Chapter IX: Topica (6)

So much greater are the difficulties belonging to the defence of a Definition, as compared with the attack upon it; and the same may be said about attack and defence of a Proprium, and of a Genus. In both cases, the assailant will carry his point, if he can show that the predicate in question is not predicable, in this relation, of all, or that it is not predicable, in this relation, of any one. But the defendant is required to make good the universal against every separate objection advanced against any one of the particulars. It is a general rule, that the work of destruction is easier than that of construction; and the present cases come under that rule.[358] The hardest of all theses to defend, and the easiest to overthrow, is where Definition is affirmed; for the respondent in this case is required to declare well the essence of his subject, and he stands in need of the greatest number of auxiliary data; while all the _Loci_ for attack, even those properly belonging to the Proprium, the Genus, and the Accident, are available against him.[359] Next in order, as regards difficulty of defence, comes the theses affirming Proprium; where the respondent has to make out, not merely that the predicate belongs to the subject, but that it belongs thereunto exclusively and reciprocally: here also all the _Loci_ for attack, even those properly belonging to Accident, are available.[360] Easiest of all theses to defend, while it is the hardest to impugn, is that in which Accident alone is affirmed--the naked fact, that the predicate A belongs to the Subject B, without investing it with the character either of Genus or Proprium. Here what is affirmed is a minimum, requiring the smallest array of data to be conceded; moreover, the _Loci_ available for attack are the fewest, since many of those which may be employed against Genus, Proprium, and Definition, have no application against a thesis affirming merely Accident.[361] Indeed, if the thesis affirmed be only a proposition particular (and not universal), affirming Accident (and nothing more), the task of refuting it will be more difficult than that of maintaining it.[362]

[Footnote 358: Ibid. b. 13-32. [Greek: e)/oike d', ô(/sper kai\ e)n toi=s a)/llois to\ diaphthei=rai toi= poiê=sai r(a=|on, ou(/tô kai\ e)pi\ tou/tôn to\ a)naskeua/sai tou= kataskeua/sai.]]

[Footnote 359: Topic. VII. v. p. 155, a. 3-21: [Greek: phanero\n de\ kai\ dio/ti pa/ntôn r(a=|ston o(/ron a)naskeua/sai.]]

[Footnote 360: Ibid. a. 23-27. Aristotle has in view the most complete Proprium: belonging _omni_, _soli_, _et semper_.]

[Footnote 361: Ibid. a. 28-36: [Greek: r(a=|ston de\ pa/ntôn kataskeua/sai to\ sumbebêko/s;--a)naskeua/zein de\ chalepô/taton to\ sumbebêko/s, o(/ti e)la/chista e)n au)tô=| de/dotai], &c.]

[Footnote 362: Ibid. p. 154, b. 36-p. 155, a. 2: [Greek: to\ d' e)pi\ me/rous a)na/palin r(a=|on kataskeua/sai ê)\ a)naskeua/sai; kataskeua/zonti me\n ga\r a)po/chrê dei=xai tini\ u(pa/rchon, a)naskeua/zonti de\ deikte/on o(/ti ou)deni\ u(pa/rchei.]]

VIII.

The Eighth Book of the Topica brings our attention back to the general considerations contained in the First. In the intervening part of the treatise we have had the quadruple distribution of dialectical problems, with the enumeration of those _Loci_ of argument which bear upon each or all: we are now invited to study the application of these distinctions in practice, and with this view to look once more both at the persons and the purposes of dialectical debate. What is the order of procedure most suitable, first, for the questioner or assailant; next, for the respondent or defender?[363] This order of procedure marks the distinctive line of separation between the dialectician and the man of science or philosopher: to both of them the _Loci_ of arguments are alike available, though each of them deals with those arguments in his own way, and in an arrangement suitable for his purpose.[364] The dialectician, being engaged in debate, must shape his questions, and regulate his march as questioner, according to the concessions obtained or likely to be obtained from his respondent; who, if a question be asked having an obvious refutative bearing on the thesis, will foresee the consequences of answering in the affirmative, and will refuse to grant what is asked. On the contrary, the philosopher, who pursues investigation with a view to his own satisfaction alone, is under no similar restriction. He looks out at once for such premisses as conduct straight to a conclusion; and, the more obvious their bearing on the conclusion is, the more scientific will the syllogism be, and the better will he be pleased.[365]

[Footnote 363: Ibid. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 3: [Greek: meta\ de\ tau=ta peri\ ta/xeôs, kai\ pô=s dei= e)rôta=n, lekte/on.]]

[Footnote 364: Topic. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 7: [Greek: me/chri me\n ou)=n tou= eu(rei=n to\n to/pon, o(moi/ôs tou= philoso/phou kai\ tou= dialektikou= ê( ske/psis, to\ d' ê)/dê tau=ta ta/ttein kai\ e)rôtêmati/zein i)/dion tou= dialektikou=.]]

[Footnote 365: Ibid. b. 10-16.]

In the _praxis dialectica_ (as has already been stated) two talkers are assumed--the respondent who sets up a thesis which he undertakes to defend, and a questioner who interrogates with a view to impugn it; or at least with a view to compel the other to answer in an inconsistent or contradictory manner. We are to assume, farther, a circle of listeners, who serve to a certain extent as guarantees against any breach of the rules of debate.[366] Three distinct purposes may be supposed in the debate. 1. You as a questioner may be a teacher, and the respondent a learner; your purpose is to teach what you know, while he wishes to learn from you what he does not know. 2. You engage in an intellectual contest or duel with the respondent, each of you seeking only victory over the other, though subject on both sides to observance of the rules of debate. 3. You neither seek to teach, nor to conquer; you and the respondent have both the same purpose--to test the argumentative consequences of different admissions, and to acquire a larger command of the chains of reasoning _pro_ and _con_, bearing on some given topic.[367]

[Footnote 366: Ibid. ii. p. 158, a. 10.]

[Footnote 367: Ibid. v. p. 159, a. 26: [Greek: ou) ga\r oi( au)toi\ skopoi\ toi=s dida/skousin ê)\ mantha/nousi kai\ toi=s a)gnônizome/nois, ou)de\ tou/tois te kai\ toi=s diatri/bousi met' a)llê/lôn ske/psis cha/rin.]]

According as the aim of the talkers is one or other of these three, the good or bad conduct of the dialogue, on the part both of questioner and of respondent, must be differently appreciated. Of each of the three, specimens may be found in Plato, though not carefully severed but running one into the other. Aristotle appears to have been the first to formulate the distinction theoretically, and to prescribe for the practice of each separately. He tells us particularly that no one before him had clearly distinguished the third head, and prescribed for it apart from the second. The merit of having first done this he expressly claims for the Topica.[368]

[Footnote 368: Topic. VIII. v. p. 159, a. 25-37: [Greek: e)pei\ d' e)sti\n a)dio/rista toi=s gumnasi/as kai\ pei/ras e(/neka tou\s lo/gous poioume/nois--e)n de\ tai=s dialektikai=s suno/dois toi=s mê\ a)gô=nos cha/rin a)lla\ pei/ras kai\ ske/pseôs tou\s lo/gous **poioume/nois, ou) **diê/rthrôtai/ pô ti/nos dei= stocha/zesthai to\n a)pokrino/menon kai\ o(poi=a dido/nai kai\ poi=a mê/, pro\s to\ kalô=s ê)\ mê\ kalô=s phula/ttein tê\n the/sin. _e)pei\ ou)=n ou)de\n e)/chomen paradedome/non u(p' a)/llôn, au)toi/ ti peirathô=men ei)pei=n_.]]

Both the questioner and the respondent have a duty towards the dialogue; their common purpose is to conduct it well, not only obeying the peremptory rules, but displaying, over and above, skill for the attainment of their separate ends. Under the first and third heads, both may be alike successful. Under the second or contentious head, indeed, one only of the two can gain the victory; yet, still, even the defeated party may exhibit the maximum of skill which his position admits. This is sufficient for his credit; so that the common work will still be well performed.[369] But a partner who performs his own part so as to obstruct instead of forwarding this common work--who conducts the debate in a spirit of ill-tempered contention rather than of regular Dialectic--deserves censure.[370]

[Footnote 369: Ibid. xi. p. 161, a. 19-b. 10: [Greek: ou) ga\r e)/stin e)pi\ thate/rô| mo/non to\ lalô=s e)pitelesthê=nai to\ koino\n e)/rgon--e)pei\ de\ phau=los koinôno\s o( e)mpodi/zôn to\ koino\n e)/rgon, dê=lon o(/ti kai\ e)n lo/gô|.] Compare Topica, I. iii. p. 101, b. 8.]

[Footnote 370: Ibid. a. 33: [Greek: dialektikô=s kai\ _mê\_ e)ristikô=s].--b. 2-18.]

Having thus in view the dialogue as a partnership for common profit, Aristotle administers counsel to the questioning as well as to the responding partner. You as questioner have to deal with a thesis set up by the respondent. You see at once what the syllogism is that is required to prove the contrary or contradictory of that thesis; and your business is so to shape your questions as to induce the respondent to concede the premisses necessary towards that syllogism. If you ask him at once and directly to concede these premisses, he sees your drift and answers in the negative. You must therefore begin your approaches from a greater distance. You must ask questions bearing only indirectly and remotely upon your ultimate conclusion.[371] These outlying and preparatory questions will fall under four principal heads. Either (1) they will be inductive particulars, multiplied in order that you may obtain assent to an universal comprising them all; or (2) they will be put for the purpose of giving dignity to your discourse; or (3) they will be shaped with a view to conceal or keep out of sight the ultimate conclusion that you aim at; or (4), lastly, they will be introduced to make your whole argument clearer.[372] The third of these four general heads--the head of questions for the purpose of concealment--comes out principally in dialectical contests for victory. In those it is of supreme importance, and the result depends much on the employment of it; but even in other dialectical debates you must employ it to a certain extent.[373]

[Footnote 371: Topic. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 29: [Greek: ta\s me\n ou)=n a)nagkai/as, di' ô(=n o( sullogismo/s, ou)k eu)thu\s au)ta\s protate/on, a)ll' a)postate/on o(/ti a)nôta/tô], &c.]

[Footnote 372: Topic. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 20.]

[Footnote 373: Ibid. b. 26.]

Aristotle goes at great length into the means of Concealment. Suppose the proposition which you desire to get conceded is, The science of two contraries is the same. You will find it useful to commence by a question more general: _e.g._, Is the science of two opposites the same? If the respondent answers in the affirmative, you will deduce from his concession, by syllogism, the conclusion which you desire. If he answers in the negative, you must then try to arrive at your end by a string of questions respecting particular contraries or opposites; which if the respondent grants successively, you will bring in your general question ultimately as the inductive result from those concessions.[374] Your particulars must be selected from obvious matters of sense and notoriety. You are likely to obtain in this way admissions which will serve as premisses for several different prosyllogisms, not indeed sufficient by themselves, yet valuable as conditions and preliminaries to the final syllogism whereby the thesis is refuted. For, when the questions are put in this way, the respondent will not see your drift nor the consequences of his own concessions; so that he will more readily concede what you want.[375] The better to conceal your purpose, you will refrain from drawing out any of these prosyllogisms clearly at once; you will not even put the major and minor premiss of any one of them in immediate sequence; but you will confound the order of them intentionally, stating first a premiss belonging to one, and next a premiss belonging to another.[376] The respondent, thus kept in the dark, answers in the affirmative to each of your questions successively. At length you find that you have obtained a sufficient number of concessions from him, to enable you to prove the syllogism contradictory of his thesis. You inform him of this; and it shows the perfect skill and success of your procedure, when he expresses surprise at the announcement, and asks on what premisses you reckon.[377]

[Footnote 374: Ibid. b. 34: [Greek: a)\n de\ mê\ tithê=|, di' e)pagôgê=s lêpte/on, protei/nanta e)pi\ tô=n kata\ me/ros e)nanti/ôn.]]

[Footnote 375: Ibid. p. 156, a. 7: [Greek: kru/ptonta de\ prosullogi/zesthai di' ô(=n o( sullogismo\s tou= e)x a)rchê=s me/llei gi/nesthai, kai\ tau=ta ô(s plei=sta.]]

[Footnote 376: Ibid. a. 23: [Greek: chrê/simon de\ kai\ to\ mê\ sunechê= ta\ a)xiô/mata lamba/nein e)x ô(=n oi( sullogismoi/, a)ll' e)nalla\x to\ pro\s e(/teron kai\ e(/teron sumpe/rasma.]]

[Footnote 377: Topic. VIII. i. p. 156, a. 13: [Greek: katho/lou d' ei)pei=n, ou(/tô dei= e)rôta=n to\n kruptikô=s punthano/menon, ô(/st' ê)rôtême/nou tou= panto\s lo/gou kai\ ei)po/ntos to\ sumpe/rasma zêtei=sthai to\ dia\ ti/.]]

There are also other manoeuvres serving your purpose of concealment, and preventing the respondent from seeing beforehand the full pertinence of your questions. Thus, if you wish to obtain the definition of your major, you will do well to ask the definition, not of the term itself but, of some one among its conjugates. You will put your question, as if the answer were of little importance in itself, and as if you did not care whether it was given in the affirmative or in the negative;[378] you will sometimes even suggest objections to that which you are seeming to aim at. All this will give you the air of a candid disputant; it will throw the respondent off his guard, and make him more ready to answer as he really thinks, without alarm for the consequences.[379] When you wish to get a certain premiss conceded, you will put the question first upon a different premiss analogous to it. In putting your question, you will add that the answer which you desire is a matter of course, familiar and admitted by every one; for respondents are shy of contradicting any received belief, unless they have present to their minds a clear instance adverse to it.[380] You will never manifest apparent earnestness about an answer; which would make the respondent less willing to concede it.[381] You will postpone until the last the premiss which you wish to obtain, and will begin by putting questions the answers to which serve as remote premisses behind it, only in the end conducting to it as consequence. Generally speaking, questioners do the reverse, putting first the questions about which they are most anxious; while most respondents, aware of this habit, are most intractable in regard to the first questions, except some presumptuous and ill-tempered disputants, who concede what is asked at first but afterwards become obstinate in denegation.[382] You will throw in some irrelevant questions with a view to lengthen the procedure, like fallacious geometers who complicate a diagram by drawing unnecessary lines. Amidst a multitude of premisses falsehood is more likely to escape detection; and thus, also, you may perhaps be able to slip in, unperceived and in a corner, some important premiss, which, if put as a separate question by itself, would certainly not have been granted.[383]

[Footnote 378: Ibid. b. 6: [Greek: a(plô=s d' ei)pei=n, o(/ti ma/lista poiei=n a)/dêlon, po/teron to\ proteino/menon ê)\ to\ a)ntikei/menon bou/letai labei=n; a)dê/lou ga\r o)/ntos tou= pro\s to\n lo/gon chrêsi/mou, ma=llon to\ dokou=n au(toi=s tithe/asin.]]

[Footnote 379: Ibid. b. 18: [Greek: dei= de\ kai\ au)to/n pote au(tô=| e)/nstasin phe/rein; a)nupo/ptôs ga\r e)/chousin oi( a)pokrino/menoi pro\s tou\s dokou=ntas dikai/ôs e)picheirei=n.]]

[Footnote 380: Ibid. b. 10, 20: [Greek: chrê/simon de\ kai\ to\ e)pile/gein o(/ti su/nêthes kai\ lego/menon to\ toiou=ton; o)knou=si ga\r kinei=n to\ ei)ôtho/s, e)/nstasin mê\ e)/chontes.]]

[Footnote 381: Ibid. b. 23: [Greek: e)/ti to\ mê\ spouda/zein].]

[Footnote 382: Ibid. b. 30-39: [Greek: kai\ to\ e)p' e)scha/tô| e)rôta=n o(\ ma/lista bou/letai labei=n;] &c.]

[Footnote 383: Topic. VIII. i. p. 157, a. 1-5: [Greek: e)/ti to\ mêku/nein kai\ paremba/llein ta\ mêde\n chrê/sima pro\s to\n lo/gon, katha/per oi( pseudographou=ntes; pollô=n ga\r o)/ntôn a)/dêlon e)n o(poi/ô| to\ pseu=dos. dio\ kai\ lantha/nousin e)ni/ote oi( e)rôtô=ntes e)n parabu/stô| prostithe/ntes a(\ kath' au(ta\ proteino/mena ou)k a)\n tethei/ê.]]

Such are the multifarious suggestions addressed by Aristotle to the questioner for concealing his method of attack;[384] Concealment being the third of the four general heads relating to the treatment of premisses not immediately necessary for proof of the final refutative conclusion. On the other three general heads--Induction from particulars to an universal, Dignity, Clearness--Aristotle goes into less detail. For Clearness, he recommends that examples should be introduced; especially familiar examples, taken from well-known poets like Homer, not from obscure poets like Choerilus.[385]

[Footnote 384: Ibid. a. 6: [Greek: ei)s me\n ou)=n pru/psin toi=s ei)rême/nois chrêste/on], &c.]

[Footnote 385: Ibid. a. 14.]

In regard to Induction, Aristotle points out an embarrassment often arising from the want of suitable universal names. When, after having obtained an affirmative answer about several similar particulars, you wish to put a question generalizing the result, you will sometimes find no universal term fitting the position. You are obliged to say: Will it not be so in all such cases? and this lets in a serious difficulty, how to know what other cases are like, and what are not. Here the respondent will often dispute your right to include this or that other particular.[386] You will do well to coin a new universal term fitting the situation.

[Footnote 386: Ibid. ii. p. 157, a. 18-33. [Greek: dio\ peirate/on e)pi\ pa/ntôn tô=n toiou/tôn o)nomatopoiei=n au)to/n], &c.]

If the respondent answers in the affirmative to several questions of similar particulars, but answers in the negative when you sum them up in an universal comprehending all similar cases,--you may require him to cite some particular case justifying his denial; though you cannot require him to do this before he has made the affirmative answers.[387] It is not sufficient that he should cite, as the single case of exception, the express case which forms the subject of the thesis: He ought to produce some distinct and independent instance, really comprised within the genus, and not merely connected with it by the link of an equivocal term.[388] If he produces an adverse instance really comprised within the genus, you may perhaps be able to re-model your question, so as to make reserve for the basis on which this objection is founded. The respondent will then be compelled (unless he can foresee some new case of objection) to concede the universal with this special qualification; so that you will have gained all that you really require. Should the respondent continue to refuse, without producing any new case, he will transgress the rules of Dialectic; which recognize an universal affirmative, wherever there are numerous affirmative particulars without one assignable negative.[389] Indeed, if you know the universal to hold in many particular cases, and do not know of any others adverse, you may boldly put your question at once in reference to the universal (without going first through the series of particulars). The respondent will hardly venture to deny it, not having in his mind any negative particulars.[390]

[Footnote 387: Ibid. a. 34-37.]

[Footnote 388: Ibid. a. 37-b. 8.]

[Footnote 389: Topic. VIII. ix. p. 1577, b. 8-33. [Greek: dialektikê\ ga/r e)sti pro/tasis pro\s ê(\n ou(/tôs e)pi\ pollô=n e)/chousan mê\ e)/stin e)/nstasis.]]

[Footnote 390: Ibid. p. 158, a. 3-6.]

You must however keep in mind what a dialectic universal premiss really is. Not every question requiring an universal answer is allowed to be put. You must not ask for positive information, nor put such questions as the following: What is man? In how many different senses is good employed? A dialectic question is one to which the respondent makes sufficient reply by saying, Yes or No.[391] You must ask in this form: Is the definition of man so and so? Is good enunciated in this or that different sense? To these questions the respondent may answer Yes or No. But if he persists in negative answers to your multiplied questions as to this or that sense of the term good, you may perhaps stand excused for asking him: "In how many different senses, then, do you yourself use the term good?"[392]

[Footnote 391: Ibid. p. 158, a. 14, seq. [Greek: e)/sti ga\r pro/tasis dialektikê\ pro\s ê(\n e)/stin a)pokri/nasthai nai\ ê)\ ou)/.]]

[Footnote 392: Ibid. a. 21-24.]

When you have obtained concessions which furnish premisses for a formal syllogism, you will draw out and propound that syllogism and its conclusion forthwith, without asking any farther question from the respondent or any leave from him to do so. He may indeed deny your right to do this, in spite of the concessions which he has made; and the auditors around, not fully appreciating all his concessions, may perhaps think that he is entitled to deny it. But, if you ask his leave to draw out the syllogism and he refuses to give leave, the auditors are much more likely to think that your syllogism is not allowable.[393] If you have the choice between an ostensive syllogism and a _Reductio ad Absurdum_, you ought always to prefer the former, as plainer and more incontestable.[394]

[Footnote 393: Ibid. a. 7-12: [Greek: ou) dei= de\ to\ sumpe/rasma e)rô/têma poiei=n; ei) de\ mê/, a)naneu/santos ou) dokei= gegone/nai sullogismo/s.]]

[Footnote 394: Topic. VIII. ii. p. 158, b. 34-p. 158, a. 2.]

You must not persevere long in the same line of questions. For, if the respondent answers them all, it will soon appear that you are in the wrong course, since your syllogism, if you can get one at all, will always be obtained from a small number of premisses; and, if the respondent will not answer them, you have no alternative except to protest and desist.[395]

[Footnote 395: Ibid. p. 158, a. 25-30.]

The theses that are most difficult to attack are also most easy to defend; and these are the highest universals, and the lowest particulars. The highest you cannot deal with, unless you can get a definition of them; which is sometimes impossible and always difficult; since the respondent will neither define them himself nor accept your definitions. Those which are next to the highest are also difficult to impugn, because there are few intermediate steps of proof. Again, the lowest particulars are also difficult for the contrary reason, that there are so many intermediate steps, and it is tedious to enumerate them all continuously; while, if any are omitted, the demonstration is incomplete, and the procedure will appear sophistical.[396] The most difficult of all to impugn are definitions framed in vague and unintelligible terms, where you do not know whether they are univocal or equivocal, literal or metaphorical. When the thesis tendered to you presents such difficulty, you may presume that it is affected with the obscurity of terms here indicated; or, at any rate, that its terms stand in need of definition.[397] In geometrical construction, as well as in dialectical debate, it is indispensable that the _principia_ or primary terms should be defined, and defined properly; without this, neither the one nor the other can be pursued.[398]

[Footnote 396: Ibid. iii. p. 158, a. 31, seq. [Greek: ê)\ sophismatô/dê phai/netai ta\ e)picheirê/mata.]]

[Footnote 397: Ibid. iii. p. 158, b. 8-23; p. 159, a. 3: [Greek: ou)/koun dei= lantha/nein, o(/tan dusepichei/rêtos ê)=| ê( the/sis, o(/ti pe/ponthe/ ti tô=n ei)rême/nôn.]]

[Footnote 398: Ibid. p. 158, b. 24-p. 159, a. 2.]

Sometimes the major and minor premisses of your syllogistic conclusion are more difficult to establish--more beyond the level of average intelligence--than the thesis itself. In such a case some may think that the respondent ought to grant these premisses, because, if he refuses and requires them to be proved, he will be imposing upon the questioner a duty more arduous than the thesis itself imposes; others may say that he ought not to grant them, because, if he did, he would be acknowledging a conclusion derived from premisses requiring proof as much or more than itself.[399] A distinction must here be made. If you are putting questions with a view to teach, the learner ought not to grant such premisses as those above described, because he is entitled to require that in every step of the process he shall be inducted from what is more knowable to what is less knowable. Accordingly, when you attempt to demonstrate to him something which he knows little, by requiring him to concede something which he knows still less, he cannot be advised to grant what you ask. But, if you are debating with a companion for the purpose of dialectical exercise, he ought to grant what you ask whenever the affirmative really appears to him true.[400]

[Footnote 399: Topic. VIII. iii. p. 159, a. 4-11. [Greek: o(/tan d' ê)=| pro\s to\ a)xi/ôma kai\ tê\n pro/tasin mei=zon e)/rgon dialegê=nai ê)\ tê\n the/sin, diaporê/seien a)/n tis po/teron thete/on ta\ toiau=ta ê)\ ou)/;] &c.]

[Footnote 400: Ibid. a. 11-14: [Greek: ê)\ tô=| me\n mantha/nonti ou) thete/on, a)\n mê\ gnôrimô/teron ê)=|, tô=| de\ gumnazome/nô| thete/on, a)\n a)lêthe\s mo/non phai/nêtai. ô(/ste phanero\n o(/ti ou)ch o(moi/ôs e)rôtô=nti/ te ki\ dida/skonti a)xiôte/on tithe/nai.]

This section is obscure and difficult. I am not sure that I understand it. It seems doubtful whether the verb [Greek: tithe/nai] is intended to apply to the questioner or to the respondent.]

We have now said enough for the purpose of instructing the questioner how to frame and marshal his interrogations. We must turn to the respondent, and point out how _he_ must answer in order to do well and perform his duty to the common work of dialogue. Speaking generally, the task of the questioner is to conduct the dialogue so as to make the respondent enunciate the most improbable and absurd replies which follow necessarily from the thesis that he has undertaken to defend; while the task of the respondent is to make it appear that these absurdities follow from the thesis itself, and not from his manner of defending it. The respondent may err in one of two ways, or indeed in both together: either he may set up an indefensible thesis; or he may fail to defend it in the best manner that it really admits; or he may do both. The second is a worse error than the first, in reference to the general purpose of Dialectic.[401]

[Footnote 401: Ibid. iv. p. 159, a. 15-24: [Greek: tou= d' a)pokrinome/nou to\ mê\ di' au)to\n phai/nesthai sumbai/nein to\ a)du/naton ê)\ to\ para/doxon, a)lla\ dia\ tê\n the/sin; e(te/ra ga\r i)/sôs a(marti/a to\ the/sthai prô=ton o(\ mê\ dei= kai\ to\ the/menon mê\ phula/xai kata\ tro/pon.]]

Aristotle distinguishes (as has been already stated) three purposes in the dialogue:--(1) Teaching and Learning; (2) Contention, where both questioner and respondent strive only for victory; (3) Investigating and Testing the consequences of some given doctrine.[402] The first two of these three are dismissed rapidly. In the first, the teaching questioner has no intention of deceiving, and the pupil respondent has only to answer by granting all that appears to him true.[403] In the second, Aristotle tells us only that the questioner must always appear as if he were making some point of his own; while the respondent, on his side, must always appear as if no point were made against him.[404] But in regard to the third head--dialogues of Search, Testing, Exercise--he is more copious in suggestions: he considers these as the proper field of Dialectic, and, as we saw, claims to have been the first who treated them apart from the didactic dialogues on one side, and the contentious on the other.[405]

[Footnote 402: Ibid. v. p. 159, a. 24-28.]

[Footnote 403: Ibid. a. 29: [Greek: tô=| me\n ga\r mantha/nonti thete/on a)ei\ ta\ dokou=nta; kai\ ga\r ou)/d' e)picheirei= pseu=dos ou)dei\s dida/skein.]]

[Footnote 404: Topic. VIII. iv. p. 159,. a. 30: [Greek: tô=n d' a)gnônizome/nôn to\n me\n e)rôtô=nta phai/nesthai/ ti dei= poiei=n pa/ntôs, to\n d' a)pokrino/menon mêde\n phai/nesthai pa/schein.]]

[Footnote 405: Ibid. a. 32-37; xi. p. 161, a. 23-25: [Greek: duskolai/nontes ou)=n a)gnônistika\s kai\ ou) dialektika\s poiou=ntai ta\s diatriba/s; e)/ti d' e)pei\ gumnasi/as kai\ pei/ras cha/rin a)ll' ou) didaskali/as oi( toiou=toi tô=n lo/gôn], &c.]

The thesis which the respondent undertakes to defend (in a dialogue of Search or Testing) must be either probable, or improbable, or neither one nor the other. The probability or improbability may be either simple and absolute, or special and relative--in the estimation of the respondent himself or of some one or more persons. Now, if the thesis be improbable, the opposite thereof, which you the questioner try to prove, must be probable; if the thesis be probable, the opposite thereof must be improbable; if the thesis be neither, its opposite will also be neither. Suppose, first, that the thesis is improbable absolutely. In that case, its opposite, which you the questioner must fish for premisses to prove, will be probable; the respondent therefore ought not to grant you any demand which is either simply improbable or less probable than the conclusion which you aim at proving; for no such concessions can really serve your purpose, since you are bound to prove your conclusion from premisses more probable than itself.[406] Suppose, next, that the thesis is probable absolutely. In that case, the opposite conclusion, which you have to make out, will be improbable absolutely. Accordingly, whenever you ask concessions that are probable, the respondent ought to grant them; whenever you ask for concessions that are less improbable than your intended conclusion, he ought to grant these also; but, if you ask for any thing more improbable than your intended conclusion, he ought to refuse it.[407] Suppose, thirdly, that the thesis is neither probable nor improbable. Here, too, the respondent ought to grant all concessions that appear to him probable, as well as all that he thinks more probable than the opposite conclusion which you are seeking to arrive at; but no others. This is sufficient for the purpose of Dialectic, and for keeping open the lines of probable argument.[408]

[Footnote 406: Ibid. v. p. 159, b. 9: [Greek: phanero\n ô(s a)do/xou me\n o)/ntos a(plô=s tou= keime/nou ou) dote/on tô=| a)pokrinome/nô| ou)/th' o(\ mê\ dokei= a(plô=s, ou)/th' o(\ dokei= me/n ê(=tton de\ tou= sumpera/smatos dokei=. a)do/xou ga\r ou)/sês tê=s the/seôs e)/ndoxon to\ sumpe/rasma, ô(/ste dei= ta\ lambano/mena e)ndoxa pa/nt' ei)=nai kai\ ma=llon e)/ndoxa tou= prokeime/nou, ei) me/llei dia\ tô=n gnôrimôte/rôn to\ ê(=tton gnô/rimon perai/nesthai. ô(/st' ei)/ ti mê\ toiou=to/n e)sti tô=n e)rôtôme/nôn, ou) thete/on tô=| a)pokrinome/nô|.]]

[Footnote 407: Ibid. b. 16.]

[Footnote 408: Topic. VIII. v. p. 159, b. 19-23: [Greek: i(kanô=s ga\r a)\n do/xeie dieile/chthai--ou(/tô ga\r e)ndoxote/rous sumbê/setai tou\s lo/gous gi/nesthai.]]

When the probability or improbability of the thesis is considered simply and absolutely, the respondent ought to measure his concessions by the standard of opinion received usually.[409] When the probability or improbability of the thesis is considered as referable to the respondent himself, he has only to consult his own judgment and estimation in granting or refusing what is asked. When he undertakes to defend a thesis avowedly as the doctrine of some known philosopher, such as Herakleitus, he must, in giving his answers, measure probability and improbability according to what Herakleitus would determine.[410]

[Footnote 409: Ibid. b. 24: [Greek: pro\s ta\ dokou=nta a(plô=s tê\n **su/gkrisin poiête/on].]

[Footnote 410: Ibid. b. 25-35. [Greek: pro\s tê\n e)kei/nou dia/noian a)poble/ponta thete/on e(/kasta kai\ a)rnête/on].]

Since all the questions that you ask must be either probable, improbable, or neuter, and either relevant[411] or not relevant to your purpose of refuting the thesis, let us first suppose that you ask for a concession which is in itself probable, but not relevant. The respondent ought to grant it, adding that he thinks it probable. If what you ask is neither probable nor relevant, he ought even then to grant it; but annexing a notification that he is aware of its improbability, in order to save his own credit for intelligence.[412] If it be both probable and relevant, he ought to say that he is aware of its probability, but that it is too closely connected with the thesis, and that, if he grants it, the thesis will stand refuted. If it be relevant, yet at the same time very improbable, he must reply that, if he grants it, the thesis will be refuted, but that it is too silly to be propounded. If, being neutral, it is also not relevant, he ought to grant it without comment; but if, being neutral, it is relevant, he ought to notify that he is aware that by granting it his thesis will be refuted.[413]

[Footnote 411: Ibid. vi. p. 159, b. 39: [Greek: ê)\ pro\s to\n lo/gon, ê)\ mê\ pro\s to\n lo/gon]. By this phrase Aristotle seems to mean, not simply relevant, but closely, directly, conspicuously relevant--equivalent to [Greek: li/an suneggu\s tou= e)n a)rchê=|] (p. 160, a. 5).]

[Footnote 412: Ibid. b. 36-p. 160, a. 2. [Greek: e)a\n de\ mê\ dokou=n kai\ mê\ pro\s to\n lo/gon, dote/on me/n, e)pisêmante/on de\ to\ mê\ dokou=n pro\s eu)la/beian eu)êthei/as.]

How is this to be reconciled with what Aristotle says in the preceding chapter, p. 159, b. 11-18, that the respondent ought not to grant such improbabilities at all?]

[Footnote 413: Ibid. p. 160, a. 6-11.]

In this way of proceeding, the march of the dialogue on both sides will be creditable. The respondent, signifying plainly that he understands the full consequences of his own concessions, will not appear to be worsted through any short-comings of his own, but only through what is inherent in his thesis; while you the questioner, having asked for such premisses as are really more probable than the conclusion to be established, and having had them granted, will have made out your point. It must be understood that you ought not to try to prove your conclusion from premisses less probable than itself; and that, if you put questions of this sort, you transgress the rules of dialectical procedure.[414]

[Footnote 414: Topic. VIII. vi. p. 160, a. 11-16. [Greek: ou(/tô ga\r o(/ t' a)pokrino/menos ou)de\n do/xei di' au(to\n pa/schein, e)a\n proorô=n e(/kasta tithê=|, o(/ t' e)rôtô=n teu/xetai sullogismou= titheme/nôn au)tô=| pa/ntôn e)ndoxote/rôn tou= sumpera/smatos. o(/soi d' e)x a)doxote/rôn tou= sumpera/smatos e)picheirou=si sullogi/zesthai, dê=lon ô(s ou) kalô=s sullogi/zontai; dio\ toi=s e)rôtô=sin ou) thete/on.]]

If you ask a dialectical question in plain and univocal language, the respondent is bound to answer Yes or No. But if you ask it in terms obscure or equivocal, he is not obliged to answer thus directly. He is at liberty to tell you that he does not understand the question; he ought to have no scruple in telling you so, if such is really the fact. Suppose the terms of your question to be familiar, but equivocal; the answer to it may perhaps be either true or false, alike in all the different senses of the terms. In that case, the respondent ought to answer Yes or No directly. But, if the answer would be an affirmation in one sense of the terms and a negation in another, he must take care to signify that he is aware of the equivocation, and to distinguish at once the two-fold meaning; for, if the distinction is not noticed till afterwards, he cannot clearly show that he was aware of it from the first. If he really was not at first aware of the equivocation, and gave an affirmative answer looking only to one among the several distinct meanings, you will try to convict him of error by pushing him on the other meaning. The best thing that he can then do will be to confess his oversight, and to excuse himself by saying that misconception is easy where the same term or the same proposition may mean several different things.[415]

[Footnote 415: Ibid. vii. p. 160, a. 17-34.]

Suppose you put several particular questions (or several analogous questions) with the view of arriving ultimately by induction at the concession of an universal, comprising them all. If they are all both true and probable, the respondent must concede them all severally; yet he may still intend to answer No, when the universal is tendered to him after them. He has no right to answer thus, however, unless he can produce some contradictory particular instance, real or apparent, to justify him; and, if he does so without such justification, he is a perverse dialectician.[416] Perhaps he may try to sustain his denegation of the universal, after having conceded many particulars, by a counter-attack founded on some chain of paradoxical reasoning such as that of Zeno against motion; there being many such paradoxes contradictory of probabilities, yet hard to refute. But this is no sufficient justification for refusing to admit the universal, when, after having admitted many particulars, he can produce no particular adverse to them. The case will be still worse, if he refuses to admit the universal, having neither any adverse instance, nor any counter-ratiocinative attack. It is then the extreme of perverse Dialectic.[417]

[Footnote 416: Topic. VIII. viii. p. 160, b. 2-5: [Greek: to\ ga\r a)/neu e)nsta/seôs, ê)\ ou)/sês ê)\ dokou/sês, kôlu/ein to\n lo/gon duskolai/nein e)sti/n. ei) ou)=n e)pi\ pollô=n phainome/nou mê\ di/dôsi to\ katho/lou mê\ e)/chôn e)/nstasin, phanero\n o(/ti duskolai/nei.]]

[Footnote 417: Ibid. b. 5, seq. [Greek: e)/ti ei) mêd' a)ntepicheirei=n e)/chei o(/ti ou)k a)lêthe/s, pollô=| ma=llon a)\n do/xeie duskolai/nein. kai/toi ou)de\ tou=th' i(kano/n; pollou\s ga\r lo/gous e)/chomen e)nanti/ous tai=s do/xais, ou(\s chalepo\n lu/ein, katha/per to\n Zê/nônos o(/ti ou)k e)nde/chetai kinei=sthai ou)de\ to\ sta/dion dielthei=n; _a)ll' ou) dia\ tou=to ta)ntikei/mena tou/tois ou) thete/on_.]]

Before the respondent undertakes to defend any thesis or definition, he ought to have previously studied the various modes attacking it, and to have prepared himself for meeting them.[418] He must also be cautious of taking up improbable theses, in either of the senses of improbable. For a thesis is so called when it involves strange and paradoxical developments, as if a man lays down either that every thing is in motion or that nothing is in motion; and also, when it implies a discreditable character and is contrary to that which men wish to be thought to hold, as, for example, the doctrine that pleasure is the good, or that it is better to do wrong than to suffer wrong. If a man defends such theses as these, people hate him because they presume that he is not merely propounding them as matter for dialectical argument, but advocating them as convictions of his own.[419]

[Footnote 418: Ibid. ix. p. 160, b. 14.]

[Footnote 419: Ibid. b. 17-22: [Greek: a)/doxon d' u(po/thesin eu)labête/on u(pe/chein; ei)/ê d' a)\n a)/doxos dichô=s;] &c.]

The respondent must farther be able, if you bring against him a false syllogistic reasoning, to distinguish upon which among your premisses the false conclusion really turns, and to refute that one. Your reasoning may have more than one false premiss; but he must not content himself with refuting any one or any other: he must single out that one which is the chief determining cause of the falsehood. Thus, if your syllogism be:--Every man in a sitting position is writing, Sokrates is a man in a sitting position; therefore, Sokrates is writing,--it will not suffice that the respondent should refute your minor premiss, though this may be false;[420] because such a refutation will not apply to the number of other cases in which men are sitting but not writing; and therefore it will not expose the full bearing of the falsehood. Your major premiss is that upon which the full bearing of the falsehood depends; and the respondent must show that he is aware of this by refuting your major.[421]

[Footnote 420: Topic. VIII. x. p. 160, b. 23-26. [Greek: ou) ga\r o( o(tiou=n a)nelô\n le/luken, ou)/d' ei) pseu=do/s e)sti to\ a)nairou/menon; e)/choi ga\r a)\n plei/ô pseudê= o( lo/gos.]]

[Footnote 421: Ibid. b. 30-39. [Greek: oi)=de de\ tê\n lu/sin o( ei)dô\s o(/ti para\ tou=to o( lo/gos--ou) ga\r a)po/chrê to\ e)nstê=nai, ou)/d' a)\n pseu=dos ê)=| to\ a)nairou/menon, a)lla\ kai\ dio/ti pseu=dos a)podeikte/on; _ou(/tô ga\r a)\n ei)/ê phanero\n po/teron proorô=n ti ê)\ ou)\ poiei=tai tê\n e)/nstasin_.]]

This last-mentioned proceeding--refutation of that premiss upon which your false conclusion in its full bearing really turns--is the only regular, valid, and complete objection whereby the respondent can stop out your syllogistic approaches. There are indeed three other modes of objection to which he may resort; but these are all either inconclusive or unfair. He may turn his objection against you personally; and, without refuting any of your premisses, he may thus perplex and confuse you, so that you are disqualified from pursuing the thread of your questions. Or he may turn his objections against portions of your questions; not refuting any one of your premisses, but showing that, as they stand, they are insufficient to warrant the conclusion which you seek to establish; when, if you are master of your subject, and retain your calmness, you will at once supply the deficiency by putting additional questions, so that his objection thus vanishes. Or, lastly, he may multiply irrelevant objections against time, for the purpose of prolonging the discussion and tiring you out.[422] Of these four modes of objection open to the respondent the first is the only one truly valid and conclusive; the three others are obstructions either surmountable or unfair, and the last is the most discreditable of all.[423]

[Footnote 422: Ibid. p. 161, a. 1-12: [Greek: e)/sti de\ lo/gon kôlu=sai sumpera/nasthai tetrachô=s. ê)\ ga\r a)nelo/nta par' o(\ gi/netai to\ pseu=dos. ê)\ pro\s to\n e)rôtô=nta e)/nstasin ei)po/nta;--tri/ton de\ pro\s ta\ ê)rôtême/na;--teta/rtê de\ kai\ cheiri/stê tô=n e)nsta/seôn ê( pro\s to\n chro/non.]]

[Footnote 423: Ibid. a. 13-15: [Greek: ai( me\n ou)=n e)nsta/seis, katha/per ei)/pamen, tetrachô=s gi/nontai; lu/sis d' e)sti\ tô=n ei)rême/nôn ê( prô/tê mo/non, ai( de\ loipai\ kôlu/seis tine\s kai\ e)mpodismoi\ tô=n sumperasma/tôn.]]

To blame the argumentative procedure and to blame the questioner are two distinct things. Perhaps your manner of conducting the interrogation, preparatory to your final syllogism, may be open to censure; yet nevertheless you the questioner may deserve no censure; for it may be the respondent's fault, not yours. He may refuse to grant the very premisses which are essential to the good conduct of your case; he may resort to perverse evasions and contradictions for the mere purpose of thwarting you; so that you are forced to adapt yourself to his unworthy manoeuvres rather than to aim at the thesis itself. Dialectic cannot be well conducted unless both the partners do their duty to the common purpose; the bad conduct of your respondent puts you out, and the dialectic presently degenerates on both sides into angry contention.[424] Apart from this, too, it must be remembered that the express purpose of Dialectic is not to teach, but to search and test consequences and to exercise the intellect of both parties. Accordingly you are not always restricted to true syllogistic premisses and conclusions. You are allowed to resort occasionally to false premisses and false conclusions; for, if what the respondent advances be true, you have no means of refuting it except by falsehood; and, if what he advances be false, the best way of refuting it may be through some other falsehood.[425] You render service to him by doing so; for, since his beliefs are contrary to truth, if the dialogue is confined to his beliefs, the result may perhaps contribute to persuade him, but it will not instruct or profit him.[426] It is your business to bring him round and emancipate him from these erroneous beliefs; but you must accomplish this in a manner truly dialectical, and not contentious; whether you proceed by true or by false conclusions.[427] If you on your side, indeed, put questions in a contentious spirit, it is you that are to blame. But often the respondent is most to blame, when he refuses to grant what he thinks probable, and when he does not apprehend what you really intend to ask.[428] He is sometimes also to blame for granting what he ought to refuse; such as _Petitio Principii_ or Affirmation of Contraries. It is often difficult to distinguish what questions involve _Petitio Principii_ or Affirmation of Contraries: they are asked and granted without either party being aware, and the like mistake is committed by men in private talk, not merely in formal dialogue. When this happens, the argument will inevitably be a bad one; but the fault is with the respondent who, having before refused what he ought to have granted, now grants what he ought to refuse.[429]

[Footnote 424: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 16-24. [Greek: duskolai/nontes ou)=n a)gônistika\s kai\ ou) dialektika\s poiou=ntai ta\s diatriba/s.] a. 37: [Greek: phau=los koinôno\s o( e)mpodi/zôn to\ koino\n e)/rgon.]]

[Footnote 425: Ibid. a. 24-31: [Greek: e)/ti d' e)pei\ gumnasi/as kai\ pei/ras cha/rin a)ll' ou) didaskali/as oi( toiou=toi tô=n lo/gôn, dê=lon ô(s ou) mo/non ta)lêthê= sullogiste/on a)lla\ kai\ pseu=dos, ou)de\ di' a)lêthô=n a)ei\ a)ll' e)ni/ote kai\ pseudô=n. polla/kis ga\r a)lêthou=s tethe/ntos a)nairei=n a)na/gkê to\n dialego/menon, ô(/ste protate/on ta\ pseudê=. e)ni/ote de\ kai\ pseu/dous tethe/ntos a)nairete/on dia\ pseudô=n.]]

[Footnote 426: Ibid. a. 30: [Greek: ou)de\n ga\r kôlu/ei tini\ dokei=n ta\ mê\ o)/nta ma=llon tô=n a)lêthô=n, ô(/st' e)k tô=n e)kei/nô| dokou/ntôn tou= lo/gou genome/nou ma=llon e)/stai pepeisme/nos ê)\ ô)phelême/nos.]]

[Footnote 427: Ibid. a. 33: [Greek: dei= de\ to\n kalô=s metabiba/zonta dialektikô=s kai\ mê\ e)ristikô=s metabiba/zein.] About [Greek: to\ metabiba/zein], compare Topica, I. ii. p. 101, a. 23.]

[Footnote 428: Ibid. b. 2: [Greek: o(/ te ga\r e)ristikô=s e)rôtô=n phau/lôs diale/getai, o(/ t' e)n tô=| a)pokri/nesthai mê\ didou\s ta\ phaino/menon mêd' e)kdecho/menos o(/ ti/ pote bou/letai o( e)rôtô=n puthe/sthai.]]

[Footnote 429: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, b. 11-18: [Greek: e)pei\ d' e)sti\n a)dio/riston po/te ta)nanti/a kai\ po/te ta\ e)n a)rchê=| lamba/nousin oi( a)/nthrôpoi (polla/kis ga\r kath' au(tou\s le/gontes ta)nanti/a le/gousi, kai\ a)naneu/santes pro/teron dido/asin u(/steron; dio/per e)rôtô/menoi ta)nanti/a kai\ to\ e)n a)rchê=| polla/kis u(pakou/ousin)--a)na/gkê phau/lous gi/nesthai tou\s lo/gous; ai)/tios d' o( a)pokrino/menos, ta\ me\n ou) didou/s, ta\ de\ toiau=ta didou/s.]

This passage is not very clear.]

Such then are the cases in which the conduct of the dialogue is open to censure, without any fault on your part as questioner. But there are other cases in which the fault is really yours. These are five in number:--(1) When all or most of your questions are so framed as to elicit premisses either false or improbable, so that neither the conclusion which you seek to obtain, nor any other conclusion at all, follows from them; (2) When, from similar defects, the proper conclusion that you seek to obtain cannot be drawn from your premisses; (3) When the proper conclusion would follow, if certain additions were made to your premisses, but such additions are of a character worse than the premisses already obtained, and are even less probable than the conclusion itself; (4) When you have accumulated a superfluous multitude of premisses, so that the proper conclusion does not follow from all of them but from a part of them only (5) When your premisses are more improbable and less trustworthy than the proper conclusion, or when, though true, they are harder and more troublesome to prove than the problem itself.[430]

[Footnote 430: Ibid. b. 19-33: [Greek: kath' au(to\n de\ tô=| lo/gô| pe/nte ei)si\n e)pitimê/seis].]

In regard to the last item, however, the fault may sometimes be in the problem itself rather than in you as questioner. Some problems, being in their own nature hard and not to be settled from probable or plausible data, ought not to be admitted into Dialectic. All that can be required from you as questioner is that you shall know and obtain the most probable premisses that the problem admits: your procedure may be thus in itself blameable, yet it may even deserve praise, having regard to the problem, if this last be very intractable; or it may be in itself praiseworthy, yet blameable in regard to the problem, if the problem admit of being settled by premisses still more probable.[431] You may even be more blameable, if you obtain your conclusion but obtain it from improbable premisses, than if you failed to obtain it; the premisses required to make it complete being true and probable and not of capital importance, but being refused by the respondent.[432] However, you ought not to be blamed if you obtain your true and proper conclusion but obtain it through premisses in themselves false; for this is recognized in analytical theory as possible: if the conclusion is false, the premisses (one or both) must be false, but a true conclusion may be drawn from false premisses.[433]

[Footnote 431: Ibid. b. 34-p. 162, a. 3.]

[Footnote 432: Ibid. p. 162, a. 3-8.]

[Footnote 433: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 162, a. 8-11: [Greek: toi=s de\ dia\ pseudô=n a)lêthe\s sumperainome/nois ou) di/kaion e)pitima=n-- phanero\n d' e)k tô=n A)nalutikô=n.]]

When you have obtained your premisses and proved a conclusion, these same premisses will not serve as proof of any other proposition separate and independent of the conclusion; such may sometimes seem to be the case, but it is a mere sophistical delusion. If your premisses are both of them probable, your conclusion may in some cases be more probable than either.[434]

[Footnote 434: Ibid. a.12-24.

Aristotle here introduces four definitions of terms, which are useful in regard to his thoughts but have no great pertinence in the place where they occur: [Greek: e)/sti de\ _philoso/phêma_ me\n sullogismo\s a)podeiktiko/s, _e)pichei/rêma_ de\ sullogismo\s dialektiko/s, _so/phisma_ de\ sullogismo\s e)ristiko/s, _a)po/rêma_ de\ sullogismo\s dialektiko\s a)ntipha/seôs.]]

One other matter yet remains in which your procedure as questioner may be blameable. The premisses through which you prove your conclusion may be long and unnecessarily multiplied; the conclusion may be such that you ought to have obtained it through fewer, yet equally pertinent premisses.[435]

[Footnote 435: Ibid. a. 24-34.

The example whereby Aristotle illustrates this position is obscure and difficult to follow. It is borrowed from the Platonic theory of Ideas. The point which you are supposed to be anxious to prove is, that one opinion is more opinion than another ([Greek: o(/ti e)sti\ do/xa ma=llon e(te/ra e(te/ras]). To prove it you ask as premisses: (1) That the Idea of every class of things is more that thing than any one among the particulars of the class; (2) That there is an Idea of _matter of opinion_, and that this Idea is more opinion than any one of the particular matters of opinion. If this Idea is more opinion, it must also be more true and accurate than any particular matter of opinion. And it is this last conclusion that Aristotle seems to indicate as the conclusion to be proved: [Greek: ô(/ste au(tê\ ê( do/xa a)kribeste/ra e)sti/n] (a. 32).

As I understand it, Aristotle supposes that the doctrine which you are here refuting is, that all [Greek: e)/ndoxa] are on an equal footing as to truth and accuracy; and that the doctrine which you are proving against it is, that one [Greek: e)/ndoxon] is more true and accurate than another. If you attempt to prove this last by invoking the Platonic theory of Ideas, you will introduce premisses far-fetched and unnecessary, even if true; whereas you might prove your conclusion from premisses easier and more obvious.

The fault is (he says) that such roundabout procedure puts out of sight the real ground of the proof: [Greek: ti/s de\ ê( mochthêri/a? ê)\ o(/ti poiei=, par' o(\ o( lo/gos, lantha/nein to\ ai)/tion] (a. 33). The dubitative and problematical form here is remarkable. How would Aristotle himself have proved the above conclusion? By Induction? He does not tell us.]

The cases in which your argument will carry the clearest evidence, impressing itself even on the most vulgar minds, are those in which you obtain such premisses as will enable you to draw your final conclusion without asking any farther concessions. But this will rarely happen. Even after you have obtained all the premisses substantially necessary to your final conclusion, you will generally be forced to draw out two or more prosyllogisms or preliminary syllogisms, and to ask the assent of the respondent to these, before you can venture to enunciate the final conclusion. This second grade of evidence is however sufficient, even if the premisses fall short of the highest probability.[436]

[Footnote 436: Topic. VIII. xii. p. 162, a. 35-b. 2.]

On the other hand, your argument may deserve to be pronounced false on four distinct grounds:--(1) If your syllogism appears to prove the conclusion but does not really prove it, being then an _eristic_ or _contentious_ syllogism; (2) If the conclusion be good but not **relevant to the thesis, which is most likely to happen where you employ _Reductio ad Impossible_; (3) If your conclusion though valid and even relevant, is not founded on the premisses and _principia_ appropriate to the thesis; (4) If your premisses are false, even though the conclusion in itself may prove true, since it has already been said that a true conclusion may sometimes be obtained from false premisses.[437]

[Footnote 437: Ibid. b. 3-15: [Greek: pseudê\s de\ lo/gos kalei=tai tetrachô=s], &c.]

Falsehood in your argument will be rather your own fault than that of your argument, especially if you yourself are not aware of its falsehood. Indeed, there are some false arguments which are more valuable in Dialectic than many true ones; where, for example, from highly probable premisses you refute some recognized truth. Such an argument is sure to serve as a demonstration of other truths; at the very least, it shows that some one of the propositions concerned is altogether untrue.[438] On the other hand, if you prove a true conclusion by premisses false and improbable, your argument will be more worthless than many others in which the conclusion is false; from such premisses, indeed, the conclusion may well be really false.[439]