Chapter M: X. again called upon us. He said M. Talleyrand was (18)

Thus then we find that the judicial power shall extend to a great variety of cases, but that the Supreme Court shall have only appellate jurisdiction in all admiralty and maritime causes, in all controversies between the United States and private citizens, between citizens of different States, between citizens of the same State claiming lands under different States, and between a citizen of the United States and foreign states, citizens, or subjects. The honorable gentleman from Kentucky, who made the motion on your table, has told us that the constitution, in its judiciary provisions, contemplated only those cases which could not be tried in the State courts. But he will, I hope, pardon me when I contend that the constitution did not merely contemplate, but did, by express words, reserve to the national tribunals a right to decide, and did secure to the citizens of America, a right to demand their decision, in many cases evidently cognizable in the State courts. And what are these cases? They are those in respect to which it is by the constitution presumed that the State courts would not always make a cool and calm investigation, a fair and just decision. To form, therefore, a more perfect union, and to ensure domestic tranquillity, the constitution has said there shall be courts of the Union to try causes, by the wrongful decision of which the Union might be endangered or domestic tranquillity be disturbed. And what courts? Look again at the cases designated. The Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction. The constitution has said that the judicial powers shall be vested in the supreme and inferior courts. It has declared that the judicial power so vested shall extend to the cases mentioned, and that the Supreme Court shall not have original jurisdiction in those cases. Evidently, therefore, it has declared that they shall (in the first instance) be tried by inferior courts, with appeal to the Supreme Court. This, therefore, amounts to a declaration, that the inferior courts shall exist. Since, without them, the citizen is deprived of those rights for which he stipulated, or rather those rights verbally granted, would be actually withheld; and that great security of our Union, that necessary guard of our tranquillity, be completely paralyzed, if not destroyed. In declaring, then, that these tribunals shall exist, it equally declares that the Congress shall ordain and establish them. I say they shall; this is the evident intention, if not the express words, of the constitution. The convention in framing, the American people in adopting, that compact, did not, could not presume, that the Congress would omit to do what they were thus bound to do. They could not presume, that the Legislature would hesitate one moment, in establishing the organs necessary to carry into effect those wholesome, those important provisions.

The honorable member from Virginia has given us a history of the judicial system, and in the course of it has told us, that the Judges of the Supreme Court knew, when they accepted their offices, the duties they had to perform, and the salaries they were to receive. He thence infers, that if again called on to do the same duties, they have no right to complain. Agreed: but that is not the question between us. Admitting that they have made a hard bargain, and that we may hold them to a strict performance, is it wise to exact their compliance to the injury of our constituents? We are urged to go back to the old system; but let us first examine the effects of that system. The Judges of the Supreme Court rode the circuits, and two of them, with the assistance of a district judge, held circuit courts and tried causes. As a Supreme Court, they have in most cases only appellate jurisdiction. In the first instance, therefore, they tried a cause, sitting as an inferior court, and then on appeal tried it over again, as a Supreme Court. Thus, then, the appeal was from the sentence of the judges to the judges themselves. But say, that to avoid this impropriety, you will incapacitate the two judges who sat on the circuit, from sitting in the Supreme Court to review their own decrees. Strike them off; and suppose either the same or a contrary decision to have been made on another circuit, by two of their brethren, in a similar case. For the same reason you strike them off, and then you have no court left. Is this wise? Is it safe? You place yourselves in the situation where your citizens must be deprived of the advantage given to them of a court of appeals, or else run the greatest risk that the decision of the first court will carry with it that of the other.

The same honorable member has given us a history of the law passed the last session, which he wishes now to repeal. That history is accurate, at least in one important part of it. I believe that all amendments were rejected, pertinaciously rejected; and I acknowledge that I joined heartily in that rejection. It was for the clearest reason on earth. We all perfectly understood, that to amend the bill was to destroy it; that if ever it got back to the other House, it would perish. Those, therefore, who approved of the general provisions of that bill, were determined to adopt it. We sought the practicable good, and would not, in pursuit of unattainable perfection, sacrifice that good to the pride of opinion. We took the bill, therefore, with its imperfections, convinced that when it was once passed into a law, it might be easily amended.

We are now told, that this procedure was improper; nay, that it was indecent. That public opinion had declared itself against us. That a majority (holding different opinions) was already chosen to the other House; and that a similar majority was expected from that in which we sit. Mr. President, are we then to understand that opposition to the majority in the two Houses of Congress, is improper, is indecent? If so, what are we to think of those gentlemen, who, not only with proper and decent, but with laudable motives, (for such is their claim,) so long, so perseveringly, so pertinaciously opposed that voice of the people, which had so repeatedly, and for so many years, declared itself against them, through the organ of their representatives? Was this indecent in them? If not, how could it be improper for us to seize the only moment which was left for the then majority to do what they deemed a necessary act? Let me again refer to those imperious demands of the constitution, which called on us to establish inferior courts. Let me remind gentlemen of their assertion on this floor, that centuries might elapse before any judicial system could be established with general consent. And then let me ask, being thus impressed with the sense of the duty and the difficulty of performing that arduous task, was it not wise to seize the auspicious moment?

Among the many stigmas affixed to this law, we have been told that the President, in selecting men to fill the offices which it created, made vacancies and filled them from the floor of this House; and that but for the influence of this circumstance, a majority in favor of it could not have been found. Let us examine this suggestion. It is grounded on a supposition of corrupt influence derived from a hope, founded on two remote and successive contingencies. First, the vacancy might or might not exist; for it depended as well on the acceptance of another, as on the President's grant; and secondly, the President might or might not fill it with a member of this House. Yet, on this vague conjecture, on this unstable ground, it is inferred that men in high confidence violated their duty. It is hard to determine the influence of self-interest on the heart of man. I shall not, therefore, make the attempt. In the present case, it is possible that the imputation may be just, but I hope not, I believe not. At any rate gentlemen will agree with me, that the calculation is uncertain, and the conjecture vague.

But let it now, for argument sake, be admitted, saving always the reputation of honorable men, who are not here to defend themselves. Let it, I say, for argument sake be admitted, that the gentlemen alluded to acted under the influence of improper motives. What then? Is a law that has received the varied assent required by the constitution, and is clothed with all the needful formalities, thereby invalidated? Can you impair its force by impeaching the motives of any member who voted for it? Does it follow, that a law is bad because all those who concurred in it cannot give good reasons for their votes? Is it not before us? Must we not judge of it by its intrinsic merit? Is it a fair argument, addressed to our understanding, to say, we must repeal a law, even a good one, if the enacting of it may have been effected in any degree by improper motives? Or is the judgment of this House so feeble, that it may not be trusted?

Let us, however, examine the clause objected to on the ground of the constitution. It is said, that by this law the district judges in Tennessee and Kentucky are removed from office, by making them circuit judges. And again, that you have by law appointed two new offices, those of circuit judges, and filled them by law, instead of pursuing the mode of appointment prescribed by the constitution. To prove all this, the gentleman from Virginia did us the favor to read those parts of the law which he condemns, and if I can trust to my memory, it is clear, from what he read, that the law does not remove these district judges, neither does it appoint them to the office of circuit judges. It does indeed put down the district courts; but it is so far from destroying the offices of district judge, that it declares the persons filling those offices shall perform the duty of holding the circuit courts. And so far is it from appointing circuit judges, that it declares the circuit courts shall be held by the district judges. But gentlemen contend, that to discontinue the district courts, was in effect to remove the district judge. This, sir, is so far from being a just inference from the law, that the direct contrary follows as a necessary result; for it is on the principle that these judges continue in office after their courts are discontinued, that the new duty of holding other courts is assigned to them. But, gentlemen say, this doctrine militates with the principles we contend for. Surely not. It must be recollected, sir, that we have repeatedly admitted the right of the Legislature to change, alter, modify, and amend the judiciary system, so as best to promote the interests of the people. We only contend that you shall not exceed or contravene the authority by which you act. But, say gentlemen, you forced this new office on the district judges, and this is in effect a new appointment. I answer, that the question can only arise on the refusal of those judges to act. But is it unconstitutional to assign new duties to officers already existing? I fear that if this construction be adopted, our labors will speedily end; for we shall be so shackled, that we cannot move. What is the practice? Do we not every day call upon particular officers to perform duties not previously assigned to, or required of them? And must the Executive in every such case make a new appointment?

But as a further reason to restore, by repealing this law, the old system, an honorable member from North Carolina has told us, the judges of the Supreme Court should attend in the States, to acquire a competent knowledge of local institutions, and for this purpose should continue to ride the circuits. I believe there is great use in sending young men to travel; it tends to enlarge their views and give them more liberal ideas than they might otherwise possess. Nay, if they reside long enough in foreign countries they may become acquainted with the manners of the people and acquire some knowledge of their civil institutions. But I am not quite convinced that riding rapidly from one end of this country to the other is the best way to study law. I am inclined to believe that knowledge may be more conveniently acquired in the closet than in the high road. It is moreover to be presumed that the first Magistrate would, in selecting persons to fill these offices, take the best characters from the different parts of the country, who already possess the needful acquirements. But admitting that the President should not duly exercise, in this respect, his discretionary powers, and admitting that the ideas of the gentleman are correct, how wretched must be our condition! These, our judges, when called on to exercise their functions, would but begin to learn their trade, and that too at a period of life when the intellectual powers with no great facility can acquire new ideas. We must, therefore, have a double set of judges. One set of apprentice-judges to ride circuits and learn; the other set of master-judges, to hold courts and decide controversies.

We are told, sir, that the repeal asked for is important, in that it may establish a precedent, for that it is not merely a question on the propriety of disbanding a corps of sixteen rank and file; but that provision may hereafter be made, not for sixteen but for sixteen hundred or sixteen thousand judges, and that it may become necessary to turn them to the right about. Mr. President, I will not, I cannot presume, that any such provision will ever be made, and therefore I cannot conceive any such necessity; I will not suppose, for I cannot suppose, that any party or faction will ever do any thing so wild, so extravagant. But I will ask, how does this strange supposition consist with the doctrine of gentlemen, that public opinion is a sufficient check on the Legislature, and a sufficient safeguard to the people? Put the case to its consequences, and what becomes of the check? Will gentlemen say it is to be found in the force of this wise precedent? Is this to control succeeding rulers in their wild, their mad career? But how? Is the creation of judicial officers the only thing committed to their discretion? Have they not, according to the doctrine contended for, our all at their disposition, with no other check than public opinion, which, according to the supposition, will not prevent them from committing the greatest follies and absurdities? Take then all the gentleman's ideas, and compare them together, it will result that here is an inestimable treasure put into the hands of drunkards, madmen, and fools.

But away with all these derogatory suppositions. The Legislature may be trusted. Our Government is a system of salutary checks: one Legislative branch is a check on the other. And should the violence of party spirit bear both of them away, the President, an officer high in honor, high in the public confidence, charged with weighty concerns, responsible to his own reputation and to the world, stands ready to arrest their too impetuous course. This is our system. It makes no mad appeal to every mob in the country. It appeals to the sober sense of men selected from their fellow-citizens for their talents, for their virtue; of men advanced in life, and of mature judgment. It appeals to their understanding, to their integrity, to their honor, to their love of fame, to their sense of shame. If all these checks should prove insufficient, and alas! such is the condition of human nature, that I fear they will not always be sufficient, the constitution has given us one more: it has given us an independent judiciary. We have been told that the Executive authority carries your laws into execution. But let us not be the dupes of sound. The Executive Magistrate commands indeed your fleets and armies; and duties, imposts, excises, and other taxes are collected, and all expenditures are made by officers whom he has appointed. So far indeed he executes your laws. But these, his acts, apply not often to individual concerns. In those cases so important to the peace and happiness of society, the execution of your laws is confided to your judges; and therefore are they rendered independent. Before then that you violate that independence, pause. There are State sovereignties, as well as the sovereignty of the General Government. There are cases, too many cases, in which the interest of one is not considered as the interest of the other. Should these conflict, if the Judiciary be gone, the question is no longer of law, but of force. This is a state of things which no honest and wise man can view without horror.

Suppose, in the omnipotence of your Legislative authority, you trench upon the rights of your fellow-citizens, by passing an unconstitutional law. If the Judiciary Department preserve its vigor, it will stop you short. Instead of a resort to arms, there will be a happier appeal to argument. Suppose a case still more impressive. The President is at the head of your armies. Let one of his generals, flushed with victory and proud in command, presume to trample on the rights of your most insignificant citizen: indignant of the wrong, he will demand the protection of your tribunals, and, safe in the shadow of their wings, will laugh his oppressor to scorn.

This, sir, leads me to the second object I had proposed. I shall therefore pray your indulgence, while I consider how far this measure is _constitutional_. I have not been able to discover the expediency, but will now, for argument's sake, admit it; and here, I cannot but express my deep regret for the situation of an honorable member from North Carolina. Tied fast, as he is, by his instructions, arguments, however forcible, can never be effectual. I ought, therefore, to wish, for his sake, that his mind may not be convinced by any thing I shall say; for hard indeed would be his condition, to be bound by the contrarient obligations of an order and an oath. I cannot, however, but express my profound respect for the talents of those who gave him his instructions, and who, sitting at a distance, without hearing the arguments, could better understand the subject than their Senator on this floor, after full discussion.

The honorable member from Virginia has repeated the distinction before taken between the supreme and the inferior tribunals; he has insisted on the distinction between the words _shall_ and _may_; has inferred from that distinction, that the judges of the inferior courts are subjects of Legislative discretion; and has contended that the word _may_ includes all power respecting the subject to which it is applied, consequently to raise up and to pull down, to create and to destroy. I must entreat your patience, sir, while I go more into this subject than ever I supposed would be necessary. By the articles so often quoted, it is declared, "that the judicial power of the United States _shall_ be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress _may_ from time to time establish." I beg leave to call your attention to what I have already said of these inferior courts. That the original jurisdiction of various subjects being given exclusively to them, it became the bounden duty of Congress to establish such courts. I will not repeat the argument already used on that subject. But I will ask those who urged the distinction between the Supreme Court and the inferior tribunals, whether a law was not previously necessary before the Supreme Court could be organized. They reply, that the constitution says, there _shall_ be a Supreme Court, and therefore the Congress are commanded to organize it, while the rest is left to their discretion. This, sir, is not the fact. The constitution says, the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in inferior courts. The Legislature can therefore only organize one Supreme Court, but they may establish as many inferior courts as they shall think proper. The designation made of them by the constitution is, such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. But why, say gentlemen, fix precisely one Supreme Court, and leave the rest to Legislative discretion? The answer is simple: it results from the nature of things from the existent and probable state of our country. There was no difficulty in deciding that one and only one Supreme Court would be proper or necessary, to which should lie appeals from inferior tribunals. Not so as to these. The United States were advancing in rapid progression. Their population of three millions was soon to become five, then ten, afterwards twenty millions. This was well known, as far as the future can become an object of human comprehension. In this increase of numbers, with a still greater increase of wealth, with the extension of our commerce and the progress of the arts, it was evident that although a great many tribunals would become necessary, it was impossible to determine either on the precise number or the most convenient form. The convention did not pretend to this prescience; but had they possessed it, would it have been proper to have established, then, all the tribunals necessary for all future times? Would it have been wise to have planted courts among the Chickasaws, the Choctaws, the Cherokees, the Tuscaroras, and God knows how many more, because at some future day the regions over which they roam might be cultivated by polished men! Was it not proper, wise and necessary, to leave in the discretion of Congress the number and the kind of courts which they might find it proper to establish for the purpose designated by the constitution? This simple statement of facts--facts of public notoriety--is alone a sufficient comment on, and explanation of, the word on which gentlemen have so much relied. The convention in framing, the people in adopting, this compact say the judicial power shall extend to many cases, the original cognizance whereof shall be by the inferior courts; but it is neither necessary, nor even possible now to determine their number or their form; that essential power, therefore, shall vest in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time, in the progression of time, and according to the indication of circumstances, establish; not provide, or determine, but establish. Not a mere temporary provision, but an establishment. If, after this, it had said in general terms, that judges should hold their offices during good behavior, could a doubt have existed on the interpretation of this act, under all its attending circumstances, that the judges of the inferior courts were intended as well as those of the Supreme Court? But did the framers of the constitution stop here? Is there then nothing more? Did they risk on these grammatical niceties the fate of America? Did they rest here the most important branch of our Government? Little important, indeed, as to foreign danger; but infinitely valuable to our domestic peace, and to personal protection against the oppression of our rulers. No; lest a doubt should be raised, they have carefully connected the judges of both courts in the same sentence; they have said, "the judges both of the supreme and inferior courts," thus coupling them inseparably together. You may cut the bands, but you can never untie them. With salutary caution they devised this clause to arrest the over-bearing temper which they knew belonged to Legislative bodies. They do not say the judges, simply, but the judges of the supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good behavior. They say, therefore, to the Legislature, you may judge of the propriety, the utility, the necessity, of organizing these courts; but when established, you have done your duty. Anticipating the course of passion in future times, they say to the Legislature, you shall not disgrace yourselves by exhibiting the indecent spectacle of judges established by one Legislature removed by another. We will save you also from yourselves. We say these judges shall hold their offices; and surely, sir, to pretend that they can hold their office after the office is destroyed, is contemptible.

The framers of this constitution had seen much, read much, and deeply reflected. They knew by experience the violence of popular bodies, and let it be remembered, that since that day many of the States, taught by experience, have found it necessary to change their forms of government to avoid the effects of that violence. The convention contemplated the very act you now attempt. They knew also the jealousy and the power of the States; and they established for your and for their protection this most important department. I beg gentlemen to hear and remember what I say: it is this department alone, and it is the independence of this department, which can save you from civil war. Yes, sir, adopt the language of gentlemen, say with them, by the act to which you are urged, "if we cannot remove the judges we can destroy them." Establish thus the dependence of the Judiciary Department, who will resort to them for protection against you? Who will confide in, who will be bound by their decrees? Are we then to resort to the ultimate reason of kings? Are our arguments to fly from the mouths of our cannon?

Is there a member of this House, who can lay his hand on his heart, and say that, consistently with the plain words of our constitution, we have a right to repeal this law? I believe not. And if we undertake to construe this constitution to our purposes, and say that public opinion is to be our judge, there is an end to all constitutions. To what will not this dangerous doctrine lead? Should it to-day be the popular wish to destroy the First Magistrate, you can destroy him; and should he to-morrow be able to conciliate to him the popular will, and lead them to wish for your destruction, it is easily effected. Adopt this principle and the whim of the moment will not only be the law, but the constitution of our country.

The gentleman from Virginia has mentioned a great nation brought to the feet of one of her servants. But why is she in that situation? Is it not because popular opinion was called on to decide every thing, until those who wore bayonets decided for all the rest? Our situation is peculiar. At present our national compact can prevent a State from acting hostilely towards the general interest. But let this compact be destroyed, and each State becomes instantaneously vested with absolute sovereignty. Is there no instance of a similar situation to be found in history? Look at the States of Greece. They were once in a condition not unlike to that in which we should then stand. They treated the recommendations of their Amphictyonic Council (which was more a meeting of Ambassadors than a Legislative assembly) as we did the resolutions of the old Congress. Are we wise? So they were. Are we valiant? They also were brave. Have we one common language, and are we united under one head? In this, also, there was a strong resemblance. But, by their divisions, they became at first victims to the ambition of Philip, and were at length swallowed up in the Roman empire. Are we to form an exception to the general principles of nature, and to all the examples of history? And are the maxims of experience to become false, when applied to our fate?

Some, indeed, flatter themselves that our destiny will be like that of Rome. Such, indeed, it might be, if we had the same wise but vile aristocracy, under whose guidance they became the masters of the world. But we have not that strong aristocratic arm, which can seize a wretched citizen, scourged almost to death by a remorseless creditor, turn him into the ranks, and bid him, as a soldier bear our eagle in triumph round the globe! I hope to God we shall never have such an abominable institution. But what, I ask, will be the situation of these States (organized as they now are) if, by the dissolution of our national compact, they be left to themselves? What is the probable result? We shall either be the victims of foreign intrigue, and split into factions, fall under the domination of a foreign power, or else, after the misery and torment of civil war, become the subjects of a usurping military despot. What but this compact--what but this specific part of it, can save us from ruin? The judicial power, that fortress of the constitution, is now to be overturned. Yes, with honest Ajax, I would not only throw a shield before it, I would build around it a wall of brass. But I am too weak to defend the rampart against the host of assailants. I must call to my assistance their good sense, their patriotism and their virtue. Do not, gentlemen, suffer the rage of passion to drive reason from her seat. If this law be indeed bad, let us join to remedy the defects. Has it been passed in a manner which wounded your pride, or aroused your resentment? Have, I conjure you, the magnanimity to pardon that offence. I entreat, I implore you to sacrifice those angry passions to the interests of our country. Pour out this pride of opinion on the altar of patriotism. Let it be an expiatory libation for the weal of America. Do not, for God's sake, do not suffer that pride to plunge us all into the abyss of ruin. Indeed, indeed, it will be but of little, very little avail, whether one opinion or the other be right or wrong; it will heal no wounds, it will pay no debts, it will rebuild no ravaged towns. Do not rely on that popular will, which has brought us frail beings into political existence. That opinion is but a changeable thing. It will soon change. This very measure will change it. You will be deceived. Do not, I beseech you, in reliance on a foundation so frail, commit the dignity, the harmony, the existence of our nation to the wild wind. Trust not your treasure to the waves. Throw not your compass and your charts into the ocean. Do not believe that its billows will waft you into port. Indeed, indeed, you will be deceived. Cast not away this only anchor of our safety. I have seen its progress. I know the difficulties through which it was obtained. I stand in the presence of Almighty God, and of the world: and I declare to you, that if you lose this charter, never, no, never will you get another! We are now, perhaps, arrived at the parting point. Here, even here, we stand on the brink of fate. Pause--pause! For Heaven's sake, pause!

WEDNESDAY, February 3.

The question was then taken on the final passage of the bill and determined in the affirmative--yeas 16, nays 15, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Anderson, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge,
Brown, Cocke, Ellery, T. Foster, Franklin, Jackson, Logan,
S. T. Mason, Nicholas, Stone, Sumter, and Wright.

NAYS.--Messrs. Chipman, Colhoun, Dayton, D. Foster,
Hillhouse, Howard, J. Mason, Morris, Ogden, Olcott, Ross,
Sheafe, Tracy, Wells, and White.[65]

So it was _Resolved_, That this bill pass, that it be engrossed, and that the title thereof be "An act to repeal certain acts respecting the organization of the courts of the United States, and for other purposes."

SATURDAY, April 17.

The VICE PRESIDENT being absent, the Senate proceeded to the election of a President _pro tempore_, as the constitution so provides; and the honorable ABRAHAM BALDWIN was chosen.

_Ordered_, That the Secretary notify the House of Representatives of this election.

On motion, it was

_Ordered_, That the Secretary wait on the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, and acquaint him that the Senate have, in the absence of the VICE PRESIDENT, elected the honorable ABRAHAM BALDWIN their President _pro tempore_.

MONDAY, April 26.

_Relief to Widows and Orphans of Naval and Marine Officers._

The Senate resumed the third reading of the bill, entitled "An act for the relief of the widows and orphans of certain persons who have died, or may hereafter die, in the naval service of the United States."

On motion to strike out the second section of the bill, to wit:

"SEC. 2. _And be it further enacted_, That if any
commissioned or warrant officer of the Navy, or
commissioned officer of Marines, have died, or shall
hereafter die, by reason of wounds received while in the
actual service of the United States, or have been lost at
sea, or drowned, or shall hereafter be lost at sea, or
drowned, while in the service as aforesaid, and in the
actual line of his duty, and shall leave a widow, or if
not, leave a child or children, under age, such widow, or
such child, or children, as the case may be, shall be
entitled to, and receive, the half of the monthly pay to
which the deceased was entitled at the time of his death,
and for and during the term of five years. And in case of
the death or intermarriage of such widow, before the
expiration of the said term of five years, the half pay for
the residue of the term shall go to the child or children
of such deceased officer under the age of sixteen years;
and, in like manner, the allowance to the child or children
of such deceased, in case there be no widow, shall be paid
no longer than during the time there is a child or children
under the age of sixteen years."

It passed in the affirmative--yeas 16, nays 8, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Anderson, Baldwin, Bradley, Brown, Clinton,
Cocke, Dayton, T. Foster, Franklin, Jackson, S. T. Mason,
Ogden, Olcott, Stone, Sumter, and Wright.

NAYS.--Messrs. Ellery, Dwight Foster, Howard, J. Mason,
Morris, Nicholas, Wells, and White.

_Georgia Limits._

The following Message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

_Gentlemen of the Senate, and of the House of
Representatives_:

In pursuance of the act, entitled "An act supplemental to
the act, entitled 'An act for an amicable settlement of
limits with the State of Georgia, and authorizing the
establishment of a government in the Mississippi
Territory,'" James Madison, Secretary of State, Albert
Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury, and Levi Lincoln,
Attorney General of the United States, were appointed
Commissioners, to settle by compromise, with the
Commissioners appointed by the State of Georgia, the claims
and cession to which the said act has relation.

Articles of agreement and cession have accordingly been
entered into and signed by the said Commissioners of the
United States and of Georgia, which, as they leave a right
to Congress to act upon them legislatively, at any time
within six months after their date, I have thought it my
duty immediately to communicate to the Legislature.

TH. JEFFERSON.

APRIL 26, 1802.

The Message and documents therein referred to were read, and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate.

TUESDAY, April 27.

_State Government for Ohio._

The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill to enable the people of the Eastern division of the territory north-west of the river Ohio to form a constitution and State government.

On motion, section sixth, to strike out the following words, reported by the committee to be struck out, and which report was amended, as follows:

"_Provided_, That the convention of the said State shall,
on its part, assent that each and every tract of land sold
by Congress, from and after the 30th day of June next,
shall be and remain exempt from any tax laid by order or
under authority of the State, whether for State, county,
township, or any other purpose whatever, for the term of
five years from and after the day of sale:"

It passed in the negative--yeas 12, nays 14, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Bradley, Brown, Dayton, Dwight, Foster,
Howard, J. Mason, Morris, Ogden, Olcott, Tracy, Wells, and
White.

NAYS.--Messrs. Anderson, Baldwin, Breckenridge, Clinton,
Ellery, T. Foster, Franklin, Jackson, Logan, S. T. Mason,
Nicholas, Stone, Sumter, and Wright.

On motion to strike out the words reported by the committee to be struck out of section sixth, and amended as follows:

"_Third._ That one-twentieth part of the net proceeds of
the lands lying within the said State, sold by Congress,
from and after the thirtieth day of June next, after
deducting all expenses incident to the same, shall be
applied to the laying out and making public roads, leading
from the navigable waters emptying into the Atlantic to the
Ohio, or to the navigable waters thereof, and continued
through the said State: such roads to be laid out under the
authority of Congress with the consent of the several
States through which the road shall pass:"

It passed in the negative--yeas 12, nays 14, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Bradley, Brown, Dayton, Dwight, Foster,
Howard, J. Mason, Morris, Ogden, Olcott, Tracy, Wells, and
White.

NAYS.--Messrs. Anderson, Baldwin, Breckenridge, Clinton,
Ellery, T. Foster, Franklin, Jackson, Logan, S. T. Mason,
Nicholas, Stone, Sumter, and Wright.

On motion to strike out these words, reported by the committee to be struck out of the sixth section:

"_Second._ That the six miles reservation, including the
salt springs, commonly called the Scioto Salt Springs, the
salt springs near the Muskingum River, and in the military
tract, with the sections of land which include the same,
shall be granted to the said State, for the use of the
people thereof, the same to be used under such terms, and
conditions, and regulations, as the Legislature of the said
State shall direct, provided the said Legislature shall
never sell nor lease the same for a longer period than ten
years:"

It passed in the negative--yeas 8, nays 18, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Brown, Dwight Foster, Howard, J. Mason,
Morris, Ogden, Olcott, and Tracy.

NAYS.--Messrs. Anderson, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge,
Clinton, Dayton, Ellery, T. Foster, Franklin, Jackson,
Logan, S. T. Mason, Nicholas, Stone, Sumter, Wells, White,
and Wright.

And the bill being further amended, it was ordered to the third reading as amended.

THURSDAY, April 29.

Mr. S. T. MASON presented the petition of David Brown, of Massachusetts, praying compensation for his sufferings while imprisoned under sentence of the judicial court, for seditious practices; and the petition was read, and ordered to lie on the table.

FRIDAY, April 30.

Mr. TRACY, from the committee to whom was referred, on the 29th instant, the bill to carry into effect a resolution of Congress for erecting a monument to the memory of the late General David Wooster, reported amendments; which were read, and ordered to lie for consideration.

_Case of John Cleves Symmes and his land purchase in Ohio._

The Senate resumed the consideration of the report of the committee on the petition of John Cleves Symmes, which was adopted, as follows:

1. That, in the year 1788, the petitioner entered into a
contract with the United States, upon a fair consideration,
for the purchase of one million of acres of land in the
North-western Territory.

2. That, in consequence of such contract, the petitioner
made a settlement upon the tract, and sold many parcels
thereof to adventurers, who went together with him into
that new country, and located themselves there.

3. That, in the year 1794, the petitioner obtained a
patent, under the authority of a law which enabled the
President of the United States to make the same, for such
proportion of the one million of acres, which had at that
time been paid for, pursuant to the said contract,
amounting to 311,682 acres of the said million of acres of
land.

4. That the petitioner, after the said in part fulfilment
of the contract on the side of both the parties to the
same, proceeded to make sales (as he before had done in
respect to the lands for which he had lately received the
patent, as above mentioned) in the residue of the one
million of acres, expecting to make the title when he
should receive his patent thereof, agreeably to his
contract, as he had before practised.

5. That no authority has been given by law, or otherwise,
that can be found by your committee, whereby the said
contract can be carried into execution on behalf of the
United States, upon the payment of the sums further
stipulated to be paid by the petitioner, agreeably to his
contract, whereby he is entitled to a patent, upon payment
of such stipulated sums; which payments the petitioner
avers he always has been, and still is, ready to pay and
perform, as thereunto required by his contract.

6. That your committee, from the papers and documents laid
before them by the petitioner, or from the statement which
he has made, do not perceive that the petitioner has done
any one act, or omitted to do any act whereby he has
forfeited any right to the full benefit of his contract
before stated.

7. That no authority exists, by law, enabling any person to
carry into execution the said contract on behalf of the
United States; but, on the contrary, that two laws have
been passed predicated upon the idea that the obligations
of the United States, under the said contract, have ceased
and determined; under the operation of which laws the said
petitioner states, and your committee believe, that the
said petitioner is suffering very great hardships, tending
to the utter destruction and total waste of his whole
property.

8. Your committee, the premises considered, beg leave to
recommend the adoption of the resolution accompanying this
report:

_Resolved_, That the President of the United States be
requested to direct the Attorney General to examine into
the contract entered into between the United States and
John Cleves Symmes, Esq., and others, bearing date on the
15th of October, 1788, and all the contracts and laws
relative thereto; and all the transactions which may
legally or equitably affect the same, as far as they may
come to his knowledge; and to make a report of the same to
the Senate at their next session, together with his opinion
whether the said John Cleves Symmes has any claims, and
what, upon the United States, in virtue of the said
contract, or any other contract, or law predicated upon the
same: and that the further consideration of the petition of
said John Cleves Symmes, Esq., of and concerning the
premises, be postponed to the first day of the next session
of Congress.

And the report was adopted.

_Ordered_, That the Secretary lay this resolution before the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

The resolution of the House of Representatives, authorizing the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives to adjourn their respective Houses on Saturday the first day of May, was read.

The bill, entitled "An act making appropriations for the Military Establishment of the United States in the year one thousand eight hundred and two," was read the third time and passed.

The bill, entitled "An act making appropriations for the support of Government for the year one thousand eight hundred and two," was read the third time.

_Resolved_, That this bill do pass as amended.

The bill making an appropriation for the support of the Navy of the United States, for the year one thousand eight hundred and two, was read the third time as amended.

On motion to strike out the third section, agreed to yesterday, it passed in the affirmative--yeas 12, nays 11, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Bradley, Brown, Dwight Foster, Howard,
Morris, Nicholas, Ogden, Olcott, Tracy, Wells, White, and
Wright.

NAYS.--Messrs. Anderson, Baldwin, Breckenridge, Clinton,
Cocke, Ellery, Franklin, Logan, S. T. Mason, Stone, and
Sumter.

_Resolved_, That this bill do pass with the amendments.

The bill, entitled "An act to provide for the establishment of certain districts, and therein to amend an act, entitled 'An act to regulate the collection of duties on imports and tonnage, and for other purposes,'" was read the third time, and passed with an amendment.

Mr. BRADLEY, from the committee to whom was referred, on the 6th and 7th instant, the petition of Elijah Brainard, also the petition of Jonathan Snowden, reported that the consideration of said petitions be severally postponed to the next session of Congress, and that the committee to whom the same were referred be discharged, and the report was adopted.

Mr. S. T. MASON, from the committee to whom was referred, on the 29th instant, the bill to incorporate the inhabitants of the City of Washington in the District of Columbia, reported amendments; which were read, and ordered to lie for consideration.

On motion, it was

_Ordered_, That the bill for the better security of public money and property in the hands of public officers and agents, as amended by the House of Representatives, be postponed to the next session of Congress.

Mr. S. T. MASON, from the committee to whom was referred, on the 29th instant, the bill additional to, and amendatory of, an act, entitled "An act concerning the District of Columbia;" reported amendments which were read, and ordered to lie for consideration.

MONDAY EVENING, 7-1/2 o'clock, May 3.

_Adjournment._

A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate that the House have appointed a committee on their part, with such as the Senate may appoint, to wait on the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, and notify him that, unless he hath any further communications to make to the two Houses of Congress, they are ready to adjourn, and they desire the appointment of a committee on the part of the Senate.

The Senate took into consideration the resolution of the House of Representatives appointing a committee, jointly, with such as the Senate may appoint, to wait on the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES and notify him of the proposed adjournment of the two Houses of Congress; and

_Resolved_, That they do concur therein, and that Messrs. ELLERY and CLINTON be the committee on the part of the Senate.

Mr. ELLERY, from the joint committee, reported that they had waited on the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, agreeably to the vote of the two Houses, and that he informed them he had no further business to communicate.

_Ordered_, That the Secretary notify to the House of Representatives that the Senate, having completed the business of the session, are ready to adjourn.

A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate that the House of Representatives having completed the business before them are about to adjourn.

Whereupon, the Senate adjourned to the first Monday in December next.

SEVENTH CONGRESS.--FIRST SESSION.

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES

IN

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

MONDAY, December 7, 1801.

This being the day appointed by the constitution for the annual meeting of Congress, the following members of the House of Representatives appeared, produced their credentials, and took their seats in the House, to wit:

_From New Hampshire._--Abiel Foster, George P. Upham, and
Samuel Tenney.

_From Massachusetts._--William Eustis, John Bacon, Phanuel
Bishop, Joseph B. Varnum, Richard Cutts, Lemuel Williams,
William Shepard, Ebenezer Mattoon, Nathan Read, Josiah
Smith, and Manasseh Cutler.

_From Rhode Island._--Thomas Tillinghast, and Joseph
Stanton, jr.

_From Connecticut._--Roger Griswold, Samuel W. Dana, John
Davenport, Calvin Goddard, Benjamin Tallmadge, Elias
Perkins, and John C. Smith.

_From Vermont._--Israel Smith.

_From New York._--Samuel L. Mitchill, Philip Van Cortlandt,
Theodorus Bailey, John Smith, Benjamin Walker, Thomas
Morris, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Lucas Elmendorph, David
Thomas, and John P. Van Ness.

_From New Jersey._--John Condit, James Mott, William Helms,
Henry Southard, and Ebenezer Elmer.

_From Pennsylvania._--William Jones, Michael Leib, John
Smilie, William Hoge, Isaac Vanhorne, Joseph Heister,
Robert Brown, Henry Woods, John A. Hanna, John Stewart,
Thomas Boude, and Joseph Hemphill.

_From Delaware._--James A. Bayard.

_From Maryland._--John Archer, Joseph H. Nicholson, Samuel
Smith, Richard Sprigg, John Dennis, and Thomas Plater.

_From Virginia._--Thomas Newton, jr., John Randolph, jr.,
George Jackson, Philip R. Thompson, John Taliaferro, John
Stratton, William B. Giles, Abram Trigg, John Trigg,
Anthony New, John Smith, David Holmes, Richard Brent, Edwin
Gray, and Matthew Clay.

_From Kentucky._--Thomas T. Davis, and John Fowler.

_From North Carolina._--Nathaniel Macon, Willis Alston,
Richard Stanford, Charles Johnson, Archibald Henderson, and
John Stanley.

_From Tennessee._--William Dickson.

_From South Carolina._--Thomas Sumter, Thomas Moore, and
Thomas Lowndes.

_From Georgia._--John Milledge.

_From the North-west Territory._--Paul Fearing.

_From Mississippi Territory._--Narsworthy Hunter.

A quorum, consisting of a majority, being present, the House proceeded, by ballot, to the choice of a Speaker; and, upon examining the ballots, a majority of the votes of the whole House was found in favor of NATHANIEL MACON, one of the Representatives for the State of North Carolina: Whereupon, Mr. MACON was conducted to the chair, and he made his acknowledgments to the House as follows:

"GENTLEMEN: Accept my sincere thanks for the honor you have
conferred on me, in the choice just made. The duties of the
chair will be undertaken with great diffidence indeed; but
it shall be my constant endeavor to discharge them with
fidelity and impartiality."

The House proceeded, in the same manner, to the appointment of a Clerk; and, upon examining the ballots, a majority of the whole House was found in favor of JOHN BECKLEY.

The oath to support the Constitution of the United States, as prescribed by law, was then administered by Mr. GRISWOLD, one of the Representatives for the State of Connecticut, to the SPEAKER; and then the same oath, or affirmation, was administered, by Mr. SPEAKER, to each of the members present.

A message from the Senate informed the House that a quorum of the Senate is assembled, and ready to proceed to business; and that, in the absence of the Vice President, they have elected the honorable ABRAHAM BALDWIN, President of the Senate, _pro tempore_.

_Ordered_, That a message be sent to the Senate to inform them that a quorum of this House is assembled, and have elected NATHANIEL MACON, one of the Representatives of the State of North Carolina, their Speaker, and are ready to proceed to business; and that the Clerk of this House do go with the said message.

The House proceeded, by ballot, to the choice of a Sergeant-at-Arms, Doorkeeper, and Assistant Doorkeeper; and upon examining the ballots, a majority of the votes of the whole House was found in favor of JOSEPH WHEATON, as Sergeant-at-Arms, and, also, a unanimous vote in favor of THOMAS CLAXTON, and THOMAS DUNN, severally, the former as Doorkeeper, and the latter as Assistant Doorkeeper.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate have appointed a committee on their part, jointly, with such committee as may be appointed on the part of this House, to wait on the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, and inform him that a quorum of the two Houses is assembled, and ready to receive any communications he may think proper to make to them.

Mr. SAMUEL SMITH, from the joint committee appointed to wait on the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, and notify him that a quorum of the two Houses is assembled and ready to receive any communication he may think proper to make to them, reported that the committee had performed that service, and that the PRESIDENT signified to them that he would make a communication to this House, to-morrow, by message.

TUESDAY, December 8.

Several other members, to wit: from Pennsylvania, ANDREW GREGG; from Virginia, SAMUEL J. CABELL; from North Carolina, JAMES HOLLAND; and from South Carolina, WILLIAM BUTLER; appeared, produced their credentials, and took their seats in the House; the oath to support the Constitution of the United States being first administered to them by Mr. SPEAKER, according to law.

A petition of John McDonald, late of the city of Philadelphia, was presented to the House and read, praying that he may be employed to superintend the arrangement and safe-keeping of the books intended for the library of the two Houses of Congress; and that he may receive such compensation for his services, in that capacity, as to the wisdom of Congress shall seem meet.

_Ordered_, That the said petition be referred to the committee appointed yesterday, on the part of this House, jointly with the committee appointed by the Senate, to take into consideration a statement made by the Secretary of the Senate, respecting books and maps purchased pursuant to a late act of Congress, and to make report respecting the future arrangement of the same.

The following committees were appointed pursuant to the standing rules and orders of the House, viz:

_Committee of Elections._--Mr. MILLEDGE, Mr. TENNEY, Mr. CONDIT, Mr. DENNIS, Mr. HANNA, Mr. STANLEY, and Mr. JOHN TALIAFERRO.

_Committee of Revised and Unfinished Business._--Mr. DAVENPORT, Mr. CLAY, and Mr. ALSTON.

_Committee of Claims._--JOHN COTTON SMITH, Mr. GREGG, Mr. HOLMES, Mr. MATTOON, Mr. JOHN SMITH, of New York, Mr. PLATER, and Mr. MOORE.

_Committee of Commerce and Manufactures._--Mr. SAMUEL SMITH, Mr. EUSTIS, Mr. DANA, Mr. MITCHILL, Mr. JONES, Mr. NEWTON, and Mr. LOWNDES.