Chapter IV: De Interpretatione (1)

In the preceding chapter I enumerated and discussed what Aristotle calls the Categories. We shall now proceed to the work which stands second in the aggregate called the Organon--the treatise De Interpretatione.

We have already seen that the Aristotelian Ontology distinguishes one group of varieties of _Ens_ (or different meanings of the term _Ens_) as corresponding to the diversity of the ten Categories; while recognizing also another variety of _Ens_ as _Truth_, with its antithesis _Non-Ens_ as _Falsehood_.[1] The former group was dealt with in the preceding chapter; the latter will form the subject of the present chapter. In both, indeed, Ontology is looked at as implicated with Logic; that is, _Ens_ is considered as distributed under significant names, fit to be coupled in propositions. This is the common basis both of the Categoriæ and of the treatise De Interpretatione. The whole classification of the Categories rests on the assumption of the proposition with its constituent parts, and on the different relation borne by each of the nine _genera_ of predicates towards their common Subject. But in the Categoriæ no account was taken of the distinction between truth and falsehood, in the application of these predicates to the Subject. If we say of Sokrates, that he is fair, pug-nosed, brave, wise, &c., we shall predicate truly; if we say that he is black, high-nosed, cowardly, stupid, &c., we shall predicate falsely; but in each case our predicates will belong to the same Category--that of _Quale_. Whether we describe him as he now is, standing, talking, in the market-place at Athens; or whether we describe him as he is not, sitting down, singing, in Egypt--in both speeches, our predicates rank under the same Categories, _Jacere_, _Agere_, _Ubi_. No account is taken in the Categoriæ of the distinction between true and false application of predicates; we are only informed under what number of general heads all our predicates must be included, whether our propositions be true or false in each particular case.

[Footnote 1: See above in the preceding chapter, p. 60.]

But this distinction between _true_ and _false_, which remained unnoticed in the Categoriæ, comes into the foreground in the treatise De Interpretatione. The Proposition, or enunciative speech,[2] is distinguished from other varieties of speech (interrogative, precative, imperative) by its communicating what is true or what is false. It is defined to be a complex significant speech, composed of two terms at least, each in itself significant, yet neither of them, separately taken, communicating truth or falsehood. The terms constituting the Proposition are declared to be a Noun in the nominative case, as Subject, and a Verb, as Predicate; this latter essentially connoting time, in order that the synthesis of the two may become the enunciation of a fact or quasi-fact, susceptible of being believed or disbelieved. All this mode of analysing a proposition, different from the analysis thereof given or implied in the Categoriæ, is conducted with a view to bring out prominently its function of imparting true or false information. The treatise called the Categoriæ is a theory of significant names subjicible and predicable, fit to serve as elements of propositions, but not yet looked at as put together into actual propositions; while in the treatise De Interpretatione they are assumed to be put together, and a theory is given of Propositions thus completed.

[Footnote 2: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 17, a. 1: [Greek: lo/gos a)pophantiko/s].]

Words spoken are marks significant of mental impressions associated with them both by speaker and hearer; words written are symbols of those thus uttered. Both speech and writing differ in different nations, having no natural connection with the things signified. But these last, the affections or modifications of the mind, and the facts or objects of which they are representations or likenesses, are the same to all. Words are marks primarily and directly of the first, secondarily and indirectly of the second.[3] Aristotle thus recognizes these two aspects--first, the subjective, next the objective, as belonging, both of them conjointly, to significant language, yet as logically distinguishable; the former looking to the proximate _correlatum_, the latter to the ultimate.

[Footnote 3: Ibid. p. 16, a. 3, seq. [Greek: ô(\n me/ntoi tau=ta sêmei=a prô/tôs, tau)ta\ pa=si pathê/mata tê=s psuchê=s, kai\ ô(=n tau=ta o(moiô/mata, pra/gmata ê)/dê tau)ta/.]]

For this doctrine, that the mental affections of mankind, and the things or facts which they represent, are the same everywhere, though the marks whereby they are signified differ, Aristotle refers us to his treatise De Animâ, to which he says that it properly belongs.[4] He thus recognizes the legitimate dependence of Logic on Psychology or Mental Philosophy.

[Footnote 4: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 16, a. 8: [Greek: peri\ me\n ou)=n tau/tôn ei)/rêtai e)n toi=s peri\ psuchê=s; a)/llês ga\r pragmatei/as.] It was upon this reference, mainly, that Andronikus the Rhodian rested his opinion, that the treatise De Interpretatione was not the work of Aristotle. Andronikus contended that there was nothing in the De Animâ to justify the reference. But Ammonius in his Scholia (p. 97, Brand.) makes a sufficient reply to the objection of Andronikus. The third book De Animâ (pp. 430, 431) lays down the doctrine here alluded to. Compare Torstrick's Commentary, p. 210.]

That which is signified by words (either single or in combination) is some variety of these mental affections or of the facts which they represent. But the signification of a single Term is distinguished, in an important point, from the signification of that conjunction of terms which we call a Proposition. A noun, or a verb, belonging to the aggregate called a language, is associated with one and the same phantasm[5] or notion, without any conscious act of conjunction or disjunction, in the minds of speakers and hearers: when pronounced, it arrests for a certain time the flow of associated ideas, and determines the mind to dwell upon that particular group which is called its meaning.[6] But neither the noun nor the verb, singly taken, does more than this; neither one of them affirms, or denies, or communicates any information true or false. For this last purpose, we must conjoin the two together in a certain way, and make a Proposition. The signification of the Proposition is thus specifically distinct from that of either of its two component elements. It communicates what purports to be matter of fact, which may be either true or false; in other words, it implies in the speaker, and raises in the hearer, the state of belief or disbelief, which does not attach either to the noun or to the verb separately. Herein the Proposition is discriminated from other significant arrangements of words (precative, interrogative, which convey no truth or falsehood), as well as from its own component parts. Each of these parts, noun and verb, has a significance of its own; but these are the ultimate elements of speech, for the parts of the noun or of the verb have no significance at all. The Verb is distinguished from the Noun by connoting time, and also by always serving as predicate to some noun as subject.[7]

[Footnote 5: Ibid. p. 16, a. 13: [Greek: ta\ me\n ou)=n o)no/mata au)ta\ kai\ ta\ r(ê/mata e)/oike tô=| a)/neu diaire/seôs kai\ sunthe/seôs noê/mati, oi(=on to\ a)/nthrôpos kai\ to\ leuko/n, o(/tan mê\ proste/thê| ti; ou)/te ga\r pseu=dos ou)/te a)lêthe/s pô.]]

[Footnote 6: Ibid. p. 16, b. 19: [Greek: au)ta\ me\n kath' e(auta\ lego/mena ta\ r(ê/mata o)no/mata/ e)sti kai\ sêmai/nei ti (_i(/stêsi ga\r o( le/gôn tê\n dia/noian_, kai\ _o( a)kou/sas ê)re/mêsen_) a)ll' ei) e)sti\n ê)\ mê/, ou)/pô sêmai/nei], &c.

Compare Analyt. Poster. II. xix. pp. 99, 100, where the same doctrine occurs: the movement of association is stopped, and the mind is determined to dwell upon a certain idea; one among an aggregate of runaways being arrested in flight, another halts also, and so the rest in succession, until at length the Universal, or the sum total, is detained, or "stands still" as an object of attention. Also Aristot. Problem. p. 956, b. 39.]

[Footnote 7: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 16, b. 2, seq.]

Aristotle intimates his opinion, distinctly and even repeatedly, upon the main question debated by Plato in the Kratylus. He lays it down that all significant speech is significant by convention only, and not by nature or as a natural instrument.[8] He tells us also that, in this treatise, he does not mean to treat of all significant speech, but only of that variety which is known as _enunciative_. This last, as declaring truth or falsehood, is the only part belonging to Logic as he conceives it; other modes of speech, the precative, imperative, interrogative, &c., belong more naturally to Rhetoric or Poetic.[9] Enunciative speech may be either simple or complex; it may be one enunciation, declaring one predicate (either in one word or in several words) of one subject; or it may comprise several such.[10] The conjunction of the predicate with the subject constitutes the variety of proposition called Affirmation; the disjunction of the same two is Negation or Denial.[11] But such conjunction or disjunction, operated by the cogitative act, between two mental states, takes place under the condition that, wherever conjunction may be enunciated, there also disjunction may be enunciated, and _vice versâ_. Whatever may be affirmed, it is possible also to deny; whatever may be denied, it is possible also to affirm.[12]

[Footnote 8: Ibid. p. 16, a. 26; p. 17, a. 2.]

[Footnote 9: Ibid. p. 17, a. 6: [Greek: _o( de\ a)pophantiko\s tê=s nu=n theôri/as_]. See the **Scholion of Ammonius, pp. 95, 96, 108, a. 27. In the last passage, Ammonius refers to a passage in one of the lost works of Theophrastus, wherein that philosopher distinguished [Greek: to\n a)pophantiko\n lo/gon] from the other varieties of [Greek: lo/gos], by the difference of [Greek: sche/sis]: the [Greek: a)pophantiko\s lo/gos] was [Greek: pro\s ta\ pra/gmata], or _objective_; the others were [Greek: pro\s tou\s a)kroôme/nous], _i.e._ varying with the different varieties of hearers, or _subjective_.]

[Footnote 10: Ibid. p. 17, a. 25.]

[Footnote 11: Ibid. p. 17, a. 25.]

[Footnote 12: Ibid. p. 17, a. 30: [Greek: a(/pan a)\n e)nde/choito kai\ o(\ kate/phêse/ tis a)pophê=sai, kai\ o(\ a)pe/phêse/ tis kataphê=sai.]]

To every affirmative proposition there is thus opposed a contradictory negative proposition; to every negative a contradictory affirmative. This pair of contradictory opposites may be called an _Antiphasis_; always assuming that the predicate and subject of the two shall be really the same, without equivocation of terms--a proviso necessary to guard against troublesome puzzles started by Sophists.[13] And we must also distinguish these propositions opposite as _Contradictories_, from propositions opposite as _Contraries_. For this, it has to be observed that there is a distinction among things ([Greek: pra/gmata]) as universal or singular, according as they are, in their nature, predicable of a number or not: _homo_ is an example of the first, and _Kallias_ is an example of the second. When, now, we affirm a predicate universally, we must attach the mark of universality to the subject and not to the predicate; we must say, Every man is white, No man is white. We cannot attach the mark of universality to the predicate, and say, Every man is every animal; this would be untrue.[14] An affirmation, then, is _contradictorily_ opposed to a negation, when one indicates that the subject is universally taken, and the other, that the subject is taken not universally, _e.g. Omnis homo est albus_, _Non omnis homo est albus_; _Nullus homo est albus_, _Est aliquis homo albus_. The opposition is _contrary_, when the affirmation is universal, and the negation is also universal, _i.e._, when the subject is marked as universally taken in each: for example, _Omnis homo est albus_, _Nullus homo est albus_. Of these contrary opposites, both cannot be true, but both may be false. Contradictory opposites, on the other hand, while they cannot both be true, cannot both be false; one must be false and the other true. This holds also where the subject is a singular term, as Sokrates.[15] If, however, an universal term appear as subject in the proposition _indefinitely_, that is, without any mark of universality whatever, _e.g._, Est albus homo_, _Non est albus homo_, then the affirmative and negative are not necessarily either contrary or contradictory, though they may be so sometimes: there is no opposition, properly speaking, between them; both may alike be true. This last observation (says Aristotle) will seem strange, because many persons suppose that _Non est homo albus_ is equivalent to _Nullus homo est albus_; but the meaning of the two is not the same, nor does the truth of the latter follow from that of the former,[16] since _homo_ in the former may be construed as not universally taken.

[Footnote 13: Ibid. p. 17, a. 33: [Greek: _kai\ e)/stô a)nti/phasis tou=to_, kata/phasis kai\ a)po/phasis ai( a)ntikei/menai.]

It seems (as Ammonius observes, Schol. p. 112, a. 33) that [Greek: a)nti/phasis] in this sense was a technical term, introduced by Aristotle.]

[Footnote 14: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 17, a. 37-b. 14: [Greek: e)pei\ d' e)sti\ ta\ me\n katho/lou tô=n pragma/tôn, ta\ de\ kath' e(/kaston (le/gô de\ katho/lou me\n o(\ e)pi\ pleio/nôn pe/phuke katêgorei=sthai, kath' e(/kaston de\ o(\ mê\, oi(=on a)/nthrôpos me\n tô=n katho/lou, Kalli/as de\ tô=n kath' e(/kaston);] &c. Ammonius (in Schol. p. 113, a. 38) says that what is predicated, either of many subjects or of one, must be [Greek: mi/a phu/sis].

The warning against quantifying the predicate appears in this logical treatise of Aristotle, and is repeated in the Analytica Priora, I. xxvii. p. 43, b. 17. Here we have: [Greek: ou)demi/a kata/phasis a)lêthê\s e)/stai, e)n ê(=| tou= katêgoroume/nou katho/lou to\ katho/lou katêgorei=tai, oi(=on e)/sti pa=s a)/nthrôpos pa=n zô=|on] (b. 14).]

[Footnote 15: Ibid. b. 16-29.]

[Footnote 16: Ibid. p. 17, b. 29-37. Mr. John Stuart Mill (System of Logic, Bk. I. ch. iv. s. 4) cites and approves Dr. Whately's observation, that the recognition of a class of Propositions called _indefinite_ "is a solecism, of the same nature as that committed by grammarians when in their list of genders they enumerate the _doubtful_ gender. The speaker _must mean_ to assert the proposition either as an universal or as a particular proposition, though he has failed to declare which."

But Aristotle would not have admitted Dr. Whately's doctrine, declaring what the speaker "_must mean_." Aristotle fears that his class, _indefinite_, will appear impertinent, because many speakers are not conscious of any distinction or transition between the particular and the general. The looseness of ordinary speech and thought, which Logic is intended to bring to view and to guard against, was more present to his mind than to that of Dr. Whately: moreover, the forms of Greek speech favoured the ambiguity.

Aristotle's observation illustrates the deficiencies of common speaking, as to clearness and limitation of meaning, at the time when he began to theorize on propositions.

I think that Whately's assumption--"the speaker _must mean_"--is analogous to the assumption on which Sir W. Hamilton founds his proposal for explicit quantification of the predicate, viz., that the speaker _must_, implicitly or mentally, quantify the predicate; and that his speech ought to be such as to make such quantification explicit. Mr. Mill has shewn elsewhere that this assumption of Sir. W. Hamilton's is incorrect.]

It thus appears that there is always one negation corresponding to one and the same affirmation; making up together the _Antiphasis_, or pair of contradictory opposites, quite distinct from contrary opposites. By _one_ affirmation we mean, that in which there is one predicate only, and one subject only, whether taken universally or not universally:--

_E.g._ Omnis homo est albus ... ... Non omnis homo est albus.
Est homo albus ... ... ... Non est homo albus.
Nullus homo est albus ... ... Aliquis homo est albus.

But this will only hold on the assumption that _album_ signifies one and the same thing. If there be one name signifying two things not capable of being generalized into one nature, or not coming under the same definition, then the affirmation is no longer one.[17] Thus if any one applies the term _himation_ to signify both horse and man, then the proposition, _Est himation album_, is not one affirmation, but two; it is either equivalent to _Est homo albus_ and _Est equus albus_--or it means nothing at all; for this or that individual man is not a horse. Accordingly, in this case also, as well as in that mentioned above, it is not indispensable that one of the two propositions constituting the _Antiphasis_ should be true and the other false.[18]

[Footnote 17: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 18, a. 13, seq.: [Greek: mi/a de/ e)sti kata/phasis kai\ a)po/phasis ê( e(\n kath' e(no\s sêmai/nousa, ê)\ katho/lou o)/ntos katho/lou ê)\ mê\ o(moi/ôs, oi(=on pa=s a)/nthrôpos leuko/s e)stin . . . _ei) to\ leuko\n e(\n sêmai/nei_. ei) de\ duoi=n e(\n o)/noma kei=tai, e)x ô(=n _mê/ e)stin e(/n_, ou) mi/a kata/phasis], &c., and the Scholion of Ammonius, p. 116, b. 6, seq.]

[Footnote 18: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 18, a. 26. The example which Aristotle here gives is one of a _subject_ designated by an equivocal name; when he had begun with the _predicate_. It would have been more pertinent if he had said at first, [Greek: ei) o( a)/nthrôpos e(\n sêmai/nei].]

With these exceptions Aristotle lays it down, that, in every _Antiphasis_, one proposition must be true and the other must be false. But (he goes on to say) this is only true in regard to matters past or present; it is not true in regard to events particular and future. To admit it in regard to these latter, would be to affirm that the sequences of events are all necessary, and none of them casual or contingent; whereas we know, by our own personal experience, that many sequences depend upon our deliberation and volition, and are therefore not necessary. If all future sequences are necessary, deliberation on our part must be useless. We must therefore (he continues) recognize one class of sequences which are not uniform--not predetermined by antecedents; events which _may_ happen, but which also _may not_ happen, for they will not happen. Thus, my coat _may_ be cut into two halves, but it never _will_ be so cut; it will wear out without any such bisection occurring.[19]

[Footnote 19: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 18, a. 28-p. 19, b. 4.]

If you affirm the reality of a fact past or present, your affirmation is of necessity determinately true, or it is determinately false, _i.e._ the contradictory negation is determinately true. But if you affirm the reality of a fact to come, then your affirmation is not by necessity determinately true, nor is the contradictory negation determinately true. Neither the one nor the other separately is true: nothing is true except the disjunctive antithesis as a whole, including both. If you say, To-morrow there will either be a sea-fight, or there will not be a sea-fight, this disjunctive or indeterminate proposition, taken as a whole, will be true. Yet neither of its constituent parts will be determinately true; neither the proposition, To-morrow there will be a sea-fight, nor the proposition, To-morrow there will not be a sea-fight. But if you speak with regard to past or present--if you say, Yesterday either there was a sea-fight or there was not a sea-fight--then not only will the disjunctive as a whole be true, but also one or other of its parts will be determinately true.[20]

[Footnote 20: Ibid. p. 18, b. 29. Ammonius (Scholia ad De Interpret. p. 119, bb. 18, 28, seq.) expresses Aristotle's meaning in terms more distinct than Aristotle himself: [Greek: mê\ pa/ntôs e)/chein to\ e(/teron mo/rion tê=s a)ntipha/seôs _a)phôrisme/nôs a)lêtheu=on_], &c. (b. 43).]

This remarkable logical distinction is founded on Aristotle's ontological or physical doctrines respecting the sequence and conjunction of events. He held (as we shall see more fully in the Physica and other treatises) that sequences throughout the Kosmos were to a certain extent regular, to a certain extent irregular. The exterior sphere of the Kosmos (the _Aplan=es_) with the countless number of fixed stars fastened into it, was a type of regularity and uniformity; eternal and ever moving in the same circular orbit, by necessity of its own nature, and without any potentiality of doing otherwise. But the earth and the elemental bodies, organized and unorganized, below the lunar sphere and in the interior of the Kosmos, were of inferior perfection and of very different nature. They were indeed in part governed and pervaded by the movement and influence of the celestial substance within which they were comprehended, and from which they borrowed their Form or constituent essence; but they held this Form implicated with Matter, _i.e._ the principle of potentiality, change, irregularity, generation, and destruction, &c. There are thus in these sublunary bodies both constant tendencies and variable tendencies. The _constant_ Aristotle calls 'Nature;' which always aspires to Good, or to perpetual renovation of Forms as perfect as may be, though impeded in this work by adverse influences, and therefore never producing any thing but individuals comparatively defective and sure to perish. The _variable_ he calls 'Spontaneity' and 'Chance,' forming an independent agency inseparably accompanying Nature--always modifying, distorting, frustrating, the full purposes of Nature. Moreover, the different natural agencies often interfere with each other, while the irregular tendency interferes with them all. So far as Nature acts, in each of her distinct agencies, the phenomena before us are regular and predictable; all that is uniform, and all that (without being quite uniform) recurs usually or frequently, is her work. But, besides and along with Nature, there is the agency of Chance and Spontaneity, which is essentially irregular and unpredictable. Under this agency there are possibilities both for and against; either of two alternative events may happen.

It is with a view to this doctrine about the variable kosmical agencies or potentialities that Aristotle lays down the logical doctrine now before us, distinguishing propositions affirming particular facts past or present, from propositions affirming particular facts future. In both cases alike, the disjunctive antithesis, as a whole, is necessarily true. Either there was a sea-fight yesterday, or there was not a sea-fight yesterday: Either there will be a sea-fight to-morrow, or there will not be a sea-fight to-morrow--both these disjunctives alike are necessarily true. There is, however, a difference between the one disjunctive couple and the other, when we take the affirmation separately or the negation separately. If we say, There will be a sea-fight to-morrow, that proposition is not necessarily true nor is it necessarily false; to say that it is either the one or the other (Aristotle argues) would imply that every thing in nature happened by necessary agency--that the casual, the potential, the _may be or may not be_, is stopped out and foreclosed. But this last is really the case, in regard to a past fact. There was a sea-fight yesterday, is a proposition either necessarily true or necessarily false. Here the antecedent agencies have already spent themselves, blended, and become realized in one or other of the two alternative determinate results. There is no potentiality any longer open; all the antecedent potentiality has been foreclosed. The proposition therefore is either necessarily true or necessarily false; though perhaps we may not know whether it is the one or the other.

In defending his position regarding this question, Aristotle denies (what he represents his opponents as maintaining) that all events happen by necessity. He points to the notorious fact that we deliberate and take counsel habitually, and that the event is frequently modified, according as we adopt one mode of conduct or another; which could not be (he contends), if the event could be declared beforehand by a proposition necessarily or determinately true. What Aristotle means by _necessity_, however, is at bottom nothing else than constant sequence or conjunction, conceived by him as necessary, because the fixed ends which Nature is aiming at can only be attained by certain fixed means. To this he opposes Spontaneity and Chance, disturbing forces essentially inconstant and irregular; admitting, indeed, of being recorded when they _have_ produced effects in the past, yet defying all power of prediction as to those effects which they _will_ produce in the future. Hence arises the radical distinction that he draws in Logic, between the truth of propositions relating to the past (or present) and to the future.

But this logical distinction cannot be sustained, because his metaphysical doctrine (on which it is founded) respecting the essentially irregular or casual, is not defensible. His opponents would refuse to grant that there is any agency essentially or in itself irregular, casual, and unpredictable.[21] The aggregate of Nature consists of a variety of sequences, each of them constant and regular, though intermixed, co-operating, and conflicting with each other, in such manner that the resulting effects are difficult to refer to their respective causes, and are not to be calculated beforehand except by the highest scientific efforts; often, not by any scientific efforts. We must dismiss the hypothesis of Aristotle, assuming agencies essentially irregular and unpredictable, either as to the past or as to the future. The past has been brought about by agencies all regular, however multifarious and conflicting, and the future will be brought about by the like: there is no such distinction of principle as that which Aristotle lays down between propositions respecting the past and propositions respecting the future.

[Footnote 21: The Stoics were opposed to Aristotle on this point. They recognized no logical difference in the character of the Antiphasis, whether applied to past and present, or to future. Nikostratus defended the thesis of Aristotle against them. See the Scholia of Simplikius on the Categoriæ, p. 87, b. 30-p. 88, a. 24. [Greek: ai( ga\r ei)s to\n me/llonta chro/non e)gklino/menai prota/seis ou)/te a)lêthei=s ei)si\n ou)/te pseudei=s dia\ tê\n tou= e)ndechome/nou phu/sin.]

The remarks of Hobbes, upon the question here discussed by Aristotle, well deserve to be transcribed (De Corpore, part II. ch. X. s. 5):--

"But here, perhaps, some man may ask whether those future things, which are called _contingents_, are necessary. I say, therefore, that generally all contingents have their necessary causes, but are called contingents in respect of other events, upon which they do not depend; as the rain, which shall be to-morrow, shall be necessary, that is, from necessary causes; but we think and say, it happens by chance, because we do not yet perceive the causes thereof, though they exist now. For men commonly call that _casual_ or _contingent_, whereof they do not perceive the necessary cause; and in the same manner they use to speak of things past, when not knowing whether a thing be done or no, they say, it is possible it never was done.

"Wherefore, all propositions concerning future things, contingent or not contingent--as this, _It will rain to-morrow_, or this, _To-morrow the sun will rise_--are either necessarily true, or necessarily false; but we call them contingent, because we do not yet know whether they be true or false; whereas their verity depends not upon our knowledge, but upon the foregoing of their causes. But there are some, who, though they confess this whole proposition, _To-morrow it will either rain or not rain_, to be true, yet they will not acknowledge the parts of it, as _To-morrow it will rain_, or _To-morrow it will not rain_, to be either of them true by itself; because they say neither this nor that is true _determinately_. But what is this _determinately true_, but true _upon our knowledge_, or evidently true? And therefore they say no more, but that it is not yet known whether it be true or no; but they say it more obscurely, and darken the evidence of the truth with the same words with which they endeavour to hide their own ignorance."

Compare also the fuller elucidation of the subject given by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his System of Logic, Bk. III. ch. xvii. s. 2:--"An event occurring by chance may be better described as a coincidence from which we have no ground to infer an uniformity; the occurrence of an event in certain circumstances, without our having reason on that account to infer that it will happen again in those circumstances. This, however, when looked closely into, implies that the enumeration of the circumstances is not complete. Whatever the fact was, since it has occurred once, we may be sure that if all the circumstances were repeated, it would occur again; and not only if all, but there is some particular portion of those circumstances, on which the phenomenon is invariably consequent. With most of them, however, it is not connected in any permanent manner: its conjunction with those is said to be the effect of chance, to be merely casual. Facts casually conjoined are separately the effect of causes, and therefore of laws; but of different causes, and causes not connected by any law. It is incorrect then to say that any phenomenon is produced by chance; but we may say that two or more phenomena are conjoined by chance, that they co-exist or succeed one another only by chance."]

There is, indeed, one distinction between inferences as to the past and inferences as to the future, which may have contributed to suggest, though it will not justify, the position here laid down by Aristotle. In regard to the disjunctive--To-morrow there will be a sea-fight, or there will not be a sea-fight--nothing more trustworthy than inference or anticipation is practicable: the anticipation of a sagacious man with full knowledge is more likely to prove correct than that of a stupid man with little knowledge; yet both are alike anticipations, unverifiable at the present moment. But if we turn to the other disjunctive--Yesterday there was a sea-fight, or there was not a sea-fight--we are no longer in the same position. The two disputants, supposed to declare thus, may have been far off, and may have no other means of deciding the doubt than inference. But the inference here is not unverifiable: there exist, or may exist, witnesses or spectators of the two fleets, who can give direct attestation of the reality, and can either confirm or refute the inference, negative or affirmative, made by an absentee. Thus the proposition, Yesterday there was a sea-fight, or the other, Yesterday there was not a sea-fight, will be verifiable or determinably true. There are indeed many inferences as to the past, in regard to which no direct evidence is attainable. Still this is an accident; for such direct evidence may always be supposed or imagined as capable of being brought into court. But, in respect to the future, verification is out of the question; we are confined to the region of inference, well or ill-supported. Here, then, we have a material distinction between the past and the future. It was probably present to the mind of Aristotle, though he misconceives its real extent of operation, and makes it subservient to his still more comprehensive classification of the different contemporaneous agencies (regular and irregular) which he supposes to pervade the Kosmos.

In the treatise before us, he next proceeds to state what collocation of the negative particle constitutes the special or legitimate negation to any given affirmation, or what are the real forms of proposition, standing in contradictory opposition to certain other forms, so as to make up one _Antiphasis_.[22] The simplest proposition must include a noun and a verb, either definite or indefinite: _non homo_ is a specimen of an indefinite noun--_non currit_, of an indefinite verb. There must be, in any one proposition, one subject and one predicate; even the indefinite noun or verb signifies, in a certain sense, one thing. Each affirmation comprises a noun, or an indefinite noun, with a verb; the special corresponding or contradictory negation (making up the _Antiphasis_ along with the former) comprises a noun (or an indefinite noun) with an indefinite verb. The simplest proposition is--

_Affirmative_. _Contradictory Negative_.

Est homo ... ... ... ... Non est homo.
Est non homo ... ... ... ... Non est non homo.

Here are only two pairs of antithetic propositions, or one quaternion. The above is an indefinite proposition (which may be either universal or not). When we universalize it, or turn it an universal proposition, we have--

_Affirmative_. _Contradictory Negative_.

Est omnis homo ... ... ... Non est omnis homo.
Est omnis non homo ... ... Non est omnis non homo.

[Footnote 22: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 19, b. 5, seq.]

The above are specimens of the smallest proposition; but when we regard larger propositions, such as those (called _tertii adjacentis_) where there are two terms besides _est_, the collocation of the negative particle becomes more complicated, and requires fuller illustration. Take, as an example, the affirmative _Est justus homo_, the true negation of this is, _Non est justus homo_. In these two propositions, _homo_ is the subject; but we may join the negative with it, and we may consider _non homo_, not less than _homo_, as a distinct subject for predication, affirmative or negative. Farther, we may attach _est_ and _non est_ either to _justus_ or to _non justus_ as the predicate of the proposition, with either _homo_, or _non homo_, as subject. We shall thus obtain a double mode of antithesis, or two distinct quaternions, each containing two pairs of contradictory propositions. The second pair of the first quaternion will not be in the same relation as the second pair of the second quaternion, to the proposition just mentioned, viz.--(A) _Est justus homo_; with its negative, (B) _Non est justice homo_.[23]

[Footnote 23: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 19, b. 19. [Greek: o(/tan de\ to\ e)/sti tri/ton proskatêgorê=tai, ê)/dê dichô=s le/gontai ai( a)ntithe/seis; le/gô de\ oi(=on _e)/sti di/kaios a)/nthrôpos_; to\ _e)/sti_ tri/ton phêmi\ sugkei=sthai o)/noma ê)\ r(ê=ma e)n tê=| katapha/sei. ô(/ste dia\ tou=to te/ttara e)/stai tau=ta, ô(=n ta\ me\n du/o pro\s tê\n kata/phasin kai\ a)po/phasin e(/xei kata\ to\ stoichou=n ô(s ai( sterê/seis, ta\ de\ du/o, ou)/. [le/gô de\ o(/ti to\ _e)/stin_ ê)\ tô=| dikai/ô| proskei/setai ê)\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|], ô(/ste kai\ ê( a)po/phasis. te/ttara ou)=n e)/stai. noou=men de\ to\ lego/menon e)k tô=n u(pogegramme/nôn.] In this passage the words which I have enclosed between brackets are altered by Waitz: I shall state presently what I think of his alteration. Following upon these words there ought to be, and it seems from Ammonius (Schol. p. 121, a. 20) that there once was, a scheme or table arranging the four propositions in the order and disposition which we read in the Analytica Priora, I. xlvi. p. 51, b. 37, and which I shall here follow. But no such table now appears in our text; we have only an enumeration of the four propositions, in a different order, and then a reference to the Analytica.]

First, let us assume _homo_ as subject. We have then

(QUATERNION I.)

(A) Est justus homo ... ... ... ... (B) Non est justus homo. (D) Non est non justus homo ... ... ... (C) Est non justus homo.

Examining the relation borne by the last two among these four propositions (C and D), to the first two (A and B), the simple affirmative and negative, we see that B is the legitimate negative of A, and D that of C. We farther see that B is a consequence of C, and D a consequence of A, but not _vice versâ_: that is, if C is true, B must certainly be true; but we cannot infer, because B is true, that C must also be true: while, if A is true, D must also be true; but D may perhaps be true, though A be not true. In other words, the relation of D to A and of C to B, is the same as it would be if the privative term _injustus_ were substituted in place of _non justus_; _i.e._ if the proposition C (_Est injustus homo_) be true, the other proposition B (_Non est justus homo_) must certainly be true, but the inference will not hold conversely; while if the proposition A (_Est justus homo_) be true, it must also be true to say D (_Non est injustus homo_), but not _vice versâ_.[24]

[Footnote 24: Referring to the words cited in the preceding note, I construe [Greek: ta\ de\ du/o, ou)/] as Boethius does (II. pp. 384-385), and not in agreement with Ammonius (Schol. p. 122, a. 26, Br.), who, however, is followed both by Julius Pacius and Waitz (p. 344). I think it impossible that these words, [Greek: ta\ de\ du/o, ou)/], can mean (as Ammonius thinks) the [Greek: kata/phasis] and [Greek: a)po/phasis] themselves, since the very point which Aristotle is affirming is the relation of these words, [Greek: pro\s tê\n kata/phasin kai\ a)po/phasin], _i.e._ to the affirmative and negative started from--

(A) Est justus homo ... ... ... ... (B) Non est justus homo.

As the words [Greek: ta\ me\n du/o] refer to the second contradictory pair (that is, C and D) in the _first_ Quaternion, so the words [Greek: ta\ de\ du/o, ou)/] designate the second contradictory pair (G and H) in the _second_ Quaternion. Though G and H are included in the second Quaternion, they are here designated by the negative relation ([Greek: ta\ de\ du/o, ou)/]) which they bear to A and B, the first contradictory pair of the _first_ Quaternion. [Greek: dichô=s le/gontai ai( a)ntithe/seis] (line 20) is explained and illustrated by line 37--[Greek: au(=tai me\n ou)=n du/o a)nti/keintai, a)/llai de\ du/o pro\s to\ _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ ô(s u(pokei/meno/n ti prostethe/n]. Lastly, Aristotle expressly states that the second Quaternion will stand independently and by itself (p. 20, a. 1), having noticed it in the beginning only in relation to the first.]

Such is the result obtained when we take _homo_ as the subject of the proposition; we get four propositions, of which the two last (C and D) stand to the two first (B and A) in the same relation as if they (C and D) were privative propositions. But if, instead of _homo_, we take _non homo_ as Subject of the proposition (_justus_ or _non justus_ being predicates as before), we shall then obtain two other pairs of contradictory propositions; and the second pair of this new quaternion will not stand in that same relation to these same propositions B and A. We shall then find that, instead of B and A, we have a different negative and a different affirmative, as the appropriate correlates to the third and fourth propositions. The new quaternion of propositions, with _non homo_ as subject, will stand thus--

(QUATERNION II.)

(E) Est justus non homo ... ... ... (F) Non est justus non homo. (H) Non est non justus non homo ... (G) Est non justus non homo.[25]

Here we see that propositions G and H do not stand to B and A in the same relations as C and D stand to B and A; but that they stand in that same relation to two perfectly different propositions, F and E. That is, if in place of _non **justus_, in propositions G and H, we substitute the privative term _injustus_ (thus turning G into _Est injustus non homo_, and turning H into _Non est injustus non homo_), the relation of G, when thus altered, to F, and the relation of H, when thus altered, to E, will be the same as it was before. Or, in other words, if G be true, F will certainly be true, but not _vice versâ_; and if E be true, H will certainly be true, but not _vice versâ_.

[Footnote 25: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 19, b. 36. [Greek: au(=tai me\n ou)=n du/o a)nti/keintai] (the two pairs--A B and C D--of the first quaternion), [Greek: a)/llai de\ du/o pro\s to\ _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ ô(s u(pokei/meno/n ti prostethe/n;]

(E) [Greek: e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos] ... ... ... (F) [Greek: ou)k e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos.] (H) [Greek: ou)k e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos] ... (G) [Greek: e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos.]

[Greek: plei/ous de\ tou/tôn ou)k e)/sontai a)ntithe/seis. au(=tai de\ chôri\s e)kei/nôn au)tai\ kath' e(auta\s e)/sontai, ô(s o)no/mati tô=| _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ chrô/menai.] The second [Greek: au(=tai] alludes to this last quaternion, [Greek: e)kei/nôn] to the first. I have, as in the former case, transposed propositions three and four of this second quaternion, in order that the relation of G to F and of H to E may be more easily discerned.

There are few chapters in Aristotle more obscure and puzzling than the tenth chapter of the De Interpretatione. It was found so by Alexander, Herminus, Porphyry, Ammonius, and all the Scholiasts. Ammonius (Schol. pp. 121, 122, Br.) reports these doubts, and complains of it as a riddle almost insolvable. The difficulties remain, even after the long note of Waitz, and the literal translation of M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire.]

The propositions which we have hitherto studied have been indefinite; that is, they might be universal or not. But if we attach to them the sign of universality, and construe them as universals, all that we have said about them would still continue to be true, except that the propositions which are diametrically (or diagonally) opposed would not be both true in so many instances. Thus, let us take the first quaternion of propositions, in which _est_ is attached to _homo_, and let us construe these propositions as universal. They will stand thus--

(A) Omnis est homo justus ... ... (B) Non omnis est homo justus. (D) Non omnis est homo non justus (C) Omnis est homo non justus.

In these propositions, as in the others before noticed, the same relation prevails between C and B, and between A and D; if C be true, B also is true, but not _vice versâ_; if A be true, D also will be true, but not _vice versâ_. But the propositions diagonally opposed will not be so often alike true:[26] thus, if A be true (_Omnis est homo justus_), C cannot be true (_Omnis est homo non justus_); whereas in the former quaternion of propositions (indefinite, and therefore capable of being construed as not universal) A and C might both be alike true.[27]

[Footnote 26: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 19, b. 35. [Greek: plê\n ou)ch o(moi/ôs ta\s kata\ dia/metron e)nde/chetai sunalêtheu/ein; e)nde/chetai de\ pote/.] The "diameter" or "diagonal" is to be understood with reference to the scheme or square mentioned p. 119, note, the related propositions standing at the angles, as above.]

[Footnote 27: The Scholion of Ammonius, p. 123, a. 17, Br., explains this very obscure passage: [Greek: a)ll' e)pi\ me\n tô=n a)prosdiori/stôn] (indefinite propositions, such as may be construed either as universal or as particular), [Greek: kata\ tê\n e)ndechome/nên u(/lên ta/s te katapha/seis] (of the propositions diagonally opposite), [Greek: sunalêtheu/ein a)llê/lais sumbai/nei kai\ ta\s a)popha/seis, _a(/te tai=s merikai=s i)sodunamou/sas_. e)pi\ de\ tô=n prosdiôrisme/nôn] (those propositions where the mark of universality is tacked to the Subject), [Greek: peri\ ô(=n nuni\ au)tô=| o( lo/gos, tê=s katho/lou katapha/seôs kai\ tê=s e)pi\ me/rous a)popha/seôs, ta\s me\n katapha/seis a)du/naton sunalêtheu=sai kath' oi(andê/pote u(/lên, ta\s me/ntoi a)popha/seis sumbai/nei sunalêtheu/ein kata\ mo/nên tê\n e)ndechome/nên;] &c.]

It is thus that Aristotle explains the distinctions of meaning in propositions, arising out of the altered collocation of the negative particle; the distinction between (1) _Non est justus_, (2) _Est non justus_, (3) _Est injustus_. The first of the three is the only true negative, corresponding to the affirmative _Est Justus_. The second is not a negative at all, but an affirmative ([Greek: e)k metathe/seôs], or by transposition, as Theophrastus afterwards called it). The third is an affirmative, but privative. Both the second and the third stand related in the same manner to the first; that is, the truth of the first is a necessary consequence either of the second or of the third, but neither of these can be certainly inferred from the first. This is explained still more clearly in the Prior Analytics; to which Aristotle here makes express reference.[28]

[Footnote 28: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 19, b. 31. [Greek: tau=ta me\n ou)=n, ô(/sper e)n toi=s A)nalutikoi=s le/getai, ou(/tô te/taktai.]

Waitz in his note suggests that instead of [Greek: te/taktai] we ought to read [Greek: teta/chthô]. But if we suppose that the formal table once existed in the text, in an order of arrangement agreeing with the Analytica, this conjectural change would be unnecessary.

Waitz has made some changes in the text of this chapter, which appear to me partly for the better, partly not for the better. Both Bekker and Bussemaker (Firmin Didot) retain the old text; but this old text was a puzzle to the ancient commentators, even anterior to Alexander of Aphrodisias. I will here give first the text of Bekker, next the changes made by Waitz: my own opinion does not wholly coincide with either. I shall cite the text from p. 19, b. 19, leaving out the portion between lines 30 and 36, which does not bear upon the matter here discussed, while it obscures the legitimate sequence of Aristotle's reasoning.

(Bekker.)--[Greek: O(/tan de\ to\ _e)/sti_ tri/ton proskatêgorê=tai, ê)/dê dichô=s le/gontai ai( a)ntithe/seis. le/gô de\ oi(=on _e)/sti di/kaios a)/nthrôpos_; to\ _e)/sti_ tri/ton phêmi\ sugkei=sthai o)/noma ê)\ r(ê=ma e)n tê=| katapha/sei. ô(/ste dia\ tou=to te/ttara e)/stai tau=ta, ô(=n ta\ me\n du/o pro\s tê\n kata/phasin kai\ a)po/phasin e(/xei kata\ to\ stoichou=n ô(s ai( sterê/seis, ta\ de\ du/o, ou)/. le/gô d' o(/ti to\ _e)/stin_ ê)\ _tô=| dikai/ô| proskei/setai_ ê)\ tô=| _ou) dikai/ô|_] (25), [Greek: ô(/ste kai\ ê( a)po/phasis. te/ttara ou)=n e)/stai.] (Here follow the first pairs of Antitheses, or the first Quaternion of propositions in the order as given)--

(A) [Greek: e)/sti di/kios a)/nthrôpos] ... ... (B) [Greek: ou)k e)/sti di/kios a)/nthrôpos.]y (C) [Greek: e)/stin ou) di/kaios a)/nthrôpos] ... (D) [Greek: ou)k e)/stin ou) di/kaios a)/nthrôpos.]

[Greek: to\ ga\r _e)/stin_ e)ntau=tha kai\ to\ _ou)k e)/sti tô=| dikai/ô| proskei/setai kai\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|]_ (30).--[Greek: Au(=tai me\n ou)=n du/o a)nti/keintai, a)/llai de\ du/o pro\s to\ ou)k _a)/nthrôpos_ ô(s u(pokei/meno/n ti] (38) [Greek: _prostethe/n_.] (Here follow the second pairs of Antitheses, or the second Quaternion of propositions, again in the order from which I have departed above)--

(E) [Greek: e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos] ... ... (F) [Greek: Ou)k e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos.] (G) [Greek: e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos] ... (H) [Greek: Ou)k e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos.]

[Greek: plei/ous de\ tou/tôn ou)k e)/sontai a)ntithe/seis. au(=tai de\] (the second Quaternion) [Greek: chôri\s e)kei/nôn] (first Quaternion) [Greek: au)tai\ kath' e(auta\s e)/sontai, ô(s o)no/mati tô=| _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ chrô/menai.]

In this text Waitz makes three alterations:--1. In line 24, instead of [Greek: ê)\ tô=| dikai/ô| proskei/setai ê)\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|]--he reads, [Greek: ê)\ tô=| a)nthrô/pô| proskei/setai ê)\ tô=| ou)k a)nthrô/pô|].

2. In line 30 he makes a similar change; instead of [Greek: tô=| dikai/ô| proskei/setai kai\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|]--he reads, [Greek: tô=| a)nthrô/pô| proskei/setai kai\ tô=| ou)k a)nthrô/pô|].

In line 38, instead of [Greek: prostethe/n], he reads [Greek: prostethe/ntos].

Of these three alterations the first appears to me good, but insufficient; the second not good, though the passage as it stands in Bekker requires amendment; and the third, a change for the worse.

The purpose of Aristotle is here two-fold. First, to give the reason why, when the propositions were _tertii adjacentis_, there were two Quaternions or four couples of antithetical propositions; whereas in propositions _secundi adjacentis_, there was only one Quaternion or two couples of antithetical propositions. Next, to assign the distinction between the first and the second Quaternion in propositions _tertii adjacentis_.

Now the first of these two purposes is marked out in line 25, which I think we ought to read not by substituting the words of Waitz in place of the words of Bekker, but by retaining the words of Bekker and inserting the words of Waitz as an addition to them. The passage after such addition will stand thus--[Greek: le/gô d' o(/ti to\ _e)/stin_ ê)\ tô=| dikai/ô| proskei/setai ê)\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|, kai\ ê)\ tô=| a)nthrô/pô| ê)\ tô=| ou)k a)nthrô/pô|, ô(/ste kai\ ê( a)po/phasis. te/ttara _ou)=n_ e)/stai.] Here Aristotle declares the _reason why_ ([Greek: ou)=n]) there come to be four couples of propositions; that reason is, because [Greek: e)/sti] and [Greek: ou)k e)/sti] may be joined either with [Greek: di/kaios] or [Greek: ou) di/kaios] and either with [Greek: a)/nthrôpos] or with [Greek: ou)k a)/nthrôpos]. Both these alternatives must be specified in order to make out a reason why there are two Quaternions or four couples of antithetical propositions. But the passage, as read by Bekker, gives only one of these alternatives, while the passage, as read by Waitz, gives only the other. Accordingly, neither of them separately is sufficient; but both of them taken together furnish the reason required, and thus answer Aristotle's purpose.

Aristotle now proceeds to enunciate the first of the two Quaternions, and then proceeds to line 30, where the reading of Bekker is irrelevant and unmeaning; but the amendment of Waitz appears to me still worse, being positively incorrect in statement of fact. Waitz reads [Greek: to\ ga\r _e)/stin_ e)ntau=tha] (in the first Quaternion, which has just been enunciated) [Greek: kai\ to\ _ou)k e)/stin_ tô=| a)nthrô/pô| proskei/setai kai\ _tô=| ou)k a)nthrô/pô|_]. These last words are incorrect in fact, for [Greek: ou)k a)/nthrôpos] does not appear in the first Quaternion, but is reserved for the second. While the reading of Waitz is thus evidently wrong, that of Bekker asserts nothing to the purpose. It is useless to tell us merely that [Greek: e)/sti] and [Greek: ou)k e)/stin] attach both to [Greek: di/kaios] and to [Greek: ou) di/kaios] in this first Quaternion ([Greek: e)ntau=tha]), because that characteristic is equally true of the second Quaternion (presently to follow), and therefore constitutes no distinction between the two. To bring out the meaning intended by Aristotle I think we ought here also to retain the words of Bekker, and to add after them some, though not all, of the words of Waitz. The passage would then stand thus--[Greek: to\ ga\r e)/stin e)ntau=tha kai\ to\ ou)k e)/sti tô=| dikai/ô| proskei/setai kai\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|, kai\ tô=| a)nthrô/pô|, _a)ll' ou)_ tô=| ou)k a)nthrô/pô|.] Or perhaps [Greek: _kai\ ou)_ tô=| ou)k a)nthrô/pô|] might suffice in the last clause (being a smaller change), though [Greek: a)ll' ou)] seem the proper terms to declare the meaning. In the reading which I propose, the sequence intended by Aristotle is clear and intelligible. Having first told us that [Greek: e)/stin] and [Greek: ou)k e)/sti] being joined alternately with [Greek: di/kaios] and with [Greek: ou) di/kaios] and also with [Greek: a)/nthrôpos] and [Greek: ou)k a)/nthrôpos], make up two Quaternions, he proceeds to enunciate the distinctive character belonging to the first Quaternion of the two, viz., that in it [Greek: e)/sti] and [Greek: ou)k e)/stin] are joined both with [Greek: di/kaios] and [Greek: ou) di/kaios], and also with [Greek: a)/nthrôpos] _but not with_ [Greek: _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_], This is exactly the truth.

Aristotle next proceeds to the second Quaternion, where he points out, as the characteristic distinction, that [Greek: ou)k a)/nthrôpos] comes in and [Greek: a)/nthrôpos] disappears, while [Greek: di/kaios] and [Greek: ou) di/kaios] remain included, as in the first. This is declared plainly by Aristotle in line 37:--[Greek: au(=tai me\n ou)=n du/o a)nti/keintai] (referring to the two pairs of antithetical propositions in the first Quaternion), [Greek: _a)/llai de\ pro\s to\ ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ ô(s u(pokei/meno/n ti prostethe/n; e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos, e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos-ou)k e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos, e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos-ou)k e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos.] When we read these words, [Greek: a)/llai de\ du/o pro\s to\ ou)k a)/nthrôpos ô(s u(pokei/meno/n ti prostethe/n], as applied to the second Quaternion, we see that there must have been some words preceding which excluded [Greek: _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_] from the first Quaternion. Waitz contends for the necessity of changing [Greek: prostethe/n] into [Greek: prostethe/ntos]. I do not concur with his reasons for the change; the words that follow, p. 20, line 2, [Greek: ô(s o)no/mati tô=| _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ chrô/menai (proschrô/menai)], are a reasonable justification of [Greek: prostethe/n--_ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ ô(s _u(pokei/meno/n ti_ prostethe/n] being very analogous to [Greek: ou)k a)/nthrôpos ô(s o)/noma].

This long note, for the purpose of restoring clearness to an obscure text, will appear amply justified if the reader will turn to the perplexities and complaints of the ancient Scholiasts, revealed by Ammonius and Boethius. Even earlier than the time of Alexander (Schol. p. 122**, b. 47) there was divergence in the MSS. of Aristotle; several read [Greek: tô=| dikai/ô|] (p. 19, b. 25), several others read [Greek: tô=| a)nthrô/pô|]. I think that all of them were right in what they retained, and wrong by omission only or mainly.]