Chapter XVI: Anglophobia (2)

As regards the Congo Conference, I came away with the
impression that there is more or less a tacit, if not very
explicit, understanding between France and Germany, in addition to
what appears in the Yellow Book; and that this understanding may
prove inconvenient to us.

The session has not opened very favourably for the Government.
The Finance Minister's hocus-pocus expedients for balancing the
Budget have been unanimously rejected by the Budget Committee. The
recent 'glories' in Tonquin hardly outweigh in public estimation
the growing expenses of the operations there and in China. Ferry
told me he disliked the protective duties on cattle and corn, but
that the Government could not altogether resist them, though it
would endeavour to make them as moderate as possible. Rouvier,
the new Minister of Commerce, is less Protectionist than his
predecessor, Hérisson; but I have no confidence in the so-called
Free Trade principles of any Frenchman. Duties on manufactures
are sure to follow in the wake of duties on food, and I can never
forget that we hold our Most Favoured Nation treatment only at the
good pleasure of the French Government. The proceedings of the
Lyonnais are socialist and revolutionary, and a great impetus has
been given to Socialism by the journeyings during the recess of the
sub-committees of the General Committee appointed by the Chamber
of Deputies to inquire into the distress of the working classes.
Nevertheless the chances still seem to be that the Ferry Ministry
will weather the storms of the autumn session.

Ferry complained bitterly of the English press. He said in
particular that the irritating lecturing tone of the _Times_ goaded
the French to madness; though he himself observed that it used the
same tone towards the Government of its own country. I said that
the press on both sides of the Channel seemed to work as if for the
express purpose of producing ill-will between the two countries;
but that certainly the English Government had no power to restrain
it. A good understanding between the two Governments and friendly
proceedings on their parts to each other, would in time act upon
public opinion; and saying this, I preached a little more on the
text of the importance of the French Government's not making itself
unnecessarily disagreeable.

Her Majesty's Government were at this time involved in domestic as well as external difficulties, and Lord Granville's reply to the foregoing letter contained a renewal of the old importunity to come over and vote in the House of Lords on a party question. It is quite obvious that Lord Granville was impelled to do so by Gladstone, and the typical Gladstonian reasoning is shown in the argument that Lord Lyons ought to vote, because being an Ambassador he was a non-party man; whereas on previous occasions his vote had been applied for, because he distinctly ranked as a party man in the Whip's list.

* * * * *

_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._

Walmer, Oct. 18, 1884.

Gladstone writes to me earnestly, but I think reasonably,
respecting your vote at the present important crisis.

He says that you must be aware of the estimate we hold of your
judgment and independence. But to save the House of Lords from a
tempest which must strain and may wreck it, some Tory Lords will
be moved to vote for the Franchise Bill, and he asks why the same
motive should not operate upon men like our Ambassadors, who he
believes are of no party.

I own I think that the same majority, or possibly a larger one
in the Lords, would be a great disaster.

If the Liberal Party take up hostility to the House of Lords
itself as its leading question--whether led by Gladstone himself,
or not,--and with a leader of the Lords who is personally in favour
of getting a larger career of power and utility for himself in the
Commons, it is difficult not to foresee the result.

With regard to immediate politics, supposing Salisbury
succeeds in forcing a dissolution, and with the help of the Irish
turns us out, what chance is there of his not being turned out in
six months by nearly the same process?

The Waddingtons came here to luncheon. I guessed that they
funked being reported as being here. He was very civil, and his
talk was not altogether unpromising.

No one with the slightest practical acquaintance with politics could possibly be taken in by the Gladstonian phrase about the 'estimate of your judgment and independence.' Ministers when urging their docile supporters either in the Lords or the Commons to support a party measure, are not in the habit of boasting that some eminent person, whether an Ambassador or not, is going to give a silent vote in their favour, and even if they did, it would not produce the slightest effect. One peer's vote is as good as another's, and in the division list an Ambassador counts no higher than the most obscure of backwoodsmen.

Anglo-French relations were not improved by the occurrences in the Far East, where the French, in consequence of the Tonquin expedition, had drifted into war with China. The Chinese fleet, composed of small obsolete vessels, was destroyed at Foochow by the heavily armed French ships in August; but as the Chinese Government showed no signs of yielding, the French Admiral, Courbet, was ordered to seize part of the island of Formosa, where valuable coal mines were known to exist. In order to effect his object, Admiral Courbet, with a magnificent disregard of all neutral Powers, proclaimed a paper blockade of Formosa, which naturally provoked a protestation on the part of the British Government. During the remainder of the year hostilities between France and China continued, although from time to time recurrence to the friendly offices of Her Majesty's Government was suggested but found impracticable.

Egypt, however, remained the centre of interest, and the prospects of any amicable arrangement appeared to recede further into the distance. Upon the return of Lord Northbrook, the new proposals of Her Majesty's Government were put before the French Government.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Dec. 26, 1884.

I suppose Waddington's private statement to me that we must
not expect an answer to our Egyptian proposals before the end of
the year was intended to imply that we _should_ get an answer about
that time.

I pressed Ferry strongly on the subject the day before
yesterday. He assured me that he had studied our papers and was
occupying himself without intermission on the subject, but I could
not bring him to book as to the exact time we might look for an
answer, nor could I extract from him any hint as to what the answer
was to be.

I am afraid that the draft of it has gone, or is going, to
Berlin, and I augur anything but good from this. It seems to
me that without being driven to anything of the kind by German
interests, Bismarck has lately taken a sort of malicious pleasure
in treating matters in a way calculated to embarrass and discredit
us.

You may be quite sure that I shall leave no stone unturned
to get an answer as soon as possible. I don't think threats of
Tunisifying Egypt, or of bankruptcy, or other strong measures,
would tell upon the French. They would not believe that we
should have recourse to such measures, in face of the opposition
of France, Germany, Austria, and Russia, even if we had the
thoroughgoing support of Italy. I should hesitate to bring matters
to a point at which we could only execute our threats by a very
large display of military and naval force, or back out of them.
The best card in our hand, and it is not a high trump, is the
reluctance of the French to be thrown irretrievably into the
clutches of Bismarck by a distinct quarrel with us.

Ferry seemed grateful to you for the way in which you
sounded him through Waddington about new proposals from China,
but he appears to think that any eagerness on his part to receive
new proposals would be looked upon by the Chinese as a sign of
weakness, and short of absolutely giving in on the part of China,
an _action d'éclat_ on the part of the French forces would answer
best for him with the Chambers.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Dec. 30, 1884.

I put your letter myself into Errington's hand this
morning.[42] He starts for Italy this evening.

You will see by the despatch I send with this that Ferry
promises an answer on the Egyptian Finances on the 15th of next
month, and that he intends to make counter-proposals. I cried out
at his mentioning so distant a date as the 15th, but he would not
name a nearer one. If, as I cannot but surmise, he is consulting
Berlin, I fear that neither speed nor conciliation to us will be
recommended from that quarter. I confess I cannot think of any
threat which would be likely to mend matters. The French would
probably rejoice at any crisis which might array distinctly against
us the three Emperors, as well as this Republic. I doubt the
Tonquin affair being very much of a safeguard. I should feel safer
if France were not getting into the habit of sending out distant
expeditions.

I report officially this evening Ferry's language about the
new Chinese proposals. The Chambers were all in favour of an
_action d'éclat_. I don't think Ferry could face them with another
doubtful negotiation on his hands which would suspend military
action. At any rate he does not seem to wish to hear anything of
Chinese proposals, short of actual surrender.

At the beginning of 1885 Her Majesty's Government were confronted with the unpleasant fact, that whereas hitherto they had only had French opposition to reckon with in respect to Egypt, Bismarck had now engineered a European combination against them in consequence of dissatisfaction at the English attitude towards his colonial policy. The English financial proposals, more especially those which suggested that the interest on the debt should be reduced, and the Anglo-French Administration of the Daira and Domain Lands should be abolished, were denounced in unmeasured terms in France. Nor did it seem easy to devise any efficacious means either of reconciling the French to the proposals or of putting pressure on them. The time for putting pressure on France was past; earlier in the day, a representation that a refusal to consent to measures necessary for the well being and good administration of Egypt would oblige the British Government to take the country formally under their protection, after the fashion of Tunis, would have met with little opposition; but now France might go to any extremities to resist such an arrangement, feeling sure that in so doing she would have the support of Germany, Austria, and Russia. Under these circumstances the prospect of a financial crisis, or even of bankruptcy, produced little alarm, because it was felt that the support of the three Empires would be forthcoming in demanding that the Egyptian financial administration should be placed under the joint control of the Powers; and it was in fact only too probable that the intractability of the French Government would increase in proportion with the support obtained from Germany and the Powers which followed the German lead.

It was hardly credible that the patronage of Germany was acceptable to the French public or entirely satisfactory to the French Government, as the danger, not to say the humiliation, of falling altogether into the hands of Bismarck, could not quite be lost sight of. The French Government no doubt had two objects in view; the first, to make use of the support of Germany and the Powers, in order to guard French pecuniary interests, and to improve as far as possible the political position of France in Egypt; the second, to avoid severing themselves so entirely from England as to be left wholly at the mercy of Germany. Unfortunately for England the second object appeared to be the one to which the lesser importance was attached.

In short, the probabilities were, that unless we succeeded in coming to some arrangement with France, we should find arrayed against us all the European Powers, except Italy, the position in which we were placed at the moment, in consequence of the expedition to Khartoum, having been taken into account in calculating the means at our disposal to withstand such a coalition. It should be mentioned that the friendship of Italy had been purchased by an arrangement under which she was to take possession of Massowah and the adjacent coast.

The French counter-proposals respecting Egyptian Finance were communicated in the middle of January.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Jan. 20, 1885.

I earnestly hope that a settlement of the Egyptian Financial
Question may be the result of the Cabinet to-day. That question
seems to me to have a disastrous effect on our foreign relations
everywhere.

Bismarck and Ferry are _jouant au plus fin_ with each other at
our expense. Each seems to think that he can use the other to help
in thwarting us, without risk to himself. But Bismarck has the best
of the game. He occupies the French thoughts, and to some extent
their forces, at a distance from Europe: he keeps up irritation
between them and us, and some of the acquisitions he encourages
them to make (Tonquin for instance) will in all probability
be a permanent cause of weakness to them. At the same time he
neutralizes opposition from us to his childish colonial schemes,
which I cannot help suspecting are founded as much on what, for
want of a better word, I must call spite against us, as on any
real expectation of advantage to Germany. Ferry hopes, by means of
Bismarck and the Powers who follow Bismarck's lead, to carry his
immediate points in regard to Egypt and other parts of the world,
and so increase his reputation at home for the moment; and he
trusts to his skill to enable him to stop before he has so entirely
alienated us as to be quite at Bismarck's mercy. It is the natural
disposition of almost all Europe to side against us, as matters
stand, on the Egyptian Financial Question, which makes this pretty
game possible.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Feb. 3, 1885.

I am provoked by Ferry's tardiness in sending Waddington the
instructions to proceed with the Egyptian Finances Question. He
has evidently been waiting for the approval of Berlin. I am more
than ever impatient to get this question disposed of. One, and not
the least of my reasons, is the desire to get rid of this habit of
referring every moment to Bismarck.

The Tonquin and China affairs seem to get more perplexing
and more expensive to the French in men and money every day. It
seems very doubtful that Ferry will get the _action d'éclat_ he is
looking for there, in time for the election; and if he do not, it
may go hard with him in the new Chamber.

The _Gaulois_ announces that a great Anglo-French meeting is
to be held in Paris in the month of March, at which a resolution
is to be voted that England and France must remain united in the
interests of liberty in Europe. According to the _Gaulois_, 'Mr.
Cremer, secrétaire general de la Workmen's Peace Association,' is
in communication about it with M. Clémenceau, who is to organise
the meeting in conjunction with Mr. Burns, _Membre de la Chambre
des Communes_, who would come to Paris with a delegation of English
workmen. If there be any truth in the story, the object of the
French promoters of this demonstration is probably to embarrass the
Ferry Government.

The Mr. Burns referred to was presumably the present President of the Local Government Board, but the description of him as an M.P. was premature.

Negotiations between the French and English Governments over the financial proposals were resumed, and eventually some sort of arrangement was arrived at, but in the meanwhile all interest had been transferred to the Soudan. The battle of Abou Klea took place on January 19, and on February 5 there arrived the news of the fall of Khartoum and death of Gordon. The French were not wanting in appreciation of the gallantry shown by the British troops, but were prodigal of gloomy forebodings with regard to the future prospects of the expeditions. Prominent amongst these prophets of evil were Lesseps and Jules Ferry. Lesseps (on the strength of having once been on a tour in the Soudan with the ex-Khedive) considered that an attempt to advance would be madness, and that the army was in great danger of being surrounded. He thought that the only prudent course would be to concentrate the forces and keep them behind walls and entrenchments until the autumn. But even then he did not see how the army could ever get away if it were stoutly opposed by the Arabs, as the scarcity of water and other difficulties would make the Berber-Suakim route impracticable; and in short he was convinced that the only practical plan was to come to terms with the Mahdi, and that the only means of making terms with the Madhi would be to reinstate Ismail as Khedive and utilize his influence. This surprising conclusion was due to the fact that Lesseps had for a long time been exerting himself in every possible way to bring about the restoration of Ismail.

M. Jules Ferry was also full of condolences upon the British position in the Soudan, but was, at the same time, not at all enthusiastic about the French position in the Far East. He admitted that the troops in Tonquin were sickly and that the climate was odious; that neither in Tonquin nor Formosa could any blow be struck which China would really feel, but that nevertheless 'in the interests of civilization as represented in those parts by France and England, it was necessary to deal a stunning blow (_coup foudroyant_) at the huge Empire of China.' This might be effected by landing an attacking force in China proper, or by blockading the ports, but either of these methods would involve great difficulties with other Powers, and the only thing that remained to be done was to dismember the Empire. Once China was broken up into three or four provinces she would become comparatively harmless. M. Jules Ferry's views were expressed after a dinner at the Embassy, and Lord Lyons in reporting the conversation remarked that his wine must be more heady than he imagined.

Before long, however, a crisis in another part of the world temporarily distracted attention from Egypt and brought home to every thinking person the indefinite and multifarious responsibilities of British rule, as well as the singularly inadequate military resources available. Prominent British statesmen had long derided the absurdity of supposing that England and Russia could ever become involved in disputes in Central Asia, but, profiting by our embarrassments in Egypt, the Russian Government had adopted so aggressive a policy, that even the peace-loving Gladstone Government found itself on the brink of a collision before the end of February. This critical situation and the possibility of a conflict between England and Russia, far from giving satisfaction to the French, afforded them just cause for anxiety.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, March 13, 1885.

The critical state of things between England and Russia has
come more home to the French mind during the last few days, and
is looked upon with increased alarm. Whatever may be Bismarck's
feelings and plans, the French cannot help feeling that it would
be a great danger to them for him to be without counterpoise in
Europe. Those who believe that they see far ahead, declare that
Bismarck's ultimate object is Holland, and that Belgium, or a part
of Belgium, is to be given to France as a compensation for the
annexation of Holland to Germany. To this end they conceive that
Bismarck has aimed at embroiling Russia with England, so that the
one may paralyse the other; at separating England and France, and
at setting up an alliance between France and Germany. It is to
be hoped that many Frenchmen would shrink from taking part in an
iniquity which would be equalled only by the partition of Poland.
It is to be supposed that none can be so blind as not to see that
Bismarck will never make a territorial arrangement which would
increase the relative strength of France as compared with that of
Germany. It can hardly be doubted that Bismarck must be well aware
that so far from the gift of Belgium reconciling the French to the
loss of Alsace and Lorraine, any additional power that gift might
confer upon them would certainly be used, on the first opportunity,
for the recovery of the two lost Provinces.

To people who incline to more simple and obvious explanations
of political conduct, Bismarck himself seems to be rather old to
indulge in any hope of executing schemes of this kind. Moreover,
the character of the Emperor would in all probability prevent his
sanctioning such proceedings, while His Majesty's death would,
in all probability, greatly diminish, if not put an end to,
Bismarck's influence. Bismarck may in fact be working in order to
attain smaller and more immediate objects, and to gratify personal
feelings.

However all this may be, the French decidedly wish to prevent
a rupture between England and Russia. They do not relish the
effect upon the position of Bismarck in Europe which would be
the consequence of France herself, England and Russia, being all
hampered by being engaged in wars in the extreme East.

* * * * *

_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._

March 14, 1885.

I doubt the Russians going quite to extremes, but the risk is
great.

Bismarck is behaving as ill as possible--after the mission of
peace and a complete making up, creating difficulties at the last
moment about Egyptian finances, concerning which he promised that
no objections would be raised by Germany, if France and England
were agreed. It is supposed to be with a view to getting a decree
against us at Cairo before the settlement.

The military preparations for a possible struggle with Russia were typical of the manner in which British statesmen occasionally prepare for the worst. In order to strike terror into a Power which could dispose of millions of soldiers, two army corps of 25,000 men each were ordered to be mobilized in India, and as 'a time of emergency had arrived,' it was announced that the first-class army reserve and militia reserve would be called out; their total numbers amounting to the stupendous figure of about 70,000 men. By these steps it was hoped that the greatest military Power in the world would be overawed.

From one embarrassment Her Majesty's Government were fortunately relieved, the basis of an arrangement with France having been arrived at with regard to Egyptian Finance. Mr. Gladstone, with whom Lord Lyons had been requested to communicate direct, wrote expressing his relief, but was obviously far more concerned to demonstrate the turpitude of his political opponents.

* * * * *

_Mr. Gladstone to Lord Lyons._

10, Downing St., March 21, 1885.

When you so kindly wrote to me about Egyptian Finance, I did
not reply. Not because I was insensible or forgetful, but because
the unsatisfactory condition of the question made it so difficult.
Now, thank God, we are through, as far as Foreign Powers are
concerned; and we have thus far escaped from a position the most
hopeless and helpless that it is possible to conceive.

It remains a subject of regret, and of some surprise, that
the Opposition are pressing for time before we take the vote, in
a manner quite unusual, with almost a certainty of bankruptcy and
financial chaos in Egypt, and the likelihood of consequences more
than financial if we comply; and all this, as far as we can make
out, because of the disorganized condition of the Tory party. It
seems that the mutinous followers have exacted this condition from
their leaders, as some reparation for the agreement about the Seats
Bill, and for their other offences.

To be defeated on the agreement would be _most_ convenient
for the Government (for me priceless) but somewhat ruinous or
mischievous, I think, to all the rest of the world.

We must of course hold our ground.

The rooted belief of Ministers that their continuance in office is absolutely essential to the welfare of the universe as well as to that of the British Empire is, of course, a well-known phenomenon which has manifested itself in more recent times in the case of both political parties. In 1885 the difficulties of the Gladstone Government continued to grow, and it was fortunate for Lord Granville's peace of mind that he was an optimist by nature.

* * * * *

_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._

March 25, 1885.

The incorrigible Turk has not yet sent instructions to
Musurus. We have tried the most serious threats, which Musurus
believes will be successful.

But if we do not take care, we shall soon be at war with the
Mahdi, with Turkey, and with the Russians.

I do not know how the latter question will finish. Being of
a sanguine disposition, I hope for the best. We are determined to
take a firm stand.

Do you believe that the French have many tricks in hand for
the Suez Canal Commission?

Early in April there arrived the news of the fight at Penjdeh, where, to use Gladstone's own expression, the attack of the Russians upon the Afghans 'bore the appearance of an unprovoked aggression.' A financial panic took place, consols fell 3 per cent., Russian stocks 9 per cent., and for a short time the impression prevailed that war was inevitable. In the House of Commons, Mr. Gladstone made one of those eloquent statements which were so widely accepted by his followers as a satisfactory solution of any outstanding difficulty, but which failed to reassure the more intelligent; and even the optimistic Lord Granville felt some uncomfortable qualms.

'It is too dreadful,' he wrote on April 10th, 'jumping from
one nightmare into another.

'Once at war with Russia we shall be obliged to toady Germany,
France, and Turkey.

'But I cannot believe that it will come to war. It cannot be
a good move of the Russians to have created a blood feud with the
Afghans.

'Not having a genius for war, I do not know how we are
effectively to carry it on against Russia, although it is not off
the cards that it may break her up.'

Probably Lord Granville was not singular in his inability to see how a war on land was to be effectively carried on against Russia.

In the meanwhile the French were not without their own foreign troubles. M. Jules Ferry had spoken of the necessity of inflicting a _coup foudroyant_. The _coup foudroyant_ fell in a totally unexpected fashion upon his own head, in the shape of a defeat of the French forces at Lang-Son. The news of the reverse arrived in Paris on March 25, and created so absurd a panic and so strong a feeling against Spirited Colonial Policy that Jules Ferry at once bowed to the storm and resigned on the 31st. He had been in office for the unprecedented period of two years and one month, which alone was sufficient cause for disappearance; nor could it be said that his administration had been colourless, for he had passed an important Education Bill, established the Protectorate of France in Tunis, and annexed Tonquin and Madagascar.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, March 31, 1885.

Ferry was certainly at work quietly with negotiations for
peace with China, and no doubt he calculated on playing it as a
high trump at the Elections; and a great card it would have been
for him, for the war in Tonquin is extremely unpopular. The reverse
at Lang-Son has changed all this; the extreme Right have always
had a special hatred of Ferry on account of the suppression of the
religious communities, and Clémenceau and the extreme Left have
become bitterly hostile to him personally. Not many of his own
party cared to stick to him when their own popularity would have
been risked by doing so. And, besides, he had been in office for
two years; a very unusually long period of late, and people were
tired of him.

Freycinet is now trying to form a Cabinet. It is not certain
that he will succeed, and if he does succeed, it is very doubtful
whether his Cabinet will last. His idea seems to be to take into it
Republicans of all shades, not excluding deep Red. The Republicans
have been rather startled by the progress, far from great though
it has been, of the Conservatives and Monarchists (Orleanist and
Imperialist) in the constituencies; and the notion seems to be that
the importance to them of resisting this, may keep them together
and prevent them quarrelling with each other, at all events until
after the Elections. But anyway, each change of Ministry produces
a further step towards the Left, and there is a foundation for the
fear that there may be socialist legislation against property and
proprietors, and that the Government may by degrees throw away all
the means of resisting anarchy.

Freycinet's own tendencies would be towards peace. Now there
is nothing but flame and fury against the Chinese, but considering
the general unpopularity of the war this may to a certain extent
subside. He would, I think, desire to be on good terms with all
countries. He would hardly be so subservient to Bismarck as Ferry
had lately become. It so happens that personally he and I are
particularly good friends.

Towards the end of April the British Government asked for a credit of eleven millions, and the eloquence of Mr. Gladstone worked his faithful followers up to a belief in verbiage which is almost pathetic. 'Gladstone's magnificent speech had a great effect here,' wrote Lord Granville. 'It will hasten the _dénouement_ one way or the other in Russia.

'I understand that the Emperor is decidedly pacific; but he believes his father lost himself from want of firmness, that he himself is determined to be firm, and that the particular firmness which appeals to him, is not that which goes against the wishes of his army.'

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, May 1, 1885.

A war between England and Russia is much dreaded by the
French. They fear that it would leave Bismarck without any
counterpoise in Europe. Any influence they may have will no doubt
be exercised in favour of peace, but their influence at this moment
does not count very much. I do not know that they would have any
strong sympathy with Russia if hostilities broke out, but such a
feeling would be produced by anything which irritated them with us
on account of Egyptian or other matters. Anyhow we must be prepared
to find them exacting and susceptible.

The consequences of the war as regards the money market here
would be disastrous; but it is believed they would be still more
disastrous at Berlin.

The dangerous point is considered here to be the notions of
military honour, of a peculiar kind, which prevail in the Russian
as much as, or more than, in other Continental armies.

These military notions in the armies do not at all require
that the rulers of the armies should keep their words to
foreigners, or abide by their international engagements; but they
do require that, right or wrong, the rulers should not allow the
_amour-propre_ of the army to be wounded. The Emperor of Russia
probably shares these feelings, and at any rate he would certainly
be afraid to run counter to them. Those here who profess to
understand Russia declare that she has no desire to take Herat or
to annex any part of Afghanistan. They think that the ultimate
object at which she is really aiming is to extend her possessions
to the Persian Gulf, and that she would be tractable enough about
the Afghan frontier, if that question were separated from military
honour, or rather vanity.

I met Freycinet and Herbette at dinner yesterday. They seemed
to be much relieved at having got rid of the _Bosphore Egyptien_
difficulty, and to be really much obliged to you for the help you
had given to them.

The _Bosphore Egyptien_, a French newspaper in Cairo which continually attacked the British administration in Egypt with unparalleled malignity, had at length worn out the patience of Sir Evelyn Baring, and been temporarily suspended.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, May 15, 1885.

The symptoms apparent here indicate that Bismarck is busily
employed in getting up a European coalition against England on the
Egyptian question. He has very nearly succeeded, if not quite, in
isolating us in the Suez Canal Commission. He would seem to have
put great pressure for this purpose upon Italy, who was disposed to
side with us, and to have frightened or cajoled Holland and Spain.
With Russia and Austria he seems to have made a regular cabal. It
has required great tact and firmness on Pauncefote's part to have
resisted the endeavours to turn the Commission into a political
conference on the whole Egyptian question, and at the same time
to have avoided breaking it up prematurely. Another circumstance
which Bismarck is using as a lever against us, is the levying by
the Egyptian Government of the tax upon the coupon, before the
Financial Convention has been ratified by all the parties to it.

He has sent Courcel here from Berlin to seduce or terrify
the French Government, and is said to have charged him with large
offers relative to establishing an international administration in
Egypt, and assigning to France a preponderant influence in such an
administration. What the real offers may be, of course, I cannot
say, but I think the French are half afraid of them. Probably, like
all Bismarck's demonstrations in so-called support of France, they
contain the essential elements--the employing a considerable number
of French troops at a distance from France, and the promoting
ill-will between France and England.

These suspicions as to Bismarck's motives were confirmed by Lord Rosebery, who at the time occupied a minor post in the Gladstone administration, and had lately paid a visit to Germany.

* * * * *

_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._

May 30, 1885.

Rosebery has not yet written out the report (which Blowitz
saw), but he has given me a full account from his notes.

Bismarck acknowledged that he had been thwarting us in every
way; but at the last conversation (influenced, Rosebery thought,
by an unsatisfactory conversation with Courcel) he was much more
conciliatory.

He was exceedingly civil to Rosebery; hostile to Gladstone,
and especially to Derby.

He is a great man, but he sees through a great many
millstones.

The Emperor is certainly unwell. Rosebery is convinced that
Bismarck will retire for a time on his death.

Judging from the material available, no statesman ever disliked so many persons as Bismarck, and the objects of his antipathy were not confined to his own sex. Busch's book and the works of other authors contain frequent references to the grievances which he entertained towards women who were alleged to have interfered with his policy, and, whether these charges were well founded or not, he made no secret of his animosity against even so important a personage as the Empress Augusta. In fact there can be little doubt that it was owing to the despotic influence exercised by the Chancellor that the Empress, who had had the misfortune to incur his displeasure, was forced to leave Berlin and to reside for a considerable period at Coblentz.

Apparently the man who inspired him with the greatest aversion was Gortschakoff, but it is easy to understand that from the Bismarckian point of view, Mr. Gladstone and Lord Derby represented a singularly futile type of statesman. Lord Rosebery's prophecy with regard to his retirement was only partially correct. In private conversation, Bismarck is understood to have calculated upon three years of office under the present German Emperor; whereas he only succeeded in remaining for two, and his retirement was compulsory and not voluntary.

One of the notable events in Paris in 1885 was the death of Victor Hugo. His funeral was made the occasion of a great ceremonial, and Queen Victoria, who was always much interested in functions of this nature, desired that she should be furnished with a special report. Any one who happened to have been a witness of the Victor Hugo funeral would corroborate the accuracy of the following account, which is probably in striking contrast to the word pictures of the newspaper correspondents of the time.

* * * * *

Paris, June 4, 1885.

Lord Lyons presents his humble duty to Your Majesty and
in obedience to Your Majesty's commands, proceeds to state the
impression made upon him by the funeral of Victor Hugo.

There was nothing striking, splendid or appropriate, either in
the monstrous catafalque erected under the Arc de Triomphe, or in
the trappings of the funeral. There was nothing mournful or solemn
in the demeanour of the people. The impressive part of the scene
consisted in the vast crowds from all parts of France and from many
other countries. As decorations of the scene, were the innumerable
wreaths, some conveyed in cars and some carried in the hands of
those who offered them.

The aspect was that of a vast assemblage of people gathered
together for some ordinary demonstration, or from curiosity. On
the other hand, perfect order was preserved. Both those who joined
in the procession and those who lined the streets through which it
passed, maintained the good humour and civility which are seldom
wanting to a Paris crowd. At some points attempts were made to
raise anarchical or socialistic cries, but met with no response.
The distance from the point of departure to the Arc de Triomphe is
about three miles by the route taken, which was through some of the
finest avenues of Paris. The procession began at 11 o'clock in the
morning and went on until after 4 in the afternoon.

The general impression left upon Lord Lyons by the day was one
of weariness and unconcern. The orderliness of the people was a
satisfactory symptom, but the total absence of strong feeling was
chilling, and the studied avoidance of any recognition of religion
did away with all solemnity.

On June 12, the Gladstone Government, having been defeated during a Budget debate, resigned, and left to the Conservatives the ungrateful task of facing an accumulation of difficulties while in a minority in the House of Commons. Lord Salisbury took Lord Granville's place at the Foreign Office and the transfer was marked by a double compliment to Lord Lyons. Lord Granville, who was always extremely popular with all those with whom he was in any way connected, with habitual kindliness and generosity expressed his obligations to the Ambassador. 'An ordinary letter of farewell and of thanks would very inadequately express my feelings to you. I cannot say how much I have valued the loyal and important assistance you have given me in most difficult circumstances.'

Lord Salisbury showed his appreciation by at once asking him to come over to England in order to discuss the general situation, and upon his return to Paris in July, he was able to report that the change of Government in England appeared to have had a beneficial effect upon Anglo-French relations. 'The statement you made in the House of Lords has made an excellent impression. Freycinet seems to be really disposed to abstain from endeavouring to thwart us or to raise difficulties for us with regard to Egyptian Finance. He also appears to be inclined to come to terms with us about Newfoundland and other matters.'

'I think he is sincerely desirous to put the relations between the two countries on a good footing, but I cannot yet say that he will be willing to make sacrifices for this purpose.'

As Freycinet, however, showed few symptoms of being willing to retire from the position he had taken up with regard to the eventual British evacuation of Egypt, and to the resumption by France of an influence equal with our own, his professions of friendship did not appear to be of much value. Some apprehension too was caused by the ostentatious announcements in the French press, that the numerous military forces in the Far East released in consequence of the conclusion of peace with China would return by the Suez Canal and would therefore be 'available for other purposes in the Mediterranean.' What was perhaps more encouraging, was the increasing distaste for Spirited Colonial Policy combined with renewed distrust of Bismarck's intentions.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, July 14, 1885.

I have been rejoiced by your telegram announcing that Germany,
Austria, and Italy agree to the issue of the Egyptian Loan Decree.
It looks as if you were on the eve of settling the question most
pressing in point of time (that of the money for Egypt), and I
hope it augurs well for the disposition generally of the German
Chancellor. The National Fête here puts a stop to all business for
to-day, but I shall see Freycinet about the issue of the Decree
to-morrow.

The debate on the Budget for 1886 elicited some curious
speeches in the Chamber of Deputies three days ago on the
'Expéditions lointaines.' There was no difficulty in showing that
they had all cost more than they were worth. They were plainly held
by the Deputies to be unpopular in the country, and condemnation of
them is likely to be one of the election cries of the extreme Left.
But hardly any one seemed to see the way to bring them to an end.
In fact, it looked as if France had got into the groove which by a
fatality leads to annexation and conquest by strong and civilized
nations when they once begin to establish themselves amongst weak
and barbarous peoples. All this may delight Prince Bismarck,
whose avowed object is to find an outlet for what he calls French
vanity and restlessness, and a gulf to swallow up French troops
and treasures at a distance from Europe. From a certain point of
view this may not be without its advantages to other nations; but
it is not without danger to the good relations between France and
England--between whom awkward questions may arise all over the
world. In the present I am uneasy about Siam and more so about
Burmah. It is not a pleasant speculation to consider the change
which may be produced in no very remote future, in the condition
of our Indian Empire, if it be in contact with a great European
Power both on the north and on the east.

In August, 1885, a prodigious outburst of Anglophobia occurred in Paris in consequence of mendacious statements published by Rochefort in his newspaper, charging the British military authorities in the Soudan with the assassination of a certain Olivier Pain. Olivier Pain was an ex-Communist and French journalist who had accompanied the Turks in the campaign of 1877, and who was reputed to be occasionally employed by the Turkish Government as a secret agent. In the spring of 1884, he had set off to join the Mahdi, and having completely disappeared from view, and being presumably dead, Rochefort took the opportunity to announce that Lord Wolseley had procured his death by offering a reward of fifty pounds for his head. The enterprise had been allotted to Major Kitchener[43]: 'un sinistre gredin nourri de psaumes et abreuvé de whisky qui a eu le premier, l'idée de mettre à prix la tête de celui qu'il appelait "l'espion français."'

As, however, it was impossible to reach Lord Wolseley and the 'sinistre gredin,' Rochefort urged that vengeance should be taken upon 'l'Ambassadeur Lyons.' 'A partir d'aujourd'hui il est notre ôtage! Sa vieille peau est le gage de la satisfaction qui nous est due.' 'L'Ambassadeur Lyons' was, however, also beyond reach, as he happened to be on leave, and it was, therefore, suggested that the few secretaries (of whom I was one), who were then in Paris, should be forthwith strung up to the lamp-posts in the Rue du Faubourg St. Honoré. The astonishing thing was that these ravings were actually taken more or less seriously, and that for some time the French authorities found it necessary to protect the Embassy with numerous police detachments.

It has always been one of the inscrutable mysteries that Rochefort, ever since the Commune, was allowed a toleration accorded to no one else, on the ground of his alleged exceptional wit and humour, whereas his effusions consisted almost entirely of gross personal abuse of the lowest type, levelled indiscriminately at prominent individuals of any description, and largely directed against England, whose hospitality he enjoyed during many years of exile.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 37: _Times_ correspondent in Paris.]

[Footnote 38: Col. the Hon. George Villiers, Military Attaché at Paris.]

[Footnote 39: Lyons, Feb. 1883.]

[Footnote 40: Sir Joseph Crowe, K.C.M.G., Commercial Attaché at the Paris Embassy.]

[Footnote 41: French Minister at Tangier.]

[Footnote 42: Mr. G. Errington, M.P., had been despatched by Mr. Gladstone on a secret mission to the Vatican in connection with the Home Rule agitation.]

[Footnote 43: Now Lord Kitchener.]