Chapter XI: Marshal Macmahon's Presidency (1)

(1873-1875)

The new French Government had been received with great favour by the upper classes, while the remainder of the population remained indifferent, but the Marshal was credited with the wish to place the Comte de Chambord on the throne, and the language of his entourage was strongly Legitimist, auguries being drawn from a frequent remark of the Maréchale, who was supposed to dislike her position: _nous ne sommes pas à notre place!_

As the confused political situation began to clear, it became evident that everything depended upon the Comte de Chambord himself, and if he could be brought to adopt anything like a reasonable attitude, it was generally felt that there would be a large majority in his favour in the Assembly. The historic White Flag manifesto issued from Salzburg at the end of October effectually ruined the Legitimist cause.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Oct. 31, 1873.

The Royalists were counting up new adhesions and expecting a
letter from the Comte de Chambord which was to be read from the
tribune at the last moment and rally the waiters upon Providence
and the waverers to them, when, to their utter consternation,
the actual letter arrived, and fell like a shell with a violent
explosion in the midst of them.

I don't know what they are to do. All plans for making the
Comte de Paris or the Duc d'Aumale Regent will be voted against
by the present Legitimists, unless the Comte de Chambord approves
them. It is very doubtful whether any explanation could do away
with the impression the letter will have produced throughout the
country, which was already averse from the idea of the Legitimist
King.

The maintenance of MacMahon and the present Ministry seems the
best mode of postponing trouble, but it cannot do much more than
postpone.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Nov. 3, 1873.

If the Chamber met to-morrow, I suppose it would vote the
prolongation of MacMahon's powers; and though no one can answer
for what a day or an hour may bring forth, I suppose this is what
must be done. It is said that the Marshal himself insists upon a
term of six years, if not ten. This is rather hard to understand,
if, as I believed, he really wished to be out of the thing, and I
doubt its adding practically to the stability of his Government.
On the other hand, the Conservatives want to have the prolongation
voted in such a way as to make it apparent that MacMahon is _their_
President. It would not suit them that he should be elected
unanimously, or nearly so, as he perhaps might be. This would put
him, they think, in a position too like that which Thiers held. The
preposterous notion of making a Lieutenant General of the Kingdom
to govern in the name of a King of full age and in possession of
all his faculties, who would undoubtedly repudiate and denounce
his representative, has been put an end to by the refusal of the
Princes of Orleans, one and all, it is affirmed, to accept the post.

Thiers told me the day before yesterday that he did not
intend to oppose the Government this session, and that we might
count on a quiet winter. We shall see.

The Legitimists are furious with their King, as well they
may be. How long this may last, one cannot say, but the numbers
of those who adore him _quand même_, as a sort of fetish, have
certainly fallen off.

MacMahon had been as much disappointed with the Chambord manifesto as the ultra-Legitimists themselves, and had looked forward to retiring from a position which he found distasteful; but as no king was available, and he was looked upon as the only guarantee for order, obviously the best course was to secure the prolongation of his powers for as long a period as possible. After many long and stormy discussions MacMahon was declared President of the Republic for seven years, and a committee of thirty was appointed to consider the Constitutional Laws. This result was so far satisfactory to the Right, that it enabled them to retire from the dangerous position in which they were placed by the attempt to put the Comte de Chambord on the throne, but it failed to establish a durable Government, and the whole period of MacMahon's Presidency was marked by a ceaseless struggle with his Republican opponents, which only terminated with his fall four years later.

The anxieties of French Ministers were, however, not confined to internal difficulties. Although the fact was concealed as much as possible, the anti-Ultramontane campaign of Bismarck created serious alarm in the beginning of 1874, and in that year may be said to have originated the long series of panics, well or ill founded, which have prevailed in France ever since. MacMahon in conversation did not scruple to express his fear of a country which, according to him, could place 800,000 men on the Rhine in less than seventeen days, and made the interesting confession that the French military authorities had never credited the famous reports of Colonel Stoffel[7] as to Prussian military efficiency. The Foreign Minister, the Duc Décazes, expressed the strongest apprehensions.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Jan. 17, 1874.

The fall of France has never, I think, been brought so
forcibly home to me, as when I listened yesterday to the humble
deprecation which Décazes was obliged to make with regard to
Bismarck's threats, in the same room in which I had so often heard
the high language with which the Imperial Minister used to speak of
the affairs of Europe. One can only hope that Odo may be right in
thinking that Bismarck's menaces may subside, when he has carried
his Army Bill at home. But may not his eagerness in his contest
with the Ultramontanes continue and carry him on to language and
even to measures against France from which it may be difficult for
him to draw back? and of course there is a limit to the submission
of the French Government, however disastrous it may know the
consequences of resistance to be. It is difficult to persecute
any religion in these days, but it is impossible for the French
Government to set itself in violent opposition to the predominant
religion in France. I do not know what means we may have of getting
pacific and moderate counsels listened to at Berlin, but I do
not think the weakness of France a sufficient safeguard to other
countries against the perils of the present state of things to the
peace of Europe. It may be very easy to bully and to crush France,
but will it be possible to do this without raising a storm in other
quarters?

What Bismarck wanted was that the French Government should attack the French bishops; and in order to conciliate him, a circular was issued by the Minister of the Interior remonstrating with them on the nature of the language in which their pastoral addresses were couched. The well-known clerical newspaper the _Univers_ was suppressed, and although every effort was made to disguise the various acts of subserviency resorted to, it was perfectly well known to what cause they were due, and it was not surprising that the French writhed under the necessity of submitting to such dictation. In view of the military weakness of France, however, it was useless to think of resistance, the Duc d'Aumale, who commanded the most vulnerable district, having reported confidentially that there were neither fortresses nor an army which would have any chance of repelling a German invasion; added to which, owing to considerations of economy, the conscription was six months in arrear.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Odo Russell._

Paris, Feb. 3, 1874.

The French want above all things to keep the peace, or, to put
it otherwise, to escape being attacked by Germany in their present
defenceless state. What, in your opinion, should they do? Of course
the temptation to the unprincipled war party in Germany to attack
them while they are unable to defend themselves, is very great;
and that party must know that a war this year would be much less
hazardous than one next year, and so on, as each year passes.

The next question I want your advice upon is what, if
anything, can other Powers, and particularly England, do to help to
preserve peace? This is a question peculiarly within your province,
as the one thing to be considered in answering it, is the effect
that anything we do may have at Berlin.

I am not very hopeful, but I think the chances of peace will
be very much increased if we can tide over this year 1874.

I can see no consolation for a fresh war. I suppose Bismarck
would be ready to buy the neutrality of Russia with Constantinople,
and that France will give Russia _anything_ even for a little help.

The Emperor Alexander has told General Le Flô[8] at St.
Petersburg that there will not be war. Do you attach much
importance to this?

You will call this a _questionnaire_ rather than a letter, but
if you have anything to catechise me upon in return, I will answer
to the best of my ability.

The Lyttons' are, as you may suppose, a very great pleasure to
me, and they have had a great success here.

No one was better fitted than Lord Odo Russell, who was a _persona grata_ with Bismarck, to answer these queries. The Emperor Alexander had been very emphatic in assuring General Le Flô on several occasions that there would be no war, but Lord Odo was in all probability quite correct in his opinion that this was no real safeguard.

* * * * *

_Lord Odo Russell to Lord Lyons._

Berlin, Feb. 20, 1874.

I was glad after a long interval to see your handwriting
again, and doubly glad to find you inclined to renew our
correspondence. You ask: _Firstly_, What in my opinion should the
French do to escape being attacked by Germany in their present
defenceless state?

In my opinion nothing can save them _if_ Bismarck is
determined to fight them again; but then, is it France or is it
Austria he is preparing to annihilate? In Bismarck's opinion,
France, to avoid a conflict with him, should gag her press,
imprison her bishops, quarrel with Rome, refrain from making
an army or from seeking alliances with other Powers all out of
deference to Germany.

_Secondly._ What can other Powers, and particularly England,
do to help to preserve peace?

A Coalition is impossible; advice or interference adds to
Bismarck's excuses for going to war, so the only course Governments
can follow is to let him do as he pleases and submit to the
consequences, until he dies.

_Thirdly._ Do I attach any importance to the Emperor of
Russia's pacific assurances?

None whatever, because Bismarck is prepared to buy his
co-operation with anything he pleases in the East.

Bismarck is now master of the situation at home and abroad.
The Emperor, the Ministers, the Army, the Press, and the National
majority in Parliament are instruments in his hands, whilst abroad
he can so bribe the great Powers as to prevent a coalition and make
them subservient to his policy. Now, his policy, as you know, is
to mediatize the minor States of Germany and to annex the German
Provinces of Austria, so as to make one great centralized Power
of the German-speaking portions of Europe. To accomplish this he
may require another war, but it may be with Austria and not with
France, which he now puts forward to keep up the war spirit of the
Germans and to remind Europe of his powers. Besides which he has to
pass the unpopular Army Bill and War Budget which he failed in last
summer.

His anti-Roman policy will serve him to pick a quarrel with
any Power he pleases by declaring that he has discovered an
anti-German conspiracy among the clergy of the country he wishes to
fight.

Such is the situation, but it does not follow that we shall
have war before another year or two are over or more, nor need we
have war _if_ Bismarck can carry out his plans without it.

At present the tone of Bismarck and Bülow is quite pacific,
and I notice a great desire for the co-operation of England in
maintaining the peace of Europe generally.

Lord Lyons's own opinions were in exact agreement with Lord Odo Russell's, and the general uncertainty as to Bismarck's intentions continued to preoccupy both the French and the English Governments, although the Emperor of Russia persisted in assuring General Le Flô that there would be no war, and it was assumed in some quarters that the German Emperor disapproved of the Bismarckian policy.

The general election in England at the beginning of 1874, resulting in the return of the Conservative party to power, placed Lord Derby again at the Foreign Office in the room of Lord Granville, and the long letter which follows was presumably intended to enlighten him on the subject of French politics generally. It is, at all events, a concise review of the situation.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Feb. 24, 1874.

I thank you cordially for your letter of yesterday, and I
resume with very peculiar satisfaction my diplomatic correspondence
with you. I wish the subject of it was as pleasant to me as is the
fact of its renewal; but I cannot help being more than usually
anxious about the prospects of Europe and of France in particular.
This spring and summer are the especially critical seasons for
France. She will be for a long time to come far too weak to indulge
in aggression, except indeed as a secondary ally of some stronger
Power, but even next year, she will not be in the absolutely
helpless condition which is at this moment so strong a temptation
to national hatreds, and to the military thirst for gold and glory
which prevails with a party in Germany. I am afraid the peace of
Europe depends entirely upon the view Bismarck may take of the
easiest means of bringing all German-speaking nations under one
rule. The wolf can always find reasons for quarrelling with the
lamb, and as Bismarck himself told Odo Russell, he has had a good
deal of experience of this kind of thing. The French lamb will not
be skittish, and indeed will hardly venture to bleat, for some
time. For my own part, I am constantly on the watch to forestall
questions which may make difficulties between France and any other
country; for if Bismarck wants war, it would suit him to be able to
appear to be only taking his part in a quarrel already made.

Italy is the most dangerous neighbour from this point of
view, and the presence of the _Orénoque_ at Civita Vecchia is the
ticklish point. It is a very delicate matter to touch; for if the
question came very prominently into notice, it might raise one of
the storms in the press of all countries, which are so often the
precursors of evil times. The ship is supposed to be at Civita
Vecchia to give the Pope the means of leaving Italy, if he wishes
to do so; and I suppose the Vatican might relieve the French of
embarrassment by saying that she is not wanted. In fact, if the
Italian Government intended to prevent the Pope's going away, they
would of course stop him before he got to Civita Vecchia, and if
they abstained (as would no doubt be the case) from interfering
with his movements, he could get a ship to depart in, whenever he
pleased.

I do not know that there is any ill-feeling in Switzerland
towards France, but the Ultramontane disputes give Bismarck a lever
to work with.

I believe the French Government have completely drawn in their
horns about the Armenian Patriarch question and the Protectorate of
the Latin Christians in the East, since Bismarck appeared on the
field at Constantinople.

In looking out for small beginnings of troubles, I have
thought of Tunis. I suppose we may lay aside all apprehension of
attempts of France to change the frontier or to bring the Regency
into more complete dependency upon her, at the present moment. I
find by a despatch from Mr. Wood, that the German commodore, in his
conversation with the Bey, insisted particularly upon the interests
of German subjects being put upon as good a footing as those of the
subjects of any other country.

I think Décazes takes the humiliating position in which
France, and he as her Foreign Minister, are placed, with more
equanimity and temper than most Frenchmen would; and so long as
the present, or any other Government, not absolutely unreasonable,
is at the head of affairs, France will be prudent in her foreign
relations.

Of Marshal MacMahon's seven years' lease of power, only three
months have elapsed; a time too short to give much foundation for
conjecture as to its probable duration. Both he himself and his
Ministers take opportunities of declaring that its continuance
is above discussion, and that they will maintain it against all
comers. There are two things against it. First, the extreme
difficulty of giving it anything like the appearance of permanence
and stability which would rally to it that great majority of
Frenchmen who are ready at all times to worship the powers that
be, if only they look as if they were likely to continue to be.
Secondly, there is the character of the Marshal himself. He is
honest and a brave soldier, but he does not take such a part in
affairs as would increase his personal prestige. The danger,
in fact, is that by degrees he may come to be looked upon as a
_nullité!_

The Imperialists are agitating themselves and spending money,
as if they were meditating an immediate coup. The wiser heads
counsel patience, but the old horses, who sorely miss the pampering
they had under the Empire, are getting very hungry, and are afraid
that they themselves may die before the grass has grown.

The fear of an Imperialist attempt has in some degree brought
back to the Government the support of the Legitimists, and in fact
the Comte de Chambord has quarrelled with his own party. The Fusion
has put an end to the Orleanist Party, as a party for placing
the Comte de Paris on the throne; but the question of appointing
the Duc d'Aumale Vice-President, in order to have some one ready
to succeed MacMahon in case of need, is seriously considered. I
suppose, however, that MacMahon would look upon this as destructive
of the arrangements between him and the Assembly. And then the
whole system depends upon the maintenance by hook or by crook of
a majority, which has not yet ceased to melt away, as seats become
vacant and new elections take place.

The Duc de Bisaccia, the new French Ambassador in London, even at his first interview with Lord Derby, did not scruple to avow that he felt quite certain that the Republican form of government would not last, and he went on to assert that Bismarck's head had been turned by success, and that he aimed at nothing less than the conquest of Europe, being quite indifferent either to the views of his Imperial Master, or of the Crown Prince. Whatever the prospects of the Republic, the prospects of Bisaccia's own party (Legitimist) were indisputably gloomy, for the prevailing sentiment in France at the time was hostility to the White Flag and to the clerical and aristocratic influences of which it was held to be the emblem. The great majority of the people were Republican, and the most numerous party after the Republican was the Imperial, but the Presidency of Marshal MacMahon was acquiesced in, for the moment, by all parties, because it was believed to be capable of preserving order, because it left the question of the definitive government of the country still undecided, and because no party saw its way to securing the pre-dominence of its own ideas.

The existing state of things was accounted for by the history of the establishment of the seven-years Presidency.

When the Orleans Princes tendered their allegiance to the Comte de Chambord in the previous autumn, the fusion, so long talked of, was complete, and it was supposed that a Parliamentary Monarchy with the Tricolour Flag, might be established under the legitimate head of the Bourbons; but the Comte de Chambord struck a fatal blow to these hopes by his celebrated letter, and the Conservatives felt that there was no time to be lost in setting up a Government having some sort of stability. The plan which they adopted was that of conferring power upon Marshal MacMahon for a fixed and long period. Had a short period been proposed, it would have been agreed to almost unanimously; but this was not their object. They wished it to be apparent to the country that the Marshal was specially the President of the Conservative majority: they asked for a term of ten years: obtained seven, and secured from the Marshal a declaration of adherence to their views. The slight modification of the Ministry which ensued, resulted in placing the Government more completely in the hands of the party pledged to a monarchical form of Government, and the Ministry thus reconstituted, set itself to the task of resisting the progress of Radicalism and Communism in the country.

But the suspicion of favouring the White Flag clung to the Government, and although the latter, following the example of the Empire, had installed their partisans in office, as mayors, etc., by thousands throughout the country, the candidates supported by the Government had, in almost every instance, found themselves at the bottom of the poll when elections took place; and the results showed that a large accession of votes had been received by the Republican and Imperialist parties. Of these the former had gained most, but the latter possessed a backing in the country which was inadequately represented by their numbers in the Assembly.

It should, however, be added that there did not appear on any side a disposition to embarrass the Government by factious or bitter opposition with regard to the three departments, Finance, War, and Foreign Affairs, in which the practical interests of the country were most deeply involved. The financial policy of M. Magne[9] was generally supported; and with regard to votes for the Army and Navy, the Government had rather to resist a pressure to increase the expenditure on these heads, than to urge the necessity of considerable supplies.

In the conduct of foreign affairs, the defenceless state of France had made the avoidance of an attack from Germany the one overwhelming care of the Government. To effect this object, to give Germany no pretext for a quarrel, and to make submission to the behests of Bismarck as little galling and in appearance as little humiliating as possible, had been the constant occupation of the Foreign Minister. In this effort he was seconded by the Assembly, and indeed every one in and out of that body, except a few clerical and Legitimist bigots, felt it to be a patriotic duty to abstain from embarrassing the Government in its relations with foreign Powers. Another reassuring feature in the situation was, that there were no symptoms of attempts to resist by force the authority of the Assembly, as no party seemed likely to venture to oppose by force a Government which disposed of the army; and the army in 1874 showed no prediction for any particular candidate for the throne sufficiently strong to overcome its habitual obedience to the Constitutional Government, whatever that Government might be.

As an instance of the dictation practised by Bismarck towards France in foreign affairs, it may be mentioned that in January, 1874,[10] Count Arnim formally announced to the Duc Décazes that the German Government would not tolerate the assumption by France of the suzerainty of Tunis, or of a Protectorate over that country. To this Décazes humbly replied that there had never been the least question of anything of the kind--a statement which can scarcely be described as accurate.

Whether Bismarck entertained any designs with regard to Tunis is not known, but it was in this year that Germany began to show some signs of interest in the Philippines and other places supposed to be of some colonial value. The following extract from a letter written on the subject by the late Lord Lytton, who was at the time Secretary of Embassy at Paris, is a striking instance of rare and remarkable political prescience.

* * * * *

_Lord Lytton to Lord Lyons._

Paris, Oct. 27, 1874.

* * * * *

Odo's impression (communicated to you) that Bismarck does
not want colonies rather surprises me. It seems to me a perfectly
natural and quite inevitable ambition on the part of a Power so
strong as Germany not to remain an inland state a moment longer
than it can help, but to get to the sea, and to extend its seaboard
in all possible directions. Is there any case on record of an
inland state suddenly attaining to the military supremacy of Europe
without endeavouring by means of its military strength and prestige
to develop its maritime power? But you can't be a Maritime Power
without colonies, for if you have ships you must have places to
send them to, work for them to do, and a marine Exercier-Platz
for training seamen. That is why I have always thought that the
English school of politicians which advocates getting rid of our
colonies as profitless encumbrances, ought (to be consistent) to
advocate the simultaneous suppression of our navy. Lord Derby says
that though Germany may probably cherish such an ambition, she
will have as much seaboard as she can practically want as long
as she retains possession of the Duchies. But that is not a very
convenient commercial seaboard, and I confess I can't help doubting
the absence of all desire for more and better outlets to the
sea, so long as her military power and prestige remain unbroken.
Anyhow, there seems to be now a pretty general instinct throughout
Europe, and even in America, that a policy of maritime and colonial
development must be the natural result of Germany's present
position: and such instincts, being those of self-preservation, are
generally, I think, what Dizzy calls 'unerring' ones.

A letter from Lord Odo Russell written about this period throws a curious light upon Bismarck's imaginary grievances, and the difficulties which he was prepared to raise upon the slightest provocation. Probably no Minister of modern times ever uttered so many complaints, threatened so often to resign, and yet wielded such absolute power.

* * * * *

_Lord O. Russell to Lord Derby._

Berlin, Nov. 9, 1874.

I found Prince Bismarck in one of his confidential moods
the other day, and he indulged me in a long talk about his own
interests, past, present, and prospective.

Among many other things, he said that his life had been
strangely divided into phases or periods of twelve years each.

Born in 1815, he had left home when he was twelve years old to
begin his studies. At 24 he inherited his small patrimony and his
father's debts, and entered upon the life and duties of a country
gentleman. At 36 (1851) his diplomatic career began, and he was
sent to Frankfort, Vienna, St. Petersburg and Paris. At 48 (1863)
he was recalled to form the present Administration, which in twelve
years had carried on three wars and made the German Empire. He was
now 60 and worn out with the responsibilities and anxieties of
office, and he was resolved to enter upon a new phase (of 12 years
he hoped) by resigning and retiring into private life--a resolution
he begged I would keep to myself for the present.

I said I could well understand his wish for rest, but I did
not believe the Emperor or the country would allow him to indulge
in it, as he was well enough and strong enough to govern Germany
for many years to come.

He replied that he felt quite strong enough to govern Germany,
but not to be governed himself any longer by the Emperor, whose
obstinacy and narrow mindedness were more than he could bear.

I said I had often heard him complain of his Court duties
before, but it appeared to me that he always carried his points,
and that after some resistance the Emperor gave way in the end and
followed his advice.

He replied that it was that very struggle with his Imperial
Master that had worn him out and that he no longer felt strong
enough to carry on after sixty. He then related to me a series of
very curious anecdotes illustrating his struggles with the Crown,
and what he called the want of confidence and ingratitude of the
Emperor.

I asked him whether anything had lately occurred calculated to
increase his wish for rest.

He said that his present difference with the Emperor related
to the new army organization. The Emperor and his generals thought
the sole object of the German Empire was to turn the nation into an
army for the greater glory of the House of Hohenzollern; whilst he
held that there must be some limit to the heavy strain of military
obligations the Crown was ever anxious to impose on the people.

I asked whether he was alluding to the Landsturm Bill, which
placed every German from the age of 16 to 42 at the disposal of the
War Department.

He replied that he did not exactly allude to that, but there
were other measures in contemplation, elaborated in the Emperor's
military Cabinet, he could not give his sanction to, and which
would consequently lead to another painful struggle. He considered
that his great task had been completed in 1870 to 1872, and that he
could now retire and leave the internal organization of Germany to
other hands. The Crown Prince, he thought, might possibly govern
on more Constitutional principles than his father, who, born
in the last century, had not yet been able to realize what the
duties of a Constitutional Sovereign were, and thought himself as
King of Prussia above the Constitution, as the Emperor Sigismund
thought himself above grammar when he wrote bad Latin. A danger
to which the Crown Prince would be exposed as Sovereign was his
love for intrigue and backstairs influence--'some one or other
always concealed behind the door or curtain.' The Prince was not as
straightforward as he appeared, and he suffered from the weakness
of obstinacy and the obstinacy of weakness due to unbounded conceit
and self-confidence--but at the same time he meant well.

After a good deal more talk about his family, his property,
and his longing for country life and pursuits, we parted.

Without attaching undue importance to Prince Bismarck's
oft-repeated threat of resignation, I do not suppose he would go
out of his way to tell me and others so, without intention. My
impression is that he wants to obtain something or other from the
Emperor which he can make conditional on remaining in office, well
knowing that His Majesty cannot do without him. Besides which,
his retirement from office would have the appearance of a defeat,
consequent on his failure to coerce the Pope and his legions. He is
not the man to admit a defeat while he lives. Time will show what
more he wants to satisfy his gigantic ambition.

The fear of war with Germany had died away temporarily in the summer, and the various political parties in France were free to continue their struggles and to reduce the situation to almost unexampled confusion. The motives of the Comte de Chambord and his followers were too remote for ordinary human understanding, and their object appeared to be to bring about a crisis and a dissolution of the Assembly on the most disadvantageous terms to themselves. Moderate Republicans were looking to the Duc d'Aumale as a safeguard against the Imperialists on the one hand, and the Reds on the other. Republicans of various shades, and the Reds in particular, were coquetting with Prince Napoleon, and he with them. Most men and most parties appeared to have particular objects, which they hated with a hatred more intense than their love for the object of their affections. Thiers, it was believed, would have rather seen anything, even a restoration of the Empire, than have the Duc de Broglie and the Orleanists in power. Notwithstanding the fusion, the Legitimists would have probably preferred Gambetta (or some one still more extreme) than an Orleans Prince--and so on.

'I cannot make head or tail of French internal politics,' Lord Derby wrote, at the end of the year, 'and presume that most Frenchmen are in the same condition. It looks as if nobody could see their way till the present Assembly is dissolved and a new one elected.'

The beginning of the new year was signalized in Paris by the appearance of the Lord Mayor of London, who had been invited to attend the opening of the new Opera House. That functionary has always been invested in French popular opinion with semi-fabulous attributes, and he seems to have risen to the level of the occasion. 'The Lord Mayor,' wrote the unimpressionable Lord Lyons, 'is astonishing the Parisians with his sword, mace, trumpeters, and State coaches. So far, however, I think the disposition here is to be pleased with it all, and I keep no countenance and do what I have to do with becoming gravity.' A little later, however, he was constrained to add:--

I am afraid the Lord Mayor's head has been turned by the
fuss which was made with him here, for he seems to have made a
very foolish speech on his return to England. Strange to say the
Parisians continued to be amused and pleased with his pomps and
vanities to the end, although the narrow limits between the sublime
and the ridiculous were always on the point of being over passed.
I abstained from going to the banquets given to him, or by him,
except a private dinner at the Elysée; but I had him to dinner
here, and, I think, sent him away pleased with the Embassy, which
it is always as well to do, and if so, I have reaped the reward of
my diplomatic command over my risible muscles.

It was not perhaps surprising that the Lord Mayor should have been thrown off his intellectual balance, for the honours accorded to him far surpassed those paid to ordinary mortals and resembled rather those habitually reserved for crowned heads. When he visited the opera the ex-Imperial box was reserved for his use; the audience rose at his entry, and the orchestra played the English National Anthem. Twice he dined with the President of the Republic; the Prefect of the Seine gave a banquet in his honour; so did the authorities at Boulogne; and to crown all, the Tribunal of Commerce struck a medal in commemoration of his visit.

The one thing that was fairly clear in French politics, besides abhorrence of the White Flag, was the gradual progress of Bonapartism which was beginning to frighten Conservatives as well as Republicans, and the Bonapartists themselves were inclined to regret having helped to turn Thiers out of office, because the army was becoming more and more anti-Republican, and it would be much easier to turn it against a civilian than against its natural head, a Marshal of France.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Jan. 26, 1875.

Bonapartism is still in the ascendant, and certainly the
Assembly is doing everything to give weight to the assertion that
France is unfit for Parliamentary Government. No one believes in
a moderate Republic, as a self-supporting institution unconnected
with some particular individual. The 'Conservative Republic'
was devised for M. Thiers. The Septennate Republic, if it be a
Republic, would be scouted if MacMahon were not at the head of
it. The Comte de Chambord is impossible. The Orleanists have cast
in their lot with his, and besides, the Government they represent
being constitutional or Parliamentary, is exactly what is most
out of favour, with the exception of the White Flag. As I have
said all along, the dispute is between a very advanced Republic
and the Empire, and _confugiendum est ad imperium_ is becoming
more and more the cry of those who dread Communism. Those who have
personal reasons for fearing the Empire are already taking their
precautions. Friends of the Orleans Princes are believed to have
seriously conferred (not with the knowledge or consent of the
Princes themselves, so far as I have heard) with the Bonaparte
leaders, in order to ascertain what the Orleans family would
have to expect if the Prince Imperial returned. At any rate the
Bonapartist papers have been insinuating that they would be allowed
to stay in France and keep their property; and these insinuations
are of course intended to relieve tender Orleanist consciences of
scruples in coming round to the Imperial cause.

The officers in the army are becoming more and more averse
from all idea of a permanent Republic. They would willingly wait to
the end of MacMahon's time, but they are beginning to talk of the
possibility of his being so much disgusted by the way in which he
is worried by the Assembly, as to throw the Presidency up.

In short France is at this moment in a fear of Bonapartism.
It may, and very probably will, subside this time, but it differs
from most intermittent fevers in this, that the attacks recur at
shorter and shorter intervals, and increase instead of diminish in
intensity.

Fear of the Imperialists drove Conservatives into voting with Gambetta and other advanced Republicans; a ministerial crisis took place; the Assembly gave contradictory decisions and generally discredited itself, and the confusion grew so great that it seemed impossible to unravel it.

'I have spent three afternoons at Versailles,' wrote Lord
Lyons on February 26th, 'and have seen a Constitution made there.
I have seen also such a confusion of parties and principles as I
hope never to witness again. I found Décazes, Broglie, and a great
number of Right Centre deputies at the MacMahons' last evening.
They all, and particularly Décazes, looked to me very unhappy,
and indeed they did not affect to be at all satisfied with the
occurrences in the Assembly. Like the horse in the fable who
invited the man to get on his back, the Right Centre have let the
Left get on their backs to attack Bonapartism, and don't know how
to shake them off again.'

The ceaseless struggles between the various political parties in France, which were of little interest to the outside world, were temporarily interrupted in the spring of 1875 by the war scare which so greatly agitated Europe at the time, but which subsequently became an almost annual phenomenon. Unfortunately, Lord Lyons was in England during the greater portion of this critical period, and there are wanting, consequently, documents which might have thrown light upon what has always been a somewhat mysterious episode, but it would appear that the symptoms of alarm on the part of the French first showed themselves about March 11. On that day the Duc Décazes drew the attention of the British Ambassador to three incidents which ought to engage the serious attention of those Governments who were desirous of maintaining peace in Europe. These were the threatening representation made by the German Minister at Brussels to the Belgian Government respecting the language and conduct of the Ultramontane Party in that country; the pointed communication to the French Government of this representation; and the prohibition of the export of horses from Germany. Prince Bismarck, said Décazes, seemed to become more and more inclined to revive old grievances and to require of foreign countries the exercise of an unreasonable and impossible control over the prelates and even over the lay members of the Roman Catholic Church, and as for the decree forbidding the export of horses, it was so inexplicable that it could only add to uneasiness. It might be easy for England, and for some other nations, to regard these things calmly, but to France they constituted a serious and immediate peril. In spite of the steps taken during the past year to conciliate Germany on the subject of the Bishop's charges, the German Government had never officially intimated that it considered the question to be closed, and Count Arnim had used the significant expression to him, that it was only closed 'so far as any question between you and us can ever be looked upon as closed.' He believed that it was only owing to the influence of other Powers, and of England in particular, that the danger had been averted in 1874; and he now hoped that the same influence would be exerted in the same way. Décazes added a somewhat surprising piece of information which had been imparted to him in January, 1874, by Prince Orloff, the Russian Ambassador, viz. that in that month an order to occupy Nancy had absolutely been issued by the German Government to its troops, and that there were strong grounds for believing that this order has been rescinded chiefly owing to influence exerted at Berlin by Russia. So far as is known, there is no corroboration of this story, and it would appear that Prince Orloff was so anxious to convince France of the goodwill of Russia that he thought it advisable to drag England into the question, but it was not surprising that France should be sensitively alive to the danger she incurred, if Bismarck, irritated by his Ultramontane difficulties, should choose to throw the blame upon the Roman Catholics of other countries, or should resort to quarrels with foreign nations as a means of diverting public opinion in Germany from inconvenient questions at home.

Prince Hohenlohe, the new German Ambassador, who also saw Lord Lyons on the same day, volunteered no opinion upon the representation to Belgium which had excited so much perturbation, but remarked with regard to the exportation of horses that the 'agriculturists might have been alarmed by the prospect of a drain of horses for foreign countries. He had no reason to suppose that purchases of horses had been made in Germany by the French Government for military purposes; but he had heard that a considerable number had lately been brought there for the Paris fiacres.'

It will not have escaped notice that the German Government--or rather Bismarck--was fortunate in always having excellent reasons available, either for not complying with inconvenient requests, or for explaining away disquieting symptoms; thus, in 1870, the insuperable difficulty to disarmament was the King of Prussia; during the peace negotiations, all harsh conditions were due to _les militaires_, and in 1875 the German agriculturists and the Paris cabs were responsible for any uneasiness that might be felt temporarily.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Paris, March 16, 1875.

I saw Décazes last night and found him in a greater state of
alarm about the intentions of Germany than anything specific he
told me seemed to warrant. The retirement of Bismarck to Varzin
will not reassure the French, because they remember that he was
there when the war broke out in 1870.

There is observable here, and not least among the Russians, a
sort of impression that there is to be a movement of some kind in
the East.

In short, there is a great deal of vague uneasiness and fear
that peace is in danger.

The German Embassy here has certainly been taking great pains
to put it about that the prohibition to export horses has been
decreed solely from economical, and not from military motives.
That Embassy keeps up very close relations with the _Times_
correspondent[11] here, and his subordinates. Of course the trouble
it has taken has increased instead of allaying alarm. Décazes
constantly harps on the string of the influence of England at
Berlin, and the consolation it affords him to feel sure that it is
exercised quietly on the side of peace. The position is a painful
one. Without particular friendships and alliances, France is
absolutely at the mercy of Germany, and if she tries to form such
friendships and alliances, she may bring the wrath of the great
Chancellor down upon her instantly.

* * * * *

_Lord Derby to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, March 16, 1875.

I do not know and cannot conjecture the cause of Décazes's
anxiety. Nothing has passed or is passing in any part of Europe to
justify alarm as to an early disturbance of general peace. But I
hear of a similar feeling of uneasiness at Berlin; and the Russian
Government is credited with designs as to the nature of which no
two persons agree. Until we hear more, I shall be inclined to set
down all these rumours of wars to the time of year, and to the
absence of any exciting questions (so far as foreign relations are
concerned) to occupy men's minds.

I may tell you confidentially that Bismarck has given us
through Odo Russell a serious warning against the unfriendly
feelings of the Russian Government towards England. He may be only
trying to stir up jealousy, a game which he often plays, or he may
be sincere. I take his hint as one not to be slighted, yet not
infallibly trusted. Gortschakoff is no doubt much disgusted about
the Conference; the Czar also to some extent; and probably they
both feel that they had miscalculated the effect of the Russian
marriage on English policy. But beyond this I know no cause of
quarrel. Dead calm for the moment. I cannot conceive any reason why
you should not take your leave when you wish it. Paris is always
within reach if anything new turns up.

It is obvious from the above that neither Lord Derby nor Lord Lyons felt any very serious apprehensions, and the latter was permitted to go home on leave at the beginning of April. On April 10, Lord Odo Russell wrote to Lord Derby:--

Bismarck is at his old tricks again--alarming the Germans
through the officious Press, and intimating that the French are
going to attack them, and that Austria and Italy are conspiring
in favour of the Pope, etc. Now he has succeeded in making the
Emperor and the Crown Prince believe that France is meditating an
invasion of Germany through Belgium! And, not knowing any better,
they are in despair and have ordered the War Department to make
ready for defence. This crisis will blow over like so many others,
but Bismarck's sensational policy is very wearisome at times. Half
the Diplomatic Body have been here since yesterday to tell me that
war was imminent, and when I seek to calm their nerves and disprove
their anticipations, they think that I am thoroughly bamboozled by
Bismarck.

In the middle of April there appeared in the _Berlin Post_ the celebrated article entitled: 'Is War in Sight?' and as it was well known that such articles were not written except under official inspiration, something akin to a real panic took place, more especially when other German papers began to write in a similar strain. Letters from Mr. Adams, who had been left as Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, show the pitiable condition of terror to which the French Government was reduced, and the efforts made by Décazes to obtain British support. Décazes urged that England ought to take an active part in protesting against the new theory that one nation was justified in falling upon another for no other reason than that the latter might possibly prove troublesome in the future. He said that he had protested to the German Ambassador against the attitude of the German Government, after all the assurances that it had received from the French Government, and added that if war took place in August, as he feared, he should advise MacMahon to retire with his army beyond the Loire without firing a shot and wait there 'until the justice of Europe should speak out in favour of France.' The idea of openly identifying England with the French cause did not commend itself apparently to Mr. Disraeli.

'I had a rather long conversation about French politics with
Mr. Disraeli,' Lord Lyons wrote to Mr. Adams on April 21st, 'and I
found him thoroughly well up in the subject. He wishes to encourage
confidence and goodwill on the part of France towards England,
but sees the danger to France herself of any such appearance of a
special and separate understanding as would arouse the jealousy of
Bismarck.

* * * * *

'With a little variation in the illustrations, Décazes's
language to you was just what he used to me before I left Paris.
Germany can, I suppose, overrun France whenever she pleases, a
fortnight after she determines to do so; and no one can tell how
suddenly she may come to this determination. Whether Décazes is
wise in perpetually crying "wolf" I cannot say. He is naturally
anxious to keep Europe on the alert, but I am not sure that the
repetition of these cries does not produce the contrary effect.'

During the second half of April the tension began to diminish, but Lord Odo Russell, who was certainly no alarmist, felt convinced that, so long as Bismarck remained in office, the peace of Europe was in jeopardy, for his power had now become absolute, and neither the Emperor nor the Crown Prince were capable of withstanding him. Writing on April 24, he remarks: 'The prospect of another war fills me with horror and disgust, and if Bismarck lives a few years longer I do not see how it can be prevented. The Emperor's powers of resistance are over; he does what Bismarck wishes, and the Crown Prince, peace-loving as he is, has not sufficient independence of character to resist Bismarck's all-powerful mind and will.'

A few days later the Belgian Minister at Berlin reported to Lord Odo Russell an alarming communication made to him by Count Moltke.

* * * * *

_Lord O. Russell to Lord Derby._

Berlin, May 1, 1875.

Since writing to you to-day, at this late hour my Belgian
colleague Baron Nothomb has called to tell me that he had a long
conversation with Moltke yesterday fully confirming what is said
in my despatch. Moltke added that, much as he hated war, he did
not see how Germany could avoid it _next year_, unless the Great
Powers 'coalesced' to persuade France to reduce her armaments to a
reasonable peace establishment.

Then Nothomb told me that Bismarck had sent Bülow to him with
the following confidential message: 'Tell your King to get his army
ready for defence, because Belgium may be invaded by France sooner
than we expect.'

This message Nothomb writes to Brussels to-day. He is under
an impression that in the event of war, Bismarck intends to occupy
Belgium, as Frederick the Great occupied Saxony when he suspected
Maria Theresa of wanting to take her revenge for the loss of
Silesia. This is curious, and you will probably hear more about it
from Brussels. I write in haste for the Messenger.

The evident desire of Bismarck to fasten a quarrel upon France aroused the indignation of Lord Derby, who realized that the intervention of Russia was the best method of preventing it.

* * * * *

_Lord Derby to Lord O. Russell._

Foreign Office, May 3, 1875.

You seem reassured as to the immediate prospect, and the panic
in Paris has subsided, but great uneasiness remains. Lumley[12]
writes to me that the state of things seems to him most critical,
and the language which you report as held by Moltke is unpleasant
enough. Münster[13] has not called for the last few days: when last
I saw him, his language about French armaments tallied exactly
with that which you and others report as being held by German
representatives throughout Europe.

Is there no hope of Russian interference to maintain peace?
It cannot be the interest of Russia to have France destroyed and
Germany omnipotent. If the Czar were to say that a new war must not
take place, and that he would not allow it, Bismarck would hardly
undertake to fight Russia and France combined. I see little other
prospect of averting mischief, and if it begins, where is it to end?

Even here, and notwithstanding the sympathy felt in the
main for the Protestant German Empire, the outrageous injustice
of picking a quarrel with France, because she does not choose to
remain disarmed, would produce its effect. There would be a great
revulsion of feeling; not unlike that which took place when the
first Napoleon had begun to show his real character and objects.
The English public knows little about foreign concerns, but it does
understand that hitting a man when he is down is not fair play, and
I think in the rest of Europe fear and jealousy of the predominant
Power would give France many adherents.

I do what I can to point this out in a quiet and friendly way;
but without being sanguine.

* * * * *