Chapter III: Categoriæ (4)

It is difficult to make out these Stoic theories clearly from the evidence before us. From the statements of Simplikius in Scholia, pp. 67-69, I cannot understand the line of distinction between [Greek: poia\] and [Greek: pô\s e)/chonta]. The Stoics considered [Greek: poio/tês] to be [Greek: du/namis plei/stôn e)poistikê\ sumptôma/tôn, ô(s ê( phro/nêsis tou= te phroni/môs peripatei=n kai\ tou= phron/môs diale/gesthai] (p. 69, b. 2); and if all these [Greek: sumptô/mata] were included under [Greek: poio/n], so that [Greek: o( phroni/môs peripatô=n, o( pu\x protei/nôn] and [Greek: o( tre/chôn], were [Greek: poioi/ tines] (p. 67, b. 34). I hardly see what was left for the third Category [Greek: pô\s e)/chonta] to comprehend; although, according to the indications of Plotinus, it would be the most comprehensive. The Stoic writers seem both to have differed among themselves and to have written inconsistently.

Neither Trendelenburg (Kategorienlehre, pp. 223-226), nor even Prantl, in his more elaborate account (Gesch. der Logik, pp. 429-437), clears up this obscurity.]

The Third Stoic Category ([Greek: pô\s e)/chon]) comprised a portion of what Aristotle ranked under _Quale_, and all that he ranked under _Quantum_, _Ubi_, _Quando_, _Agere_, _Pati_, _Jacere_, _Habere_. The fourth Stoic Category coincided with the Aristotelian _Ad Aliquid_. The third was thus intended to cover what were understood as absolute or non-relative Accidents; the fourth included what were understood as Relative Accidents.

The order of arrangement among the four was considered as fixed and peremptory. They were not co-ordinate species under one and the same genus, but superordinate and subordinate,[134] the second presupposing and attaching to the first; the third, presupposing and attaching to the first, _plus_ the second; the fourth, presupposing and attaching to the first, _plus_ the second and third. The first proposition to be made is, in answer to the question _Quale Quid_? You answer _Tale Aliquid_, declaring the essential attributes. Upon this, the next question is put, _Quali Modo se habens_? You answer by a term of the third Category, declaring one or more of the accidental attributes non-relative, _Tale Aliquid, tali Modo se habens_. Upon this, the fourth and last question follows, _Quali Modo se habens ad alia_? Answer is made by the predicate of the fourth Category, _i.e._ a Relative. _Hic Aliquis--homo_ (1), _niger_ (2), _servus_ (3).

[Footnote 134: Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, vol. i. pp. 428, 429; Simplikius ad Categor. fol. 43, A: [Greek: ka)kei=no a)/topon to\ su/ntheta poiei=n ta\ ge/nê e)k prote/rôn tinô=n kai\ deute/rôn ô(s to\ pro/s ti e)k poiou= kai\ pro/s ti.] Cf. Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1, 25-29.

Porphyry appears to include all [Greek: sumbebêko/ta] under [Greek: poio\n] and [Greek: pô\s e)/chon]: he gives as examples of the latter, what Aristotle would have assigned to the Category [Greek: kei=sthai] (Eisagoge, cc. 2, 10; Schol. Br. p. 1, b. 32, p. 5, a. 30).]

In comparing the ten Aristotelian with the four Stoic Categories we see that the first great difference is in the extent and comprehension of _Quale_, which Aristotle restricts on one side (by distinguishing from it _Essentia Secunda_), and enlarges on the other (by including in it many attributes accidental and foreign to the Essence). The second difference is, that the Stoics did not subdivide their third Category, but included therein all the matter of six Aristotelian Categories,[135] and much of the matter of the Aristotelian _Quale_. Both schemes agree on two points:--1. In taking as the point of departure the concrete, particular, individual, Substance. 2. In the narrow, restricted, inadequate conception formed of the Relative--_Ad Aliquid_.

[Footnote 135: Plotinus (Ennead. vi. 1. 80) disapproves greatly the number of disparates ranked under [Greek: to\ pô\s e)/chon], which has (he contends) no discoverable unity as a generic term. It is curious to see how he cites the Aristotelian Categories, as if the decuple distinction which they marked out were indefeasible.

Simplikius says that the Stoics distinguished between [Greek: to\ pro/s ti] and [Greek: to\ pro/s ti pô\s e)/chon]; and Trendelenburg, (pp. 228, 229) explains and illustrate this distinction, which, however, appears to be very obscure.]

Plotinus himself recognizes five _Summa_ or _Prima Genera_,[136] (he does not call them Categories) _Ens_, _Motus_, _Quies_, _Idem_, _Diversum_; the same as those enumerated in the Platonic Sophistes. He does not admit _Quantum_, _Quale_, or _Ad Aliquid_, to be _Prima Genera_; still less the other Aristotelian Categories. Moreover, he insists emphatically on the distinction between the intelligible and the sensible world, which distinction he censures Aristotle for neglecting. His five _Genera_ he applies directly and principally to the intelligible world. For the sensible world he admits ultimately five Catgories; _Substantia_ or _Essentia_ (though he conceives this as fluctuating between Form, Matter, and the Compound of the two), _Ad Aliquid_, _Quantum_, _Quale_, _Motus_. But he doubts whether _Quantum_, _Quale_, and _Motus_, are not comprehended in _Ad Aliquid_.[137] He considers, moreover, that Sensible Substance is not Substance, properly speaking, but only an imitation thereof; a congeries of non-substantial elements, qualities and matter.[138] Dexippus,[139] in answering the objections of Plotinus, insists much on the difference between Aristotle's point of view in the Categoriæ, in the Physica, and in the Metaphysica. In the Categoriæ, Aristotle dwells mainly on sensible substances (such as the vulgar understand) and the modes of naming and describing them.

[Footnote 136: Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 2, 8, 14, 16.]

[Footnote 137: Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 3. 3. [Greek: ê)\ kai\ tau=ta ei)s ta\ pro/s ti; periektiko\n ga\r ma=llon.] His idea of Relation is more comprehensive than that of Aristotle, for he declares that terms, propositions, discourse, &c., are [Greek: pro/s ti; kath' o(\ sêmantika/] (vi. 3. 19).]

[Footnote 138: Ibid. vi. 3. 8-15.]

[Footnote 139: The second and third books of Dexippus's Dialogue contain his answers to many of the objections urged by Plotinus. Aristotle, in the Categoriæ (Dexippus says), accommodates himself both to the received manner of speaking and to the simple or ordinary conception of [Greek: ou)si/a] entertained by youth or unphilosophical men--[Greek: ou)/te ga\r peri\ tô=n o)/ntôn, ou)/te peri\ tô=n genô=n tê=s prô/tês ou)si/as nu=n au)tô=| pro/keitai le/gein; stocha/zetai ga\r tô=n ne/ôn toi=s a(plouste/rois e)pakolouthei=n duname/nôn] (p. 49). Compare also pp. 50-54, where Dexippus contrasts the more abstruse handling which we read in the Physica and Metaphysica, with the more obvious and unpretending thoughts worked out by Aristotle in the Categoriæ. Dexippus gives an interesting piece of advice to his pupil, that he should vary his mode of discussing these topics, according as his companions are philosophical or otherwise--[Greek: e)gô\ me\n ou)=n, ô)= kale\ ka)gathe\ Se/leuke, dogmatikô/teron pro\s Plôti=non a)pantô=, su\ de/, e)pei\ bathu/terai/ pôs ei)si\n ai( lu/seis au(=tai, pro\s me\n tou=s e)k philosophi/as o(rmôme/nous tai=s toiau/tais a)pantê/sesi chrô=, pro\s de\ tou\s o)li/ga e)pistame/nous tô=n dogma/tôn tai=s prochei/rois chrô= dialu/sesin, e)kei=no le/gôn, _o(/ti peri\ po/da poiei=sthai e)/thos ta\s a)kroa/seis A)ristote/lei;_ dio\ kai\ nu=n ou)de\n e)/xôthen e)peisa/gei tô=n a)nôte/rô keime/nôn philosophêma/tôn], &c. (pp. 50, 51).]

Galen also recognizes five Categories; but not the same five as Plotinus. He makes a new list, formed partly out of the Aristotelian ten, partly out of the Stoic four:--[Greek: Ou)si/a, poso/n, poio/n, _pro/s ti_, pro/ ti pô\s e)/chon].[140]

[Footnote 140: Schol. ad Categor. p. 49 a. 30.]

. . . . . .

The latter portion of this Aristotelian treatise, on the Categories or Predicaments, consists of an Appendix, usually known under the title of 'Post-Predicamenta;'[141] wherein the following terms or notions are analysed and explained--_Opposita_, _Prius_, _Simul_, _Motus_, _Habere_.

[Footnote 141: Andronikus and other commentators supposed the Post-Predicamenta to have been appended to the Categoriæ by some later hand. Most of the commentators dissented from this view. The distinctions and explanations seem all Aristotelian.]

Of _Opposita_, Aristotle reckons four modes, analogous to each other, yet not different species under the same genus:[142]--1. _Relative-Opposita_--_Relatum_ and _Correlatum_. 2. _Contraria_. 3. _Habitus_ and _Privatio_. 4. _Affirmatio_ and _Negatio_.

[Footnote 142: Categ. p. 11, b. 16: [Greek: peri\ de\ tô=n a)ntikeime/nôn, posachô=s ei)/ôthen a)ntikei=sthai r(ête/on.] See Simpl. in Schol. p. 81, a. 37-b. 24. Whether Aristotle reckoned [Greek: ta\ a)ntikei/mena] a true genus or not, was debated among the commentators. The word [Greek: posachô=s] implies that he did not; and he treats even the term [Greek: e)nanti/a] as a [Greek: pollachô=s lego/menon], though it is less wide in its application than [Greek: a)ntikei/mena], which includes _Relata_ (Metaphys. I. p. 1055, a. 17). He even treats [Greek: ste/rêsis] as a [Greek: pollachô=s lego/menon] (p. 1055, a. 34).

[Greek: Ai( a)ntithe/seis te/ssares], the four distinct varieties of [Greek: ta\ a)ntikei/mena] are enumerated by Aristotle in various other places:--Topic. ii. p. 109, b. 17; p. 113, b. 15; Metaphys. I. p. 1055, a. 38. In Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1018, a. 20, two other varieties are added. Bonitz observes (ad Metaph. p. 247) that Aristotle seems to treat this quadripartite distribution of _Opposita_, "tanquam certum et exploratum, pariter ac causarum numerum," &c.]

These four modes of opposition have passed from the Categoriæ of Aristotle into all or most of the modern treatises on Logic. The three last of the four are usefully classed together, and illustrated by their contrasts with each other. But as to the first of the four, I cannot think that Aristotle has been happy in the place which he has assigned to it. To treat _Relativa_ as a variety of _Opposita_, appears to me an inversion of the true order of classification; placing the more comprehensive term in subordination to the less comprehensive. Instead of saying that Relatives are a variety of the Opposite, we ought rather to say that Opposites are varieties of the Relative. We have here another proof of what has been remarked a few pages above; the narrow and inadequate conception which Aristotle formed of his _Ad Aliquid_ or the Relative; restricting it to cases in which the describing phrase is grammatically elliptical.[143] The three classes last-mentioned by Aristotle (1. _Contraria_, 2. _Habitus_ and _Privatio_, 3. _Affirmatio_ and _Negatio_) are truly _Opposita_; in each there is a different mode of opposition, which it is good to distinguish from the others. But the _Relatum_ and its _Correlatum_, as such, are not necessarily _Opposite_ at all; they are compared or conceived in conjunction with each other; while a name, called relative, which connotes such comparison, &c., is bestowed upon each. _Opposita_ fall under this general description, as parts (together with other parts not _Opposita_) of a larger whole. They ought properly to be called _Opposite-Relativa_: the phrase _Relative-Opposita_, as applied to Relatives generally, being discontinued as incorrect.[144]

[Footnote 143: Categ. p. 11, b. 24.

Ammonius and Simplikius inform us that there was much debate among the commentators about these four alleged varieties of [Greek: a)ntikei/mena]; also, that even Aristotle himself had composed a special treatise (not now extant), [Greek: Peri\ tô=n A)ntikeime/nôn], full of perplexing [Greek: a)pori/ai], which the Stoics afterwards discussed without solving (Schol. p. 83, a. 15-48). Herminus and others seem to have felt the difficulty of calling all Relatives [Greek: a)ntikei/mena]; for they admitted that the antithesis between the Relative and its Correlate was of gentler character, not conflicting, but reciprocally sustaining. Alexander ingeniously compared _Relatum_ and its _Correlatum_ to the opposite rafters of a roof, each supporting the other ([Greek: malakô/tera kai\ ê(=tton macho/mena e)n toi=s a)ntikeime/nois, ô(s _ kai\ a)mphiba/lesthai ei) ei)si\n a)ntikei/mena sô/zonta a)/llêla;_ a)lla\ tou=to me\n dei/knusin A)le/xandros o(/ti a)ntikei/mena, o(\s kai\ ta\ labdoeidê= xu/la paradei=gma lamba/nei], &c., Schol. p. 81, b. 32; p. 82, a. 15, b. 20). This is an undue enlargement of the meaning of _Opposita_, by taking in the literal material sense as an adjunct to the logical. On the contrary, the Stoics are alleged to have worked out the views of Aristotle about [Greek: e)nanti/a], but to have restricted the meaning of [Greek: **a)ntikei/mena] to contradictory opposition, _i. e._ to Affirmative and Negative Propositions with the same subject and predicate (Schol. p. 83, b. 11; p. 87, a. 29). In Metaphysica, A. 983, a. 31, Aristotle calls the final cause ([Greek: to\ ou(= e(/neka kai\ ta)gatho/n) tê\n a)ntikeime/nên ai)ti/an] to the cause (among his four), [Greek: to\ **o(/then ê( ki/nêsis]. This is a misleading phrase; the two are not opposed, but mutually implicated and correlative.]

[Footnote 144: See the just and comprehensive definition of Relative Names given by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his System of Logic, Book I. chap. ii. § 7, p. 46.

After reading that definition, the inconvenience of ranking Relatives as a species or variety of Opposites, will be seen at once.]

From _Opposita_ Aristotle passes to _Prius_ and _Simul_; with the different modes of each.[145] _Successive_ and _Synchronous_, are the two most general classes under which facts or events can be cast. They include between them all that is meant by Order in Time. They admit of no definition, and can be explained only by appeal to immediate consciousness in particular cases. Priority and Simultaneity, in this direct and primary sense, are among the clearest and most impressive notions of the human mind. But Aristotle recognizes four additional meanings of these same words, which he distinguishes from the primary, in the same way as he distinguishes (in the ten Categories) the different meanings of _Essentia_, in a gradually descending scale of analogy. The secondary _Prius_ is that which does not reciprocate according to the order of existence with its _Posterius_; where the _Posterius_ presupposes the _Prius_, while the _Prius_ does not presuppose the _Posterius_: for example, given two, the existence of one is necessarily implied; but given one, the existence of two is not implied.[146] The tertiary _Prius_ is that which comes first in the arrangements of science or discourse: as, in geometry, point and line are prior as compared with the diagrams and demonstrations; in writing, letters are prior as compared with syllables; in speeches, the proem is prior as compared with the exposition. A fourth mode of _Prius_ (which is the most remote and far-fetched) is, that the better and more honourable is _prius naturâ_. Still a fifth mode is, when, of two Relatives which reciprocate with each other as to existence, one is cause and the other effect: in such a case, the cause is said to be prior by nature to the effect.[147] For example, if it be a fact that Caius exists, the proposition "Caius exists," is a true proposition; and _vice versâ_, if the proposition "Caius exists" is a true proposition, it is a fact that Caius exists. But though from either **of these you can infer the other, the truth of the proposition is the effect, and not the cause, of the reality of the fact. Hence it is correct to say that the latter is _prius naturâ_, and the former _posterius naturâ_.

[Footnote 145: Categ. p. 14, a. 26, seq.]

[Footnote 146: Ibid. p. 14, a. 29, seq. This second mode of _Prius_ is entitled by Alexander (see Schol. (ad Metaphys. [Greek: D].) p. 707, b. 7, Brandis) [Greek: pro/teron tê=| phu/sei]. But Aristotle does not so call it here; he reserves that title for the fourth and fifth modes.

It appears that debates, [Greek: Peri\ Prote/rou kai\ U(ste/rou] were frequent in the dialectic schools of Aristotle's day as well as debates, [Greek: Peri\ Tau)tou= kai\ E(te/rou, Peri\ O(moi/ou kai\ A)nomoi/ou, Peri\ Tau)to/têtos kai\ E)nantio/têtos] (Arist. Metaph. B. p. 995, b. 20).]

[Footnote 147: Aristot. Categ. p. 14, b. 10.]

This is a sort of article in a Philosophical Dictionary, tracing the various derivative senses of two very usual correlative phrases; and there is another article in the fourth book of the Metaphysica, where the derivations of the same terms are again traced out, though by roads considerably different.[148] The two terms are relatives; _Prius_ implies a _Posterius_, as _Simul_ implies another _Simul_; and it is an useful process to discriminate clearly the various meanings assigned to each. Aristotle has done this, not indeed clearly nor consistently with himself, but with an earnest desire to elucidate what he felt to be confused and perplexing. Yet there are few terms in his philosophy which are more misleading. Though he sets out, plainly and repeatedly the primary and literal sense of Priority, (the temporal or real), as discriminated from the various secondary and metaphorical senses, nevertheless when he comes to employ the term _Prius_ in the course of his reasonings, he often does so without specifying in which sense he intends it to be understood. And as the literal sense (temporal or real priority) is the most present and familial to every man's mind, so the term is often construed in this sense when it properly bears only the metaphorical sense. The confusion of logical or emotional priority (priority either in logical order of conception, or in esteem and respect) with priority in the order of time, involving separability of existence, is a frequent source of misunderstanding in the Aristotelian Physics and Metaphysics. The order of logical antecedence and sequence, or the fact of logical coexistence, is of great importance to be understood, with a view to the proof of truth, to the disproof of error, or to the systematization of our processes of thought; but we must keep in mind that what is prior in the logical order is not for that reason prior in temporal order, orf separable in real existence, or fit to be appealed to as a real Cause or Agent.[149]

[Footnote 148: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1018, b. 11-p. 1019, a. 12. The article in the Metaphysica is better and fuller than that in the Categoriæ. In this last, _Order in Place_ receives no special recognition, while we find such recognition in the Metaphysica, and we find also fuller development of the varieties of the logical or intellectual _Prius_.]

[Footnote 149: In the language of Porphyry, [Greek: prou+phe/stêke] (priority in real existence) means nothing more than [Greek: proe+pinoei=tai] (priority in the order of conception), Eisagoge, cc. xv., xvi.; Schol. Br. p. 6, a. 7-21.]