Chapter M: X. again called upon us. He said M. Talleyrand was (23)

Here we find the constitution founded upon the will of the people, and the object declared to be the good of the people. Through the whole body of the constitution may be discerned the responsibility of all public agents, either mediately or immediately, to the people. This responsibility results, first, from the division of authority into different departments; secondly, from a specification and limitation of the authorities of all and each of the departments; thirdly, from periodical appointments of the public agents. The first clause declares there shall be a Congress, to whom the business of legislation is confided. This Congress is to consist of a House of Representatives, to be chosen by the people immediately, and responsible to them at the end of every two years; and a Senate, to be chosen by the Legislatures of the different States, who are chosen by the people--one-third of the Senators to be chosen every two years, and responsible at the end of every six years. The Executive power is vested in a President, who is chosen by electors, who are chosen for the express purpose by the people, and responsible at the end of every four years. The President may be considered as immediately responsible to the people, although chosen through the medium of electors; because it is found, in practice, that the electors are constrained to avow the vote they intend to give before they are chosen, and the people have generally made their elections with a view to that object.

Thus, then, are formed two departments, their powers specified and defined, the times for extending their powers fixed, and indeed a complete organization for the execution of their respective powers, without the intervention of any law for that purpose. A third department, to wit, the Judiciary Department, is still wanting. Is that formed by the constitution? How is that to be formed? It is not formed by the constitution. It is only declared that there shall be such a department; and it is directed to be formed by the other two departments, who owe a responsibility to the people. Here there arises an important difference of opinion between the different sides of this House. It is contended on one side that the Judiciary Department is formed by the constitution itself. It is contended on the other side, that the constitution does no more than to declare that there shall be a Judiciary Department, and directs that it shall be formed by the other two departments, under certain modifications. Article third, section first, the constitution has these words: "The Judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress shall from time to time ordain and establish." Here, then, the power to ordain and establish inferior courts is given to Congress in the most unqualified terms, and also to ordain and establish "one Supreme Court." The only limitation upon the power of Congress in this clause, consists in the number of supreme courts to be established; the limitation is to the number of one, although that is an affirmative and not a negative expression. The number of judges, the assignation of duties, the fixing compensations, the fixing the times when, and places where, the courts shall exercise their functions, &c., are left to the entire discretion of Congress. The spirit, as well as the words of the constitution, are completely satisfied, provided one Supreme Court be established. Hence, when all these essential points in the organization and formation of courts are intrusted to the unlimited discretion of Congress, it cannot be said that the courts are formed by the constitution. For further restraints, therefore, upon the discretion of Congress, the remaining part of the same section must be consulted. Here he begged leave to remark, that he had often felt a veneration for the wisdom of the sages who formed this constitution; considering the difficulties they had to encounter, resulting from the various local prejudices and local interests of the different parts of the United States, and the vast variety of opinions which the subject presented, it was almost wonderful to conceive how they should have hit upon a system so admirably calculated to protect and to promote the general interests, when administered according to its original meaning and intention. He could not go so far as to say it was perfect. He admitted, like other human productions, it was stamped with the common fallibility of man. That he wished, however, to see no radical changes in its principles. He wished to hand it down to posterity with those amendments only which experience should suggest, and which would grow out of the continually varying state of the nation. He said it was not only remarkable for the wisdom of its arrangements, but the correct and technical mode of expression. The part of the section now to be examined, was an example of the justice of both these remarks. The words are, "the judges both of the supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office."

The first part of the sentence respects the relationship between the Executive and the Judiciary Departments. It respects judges or officers of the courts who are appointed by the President. The last part of the sentence respects the relationship between the Legislative and Judiciary Departments. It respects the creation of offices, the fixing the compensation of the officers or judges, and their continuance in office. These are the peculiar attributes of the Legislative Department. Accordingly, the most correct and technical words are used in relation to both these objects. The term "hold their offices during good behavior," relates merely to the Executive Department. The term "hold," is the common technical word used to convey the idea of tenure. Tenure requires two parties. The one granting, the other holding or receiving the grant. Let the inquiry be made, of whom do the judges hold? The constitution furnishes the answer, of the President. One of the most obvious rules in the construction of instruments of writing is, that the whole of it must be taken together, and not one particular part by itself. The following words will be found in the second section of the second article of the constitution: "And he (to wit, the President) shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law." In the third section of the same article, are these words: "And shall (to wit, the President) commission all the officers of the United States." These three sentences contain the relationship between the Executive and Judiciary Departments, so far as respects the objects of the present discussion.

To ascertain the real meaning and import of these sentences, they should be read in connection with each other, excluding therefrom all intermediate words not immediately bearing on the subject. In that case the constitution would read thus: "He (to wit, the President) shall nominate and appoint the Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, and shall commission all the officers of the United States. The judges both of the supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good behavior." It may now be asked, if this case of the judges of the supreme and inferior courts be not an obvious exception out of the general Presidential discretion of appointing and commissioning all officers of the United States during pleasure? After the Government has been in operation above twelve years, and the principle of commissioning all Executive officers during pleasure, has been practised upon during the whole of the period by the Executive, as well as the Legislative Department, the propriety of that practice is for the first time now become questionable. It is said that the right to commission during pleasure, is by implication. It is readily admitted that there are no express words in the constitution to that effect; but the inference from the words which are there, is almost as strong as the words themselves, if they had been inserted. The President is authorized, without limitation, to "commission all the officers of the United States." The question arises, by what tenure? The reply is, according to his pleasure or discretion. It was not difficult to foresee, that if the President was fully empowered to commission as he pleased, he would please to commission during his pleasure. The Legislature has no more control over an officer who holds an Executive commission during the pleasure of the President, than over a Judicial officer holding his office during good behavior. The remedy given by the constitution being the same in both cases, to wit, impeachment. Nor is there any reason why the office of the one should be less subject to the discretion of the Legislature, than the office of the other; and it seems to be universally agreed, that although the Legislature cannot deprive an Executive officer of his office in any other way than by impeachment, during the continuance of such office, yet the office itself is always subject to be abolished. The same reasoning will hold with equal force respecting a judge and a Judicial office. The reason why the Executive is proscribed from the removal of a judge, is to secure to the judge a complete independence of the President, who is not responsible for the discharge of Judicial duties; but the removal is perfectly correct in the case of an Executive officer, because the President is highly responsible for the due discharge of Executive duties. The Legislature is not responsible for either, and of course stands in the same constitutional relation to both. This appears obvious from furnishing to the Legislature the same means of removing both, as will appear by the fourth section of the second article, in the following words: "The President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office by impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors." He now begged to call the attention of the committee particularly to the last clause of the sentence, which ascertains the constitutional connection between the Legislative and Judicial Departments, so far as respects the limitation of the Legislative, in the exercise of the power committed to it, for the organization of the Judicial Department. He should place particular emphasis on these words of the constitution in the exposition he proposed to make. The words are: "And shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." The first part of this section having given to Congress the power of creating courts, ascertaining the number of judges, &c., these last words may be considered as containing explanations and limitations of the general power of Congress, as was the foregoing part of this sentence a limitation of the general Executive power. And accordingly the most correct terms are used for limiting Legislative discretion, and explaining its objects; according to the words of this sentence, the judge is to receive a compensation for his services. To whom are these services to be rendered? To the people, for the benefit of the people. Who is to judge of the necessity or utility of these services? The constitution has ordained, that Congress, or, in other words, the Representatives of the people, shall be the tribunal. Suppose there should be no services required, none for the judge to perform, and that Congress should so think and determine: is the judge entitled to compensation? He is not. The condition of service for the benefit of the people, is the express consideration upon which the compensation accrues. No service is rendered, the competent tribunal says, there is none required, of course no compensation accrues. The judge is entitled to receive none. On this point, an obvious and most important difference of opinion exists between the two sides of the committee. On one side it is contended, that the office is the vested property of the judge, conferred on him by his appointment, and that his good behavior is the consideration of his compensation; so long, therefore, as his good behavior exists, so long his office must continue in consequence of his good behavior, and that his compensation is his property in virtue of his office, and therefore cannot be taken away by any authority whatever, although there may be no service for him to perform. On the other side, it is contended that the good behavior is not the consideration upon which the compensation accrues, but services rendered for the public good; and that if the office is to be considered as a property, it is a property held in trust for the benefit of the people, and must therefore be held subject to that condition, of which Congress is the constitutional judge. Mr. G. said, considering the boundary line between these conflicting opinions to be the boundary line between the offices held for public utility, and offices held for personal favor, he could not bestow too much attention upon this part of the discussion; for if the construction gentlemen contend for should prevail, in vain have the framers of the constitution, with so much jealous circumspection, erected so many ramparts against the introduction of some of these offices in the Government of the United States. A sinecure office is an office held without the condition of service; often for past services already compensated; often for present favor, without the condition of any service. For the purpose of excluding from the Federal Government all sinecure offices, the sages who formed the constitution have through every part of it connected services and compensation, and they ought never to be separated in construction. The sixth section of the first article is in these words: "The Senators and Representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law," &c., and so far has this principle of the rendition of service been carried, that the service of the Senate and Representatives is to be rendered every day, and unless they do daily render service, they are not entitled to their day's compensation. In the first section of the second article of the constitution, are these words: "The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation," &c. In the forty-first section of the act under which the judges claim their compensation, are these words: "That each of the circuit judges of the United States, to be appointed by virtue of this act, shall be allowed as a compensation for his services," &c. These expressions all demonstrate the importance of coupling the service and compensation of office. But the jealous caution of the framers of the constitution did not stop at choosing the best affirmative expression for excluding this doctrine of sinecure offices, they also applied negative restraints.

In the ninth section of the first article of the constitution, are these words, "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law." In the same section, "No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States, and no person holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall, without the consent of Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State." If then services rendered for the public benefit be the essential consideration, upon which the compensation does accrue to the judges; if the Congress be the proper tribunal for pronouncing upon the necessity or utility of such service, and if they decide that no such service is necessary or useful; the judge sustains no injury in not receiving the compensation, because he does not comply with the condition on his part; nor does he sustain a hardship thereby, because it must be presumed that he understood the second conditions attached to his office at the time of his acceptance. It has been admitted by all gentlemen, that Congress is the constitutional tribunal for deciding respecting the services to be performed. They admit that Congress may modify the courts, diminish or add to their duties, alter the terms of their sessions, or make any other arrangements respecting them which do not go to take away or diminish their compensations. It is to be observed that there is not one of these powers specified in the constitution; they are therefore necessary inferences from the paramount power "to ordain and establish," and the power of repeal, or to take away all the services to be performed, is as necessary an inference as either of the others, and has uniformly resulted from every other specified power in the constitution. From this part of the sentence, therefore, it is deducible, that the only restraint upon the general power given to Congress in the first part of the section to ordain and establish courts, is, that the compensations of the judges should not be lessened during their continuance in office; not during their good behavior. And in this part of the sentence the correct phraseology of the constitution is worthy of observation. In speaking of the Executive attribute, to wit, the appointing and commissioning officers, the term _good behavior_ is used. In speaking of the Legislative attribute, to wit, the creation of the offices and fixing compensations, the term _during their continuance in office_ is used. The reason for this variation of expression is obvious. It was known that the office might be discontinued, and the judge continue to behave well; the limitation was therefore applied to the office, and not the good behavior, because if the office should be discontinued, which is clearly implied in this expression, it was not the intention of the constitution that the compensation should be received, no service in that event being to be rendered. From this interpretation of the constitution, all of the departments are preserved in the due exercise of their respective functions for the general good, without any of the mischievous and absurd consequences resulting from the opposite construction. It is admitted that the first part of this section expressly vests Congress with the general power to ordain and establish courts; and, if there had been no other restriction, the consequent power to unordain, or abolish. The restriction relied upon is not a restriction in express words: there are no words in the constitution prohibiting Congress from repealing a law for organizing courts; the restraint contended for, therefore, is by implication, and that implication, to say the least, not expressly connected with any Legislative attribute. Is it right, is it a correct interpretation, that when a power is given in express words for the most important purposes, that it should be restrained or prohibited by implication? Can so much inattention and folly be attributed to the framers of the constitution, as would result from the supposition that if it was their intention that a law growing out of one of the specified powers, in contradistinction to all others, should be irrepealable when once passed, that so extraordinary a principle would be left to mere implication? Such a supposition would be the highest injustice to the superior intelligence and patriotism of those gentlemen, manifested in every other part of the instrument. No, sir, they would have made notes of admiration: they would have used every mark, adopted every caution, to have arrested and fixed the attention of the Legislature to so extraordinary a principle.

They would have said, Legislators! Be circumspect! Be cautious! Be calm! Be deliberate! Be wise! Be wise not only for the present, but be wise for posterity! You are now about to tread upon holy ground. The law you are now about to pass, is irrepealable! Irrevokable! We are so enamored with the salutary and practical independence of the English Judiciary system, that in infusing its principle into our constitution, we have stamped it with the proverbial folly of the Medes and Persians! If this principle had been introduced into the constitution in express words, it would have formed an unfortunate contrast to all other parts of the instrument; yet gentlemen make no difficulty in introducing that principle by construction, which would have appeared so stupid and absurd if written in express words in the body of the instrument. But there is no such language in the constitution. Let us see what is the language of that instrument, "The Judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Here, then, instead of cautioning the Legislature that a law for the organization of courts, when passed, can never be repealed, it contains an invitation to a revision from time to time. It contains an intimation, that the subject is new and difficult, and an injunction to ordain and establish your courts from time to time, according to the results, which an experience of the system alone could suggest. The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. HEMPHILL) observed that the character of irrepealability was not exclusively attached to this law, and attempted to furnish instances of other laws of the same character. He instanced a law for the admission of a new State into the Union.

The gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. DAVIS) had given a proper reply to that remark; the strongest instance the gentleman gave, was of a law executed. After the new State is remitted into the Union, in virtue of a law for that purpose, the object of the law is answered. The State admitted has no stipulated duties to perform on its part, no services to render; in the case before the committee the law is in a state of execution, and the judges have services to render on their part which the competent tribunals may determine to be neither useful nor necessary. A law for the appropriation of money to a given object, may be adduced is an instance; the money is applied; its object is answered; the law may be said to be irrepealable, or, in other words, the repeal would produce no effect. That is not the case of the law in question. Mr. G. said he had no doubt but that the framers of the constitution had particular reference to the British act of Parliament of William III. for the establishment of the independence of the judges in that country, in framing the section for the establishment of the Judicial Department in the United States; and it is not a little remarkable, that whilst gentlemen in one breath speak of the independence of the English judges, as the boast and glory of that nation, in the next breath they tell us that by the repeal of the present act, the independence of the judges here would be immolated. Let this subject be examined. In the third chapter of the first book of Blackstone's Commentaries, the independence of the English Judiciary is fully explained. He begged to read the exposition of that commentator on that subject.

"And, in order to maintain both the dignity and
independence of the judges of the superior courts, it is
enacted by the statute, 13 W. III. c. 2, that their
commissions shall be made (not, as formerly, _durante bene
placito_, but) _quam diu bene se gesserint_, and their
salaries ascertained and established; but that it may be
lawful to remove them on the address of both Houses of
Parliament. And now, by the noble improvements of that law
in the statute of Geo. III. c. 23, enacted at the earnest
recommendation of the King himself, from the Throne, the
judges are continued in their offices during their good
behavior, notwithstanding any demise of the Crown, (which
was formerly held immediately to vacate their seats,) and
their full salaries are absolutely secured to them during
the continuance of their commissions. His Majesty having
been pleased to declare, that "he looked upon the
independence and uprightness of the judges, as essential to
the impartial administration of justice; as one of the best
securities of the rights and liberties of his subjects; and
as the most conducive to the honor of the Crown.""

Now, sir, under the doctrine contended for by the repeal of this law, let us see whether the judges of the United States are not more independent than the judges of England. In the first place, Congress have the power of originating, abolishing, modifying, &c., the courts here. The Parliament in England have the same power there. Congress cannot remove a judicial officer from his office so long as the office itself is deemed useful, except by impeachment, two-thirds of the Senate being necessary to a conviction. In England, judges can be removed from their offices, although the offices may be deemed useful, by an address of the majority of the two Houses of Parliament. Here then is one essential advantage in favor of the independence of the judges of the United States. Congress cannot diminish the compensation of the judges here during their continuance in office. In England, the Parliament may diminish the compensation of the judges, at their discretion, during their continuance in office. Here, then, is another obvious advantage in favor of the independence of the judges of the United States; whence is it, then, that we hear of the independence of the English judiciary, as being the boast and glory of that country, and with justice, too, and at the same time hear the cry of the immolation of the independence of the judges of the United States, when, under the interpretation of the constitution by the favorers of the repeal, the judges here are more independent than the English judges? It can have no other object than to excite a popular clamor, which, if excited at all, can have only a momentary effect, and will be dissipated as soon as the subject shall be thoroughly examined and understood. But it appeared to him, that if gentlemen really do value the independence of the judges, they have taken an unfortunate ground in the interpretation of the constitution. Under their construction, the judges may be placed not only in a dependent, but a ludicrous point of view.

Gentlemen admit that Congress may constitutionally increase or diminish the duties of judges; give or take away jurisdiction; fix the times of holding courts, &c., saving therefrom the salaries of the judges. Under this admission, Congress may postpone the sessions of the courts for eight or ten years, and establish others, to whom they could transfer all the powers of the existing courts. In this case, the judges would be held up to the people as pensioners, receiving their money and rendering no service in return; or Congress might convert them into mere courts of piepoudre, assigning them the most paltry duties to perform, and keep them continually in session, in inconvenient places; whilst new courts could be erected to perform all the essential business of the nation. This would be taking down the high pretensions assigned to the judges by the gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. HENDERSON,) of being formed into a permanent corps for the purpose of protecting the people against their worst enemies, themselves; and degrading them into pitiful courts of piepoudre, rendering little service and receiving large compensations. And this would be the case, if party purposes were the object, and not the general good. According to his construction, these absurd results could not take place, unless by a virtual breach of the constitution. Because, he contended, that service and compensation were correlative terms; and that there ought always to be a due apportionment of service to compensation. This he considered as the plain and sound interpretation of the constitution, and the moment it is departed from, infinite absurdities ensue. He intended to have taken another view of this subject, as it respects the relative influence of the law of the last session, and the proposed repeal upon this question; but the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. BACON) has put this subject in so much stronger point of view than he could do, that he would refer to his remarks thereupon, observing only that he had no doubt but that the law of last session, now proposed to be repealed, was, in every respect, as much opposed to the doctrine of gentlemen, as the contemplated repeal could be. The sections of the law particularly alluded to, are the twenty-fourth, in these words, "and be it further enacted, that the district courts of the United States, in and for the districts of Tennessee and Kentucky, shall be and are hereby abolished," and the twenty-seventh, in these words, "and be it further enacted, that the circuit courts of the United States, heretofore established, shall cease and be abolished."

Mr. G. concluded by observing that, upon the whole view of the subject, feeling the firmest conviction that there is no constitutional impediment in the way of repealing the act in question, upon the most fair and candid interpretation of the constitution:--believing that principles advanced in opposition, go directly to the destruction of the fundamental principle of the constitution, the responsibility of all public agents to the people--that they go to the establishment of a permanent corporation of individuals invested with ultimate censorial and controlling power over all the departments of the Government, over legislation, execution, and decision, and irresponsible to the people; believing that these principles are in direct hostility to the great principle of Representative Government; believing that the courts formerly established, were fully competent to the business they had to perform, and that the present courts are useless, unnecessary, and expensive; believing that the Supreme Court has heretofore discharged all the duties assigned to it in less than one month in the year, and that its duties could be performed in half that time; considering the compensations of the judges to be among the highest given to any of the highest officers of the United States for the services of the whole year; considering the compensations of all the judges greatly exceeding the services assigned them, as well as considering all the circumstances attending the substitution of the new system for the old one, by increasing the number of judges, and compensations, and lessening their duties by the distribution of the business into a great number of hands, &c., while acting under these impressions, he should vote against the motion now made for striking out the first section of the repealing bill.

FRIDAY, February 19.

_Judiciary System._

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act to repeal certain acts respecting the organization of the Courts of the United States, and for other purposes."

Mr. BAYARD.--Mr. Chairman, I must be allowed to express my surprise at the course pursued by the honorable gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. GILES,) in the remarks which he has made on the subject before us. I had expected that he would have adopted a different line of conduct. I had expected it as well from that sentiment of magnanimity which ought to have been inspired by a sense of the high ground he holds on the floor of this House, as from the professions of a desire to conciliate, which he has so repeatedly made during the session. We have been invited to bury the hatchet, and brighten the chain of peace. We were disposed to meet on middle ground. We had assurances from the gentleman that he would abstain from reflections on the past, and his only wish was that we might unite in future in promoting the welfare of our common country. We confided in the gentleman's sincerity, and cherished the hope that, if the divisions of party were not banished from the House, its spirit would be less intemperate. Such were our impressions, when the mask was suddenly thrown aside, and we saw the torch of discord lighted and blazing before our eyes. Every effort has been made to revive the animosities of the House, and inflame the passions of the nation. I am at no loss to perceive why this course has been pursued. The gentleman has been unwilling to rely upon the strength of his subject, and has therefore determined to make the measure a party question. He has probably secured success, but would it not have been more honorable and more commendable to have left the decision of a great constitutional question to the understanding, and not to the prejudices of the House? It was my ardent wish to discuss the subject with calmness and deliberation, and I did intend to avoid every topic which could awaken the sensibility of party. This was my temper and design when I took my seat yesterday. It is a course at present we are no longer at liberty to pursue. The gentleman has wandered far, very far, from the points of the debate, and has extended his animadversions to all the prominent measures of the former administrations. In following him through his preliminary observations, I necessarily lose sight of the bill upon your table.

The gentleman commenced his strictures with the philosophic observation, that it was the fate of mankind to hold different opinions as to the form of government which was preferable. That some were attached to the monarchal, while others thought the republican more eligible. This, as an abstract remark, is certainly true, and could have furnished no ground of offence, if it had not evidently appeared that an allusion was designed to be made to the parties in this country. Does the gentleman suppose that we have a less lively recollection than himself of the oath which we have taken to support the constitution; that we are less sensible of the spirit of our Government, or less devoted to the wishes of our constituents? Whatever impression it might be the intention of the gentleman to make, he does not believe that there exists in this country an anti-republican party. He will not venture to assert such an opinion on the floor of this House. That there may be a few individuals having a preference for monarchy is not improbable; but will the gentleman from Virginia, or any other gentleman, affirm, in his place, that there is a party in the country who wish to establish a monarchy? Insinuations of this sort belong not to the Legislature of the Union. Their place is an election ground or an alehouse. Within these walls they are lost; abroad, they have an effect, and I fear are still capable of abusing the popular credulity.

We were next told of the parties which have existed, divided by the opposite views of promoting the Executive power and guarding the rights of the people. The gentleman did not tell us in plain language, but he wished it to be understood, that he and his friends were the guardians of the people's rights, and that we were the advocates of Executive power.

I know that this is the distinction of party which some gentlemen have been anxious to establish; but this is not the ground on which we divide. I am satisfied with the constitutional powers of the Executive, and never wished nor attempted to increase them; and I do not believe that gentlemen on the other side of the House ever had a serious apprehension of danger from an increase of Executive authority. No, sir, our views as to the powers which do and ought to belong to the General and State Governments, are the true sources of our divisions. I co-operate with the party to which I am attached, because I believe their true object and end, is an honest and efficient support of the General Government, in the exercise of the legitimate powers of the constitution.

I pray to God I may be mistaken in the opinion I entertain as to the designs of gentlemen to whom I am opposed. Those designs I believe hostile to the powers of this Government. State pride extinguishes a national sentiment. Whatever is taken from this Government is given to the States.

The ruins of this Government aggrandize the States. There are States which are too proud to be controlled; whose sense of greatness and resource renders them indifferent to our protection, and induces a belief, that if no General Government existed, their influence would be more extensive, and their importance more conspicuous. There are gentlemen who make no secret of an extreme point of depression, to which the Government is to be sunk. To that point we are rapidly progressing. But I would beg gentlemen to remember, that human affairs are not to be arrested in their course, at artificial points. The impulse now given may be accelerated by causes at present out of view. And when those who now design well, wish to stop, they may find their powers unable to resist the torrent. It is not true that we ever wished to give a dangerous strength to Executive power. While the Government was in our hands, it was our duty to maintain its constitutional balance, by preserving the energies of each branch. There never was an attempt to vary the relation of its powers. The struggle was to maintain the constitutional powers of the Executive. The wild principles of French liberty were scattered through the country. We had our Jacobins and disorganizers. They saw no difference between a King and a President, and as the people of France had put down their King, they thought the people of America ought to put down their President. They who considered the constitution as securing all the principles of rational and practical liberty, who were unwilling to embark upon the tempestuous sea of revolution, in pursuit of visionary schemes, were denounced as monarchists. A line was drawn between the Government and the people, and the friends of the Government were marked as the enemies of the people. I hope, however, that the Government and the people are now the same; and I pray to God that what has been frequently remarked may not in this case be discovered to be true, that they who have the name of people the most often in their mouths, have their true interests the most seldom at their hearts.

The honorable gentleman from Virginia wandered to the very confines of the Federal Administration, in search of materials the most inflammable and most capable of kindling the passions of his party.

He represents the Government as seizing the first moment which presented itself to create a dependent moneyed interest, ever devoted to its views. What are we to understand by this remark of the gentleman? Does he mean to say that Congress did wrong in funding the public debt? Does he mean to say that the price of our liberty and independence ought not to have been paid? Is he bold enough to denounce this measure as one of the Federal victims marked for destruction? Is it the design to tell us that its day has not yet come, but is approaching; and that the funding system is to add to the pile of Federal ruins? Do I hear the gentleman say we will reduce the army to a shadow; we will give the navy to the worms; the mint, which presented the people with the emblems of their liberty, and of their sovereignty, we will abolish; the revenue shall depend upon the winds and waves; the judges shall be made our creatures, and the great work shall be crowned and consecrated by relieving the country from an odious and oppressive public debt? These steps, I presume, are to be taken in progression. The gentleman will pause at each, and feel the public pulse. As the fever increases he will proceed, and the moment of delirium will be seized to finish the great work of destruction.

The assumption of the State debts has been made an article of distinct crimination. It has been ascribed to the worst motives--to a design of increasing a dependent moneyed interest. Is it not well known that those debts were part of the price of our Revolution? That they rose in the exigency of our affairs, from the efforts of the particular States, at times when the Federal arm could not be extended to their relief? Each State was entitled to the protection of the Union, the defence was a common burden, and every State had a right to expect that the expenses attending its individual exertions in the general cause, would be reimbursed from the public purse. I shall be permitted further to add, that the United States, having absorbed the sources of State revenue, except direct taxation, which was required for the support of the State governments, the assumption of these debts was necessary to save some of the States from bankruptcy.

The internal taxes are made one of the crimes of the Federal Administration. They were imposed, says the gentleman, to create a host of dependents on Executive favor. This supposes the past administrations to have been not only very wicked, but very weak. They laid taxes in order to strengthen their influence. Who is so ignorant as not to know, that the imposition of a tax would create a hundred enemies for one friend? The name of excise was odious; the details of collection were unavoidably expensive, and it was to operate upon a part of the community least disposed to support public burdens, and most ready to complain of their weight. A little experience will give the gentleman a new idea of the patronage of this Government. He will find it not that dangerous weapon in the hands of the administration which he has heretofore supposed it; he will probably discover that the poison is accompanied by its antidote, and that an appointment of the Government, while it gives to the administration one lazy friend, will raise up against it ten active enemies. No! The motive ascribed for the imposition of the internal taxes is as unfounded as it is uncharitable. The Federal Administration, in creating burdens to support the credit of the nation, and to supply the means of its protection, knew that they risked the favor of those upon whom their power depended. They were willing to be the victims when the public good required.

The duties on imports and tonnage furnished a precarious revenue--a revenue at all times exposed to deficiency, from causes beyond our reach. The internal taxes offered a fund less liable to be impaired by accident--a fund which did not rob the mouth of labor, but was derived from the gratification of luxury. These taxes are an equitable distribution of the public burdens. Through this medium the Western country is enabled to contribute something to the expenses of a Government which has expended and daily expends such large sums for its defence. When these taxes were laid they were indispensable. With the aid of them it has been difficult to prevent an increase of the public debt. And notwithstanding the fairy prospects which now dazzle our eyes, I undertake to say, if you abolish them this session, you will be obliged to restore them or supply their place by a direct tax before the end of two years. Will the gentleman say, that the direct tax was laid in order to enlarge the bounds of patronage? Will he deny that this was a measure to which we had been urged for years by our adversaries, because they foresaw in it the ruin of Federal power? My word for it, no administration will ever be strengthened by a patronage united with taxes which the people are sensible of paying.

We were next told, that to get an army an Indian war was necessary. The remark was extremely bald, as the honorable gentleman did not allege a single reason for the position. He did not undertake to state that it was a wanton war, or provoked by the Government. He did not even venture to deny, that it was a war of defence, and entered into in order to protect our brethren on the frontiers from the bloody scalping-knife and murderous tomahawk of the savage. What ought the government to have done? Ought they to have estimated the value of the blood which probably would be shed, and the amount of the devastation likely to be committed before they determined on resistance? They raised an army, and after great expense and various fortune, they have secured the peace and safety of the frontiers. But why was the army mentioned on this occasion, unless to fore-warn us of the fate which awaits them, and to tell us that their days are numbered? I cannot suppose that the gentleman mentioned this little army, distributed on a line of three thousand miles, for the purpose of giving alarm to three hundred thousand free and brave yeomanry, ever ready to defend the liberties of the country.

The honorable gentleman proceeded to inform the committee, that the Government, availing itself of the depredations of the Algerines, created a navy. Did the gentleman mean to insinuate, that this war was invited by the United States? Has he any documents or proof to render the suspicion colorable? No, sir, he has none. He well knows that the Algerine aggressions were extremely embarrassing to the Government. When they commenced, we had no marine force to oppose to them. We had no harbors or places of shelter in the Mediterranean. A war with these pirates could be attended with neither honor nor profit. It might cost a great deal of blood, and in the end it might be feared that a contest so far from home, subject to numberless hazards and difficulties, could not be maintained. What would gentlemen have had the Government to do? I know there are those who are ready to answer: abandon the Mediterranean trade. But would this have done? The corsairs threatened to pass the Straits, and were expected in the Atlantic. Nay, sir, it was thought that our very coasts would not have been secure.

Will gentlemen go further, and say that the United States ought to relinquish their commerce. It has been said that we ought to be cultivators of the earth, and make the nations of Europe our carriers. This is not an occasion to examine the solidity of this opinion; but I will only ask, admitting the administration were disposed to turn the pursuits of the people of this country from the ocean to the land, whether there is a power in the Government, or whether there would be if we were as strong as the Government of Turkey, or even of France, to accomplish the object? With a sea-coast of seventeen hundred miles, with innumerable harbors and inlets, with a people enterprising beyond example, is it possible to say, you will have no ships or sailors, nor merchants? The people of this country will never consent to give up their navigation, and every administration will find themselves constrained to provide means to protect their commerce.

In respect to the Algerines, the late administration were singularly unfortunate. They were obliged to fight or pay them. The true policy was to hold a purse in one hand and a sword in the other. This was the policy of the Government. Every commercial nation in Europe was tributary to those petty barbarians. It was not esteemed disgraceful. It was an affair of calculation, and the administration made the best bargain in their power. They have heretofore been scandalized for paying tribute to a pirate, and now they are criminated for preparing a few frigates to protect our citizens from slavery and chains! Sir, I believe on this and many other occasions, if the finger of Heaven had pointed out a course, and the Government had pursued it, yet that they would not have escaped the censure and reproaches of their enemies.

We were told that the disturbances in Europe were made a pretext for augmenting the army and navy. I will not, Mr. Chairman, at present go into a detailed view of the events which compelled the Government to put on the armor of defence, and to resist by force the French aggressions. All the world know the efforts which were made to accomplish an amicable adjustment of differences with that power. It is enough to state, that ambassadors of peace were twice repelled from the shores of France with ignominy and contempt. It is enough to say, that it was not till after we had drunk the cup of humiliation to the dregs, that the national spirit was roused to a manly resolution, to depend only on their God and their own courage for protection. What, sir, did it grieve the gentleman that we did not crouch under the rod of the Mighty Nation, and, like the petty powers of Europe, tamely surrender our independence? Would he have had the people of the United States relinquish without a struggle those liberties which had cost so much blood and treasure? We had not, sir, recourse to arms, till the mouths of our rivers were choked with French corsairs; till our shores, and every harbor, were insulted and violated; till half our commercial capital had been seized, and no safety existed for the remainder but the protection of force. At this moment a noble enthusiasm electrized the country; the national pulse beat high, and we were prepared to submit to every sacrifice, determined only that our independence should be the last. At that time an American was a proud name in Europe; but I fear, much I fear, that in the course we are now likely to pursue, the time will soon arrive when our citizens abroad will be ashamed to acknowledge their country.

The measures of 1798 grew out of the public feelings; they were loudly demanded by the public voice. It was the people who drove the Government to arms, and not (as the gentleman expressed it) the Government which pushed the people to the X, Y, Z of the political designs before they understood the A, B, C of their political principles.

But what, sir, did the gentleman mean by his X, Y, Z? I must look for something very significant--something more than a quaintness of expression, or a play upon words--in what falls from a gentleman of his learning and ability. Did he mean that the dispatches which contained those letters were impostures, designed to deceive and mislead the people of America--intended to rouse a false spirit not justified by events? Though the gentleman had no respect for some of the characters of that embassy; though he felt no respect for the Chief Justice, or the gentleman appointed from South Carolina--two characters as pure, as honorable, as exalted, as any the country can boast of--yet I should have expected that he would have felt some tenderness for Mr. Gerry, in whom his party had since given proofs of undiminished confidence. Does the gentleman believe that Mr. Gerry would have joined in the deception, and assisted in fabricating a tale which was to blind his countrymen, and to enable the Government to destroy their liberties? Sir, I will not avail myself of the equivocations or confessions of Talleyrand himself; I say these gentlemen will not dare publicly to deny what is attested by the hand and seal of Mr. Gerry.

The truth of these despatches admitted, what was your Government to do? Give us, say the Directory, 1,200,000 livres for our own purse, and purchase $15,000,000 of Dutch debt, (which was worth nothing,) and we will receive your Ministers, and negotiate for peace.

It was only left to the Government to choose between an unconditional surrender of the honor and independence of the country, or a manly resistance. Can you blame, sir, the Administration for a line of conduct which has reflected on the nation so much honor, and to which, under God, it owes its present prosperity?

These are the events of the General Government which the gentleman has reviewed in succession, and endeavored to render odious or suspicious. For all this I could have forgiven him, but there is one thing for which I will not, I cannot forgive him--I mean this attempt to disturb the ashes of the dead; to disturb the ashes of the great and good WASHINGTON! Sir, I might degrade by attempting to eulogize this illustrious character. The work is infinitely beyond my powers. I will only say, that as long as exalted talents and virtues confer honor among men, the name of WASHINGTON will be held in veneration.