Chapter IX: Topica (2)

Such are the four distinct helps, towards facility of syllogizing, enumerated by Aristotle. It will be observed that the third and fourth (study of Resemblances and Differences) bear more upon matters of fact and less upon words; while the second ([Greek: to\ posachô=s]), though doubtless also bearing on matters of fact and deriving from thence its main real worth, yet takes its departure from terms and propositions, and proceeds by comparing multiplied varieties of these in regard to diversity of meaning. Upon this ground it is, apparently, that Aristotle has given so much fuller development to the second head than to the third and fourth; for, in the Topica, he is dealing with propositions and counter-propositions--with opinions and counter-opinions, not with science and truth.

He proceeds to indicate the different ways in which these three helps (the second, third, and fourth) further the purpose of the dialectician--respondent as well as assailant. Unless the different meanings of the term be discriminated, the respondent cannot know clearly what he admits or what he denies; he may be thinking of something different from what the assailant intends, and the syllogisms constructed may turn upon a term only, not upon any reality.[66] The respondent will be able to protect himself better against being driven into contradiction, if he can distinguish the various meanings of the same term; for he will thus know whether the syllogisms brought against him touch the real matter which he has admitted.[67] On the other hand, the assailant will have much facility in driving his opponent into contradiction, if he (the assailant) can distinguish the different meanings of the term, while the respondent cannot do so; in those cases at least where the proposition is true in one sense of the term and false in another.[68] This manner of proceeding, however, is hardly consistent with genuine Dialectic. No dialectician ought ever to found his interrogations and his arguments upon a mere unanalysed term, unless he can find absolutely nothing else to say in the debate.[69]

[Footnote 66: Ibid. xviii. p. 108, a. 22.]

[Footnote 67: Ibid. a. 26: [Greek: chrê/simon de\ kai\ pro\s to\ mê\ paralogisthê=nai kai\ pro\s to\ paralogi/sasthai. ei)do/tes ga\r posachô=s le/getai ou) mê\ paralogisthô=men, a)ll' ei)dê/somen e)a\n mê\ pro\s to\ au)to\ to\n lo/gon poiê=tai o( e)rôtô=n.]]

[Footnote 68: Ibid. a. 29: [Greek: au)toi/ te e)rôtô=ntes dunêso/metha paralogi/sasthai e)a\n mê\ tugcha/nê| ei)dô\s o( a)pokrino/menos posachô=s le/getai; tou=to d' ou)k e)pi\ pa/ntôn dunato/n, a)ll' o(/tan ê)=| tô=n pollachô=s legome/nôn ta\ me\n a)lêthê=, ta\ de\ pseudê=.]]

[Footnote 69: Topic. I. xviii. p. 108, a. 34: [Greek: dio\ pantelô=s eu)labête/on toi=s dialektikoi=s to\ toiou=nton, to\ pro\s tou)/noma diale/gesthai, _e)a\n mê/ tis a)/llôs e)xadunatê=| peri\ tou= prokeime/nou diale/gesthai_.]]

The third help (an acquaintance with Differences) will be of much avail on all occasions where we have to syllogize upon Same and Different, and where we wish to ascertain the essence or definition of any thing; for we ascertain this by exclusion of what is foreign thereunto, founded on the appropriate differences in each case.[70]

[Footnote 70: Ibid. b. 2.]

Lastly, the fourth help (the intelligent survey of Resemblances) serves us in different ways:--(1) Towards the construction of inductive arguments; (2) Towards syllogizing founded upon assumption; (3) Towards the declaration of definitions. As to the inductive argument, it is founded altogether on a repetition of similar particulars, whereby the universal is obtained.[71] As to the syllogizing from an assumption, the knowledge of resemblances is valuable, because we are entitled to assume, as an _Endoxon_ or a doctrine conformable to common opinion, that what happens in any one of a string of similar cases will happen also in all the rest. We lay down this as the major proposition of a syllogism; and thus, if we can lay hold of any one similar case, we can draw inference from it to the matter actually in debate.[72] Again, as to the declaration of definitions, when we have once discovered what is the same in all particular cases, we shall have ascertained to what genus the subject before us belongs;[73] for that one of the common predicates which is most of the essence, will be the genus. Even where the two matters compared are more disparate than we can rank in the same genus, the knowledge of resemblances will enable us to discover useful analogies, and thus to obtain a definition at least approximative. Thus, as the point is in a line, so is the unit in numbers; each of them is a _principium_; this, therefore, is a common genus, which will serve as a tolerable definition. Indeed this is the definition of them commonly given by philosophers; who call the unit _principium_ of number, and the point _principium_ of a line, thus putting one and the other into a genus common to both.[74]

[Footnote 71: Ibid. b. 9.]

[Footnote 72: Ibid. b. 12: [Greek: pro\s de\ tou\s e)x u(pothe/seôs sullogsismou/s, _dio/ti e)/ndoxo/n e)stin_, ô(/s pote e)ph' e(no\s tô=n o(moi/ôn e)/chei, ou(/tôs kai\ e)i\ tô=n loipô=n; ô(/ste pro\s o(/ ti a)\n au)tô=n eu)porô=men diale/gesthai, _prodiomologêso/metha_, ô(/s pote e)pi\ tou/tôn e)/chei, ou(/tô kai\ e)pi\ tou= prokeime/nou e)/chein. dei/xantes de\ e)kei=no kai\ **to\ prokei/menon _e)x u(pothe/seôs dedeicho/tes e)so/metha; u(pothe/menoi_ ga/r, ô(/s pote e)pi\ tou/tôn e)/chei, ou(/tô kai\ e)pi\ tou= prokeime/nou e)/chein, tê\n a)po/deixin pepoiê/metha.] For [Greek: to\ e)x u(pothe/seôs], compare Topic. III. vi. p. 119, b. 35.]

[Footnote 73: Topic. I. xviii. p. 108, b. 19.]

[Footnote 74: Topic. I. xviii. p. 108, b. 27: [Greek: ô(/ste to\ koino\n e)pi\ pa/ntôn ge/nos a)podi/dontes _do/xomen ou)k a)llotri/ôs o(ri/zesthai_.] It will be recollected that all the work of Dialectic (as Aristotle tells us often) has reference to [Greek: do/xa] and not to scientific truth. "We shall _seem to define_ not in a manner departing from the reality of the subject" is, therefore, an appropriate dialectic artifice.]

II.

The First Book of the Topica, which we have thus gone through, was entitled by some ancient commentators [Greek: ta\ pro\ tô=n To/pôn]--matters preliminary to the _Loci_. This is quite true, as a description of its contents; for Aristotle in the last words of the book, distinctly announces that he is about to enumerate the _Loci_ towards which the four above-mentioned _Organa_ will be useful.[75]

[Footnote 75: Ibid. p. 108, b. 32: [Greek: oi( de\ to/poi pro\s ou(\s chrê/sima ta\ lechthe/nta oi(/de ei)si/n.]]

_Locus_ ([Greek: to/pos]) is a place in which many arguments pertinent to one and the same dialectical purpose, may be found-- _sedes argumentorum_. In each _locus_, the arguments contained therein look at the thesis from the same point of view; and the _locus_ implies nothing distinct from the arguments, except this manner of view common to them all. In fact, the metaphor is a convenient one for designating the relation of every Universal generally to its particulars: the Universal is not a new particular, nor any adjunct superimposed upon all its particulars, but simply a _place_ in which all known similar particulars may be found grouped together, and in which there is room for an indefinite number of new ones. If we wish to arm the student with a large command of dialectical artifices, we cannot do better than discriminate the various groups of arguments, indicating the point of view common to each group, and the circumstances in which it becomes applicable. By this means, whenever he is called upon to deal with a new debate, he will consider the thesis in reference to each one of these different _loci_, and will be able to apply arguments out of each of them, according as the case may admit.

The four _Helps_ ([Greek: o)/rgana]) explained in the last book differ from the _Loci_ in being of wider and more undefined bearing: they are directions for preparatory study, rather than for dealing with any particular situation of a given problem; though it must be confessed that, when Aristotle proceeds to specify the manner in which the three last-mentioned helps are useful, he makes considerable approach towards the greater detail and particularization of the _Loci_. In entering now upon these, he reverts to that quadruple classification of propositions and problems (according to the four Predicables), noted at the beginning of the treatise, in which the predicate is either Definition, Proprium, Genus, or Accident, of the subject. He makes a fourfold distribution of _Loci_, according as they bear upon one or other of these four. In the Second and Third Books, we find those which bear upon propositions predicating Accident; in the Fourth Book, we pass to Genus; in the Fifth, to Proprium; in the Sixth and Seventh, to Definition.

The problem or thesis propounded for debate may have two faults on which it may be impugned: either it may be untrue; or it may be expressed in a way departing from the received phraseology.[76] It will be universal, or particular, or indefinite; and either affirmative or negative; but, in most cases, the respondent propounds for debate an affirmative universal, and not a negative or a particular.[77] Aristotle therefore begins with those _loci_ that are useful for refuting an Affirmative Universal; though, in general, the same arguments are available for attack and defence both of the universal and of the particular; for if you can overthrow the particular, you will have overthrown the universal along with it, while if you can defend the universal, this will include the defence of the particular. As the thesis propounded is usually affirmative, the assailant undertakes the negative side or the work of refutation. And this indeed (as Eudemus, the pupil of Aristotle, remarked, after his master[78]) is the principal function and result of dialectic exercise; which refutes much and proves very little, according to the analogy of the Platonic Dialogues of Search.

[Footnote 76: Topic. II. i. p. 109, a. 27: [Greek: diori/sasthai de\ dei= kai\ ta\s a(marti/as ta\s e)n toi=s problê/masin, o(/ti ei)si\ dittai/, ê)\ tô=| pseu/desthai, ê)\ tô=| parabai/nein tê\n keime/nên le/xin.]

Alexander remarks (Schol. p. 264, b. 23, Br.) that [Greek: pro/blêma] here means, not the interrogation, but [Greek: to\ ô(risme/non ê)/dê kai\ kei/menon--ou(= proi+/statai/ tis, o(/n o( dialektiko\s e)le/gchein e)picheirei=].]

[Footnote 77: Topic. II. i. p. 109, a. 8: [Greek: dia\ to\ ma=llon ta\s the/seis komi/zein e)n tô=| u(pa/rchein ê)\ mê/, tou\s de\ dialegome/nous a)naskeua/zein.]]

[Footnote 78: Alexander ap. Schol. p. 264, a. 27, Br.: [Greek: o(/ti de\ oi)keio/teron tô=| dialektikô=| to\ a)naskeua/zein tou= kataskeua/zein, e)n tô=| prô/tô| tô=n e)pigraphome/nôn Eu)dêmei/ôn A)nalutikô=n (e)pigra/phetai de\ au)to\ kai\ Eu)dê/mou u(pe\r tô=n A)nalutikô=n) ou(/tôs le/getai, o(/ti o( dialektiko\s a(\ me\n kataskeua/zei mikra/ e)sti, to\ de\ polu\ tê=s duna/meôs au)tou= pro\s to\ a)nairei=n ti e)sti/n.]]

Aristotle takes the four heads--Accident, Genus, Proprium, and Definition, in the order here enumerated. The thesis of which the predicate is enunciated as Accident, affirms the least, is easiest to defend, and hardest to upset.[79] When we enunciate Genus or Proprium, we affirm, not merely that the predicate belongs to the subject (which is all that is affirmed in the case of Accident), but, also something more--that it belongs to the subject in a certain manner and relation. And when we enunciate Definition, we affirm all this and something reaching yet farther--that it declares the whole essence of the _definitum_, and is convertible therewith. Accordingly, the thesis of Definition, affirming as it does so very much, presents the most points of attack and is by far the hardest to defend.[80] Next in point of difficulty, for the respondent, comes the Proprium.

[Footnote 79: Topic. VII. v. p. 155, a. 27: [Greek: r(a=|ston de\ pa/ntôn kataskeua/sai to\ sumbebêko/s--a)naskeua/zein de\ chalepô/taton to\ sumbebêko/s, o(/ti e)la/chista e)n au)tô=| de/dotai; ou) ga\r prossêmai/nei e)n tô=| sumbebêko/ti pô=s u(pa/rchei, ô(/st' e)pi\ me\n tô=n a)/llôn dichô=s e)/stin a)nelei=n, ê)\ dei/xanta o(/ti ou)ch u(pa/rchei ê)\ o(/ti ou)ch ou(/tôs u(parchei, e)pi\ de\ tou= sumbebêko/tos ou)k e)/stin a)nelei=n a)ll' ê)\ dei/xanta o(/ti ou)ch u(pa/rchei.]]

[Footnote 80: Topic. VII. v. p. 155, a. 3. [Greek: pa/ntôn r(a=|ston o(/ron a)naskeua/sai; plei=sta ga\r e)n au)tô=| ta\ dedome/na pollô=n ei)rême/nôn.] a. 23: [Greek: tô=n d' a)/llôn to\ i)/dion ma/lista toiou=ton.]]

Beginning thus with the thesis enunciating Accident, Aristotle enumerates no less than thirty-seven distinct _loci_ or argumentative points of view bearing upon it. Most of them suggest modes of assailing the thesis; but there are also occasionally intimations to the respondent how he may best defend himself. In this numerous list there are indeed some items repetitions of each other, or at least not easily distinguishable.[81] As it would be tedious to enumerate them all, I shall select some of the most marked and illustrative.

[Footnote 81: Aristotle himself admits the repetition in some cases, Topic. II. ii. p. 110, a. 12: the fourth _locus_ is identical substantially with the second _locus_.

Theophrastus distinguished [Greek: para/ggelma] as the general precept, from [Greek: to/pos] or _locus_, as any proposition specially applying the precept to a particular case (Schol. p. 264, b. 38).]

1. The respondent has enunciated a certain predicate as belonging in the way of accident, to a given subject. Perhaps it may belong to the subject; yet not as accident, but under some one of the other three Predicables. Perhaps he may have enunciated (either by explicit discrimination, or at least by implication contained in his phraseology) the genus as if it were an accident,--an error not unfrequently committed.[82] Thus, if he has said, To be a colour is an accident of white, he has affirmed explicitly the genus as if it were an accident. And he has affirmed the same by implication, if he has said, White (or whiteness) is coloured. For this is a form of words not proper for the affirmation of a genus respecting its species, in which case the genus itself ought to stand as a literal predicate (White is a colour), and not to be replaced by one of its derivatives (White is coloured). Nor can the proposition be intended to be taken as affirming either proprium or definition; for in both these the predicate would reciprocate and be co-extensive with the subject, whereas in the present case there are obviously many other subjects of which it may be predicated that they are coloured.[83] In saying, White is coloured, the respondent cannot mean to affirm either genus, proprium, or definition; therefore he must mean to affirm _accident_. The assailant will show that this is erroneous.

[Footnote 82: Topic. II. ii. p. 109, a. 34: [Greek: ei(=s me\n dê\ to/pos to\ e)pible/pein ei) to\ kat' a)/llon tina\ tro/pon u(pa/rchon ô(s sumbebêko\s a)pode/dôken. a(marta/netai de\ ma/lista tou=to peri\ ta\ ge/nê, oi(=on ei)/ tis tô=| leukô=| phai/ê sumbebêke/nai chrô/mati ei)=nai; ou) ga\r sumbe/bêke tô=| leukô=| chrô/mati ei)=nai, a)lla\ ge/nos au)tou= to\ chrô=ma/ e)stin.]]

[Footnote 83: We may find cases in which Aristotle has not been careful to maintain the strict logical sense of [Greek: sumbebêko/s] or [Greek: sumbe/bêken] where he applies these terms to Genus or Proprium: _e.g._ Topic. II. iii. p. 110, b. 24; Soph. El. vi. p. 168, b. 1.]

2. Suppose the thesis set up by the respondent to be an universal affirmative, or an universal negative. You (the interrogator or assailant) should review the particulars contained under these universals. Review them not at once as separate individuals, but as comprised in subordinate genera and species; beginning from the highest, and descending down to the lowest species which is not farther divisible except into individuals. Thus, if the thesis propounded be, The cognition of opposites is one and the same cognition; you will investigate whether this can be truly predicated respecting all the primary species of _Opposita_: respecting _Relata_ and _Correlata_, respecting Contraries, respecting Contradictories, respecting _Habitus_ and _Privatio_. If, by going thus far, you obtain no result favourable to your purpose,[84] you must proceed farther, and subdivide until you come to the lowest species:--Is the cognition of just and unjust one and the same? that of double and half? of sight and blindness? of existence and non-existence? If in all, or in any one, of these cases you can show that the universal thesis does not hold, you will have gained your point of refuting it. On the other hand, if, when you have enumerated many particulars, the thesis is found to hold in all, the respondent is entitled to require you to grant it as an universal proposition, unless you can produce a satisfactory counter-example. If you decline this challenge, you will be considered an unreasonable debater.[85]

[Footnote 84: Topic. II. ii. p. 109, b. 20: [Greek: ka)\n e)pi\ tou/tôn mê/pô phanero\n ê)=|, pa/lin tau=ta diairete/on me/chri tô=n a)to/môn, oi(=on ei) tô=n dikai/ôn kai\ a)di/kôn], &c.]

[Footnote 85: Ibid. b. 25-30. [Greek: e)a\n ga\r mêde/teron tou/tôn poiê=|, a)/topos phanei=tai mê\ tithei/s.]]

3. You will find it useful to define both the accident predicated in the thesis, and the subject respecting which it is predicated, or at least one of them: you will see then whether these definitions reveal anything false in the affirmation of the thesis. Thus, if the thesis affirms that it is possible to do injustice to a god, you will define what is meant by doing injustice. The definition is--hurting intentionally: you can thus refute the thesis by showing that no injustice to a god can possibly be done; for a god cannot be hurt.[86] Or let the thesis maintained be, The virtuous man is envious. You define envy, and you find that it is--vexation felt by reason of the manifest success of some meritorious man. Upon this definition it is plain that the virtuous man cannot feel envy: he would be worthless, if he did feel it. Perhaps some of the terms employed in your definition may themselves require definition; if so, you will repeat the process of defining until you come to something plain and clear.[87] Such an analysis will often bring out some error at first unperceived in the thesis.

[Footnote 86: Topic. II. ii. p. 109, b. 34: [Greek: ou) ga\r e)nde/chetai bla/ptesthai to\n theo/n.]]

[Footnote 87: Ibid. p. 110, a. 4: [Greek: lamba/nein de\ kai\ a)nti\ tô=n e)n toi=s lo/gois o)noma/tôn lo/gous, kai\ mê\ a)phi/stasthai e(/ôs a)\n ei)s gnô/rimon e)/lthê|.]]

4. It will be advisable, both for assailant and respondent, to discriminate those cases in which the authority of the multitude is conclusive from those in which it is not. Thus, in regard to the meaning of terms and in naming objects, we must speak like the multitude; but, when the question is as to what objects deserve to be denominated so and so, we must not feel bound by the multitude, if there be any special dissentient authority.[88] That which produces good health we must call wholesome, as the multitude do; but, in calling this or that substance wholesome, the physician must be our guide.

[Footnote 88: Ibid. a. 14-22.]

5. Aristotle gives more than one suggestion as to those cases in which the terms of the thesis have a double or triple sense, yet in which the thesis is propounded either as an universal affirmative or as an universal negative. If the respondent is himself not aware of the double sense of his thesis, while you (the questioner) are aware of it, you will prove the point which you are seeking to establish against him in one or other of the two senses, if you cannot prove it in both. If he is aware of it in the double sense, he will insist that you have chosen the sense which he did not intend.[89] This mode of procedure will be available to the respondent as well as to you; but it will be harder to him, since his thesis is universal. For, in order to make good an universal thesis, he must obtain your assent to a preliminary assumption or convention, that, if he can prove it in one sense of the terms, it shall be held proved in both; and, unless the proposition be so plausible that you are disposed to grant him this, he will not succeed in the procedure.[90] But you on your side, as refuting, do not require any such preliminary convention or acquiescence; for, if you prove the negative in any single case, you succeed in overthrowing the universal affirmative, while, if you prove the affirmative in any single case, you succeed in overthrowing the universal negative.[91] Such procedure, however, is to be adopted only when you can find no argument applicable to the equivocal thesis in all its separate meanings; this last sort of argument, wherever it can be found, being always better.[92]

[Footnote 89: Topic. II. iii. p. 110, a. 24.]

[Footnote 90: Ibid. a. 37: [Greek: kataskeua/zousi de\ prodiomologête/on o(/ti ei) o(tô|ou=n u(pa/rchei, panti\ u(pa/rchei, a)\n pithano\n ê)=| to\ a)xi/ôma; ou) ga\r a)po/chrê pro\s to\ dei=xai o(/ti panti\ u(pa/rchei to\ e)ph' e(no\s dialechthê=nai.]]

[Footnote 91: Topic. II. iii. p. 110, a. 32: [Greek: plê\n a)naskeua/zonti me\n ou)de\n dei= e)x o(mologi/as diale/gesthai].]

[Footnote 92: Ibid. b. 4.]

In cases where the double meaning is manifest, the two meanings must be distinguished by both parties, and the argument conducted accordingly. Where the term has two or more meanings (not equivocal but) related to each other by analogy, we must deal with each of these meanings distinctly and separately.[93] If our purpose is to refute, we select any one of them in which the proposition is inadmissible, neglecting the others: if our purpose is to prove, we choose any one in which the proposition is true, neglecting the others.[94]

[Footnote 93: Topic. II. iii. p. 110, b. 16-p. 111, a. 7. This _locus_ is very obscurely stated by Aristotle.]

[Footnote 94: Ibid. p. 110, b. 29-32: [Greek: e)a\n boulô/metha kataskeua/sai, ta\ toiau=ta prooiste/on o(/sa e)nde/chetai, kai\ diairete/on _ei)s tau=ta mo/non_ o(/sa kai\ chrê/sima pro\s to\ kataskeua/sai; a)\n d' a)naskeua/sai, o(/sa mê\ e)nde/chetai, _ta\ de\ loipa\ paraleipte/on_.]

Aristotle's precepts indicate the way of managing the debate _with a view to success._]

6. Observe that a predicate which belongs to the genus does not necessarily belong to any one of its species, but that any predicate which belongs to one of the species does belong also to the genus; on the other hand, that any predicate which can be denied of the genus may be denied also of all its contained species, but that any predicate which can be denied of some one or some portion of the contained species cannot for that reason be denied of the genus. You may thus prove from one species to the genus, and disprove from the genus to each one species; but not _vice versâ_. Thus, if the respondent grants that there exist cognitions both estimable and worthless, you are warranted in inferring that there exist habits of mind estimable and worthless; for cognition is a species under the genus habit of mind. But if the negative were granted, that there exist no cognitions both estimable and worthless, you could not for that reason infer that there are no habits of mind estimable and worthless. So, if it were granted to you that there are judgments correct and erroneous, you could not for that reason infer that there were perceptions of sense correct and erroneous; perceiving by sense being a species under the genus judging. But, if it were granted that there were no judgments correct and erroneous, you might thence infer the like negative about perceptions of sense.[95]

[Footnote 95: Topic. II. iv. p. 111, a. 14-32. [Greek: nu=n me\n ou)=n e)k tou= ge/nous peri\ to\ ei)=dos ê( a)po/deixis; to\ ga\r kri/nein ge/nos tou= ai)stha/nesthai; o( ga\r ai)sthano/menos kri/nei pôs--o( me\n ou)=n pro/teros to/pos pseudê/s e)sti pro\s to\ kataskeua/sai, o( de\ deu/teros a)lêthê/s.--pro\s de\ to\ a)naskeua/zein o( me\n pro/teros a)lêthê/s, o( de\ deu/teros pseudê/s.]

It is here a point deserving attention, that Aristotle ranks [Greek: to\ ai)stha/nesthai] as a species under the genus [Greek: to\ kri/nein]. This is a notable circumstance in the Aristotelian psychology.]

7. Keep in mind also that if there be any subject of which you can affirm the genus, of that same subject you must be able to affirm one or other of the species contained under the genus. Thus, if science be a predicate applicable, grammar, music, or some other of the special sciences must also be applicable: if any man can be called truly a scientific man, he must be a grammarian, a musician, or some other specialist. Accordingly, if the thesis set up by your respondent be, The soul is moved, you must examine whether any one of the known varieties of motion can be truly predicated of the soul, _e.g._, increase, destruction, generation, &c. If none of these special predicates is applicable to the soul, neither is the generic predicate applicable to it; and you will thus have refuted the thesis. This _locus_ may serve as a precept for proof as well as for refutation; for, equally, if the soul be moved in any one species of motion, it is moved, and, if the soul be not moved in any species of motion, it is not moved.[96]

[Footnote 96: Topic. II. iv. p. 111, a. 33-b. 11.]

8. Where the thesis itself presents no obvious hold for interrogation, turn over the various definitions that have been proposed of its constituent terms; one or other of these definitions will often afford matter for attack.[97] Look also to the antecedents and consequents of the thesis--what must be assumed and what will follow, if the thesis be granted. If you can disprove the consequent of the proposition, you will have disproved the proposition itself. On the other hand, if the antecedent of the proposition be proved, the proposition itself will be proved also.[98] Examine also whether the proposition be not true at some times, and false at other times. The thesis, What takes nourishment grows necessarily, is true not always, but only for a certain time: animals take nourishment during all their lives, but grow only during a part of their lives. Or, if a man should say that knowing is remembering, this is incorrect; for we remember nothing but events past, whereas we know not only these, but present and future also.[99]

[Footnote 97: Ibid. b. 12-16.]

[Footnote 98: Ibid. b. 17-23.]

[Footnote 99: Topic. II. iv. p. 111, b. 24-31.]

9. It is a sophistical procedure (so Aristotle terms it) to transfer the debate to some point on which we happen to be well provided with arguments, lying apart from the thesis defended. Such transfer, however, may be sometimes necessary. In other cases it is not really but only apparently necessary; in still other cases it is purely gratuitous, neither really nor apparently necessary. It is really necessary, when the respondent, having denied some proposition perfectly relevant to his thesis, stands to his denial and accepts the debate upon it, the proposition being one on which a good stock of arguments may be found against him; also, when you are endeavouring to disprove the thesis by an induction of negative analogies.[100] It is only apparently, and not really, necessary, when the proposition in debate is not perfectly relevant to the thesis, but merely has the semblance of being so. It is neither really nor apparently necessary, when there does not exist even this semblance of relevance, and when some other way is open of bringing bye-confutation to bear on the respondent. You ought to avoid entirely such a procedure in this last class of cases; for it is an abuse of the genuine purpose of Dialectic. If you do resort to it, the respondent should grant your interrogations, but at the same time notify that they are irrelevant to the thesis. Such notification will render his concessions rather troublesome than advantageous for your purpose.[101]

[Footnote 100: Ibid. v. p. 111, b. 32-p. 112, a. 2: [Greek: e)/ti o( sophistiko\s tro/pos, to\ a)/gein ei)s toiou=ton pro\s o(\ eu)porê/somen e)picheirêma/tôn], &c.]

[Footnote 101: Ibid. p. 112, a. 2-15. [Greek: dei= d' eu)labei=sthai to\n e)/schaton tô=n r(êthe/ntôn tro/pôn; pantelô=s ga\r a)pêrtême/nos kai\ a)llo/trios e)/oiken ei)=nai tê=s dialektikê=s.]

The epithet [Greek: sophistiko\s tro/pos] is probably intended by Aristotle to apply only to this last class of cases.

This paragraph is very obscure, and is not much elucidated by the long Scholion of Alexander (pp. 267-268, Br.).]

10. You will recollect that every proposition laid down or granted by the respondent carries with it by implication many other propositions; since every affirmation has necessary consequences, more or fewer. Whoever says that Sokrates is a man, has said also that he is an animal, that he is a living creature, biped, capable of acquiring knowledge. If you can disprove any of these necessary consequences, you will have disproved the thesis itself. You must take care, however, that you fix upon some one of the consequences which is really easier, and not more difficult, to refute than the thesis itself.[102]

[Footnote 102: Topic. II. v. p. 112, a. 16-23.]

11. Perhaps the thesis set up by the respondent may be of such a nature that one or other of two contrary predicates must belong to the subject; _e.g._, either health or sickness. In that case, if you are provided with arguments bearing on one of the two contraries, the same arguments will also serve indirectly for proof, or for disproof, of the other. Thus, if you show that one of the two contraries does belong to the subject, the same arguments prove that the other does not; _vice versâ_, if you show that one of them does not belong, it follows that the other does.[103]

[Footnote 103: Topic. II. vi. p. 112, a. 25-31. [Greek: dê=lon ou)=n o(/ti pro\s a)mphô chrê/simos o( to/pos.]]

12. You may find it advantageous, in attacking the thesis, to construe the terms in their strict etymological sense, rather than in the sense which common **usage gives them.[104]

[Footnote 104: Ibid. a. 32-38: [Greek: e)/ti to\ e)picheirei=n metaphe/ronta tou)/noma e)pi\ to\n lo/gon, ô(s ma/lista prosê=kon e)klamba/nein ê)\ ô(s kei=tai tou)/noma.]

The illustrative examples which follow prove that [Greek: lo/gon] here means the etymological origin, and not the definition, which is its more usual meaning.]

13. The predicate may belong to its subject either necessarily, or usually, or by pure hazard. You will take notice in which of these three ways the respondent affirms it, and whether that which he chooses is conformable to the fact. If he affirms it as necessary, when it is really either usual or casual, the thesis will be open to your attacks. If he affirms it without clearly distinguishing in which of the three senses he intends it to be understood, you are at liberty to construe it in that one of the three senses which best suits your argument.[105]

[Footnote 105: Ibid. b. 1-20. This _locus_ seems unsuitable in that part of the Topica where Aristotle professes to deal with theses [Greek: tou= symbebêko/tos], or theses affirming or denying _accidental_ predicates. It is one of the suppositions here that the respondent affirms the predicate as _necessary_.]

14. Perhaps the thesis may have predicate and subject exactly synonymous, so that the same thing will be affirmed as an accident of itself. On this ground it will be assailable.[106]

[Footnote 106: Ibid. b. 21-26.]

15. Sometimes the thesis will have more than one proposition contrary to it. If so, you may employ in arguing against it that one among its various contraries which is most convenient for your purpose.[107] Perhaps the predicate (accidental) of the thesis may have some contrary: if it has, you will examine whether that contrary belongs to the subject of the thesis; and, should such be the case, you may use it as an argument to refute the thesis itself.[108] Or the predicate of the thesis may be such that, if the thesis be granted, it will follow as a necessary consequence that contrary predicates must belong to the same subject. Thus, if the thesis be that the Platonic Ideas exist _in us_, it follows necessarily that they are both in motion and at rest; both perceivable by sense, and cogitable by intellect.[109] As these two predicates (those constituting the first pair as well as the second pair) are contrary to each other, and cannot both belong to the same subject, this may be used as an argument against the thesis from which such consequence follows.

[Footnote 107: Ibid. vii. p. 112, b. 28-p. 113, a. 19. [Greek: dê=lon ou)=n e)k tô=n ei)rême/nôn o(/ti tô=| au)tô=| plei/ona e)nanti/a sumbai/nei gi/nesthai.--lamba/nein ou)=n tô=n e)nanti/ôn o(po/teron a)\n ê)=| pro\s tê\n the/sin chrê/simon.]]

[Footnote 108: Ibid. viii. p. 113, a. 20-23.]

[Footnote 109: Topic. II. viii. p. 113, a. 24-32: [Greek: ê)\ ei)/ ti toiou=ton ei)/rêtai kata/ tinos, ou(= o)/ntos a)na/gkê ta\ e)nanti/a u(pa/rchein; oi(=on ei) ta\s i)de/as e)n ê(mi=n e)/phêsen ei)=nai; kinei=sthai/ te ga\r kai\ ê)remei=n au)ta\s sumbê/setai, e)/ti de\ ai)sthêta\s kai\ noêta\s ei)=nai.] Aristotle then proceeds to state how this consequence arises. Those who affirm the Platonic Ideas, assign to them as fundamental characteristic, that they are at rest and cogitable. But, if the Ideas exist _in us_, they must be moveable, because _we_ are moved; they must also be perceivable by sense, because it is through vision only that we discriminate and know differences of form. Waitz observes (in regard to the last pair, [Greek: kai\ ai)sthêtai/]): "Nam singulæ ideæ certam quandam rerum speciem et formam exprimunt: species autem et forma oculis cernitur." I do not clearly see, however, that this is a consequence of affirming Ideas to be [Greek: e)n ê(mi=n]; it is equally true if they are _not_ [Greek: e)n ê(mi=n].]

16. We know that whatever is the recipient of one of two contraries, is capable also of becoming recipient of the other. If, therefore, the predicate of the thesis has any contrary, you will examine whether the subject of the thesis is capable of receiving such contrary. If not, you have an argument against the thesis. Let the thesis be, The appetitive principle is ignorant. If this be true, that principle must be capable of knowledge.[110] Since this last is not generally admitted, you have an argument against the thesis.

[Footnote 110: Topic. II. vii. p. 113, a. 33-b. 10.]

17. We recognize four varieties of _Opposita_: (1) Contradictory; (2) Contrary; (3) _Habitus_ and _Privatio_; (4) _Relata_. You will consider how the relation in each of these four varieties bears upon the thesis in debate.

In regard to Contradictories, you are entitled, converting the terms of the thesis, to deny the predicate of the converted proposition respecting the negation of the subject. Thus, if man is an animal, you are entitled to infer, What is not an animal is not a man. You will prove this to be an universal rule by Induction; that is, by citing a multitude of particular cases in which it is indisputably true, without possibility of finding any one case in which it does not apply. If you can prove or disprove the converted obverse of the thesis--What is not an animal is not a man--you will have proved or disproved, the thesis itself, Man is an animal. This _locus_ is available both for assailant and respondent.[111]

[Footnote 111: Ibid. viii. p. 113, b. 15-26: [Greek: e)pei\ d' ai( a)ntithe/sis te/ssares, skopei=n e)k me\n tô=n a)ntipha/seôn e)k tê=s a)kolouthê/seôs kai\ a)nairou=nti kai\ kataskeua/zonti; _lamba/nein d' e)x e)pagôgê=s_, oi(=on ei) o( a)/nthrôpos zô=|on, to\ mê\ zô=|on ou)k a)/nthrôpos; _o(moi/ôs de\ kai\ e)pi\ tô=n a)/llôn--e)pi\ pa/ntôn ou)=n to\ toiou=ton a)xiôte/on_.]

Aristotle's declaration, that this great logical rule can only be proved by Induction, deserves notice. I have remarked the same thing about his rules for the conversion of propositions, in the beginning of the Analytica Priora. See above, p. 145, seq.]

In regard to Contraries, you will study the thesis, to see whether the contrary of the predicate can be truly affirmed respecting the contrary of the subject, or whether the contrary of the subject can be truly affirmed respecting the contrary of the predicate. This last alternative occurs sometimes, but not often; in general the first alternative is found to be true. You must make good your point here also by Induction, or by repetition of particular examples. This _locus_ will serve either for the purpose of refutation or for that of defence, according to circumstances. If neither of the two alternatives above-mentioned is found correct, this is an argument against the thesis.[112]

[Footnote 112: Topic. II. viii. p. 113, b. 27-p. 114, a. 6. [Greek: lamba/nein de\ kai\ ta\ toiau=ta e)x e)pagôgê=s, e)ph' o(/son chrê/simon.--spa/nion de\ to\ a)na/palin e)pi\ tô=n e)nanti/ôn sumbai/nei, a)lla\ toi=s plei/stois e)pi\ tau)ta ê( a)kolou/thêsis. ei) ou)=n mêt' e)pi\ tau)ta\ tô=| e)nanti/ô| to\ e)nanti/on a)kolouthei= mê/te a)na/palin, dê=lon o(/ti ou)de\ tô=n r(êthe/ntôn a)kolouthei= to\ e(/teron tô=| e(te/rô|.]]

In regard to _Habitus_ and _Privatio_, the rule is the same as about Contraries; only that the first of the two above alternatives always holds, and the second never occurs.[113] If sensible perception can be predicated of vision, insensibility also can be predicated of blindness; otherwise, the thesis fails.

[Footnote 113: Ibid. p. 114, a. 7-12.]

In regard to _Relata_, the inference holds from the correlate of the subject to the correlate of the predicate. If knowledge is belief, that which is known is believed; if vision is sensible perception, that which is visible is sensibly perceivable. Some say that there are cases in which the above does not hold; _e.g._, That which is sensibly perceivable is knowable; yet sensible perception is not knowledge. But this objection is not valid; for many persons dispute the first of the two propositions. This _locus_ will be equally available for the purpose of refutation--thus, you may argue--That which is sensibly perceivable is not knowable, because sensible perception is not knowledge.[114]

[Footnote 114: Ibid. a. 13-25.]

18. You will look at the terms of the proposition, also, in regard to their Derivatives, Inflections, &c., and to matters associated with them in the way of production, preservation, &c. This _locus_ serves both for proof and for refutation. What is affirmable of the subject, is affirmable also of its derivatives: what is not affirmable of the derivatives, is not affirmable of the subject itself.[115]

[Footnote 115: Ibid. ix. p. 114, a. 26-b. 5. [Greek: du/stoicha, ptô/seis, ta\ poiêtika\ kai\ phulaktika/--dê=lon ou)=n o(/ti e(no\s o(poiouou=n deichthe/ntos tô=n kata\ tê\n au)tê\n sustoichi/an a)gathou= ê)\ e)painetou=, kai\ ta\ loipa\ pa/nta dedeigme/na gi/netai.]--b. 23: [Greek: ô(=n me\n ga\r ta\ poiêtika\ a)gatha/, kai\ au)ta\ tô=n a)gathô=n, ô(=n de\ ta\ phthartika\ a)gatha/, au)ta\ tô=n kakô=n.]]

19. Arguments may often be drawn, both for proof and for refutation, from matters Similar or Analogous to the subject or predicate of the thesis. Thus, if one and the same cognition comprehends many things, one and the same opinion will also comprehend many things. If to possess vision is to see, then also to possess audition is to hear. If to possess audition is _not_ to hear, then neither is to possess vision to see. The argument may be urged whether the resemblance is real or only generally supposed. Sometimes, however, the inference will not hold from one to many. Thus, if to know is to cogitate, then to know many things should be to cogitate many things. But this last is impossible. A man may know many things, but he cannot cogitate many things; therefore, to know is _not_ to cogitate.[116]

[Footnote 116: Topic. II. x. p. 114, b. 25-36: [Greek: pa/lin e)pi\ tô=n o(moi/ôn, ei) o(moi/ôs e)/chei,--kai\ e)pi\ tô=n o)/ntôn kai\ tô=n dokou/ntôn; chrê/simos d' o( to/pos pro\s a)/mphô;--skopei=n de\ kai\ ei) e)ph' e(no\s kai\ ei) e)pi\ pollô=n o(moi/ôs e)/chei; e)niachou= ga\r diaphônei=.]]

20. There are various _loci_ for argument, arising from degrees of Comparison--more, less, equally. One is the argument from concomitant variations, which is available both for proof and for disproof. If to do injustice is evil, to do more injustice is more evil. If an increase in degree of the subject implies an increase in degree of the predicate, then the predicate is truly affirmed; if not, not. This may be shown by Induction, or repetition of particular instances.[117] Again, suppose the same predicate to be affirmable of two distinct subjects A and B, but to be more probably affirmable of A than of B. Then, if you can show that it does _not_ belong to A, you may argue (_à fortiori_) that it does _not_ belong to B; or, if you can show that it belongs to B, you may argue (_à fortiori_) that it belongs also to A. Or, if two distinct predicates be affirmable respecting the same subject but with unequal degrees of probability, then, if you can disprove the more probable of the two, you may argue from thence in disproof of the less probable; and, if you can prove the less probable, you may argue from thence in proof of the more probable. Or, if two distinct predicates be affirmable respecting two distinct subjects but with unequal degrees of probability, then, if you can disprove the more probable you may argue from thence against the less probable; and, if you can prove the less probable, you are furnished with an argument in proof of the more probable.[118] If the degrees of probability, instead of being unequal, are equal or alike, you may still, in the cases mentioned, argue in like manner from proof or disproof of the one to proof or disproof of the other.[119]

[Footnote 117: Ibid. b. 37-p. 115, a. 5: [Greek: ei)si\ de\ tou= ma=llon to/poi te/ssares, ei(=s me\n ei) a)kolouthei= to\ ma=llon tô=| ma=llon,--chrê/simos de\ pro\s a)/mphô o( to/pos; ei) me\n ga\r a)kolouthei= tê=| tou= u(pokeime/nou e)pido/sei ê( tou= sumbebêko/tos e)pi/dosis, katha/per ei)/rêtai, dê=lon o(/ti sumbe/bêken, ei) de\ mê\ a)kolouthei=, ou) sumbe/bêken. tou=to d' e)pagôgê=| lêpte/on.]]

[Footnote 118: Topic. II. x. p. 115, a. 5-14.]

[Footnote 119: Ibid. a. 15-24: [Greek: e)k tou= o(moi/ôs u(pa/rchein ê)\ dokei=n u(pa/rchein], &c.]

21. Another _locus_ for argument is, that _ex adjuncto_. If the subject, prior to adjunction of the attribute, be not white or good, and if adjunction of the attribute makes it white or good, then, you may argue that the adjunct must itself be white or good. And you might argue in like manner, if the subject prior to adjunction were to a certain extent white or good, but became more white or more good after such adjunction.[120] But this _locus_ will not be found available for the negative inference or refutation. You cannot argue, because the adjunction does not make the subject white or good, that therefore the adjunct itself is not white or not good.[121]

[Footnote 120: Ibid. xi. p. 115, a. 26-33.]

[Footnote 121: Ibid. a. 32-b. 2.]

22. If the predicate be affirmable of the subject in greater or less degree, it must be affirmable of the subject simply and absolutely. Unless the subject be one that can be called white or good, you can never call it more white or more good. This _locus_ again, however, cannot be employed in the negative, for the purpose of refutation. Because the predicate cannot be affirmed of the subject in greater or less degree, you are not warranted in inferring that it cannot be affirmed of the subject at all. Sokrates cannot be called in greater or less degree a man; but you cannot thence infer that he is not called a man simply.[122] If the predicate can be denied of the subject simply and absolutely, it can be denied thereof with every sort of qualification: if it can be affirmed of the subject with qualification, it can also be affirmed thereof simply and absolutely, as a possible predicate.[123] This, however, when it comes to be explained, means only that it can be affirmed of some among the particulars called by the name of the subject. Aristotle recognizes that the same predicate may often be affirmed of the subject _secundum quid_, and denied of the subject simply and absolutely. In some places (as among the Triballi), it is honourable to sacrifice your father; simply and absolutely, it is not honourable. To one who is sick, it is advantageous to undergo medical treatment; speaking simply and absolutely (_i.e._, to persons generally in the ordinary state of health), it is not advantageous. It is only when you can truly affirm the proposition, without adding any qualifying words, that the proposition is true simply and absolutely.[124]

[Footnote 122: Ibid. b. 3-10.]

[Footnote 123: Ibid. b. 11-35. [Greek: ei) ga\r kata/ ti e)nde/chetai, kai\ a(plô=s e)nde/chetai.]]

[Footnote 124: Topic. II. xi. p. 115, b. 33: [Greek: ô(/ste o(\ a)\n mêdeno\s prostitheme/nou dokê=| ei)=nai kalo\n ê)\ ai)schro\n ê)\ a)/llo ti tô=n toiou=tôn, a(plô=s r(êthê/setai.]]

III.

Such are the chief among the thirty-seven _Loci_ which Aristotle indicates for debating dialectically those theses in which the predication is only of Accident--not of Genus, or Proprium, or Definition. He proceeds (in the Third Book of the Topica) to deal separately with one special branch of such theses, respecting _Expetenda_ and _Fugienda_: where the question put is, Of two or more distinct subjects, which is the more desirable or the better? The cases supposed are those in which the difference of value between the two subjects compared is not conspicuous and unmistakeable, but where there is a tolerably near approximation of value between them, so as to warrant doubt and debate.[125]

[Footnote 125: Ibid. III. i. p. 116, a. 1-12: [Greek: Po/teron d' ai(retô/teron ê)\ be/ltion duei=n ê)\ pleio/nôn, e)k tô=nde skepte/on.] &c.]

We must presume that questions of this class occurred very frequently among the dialectical debates of Aristotle's contemporaries; so that he thinks it necessary to give advice apart for conducting them in the best manner.

1. Of two good subjects compared, that is better and more desirable which is the more lasting; or which is preferred by the wise and good man; or by the professional artist in his own craft; or by right law; or by the multitude, all or most of them. That is absolutely or simply better and more desirable, which is declared to be such by the better cognition; that is better to any given individual, which is declared to be better by his own cognition.[126]

[Footnote 126: Topic. III. i. p. 116, a. 13-22.]

2. That is more desirable which is included in the genus good, than what is not so included; that which is desirable on its own account and _per se_, is better than what is desirable only on account of something else and _per accidens_; the cause of what is good in itself is more desirable than the cause of what is good by accident.[127]

[Footnote 127: Ibid. a. 23-b. 7.]

3. What is good absolutely and simply (_i.e._, to all and at all times) is better than what is good only for a special occasion or individual; thus, to be in good health is better than being cut for the stone. What is good by nature is better than what is good not by nature; _e.g._, justice (good by nature), than the just individual, whose character must have been acquired.[128] What is good, or what is peculiarly appurtenant, to the more elevated of two subjects is better than what is good or peculiar to the less elevated. Good, having its place in the better, prior, and more exalted elements of any subject, is more desirable than good belonging to the derivative, secondary, and less exalted; thus, health, which has its seat in proper admixture and proportion of the fundamental constituents of the body (wet, dry, hot, cold), is better than strength or beauty--strength residing in the bones and muscles, beauty in proper symmetry of the limbs.[129] Next, an end is superior to that which is means thereunto; and, in comparing two distinct means, that which is nearer to the end is the better. That which tends to secure the great end of life is superior to that which tends towards any other end; means to happiness is better than means to intelligence; also the possible end, to the impossible. Comparing one subject as means with another subject as end, we must examine whether the second end is more superior to the end produced by the first subject, than the end produced by the first subject is superior to the means or first subject itself. For example, in the two ends, happiness and health, if happiness as an end surpasses health as an end in greater proportion than health surpasses the means of health, then the means producing happiness is better than the end health.[130]

[Footnote 128: Topic. III. i. p. 116, b. 7-12.]

[Footnote 129: Ibid. b. 12-22: [Greek: kai\ to\ e)n belti/osin ê)\ prote/rois ê)\ timiôte/rois be/ltion, oi(=on u(gi/eia i)schu/os kai\ ka/llous. ê( me\n ga\r e)n u(groi=s kai\ xêroi=s kai\ thermoi=s kai\ psuchroi=s, a(plô=s d' ei)pei=n e)x ô(=n prô/tôn sune/stêke to\ zô=|on, ta\ d' e)n toi=s u(ste/rois; ê( me\n ga\r i)schu\s e)n toi=s neu/rois kai\ o)stoi=s, to\ de\ ka/llos tô=n melô=n tis summetri/a dokei= ei)=nai.]

The reason given in this _locus_ for superior estimation is a very curious one: the fundamental or primary constituents rank higher than compounds or derivatives formed by them or out of them. Also, the definition of beauty deserves attention: the Greeks considered beauty to reside more in proportions of form of the body than in features of the face.]

[Footnote 130: Ibid. b. 22-36.]

Again, that which is more beautiful, honourable, and praiseworthy _per se_, is better than what possesses these same attributes in equal degree but only on account of some other consequence. Thus, friendship is superior to wealth, justice to strength; for no one values wealth except for its consequences, whereas we esteem friendship _per se_, even though no consequences ensue from it.[131]

[Footnote 131: Ibid. b. 33-p. 117, a. 4.]

Where the two subjects compared are in themselves so nearly equal that the difference of merit can hardly be discerned, we must look to the antecedents or consequents of each, especially to the consequents; and, according as these exhibit most of good or least of evil, we must regulate our estimation of the two subjects to which they respectively belong.[132] The larger lot of good things is preferable to the smaller. Sometimes what is not in itself good, if cast into the same lot with other things very good, is preferable to another thing that is in itself good. Thus, what is not _per se_ good, if it goes along with happiness, is preferable even to justice and courage. The same things, when taken along with pleasure or with the absence of pain, are preferable to themselves without pleasure or along with pain.[133] Everything is better, at the season when it tells for most, than itself at any other season; thus, intelligence and absence of pain are to be ranked as of more value in old age than in youth; but courage and temperance are more indispensably required, and therefore more to be esteemed, in youth than in old age. What is useful on all or most occasions is more to be esteemed than what is useful only now and then; _e.g._, justice and moderation, as compared with courage: also that which being possessed by every one, the other would not be required; _e.g._, justice is better than courage, for, if every one were just, courage would not be required.[134]

[Footnote 132: Topic. III. i. p. 117, a. 5-15.]

[Footnote 133: Ibid. a. 16-25.]

[Footnote 134: Ibid. a. 26-b. 2.]

Among two subjects the more desirable is that of which the generation or acquirement is more desirable; that of which the destruction or the loss is more to be deplored; that which is nearer or more like to the _Summum Bonum_ or to that which is better than itself (unless indeed the resemblance be upon the ridiculous side, in the nature of a caricature, as the ape is to man[135]); that which is the more conspicuous; the more difficult to attain; the more special and peculiar; the more entirely removed from all bad accompaniments; that which we can best share with friends; that which we wish to do to our friends, rather than to ordinary strangers (_e.g._, doing justice or conferring benefit, than seeming to do so; for towards our friends we prefer doing this in reality, while towards strangers we prefer seeming to do so[136]); that which we cannot obtain from others, as compared with that which can be hired; that which is unconditionally desirable, as compared with that which is desirable only when we have something else along with it; that of which the absence is a ground of just reproach against us and ought to make us ashamed;[137] that which does good to the proprietor, or to the best parts of the proprietor (to his mind rather than his body);[138] that which is eligible on its own ground, rather than from opinion of others; that which is eligible on both these accounts jointly, than either.[139] Acquisitions of supererogation are better than necessaries, and are sometimes more eligible: thus, to live well is better than life simply; philosophizing is better than money-making; but sometimes necessaries are more eligible, as, _e.g._, to a starving man. Speaking generally, necessaries are more eligible; but the others are better.[140]

[Footnote 135: Ibid. p. 117, b. 2-17. [Greek: skopei=n de\ kai\ ei) e)pi\ ta\ geloio/tera ei)/ê o(/moion, katha/per o( pi/thêkos tô=| a)nthrô/pô|, tou= i(/ppou mê\ o)/ntos o(moi/ou; ou) ga\r ka/llion o( pi/thêkos, o(moio/teron de\ tô=| a)nthrô/pô|.]]

[Footnote 136: Ibid. b. 20-p. 118, a. 5. [Greek: a(\ pro\s to\n phi/lon pra=xai ma=llon boulo/metha ê)\ a(\ pro\s to\n tucho/nta, tau=ta ai(retô/tera, oi(=on to\ dikaiopragei=n kai\ eu)= poiei=n ma=llon ê)\ to\ dokei=n; tou\s ga\r phi/lous eu)= poiei=n boulo/metha ma=llon ê)\ dokei=n, _tou\s de\ tucho/ntas a)na/palin_.]]

[Footnote 137: Topic. III. ii. p. 118, a. 16-26.]

[Footnote 138: Ibid. iii. p. 118, a. 29.]

[Footnote 139: Ibid. b. 20. The definition of this last condition is--that we should not care to possess the thing if no one knew that we possessed it: [Greek: o(/ros de\ tou= pro\s do/xan, to\ mêdeno\s suneido/tos mê\ a)\n spouda/sai u(pa/rchein.]]