Chapter L: TREZEVANT and W. TIMMONS, Esqs (3)

"But the actual habits of our countrymen attach them to
commerce. They will exercise it for themselves. Wars, then,
must sometimes be our lot; and all the wise can do, will be
to avoid that half of them which would be produced by our
own follies, and our own acts of injustice; and to make for
the other half the best preparations we can. Of what nature
should these be? A land army would be useless for offence,
and not the best nor safest instrument of defence. For
either of these purposes, the sea is the field on which we
should meet an European enemy. On that element it is
necessary we should possess some power. To aim at such a
navy as the greater nations of Europe possess, would be a
foolish and wicked waste of the energies of our countrymen;
it would be to pull on our own heads that load of military
expense which makes the European laborer go supperless to
bed, and moistens his bread with the sweat of his brow. It
will be enough if we enable ourselves to prevent insults
from those nations of Europe which are weak on the sea,
because circumstances exist which render even the stronger
ones weak as to us. Providence has placed their richest and
most defenceless possessions at our door--has obliged their
most precious commerce to pass, as it were, in review
before us. To protect this, or to assail us, a small part
only of their naval force will ever be risked across the
Atlantic. The danger to which the elements expose them here
are too well known, and the greater danger to which they
would be exposed at home, were any general calamity to
involve their whole fleet. They can attack us by detachment
only; and it will suffice to make ourselves equal to what
they may detach. Even a smaller force than what they may
detach will be rendered equal or superior by the quickness
with which any check may be repaired with us, while losses
with them will be irreparable till too late. A small naval
force, then, is sufficient for us, and a small one is
necessary. What this should be, I will not undertake to
say. I will only say, it should by no means be so great as
we are able to make it."

Mr. P. perfectly concurred in this opinion. He had frequently expressed it. But the gentleman from Pennsylvania says we have no money, and therefore we ought neither to have a navy nor any thing else, to defend ourselves at home or at sea. He tells the House that our revenue will not exceed ten millions, and that if we agree to have these ships built, we shall want twelve millions. Mr. P. trusted that if these two millions were wanted the ways and means will be found, rather than that we shall suffer our commerce to be destroyed, and lose all our credit as a nation abroad. Admitting, said Mr. P., that our debt is a hundred millions of dollars, it must be recollected that its increase has been owing to a number of causes which could not be avoided, amongst which was our war with the Indians, the Western insurrection, our treaty with Algiers, and the building of vessels for the protection of our commerce; but if our debt is fifteen millions more now than it was at the commencement of the present Government, our numbers have greatly increased since that time, so that he supposed, considering the number of individuals who have to bear it, it is not so heavy, in proportion to our population, as it was at that time. Having the ability, therefore, he trusted there would be found the will to provide a respectable naval force to protect us at home, our commerce abroad, and leave us in a situation to be more respected by foreign nations than we have heretofore been, and therefore hoped the present motion would be rejected.

Mr. HARPER.--Notwithstanding, Mr. Chairman, the subject now before the committee, the usefulness of a Naval Establishment for the United States, has been so frequently and so fully discussed on former occasions, I deem it important to enter once more into a particular consideration of it, less on account of the general reasons so often urged against the measure, than of those particular objections, founded on the supposed state of our pecuniary resources, whereby it has, at this time, been assailed.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania has proved, as he thinks, that no possible navy could be equal to the protection of our commerce, extended as it is. And how has he proved this? By the example of other nations--of Holland, Spain, and Great Britain. Spain, he says, has a very considerable navy, perhaps the third in Europe, and yet no commerce. Holland found herself unable to support her navy, and even while she supported it, was unable to protect her trade; and therefore she gave it up, and yet, after she had done so, continued to possess a very great commerce. Even Britain, according to him, mistress of the ocean as she has been for a century past, has not fully protected her trade by her marine; which, in the mean time, has cost her more than the whole sum which her trade has yielded--and, therefore, she would have been better without a navy. This, Mr. Chairman, is the calculation of a schoolboy, not of a statesman; of the counting-house, not of the cabinet; and if the judgment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania were not warped on this, as on so many other occasions, by his particular political system, he would be one of the last persons in the world to present the subject in a point of view so much beneath a mind of the least political discernment. The gentleman, in fact, forgets that Britain is indebted to her navy, not for her commerce only, but for her independence; not only for the dominion of the seas, but for her existence as a nation. Every man, who is in the smallest degree versed in history, knows that Great Britain, but for her navy, must long since have been a province of France. Had not Britain been mistress of the ocean, France would long since have been not only her mistress, but mistress of the rest of Europe. That great people, uniting within itself all the sources of military, pecuniary, and maritime strength, has never ceased to contend for universal empire, with immense means, vast genius, boundless ambition and unwearied perseverance, since the period when, two centuries ago, its provinces became united under one Government, and its immense resources, managed and called into activity by a minister whose mind was equal to his station, were directed to the increase of its power and extension of its limits. How has Britain been enabled to check this formidable career, to maintain her own power, and to arrive at her present high pitch of consequence in the scale of nations? Not by her population, which is little more than one-third of that possessed by France; nor by her insular situation, which heretofore could not protect her from invasion and conquest; nor by her military power, which, when compared with that of France, has never been considerable--but by her navy. It was that navy, and the wealth which commerce, protected by it, poured into her lap, that enabled her to support with glory so unequal a contest, to call to her aid the military force of Germany, and thus to establish a counterpoise to the power of France. But for this naval force, and the commerce which it protected and cherished--but for this union, cemented by the money, and aided by the maritime preponderance of England--France, combining, as she did, greater means of strength of every kind than any other nation, or even than all the nations of Europe united, except Germany and Great Britain, must long since have established her dominion over all. England must have fallen first, being unable, without the command of the sea, to save herself from invasion; and then the powers of the Continent, deprived of the pecuniary aid wherewith England was enabled by her commerce, under the protection of her navy, to supply and unite them, would have bent, one after another, beneath her formidable and continually augmenting strength. Even now this same navy enables England to ride secure amidst the most terrible storm wherewith the political world has ever been afflicted; to brave all the tremendous dangers by which she has been threatened; to baffle every attempt against her safety, or that of her remotest possessions; and amidst the dismay, the humiliation, or the total overthrow of so many powers, to triumph over her rival, whose strength, always formidable, is exercised, not more by her extension of territory and of influence, than by the consternation wherewith her successes have stricken other States, by the disunion and feebleness which has characterized their counsels, by the terrible weapon of internal commotion with which she threatens, or has actually assailed them, and by the unheard of despotism of her own Government, which enables it to employ, in a degree hitherto unexampled in the history of civilized men, the physical forces of the nation, in executing its plans of plunder and conquest. This same navy enables England not only to maintain thus gloriously a conflict so dreadful and so unequal, but to stand the barrier between independence and universal dominion, between liberty and the most degrading despotism, between civilization and the barbarism of the dark ages--to become the citadel of property, the storehouse and the banker of the world, and to render all nations, with their own consent, tributary, by means of her commerce, to the support of her greatness.

What, then, Mr. Chairman, must we think of that political system which estimates the British navy by a calculation of the sums which it has cost to maintain it; forgetting that, without this navy, there would have been no wealth to supply these sums, and, perhaps, no nation to pay them; that without this navy, Great Britain, instead of holding her present exalted station among the powers of the earth, must long since have sunk into a secondary and unimportant State; and, probably, into the condition of a province of that very rival against whom she now so nobly and so gloriously contends! Is it too much to say of such a calculation, that it is a paltry calculation, unworthy of a statesman, and befitting only a schoolboy?

But even the navy of Great Britain, the gentleman from Pennsylvania has told us, formidable as it is, has not afforded complete protection to her commerce. How, then, he asks, can we expect to protect our commerce by a navy? If the gentleman means by "protection" the total prevention of captures at sea, it is certain that no nation ever did, or ever can protect its commerce, in that scale. But that is not the true idea of "protection," which means nothing more than such a degree of safety as may enable the merchants of a nation, taken as a body, to pursue their commercial enterprises without discouragement, or eventual loss. This is all the protection that is ever attempted, or that is necessary; and this, I contend, we have it in our power to give.

Respecting the navy of Holland, the gentleman from Pennsylvania falls into a mistake equally remarkable. Holland, he tells us, has no navy, and yet maintains a very great commerce. Formerly she had a navy, but could not maintain it, and was forced to give it up. But where did that gentleman learn that Holland has no navy? Had she no navy in the American war, when with great gallantry, though with unequal success, she fought the English at sea? Had she no navy when she fitted out the formidable armament under De Winter, in October, 1797, which, after a dreadful conflict, was defeated rather by the superior address of the British Admiral, than the superior force or bravery of his fleet? Do we not know, that even now, after this fatal defeat, she possesses, in her different harbors, a much more numerous fleet than is proposed by the present bill for the United States? How then could the gentleman from Pennsylvania say that Holland has no navy? He ought to have known that until the marine of France and Spain were destroyed, in the present war, that of Holland was sufficient to turn the scale in their favor and against England; which gave her not only security for her commerce, but respectability and weight among the maritime powers of Europe.

As to the other assertion of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, that Holland a long time ago found her navy too burdensome for her resources, and therefore gave it up, it is equally erroneous. Holland, as we have seen, never gave up her navy, and even now, exhausted and ruined as she is by French fraternity and internal revolution, maintains a much greater one than is proposed for the United States. There is, indeed, a period in her history, the close of the last and the beginning of the present century, when she ceased to be ranked with the first maritime powers of Europe; but that happened, not through the want of means, but a mistake in policy. Before that period her system had been wholly maritime. All her resources were applied to her navy. A maritime armed neutrality was her great object, and she long preserved it with success. Her commerce, fostered by her marine, spread over every sea; and the Northern maritime States, guided to the same policy by her influence, acknowledged her as their umpire, their mediator, and their safeguard. The great powers courted her alliance and respected her rights. She interfered with weight in their disputes. Her village of the Hague became the centre of their most important negotiations. She disputed the empire of the seas with them singly; and, at one time, she held the united forces of France and England in check at sea, and finally compelled the French armies to retreat from her territory, which they had overrun and occupied. All this she effected by means of her navy, and of the resources which it had furnished to her by the protection of her commerce.

At this period she altered her system, and instead of cherishing her marine, and confining herself solely to the maintenance of her commerce, by an armed maritime neutrality at the head of the Northern Powers, she engaged in the land wars of the great military powers, and made exertions disproportionate to her strength, whereby her resources were exhausted. Into this fatal mistake she was drawn by the aspiring ambition, the popularity, and the heroism of one of her own citizens, stimulated and aided by the aggressions, the insults, and the alarming encroachments of the French Monarch, Louis XIV., at the zenith of his glory, evidently aspiring to universal dominion. William III., placed by his birth and personal merit at the head of the Dutch nation, saw those objects of French ambition, and roused his own country to resistance. Called, at length, to the Government of England, he communicated to that nation his own martial ardor. He finally succeeded in forming a confederacy to check the progress of France. Of this confederacy, Holland, his native country, was induced by his influence to become a principal member. At the head of it he struggled against the power of France, with unequal means, and sometimes with unprosperous fortune, but with a genius and perseverance not to be subdued, and a heroism rarely to be equalled. After his death, the impulse which his mind had given to his own and other countries continued to be felt, and the confederacy was renewed under his successor, on a different occasion, but with the same views. At length its object was altered. France was completely humbled and Europe secured against her enterprises, but the strength of Holland was undermined in the struggle. The vast armies which she had kept up had loaded her with debts. Her operations for so many years, by land, had drawn off her attention from her marine; and from that moment it declined, while that of England rose gradually on its ruins.

Hence, Mr. Chairman, the downfall of the maritime greatness of Holland. Her resources were not equal to the maintenance of fleets and armies, of both maritime and military strength. While she was left to attend solely to her maritime concerns, she continued to be powerful, respected, and prosperous; but her situation on the Continent, in the neighborhood of a great and ambitious military power, drew her, perhaps unnecessarily, into land wars, to which her strength was unequal, and, of course, her naval power declined. But still she continued for a century to keep up a navy sufficient to form a considerable weight in the scale, and to secure attention to her rights as a nation; and under this security her commerce continued to flourish, in a greater or less degree, till a domestic revolution, aiding and aided by foreign oppression, dried up all its sources.

What, then, Mr. Chairman, is the instruction which we may draw from this example? A nation whose population never exceeded two millions and a half, and whose territory, compared with ours, is but a mere speck on the surface of the globe, a mere garden spot, was able to maintain a most formidable marine, while it attended to that object solely, to extend its commerce under the protection of this marine, and to maintain not only an equal, but a distinguished rank, among the great powers of Europe, by whose territories it was surrounded, and by whose formidable armies it was liable to be invaded. Even this nation, after a mistake in its policy, or the pressure of inevitable circumstances, it had been induced to divert its attention from its marine to land wars, to exhaust its resources, and burden itself with debts too great for its means, by these disproportionate efforts, still was able to preserve a navy sufficient to give respectability to its flag, and a degree of safety to its commerce. Even now, when its resources are dried up by anarchy, or diverted by foreign exaction into the coffers of another nation; when its territory is curtailed, and its population reduced to one million and a half; when it is compelled to maintain an army of 25,000 men for France, still it has a navy greater than we propose. Shall it, then, be said, that this country, with probably six millions of population, most rapidly increasing, with an extent of territory capable of containing fifty millions, with a commerce greater than that of Holland ever was, and with more tonnage and sailors than she ever possessed, is not able to support such a navy as she, even since the commencement of her downfall, has always supported, and still supports? Yes, it is said by the gentleman from Pennsylvania; but the good sense of this House and of this country will, I trust, correct his mistake, as it has so often done heretofore.

But if it were true, Mr. Chairman, that Holland had afforded no protection to her commerce by the navy which she has been able to keep up, does it follow that the same thing will happen to us? Will the same navy be more efficacious in our case, than in the case of Holland, or Spain, or Portugal? This must be taken for granted in order to give any solidity to the argument of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, and yet nothing can be more untrue. Those States are situated at the very door of the great maritime powers, and their dominions are also exposed to invasion by land. They must, therefore, either singly or by combinations with other powers, contend against the whole maritime force of those great States, and must maintain navies adequate to that purpose. But we are under no such necessity. Placed at a vast distance from those great powers, and in the neighborhood of those possessions which contribute most to the support of their commerce and their navies, we can attack them in a weak, and yet a vital part, with our whole force, while but a small part of their force can at any time be brought to act against us. It is with this part only that we shall have to contend, should they at any time drive us into a war. Let us take England as an instance. Her great and valuable possessions lie at our threshold. The uniform course of the trade-winds compels all her vast and rich commerce with those possessions, to pass almost in sight of our shores. The force which she can send to protect this commerce and annoy us, in case of a rupture, will not be her whole force, but that part of it only which she can spare from Europe, after securing her preponderance there. France, notwithstanding the prostrate condition of her navy at present, possesses maritime means which will speedily enable her to raise it up again, whensoever those means come to be directed, as one day they must, by a Government of some understanding. This navy, and the maritime combinations which will be formed under its protection, England must watch and keep under. Her existence will depend upon it. She will, therefore, have but little force to spare which she can bring to act against us. A comparatively small maritime force, therefore, will compel her to respect us, and to avoid a quarrel with us by all just and reasonable means.

It follows that a moderate navy, a much smaller one than Holland, Spain, or even Portugal, have supported, would be sufficient for our protection, aided by the peculiar advantages of our situation. Those nations, inconsiderable as they are when compared to us in population, wealth, and extent of territory, have supported navies which, however unequal to that of England, have yet afforded some degree of protection to their trade, rendered their flags in some degree respectable, and given them a weight in the scale, a consequence among nations, which otherwise they could not have had. And shall not we, with our great and increasing resources, and the peculiar advantages of our situation, be able to effect still more?

Mr. NICHOLAS said this question was different from any former question, with respect to the Navy, which had been before the House. Whatever gentlemen may have heretofore said with respect to the advantages of a navy for the protection of our commerce, they must agree that the present question has a different aspect, as no man can say that seventy-four gun ships are calculated to resist the kind of force which has heretofore made attacks upon our commerce in the West Indies.

Mr. N. was far from believing that our armed vessels had produced the effect which the committee, who reported this bill, stated them to have done. He thought the gentleman from Pennsylvania had adduced many sufficient reasons for the fall which had taken place in the price of insurance, independent of our navy; and that, therefore, the committee were wholly mistaken that the advantages already derived from our navy have exceeded the cost of it; and that, if it had been established several years ago, it would have proved a great saving to the United States.

Mr. N. confessed he had always been opposed to a naval force for the purpose of warring with European nations, and whether the force now proposed is considered as necessary for defence or offence, it must have that character. The propriety of a naval force for this purpose never appeared to him in a questionable point of view; he thought every consideration of policy and interest forbids it. We are well informed, said he, by the best historians, that the British navy has been the means of sinking that nation to its present state; for he could not admire, like the gentleman from South Carolina, the splendor and prosperity of a nation, which is brought into such a situation as to render it doubtful whether it can exist for a day, a month, or any other period. If the navy of Great Britain, then, commenced under different circumstances from those in which we are placed--which, according to the gentleman from South Carolina, was not only for the protection of her commerce, but as a defence against neighboring nations, and to guard against the worst revolutionary principles--has nearly ruined that country by the immense sums necessary for its support, shall we, who, according also to the confession of that gentleman, have nothing to fear from European nations--[Mr. HARPER interrupted Mr. N. to deny that he had said we had nothing to fear from Europe. He had said we had nothing to fear but from the sea.] Mr. N. said this was the way in which he understood the gentleman, and that no danger exists of any invasion by a land force. If this is the case, the use to which a navy can be put will only be to defend our commerce from cruisers, and passing fleets. We have not, therefore, half the inducements to the establishment of a navy which influence European nations, and many powerful reasons against such a force.

The European nations have, most of them, distant colonies, which they have to protect, and with which they have to keep up a constant communication across the ocean, which renders a navy in some degree necessary. But all the European nations commenced their navies under the delusion that a small force would only be necessary, and that one or two ships would give them an ascendency over other nations. Can we expect this, said Mr. N.? No; we begin the business with fewer inducements than any other nation ever begun a navy, and without necessity; for it is acknowledged we have nothing now to apprehend from invasion, (and if we had, this force could not be provided in time,) we have no colonies to protect, and no intercourse which calls for a naval force.

We cannot, therefore, said Mr. N., embark in this business with the same motives which influenced all European nations in establishments of this kind. They built small navies because they would be equal to cope with the small navies of their neighbors; but we are about to begin the business with a navy staring us in the face, the most formidable that any man could suppose to exist. According to his colleague, the British have 140 sail-of-the-line; and yet our navy is undertaken with the avowed purpose of keeping her, as well as the other nations of Europe, in check. Mr. N. asked whether we could ever hope to succeed in a plan of this kind? We certainly could not, since Great Britain would always even in war have more than a sufficient force to meet all the ships which we can build. Besides, if our situation, as gentlemen say, will make a small force so operative in our hands in time of European wars, will not our possessing it be sufficient to produce war with Great Britain, when it is always a sufficient cause for war, in the opinion of Great Britain, for any other maritime power to put a few more ships in commission than their ordinary establishment? And, if Congress were to order the building of fifty ships, it would only increase the certainty of this effect. How is a naval force to guard us, which Great Britain can destroy, whenever she pleases, even in time of war? For she has frequently ships sufficient on our coast to destroy all the vessels which are contemplated to be built. In short, this navy will be the means of keeping this country in continual broils. On the first appearance of arming any additional vessels on the part of Great Britain, for whatever cause, we must set on foot a negotiation to combine the other powers of Europe in our favor; and this country will become the centre of intrigue and tricks for the agents of every country.

But the gentleman from South Carolina says, this is the cheapest mode of defence; but does the gentleman prove this? Can he prove that £10,000,000 sterling is only the third part of the expense of defence, as he says? Does he not recollect how much of the revenue of that country goes to pay the interest of their enormous debt, and, therefore, cannot be considered as a part of the expenditure for defence? The gentleman will find, on reflection, he is much mistaken in his calculation in this respect. The gentleman from South Carolina has been loud in his encomiums on the British navy, on account of its usefulness to the world; and he calls the calculation of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, relative to the expenses of a navy, a paltry, schoolboy calculation, because it has not taken into view this usefulness. That gentleman, said Mr. N., only referred to the British navy so far as it was useful in the way gentlemen say they expect ours to be advantageous. But from the contradictions which the gentleman from South Carolina seemed to run into on this subject, he did believe that he had not an eye to a navy, merely for the defence of our commerce; he appeared to wish that this country should take a stand like that of Great Britain, that the safety of the world may, at a future day, depend upon us, as it now does upon Great Britain. Mr. N. believed the ambition of this country, the pride of its Government, and naval commanders, will all operate this way; and we may, one day or other, if we proceed with this navy scheme, be as aspiring, as domineering, as any other nation in the world, and by this means be embroiled in continual war, and be saddled with a debt equal to that of Great Britain.

Mr. N. believed there existed no good reason for going into the establishment of a navy at all, because he believed it would never be really useful to this country; but if it should be otherwise determined by a majority of Congress, this, he thought, of all times the most improper to commence the work.

Mr. J. WILLIAMS then moved to strike out what relates to 18-gun vessels, on the ground that the thirty-nine small vessels which we have are sufficient. The motion was negatived without a division.

Mr. J. PARKER proposed filling up the blanks in the section fixing the pay of captains in the Navy, with an advance from $75 to $100 per month to captains of 74's, and others in proportion; except the masters of vessels under 20 guns, which were proposed to be lowered.

Some objection, however, being made to this, and particularly to the mode of doing the business, this being the first time that the subject had been before the House, the section was moved to be struck out, and carried.

The committee then rose, and the House having concurred in the amendment reported,

Mr. NICHOLAS renewed the motion for striking out the 74-gun ships, and called the yeas and nays upon it. They were taken and stood, yeas 40, nays 54, as follows:

YEAS.--Abraham Baldwin, David Bard, Richard Brent, Robert
Brown, Samuel J. Cabell, Thomas Claiborne, William Charles,
Cole Claiborne, John Clopton, John Dawson, Joseph
Eggleston, Lucas Elmendorph, William Findlay, John Fowler,
Albert Gallatin, James Gillespie, Andrew Gregg, John A.
Hanna, Carter B. Harrison, Jonathan N. Havens, Joseph
Heister, David Holmes, Walter Jones, Edward Livingston,
Matthew Locke, Nathaniel Macon, Blair McClenachan, Joseph
McDowell, Anthony New, John Nicholas, Thompson J. Skinner,
William Smith, Richard Sprigg, Richard Stanford, Thomas
Sumter, Abram Trigg, John Trigg, Philip Van Cortlandt,
Joseph B. Varnum, Abraham Venable, and Robert Williams.

NAYS.--John Allen, George Baer, jun., Bailey Bartlett,
James A. Bayard, Jonathan Brace, David Brooks, Stephen
Bullock, Christopher G. Champlin, James Cochran, William
Craik, Samuel W. Dana, John Dennis, George Dent, William
Edmond, Thomas Evans, Abiel Foster, Dwight Foster, Jonathan
Freeman, Henry Glenn, Chauncey Goodrich, William Gordon,
Roger Griswold, William Barry Grove, Robert Goodloe Harper,
Thomas Hartley, William Hindman, Hezekiah L. Hosmer, James
H. Imlay, John Wilkes Kittera, Samuel Lyman, James Machir,
William Matthews, Daniel Morgan, Lewis R. Morris, Harrison
G. Otis, Isaac Parker, Josiah Parker, Thomas Pinckney, John
Read, John Rutledge, jun., James Schureman, Samuel Sewall,
Thomas Sinnickson, Samuel Smith, Richard Dobbs Spaight,
Peleg Sprague, George Thatcher, Richard Thomas, Mark
Thompson, Thomas Tillinghast, John E. Van Alen, Peleg
Wadsworth, Robert Waln, and John Williams.

The bill was then ordered to be engrossed for a third reading [and passed by the same vote].[44]

THURSDAY, February 14.

_Relations with France._

Mr. LIVINGSTON called up for consideration the resolution which he yesterday laid upon the table, calling upon the PRESIDENT for any information which he may possess touching the suspension of the French arrêt, declaring neutral citizens pirates when found on board the vessels of belligerent powers; which being read,

Mr. L. called the yeas and nays upon it. He said he understood that, since yesterday, a member of this House had applied at the office of the Secretary of State, and had been informed that some information had been received relative to this subject. Perhaps the gentleman would himself state to the House what he had learned from that office.

Mr. HARPER said, he had only to state, that he had made inquiry at the office of the Secretary of State, and had been informed that a letter had been received from our Minister in London, enclosing an extract from the _Redacteur_ (supposed to be an official French paper) stating that the Executive Directory had suspended the edict in question. This extract, he understood, does not state the reason of this suspension; but our Minister writes it was owing to a threat of the British Government to retaliate upon French citizens within their power.

The yeas and nays were taken, and stood--52 to 38.

_Naval Pay._

On motion of Mr. JOSIAH PARKER, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill fixing the pay of captains of ships and vessels of the United States; and after some amendments, the bill was reported, and ordered to be engrossed for a third reading.

[This bill provides "that all vessels in the service of the United States, mounting 20 guns and upward, be commanded by captains; those not exceeding 18 guns (except galleys, which are to be commanded as heretofore provided by law,) by masters or lieutenants, according to the size of the vessel, to be regulated by the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES; that the pay of a captain, commanding ships of 32 guns and upward, be $100 dollars per month, and eight rations per day; of captains, commanding ships of 20 and under 32 guns, $75 a month, and six rations a day; of a master-commandant, $60 per month, and five rations per day; and of lieutenants who may command the smaller vessels, $50 dollars per month, and four rations per day; that whenever any officer as aforesaid shall be employed in the command of a squadron, in separate service, the allowance of rations to such commanding officer shall be doubled during the continuance of such command, and no longer, except in case of a commanding officer of the Navy, whose allowance, while in service, shall always be at the rate of sixteen rations per day."]

FRIDAY, February 8.

_Relations with France._

The following Message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

_Gentlemen of the House of Representatives_:

In pursuance of the request, in your resolve of yesterday,
I lay before you such information as I have received,
touching a suspension of the arrêt of the French Republic,
communicated to your House by my Message of the 28th of
January last. But if the execution of that arrêt be
suspended, or even if it were repealed, it should be
remembered that the arrêt of the Executive Directory of the
2d of March, 1797, remains in force, the third article of
which subjects explicitly and exclusively American seamen
to be treated as pirates, if found on board ships of the
enemies of France.

JOHN ADAMS.

UNITED STATES, _February 15, 1799_.

_Extract of a letter from Rufus King, Esq., Minister
Plenipotentiary, &c., London, to the Secretary of State,
dated 28th November, 1798._

"Annexed I send you a copy of a note from Lord Grenville,
respecting the French arrêt transmitted to you with my No.
9. A late French paper contains a second arrêt which
postpones the execution of the first."

_Lord Grenville to Mr. King._

The undersigned, His Majesty's Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, has the honor of communicating to Mr.
King, Minister Plenipotentiary for the United States of
America, for the information of his Government, that, by a
decree, published officially at Paris, it appears to have
been declared, in the name of the French Directory, that
every person being a native of or originally belonging to
neutral countries, or to such as are in amity and alliance
with the French Republic, who shall bear any commission
under His Majesty, or who shall form a part of the crews of
any British ships of war, or other vessels, should, on the
proof of that fact alone, be considered and treated as a
pirate, and that it has been ordered that this resolution
shall be notified to the neutral powers, and to those in
alliance with France.

Even this decree, contrary as it is to the usages of every
civilized nation, cannot excite any surprise, as proceeding
from those in whose name it has been published. To the
different powers who are thus insulted, and whose innocent
subjects are exposed to the most cruel treatment on the
part of a Government professing friendship or alliance with
them, His Majesty must leave it to adopt such measures as
they will, without doubt, judge necessary, in the case of
an outrage hitherto unexampled in the history of the world.

The King, however, feels, that protection is also due from
him to those who sail under his flag, either in His
Majesty's ships of war, or in other British vessels; His
Majesty has, therefore, not hesitated to direct it to be
signified to the Commissioner for French prisoners in Great
Britain, that the first instance of the execution of this
decree shall be followed by the most rigorous retaliation
against the French prisoners, whom the fortune of war has
already, or may hereafter place at the King's disposal.

It would certainly never be but with extreme reluctance
that the King could yield to the painful necessity of
exposing so many unfortunate individuals to the fatal but
inevitable effects of this atrocious decree; but His
Majesty will have at least the satisfaction of feeling that
nothing has been omitted on his part to prevent its
execution, and that the authors of it can alone be
considered responsible for all its guilt and all its
consequences.

GRENVILLE.

DOWNING STREET, _November 27, 1798_.

Mr. LIVINGSTON moved that this communication be printed.

Mr. ALLEN objected to the motion as it would delay the consideration of the bill proposing to vest the PRESIDENT with the power of retaliation in certain cases; and it was clear, from this communication, it ought to have no effect upon that bill.

Mr. LIVINGSTON said he was not possessed of that intuitive faculty which the gentleman from Connecticut seemed to have, as he seems prepared to act on the bill alluded to, without scarcely hearing this communication read; and, perhaps, without knowing the dates of the different decrees. The PRESIDENT has told the House that though the obnoxious decree has been repealed, there is still left in force another decree. Does the gentleman from Connecticut recollect the words of that decree? Or has he had time to examine whether that decree is really in force, or not? If he had done this, Mr. L. said he had not done it. It would appear, from what happened the other day, that the House ought not to move quite so rapidly in this business. The House was then told by the gentleman from South Carolina, that it was impossible that this information could have been received by the PRESIDENT, because, if it had been received, the PRESIDENT would undoubtedly have immediately sent it to the House. [Mr. RUTLEDGE said, he did not use the word impossible, but improbable.] Mr. L. admitted this might be the word. But it now appears, that the PRESIDENT has not only received the information then alluded to, but received it officially.

Mr. ALLEN interrupted Mr. L. by withdrawing his motion. The communication was ordered to be printed, and was committed to the same Committee of the Whole to whom was referred the bill vesting the power of retaliation in the PRESIDENT.

MONDAY, February 18.

_Army Increase._

A bill from the Senate giving eventual authority to the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES to augment the army. [This bill gives the PRESIDENT authority, in case a war shall break out between the United States and any foreign power, or in case of imminent danger of such war, in his opinion to exist, to organize and raise twenty-four regiments of infantry, one regiment of riflemen, and three regiments of cavalry. The PRESIDENT is also authorized to call out the volunteer corps, on all occasions in which he is at present authorized to call out the militia, provided that he does not call a greater proportion from any one State, than he is authorized to call out of the militia, by the law which directs the 80,000 militia to be held in readiness. If it be necessary to carry this law into effect, two millions of dollars are appropriated for the purpose.]

On the question for reading this bill a second time, it was carried--45 to 37.

_Capture of French Vessels._

On motion of Mr. OTIS, the House went into a Committee of the Whole, Mr. RUTLEDGE in the chair, on the bill encouraging the capture of French armed vessels, by armed ships or vessels, owned by a citizen or citizens of the United States, and for allowing salvage in certain cases. The bill, which proposes a bounty on guns, according to their sizes, having been read,

Mr. MCDOWELL observed, that this bill is similar to the one which was two or three different times negatived at the last session. At that time, he considered the situation of this country more alarming than at present, and the conduct of France more likely to drive us to extremities than it has since been. Knowing this, he did not expect gentlemen would have introduced a bill of this kind. Finding however that gentlemen are not satisfied with things as they are, but are desirous of hiring the people of the United States to make war upon France, though they are unwilling to declare war, and not being willing to give his vote to any such measure, he should move to strike out the first section of the bill.

The question was put, when there appeared 43 votes for it, and 42 against it, and the Chairman said "it is carried," before he declared his vote to be in the negative.

A motion was made for the committee to rise, and negatived--43 to 42.

WEDNESDAY, February 20.

MATTHEW LYON, from Vermont, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

_Alien and Sedition laws._

Mr. LIVINGSTON said, he had received, under cover, a number of petitions from the State of Vermont, praying for a repeal of the alien and sedition laws, which he begged leave to present to the House. One of which having been read, in which, among their other objections to the laws, the petitioners complain of having been deprived, by the sedition law, of their Representative in Congress for the greater part of the present session; Mr. L. moved to have the whole referred to the select committee to whom was referred the other petitions relative to this subject; but on Mr. GALLATIN's suggesting that he understood that committee is ready to report, and that it would therefore be better to suffer the petitions to lie on the table until that report is made, and then have the whole referred to the same Committee of the Whole; that course was taken.

_Capture of French Vessels._

The House took up the report of the Committee of the Whole on the bill for encouraging the capture of French privateers, by allowing a bounty on guns, and the motion being to concur in the agreement of the committee to strike out the first section of the bill,

Mr. MACON said, there were some other observations made the other day, when this subject was under consideration, which he thought very foreign to the subject. The history of this bill during the last session was given. The House was told it was three times rejected--once by trick. He was surprised to hear two gentlemen make use of this expression. If there was any trick, it certainly was among those gentlemen who had so frequently brought the subject before the House. It had been said, also, that it was once rejected by accident. It was the first time he had ever heard it urged as a reason for reconsidering a subject, that certain members had before voted accidentally upon it. Another reason was given, that the vote in the Committee of the Whole had been improperly obtained, by taking advantage of a mistake of the Chairman. By the rules of the House, Mr. M. said, the Speaker, or Chairman of a Committee of the Whole, has a casting vote, or they may tie a vote; but, after the Chairman had declared the question carried, it might be supposed he did not mean to vote, or if he did that he meant to vote with the majority.

Mr. M. said, he had seen a letter printed in the papers from one of our naval commanders in the West Indies, wherein he says, that American vessels sail into the neighborhood of the French islands, in order to be carried in; that they afterwards get away, pretending to have made their escape, and soon return with another cargo. He also mentions having fallen in with one of these vessels evidently steering for a French island, but the vessel's papers were so well managed, and the captain and mate understood each other so well, that he could make nothing of them. If, said Mr. M., the laws for suspending our intercourse with France and her possessions can be so easily evaded, might it not be expected that this law would be evaded, and that privateers might be fitted out in the West Indies, and brought to a certain latitude, for the purpose of being taken? He had no doubt this would be the case.

Mr. MCDOWELL said, that when this bill was before under discussion, he had stated that our situation with respect to France appeared to be more favorable than last year. This was denied by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. OTIS.) He considers our danger greater, and this bill more necessary than at that time; and has gone on to remark, that all that was said about our improved situation with respect to France, were songs only fit for children, and not for the people of America. He was of a different opinion; they were the songs of peace, and as such, he believed, suited to the people of this country, who wish to live in peace. And if that gentleman knew more of the evils attendant on war than he does, he certainly would not be so ready to embrace them as he appears to be.

But he thought the gentleman from Massachusetts mistaken as to our situation; he believed it to be much better than it was at the last session. He formed this opinion from the despatches of Mr. Gerry, who declares it to be his opinion, that France is sincerely disposed to make peace; and more particularly from the PRESIDENT having nominated a Minister to treat with France, though he had declared he never would send another Minister until he should receive assurances that he would be received as the Minister of a great, free, and powerful nation. He supposed, therefore, that the PRESIDENT has received these assurances, and that we have, on this account, some reason to hope, that a reconciliation between the two Governments will take place.

He was opposed to this bill, because it might be the means of bringing the country into difficulties and war; it was giving to one part of our citizens the power to embroil the whole. No necessity has been shown to exist for this law; it is, indeed, said to be necessary to keep down the privateers of France, but we find by letters which have just been published, from the commanders of our armed vessels, that there are very few to be seen. But supposing there are yet a number of them, what better use can our public armed vessels be put to than to go after them? They must either be employed in doing this, or sent where he did not wish them to go, to the European seas, or kept useless at home.

Mr. GALLATIN would not have troubled the House on this subject, had it not been for the remark of the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. OTIS) immediately before the adjournment took place on Monday. He told the House that the vote on this subject ought not to be influenced by the nomination of a minister to go to France; and he precluded any answer being then given to the remark, by moving an adjournment.

For my part, said Mr. G., I do not consider this bill as very important in itself, and I have always been at a loss to know why there appeared to be so great an anxiety to have it passed. It is said, we ought not to recede from the ground we have taken; and really, from the arguments of the gentleman from Massachusetts, it would appear that there was a motion before the House to prevent our merchants from arming their vessels, or our public vessels from taking French privateers. This measure brings us to the question, not whether we will recede, but whether we will progress. The object of this bill is not to authorize any new measure, but it is to give a bounty to merchants to do what they are already authorized to do. The only question is, whether it will promote the taking of French privateers? He believed it would produce no effect at all, except the blanks in the bill are to be filled with sums which would produce a very serious demand on our treasury. The object of merchants is to make a safe and quick voyage, and if privateers will keep out of their way, they will never go in search of them: and if they should fall in with a privateer, their aim would be self-defence, and not capture, since to attempt this might hazard the loss of their vessel and valuable cargo, and take from them means of defence against any other attack, since they must put their own men on board the captured privateer.

It is clear, therefore, said Mr. G., that one of two things must take place, either we must give such a bounty on the guns of privateers as will make the expense of taking them greater than the benefit, or else it will become a mere matter of speculation, or small vessels will be fitted out on purpose to obtain the bounty. When privateers are taken by other countries, they are always taken by their vessels of war, and seldom by letters of marque.

But it is said this measure ought to be taken, in order to strengthen the hands of our Minister, by showing our determination to resist, in case an accommodation does not take place. On the same grounds, Mr. G. said, a declaration of war might be urged.

As to the effect to be expected from the appointment of a Minister to treat with France, he considered it merely as opening a door to negotiation. He agreed with the gentleman from Massachusetts, that it ought by no means to be considered as putting an end to the dispute between the two countries. It may succeed, or not. But this step having been taken, he did not think proper to go into a measure of this kind, especially since it can be attended with so little good effect.