Chapter IX: Topica (4)

Moreover, the proprium will not be well set out, if it be such as does not necessarily belong to the subject, but is only shown by the evidence of sense to belong thereunto. In this case, when the subject is out of the reach of sensible perception, no one knows whether the supposed proprium still continues as its attribute. Thus, suppose the thesis to enunciate as a proprium of the sun, that it is the brightest star borne in movement above the earth: the fact that it is so borne in movement above the earth is one that we know by sensible perception only; accordingly, after the sun sets and we cease to see it, we cannot be sure that it continues to be borne in movement. If a proprium knowable as such by sense be chosen, it ought to be one which is also knowable independently, as belonging to the subject by necessity. Thus, if a man enunciates, as proprium of superficies, that superficies is what first becomes coloured or first receives colour, this is a proprium well set out. For we know clearly that it must always belong to a superficies; though we may also obtain the additional evidence of sense, by looking at some perceivable body.[217]

[Footnote 217: Ibid. b. 19-36. [Greek: oi(=on e)pei\ o( the/menos e)piphanei/as i)/dion o(\ prô=ton ke/chrôstai, ai)sthêtô=| me/n tini _proske/chrêtai_ tô=| kechrô=sthai, _toiou/tô| d' o(\ phanero/n e)stin u(pa/rchon a)ei/_, ei)/ê a)\n kata\ tou=to kalô=s a)podedome/non to\ tê=s e)piphanei/as i)/dion.]

Aristotle means that we know clearly, _by evidence independent of sense_, that the superficies must be the first portion of the body that becomes coloured, though we may attain the additional evidence of our senses ([Greek: _proske/chrêtai_]) to the same fact.]

Perhaps too the thesis may enunciate the Definition as if it were a Proprium; which is another ground for objecting that the proprium is not well set out. Thus, the thesis may enunciate, as proprium of man, that man is a land animal walking on two feet. Here what is given as proprium is the essence of man, which never ought to be affirmed in the proprium. To set out the proprium well, the predicate ought to reciprocate and to be co-extensive with the subject, but it ought not to affirm the essence thereof. A good specimen of proprium well set out is the following, Man is an animal by nature gentle; for here the predicate is co-extensive with the subject, yet does not declare the essence of the subject.[218]

[Footnote 218: Ibid. b. 37-p. 132, a. 9.]

Lastly, the proprium, to be well set out, though it does not declare the essence of the subject, yet ought to begin by presupposing the generic portion of the essence, and to attach itself thereunto as a constant adjunct or concomitant. Thus, suppose the thesis to enunciate, as proprium, Animal is that which has a soul; this will not be well set out, for the predicate is not superadded or attached to the declared generic essence of animal. But, if the thesis enunciates, as proprium of man, Man is an animal capable of acquiring cognition,--this will be a proprium well set out, so far as the present objection is concerned. For here the predicate declares first the generic essence of the subject, and then superinduces the peculiar adjunct thereupon.[219]

[Footnote 219: Topic. V. iii. p. 131, a. 10-21.]

Thus far Aristotle has pointed out certain conditions to be attended to in determining whether a Proprium is well set out or described, without determining whether it be really a Propium or not. It may perhaps be truly predicated of the subject, and may even admit of a better description which would show it to be a proprium of the subject; but the description actually set out is defective, and the assailant is entitled to impeach it on that ground. He now proceeds to a larger discussion: What are the conditions for determining whether the supposed Proprium be really a Proprium at all, in respect to the subject of which it is predicated? Assuming that the description of it is not open to impeachment on any of the grounds above enumerated, are there not other real grounds of objection, disproving its title to the character of Proprium?[220]

[Footnote 220: Ibid. p. 132, a. 22-27. [Greek: po/teron me\n ou)=n kalô=s ê)\ ou) kalô=s a)pode/dotai to\ i)/dion, dia\ tô=nde skepte/on; po/teron d' _i)/dio/n e)stin_ o(/lôs to\ ei)rême/non ê)\ ou)k i)/dion, e)k tô=nde theôrête/on.]

The distinction here noted by Aristotle (between the two questions:--(1) Whether the alleged Proprium is well set out or clearly described? (2) Whether the alleged Proprium is a Proprium at all?) is not carried out, nor indeed capable of being carried out, with strict precision. The two heads of questions run together and become confounded. Alexander remarks (Scholia, p. 284, b. 24-46, Br.) that the three or four last-mentioned _loci_ under the first head embrace the second head also. He allows only three _loci_ as belonging peculiarly to the first head--[Greek: tou= mê\ kalô=s a)podedo/sthai to\ i)/dion]:--(1) Equivocal terms; (2) Predicate not reciprocating or co-extensive with subject; (3) Predicate not more knowable than subject. The other _loci_ (besides these three) enumerated by Aristotle under the first head, Alexander considers as belonging equally to the second head. But he commends Aristotle for making a distinction between the two heads: [Greek: ou) ga\r pa=n to\ a)pêllotriôme/non tou/tôn, kai\ mê\ e)/chon o(mônu/mous phôna\s ê)/ ti tô=n ei)rême/nôn, kai\ i)/dion r(ête/on e)x a)na/gkês.] The manner in which M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire explains this nice distinction is not clear to me (Note to his translation of Topica, p. 177).]

1. Suppose your respondent to set up A as a proprium of B: you will examine first whether A can be truly predicated of B at all; next, if it can so be, whether it is truly predicable of B _quâ_ B, or of every thing that comes under B _quâ_ B. Thus, if he contends that not to be deceived by reason is a proprium of scientific men, you will be able to show that this does not hold in geometry, since geometricians are deceived by pseudographemes or scientific paralogisms. Or, should the respondent deny that A is a proprium of B, you will succeed in refuting him, if you can prove that A is truly predicable of every B and _quâ_ B. Thus, it is a proprium of man to be an animal capable of acquiring knowledge; because that attribute is truly predicable of every man _quâ_ man.[221]

[Footnote 221: Topic. V. iv. p. 132, a. 27, seq.]

2. Again, suppose your respondent affirms a given proprium A of B: you will examine whether A can be truly predicated of every thing called B, and whether B can be truly predicated of every thing called A; if not, the alleged proprium will not hold. Thus the affirmation, A god is an animal participant of knowledge, is a true affirmation; but it would not be true to say, A god is a man: wherefore, to be participant of knowledge is not proprium of man; and, if this be the proprium which the respondent undertakes to maintain, you will be able to refute him. On the other hand, if what he undertakes is the negation of a proprium (A is not a proprium of B), you will establish the affirmative against him by showing that of every thing respecting which A can be truly affirmed B can be affirmed also, and _vice versâ_. You will thus show that A is a true proprium of B.[222]

[Footnote 222: Ibid. b. 8-18.]

3. Again, the respondent may perhaps affirm the subject itself as a proprium of something inherent in the subject. You may refute this by showing that, if it were so, the same thing would be a proprium of several things differing from each other in species. On the other hand, the respondent may perhaps deny that something inherent in the subject is a proprium: you may then refute him by showing that it is truly predicable of the subject only, and not truly predicable of any thing else.[223]

[Footnote 223: Ibid. b. 19-34. Alexander, in the Scholia (p. 285, a. 14, Br.) has stated this _locus_ more clearly than Aristotle--[Greek: to\ ga\r i)/dion u(pa/rchein dei= e)n e(te/rô|, ou)ch e(/teron e)n au)tô=|.]]

4. The respondent may perhaps affirm as a proprium something contained in the essence of the subject: if so, you will refute him by showing this. On the other hand, if he denies something to be a proprium, you will refute him by showing that, though it is not contained in the essence of the subject, it is nevertheless predicable co-extensively therewith.[224]

[Footnote 224: Topic. V. iv. p. 132, b. 35-p. 133, a. 11.]

5. The respondent may affirm as a proprium that which is not a necessary concomitant of the subject, but may either precede or follow it. Or, on the other hand, he may deny something to be a proprium which you can show to be a constant and necessary concomitant of the subject, without being included either in its definition or differentia. In each case you will have a ground for refuting him.[225]

[Footnote 225: Topic. V. iv. p. 133, a. 12-23.]

6. The respondent may affirm as a proprium of the subject what he has already denied of the same subject under some other name; or he may deny of it what he has already affirmed of it under some other name. You will have grounds for refuting him.[226]

[Footnote 226: Ibid. a. 24-32.]

7. If there be two subjects (_e.g._, man and horse) the same with each other in species, the respondent may affirm respecting one of them a proprium which is not the same in species with the proprium of the other. Thus, it is not a constant proprium of horse to stand still spontaneously; accordingly neither is it a constant proprium of man to move spontaneously; these two propria being the same in species, and belonging both to man and to horse _quatenus_ animal.[227] If, therefore, the respondent affirms the one while he denies the other, you have an argument in refutation. On the other hand, he may propound as thesis the denial of the one proprium, while he affirms or admits the other. Here too you will be able to make good the counter-affirmation against his denial, on the ground of that which he admits. Thus, if it be proprium of man to be a walking-biped, it must also be proprium of bird to be a flying-biped. The two pairs, man and bird, walking and flying, are the same in species with each other, since both pairs are subordinates under the same genus: man and bird are species, flying and walking are differentiæ, under the same genus animal. This _locus_, however, is not universally applicable; for perhaps one of the two predicates may not be of exclusive application to the subject, but may belong to other subjects also. Thus walking-biped designates only one variety--man; but walking-quadruped designates several--horse, ass, dog, &c. Walking-quadruped therefore is not a proprium of horse.[228]

[Footnote 227: Ibid. a. 35-b. 5. [Greek: oi(=on e)pei\ tau)to/n e)sti tô=| ei)/dei a)/nthrôpos kai\ i(/ppos, ou)k a)ei\ de\ tou= i(/ppou e)sti\n i)/dion to\ e(sta/nai u(ph' au(tou=, ou)k a)n ei)/ê tou= a)nthrô/pou i)/dion to\ kinei=sthai u(ph' au(tou=; tau)to\n ga/r e)sti tô=| ei)/dei to\ kinei=sthai kai\ e(sta/nai u(ph' au(tou=, ê(=| zô/|ô| e)sti\n e(kate/rô| au)tô=n to\ sumbebêke/nai.] The last words are very obscure: they are explained by Waitz (p. 486)--"[Greek: ê(=| to\ sumbebêke/nai e(ka/teron (to\ kinei=sthai kai\ e(sta/nai u(ph' au(tou=] intell.) [Greek: e(kate/rô| au)tô=n e)sti\ sumbebêke/nai ê(=| zô/|ô|], quatenus utrumque de utroque, quatenus animal est, prædicatur."]

[Footnote 228: Topic. V. iv. p. 133, b. 5-14. Alexander declares this _locus_ to be obscure. He comments, not without reason, on the loose manner in which Aristotle uses the term [Greek: ei)=dos]; and he observes that Aristotle himself admits the _locus_ to be [Greek: kata/ ti pseudê/s] (Schol. p. 285, a. 40-45, Br.). It is strange to read that man and horse, man and bird, are [Greek: tau)to\n ei)/dei], the same in _species_.]

8. There is some difficulty in discussing the proprium, when the respondent is assailed by a sophistical dialectician who avails himself of the equivocal application of _Idem_ and _Diversum_: contending that Subject with an Accident becomes a different subject--_e.g._, _homo albus_, a subject different from _homo_ (so that, when a proprium has been shown to belong to _homo_, it has not been shown that the same proprium belongs to _homo albus_); and that the Abstract is a different subject from the Concrete--_e.g._ cognition, from the cognizing man (so that what has been shown as proprium of cognition has not been shown as proprium of the cognizing man). If the respondent shall himself set up these negatives, leaving to you the task of establishing the proprium against him, you will meet him by saying that _homo_ is not a subject absolutely different and distinct from _homo albus_, but that there is only a notional distinction, the same subject having here two names each with a distinct connotation: _homo_ has its own connotation; _homo albus_ has also its own connotation, embodying in one total that which each of the terms connotes. And, when the Sophist remarks that what is a proprium of _scientia_ cannot be predicated also as a proprium of _homo sciens_, you will reply that it may be so predicated, only with a slight change of inflection. For you need not scruple to employ sophistical refutation against those who debate with you in a sophistical way.[229]

[Footnote 229: Topic. V. iv. p. 133, b. 15-p. 134, a. 4. [Greek: pro\s ga\r to\n pa/ntôs e)nista/menon, pa/ntôs a)ntitakte/on e)sti/n]. It appears to me that Aristotle is not entitled to treat this objection as sophistical (_i.e._ as unfair Dialectic). He is here considering predication as Proprium, contrasted with predication as Accident. What is true as an accident respecting _homo albus_, will also be true as an accident respecting _homo_: but what is true as a proprium respecting _homo albus_, will not be true as a proprium respecting _homo_--nor _vice versâ_. This is a good _locus_ for objections in predication of Proprium. There is a real distinction between _homo_ and _homo albus_; between Koriskus and Koriskus _albus_: and one of the ways of elucidating that distinction is by pointing out that the proprium of one is not the same as the proprium of the other. Aristotle treats those who dwelt upon this distinction as Sophists: what their manner of noticing it may have been he does not clearly tell us; but if we are to have that logical accuracy of speech which _his_ classification and theory demand, this distinction must undoubtedly be brought to view among the rest.]

9. The respondent may perhaps intend to affirm as proprium something which by nature belongs to the subject; but he may err in his mode of stating it, and may predicate it as always belonging to the subject. Thus, he may predicate biped as a proprium always belonging to man. Under this mode of expression, you will be able to show that he is wrong; for there are some men who have not two feet. On the other hand, if the respondent denies biped to be a proprium of man, relying upon the statement that it is not actually true of every individual, you will be able to show against him that it is so in the correct phraseology of belonging to man by nature.[230]

[Footnote 230: Topic. V. v. p. 131, a. 5-17. This _locus_ is a question rather of phraseology than of real fact, and seems therefore rather to belong to the former class of _Loci_ respecting the Proprium--[Greek: po/teron kalô=s ê)\ ou) kalô=s a)pode/dotai to\ i)/dion]--than to the present class, which Aristotle declares (V. iv. p. 132, a. 25) to relate to the question [Greek: po/teron i)/dio/n e)stin o(/lôs to\ **ei)rême/non ê)\ ou)k i)/dion].]

10. That which is affirmed as a proprium may belong to its subject either primarily and immediately, or in a secondary way--relatively to some prior denomination of the same subject. In such cases it is difficult to set out the proprium in terms thoroughly unobjectionable. Thus, the superficies of a body is what is _first_ coloured: when we speak of _corpus album_, this is by reason of its white superficies. _Album_ is a proprium true both of body and of superficies; but the explanation usually given of Proprium will not hold here--that, wherever the predicate can be affirmed, the subject can be affirmed also. _Album_ is proprium of superficies; and _album_ can be truly affirmed as also proprium of body; but superficies cannot be truly affirmed of body.[231]

[Footnote 231: Topic. V. v. p. 134, a. 18-25. This is a very obscure and difficult _locus_. I am not sure that I understand it.]

11. The respondent who is affirming a Proprium may sometimes err by not clearly distinguishing in what mode, and in respect to what precise subject, he intends to affirm it. There are ten different modes, in one or other of which he always proposes to affirm it:--[232]

_a._ As belonging to the subject by nature. _E.g._, Biped is by nature a proprium of man.

_b._ As belonging to the subject simply--in some way or other. _E.g._, To have four fingers, belongs to Koriskus or some other individual man.

_c._ As belonging to the _species_. _E.g._, It belongs to fire to be the most subtle of all bodies.

_d._ As belonging absolutely ([Greek: a(plô=s, katha/per zô/|ou to\ zê=n])--in virtue of the essence of the subject--_per se_.[233]

_e._ As belonging to the subject by reason of some primary intervening aspect or attribute thereof. _E.g._, Prudence is a proprium of the soul, looked at _quatenus_ reasonable or intellectual.

_f._ As belonging to that primary attribute or special aspect, logically distinguished and named separately from the subject. _E.g._, Prudence is a proprium of the _logistikon_ or _rationale_.

_g._ As belonging to the subject viewed as possessing or holding in possession. _E.g._, The scientific man possesses that acquired mental habit which renders him incapable of having his convictions farther altered by discussion.

_h._ As belonging to some possession held by a possessing person. _E.g._, Science is unalterable by discussion; where science, a possession of the scientific man, is assigned as subject of the proprium, unalterable by discussion.

_i._ As belonging to a subject which is partaken or held in participation by another subject lying behind. _E.g._, Sensible perception is a proprium of the genus animal which genus is partaken or held in participation by this individual man, that individual horse, &c.; whence it may be predicated not only of animal but also of man, as thus participant.

_k._ As belonging to the ultimate subject partaking. _E.g._, To live is a proprium of this particular man or horse, participant in the genus animal, in the way just indicated.

[Footnote 232: Ibid. a. 26-b. 4: [Greek: sumbai/nei d' e)n e)ni/ois tô=n i)di/ôn ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu\ gi/nesthai/ tina a(marti/an para\ to\ mê\ diori/zesthai pô=s kai\ ti/nôn ti/thêsi to\ i)/dion. a(/pantes ga\r e)picheirou=sin a)podido/nai to\ i)/dion ê)\ to\ phu/sei u(pa/rchon], &c.

He then proceeds to enumerate the ten diversities of Proprium which I have given in the text: this paragraph also is very obscure.

I cannot but repeat the remark here (which I made _supra_ p. 318), that the contents of this paragraph also belong to the former investigation (_viz._, How ought the Proprium to be set out and described?) rather than to the present investigation (_viz._, Whether the alleged Proprium is really a Proprium of the assigned subject or not?).]

[Footnote 233: Topic. V. v. p. 134, a. 32: [Greek: ê)\ a(plô=s, katha/per zô/|ou to\ zê=n.] Is not [Greek: to\ zê=n] included in the _essentia_ ([Greek: to\ ti\ ê)=n ei)=nai]) of [Greek: zô=|on]? If so, how can it be admitted as a _proprium_ thereof?]

Now each of these varieties of the Proprium is liable to its own mode of erroneous setting out or description. Thus the corresponding errors will be:--[234]

_a._ Not to add the qualifying words _by nature_.

_b._ Not to state the proprium as simply belonging, when it does only belong to the subject now, and may presently cease to belong.

_c._ Not to state the proprium as belonging _to the species_. If he omits these words, he may be told that it belongs to one variety alone among the species (_e.g._, should it be a superlative) and not to others: perhaps it may belong to some conspicuously, and to others faintly. Or perhaps, if he does add the express words--_to the species_, he may err, inasmuch as there exists no real species properly so called.

_e._ _f._ Not to distinguish whether he means to affirm it of B by reason of A, or of A directly: he will lay himself open to the objection that his proprium, and the subject term of which he declares it to be a proprium, are not co-extensive in predication.

_g._ _h._ Not to distinguish whether he intends as subject the person possessing, or the possession. If he leaves this undetermined, the objector may attack him on one ground or the other.

_i._ _k._ Not to distinguish whether he means as subject the partaker, or the genus which is partaken. Here too the objector will have ground for attack either from one side or from the other.

[Footnote 234: Topic. V. v. p. 134, b. 5-p. 135, a. 5. For the fourth head (_d._), no corresponding error is assigned. It should be noted that the illustration given of it, and remarked upon at the foot of the last page, is repeated for the concluding head of the list.]

In case the respondent should enunciate his proprium in any one of the above defective ways, you will thus know where to find objections against him. But, if you undertake yourself to enunciate a proprium, you will avoid laying yourself open to the objections, by discriminating under which of these heads you intend to affirm it.[235]

[Footnote 235: Topic. V. v. p. 135, a. 5: [Greek: a)/llou me\n ou)=n ou(/tôs a)podido/ntos to\ i)/dion e)picheirête/on, au)tô=| d' ou) dote/on e)sti\ tau/tên tê\n e)/nstasin, a)ll' eu)thu\s tithe/menon to\ i)/dion dioriste/on o(\n tro/pon ti/thêsi to\ i)/dion.]]

12. Again, the respondent may perhaps affirm as proprium a predicate really identical with the subject, though under a different name. Thus, he may declare to [Greek: to\ pre/pon] to be a proprium [Greek: tou= kalou=]: you may then refute him by showing that [Greek: pre/pon] is identical with [Greek: kalo/n]. If he is on the negative side, denying A to be a proprium of B on the ground that A is identical with B, you will make out the affirmative against him by showing that A is not identical with B, but only co-extensive and reciprocating therewith. Thus, you may show that animated substance is not identical with animal, but a proprium of animal.[236]

[Footnote 236: Ibid. a. 11-19.]

13. Where the subject is _homoeomeric_, the respondent may declare as proprium of the whole what cannot be truly affirmed as proprium of a part separately; or he may declare as proprium of a part separately what cannot be truly declared as proprium of the whole. In either case, you have a plausible argument for refuting him; but your refutation will not be always conclusive, because there are various cases in which what is true of each homoeomeric part is not true of the whole; and _vice versâ_. If your position in the debate is affirmative, you will select as illustration some case in which what is by nature true of the whole is also true of each separate part: _e.g._, The earth as a whole, and each of its parts, tend by nature downwards. This is a proprium of the earth.[237]

[Footnote 237: Topic. V. v. p. 135, a. 20-b. 6.]

14. Respecting _Opposita_, there are different _loci_ for different varieties.

_a._ _Contraria_.--Suppose the respondent to affirm A as proprium of B: you will examine whether the contrary of A is proprium of the contrary of B. If it be not, then neither is A proprium of B. Thus, if best is not a proprium of justice, neither can worst be a proprium of injustice. If the respondent is on the negative side, you may prove the affirmative against him by showing that the contrary of the alleged proprium is a proprium of the contrary of the alleged subject.[238]

[Footnote 238: Ibid. vi. p. 135, b. 7-16.]

_b._ _Relata_.--Suppose the respondent to affirm a _relatum_ A as proprium of a _relatum_ B, you may refute him by showing that the correlate of A is not proprium of the correlate of B. Suppose him to deny the same, you will refute him by proving the affirmative between correlate and correlate.[239]

[Footnote 239: Ibid. vi. p. 135, b. 17-26.]

_c._ _Habitus et Privatio_.--Suppose the respondent to affirm an attribute of the _habitus_ B, as proprium thereof: you may refute him by showing that the corresponding attribute of the _privatio_ correlating with _habitus_ B, is not proprium of that _privatio_. Suppose him to take the negative side, you will refute him by proving the affirmative of this latter proposition.[240]

[Footnote 240: Ibid. b. 27-p. 136, a. 4.]

15. Respecting Contradictory Propositions (affirmation and negation of the same), more than one mode of dealing may be stated. Wherever the affirmation is a proprium of the subject, the negation cannot also be a proprium thereof; and _vice versâ_. If the affirmative predicate be not a proprium of the affirmative subject, neither can the negative predicate be proprium of the negative subject; and _vice versâ_. If the affirmative predicate be proprium of the affirmative subject, the negative predicate will also be proprium of the negative subject. The same predicate cannot be proprium both of the affirmative subject and of the negative subject.[241]

[Footnote 241: Ibid. p. 136, a. 5-b. 2. This _locus_ is declared by Aristotle to furnish arguments for refutation only, and not for proof.]

16. Respecting two or more Contra-Specific Terms under the same genus and exhausting the whole genus:--Suppose A and B contra-specific terms used as subjects; C and D contra-specific terms used as predicates. If C be not a proprium of A, neither will D be a proprium of B; thus, if perceivable ([Greek: ai)sthêto/n]) is not a proprium of any other species (except gods) included under the genus animal, neither will intelligible ([Greek: noêto/n]) be proprium of a god. Again, if C be a proprium of A, D also will be a proprium of B. Thus, if it be a proprium of prudence to be by its own nature the excellence of the rational or calculating soul ([Greek: logistikou=]), we must also affirm as proprium of temperance that it is the excellence of the appetitive soul ([Greek: e)pithumêtikou=]).[242]

[Footnote 242: Topic. V. vi. p. 136, b. 3-13. "Il faut supposer ici quatre termes, qui sont deux à deux les membres d'une division: si le premier n'est pas le propre du troisième, le second ne le sera pas du quatrième; et réciproquement pour la négation d'abord. Les quatre termes sont ici: sensible, intelligible, membres d'une même division: mortel, divinité, membres d'une autre division." (Barthélemy St. Hilaire, p. 197.)]

17. Respecting Cases or Inflections, either of the subject B, or the predicate A:--If the case or inflection of the predicate be not a proprium of the corresponding case or inflection of the subject, neither will the predicate be proprium of the subject. If the case or inflection of the predicate be a proprium of the corresponding case or inflection of the subject, then the predicate itself will also be proprium of the subject. _Pulchré_ is not proprium of _justé_; therefore, _pulchrum_ is not proprium of _justum_.

This _locus_ will be found available in combination with the preceding _locus_ bearing on _Opposita_. Not only _opposita_ themselves, but also the cases and inflections of _opposita_, may be adduced as arguments, following the rules above laid down.[243]

[Footnote 243: Topica, V. vii. p. 136, b. 15-32.]

18. Analogous cases or propositions:--If the respondent affirms A as proprium of B, you have an argument against him by showing that something analogous to A is not proprium of a subject analogous to B. Thus, the builder, in relation to house-making, is analogous to the physician, in relation to health-making; now health-making is not the proprium of the physician, and therefore neither is house-making the proprium of the builder. If the respondent has advanced a negative, you will apply this same _locus_ in the affirmative against him: _e.g._, as it is the proprium of the gymnast to impart a good habit of body, so it is the proprium of the physician to impart health.[244]

[Footnote 244: Ibid. b. 33-p. 137, a. 7.]

19. _Esse_, and _Generari_ or _Fieri_:--If A considered as _Ens_ is not the proprium of B considered as _Ens_, then neither will A considered as _Fiens_ be the proprium of B considered as _Fiens_. _Vice versâ_, on the affirmative side: if the former of these two be the fact, you may argue that the latter is the fact also.[245]

[Footnote 245: Topic. V. vii. p. 137, a. 21-b. 2.]

20. Comparison with the Idea:--If the respondent sets up A as proprium of B, you will turn your mind to the Idea of B, and note whether A is proprium of this Idea, in the same sense and under the same aspect as it is affirmed to be proprium of B. If it be not so, you will have an argument in refutation of the respondent. Thus, if he maintains that it is a proprium of man to be at rest, you will argue that this cannot be so, because to be at rest is not the proprium of the Self-man ([Greek: au)toa/nthrôpos]) _quatenus_ man, but _quatenus_ Idea. _Vice versâ_, you will have an affirmative argument, if you can show that it is the proprium of the Idea. Thus, since it is a proprium of the self-animal _quatenus_ animal to be composed of soul and body, you may infer that to be composed of soul and body is really a proprium of animal.[246]

[Footnote 246: Ibid. b. 3-13.]

21. _Locus_ from More and Less:--Suppose the respondent to affirm A as proprium of B: you will have an argument against him, if you can show that what is more A is not proprium of that which is more B. Thus, if to be more coloured is not proprium of that which is more body, neither is to be less coloured proprium of that which is less body; nor is to be coloured proprium of body simply. _Vice versâ_, if you can show that what is more A is proprium of what is more B, you will have an affirmative argument to establish that A is proprium of B. Thus, to perceive more is proprium of that which is more living. Hence, to perceive simply is proprium of that which is living simply; also, to perceive most, least, or less, is proprium of that which is most, least, or less living, respectively.[247]

[Footnote 247: Ibid. viii. p. 137, b. 14-27.]

If you can show that A simply is not proprium of B simply, you have an argument to establish that what is more or less A is not proprium of that which is more or less B. If, on the other land, you show the affirmative of the first, this will be an argument sustaining the affirmative of the last.[248] Perhaps you can show that what is more A is not proprium of what is more B: this will be an argument to show that A is not proprium of B. Thus, to perceive is more proprium of animal than to know is proprium of man; but to perceive is not proprium of animal; therefore, to know is not proprium of man. Or again, if you can show that what is less A is proprium of what is less B, this will form an argument to show that A is proprium of B. Thus, natural mansuetude is less proprium of man than life is proprium of animal; but natural mansuetude _is_ proprium of man: therefore life is proprium of animal.[249] Farther, if you can show that A is more a proprium of C than it is a proprium of B, yet nevertheless that it is not a proprium of C you may thence argue that A is not a proprium of B. Thus, to be coloured is more a proprium of superficies than it is a proprium of body; yet it is not a proprium of superficies; therefore, it is _not_ a proprium of body. This last variety of the _locus_ of More and Less (Aristotle remarks) affords no corresponding affirmative plea;[250] for the same predicate cannot be a proprium of many subjects. If A be really a proprium of superficies, it cannot be also proprium of body. Lastly, you may perhaps be able to show that C is more a proprium of B than A is a proprium of B; yet, if C is _not_ a proprium of B, you will infer negatively that neither is A proprium of B. Thus, to be perceivable is more proprium of animal, than to be divisible is proprium of animal; yet to be perceivable is _not_ proprium of animal, and, therefore, neither is to be divisible proprium of animal. You may invert this argument for the affirmative, if you can show that C is less a proprium of B than A is a proprium of B, yet still that C _is_ a proprium of B; hence you will infer, _à fortiori_, that A is a proprium thereof. _E.g._, If to perceive is less a proprium of animal than to live is a proprium thereof, yet to perceive _is_ a proprium of animal; then, to live is so likewise.[251]

[Footnote 248: Ibid. b. 28-p. 138, a. 3.]

[Footnote 249: Topica, V. viii. p. 138, a. 4-12.]

[Footnote 250: Ibid. p. 138, a. 13-20: [Greek: kataskeua/zonti de\ o( to/pos ou(=tos ou)/k e)sti chrê/simos; a)du/naton ga/r e)sti tau)to\ pleio/nôn i)/dion ei)=nai.]]

[Footnote 251: Ibid. a. 21-30.]

22. _Locus_ from Equal Relation:--Arguments both negative and affirmative may in like manner be obtained by comparing different things which are (not more or less propria, but) alike or equally propria of some other subject. If A is as much a proprium of B as C is proprium of D, while yet A is _not_ a proprium of B, you may hence infer that C is not a proprium of D. If, under this hypothesis, A _is_ a proprium of B, you may infer affirmatively that C is a proprium of D.[252] Or, if A and C be, alike and equally, propria of the same subject B, then, if you show that A is not proprium thereof, you will infer negatively that C is not so; if you show that A _is_ proprium of B, you will infer affirmatively that C is so likewise. Or, thirdly, if A be, alike and equally, a proprium of B and of E, then, if you can show that A is _not_ a proprium of E, you may infer negatively that it is _not_ a proprium of B. Here, however, the counter-inference affirmatively is not allowable; for the same proprium cannot belong as proprium to two distinct subjects, as was stated before.[253]

[Footnote 252: Ibid. a. 30-b. 15.]

[Footnote 253: Ibid. b. 16-22.]

23. _Locus_ from Potentiality:--No potentiality whatever can belong to _Non-Ens_. Accordingly, if A, the proprium affirmed of a subject B, is a potentiality, this must imply some real _Ens_ in which it inheres, and which is correlate to the subject. But, if in the specification of the proprium no allusion is made to such correlate, you will attack it as a bad proprium--as a potentiality inhering in _Non-Ens_ or nothing. _E.g._, if the case be, It is a proprium of air to be respirable, you will refute this by pointing out that this is true only when there exist animals in whom the potentiality of breathing resides; that no mention is made by the respondent of this correlate or of any other correlate; in other words, that, so far as the specification is concerned, the correlate is passed over as _Non-Ens_ or a non-entity. Therefore the proprium is not a good proprium.[254] Again, suppose the affirmation to be, It is a proprium of _Ens_ to be capable of doing or suffering something; this will be defensible because it is only when the subject _is Ens_, that it is declared to have such proprium.[255]

[Footnote 254: Topica, V. ix. p. 138, b. 27-37. [Greek: oi(=on e)pei\ o( ei)/pas a)e/ros i)/dion to\ a)napneusto/n tê=| duna/mei me\n a)pe/dôke to\ i)/dion (to\ ga\r toiou=ton i)/dion _oi(=on a)napnei=sthai_ a)napneusto/n e)stin), a)pode/dôke de\ kai\ pro\s to\ mê\ o(\n to\ i)/dion; kai\ ga\r mê\ o)/ntos zô/|ou, oi(=on a)napnei=n pe/phuke to\n a)e/ra, e)nde/chetai a)e/ra ei)=nai; ou) me/ntoi mê\ o)/ntos zô/|ou dunato/n e)stin a)napnei=n; ô(/st' ou)d' a)e/ros e)/stai i)/dion to\ toiou=ton oi(=on a)napnei=sthai, _to/te o(/te_ zô/|on ou)k e)/stai toiou=ton oi(=on a)napnei=n. ou)k a)\n ou)=n ei)/ê a)e/ros i)/dion to\ a)napneusto/n.]

_Respirability_ (the proprium here discussed) being a relative term, Aristotle demands that the correlate thereof shall be named and included in setting out the proprium. If this be not done, a refutative argument may be drawn from such omission--that the respondent was not aware of the relativity. We may remark here that this objection is founded on a bad or incomplete specification of the proprium in question: it is not an objection against the reality of that proprium itself, if carefully described. The objection belongs to that class which Aristotle had discussed before, at the commencement of Book V.]

[Footnote 255: Ibid. p. 139, a. 1-8.]

24. _Locus_ from the Superlative:--Suppose the affirmation to be, It is a proprium of fire to be the lightest of all bodies: this you may refute by showing that, if fire ceased to exist, there would still be some other body the lightest of all bodies. Therefore the proprium may still be predicated of something else, when its alleged subject has ceased to exist. The proprium and its subject are not reciprocating and co-extensive; therefore it is not a true proprium.[256]

[Footnote 256: Ibid. a. 9-20.]

VI.

We now enter on the Sixth Book, containing the _Loci_ bearing on Definition. In debates respecting Definition, there are five points on any of which the attack and defence may turn:--[257]

1. That which the definer enunciates as a definition may not be true at all, even as a predicate of the definiend or subject to be defined; or at least not true of everything that bears the name of the subject.

2. The definiend may have been included in a genus, but not in that genus to which it rightly and specially belongs.

3. The definition given may not be specially appropriate to the definiend (_i.e._, it may include, not only that but, other matters besides).

4. The definition, though unobjectionable on any of the above three grounds, may nevertheless not declare the Essence of the definiend.

5. Lastly, the definition may be good in substance, but badly expressed or set out.

[Footnote 257: Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 24-35: [Greek: tê=s de\ peri\ tou\s o(/rous pragmatei/as me/rê pe/nte e)sti/n.]]

As to the first of these five heads, the _Loci_ bearing thereupon have already been enumerated in the Third Book, on Accident: in accidental predications the question raised is always about the truth or falsehood of the predication.[258] As to the second and third of the five heads, these have been dealt with in the Fourth and Fifth Books, enumerating the _Loci_ on Genus and Proprium.[259]

[Footnote 258: Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 36.]

[Footnote 259: Ibid. b. 3.]

There remain the fourth and fifth heads, on which we are about to enter: (1) Whether the definition is well expressed or set out (the fifth head); (2) Whether it has any right to be called a definition at all, _i.e._, whether it declares the Essence of the subject (the fourth).[260] The fifth is taken first, because to do a thing well is always more difficult than to do it simply, and is therefore likely to afford greater opening for argumentative attack.

[Footnote 260: Ibid. b. 6.]

The definition, while unobjectionable in substance, may be badly set out in two ways. First, it may be indistinct in terms--not plain nor clear. Next, it may be redundant: the terms may include more than is required for the definition. Under each of these defects of expression several _loci_ may be indicated.[261]

[Footnote 261: Ibid. b. 12-18.]

1. Indistinctness may arise from the employment of equivocal terms in the definition. Or it may arise from the term to be defined being itself equivocal; while the definer, taking no notice of such equivocation, has tried to comprehend all its senses under one and the same definition. You may attack him either by denying that the definition as given covers all the different meanings of the definiend; or you may yourself distinguish (which the definer has omitted to do) these different meanings, and show that none of them or few of them are covered by the definition.[262]

[Footnote 262: Topic. VI. ii. p. 139, b. 19. [Greek: o(moi/ôs de\ kai\ ei) tou= o(rizome/nou pleonachô=s legome/nou mê\ dielô\n ei)=pen; a)/dêlon ga\r o(pote/rou to\n o(/ron a)pode/dôken, e)nde/chetai/ te _sukophantei=n_ ô(s ou)k e)pharmo/ttontos tou= lo/gou e)pi\ pa/nta ô(=n to\n o(rismo\n a)pode/dôken.]

The term [Greek: sukophantei=n] surprises us here, because the point under consideration is indicated by Aristotle himself as a real mistake; accordingly he ought not to characterize the procedure whereby such mistake is exposed as _mere cavil_--[Greek: sukophanti/a]. Alexander, in the Scholia (p. 287, b. 1, Br.), says that Aristotle intends to apply the term [Greek: sukophantei=n] to the respondent who advances this bad definition, not to the assailant who impeaches it. But the text of Aristotle does not harmonize with this interpretation.]

2. Indistinctness may arise from defining by means of a metaphor; but Aristotle treats you as a caviller if you impugn this metaphor as though it were _proprio sensu_.[263] He declares it to be wrong, but he seems to think that you ought to object to it at once as a metaphor, without troubling yourself to prove it inappropriate.

[Footnote 263: Ibid. b. 32: [Greek: e)nde/chetai de\ kai\ tê\n metaphora\n ei)po/nta _sukophantei=n_ ô(s kuri/ôs ei)rêko/ta.] Here again we have the word [Greek: sukophantei=n] to designate what seems a legitimate mode of argumentative attack.]

3. Indistinctness will arise if the terms of the definition are rare or far-fetched or founded upon some fact very little known.[264] Definitions given by Plato are cited to illustrate this.

[Footnote 264: Ibid. p. 140, a. 3: [Greek: pa=n ga\r a)saphe\s to\ mê\ ei)ôtho/s].]

4. Indistinctness arises from the employment of a poetical image, which is even worse than a professed metaphor: as where law is defined to be--a measure or image of things by nature just.[265]

[Footnote 265: Ibid. a. 6-17. [Greek: chei=ron o(poiouou=s tô=n kata\ metaphora\n legome/nôn].]

5. The definition is indistinct, if it does not, while making known the definiend, make clear at the same time its contrary.[266]

[Footnote 266: Ibid. a. 18.]

6. The definition is also indistinct if it does not, when enunciated, make known what the definiend is, without requiring that the definiend itself shall be expressly enunciated. The definition by itself ought to suggest at once the name of the definiend. Otherwise, the definer is no better than those archaic painters, who, when painting a dog or a horse, were compelled to write the name alongside in order that the animal might be recognized.[267]

[Footnote 267: Ibid. a. 20. This last condition is a high measure of perfection to exact from a definition. Assuredly Aristotle's own definitions often fall lamentably short of it.]

Such are the _Loci_ regarding Indistinctness in the setting out of the definition. The second defect is Redundancy.

1. Redundancy will arise if the terms of the definition include either all things absolutely, or all things contained in the same genus as the definiend; since the definition ought to consist of a generic term to discriminate the definiend from all extra-generic things, and a differential term to discriminate it from other things within the same genus. A definition of the kind mentioned will be useless through redundancy.[268] It will also be open to the like objection, if it includes what is merely a proprium of the definiend, over and above the essential attributes; or, indeed, if it includes any thing else except what is required for clearly bringing out the definiend.[269] It will be still worse, if it comprises any attribute not belonging to all individuals of the species; for then it will not even be a proprium or a reciprocating predication.[270]

[Footnote 268: Topic. VI. iii. p. 140, a. 23-32. Alexander, however, remarks very pertinently, that the defects of such a definition are defects of substance rather than of expression. Aristotle has passed unconsciously from the latter to the former: [Greek: e)n me\n tê=| prô/tê| tô=n e)pho/dôn do/xeien a)\n o( A)ristote/lês meta/gein ei)s ta\s pragmatika\s e)xeta/seis] (Schol. p. 287, b. 27, Br.).]

[Footnote 269: Ibid. a. 37: [Greek: a(plô=s d' ei)pei=n, a(/pan peri/ergon ou(= a)phairethe/ntos to\ loipo\n dê=lon poiei= to\ o(rizo/menon.]]

[Footnote 270: Ibid. b. 16.]

2. Repetition is another fault sometimes committed. The same attribute may be predicated twice over. Or a particular and narrow attribute may be subjoined, in addition to a more general and comprehensive attribute in which it has already been included.[271]

[Footnote 271: Ibid. b. 27-p. 141, a. 22.]

So much for the faults which belong to the manner of expressing the definition tendered. Next, as bearing on the matter and substance of the definition, the following _loci_ are distinguishable.

1. The first of these _loci_ is, if the matter of the definition is not _prius_ and _notius_ as compared with the definiend. It is one of the canons of Definition, the purpose of which is to impart knowledge of the definiend, to introduce nothing except what is prior by nature and better known than the latter. The essence of each definiend--the being what it is--is one and only one. If a definition be given, other than that by means of what is _prius_ and _notius_, it would follow that the same definiend might have two distinct essences; which is impossible. Accordingly, any proposition tendered as a definition but enunciating what is not prior by nature and better known than the definiend sins against this canon, and is to be held as no true definition at all.[272]

[Footnote 272: Ibid. iv. p. 141, a. 24-b. 2.]

The _locus_ here indicated by this general feature is one, but it includes a number of varieties.[273] More known, or less known, it should first be observed, has two distinct meanings: either more or less known _absolutely_ (_by nature_); or more or less known _to us_. Absolutely, or by nature, the point is better known than the line; the line, than the superficies; the superficies, than the solid; the _prius_, than the _posterius_. But _to us_ the reverse is true. The solid, as object of sensible perception, is earlier known and more known than the superficies; the superficies, than the line; the line, than the point; the _posterius_, than the _prius_. _To us_ means to the bulk of mankind: _absolutely_ or _by nature_ refers to the instructed, superior, teaching and expository, intellects.[274] There may be some cases in which the _notius nobis_ coincides and is identical with the _notius naturâ_;[275] but, as a rule, the two are distinct, and the one is the inverse of the other. A genuine and perfect definition is one which enunciates the essence of the Species through Genus and Differentiæ, which are both of them absolutely prior and more knowable than the Species, since, if they be supposed non-existent, the Species is nowhere to be found. No man can know the Species without knowing its Genus and Differentiæ; but you may know the Genus and Differentiæ without knowing the Species; hence the Species is more unknowable than they are.[276] This is the true scientific definition; but there are persons incapable of acquiring knowledge by means of it. To these persons, an imperfect explanation or quasi-definition must be given, by means of matters knowable to them.[277] Those, however, who regard such imperfect explanations as true definitions, must be reminded that, upon that hypothesis, we should be compelled to admit many distinct definitions of the same definiend. For individuals differ from each other in respect to what is more knowable: what is more so to one man is not more so to another. Indeed the same man differs from himself on this point at different periods: to the early and untrained mind objects of sensible perception are the most knowable; but, when a man has been improved by training and instruction, the case is reversed, and the objects of intellect become the most familiar to his mind.[278] To define properly, therefore, we must enunciate, not the _notiora nobis_ but, the _notiora naturâ_ or _simpliciter_; understanding by this last phrase, not what is more knowable to all actual men but, what is more knowable to men of well-trained and well-constituted intellect; just as, when we speak of the wholesome, we mean what is wholesome to the well-constituted body.[279] These conditions of Definition you must thoroughly master, and apply to each debate as the occasion may require. Your task in refuting an alleged definition will be the easiest in those cases where it conforms to neither of the above conditions; that is, when it enunciates neither what is _notius naturâ_ nor what is _notius nobis_.[280]

[Footnote 273: Ibid. v. p. 142, b. 20.]

[Footnote 274: Topic. VI. iv. p. 141, b. 3-14.]

[Footnote 275: Ibid. b. 22.]

[Footnote 276: Ibid. b. 25.]

[Footnote 277: Ibid. b. 16.]

[Footnote 278: Ibid. b. 34.

The general mental fact here noticed by Aristotle may be seen philosophically stated and explained in the volume of Professor Bain on the Emotions and the Will. (Chapter on Consciousness, sect. 19, p. 581, 2nd ed.)

"A sensation is, under any view of it, a conscious element of the mind. As pleasure or pain, we are conscious in one way; as discrimination, we are conscious in the other way, namely, in a mode of neutral excitement.--But this is not all. After much contact with the sensible world, a new situation arises, and a new variety of the consciousness, which stands in need of some explanation. When a child experiences for the first time the sensation of scarlet, there is nothing but the sensibility of a new impression more or less intense. . . . It is very difficult for us to realize or define this original shock, our position in mature life being totally altered. It is the rarest thing for us _then_ to come under a radically new impression; and we can only, by help of imperfect analogies, form an approximate conception of what happens at the first shock of a discriminative sensation. The process of engraining these impressions on the mind after repetition, gives to subsequent sensations quite a different character as compared with the first. The second shock of scarlet, if it stood alone, would doubtless resemble the preceding; but such is the nature of the mind, that the new shock will not stand alone, but restores the notion or idea or trace that survived the former. The sensation is no longer the primitive stroke of surprise, but a coalition of a present shock with all that remains of the previous occasions. Hence it may properly be said, when we see, or hear, or touch, or move, that what comes before us is really contributed more by the mind itself than by the object present. The consciousness is complicated by three concurring elements--the new shock, the flash of agreement with the sum total of the past, and the feeling of that past as revived in the present. In truth, the new sensation is apt to be entirely over-ridden by the old; and, in place of discriminating by virtue of our susceptibility to what is characteristic in it, our discrimination follows another course. For example, if I have before me two shades of colour, instead of feeling the difference exactly as I am struck at the moment, my judgment resorts to the round-about process of first identifying each with some reiterated series of past impressions; and, having two sum-totals in my mind, the difference that I feel is between those totals. If I made a mistake, it may be attributed not so much to a wrong act of discrimination, as to a wrong act of identification.--All sensations, therefore, after the first of each kind, involve a flash of recovery from the past, which is what really determines their character. The present shock is simply made use of as a means of reviving some one past in preference to all others; the new impression of scarlet is in itself almost insignificant, serving only as the medium of resuscitating the cerebral condition resulting from the united force of all the previous scarlets.--Sensation thus calls into operation the two great intellectual laws, in addition to the primitive sensibility of difference.--When we consider ourselves as performing the most ordinary act of seeing or hearing, we are bringing into play those very functions of the intellect that make its development and its glory in its highest manifestations."]

[Footnote 279: Topic. VI. iv. p. 142, a. 10.]

[Footnote 280: Ibid. a. 12; also, a. 32.]