Chapter XV: Arabi's Rebellion (2)

They are full of suspicions of designs on our part to seize the Suez Canal with or without the assistance or connivance of Turkey. You will see by a telegram I have just sent, that Freycinet has asked me a question about this. I imagine the French would object very much less to our acting entirely alone than to our acting in any way with the Porte.

The Sultan seems to tell de Noailles all kinds of stories against England and Dufferin. It is not, however, from Freycinet that I hear this.

In Lord Lyons's opinion, the French, at this stage, were quite prepared for England acting alone in Egypt, but he considered that it was most important to be very frank with them, to afford them every opportunity of joining us, but to do it in such a way that other Powers should not be given too much time in which to raise objections.

It was not apparently until June 27, 1882, that the British Government seriously considered the probability of having to employ 'material force' in Egypt, whether alone or in concert with other Powers; but in consequence of the danger of the situation and of the necessity of acting quickly, they then applied to the War Office for information as to what forces were available for an expedition. In view of our alleged military capacity at the present time, it is of interest to learn what the War Office was prepared to do thirty-one years ago. The military authorities stated that they were prepared to embark within twenty-four hours, 3500 infantry, and 500 garrison artillerymen, with a small siege train, from Malta and Gibraltar, with necessary camp equipage and reserves of food and ammunition. These troops could be conveyed in the ships of the Channel Squadron now in the Mediterranean. A force of about 12,000 fighting men, complete in infantry, cavalry, and field artillery, with forty-eight field guns, was also available, to embark from England. The first 5000 of the infantry could sail within a week, and the whole force could leave England in a fortnight from the date of the order, with complete supplies for an army in the field. The force from England would be made up partially by the First Class Army Reserve, and a Brigade was also available to be sent from Bombay to Suez. Such was the purport of a most confidential communication to Lord Granville from the War Office, dated June 27, 1882.

On July 11, the bombardment of Alexandria by the British fleet took place; the departure of the French ships marking, in an unmistakeable form, the refusal of the French Government to incur further responsibility, and foreshadowing the permanent renunciation of the old French position in Egypt.

The news of the Alexandria bombardment, which, owing to the absence of troops for landing, could hardly be described as a very effective operation, was received without much excitement in Paris, and Freycinet stated that the Chamber would certainly not have sanctioned the co-operation of the French fleet. The main point on which sensitiveness was shown was the Suez Canal. The French seemed disposed to resent any landing of English troops alone at Port Said, and to insist, if not on joining with us, on sending a 'lateral' expedition of their own. It was important, therefore, that they should be given a _bona fide_ invitation to join in anything we might determine to do, and the French were accordingly invited by Lord Granville to concert measures at once for the protection of the canal; questions of detail being left to the Conference at Constantinople. Upon the whole the bombardment of Alexandria had tended to improve rather than to impair Anglo-French relations, and the chief danger seemed to lie in the projected Turkish intervention, which would alienate public opinion and provoke strong opposition from Gambetta and his followers. Extraordinary French Naval Credits were voted and Lord Granville appears to have thought that joint action was secured after all, at least as far as the Canal was concerned.

* * * * *

_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._

July 19, 1882.

I wish you and ourselves joy of the renewed _entente
cordiale_. It will not be popular in many quarters here, but it is
an immense national advantage, and ought to relieve us from many
dangers.

I am not in the least jealous of the dual action in the Canal,
though I should prefer its being triangular. But I own I dread it,
if we are obliged, as is probable, to intervene in Egypt itself.

I hope they do not think we are pressing them too fast. I
believe the Cabinet will settle to send 15,000 men to Malta. If so,
I will let you know.

Remember I am always grateful for suggestions and criticisms.
I hear Bismarck is really ill and cannot sleep at night. The
preparation of his own financial measures does not act as an
anodyne.

I am told that the debate in the Commons last night did us
good and not harm. I suppose we shall have a more formidable one in
the Lords.

It is rumoured that the Peers will pass the Second Reading of
the Arrears Bill, and mutilate it in Committee.

The voting of the extraordinary French Naval Credits, which had caused it to be supposed that the French Government intended to take some decided action, was soon shown to mean nothing at all. Freycinet, whose position had been much shaken, was in the uncomfortable situation of being blamed by the Chamber for doing too much and denounced in the Senate for not doing enough. On July 19, an important debate took place in the Chamber, during which Gambetta, with his accustomed eloquence, adjured the Government to adhere to the English alliance at all costs, and urged that to quarrel with England would be the most fatal of mistakes. The Credits asked for were agreed to, and the Government obtained a large majority; but when Freycinet appeared in support of his modest proposals before the Senate, he was obliged to admit that the Conference at Constantinople had refused to entrust France and England with a Mandate, and that in consequence of this refusal the French Government would leave England to act alone, and would confine their own action to the protection of the Suez Canal. A fresh credit amounting to about £350,000 was asked for with this object, but met with formidable opposition.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, July 26, 1882.

When I saw Freycinet this afternoon he seemed in absolute
despair. There are two modes of escape which are supposed to be
still open.

Though the majority of the Chamber are strongly opposed to
military intervention in Egypt, they may still hesitate to turn
Freycinet out, lest by showing it to be impossible to make their
own existence compatible with anything like a stable Government in
France, they may bring about a dissolution.

It is said that they are casting about for some means of
refusing the Credit and yet not turning out Freycinet; and the
second device, which might enable Freycinet to stay in, is the
singularly undignified one of his playing into their hand, by
declaring that he does not make the Credit a Cabinet question, and
that if it be refused, he will bow to the will of the Chamber and
withdraw from the protection of the Canal.

So long as it is undeniable that we have _bona fide_ invited
and pressed France to take part in all our operations in Egypt, I
shall not break my heart if she chooses to decline to do so.

I believe that Freycinet would have been in a better plight
if he had taken a decided course either way; if he had distinctly
refused all intervention, or if he had boldly joined England in all
her operations.

On July 29, the question of voting the fresh Credit was brought forward in the Chamber and made one of confidence in the Ministry. Every one by this time was much alarmed at the prospect of France being dragged into some vague and desperate adventure; the Credit was refused by an overwhelming majority; Freycinet resigned office, and France definitely retired from the scene of action.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, July 30, 1882.

Among the innumerable Ministerial crises which I have seen
here, I do not recollect one in which there has been so much
uncertainty as to who would be the new Prime Minister.

Grévy, in conformity with his own views, and with those of
the great majority of the Chamber and indeed of the country, is
trying to form an absolutely non-intervention Cabinet. But such a
Cabinet might have difficulties with the Senate. Léon Say and Jules
Ferry, the most able members of the late Ministry, were for full
intervention and the English Alliance.

Freycinet very unwisely began with a perfectly idle dispute
with Gambetta as to whether the English Government would, or would
not, have consented to armed intervention with France only, if
Gambetta had remained in power. Gambetta did not speak yesterday,
but he and his followers voted against Freycinet.

Hohenlohe seemed, I hear, dreadfully put out by the result of
the division yesterday. It was Bismarck's communication which gave
Freycinet the _coup de grâce_. Hohenlohe had evidently hoped that
it would save him, by giving him an excuse for withdrawing the Bill.

I was very much disappointed to hear from Freycinet that
Russia had gone back to the Conference. I hoped her retirement
would have given us a good opportunity of freeing ourselves from
that cumbrous clog.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Aug. 1, 1882.

All is still uncertain as to who the new French Ministers
will be. Grévy is doing his best to keep Freycinet, and Hohenlohe
is working in the same direction, which is not wise. Hitherto
Freycinet has positively declined, but he is a man who sometimes
changes his mind. He will be in an extraordinarily false position
if he does come back. Grévy may, perhaps, manage to appoint a
warming-pan sort of Ministry, just to keep the offices warm during
the recess and to make room for something more serious in October.

The French are in very good disposition towards us at this
moment. The way to keep them so will be to endeavour to make their
present position comfortable to them, without being humiliating,
and, above all, not to crow over them, as part of our press seems
too much inclined to do. Their fleet, next to our own, is the most
important factor in the Mediterranean question. We can do as well
or better, without any aid from France or other countries, but we
ought to have the field to ourselves.

I wish we were well rid of that dangerous Conference. I had
a sort of hope that just now it might have a sort of use, as a
means of letting the other Powers talk while we were acting. But in
fact, as worked by Bismarck and by the Turks under his direction,
it seems merely to supply the machinery for formally placing us in
opposition to the so-called European Concert, and for embarrassing
France. I think the French would be glad to be delivered from it.

Public opinion in France is at this moment friendly to us, but
it is in a very susceptible state.

A new Ministry was in course of time formed under M. Duclerc, one of the many uninteresting mediocrities who have governed France during the last forty years, and a sort of formula was agreed upon that there was no 'solution of continuity in the Entente,' which was not intended to commit the French to anything in particular.

A vast amount has been written respecting the events in Egypt in 1882; much of it by persons who occupied responsible and important positions at the time; but the reasons for the inaction and eventual retirement of the French have never been clearly explained. Probably the French themselves would be unable to give a satisfactory explanation, and would attribute their inglorious attitude to the Freycinet Government, which did not know its own mind. But it may be assumed that a variety of reasons were responsible for the French refusal of co-operation with England. Had the invitation been received some months earlier, it would probably have been accepted with enthusiasm; but the Tunis expedition, which had opened with so much success and enthusiasm, had proved a much more troublesome and unsatisfactory business than had been anticipated, and had created a decided disinclination for further enterprises in North Africa. In the second place, the difficulties of an Egyptian campaign were greatly over-estimated; the French calculation was that no less than 60,000 men would be necessary, and the ordinary French Minister would not venture to allow so many men to leave the country. Lastly, the French were quite unable, rightly or wrongly, to get it out of their minds that they were being deliberately led into a trap by Bismarck, and this by itself was sufficient to daunt a Government of the Freycinet type.

France having now definitely declined, the British invitation was transferred to Italy.

'We have asked the Italians to join us,' Lord Granville wrote
on July 27, 'but we have not pressed them. They also will try to
_se faire prier_, and will be too late. I told Menabrea I could not
delay operations.

'I hope they will decline, but I myself was not very hot for
even the offer. But the balance of argument seemed to be in favour
of it, and you did not raise any objection to it.

'Please explain that the _Times_ is entirely off the track as
to our wish for a protectorate.'

The refusal of the Italians was welcome and not unexpected, and as no other Power was in the least inclined to co-operate, the British Government was able to set about the task of smashing Arabi with a clear conscience, in its own way, and unhampered by allies; for the Turks, who had agreed to send troops, protracted the negotiations with regard to their employment to such an extent, that the campaign was finished long before an agreement was arrived at.

Lord Cromer in his well-known work 'Modern Egypt,' has exposed with much skill and lucidity the futile nature of many of the proposals put forward by the British and French Governments during the period that they were acting together. But the really remarkable fact is, that each Government succeeded in bringing about the result which it least desired. The policy of the British Government was governed by a sincere, if mistaken, determination not to be dragged into assuming sole responsibility for Egypt, and in particular to avoid the necessity of military occupation. The efforts of the French Government were chiefly directed towards the prevention of Turkey or any other Power establishing its predominant influence in Egypt, and that French policy should have unconsciously and involuntarily thrust England into this unsought and unwelcome position is one of the real ironies of recent history.

Perhaps the most fortunate event for England during the crisis which preceded the Egyptian expedition was the fall of Gambetta early in the year. Had that statesman remained in office he would certainly have never consented to remain a supine and indifferent spectator; he would undoubtedly have insisted on France taking an active part: a joint expedition would have taken place, and the sequel might have followed the Schleswig-Holstein precedent.

It was hardly to be expected that the skill and rapidity with which the campaign against Arabi was conducted would evoke much enthusiasm in France, nor could the French reasonably expect that upon the restoration of peace and order the old state of things would be renewed. Before the end of October Lord Granville informed the French Ambassador in London that the Control would not be restored; and when the French Government objected, on the ground that such an alteration must be submitted to the Powers, it was pointed out the matter was one for the Khedive to decide himself. In order to soothe wounded French feelings various compromises in the shape of posts in the Egyptian administration were offered in vain.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Nov. 3, 1882.

I thought it simpler and better to let Duclerc have a copy of
your despatch, as you had no objection to my doing so. He has not
yet given any sign of life since he received it.

The argument that the Financial Adviser will have only a small
position in Egypt, or at all events a less important position than
the Controllers, cuts both ways here. Duclerc's line is to say that
we are making a distinction without any real difference: that in
practice the adviser will have all and more than all the powers of
the Controllers; and that thus virtually France is to be deprived
of her share in the Control without receiving, even nominally, any
compensation.

A complaint of a very different kind is made by the 'Haute
Finance.' They say that the only real compensation which could be
given to France, if she is to be ousted from the Control, would
be the establishment, under the auspices and responsibility of
England, of such a strong practical supervision of the Egyptian
Administration as would make the regular payment of the Debt
and the maintenance of the commercial and other interests of
foreigners secure. They pretend that the proposed establishment
of the Financial Adviser is in form injurious to the dignity of
France, while in substance it does not sufficiently provide for the
control by any one of the Egyptian Government. These seem to be the
opinions of a very influential body here. It is quite consistent
with them that Dufferin's mission should be looked on with favour
by those who hold them.

Clémenceau's views seem to be confined to himself.

The thing most favourable to our coming to an understanding
with France, is the very general belief among Frenchmen that
Bismarck is egging indirectly both England and France on to a
quarrel.

In the meantime the alarm caused by the anarchists is enough
to keep the minds of the great majority of the French fixed
on their own internal affairs. People are sending away their
securities and other valuables to foreign countries. I suppose an
absolute outbreak in force enough to resist the Government, if the
Government be resolute, is not to be expected. But there may be
explosions of dynamite here and there, and the employment of the
other new-fangled means of creating panic which the French seem to
be inclined to adopt from the Russians.

The competition of America and other causes are producing
a curious change in the French peasantry, and a change not
favourable to peace and order. The tenacity with which the very
small proprietors have hitherto clung to their land is visibly
diminishing. They now offer their land for sale to an extent
hitherto quite unprecedented. They say that they can get better
interest by putting the price of the land into the funds or other
speculations, and can thus lead a pleasant life, instead of
slaving from morning to night to get a bare subsistence out of
their fields. The tendency of all this is to reduce the numbers
of the hitherto ultra-Conservative laborious class, and to fill
the towns more and more with idle and very often disappointed and
discontented speculators, who form a material ready to the hand of
anarchists.

The letters from Lord Granville show that although the British Government had embarked most unwillingly upon the Egyptian enterprise, and viewed additional responsibility with so much horror that some members of the Cabinet were even opposed to the office of Financial Adviser to the Egyptian Government being given to an Englishman, yet that the Cabinet was at all events unanimously against the maintenance of the Control, and of the old dual arrangements. The French Government, with an entire absence of logic and common sense, was quite indisposed to recognize the complete change in the situation which had taken place, and continued to claim that England and France should remain on an equality as regarded themselves, and in a superior position as far as the other Powers were concerned. The difficulty lay in discovering some means of satisfying French vanity without yielding on the essential point of equality, and efforts to ascertain what would be considered satisfactory did not meet with much success.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Nov. 14, 1882.

I tried to make Duclerc see yesterday that the practical way
towards obtaining some satisfaction for French _amour-propre_ was
to enter upon the discussion of details as to the Boards in Egypt.
I went as far as I could without running the risk of provoking
lofty language, which might have been an obstacle to moderate
arrangements hereafter.

However, at the moment Duclerc did not go back from his old
grounds. He does not insist upon a literal re-establishment of
the Control, but he does claim a virtual return to the _status quo
ante_, and he interprets that status as equality between England
and France and superiority of the two jointly over other Powers.

The single Financial Councillor pleases no one here. As
he must of course be an Englishman, the sticklers for French
_gloriole_ declare that whether his functions be great or small,
he will simply be a symbol of English supremacy and French
decadency. To the _haute_ and _petite finance_, the mode of his
appointment and the smallness of his powers seem an additional
cause of complaint, as not giving sufficient security for a proper
administration of the finances of Egypt. I shall be very anxious to
hear how it all strikes Dufferin.

In fact, at the present moment, the French are too uneasy
about their internal affairs to pay much attention to Egypt. But
they may fire up if any special event comes to irritate them. It
is more, however, future lasting ill will than violence at the
moment which I apprehend. If we leave them bitterly discontented
with arrangements in Egypt, I hardly see when we shall be able to
withdraw our troops and still maintain the influence which is a
necessity to us.

The idea that the British occupation of Egypt was anything more than a temporary expedient does not seem to have been considered a serious possibility by any English Minister so far. Partly by luck, partly by the skill of Sir Garnet Wolseley and Lord Dufferin, we had found ourselves in possession of Egypt, unhampered by association with any European Power or with the Turks; but for a time it looked as if the brilliant results achieved were to be thrown away because the British Government had no clear idea what its policy was to be. Fortunately for all concerned, the step was taken of sending Lord Dufferin on a special mission to Cairo, and unlike most special missions of more recent date, the experiment proved a complete success, and quickly destroyed the mischievous delusion entertained by a section of English politicians that an evacuation of Egypt was possible at any early date. This delusion had never been shared by the French, who naturally judged the action of others in the light in which they themselves would have acted under similar circumstances, and who made little effort to conceal their annoyance.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Dec. 1, 1882.

I don't succeed in making Duclerc _coulant_ about Egypt. He
rather implied that it was not from Tissot that he had heard that
you were going to send him a favourable communication, and that you
were thinking of sending an expert to discuss details. He did not,
however, say who it was that told him. Perhaps d'Aunay may have had
something to do with it. Duclerc went on to hint at there being two
currents in the English Cabinet, one more favourable to the French
than the other, but I declined to listen to this. He talked as if
he had some special source of information as to your intentions and
sentiments. He seemed to take to the idea of a discussion between
experts.

He was amiable about Madagascar, but we shall see what
his written answer will be. He represented himself as having
overwhelmed the Ambassadors with kindness, and then as having
broken off the negotiation on the point of the leases being for 99
years.

In the meantime prospects at home do not brighten. Railroads
and other public works have been begun, with very little system, in
all kinds of places to please Deputies and their constituents. The
Government dare not stop them for fear of what the workmen would do
if large numbers of them found themselves out of work. To go on,
is ruinous to the finances. There must be a limit to the floating
debt. The Government are again negotiating with the railway
companies. People are beginning to talk of Saviours of Society.
The names most mentioned are those of General Chanzy and the Duc
d'Aumale. Gambetta would have been everybody's man, if he had never
been Minister. However, I don't think that we are very near any
violent change.

Grévy is certainly not brisk, but he may grow old without
things coming to an early catastrophe.

There is a not unaccredited rumour that it was in wresting
the revolver from a female hand that Gambetta got wounded. The
bulletins at the office of the _République Française_ are that he
is going on as well as possible.

The last paragraph refers to the wounding of Gambetta by a pistol shot. The accident (which terminated fatally) occurred at his villa outside Paris, and was surrounded by a mystery which has never been dispelled, but it may be assumed that a lady really was involved.

The allusion to Madagascar relates to the mission despatched by the Queen of the Hovas to Europe in the autumn in the vain hope of coming to some agreement with the French Government, which had raised questions ominously resembling those which had, in the previous year, formed the prelude to the Tunis expedition. The Hovas, like the Kroumirs, constituted 'a serious danger' to the French Republic, and demands were put forward which involved general French rights over the whole of Madagascar, and a protectorate over the northwest coast. The unhappy Hova envoys proceeded from Paris to London, but met with little encouragement there, and before long a semi-official announcement was made in which the stereotyped statement, with which small and defenceless states are so painfully familiar, appeared: 'The Cabinet is resolved to enforce the respect of the rights and interests of France in Madagascar, and orders in conformity with the situation have, therefore, been sent to the Commander of the French naval station.' Signs of the same ominous activity were also beginning to manifest themselves in Tonquin; and the only compensating factor was that Madagascar and Tonquin served to distract a certain amount of French attention from Egypt, although the tone of the press, and especially of the _République Française_, the organ of Gambetta, became increasingly hostile to England.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Dec. 19, 1882.

There are reports afloat that Gambetta's cure is not going
on as steadily as it ought. At all events there is no change for
the better in the tone of the _République Française_ respecting
England in Egypt. I don't like the idea of having the French there
in bitter opposition to all we do. It may make it very difficult
for us with safety to ourselves to give any large measure of
independence to the Egyptian Government. At all events, the less we
are able to sacrifice to satisfy French _amour-propre_, the more we
must do to give security to legitimate French material interests by
providing for a really good honest financial administration. If the
French take the protection of their material interests exclusively
into their own hands, they may go very great lengths indeed to
protect them, if they are seriously threatened; and, besides, the
pretext that the credit, property or persons of Frenchmen are
threatened, will always be at hand to sanction interference.

At present it looks as if the Duclerc Government would be
glad to back out of its expeditions to Tonquin, etc., etc. The
proceedings of the Hova Ambassadors and their supporters in England
may make it difficult for the French Government to be as reasonable
as it might otherwise wish to be about Madagascar.

The prevalent feeling of depression and uneasiness about
the general condition of France does not seem to diminish. There
seems to be a profound distrust of the abilities, if not of the
intentions, of the men who so rapidly succeed one another in
office, and no one seems to know where to turn for something better.

It was somewhat unfortunate that French aggression in Tonquin and Madagascar was unconsciously stimulated by the English press. 'The English press is driving the French public wild on the subject of Tonquin, Madagascar, and other beyond sea questions, which the Government would probably have been glad enough to back out of if they had been let alone.'[36]

Until the end of the year private negotiations continued between Lord Granville and the French Government with reference to the abolition of the Control with completely unsuccessful results.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Dec. 26, 1882.

I hear, not from himself, that Duclerc's present intention
is to make a very strong protest if we abolish Control without
coming to a previous understanding with France; and that our making
our own Control, or that of Europe in general, over the Egyptian
finances weak, would not mollify him. On the contrary, he would try
to make a point of what he would call our abandonment of French
material interests--and deduce from it an argument that France is
bound to protect them herself. While we are absolutely at two with
France, we shall find it very difficult to relax our material hold
on Egypt. Egypt for the Egyptians is only too likely to become
Egypt for the French.

Gambetta's illness seems to have rather strengthened his
position. The anxiety of his opponents in the press to make out
that he is worse than is really the case and the disgusting
statements they have in consequence put forward, have served to
impress on friends and foes his importance. According to the best
information I have been able to get, he is not at this moment
seriously ill, though his recovery is too slow to be satisfactory.

Confidence and tranquillity do not appear to revive in France,
and the disappearance of Gambetta would increase uneasiness. People
do not exactly know what they are afraid of, but there is a general
vague uneasiness. Perhaps the most definite cause of fears or hopes
is the intrigue in which certain officers of the army are said to
be engaged with a view of putting the Duc d'Aumale at the head of
the state.

The childish frame of mind in which the French Government of the day considered the question of the Control may be judged from the fact that Duclerc in private conversation had admitted in the autumn that, if for form's sake, the _status quo ante_ could be restored for only five minutes, he would agree subsequently to its immediate abolition. In December, however, he was in a more intractable mood, and, at the end of the year, Lord Granville found it necessary to break off all private negotiations on the subject, observing that it was very painful and disadvantageous to be on bad terms with the French, but that it was, at the least, equally disadvantageous to them.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 35: 'Egypt and the Egyptian Question,' Sir D. Mackenzie Wallace.]

[Footnote 36: Lyons to Granville.]