satisfaction to your
time at the Foreign Office. You have certainly won golden opinions
from your subordinates and from the world at large, which is
perhaps a less competent judge. My own official intercourse with
you was certainly both very pleasant to me and very satisfactory.

I attribute the difficulties with France more to the
inevitable consequences of our coming into contact with the French
in all parts of the world, than to any ill-will on either side,
although I do not pretend to say that the state of feeling is what
I could wish it to be.

Independently of any other considerations, I felt altogether
too old to undertake the Foreign Office. I was so convinced of
this, that I regarded it as what the French call an objection
_préjudicielle_ to entertaining the question at all.

The post which Lord Lyons had declined was accepted by Lord Iddesleigh, who had just been removed from the House of Commons, and, as was only natural, it is evident that he was in the habit of consulting Lord Salisbury before taking any step of importance. In October, 1886, with the concurrence of Lord Salisbury, Lord Lyons was instructed to approach the French Government on the question of Egypt, and to explain the conditions under which it would be possible to terminate the British military occupation. There seems to be absolutely no doubt that Her Majesty's Government were perfectly sincere and honestly desirous of carrying out the promises that had been made at various times, and as subsequent history showed, it was the misguided opposition of France and Russia which was as much responsible as anything else for the permanent British occupation of Egypt.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Iddesleigh._

Paris, Oct. 22, 1886.

In my previous letter of to-day I have told you what M. de
Freycinet said to me about the Suez Canal Convention. I had a long
interview with him, but though I gave him plenty of opportunities,
he did not say one other word about Egypt. This being the case,
I thought it prudent to abstain, at all events at this first
interview, from saying anything on my side. So far then I have not
made known to him any part of the contents of your letter to Lord
Salisbury of the 18th or of his telegraphic answer.

The fact is, that from what I have made out since I came back
here, I am led to think that the French Government have now good
reason to doubt whether they would get Bismarck's support if they
raised the Egyptian question with a view to embarrass us. This
being the case, they are very much hesitating to do so, and are
on the look-out for signs of our impressions on the subject, and
would interpret any appearance of unusual anxiety on our part, or
any fresh offers of concessions from us, simply as indications
that we still thought Germany might join against us. If the French
Government are not pretty sure of help and sympathy from abroad,
they will probably not stir in the matter.

In the meantime, however, the press has been strongly excited,
probably by d'Aunay and Charmes. There is a very nasty article,
principally about the financial part of the Egyptian question, in
the _Débuts_ this morning.

I shall perhaps be able to see my way more clearly in a day or
two. In the meantime I am disposed to think the most prudent plan
will be to be reserved and firm about Egypt, but not to display
anxiety on the subject.

The idea of Lord Salisbury, speaking generally, was that a somewhat distant date of evacuation should be foreshadowed; that if evacuation, as was fully intended, should be carried out, some return should be expected for the expenditure of British blood and treasure, and that the Suez Canal difficulty should be settled without further delay. He considered that the negotiations should be carried on with the Porte (Sir Henry Drummond Wolff had already been despatched on this mission), and that confidential communications should be made to France and Germany.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Iddesleigh._

Paris, Oct. 26, 1886.

I shall be very anxious to know what line Waddington took on
his return to his post, and particularly what, if anything, he said
about Egypt.

Freycinet is the man chiefly responsible for the refusal of
France to join in our expedition to Egypt, and this no doubt makes
him very anxious to gain for himself the credit of some striking
success in getting England out of that country. So far as I can
make out here, the attempts that have been made to get the Powers
to unite in calling for a general Conference upon Egyptian affairs
have not met with much success. If Bismarck decidedly opposes
attempts of this kind, they will no doubt be abandoned. The Press
continue to urge strong measures against our continuing in Egypt,
and is not measured in its language.

The autumn session is often fatal to French Ministers. I
recollect Gambetta's saying to me not long before his own fall:
'_En automne les feuilles tombent et les porte-feuilles aussi._'

It is more than likely that the instructions which M. Waddington received about this period were of a disagreeable nature. A well-known French Ambassador once remarked to me some years later, that the London Embassy was no very desirable post from the French diplomatist's point of view. 'We are sent there with the mission of getting the English out of Egypt, and the thing cannot be done!'

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Iddesleigh._

Paris, Nov. 23, 1886.

Freycinet's aim seems to be to improve his own position in
the Chambers and in the country by obtaining our withdrawal from
Egypt, and of course the object cannot be attained unless he can
make it appear that the withdrawal is his doing. Hence his strong
desire that we should negotiate with him and his dislike to our
negotiating with Turkey or any other Power.

The crushing defeat of the Right in the elections in the
Department of the Nord is another proof of their blindness in
misusing the chance they had after the general election. They might
possibly have led gradually up to a restoration by giving strength
to Conservative principles and measures. They could only discredit
themselves by joining the extreme Radicals and attempting to
produce mischief and confusion.

The Germans are either very dilatory, or they have some
_arrière pensée_ about the Zanzibar affair. Yesterday afternoon
Münster was still without any instructions to make the joint
invitation to the French.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Iddesleigh._

Paris, Dec. 3, 1886.

You will see by my despatch that Freycinet has again attacked
me about Egypt. He wants the negotiation to go through him, and
if possible to be made with him, independently of the Turks, or
at least virtually in conjunction with us. I have not yet seen
any symptoms of his being anxious really to help us in Egyptian
matters; and I am not generally favourable to carrying on parallel
negotiations, or the same negotiation in different places. The
danger of informal conversations between Freycinet and me is that,
however cautious I may be, he may somehow or other find occasion
to quote me, as being more _coulant_ than you. At any rate, if I
had to talk to him it would be very necessary for you to tell me
very exactly how far I could go: and above all, that I should be
guarded from holding any language which might by any possibility be
embarrassing to the line circumstances might make it advisable for
Her Majesty's Government to take in Parliament afterwards.

I was long enough at Constantinople to see that no dependence
whatever was to be placed upon what the Porte told an Ambassador
about his colleagues. Still I cannot say that the Turkish
revelation about the communications the Porte affects to receive
from the French and Russian Ambassadors about Egypt and about us,
are, in the face of them, improbable. At any rate, our views must
be much nearer than those we now have to the French ideas, before
we shall get any real help from France at the Porte.

I write, as you know, in ignorance of Wolff's opinion, as he
did not stop here on his way home.

Freycinet's defeat in the Chamber this afternoon is serious
because it followed a strong speech from himself against the
_Sous-Préfet_ abolition, but he has wonderful skill in patching
things up.

Freycinet in December was defeated by one of those combinations of Royalist and Radicals which were not uncommon in French politics, and although the absurdity of the situation was obvious to every one, insisted on placing his resignation and that of the Cabinet in President Grévy's hands. A change of Government was so useless that even those who had combined to overthrow Freycinet endeavoured to persuade him to reconsider his determination. He remained obdurate, however, and the President, casting about for a successor, pitched at first upon M. Floquet, a strong Radical who was particularly obnoxious to the Russian Government.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Iddesleigh._

Paris, Dec. 7, 1886.

The chances seem to be in favour of Floquet being Prime
Minister. He is of the section of the Chamber called 'Gauche
radical,' that is to say, he falls just short of the most extreme
Left. Who would be his Minister for Foreign Affairs and what would
be his foreign policy I do not pretend to say. The incident in
his life most talked about is his having cried out, '_Vive la
Pologne!_' and used some expressions taken as disrespectful to
the late Emperor of Russia, when His Majesty was at the Palais de
Justice, on his visit to Paris during the Exhibition of 1867. The
Russian Ambassadors have, I believe, declined or avoided exchanging
courtesies with him when he has since been in situations, such
as that of _Préfet de la Seine_, and President of the Chamber of
Deputies, which have brought him into communication with the rest
of the diplomatic body. Russia at this moment is paying so much
court to France that she might perhaps get over this.

The Left of the Chamber have hitherto been opposed to the
Tonquin and Madagascar Expeditions and to an adventurous and
Chauvin policy altogether; but if in power they would probably go
in for pleasing the Chamber and the bulk of the people out of doors
even more unreservedly than Freycinet did.

I should have regretted Freycinet's fall more, if he had
not taken up the Egyptian question in the way he did. Our
communications with him on that subject were becoming very
uncomfortable. I am not very sanguine, however, about their being
more satisfactory with his successor.

The notion, however, of having M. Floquet as Prime Minister frightened every one except the extreme Radicals so much that that gentleman was unable to form an administration, and the choice of the President ultimately fell upon a M. Goblet, who was Radical enough for most people and not much hampered by pledges and declarations. The office of Foreign Minister remained vacant, but, much to the relief of Lord Lyons, it was definitely refused by M. Duclerc. Lord Lyons had, by this time, had no less than twenty-one different French Foreign Ministers to deal with, and of these Duclerc was the one he liked least. No suitable person seemed to be available, and it was in vain that, one after the other French diplomatists were solicited to accept the office. At length a Foreign Minister was found in M. Flourens, a brother of the well-known Communist who was killed in 1871. M. Flourens was completely ignorant of everything concerning foreign affairs, and his appointment was perhaps an unconscious tribute to the English practice of putting civilians at the head of our naval and military administrations.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Iddesleigh._

Paris, Dec. 21, 1886.

I have not yet had the means of improving my acquaintance
with Flourens, but I expect to have some conversation with him
to-morrow. He had not a word to say about Bulgaria when I saw him
on Friday. He did not seem to have known anything about foreign
affairs before he took office, nor to expect to stay long enough in
office to become acquainted with them. Some people suppose that he
is to make way for the return of Freycinet as soon as the Budget is
passed. Anyway, the Goblet Ministry is only the Freycinet Ministry
over again without the strongest man, who was undoubtedly Freycinet
himself. When Parliament meets, things will be just as they were.
There will still be in the Chamber 180 Deputies on the Right,
ready to vote any way in order to make mischief and discredit the
Republic; about 100 Deputies on the extreme Left, intimidating the
Government and forcing it into extreme Radical measures, they being
able to count in all emergencies upon getting the vote of the Right
to turn out a Ministry; and lastly there will be 300 remaining
deputies, who cannot agree enough amongst themselves to form a
majority that can be relied upon, who do not at all like violent
radical measures, but who are too nervously afraid of unpopularity
to show resolution in opposing the extreme Left.

So far the Comte de Paris's declaration seems simply to have
made the ultra-Monarchists furiously angry, and not to have induced
any great part of the Right to think of taking the wise course it
recommends.

I do not see any outward signs here of the strained relations
between France and Germany and the imminent war between the two
countries which the _Standard_ announces. But it is true that among
the French themselves some suspicion and distrust of Boulanger's
aims are becoming more apparent.

The hackneyed saying: _Plus cela change, plus c'est la même chose_, was never more appropriate than in the case of the change from a Freycinet to a Goblet Government; one section of uninspiring ministers had merely given place to another, and no one in France seemed in any way the better for it.

On New Year's Dav, 1887, President Grévy broke out into Latin in congratulating the Diplomatic Corps on the already long continuance of peace, but a more accurate view of the situation was expressed by a French newspaper in the sentence: 'Jamais année nouvelle ne s'est ouverte au milieu d'autant de promesses de paix et de préparatifs de guerre que l'année 1887.' 'I do not know,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'which is the nation which wishes for war. France certainly does not, she is, on the contrary, very much afraid of it. But one would feel more confidence in peace if there appeared less necessity in all countries to be perpetually giving pacific assurances. There are rumours of a defensive alliance between Russia and France. The bond of union between the two countries, if it exists, must be simply a common hatred of Germany.'

At the beginning of the year 1887, the Germans professed to be in dread of an attack from France, while the French complained that they were threatened by Germany. In France it was believed that in August, 1886, preparations had been actually made to mobilize the German army, and the language held by Boulanger was to the effect that the military power of France would be found to be very different to what it was in 1870. Meanwhile an unsuccessful attempt had been made by those two old Parliamentary hands, Freycinet and Ferry, to get rid of Boulanger, who was now becoming to be considered as equally dangerous both in France and Germany.

It was probably the apprehension caused by the presence of this adventurer, whose incapacity was as yet imperfectly realized, that was responsible for the state of tension and alarm which prevailed in France during January and February, 1887.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._[44]

Paris, Jan. 18, 1887.

I saw M. Grévy this morning, and found him, as it seemed to
me, really alarmed at the possibility of France being attacked
by Germany. The only overt act he spoke of, on the part of
Germany, was the increase of the strength of the German garrisons
in the neighbourhood of the French frontier. Grévy himself is
most peaceful, and quite sincerely so. His natural character and
temperament, and his interest too, tend that way. He would hardly
be able to hold his own as President in case of war, and there is
very little chance of France going to war as long as he is the head
of the State. Flourens also spoke to me of danger to France and
Germany when I saw him this afternoon.

I think the alarm of Grévy and Flourens was sincere, though I
do not share it myself at this moment.

In France there is no desire to go to war, and I doubt whether
she is able, or at all events fancies herself able, to cope with
Germany.

It is perhaps more difficult to keep her on good terms
with us. Egypt is a sore which will not heal. There was a nasty
discussion about Newfoundland Fisheries in the Senate yesterday. I
send you a full report officially. Happily, so far, it has not had
much echo in the public.

Alarm with respect to Germany continued to grow, and was fed by private communications from Bismarck, who sent by unofficial agents messages to the effect that 'he was all for peace, but that it was impossible for him to stand the way that France was going on.' These messages came through Bleichröder and members of the _haute finance_ in Paris, who expressed the opinion that if Boulanger remained in office, war with Germany was certain. The _haute finance_ is by no means invariably correct in its political judgment, but it seems highly probable that the war scares prevalent in 1887 were promulgated with the object of getting rid of the troublesome firebrand upon whom so much public attention was concentrated. The position of Boulanger, however, was a strong one, and to dislodge him was a work of no slight difficulty. Ever since the day when he had been taken into Freycinet's Cabinet he had contrived by adroit advertising to keep himself before the public, and to distinguish himself from his colleagues as exercising a separate and commanding influence in the Chambers and with the public. In the army he had managed to make himself feared by the higher officers and assiduously courted popularity with the rank and file. In the political world he had at first been regarded as being ultra democratic, but now excited suspicion by paying court to the Conservatives, and by endeavouring, not entirely without success, to obtain their good will.

On the whole, there was a very general impression that he was ambitious, self-seeking, and thoroughly unscrupulous; but there were few means of forming an opinion as to what his special plans really were, if indeed he had formed any. Still he successfully flattered the belief of the French that they were fast emerging from the eclipse in which their military power and reputation were involved in 1870, and there were not wanting those who asserted that he was inclined to seek a war, in the hope of conducting it with success, and so establishing himself as a military dictator. Others, influenced by their wishes, indulged in the hope that he might be meditating a Monarchist restoration under an Orleanist or Bonapartist Dynasty. Unsubstantial and improbable as these suppositions may have been, it was plain that in the army and among the public at large there prevailed a vague notion that he might be the man of the future, a notion fostered by the absence of any one recognized in France as possessing conspicuous and commanding abilities, and by the craving for a real personality after a long succession of second-class politicians.

The embarrassment with regard to Germany created by the presence of so disturbing an element in the Government as Boulanger did not, contrary to what might have been expected, tend to improve Anglo-French relations, and a letter from Lord Salisbury expresses in forcible terms his dissatisfaction at difficulties which seemed to have been gratuitously created.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

Feb. 5, 1887.

The French are inexplicable. One would have thought that under
existing circumstances it was not necessary to _make_ enemies--that
there were enough provided for France by nature just now. But
she seems bent upon aggravating the patient beast of burden that
lives here by every insult and worry her ingenuity can devise. In
Newfoundland she has issued orders which, if faithfully executed,
must bring the French and English fleets into collision. At the
New Hebrides, in spite of repeated promises, she will not stir. In
Egypt she baulks a philanthropic change out of pure 'cussedness.'
In Morocco she is engaged in appropriating the territory by
instalments, threatening to reach Tangier at no distant date. And
now, just as we are entering on pacific negotiations, the French
Government sent orders to do precisely that which, a month ago,
Waddington promised they should not do, namely run up the French
flag at Dongorita.[45] It is very difficult to prevent oneself
from wishing for another Franco-German war to put a stop to this
incessant vexation.

We have protested earnestly about Dongorita, which has more
the air of a studied insult than any of the others. As to the
Newfoundland Fisheries, if they execute their threats, they render
the passage of a Bait Bill next year a matter of certainty. We
have strained the good will of the colonists very far in refusing
to allow it this year. The other matters will, I suppose, be the
subject of slow negotiations.

D'Herbette has made at Berlin more practical suggestions as to
naming a date for the annexation of Egypt than we have yet had from
the French Government. I hope the large majorities will persuade
the French that the national feeling is in this instance not in
favour of scuttle.

All that Lord Lyons, who was always most anxious to make the best case he could for the French, was able to say in their defence, was that he hoped that it was an exceptionally dark moment, and that there must be a change shortly for the better.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, Feb. 18, 1887.

The French seem to be more confident of peace and altogether
in better spirits than they were a few days ago, but I do not know
that they have any positive facts or distinct information to go
upon. The hopes of a certain number of them rest upon the belief
that the Goblet Ministry is likely to be upset as soon as the
Budget is finally disposed of, and that thus Boulanger will be got
rid of.

The newspaper accounts of Wolff's mission to Constantinople
have brought Egypt on the tapis again, and as anxiety about
Germany falls into the background, irritation against England
comes prominently forward. There are, however, some symptoms of
a return among wiser men to more prudent and reasonable views
respecting the relations of France towards England. These men are
alarmed especially respecting the hostility towards France which is
apparent in Italy, and they see the folly of making enemies on all
sides. If there should be a new Ministry it might possibly pursue
a policy more friendly towards England with regard to Egypt and
other matters. The Egyptian question would no doubt become less
difficult if a change should remove M. Charmes from the Foreign
Office and put into his place, as Political Director there, a man
less prejudiced about Egypt.

In the meantime much amusement has been caused by an escapade
of Madame Flourens. On Saturday last she called upon Countess Marie
Münster, and found with her Count Hoyos, the Austrian Ambassador.
Madame Flourens announced loudly that her husband had resigned
the Foreign Office, because Boulanger had attempted, without his
knowledge, to send a letter direct to the Emperor of Russia by the
French Military Attaché, who was to start for St. Petersburg.
Hoyos fetched Münster himself out of an adjoining room, to hear the
story. Madame Flourens, it appeared, supposed that Flourens was on
the point of announcing his resignation to the Chamber of Deputies.
It turned out, however, that Flourens had made a scene with
Boulanger at the Council of Ministers, had gone away in a huff,
but had been subsequently calmed by M. Grévy and M. Goblet; no
letter to the Emperor had been sent, and the resignation had been
withdrawn. The story had of course spread all over the town. In
defiance of truth, a _communiqué_ contradicting it was inserted in
the _Agence Havas_, with no other effect than that of discrediting
the _communiqués_ which the Government is apt to put into the Havas.

There is so little mention of women in Lord Lyons's correspondence that Madame Flourens's indiscretion comes as a welcome relief, although in all probability it got the unfortunate Count Münster into trouble with Bismarck, and afforded an excuse for fresh bullying. Count Münster, who had been for many years Ambassador in London, where he had been extremely popular, found the transfer to Paris singularly unpleasant, more especially as in order to make things thoroughly uncomfortable for him, Bismarck had provided an entirely new Embassy Staff.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

Feb. 19, 1887.

* * * * *

We are thinking of renewing our negotiations with respect to
the Suez Canal in a serious spirit. But before we sign anything we
shall want some satisfaction about Dongorita and the New Hebrides,
and possibly about the Corvée.

I think it was very shabby of the French to open the Dongorita
affair upon us, just after we had made so material a concession
upon the subject of the bait in Newfoundland.

Waddington is gloomy and rather ill-tempered--either from the
fogs or the crisis. I have not had any further talk with him about
Egypt lately. I think he avoids the subject. Wolff tells me that
the French Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople is a mere creature
of Nelidoff's. Our negotiations are dragging on with little
prospect of success. We are willing to fix a distant date for our
leaving, if we receive a treaty power to go back whenever internal
or external security are threatened. The tone in which both France
and Turkey have received this proposal may be best expressed by the
colloquial phrase 'Damn their impudence!' I do not expect to carry
what I want at present, but before modifying these terms, I should
like to know what is going to happen in Europe.