Chapter X: Sophistici Elenchi (2)

[Footnote 53: Topic. I, i. p. 100, b. 26: [Greek: ou) ga\r pa=n to\ phaino/menon e)/ndoxon kai\ e)/stin e)/ndoxon. ou)the\n ga\r tô=n legome/nôn e)/ndoxôn e)pipo/laion e)/chei pantelô=s tê\n phantasi/an, katha/per peri\ ta\s tô=n e)ristikô=n lo/gôn a)rcha\s sumbe/bêken e)/chein; parachrê=ma ga\r kai\ ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu\ toi=s kai\ mikra\ sunora=n duname/nois kata/dêlos e)n au)toi=s ê( tou= pseudou=s e)sti\ phu/sis.] It is by reference to this distinction between [Greek: e)/ndoxa] which are genuine and [Greek: e)/ndoxa] which are only such in appearance that the Scholiast (p. 306, b. 40) explains the meaning of Aristotle in the eleventh chapter of Sophistici Elenchi: [Greek: o( me\n ou)=n kata\ to\ pra=gma theôrô=n ta\ koina\ dialektiko/s, o( de\ tou=to phainome/nôs poiô=n sophistiko/s] (p. 171, b. 6-20). I confess that I attach no distinct meaning to the words [Greek: kata\ to\ pra=gma theôrô=n ta\ koina\], which characterizes the Dialectician as contrasted with the Sophist; nor can I learn much from the notes either of Waitz, or of Mr. Poste (p. 129, seq.) on the passage. Take for example the last half of the Parmenides of Plato, or Book B. of the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Are we to say that in these two compositions Plato and Aristotle speculate on to [Greek: ta\ koina\ kata\ to\ pra=gma], or that they do so only in appearance?]

[Footnote 54: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 25-35; i. p. 165, a. 21-31.]

Now, in regard to the distinction of aim or disposition drawn by Aristotle between the dialectical disputant and the litigious or sophistic disputant, we see at once, as was before suggested, that it lies apart from the critical estimate of art, science, or philosophy; and that it belongs, so far as it is well founded, to the estimate of individuals ethically and politically, as worthy men or patriotic citizens. Whether Euripides or Sophokles composed finer tragedies (as we find argued in the Ranæ of Aristophanes), must be decided by examining the tragedies themselves, not by enquiring whether one of them was vain and greedy of money, the other free from these blemishes. A theorist who is laying down general principles of Rhetoric, and illustrating them by the study of Æschines and Demosthenes, will appreciate the oration against Ktesiphon and the oration De Coronâ in their character of compositions intended for a particular purpose. For Rhetoric it is of no moment whether Æschines was venal or disinterested--a malignant rival or an honest patriot; this is an enquiry important indeed, but belonging to the historian and not to the rhetorical theorist. Whether Aristotle was or was not guided, in his animadversions on Plato, by an unworthy and captious jealousy of his master, is an interesting question in reference to his character; but our appreciation of his philosophy must proceed upon an examination, not of his motives but, of his doctrines and reasonings as we find them. A good argument is not deprived of its force when enunciated by a knave, nor is a bad argument rendered good because it proceeds from a virtuous man. Indeed, so far as the character of the speaker counts at all, in falsifying the fair logical estimate of an argument, it operates in a direction opposite to that here indicated by Aristotle. The same argument in the mouth of one who is esteemed and admired counts for more than its worth; in the mouth of a person of low character it counts for less than it is worth.[55] To distribute arguments into two classes--those employed by persons of dishonourable character and those employed by honourable men--is a departure from the scientific character of Logic.

[Footnote 55: Eurip. Hecub. 293.

[Greek: to\ d' a)xi/ôma, ka)\n kaô=s le/gê|s, to\ so\n
pei/sei; lo/gos ga\r e)/k t' a)doxou/ntôn i)ô\n
ka)\k tô=n dokou/ntôn au)to\s ou) tau)to\n sthe/nei.]

Aristot. Rhetoric. I. ii. p. 1356, a. 5-15.]

As to the other part of the case (if it is still necessary to recur to it), touching the peculiarity of the matter of sophistical arguments, the inconsistency of Aristotle is most apparent. In enumerating the Sophistical Refutations he tells us that these fallacies are indeed sometimes palpable and easily detected, but that they are often very difficult to detect and very misleading; that an unprepared hearer will generally be imposed upon by several of them, and even a scientific hearer by some; and that, even where the fallacy does not actually deceive, the proper mode of meeting and exposing it will not occur unless to one previously exercised in Dialectic.[56] That Fallacies _In Dictione_, taken as a class (though these are what he declares to be the most usual _modus operandi_ of the sham dialecticians called Sophists[57]), often passed unperceived, and were hard to solve and elucidate even when perceived--we know to have been his opinion; for it is not only in the Topica and Sophistici Elenchi, but also in the Metaphysica and other works,[58] that he takes pains to analyse and discriminate the several distinct meanings borne by terms familiar to every one, such as _idem_, _unum_, _pulchrum_, _bonum_, _amare_, _album_, _acutum_, &c., which terms therefore, when employed in argument, were always liable to introduce a fallacy of Equivocation or Amphiboly. He tells us the like in specifying the seven Fallacies _Extra Dictionem_: that they also were often unnoticed, and required vigilant practice to see through and solve. The description in detail, therefore, which Aristotle gives (in Sophistici Elenchi) of the working process peculiar to the litigious Sophist, is completely at variance with the definition which he had given of the sophistic syllogism at the commencement of the Topica. That definition is indeed suitable for the _type-specimens_ which he and other logicians give to illustrate this or that class of Fallacies: the type-specimen produced must carry absurdity on the face of it, so that the reader may at first sight recognize it as a fallacy; and he may even find difficulty in believing that any one can really be imposed upon by such trifling. But, though suitable for the type-specimen taken separately, this definition fails in the essential character which Aristotle postulates for a definition, since it is quite untrue and unsuitable for numerous instances of the class intended to be illustrated.[59] Aristotle was the first who attempted to distribute Fallacies into classes, such that, while in each class there were certain specimens palpably stamped with the fallacious character, there were also in each class an indefinite multitude of analogous cases wherein the fallacious character did not reveal itself openly or easily, but required attentive consideration to detect it, often indeed remaining undetected, and producing its natural fruit of error and confusion. This was one of his many great merits in regard to Logic; and the classification of Fallacies (modified as to details) has passed to all subsequent logicians, so that we find difficulty in understanding that the contemporaries of Sokrates and Plato had no idea of it. But the value of his service to Logic would be much lessened, if all fallacies were sophistic syllogisms, intended to deceive but never really deceiving, corresponding to his definition at the beginning of the Topica; if (as he tells us in the Sophistici Elenchi) they were only impudent forgeries put in circulation by a set of professional knaves called Sophists; and if all non-sophistical dialecticians, and all the world without, could be trusted as speaking correctly by nature and as never falling into them.

[Footnote 56: Soph. El. v. p. 167, a. 5-15, b. 5-35. [Greek: kai\ lantha/nei polla/kis ou)ch ê(=tton au)tou\s tou\s e)rôtô=ntas to\ toiou=ton.]--vii. p. 169, a. 22-30, b. 8-15: [Greek: e)n a(/pasi ga\r ê( a)pa/tê dia\ to\ para\ mikro/n].--xv. p. 175, a. 20.]

[Footnote 57: Ibid. i. p. 165, a. 2-20.]

[Footnote 58: Topic. I. vii. p. 103, a. 6-39; p. 106, b. 3-9; p. 107, a. 12, b. 7: [Greek: polla/kis de\ kai\ e)n au)toi=s toi=s lo/gois lantha/nei parakolouthou=n to\ o(mô/numon.] Cf. Topic. II. iii. p. 110, b. 33; V. ii. p. 129, b. 30, seq.; VI. x. p. 148, a. 23, seq. Soph. El. x. p. 171, a. 17.

Compare also Book [Greek: D]. of the Metaphysica, and the frequent recognition and analysis [Greek: tô=n polla/kô=s legome/nôn] throughout the other Books of the Metaphysica.]

[Footnote 59: Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 26: [Greek: dei= ga\r to\n tou= a)nthrô/pou o(rismo\n kata\ panto\s a)nthrô/pou a)lêtheu/esthai.]--VI. x. p. 148, x. p. 148, b. 2: [Greek: dei= ga\r e)pi\ pa=n to\ sunô/numon e)pharmo/ttein.]

Whoever reads the Sixth Book of the Topica, wherein Aristotle indicates to the questioner _Loci_ for impugning a definition, will see how little this definition of the Sophistic Syllogism will stand such attacks.]

The appeal made by Aristotle to a difference of character and motives as the distinction between the Dialectician and the Sophist is all the more misplaced, because he himself lays down as the essential feature of Dialectic generally, that it is a match or contention between two rivals, each anxious to obtain the victory. It is like a match at chess between two expert players, or a fencing-match between two celebrated masters at arms. Its very nature is to be an attack and defence, in which each combatant resorts to stratagem, and each outwits the other if he can. Whether the match is played for money or for nothing--whether the contentious spirit is more or less intense--does not concern the theorist on dialectical procedure. It is indispensable that both the questioner and the respondent should exert their full force, the one in thrusting, the other in parrying: if they do not, the purpose of Dialectic, which is the common business of both, will not be attained. That purpose is clearly declared by Aristotle. It is not didactic: he distinguishes it expressly from teaching,[60] where one man who knows communicates such knowledge to an ignorant pupil. It is gymnastic, exercising the promptitude and invention of both parties; or peirastic, testing whether the respondent knows a given thesis in such manner as to avoid being driven into answers inconsistent with each other or notoriously false.[61] Each party seeks, not to help or enlighten but, to puzzle and defeat the other. As at chess or in fencing, to mask one's projects and deceive the adversary is essential to the work and to its purpose; each expects it from the other, and undertakes to meet and parry it. The theses debated were always such that arguments might be found both for the affirmative and for the negative.

[Footnote 60: Soph. El. ii. p. 165, b. 1-5; x. p. 171, a. 32-b. 2. Cf. Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 25.]

[Footnote 61: Topic. I. i. p. 100, a. 20; VIII. i. p. 155, b. 10-28.]

According to Aristotle himself, therefore, the Dialectician is agonistic and eristic, just as much as the Sophist. If the one tries to entrap his opponent for the purpose of victory, so also does the other: the line which Aristotle draws between them is one not founded upon any real distinction between two purposes and modes of procedure, but is merely verbal and sentimental; putting aside under a discredited title what he himself disliked. He admits that the dialectical questioner, whenever the thesis which he undertakes to refute is true, can never refute it except by inducing the respondent to concede what is false; that, even where the thesis is false, he often can only refute it by some other incompatible falsehood, because he cannot obtain from the respondent better premisses; that, where the thesis is probable and conformable to received opinion, his only way of refuting it is by entrapping the respondent into concessions paradoxical and contrary to received opinion.[62] But these ends--fallacious refutation, falsehood, and paradox--are the very same as those which Aristotle (in the Sophistici Elenchi)[63] sets forth as the peculiar characteristics of the litigious Sophist. And the improving intellectual tendencies which he ascribes to Sophistic, are almost identical with those attributed to Dialectic, being declared in very similar words.[64] That there were dialecticians of every degree of merit, in the time of Aristotle, cannot be doubted; some clever and ready, others stupid and destitute of invention. But that there were any two classes of dialecticians such as he describes and contrasts--one heretical class, called Sophists, who purposely and habitually employed the thirteen fallacious refutations, and another orthodox class who purposely avoided or habitually abstained from them--we may most reasonably doubt. If the argument in the Sophistici Elenchi is good at all, it is good against all Dialectic. The Sophist, as Aristotle describes him, is only the Dialectician looked at on the unfavourable side and painted by an enemy. We know that there were in Greece many enemies of Dialectic generally; the intense antipathy inspired by the cross-examining colloquy of Sokrates, and attested by his own declarations, is a sufficient proof of this. The enemies of Sokrates depicted him--as Aristotle depicts the Sophist in the Sophistici Elenchi--as a clever fabricator of fallacious contradictions and puzzles; to which Aristotle adds the farther charge (advanced by Plato before him) against the Sophist, of arguing for lucre--which is an irrelevant charge, travelling out of the region of art, and bearing on the personal character of the individual. If the sophistical stratagems were discreditable and mischievous when exhibited for money, they would be no less such if exhibited gratuitously. The sophistical discourse is not (as Aristotle would have us believe) generically distinguishable from the dialectical;[65] nor is Sophistic an art distinct from Dialectic while adjoining to it, but an inseparable portion of the tissue of Dialectic itself.[66] If the Sophist passed himself off as knowing what he did not really know, so also did the Dialectician; as we know from the testimony of Sokrates, the most consummate master of the art. The conflict of two minds each taking advantage of the misconceptions, short-comings, and blindness of the other, is the essential feature of Dialectic as Aristotle conceives it; to which the eight books of his Topica are adapted, with their multiplicity of distinctions and precepts both for attack and defence. There cannot be a game of chess without stratagems, nor a fencing-match without feints; the power of such aggressive deception is one characteristic mark of a good player. Those who teach or theorize on the game do not seek to exclude stratagem, but furnish precautions to prevent it from succeeding. Mastery of the art assumes skill in defence as well as in attack.

[Footnote 62: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 24.]

[Footnote 63: Soph. El. iii. p. 165, b. 14.]

[Footnote 64: Compare Topic. I. ii. p. 101, a. 26-b. 4, with Soph. El. xvi. p. 175, a. 5-16.]

[Footnote 65: Soph. El. ii. p. 165, a. 32; xxxiv. p. 183, b. 1.]

[Footnote 66: Plato, Apol. Sokrat. p. 23, A.

Compare this with Aristot. Soph. El. i. p. 165, a. 30.]

Doubtless there are rules that require to be observed in the dialectical attack and defence, as there are rules for all other matches such as chess or fencing. I should have been glad if Aristotle had given a precise and tenable explanation what these rules were. He describes the Sophist as one who plays the game unfairly; but we have already seen that the ends pursued by the Dialectician generally are hardly at all distinguishable from those aimed at by the Sophist. If we look to the account of the means employed by one and the other, we shall in like manner fail to see how any real line can be drawn between them.

Thus, one proceeding declared to be characteristic of the Sophist is--that he puts multiplied questions apparently at random, without any visible bearing on the thesis; practising a sort of fishing examination, in order to obtain some answer of which he may take advantage.[67] But, when we turn to the Eighth Book of the Topica, we find Aristotle expressly recommending the like manoeuvre to the Dialectician; advising him to conceal as much as possible the scheme and intended series of his questions--to begin as far as possible apart from the thesis, to put the questions in a succession designedly incoherent and unintelligible, and to obtain (what, if obtained, ensured complete success) the full extent of premisses necessary for his final refutative syllogism, without the respondent being aware that he had conceded them.[68] The questioner is farther advised to throw the respondent off his guard by affecting indifference whether each question is answered affirmatively or negatively, and by occasionally taking objection against himself, in order that he may create the impression of a strictly honest purpose.[69] If we compare the interrogative procedure which Aristotle recommends to the Dialectician with that which he blames in the Sophist, we shall find that the former is even a greater refinement of deception than the latter.

[Footnote 67: Soph. El. xii. p. 172, b. 9-25.

Aristotle treats the Sophists as guilty of dishonourable proceeding herein--[Greek: du/nantai de\ nu=n ê(=tton _katourgei=n_ dia\ tou/tôn ê)\ pro/teron.] The very same charge was urged against the dialectic of Sokrates by his opponents: Plato, Hippias Minor, p. 373--[Greek: a)lla\ Sôkra/tês a)ei\ tara/ttei e)n toi=s lo/gois kai\ e)/oiken ô(/sper kakourgou=nti.] Compare Plato, Gorgias, pp. 461, B., 482, E., 483, A.]

[Footnote 68: Topic. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 1.-p. 155, b. 30; p. 156, a. 5-22. Compare Analyt. Priora, II. xix. p. 66, a. 33.]

[Footnote 69: Topic. VIII. i. p. 156, b. 3, 17. Compare VIII. i. pp. 155-156, with Soph. El. xv. p. 174, a. 28.]

The next trick which we find ascribed to the Sophist is--that he conducts the train of interrogation in such manner as to bring it upon a ground on which his memory is abundantly furnished with topics. Aristotle adds that this may be done well and honourably, or ill and dishonourably.[70] From his own admission we see that this practice was not peculiar to Sophists, but was common also to those whom he calls Dialecticians: like every other part of the procedure, it might be done well or ill; but wherein this difference consisted he does not further explain. Indeed, when we recollect that the elaborate details and classification of the Topica are mainly intended to furnish the memory with an abundant store of premisses well-arranged and ready for interrogation,[71] we may be sure that every Dialectician who had gone through the trouble of learning them would be impatient to apply them; and would make an opportunity for doing so, if none were spontaneously tendered to him. But, if the answers obtained were totally irrelevant to his final purpose of refuting the thesis, they would be nothing but embarrassment to him.[72] We must, therefore, understand that the questions put would be such as tended ultimately to introduce that refutative Syllogism which the questioner was bound to conclude with. If they were not, he was of course punished by failure.

[Footnote 70: Soph. El. xii. p. 172, b. 26. In Topic. III. i. p. 116, a. 20, Aristotle prescribes the same procedure to the Dialectician. See also Waitz's note on the passage.

Alexander (in Scholia, p. 267, b. 8) tells us that it was customary for the Sophists to put questions lying away from the thesis, and he shows this by mentioning the Platonic Protagoras, in which he says that the Sophist Protagoras does so. But the illustration here produced does not serve Alexander's purpose. The Sophist Protagoras (in the Platonic dialogue so called) is represented, not as shifting dialectic from one point to another, but as running away from it altogether into long discourse and continuous rhetoric (Plato, Protagor. pp. 333, 334, 335). In respect to the thesis started for debate, the dialectic of Sokrates departs from it as widely as that of Protagoras, and this is acknowledged at the close of the dialogue, p. 361. Compare 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates', Vol. II. pp. 53, 59, 70.]

[Footnote 71: Topic. I. v. p. 102, a. 13; I. xiii. p. 105, a. 22; VIII. xiv. p. 163, a. 31-b. 2.]

[Footnote 72: Aristotle himself observes this, Topic. II. v. p. 112, a. 14.]

A third manoeuvre treated as peculiar to the Sophist is--that he takes account of the particular philosophical sect to which the respondent belongs, and endeavours to bring out by interrogations whatever there may be paradoxical in the tenets of that sect.[73] But would not any expert Dialectician do just the same? What else would be done by Sokrates, if cross-examining an Anaxagorean or a Herakleitean? or by Aristotle himself, if interrogating a Platonist?

[Footnote 73: Soph. El. xii. p. 172, b. 29.]

Another proceeding treated as peculiar to the Sophist is--that he seeks to drive the respondent into a paradox, by bringing out in cross-examination certain well-known antitheses or contradictions which subsist together in the opinions of mankind. Thus, men profess in their public talk high principles of virtue; but secretly and at the bottom of their hearts they desire to get wealth or power _per fas et nefas_. Again, there are two kinds of justice: one, that which is just by nature and in truth, such as wise men or philosophers approve; the other, that which is just according to law or custom, such as the multitude in this or in in some other society approve. There is, also, conflict between the authority of a father, and that of the wise; between justice and expediency; and as to whether it is more eligible to suffer wrong or to do wrong.[74] All these antitheses are presented to us in the Platonic Gorgias, to which (_i.e._, to the speech of Kallikles therein) Aristotle here makes reference; and he numbers it among the vices distinguishing the Sophist from the genuine Dialectician--to dwell upon such antitheses for the purpose of forcing the respondent into paradoxical answers. But, surely, the antitheses here fastened upon that obnoxious name are of a class utterly opposed to the class of _pseudo-probabilia_, which he tells us are the peculiar game of the litigious Sophist, though every man of ordinary intelligence detects them at first sight as fallacies. They are all real and serious issues,[75] having plausible arguments _pro_ and _con_, debateable without end, and settled by every man for himself according to his own sentiment and predisposition. They are exactly the subject-matter best fitted for the acute Dialectician. No man would be allowed by Aristotle to deserve that title, if he omitted to raise and argue them, the thesis being supposed suitable.[76] Aristotle himself speaks often of the equivocal sense of the term justice--of the distinction between what is just by nature and what is just according to some local or peculiar sentiment.[77] The manoeuvre which Aristotle imputes to the Sophist being exactly the same as that which Kallikles imputes to Sokrates in the Platonic Gorgias,[78] it is Sokrates, and not Kallikles, who serves here as illustrating what Aristotle calls a Sophist. Indeed, if we read the Gorgias, we shall find the Platonic Sokrates there represented as neglecting the difference between what is probable (conformable to received opinion) and what is paradoxical. He admits that he stands alone in his opinion, against all the world, and his opponents even imagine that he is bantering them; but he confides in his own individual reason and consistency, so as to be able to reduce all opponents dialectically to proved contradiction with themselves.[79] Himself maintaining a paradox, he constrains his respondent by acute dialectic to assent to it; which is exactly what Aristotle imputes to the Sophists of his day as a reproach.

[Footnote 74: Ibid. b. 36-p. 173, a. 30.]

[Footnote 75: Rhetoric. II. xxv. p. 1402, a. 33: [Greek: oi( me\n ga\r sullogismoi\ e)k tô=n e)ndo/xôn, dokou=nta de\ polla\ e)nanti/a a)llê/lois e)sti/n.]

A disputant who argued about these memorable ethical antitheses, must be allowed [Greek: kata\ to\ pra=gma theôrei=n ta\ koina/], which is the characteristic feature assigned by Aristotle to the Dialectician, as contrasted with the Sophist (Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 5), in so far us I can understand the words [Greek: kata\ to\ pra=gma]. See note b p. 394 supra.]

[Footnote 76: Topic. I. iii. p. 101, a. 5-10. [Greek: e)k tô=n e)ndechome/nôn poiei=n a(\ proairou/metha.]]

[Footnote 77: Topic. II. xi. p. 115, b. 25. Ethic. Nikom. V. x. p. 1134, b. 18; I. i. p. 1094, b. 15. Rhetoric. I. xiii. p. 1373, b. 5.]

[Footnote 78: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 482-483. [Greek: o(\ dê\ kai\ su\] (Sokrates) [Greek: tou=to to\ sopho\n katanenoêkô\s kakourgei=s e)n toi=s lo/gois, e)a\n me/n tis kata\ no/mon le/gê|, kata\ phu/sin u(perôtô=n, e)a\n de\ ta\ tê=s phu/seôs, ta\ tou= no/mou.]]

[Footnote 79: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 470, 472, 481, 482.]

Some predecessors of Aristotle had distinguished arguments or discourses into two separate classes--those addressed to the name, and those addressed to the thought.[80] This distinction Aristotle disapproves, denying certainly its pertinence and almost its reality. There can be no arguments addressed to the thought only, apart from the name: all of them must be addressed to the name, and through it to the thought.[81] Whether an argument is addressed to the thought or not, depends not upon any thing in the argument itself, but upon the meaning which one respondent or other may happen to attach to the words: if the respondent understands it as the questioner intended, it is addressed to the thought; if not, not.[82] To require that the questioner shall distinguish accurately the sense in which he puts the question, would, according to Aristotle, convert him into a teacher--would confound the line between Dialectic and Didactic.[83] And this may be granted; but not less, if Dialecticians are to refrain from all those proceedings which Aristotle notes and condemns as peculiar to the Sophist, must they be held to pass into the attitude of teacher and learner; the questioner doing what he can, not to embarrass but, to enlighten and assist the respondent. The purpose of victory, and the stimulus of competition in the double function of question and answer (while entirely absent from Didactic), are quite as essential to the Dialectician as to the Sophist. That the Sophist seeks victory unscrupulously and at all cost, while the Dialectician respects certain rules and limits of the procedure--is a difference well deserving to be noticed; yet not a _differentia_ giving name and essence to a new species. The unfair Dialectician is a Dialectician still; all his purposes remain the same, though the means whereby he pursues them are altered. This distinction of means between the two, Aristotle has taken very insufficient pains to point out. Rude and provocative manner, either on the part of questioner or respondent, and impudent assumption of concessions which have neither been asked nor granted,--these are justly enumerated as illustrations of unfair Dialectic.[84] But the enumeration is most incompletely performed; because Aristotle, in his anxiety to erect Sophistic into an art or procedure by itself, distinct from and alongside of Dialectic, has transferred to it much that belongs to fair and and admissible Dialectic. Hence the really unfair and objectionable means are not often brought into the foreground.

[Footnote 80: Soph. El. x. p. 170, b. 12: [Greek: ou)k e)/sti de\ diaphora\ tô=n _ê(\n le/gousi tines_, to\ ei)=nai tou\s me\n pro\s tou)/noma lo/gous, e(te/rous de\ pro\s tê\n dia/noian.]

From this allusion (and other allusions also xvii. p. 176, a. 6; xx. p. 177, b. 8; xxii. p. 178, b. 10) to the doctrines of predecessors, we see that the assertion made by Aristotle (in the last chapter of Sophistici Elenchi) of his own originality, and of the absence of prior researches, must be taken with some indulgence.]

[Footnote 81: Soph. El. x. p. 170, b. 23.]

[Footnote 82: Ibid. b. 28: [Greek: ou) ga\r e)n tô=| lo/gô| e)/sti to\ pro\s tê\n dia/noian ei)=nai, a)ll' e)n tô=| to\n a)pokrino/menon e)/chein pôs pro\s ta\ dedome/na.]]

[Footnote 83: Ibid. p. 171, a. 28, seq.]

[Footnote 84: Soph. El. xv. p. 174, a. 22, b. 10.]

Though Aristotle speaks so contemptuously about Sophistic, he nevertheless indicates _Loci_ (or general heads of subjects) to assist the sophistical questioner in attacking, and precepts to the sophistical respondent for warding off attack. On the whole, these precepts are not materially different from those laid out in the Topica for Dialectic; except that he gives greater prominence to Solecism and Tautology, as thrusts practised by the sophistical questioner. He insists upon the intellectual usefulness of practice in sophistical debate, hardly less than in what he calls dialectical, and, as was remarked, upon similar grounds.[85] He recommends it as valuable not only for imparting readiness and abundance in argument, but also for solitary meditation and for investigation of scientific truths. Without it (he declares) we cannot become familiar with the equivocations of terms and propositions, nor acquire the means of escaping them. If we allow ourselves to be entangled in them, without being aware of it, by others, we shall also be entangled in them when we pursue reflections of our own.[86] It is not enough to see generally that there _is_ a fallacy; we must farther learn to detect at once the precise seat of the fallacy, and to point out rapidly how it may be cleared up. This is the more difficult to do, because fallacies that we are thoroughly aware of will often escape our notice under inversion and substitution of words.[87] Unless we acquire promptitude by frequent exercise in such debates, we shall find ourselves always unprepared and behind-hand in each particular case of confusion. If we complain and condemn such debates generally, we shall appear to do so upon no better grounds than our own stupidity and incompetence.[88]

[Footnote 85: Ibid. xvi. p. 175, a. 5-16. Compare Topica**, I. ii. p. 101, a. 30, seq.]

[Footnote 86: Soph. El. xvi. p. 175, a. 9: [Greek: deu/teron de\ pro\s ta\s kath' au(to\n zêtê/seis (chrê/simoi); o( ga\r u(ph' e(te/rou r(a|diôs paralogizo/menos kai\ tou=to mê\ ai)sthano/menos ka)\n au)to\s u(ph' au(tou= tou=to pa/thoi polla/kis.]]

[Footnote 87: Ibid. a. 20: [Greek: ou) tau)to\ d' e)sti\ labo/nta te to\n lo/gon i)dei=n kai\ lu=sai tê\n mochthêri/an, kai\ e)rôtô/menon a)panta=n du/nasthai tache/ôs. o(\ ga\r i)/smen, polla/kis metatithe/menon a)gnoou=men.] Compare xxxiii. p. 182, b. 7.]

[Footnote 88: Soph. El. xvi. p. 175, a. 25: [Greek: ô(/ste, a)\n dê=lon me\n ê(mi=n ê)=|, a)mele/têtoi d' ô)=men, u(sterou=men tô=n kairô=n polla/kis.]]

Accordingly the Sophistici Elenchi contains precepts, at considerable length,[89] to the respondent in a sophistical debate, how reply or solution is to be given to the fallacies involved in the questions; all the thirteen Fallacies, (the six _In Dictione_, and the seven _Extra Dictionem_) being treated in succession. In conducting his defensive procedure, the respondent must keep constantly in mind what the Sophistical Refutation really is. He must treat it not as a real or genuine refutation, but as a mere simulation of such; and he must so arrange his reply as to bring into full evidence this fact of simulation. What he has to guard against is, not the being really refuted but, the seeming to be refuted.[90] The refutative syllogism constructed by the sophistical questioner, including as it does Equivocation, Amphiboly, or some other verbal fallacy, and therefore yielding no valid conclusion, does not settle whether the respondent is really refuted or not. If indeed the questioner, in putting his interrogation, discriminates the double meaning of his words, where they have a double meaning, the respondent ought to answer plainly and briefly Yes, or No; either affirming or denying what is tendered. But, if the questioner does not so discriminate, the respondent cannot reply simply Yes, or No: he must himself discriminate the two meanings, and affirm or deny accordingly.[91] Unless he guards himself by such discrimination, he cannot avoid falling into a contradiction, at least in appearance. The equivocal wording of the question will be tantamount to the fallacy of putting two questions as one.[92]

[Footnote 89: From xvi. p. 175, to xxxiii. p. 183, of Soph. El.]

[Footnote 90: Soph. El. xvii. p. 175, a. 33: [Greek: o(/lôs ga\r pro\s tou\s e)ristikou\s machete/on, ou)k ô(s e)le/gchontas, a)ll' ô(s phainome/nous; ou) ga/r phamen sullogi/zesthai/ ge au)tou/s, ô(/ste pro\s to\ mê\ dokei=n diorthôte/on.]]

[Footnote 91: Ibid. b. 1-14. Compare Topica, VIII. vii. p. 160, a. 29.

Aristotle tells us that this demand for a reply brief and direct, without any qualifying additions or distinctions, was advanced by dialecticians in former days much more emphatically than in his own--[Greek: o(/ t' e)pizêtou=si nu=n me\n ê(=tton pro/teron de\ ma=llon oi( e)ristikoi/, to\ ê)\ nai\ ê)\ ou)\ a)pokri/nesthai to\n e)rôtô/menon, e)gi/net' a)/n.] I presume that he makes comparison with the Platonic dialogues--Euthydemus, p. 295; Gorgias, pp. 448-449; Protagoras, pp. 334-335.]

[Footnote 92: Soph. El. xvii. 175, b. 15-p. 176, a. 18.]

As the questioner may propound as refutation what seems to be such but is not so in reality, so the respondent may meet it by what is an apparent solution but no solution in reality, There occur various cases, in sophistic or agonistic debate, wherein a simulated solution of this kind is even preferable to a real one.[93] If the question is plausible, the respondent may answer, "Be it so"; but, if it involves any paradox in answering, he will answer by saying, "So it would appear": he will thus not be supposed to have granted what amounts to refutation or paradox.[94] Where the question put is such that, while involving falsehood or paradox if answered in the affirmative, it is at the same time closely or immediately connected with the thesis set up,--the respondent may treat it as equivalent to a _Petitio Principii_, and make answer in the negative. Also, where the questioner, trying to establish an universal proposition by Induction, puts the final question, not under an universal term but, as the general result of the particulars conceded (and such like),--the respondent may refuse to admit this last step, and may say that his antecedent concessions have been misunderstood.[95]

[Footnote 93: Ibid. p. 176, a. 21.]

[Footnote 94: Ibid. a. 25.]

[Footnote 95: Ibid. a. 27-35.]

If a question is put in plain and appropriate language, answer must be made plainly or with some clear distinction; but, where the question is put obscurely and elliptically, leaving part of the meaning unexpressed, the respondent must not concede it unreservedly. If he does, fallacious refutation may very possibly be the result:[96] he may appear to be refuted by that which is no real refutation. If, of two propositions, the second follows upon the first, but the first does not follow upon the second, the respondent, where he has the choice, ought to grant the second only, and not the first. He ought not to make a greater concession when he can escape with a less;[97] _e.g._, he ought to concede the particular rather than the universal.

[Footnote 96: Ibid. a. 38-b. 7.]

[Footnote 97: Ibid. b. 8-13.]

Again, among opinions generally received, there are some which the public recognize as matters of more or less doubt and uncertainty; others, on which they are firmly assured that every one who contradicts them speaks falsely. When it is uncertain to which of these two classes the question put is referable, the respondent will be safer in answering neither affirmatively nor negatively, but simply, "I go with the received opinions."[98] In cases where opinions are divided, he may find opportunity for changing the terms, and for substituting a metaphorical equivalent as what he concedes. Such change of terms may pass without protest, in consequence of the doubtful character of the matter; while it will embarrass the questioner in constructing his refutation.[99] The respondent may further embarrass him by anticipating questions that seem likely to be put, and by objecting against them beforehand.[100]

[Footnote 98: Soph. El. **xvii. p. 176, b. 14-20.

Both the text and the meaning of this difficult clause are differently given by various commentators. The text and construction of Waitz appears to me the best, and I have followed him. I cannot agree with Mr. Poste when he declares (notes, p. 143) [Greek: a)popha/neis] to be the true reading, instead of [Greek: a)popha/seis], which last is adopted both by Bekker and in the edition of **Firmin Didot.]

[Footnote 99: Ibid. b. 20-25.]

[Footnote 100: Ibid. b. 26.]

When the questioner has obtained the premisses which he thinks necessary, and has drawn from them a refutative syllogism, the respondent must see whether he can properly solve that syllogism or not.[101] A good and proper solution is, to point out on which premiss the fallacy of the conclusion depends. First, he must examine whether it is formally correct, or whether it has only a false appearance of being so: if the last be the case, he must distinguish in which of the premisses and in what way such false appearance has arisen. If on the other hand the syllogism is formally correct, he must look whether the conclusion is true or false. Should it be true, he cannot solve the syllogism except by controverting one or both of the premisses; but should the conclusion be false, two modes of solution are open to him. One mode is, if he can point out an equivocation or amphiboly in the terms of the conclusion; another mode will be, to controvert, or exhibit a fallacy in, one of the premisses.[102] The respondent, however, must learn to apply this examination rapidly and unhesitatingly: to do so at once is very difficult, though it may be easily done if he has leisure to reflect.[103]

[Footnote 101: Soph. El. xviii. p. 176, b. 29: [Greek: ê( me/n o)rthê\ lu/sis e)mpha/nisis pseudou=s sullogismou=, par' o(poi/an e)rô/têsin sumbai/nei to\ pseu=dos.]]

[Footnote 102: Soph. El. xviii. p. 176, b. 38: [Greek: tou\s me\n kata\ to\ sumpe/rasma pseudei=s dichô=s e)nde/chetai lu/ein; kai\ ga\r tô=| a)nelei=n ti tô=n ê)rôtême/nôn, kai\ tô=| dei=xai to\ sumpe/rasma e)/chon ou)ch ou(/tôs.]

Mr. Poste translates these last words--"or by a counterproof directed against the conclusion:" and he remarks in his note (pp. 145-147), "that this assertion--disproof of the conclusion of the refutative syllogism is one mode of _solution_--is both manifestly inadmissible, and flatly contradicted by Aristotle himself elsewhere." The words of Aristotle doubtless seem to countenance Mr. Poste's translation; yet the contradiction pointed out by Mr. Poste (and very imperfectly explained, p. 147) ought to make us look out for another meaning; which is suggested by the chapter immediately following (xix. p. 177, a. 9), where Aristotle treats of the Fallacies of Equivocation and Amphiboly. He tells us that equivocation may be found either in the conclusion or in the premisses; and that to show it in the conclusion is one mode of solving or invalidating the refutation. This is what Aristotle means by the words cited at the beginning of this note: [Greek: tô=| dei=xai to\ sumpe/rasma e)/chon ou)ch o)rthô=s]. In Mr. Poste's translation these words mean the same as [Greek: a)nelei=n] used just before, which Aristotle obviously does not intend.]

[Footnote 103: Soph. El. xviii. p. 177, a. 7.]

Aristotle then proceeds to indicate the modes in which the respondent may provide solutions for each of the thirteen heads of fallacious refutation above enumerated. For these thirteen classes, he pronounces that one and the same solution will be found applicable to all fallacies contained in one and the same class.[104]

[Footnote 104: Scholia, p. 312, a. 4, Br.; Soph. El. 20, p. 177, b. 31: [Greek: tô=n ga\r para\ tau)to\n lo/gôn ê( au)tê\ lu/sis], &c.]

Thus, in the two first of them--Equivocation of Terms and Amphiboly of Propositions--duplicity of meaning must be either in the conclusion, or in the premisses, of the refutative syllogism. If it be in the conclusion, the refutation must at once be rejected, unless the respondent has previously admitted some proposition containing the equivocal word as one of its terms, so that the refutation may appear to contradict it expressly and distinctly. But, if it be in the premisses, then there is no necessity that the respondent should have previously admitted such a proposition; for the equivocal word may form the middle term of the refutative syllogism, and may thus not appear in the conclusion thereof.[105] The proper way for the respondent to deal with these questions, involving equivocation or amphiboly, is to answer them, at the outset, with a reserve for the double meaning, thus: "In one sense, it is so; in another sense, it is not." If he does not perceive the double meaning until he has already answered the first question, he must recover himself, when he answers the second, by pointing out the equivocation more distinctly, and by specifying how much he is prepared to concede.[106] Even if he has been taken unawares, and has not perceived the equivocation until the refutative syllogism has been constructed simply and absolutely, he should still contend that he never meant to concede what has been apparently refuted, and that the refutation tells only against the name, not against the thing meant;[107] so that there is no genuine refutation at all.

[Footnote 105: Soph. El. xix. p. 177, a. 18: [Greek: o(/sois d' e)n toi=s e)rôtê/masin, ou)k a)na/gkê proapophê=sai to\ ditto/n; ou) ga\r pro\s tou=to a)lla\ dia\ tou=to o( lo/gos.]]

[Footnote 106: Ibid. a. 24: [Greek: e)a\n de\ la/thê|, e)pi\ te/lei prostithe/nta tê=| e)rôtê/sei diorthôte/on;] &c.]

[Footnote 107: Ibid. a. 30: [Greek: o(/lôs te machete/on, a)\n kai\ a(plô=s sullogi/zêtai, o(/ti ou)ch o(\ e)/phêsen a)pe/phêse pra=gma, a)ll' o)/noma; ô(/st' ou)k e)/legchos.]

Instead of [Greek: a)\n kai/], Julius Pacius reads [Greek: ka)/n]: the meaning is much the same.]

In the next two Fallacies--those of Composition and Division, or Conjunction and Disjunction--when the questioner draws up his refutative syllogism as if one of the two had been conceded, the respondent will retort by saying that his concession was intended only in the other construction of the words. This fallacy is distinct from Equivocation; and it is a mistake to try (as some have tried) to reduce all fallacies to Equivocation or Amphiboly.[108] The respondent will distinguish, in each particular case, that construction of the words which he intended in his admission, from that which the questioner assumes in his pretended refutation.[109]

[Footnote 108: Soph. El. xx. p. 177, a. 33-b. 9. [Greek: ou) pa/ntes oi( e)/legchoi para\ to\ ditto/n, katha/per tine/s phasin.]

This is another of the evidences showing that there were theorists prior to Aristotle on logical proof; and that his declaration of originality (in the concluding chapter of Sophist. Elenchi) must be taken with reserve.]

[Footnote 109: Soph. El. xx. p. 177, b. 10-26: [Greek: diairete/on ou)=n tô=| a)pokrinome/nô|;] &c.]

The Fallacies of Accent rarely furnish sophistical refutations,[110] but those of _Figura Dictionis_ furnish a great many. When two words have the like form and structure, it may naturally be imagined that the signification of one belongs to the same Category as that of the other. But this is often an illusion; and in such cases a sophistical refutation may be founded thereupon. The respondent will solve it by denying the inference from similarity of form to similarity of meaning, and by distinguishing accurately to which among the ten Categories the meaning of each several word or each proposition belongs. When two words thus seem, by their form, to belong to the same Category, the questioner will often take it for granted, without expressly asking, that they do belong to the same, and will found a confutation thereupon; but the respondent must not admit the confutation to be valid, unless this question has been explicitly put to him and conceded.[111] A question is put which, in its direct and obvious meaning, bears only on the category of Quantity, of Quality, of Relation, of Action, or of Passion; but the respondent, not aware of the equivocation, answers it in such a manner as to comprehend the Category of Substance, and is so understood by the questioner when he constructs his refutative syllogism. The respondent will secure himself from being thus confuted, by keeping constantly in view to which of the Categories his answer is intended to refer.[112]

[Footnote 110: Ibid. xxi. p. 177, b. 35.]

[Footnote 111: Ibid. xxii. p. 178, a. 4-28. [Greek: to\ ga\r loipo\n au)to\s prosti/thêsin o( a)kou/ôn ô(s o(moi/ôs lego/menon; to\ de\ le/getai me\n ou)ch o(moi/ôs, phai/netai de\ dia\ tê\n le/xin.]]

[Footnote 112: Several illustrative examples of this mode of sophistical refutation, founded on the Fallacy called _Figura Dictionis_, are indicated in this chapter by Aristotle. The indication however, is often so brief and elliptical, that there is great difficulty in restoring the fallacies in full, and still greater difficulty in translating them into any modern language.

1. Is it possible at the same time to do and to have done the same thing?--No. To see something is to do something; to have seen something is to have done something?--Yes. Is it possible at the same time to see and to have seen the same thing?--Yes.

The respondent has thus contradicted himself. The form of the word [Greek: o(ra=n] appears to rank it under the Category [Greek: poiei=n]. However, I think that the mistake really made here was, that the respondent returned an answer universally negative to the first question.

2. Does anything coming under the Category _Pati_ come under the Category _Agere_?--No. But [Greek: te/mnetai, kai/etai, ai)stha/netai], all show by their form that they belong to the Category _Pati_?--Yes. Again, [Greek: le/gein, tre/chein, o(ra=n], show by their form that they belong to the Category _Agere_?--Yes. You will admit, however, that [Greek: to\ o(ra=n] is [Greek: ai)stha/nesthai/ ti]?--Certainly. Therefore something that belongs to the Category _Agere_ belongs also to that of _Pati_.

If we turn back to Aristot. Categ. viii. p. 11, a. 37, we shall find that he admits the possibility that the same subject may belong to two distinct Categories.

3. Did any one write that which stands here written?--Yes. It stands here written that you are standing up--a false statement; but when it was written the statement was true?--Yes. Therefore the writer has written a statement both true and false?--Yes.

Here _true_ and _false_ belong to the Category Quality; the statement or matter written belongs to that of Substance. What the writer wrote had nothing to do with the former of the two Categories; and no contradiction has been made out by admitting that the statement _was_ once true and _is_ now false.

4. Does a man tread that which he walks?--Yes. But he walks the whole day?--Yes. Therefore he treads the whole day.

Here the Category of _Quando_ is confused with that of Substance.

5. But the most interesting illustration of this confusion of one Category with another, is furnished by Aristotle in respect of the difference between himself and Plato as to Ideas or Universals. According to Plato the universal term denoted a separate something apart from the particulars, yet of which each of these particulars partook. According to Aristotle it denoted nothing separate from the particulars, but something belonging (essentially or non-essentially) to all and each of the particulars. In the Platonic theory it was an _Hoc Aliquid_ ([Greek: to/de ti]), or had an existence substantive and separate: in the Aristotelian it was a _Quale_ or _Quale Quid_ ([Greek: poio/n]), having an existence merely adjective or predicative. Aristotle maintains that Plato or the Platonists placed it in the wrong Category--in the Category of Substance instead of in that of Quality.

Now it is by rectifying this confusion of Categories that Aristotle solves two argumentative puzzles which he ranks as sophistical:--(1) The argument concluding in what was called the 'Third Man;' (2) The following question: Koriskus, and the musical Koriskus--are these the same, or is the second different from the first?

What is called the 'Third Man' was a refutation of the Platonic theory of Ideas. Because Plato recognized a substantive existence, corresponding to each common denomination connoting likeness, apart from all the similar particulars denominated, _e.g._, a Self-man, or separate self-existent man, corresponding to the Idea, and apart from all individual men, Caius, &c.--opponents argued against him, saying:--If this is recognized, you must also recognize that the Self-man, and the individual man called Caius, have also a common denomination and similarity, which (upon your principles) corresponds to another Ideal Man, or a Third Man. You must, therefore, go on inferring upwards to a Fourth Man, a Fifth Man, &c., and so onwards to an indefinite number of Ideal Men, one above the other. This was intended as a refutation, by _Reductio ad Impossibile_, of the Platonic view of Ideas as separate Entities, each of them One and Universal. But Aristotle here treats it as a Sophistical Refutation; and he indicates what he calls the solution of it by saying that it confounds the Categories of Substance and Quality, putting the Universal (which ought to be under the Category of Quality) under the Category of Substance. He has no right, however, to include this among Sophistical Refutations, which are (as he himself defines them) not real but fallacious refutations, invented by a dishonest money-getting profession called Sophists, and which are solved by pointing out the precise seat of the fallacy. The refutation called the 'Third Man' is so far from being fallacious, that it is valid, and is recited as such elsewhere by Aristotle himself (Metaphs. A. ix. p. 990, b. 17**); while the solution tendered by Aristotle, instead of being a solution, is a confirmation, pointing out, not where the fallacy of the refutation resides but, where the fallacy of the doctrine refuted resides. Moreover, if we are to treat the refutation called the 'Third Man' as sophistical, we must number Plato himself among the dishonest class called Sophists. Here is one among the many proofs that the strong line drawn by Aristotle between the Dialectician and the Sophist is quite untenable. The argument is distinctly enunciated in the Platonic Parmenides (pp. 131-133).

The meaning of the Universal (Aristotle maintains) must be considered as predicative only, tacked on to some _Hoc Aliquid_, and belonging to _Quale_ or some other of the nine latter Categories. It may be set out as a distinct subject for logical consideration and reasoning: but it cannot be set out as a distinct existence beyond and apart from its particulars ([Greek: para\ tou\s pollou\s e(/n ti]). It is [Greek: poio/n], and it cannot even be recognized as [Greek: o(/per poio/n] or [Greek: au)to-poio/n], for this would put it apart from all the other [Greek: poia/], and would be open to the refutation above noticed called the 'Third Man.' Such is the drift of the very difficult passage of the Sophistici Elenchi (xxii. p. 178, b. 37-p. 179, a. 10**). I differ from Mr. Poste's translation (p. 71) of part of this passage, and still more from the explanation given in the latter part of his note (p. 155). I think that the doctrine of [Greek: to\ e(\n para\ ta\ polla/] is produced by Aristotle here and elsewhere in his work as untrue and inadmissible, not as his own doctrine. Mr. Poste understands this passage differently from the previous translators, with whom I agree for the most part, though M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire appears to me to have missed the hinge upon which Aristotle's argument turns, by translating [Greek: o(/per poio/n]--id ipsum, quod quale est (J. Pacius)--"une qualité:" the argument turns upon the distinction between [Greek: o(/per poio/n] and [Greek: poio/n].

I come now to the second sophistical refutation given by Aristotle: Koriskus, and the musician Koriskus--are the two the same or different? This is what Aristotle calls a sophistical or fallacious argument (compare Metaphys. E. ii. p. 1026, b. 15); but it can hardly be so called with propriety, for the only solution that Aristotle himself gives of it is, that the two are _idem numero_, but in an improper or secondary sense (Topic. I. vii. p. 103, a. 30); _i. e._, that they are in one point of view the same, in another point of view different--they are [Greek: e(\n kata\ sumbebêko/s]. See Arist. Metaph. [Greek: D]. vi. p. 1015, b. 16; Scholia, p. 696, a. 22, seq.; and Alexand. Aphrodis. ad Metaph. pp. 321, 322, 414, 415, ed. Bonitz. I understand Aristotle to say that [Greek: Ko/riskos mousiko/s] cannot be properly _set out_ or abstracted ([Greek: ou)k e)/stin au)to\ e)kthe/sthai]), because it includes two Categories (Substance and Quality) in one; wherefore it cannot be properly compared either with [Greek: Ko/riskos] simply (Category of Substance) or with [Greek: mousiko/s] simply (Category of Quality). It seems strange that Aristotle does not notice this argumentative difficulty in the discussion which he bestows on [Greek: tau)to/n] in the Seventh Book of the Topica. The subtle reasonings, very hard to follow, which Aristotle employs (Physic. V. iv. p. 227) might have made him cautious in treating the difficulties of opponents as so many dishonest cavils. It is curious that Alexander, in reciting the sophistical argument, assumes as a matter of course that [Greek: o( grammatiko\s Sôkra/tês] is [Greek: o( au)to\s tô=| Sôkra/tei] (Schol. ad Metaphys. p. 736, b. 26, Brand.).]

As a general rule, in all the refutations founded on the seven Fallacies _In Dictione_, the respondent will solve the refutation by distinguishing the double meaning of the words or of the phrase, and by adopting as his own the one opposite to that which the questioner proceeds upon. If the Fallacy is of Conjunction and Disjunction, and if the questioner assumes Conjunction, the respondent will adopt Disjunction; if it be a Fallacy of Accent, and if the questioner assumes the grave accent, the respondent will adopt the acute.[113]

[Footnote 113: Soph. El. xxiii. p. 179, a. 11-25.]