Chapter II: Aristotelian Canon (2)

Before I proceed to deal with the preserved works of Aristotle--those by which alone he is known to us, and was known to mediæval readers, I shall say a few words respecting the import of a distinction which has been much canvassed, conveyed in the word _exoteric_ and its opposite. This term, used on various occasions by Aristotle himself, has been also employed by many ancient critics, from Cicero downwards; while by mediæval and modern critics, it has not merely been employed, but also analysed and elucidated. According to Cicero (the earliest writer subsequent to Aristotle in whom we find the term), it designates one among two classes of works composed by Aristotle: _exoteric_ works were those composed in a popular style and intended for a large, indiscriminate circle of readers: being contrasted with other works of elaborated philosophical reasoning, which were not prepared for the public taste, but left in the condition of memorials for the instruction of a more select class of studious men. Two points are to be observed respecting Cicero's declaration. First, he applies it to the writings not of Aristotle exclusively, but also to those of Theophrastus, and even of succeeding Peripatetics; secondly, he applies it directly to such of their writings only as related to the discussion of the _Summum Bonum_.[36] Furthermore, Cicero describes the works which Aristotle called exoteric, as having _proems_ or introductory prefaces.[37]

[Footnote 36: Cicero, De Finibus, v. 5, 12. "De summo autem bono, quia duo genera librorum sunt, unum populariter scriptum, quod [Greek: e)xôteriko\n] appellabant, alterum limatius, quod in commentariis reliquerunt, non semper idem dicere videntur: nec in summâ tamen ipsâ aut varietas est ulla, apud hos quidem quos nominavi, aut inter ipsos dissensio."

The word _limatius_ here cannot allude to high polish and ornament of style (nitor orationis), but must be equivalent to [Greek: a)kribe/steron], _doctius_, _subtilius_, &c. (as Buhle and others have already remarked, Buhle, De Libris Aristot. Exoter. et Acroam. p. 115; Madvig, ad Cicero de Finib. v. 12; Heitz, p. 134), applied to profound reasoning, with distinctions of unusual precision, which it required a careful preparatory training to apprehend. This employment of the word _limatius_ appears to me singular, but it cannot mean anything else here. The _commentarii_ are the general heads--plain unadorned statements of facts or reasoning--which the orator or historian is to employ his genius in setting forth and decorating, so that it may be heard or read with pleasure and admiration by a general audience. Cicero, in that remarkable letter wherein he entreats Lucceius to narrate his (Cicero's) consulship in an historical work, undertakes to compose "commentarios rerum omnium" as materials for the use of Lucceius (Ep. ad Famil. v. 12. 10). His expression, "in commentariis reliquerunt," shows that he considered the exoteric books to have been prepared by working up some naked preliminary materials into an ornate and interesting form.]

[Footnote 37: Cicero, Ep. ad Att. iv. 16.]

In the main, the distinction here drawn by Cicero, understood in a very general sense, has been accepted by most following critics as intended by the term _exoteric_: something addressed to a wide, indiscriminate circle of general readers or hearers, and intelligible or interesting to them without any special study or training--as contrasted with that which is reserved for a smaller circle of students assumed to be specially qualified. But among those who agree in this general admission, many differences have prevailed. Some have thought that the term was not used by Aristotle to designate any writings either of his own or of others, but only in allusion to informal oral dialogues or debates. Others again, feeling assured that Aristotle intended by the term to signify some writings of his own, have searched among the works preserved, as well as among the titles of the works lost, to discriminate such as the author considered to be exoteric: though this search has certainly not ended in unanimity; nor do I think it has been successful. Again, there have not been wanting critics (among them, Thomas Aquinas and Sepulveda), who assign to the term a meaning still more vague and undefined; contending that when Aristotle alludes to "exoteric discourses," he indicates simply some other treatise of his own, distinct from that in which the allusion occurs, without meaning to imply anything respecting its character.[38]

[Footnote 38: Sepulveda, p. 125 (cited by Bernays, Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 41): "Externos sermones sive exotericos solet Aristoteles libros eos appellare, quicunque sunt extra id opus in quo tunc versatur, ut jure pontificio periti consueverunt: non enim exoterici sermones seu libri certo aliquo genere continentur, ut est publicus error."

Zeller lends his high authority to an explanation of _exoteric_ very similar to the above. (Gesch. der Philos. ii. 2, p. 100, seq.:--"dass unter exoterischen Reden nicht eine eigene Klasse populär geschriebener Bücher, sondern nur überhaupt solche Erörterungen verstanden werden, welche nicht in den Bereich der vorliegenden Untersuchung gehören.") He discusses the point at some length; but the very passages which he cites, especially Physica, iv. 10, appear to me less favourable to his view than to that which I have stated in the text, according to which the word means _dialectic_ as contrasted with _didactic_.]

To me it appears that this last explanation is untenable, and that the term _exoteric_ designates matter of a certain character, assignable to some extent by positive marks, but still more by negative; matter, in part, analogous to that defined by Cicero and other critics. But to conceive clearly or fully what its character is, we must turn to Aristotle himself, who is of course the final authority, wherever he can be found to speak in a decisive manner. His preserved works afford altogether eight passages (two of them indeed in the Eudemian Ethics, which, for the present at least, I shall assume to be his work), wherein the phrase "exoteric discourses" ([Greek: e)xôterikoi\ lo/goi]) occurs. Out of these eight passages, there are seven which present the phrase as designating some unknown matter, not farther specified, but distinct from the work in which the phrase occurs: "Enough has been said (or is said, Aristotle intimates) about this subject, even in the exoteric discourses." To what it is that he here alludes--whether to other writings of his own or oral discussions of his own, or writing and speech of a particular sort by others--we are left to interpret as we best may, by probable reason or conjecture. But there is one among the eight passages, in which Aristotle uses the term _exoteric_ as describing, not what is to be looked for elsewhere, but what he is himself about to give in the treatise in hand. In the fourth book of the Physica, he discusses the three high abstractions, Place, Vacuum, Time. After making an end of the first two, he enters upon the third, beginning with the following words:--"It follows naturally on what has been said, that we should treat respecting Time. But first it is convenient to advert to the difficulties involved in it, by _exoteric discourse also_--whether Time be included among entities or among non-entities; then afterwards, what is its nature. Now a man might suspect, from the following reasons, that Time either absolutely does not exist, or exists scarcely and dimly," &c. Aristotle then gives a string of dialectic reasons, lasting through one of the columns of the Berlin edition, for doubting whether Time really exists. He afterwards proceeds thus, through two farther columns:--"Let these be enumerated as the difficulties accompanying the attributes of Time. What Time is, and what is its nature, is obscure, as well from what has been handed down to us by others, as from what we ourselves have just gone through;"[39] and this question also he first discusses dialectically, and then brings to a solution.

[Footnote 39: Aristot. Physic. iv. 10, p. 217, b. 29. [Greek: E)cho/menon de\ tô=n ei)rême/nôn e)sti\n e)pelthei=n peri\ chro/nou; prô=ton de\ kalô=s e)/chei diaporê=sai peri\ au)tou= _kai\ dia\ tô=n e)xôterikô=n lo/gôn_, po/teron tô=n o)/ntôn e)sti\n ê)\ tô=n mê\ o)/ntôn, ei)=ta ti/s ê( phu/sis au)tou=. O(/ti me\n ou)=n ê)\ o(/lôs e)/stin, ê)\ mo/lis kai\ a)mudrô=s, e)k tô=nde/ tis a)\n u(popteu/seien.] Then, after a column of text urging various [Greek: a)pori/as] as to whether Time is or is not, he goes on, p. 218, a. 31:--[Greek: Peri\ me\n ou)=n tô=n u(parcho/ntôn au)tô=| tosau=t' e)/stô diêporême/na. Ti/ d' e)sti\n o( chro/nos, kai\ ti/s au)tou= ê( phu/sis, o(moi/ôs e)/k te tô=n paradedome/nôn a)/dêlo/n e)sti, kai\ peri\ ô(=n tugcha/nomen dielêlutho/tes pro/teron]--thus taking up the questions, What Time is? What is the nature of Time? Upon this he goes through another column of [Greek: a)pori/ai], difficulties and counter-difficulties, until p. 219, a. 1, when he approaches to a positive determination, as the sequel of various negatives--[Greek: o(/ti me\n ou)=n ou)/te ki/nêsis ou)/t' a)/neu kinê/seôs o( chro/nos e)sti/, phanero/n. _lêpte/on_ de/, e)pei\ zêtou=men ti/ e)stin o( chro/nos, _e)nteu=then a)rchome/nois_, ti/ tê=s kinê/seô/s e)stin.] He pursues this positive determination throughout two farther columns (see [Greek: u(pokei/sthô], a. 30), until at length he arrives at his final definition of Time--[Greek: a)rithmo\s kinê/seôs kata\ to\ pro/teron kai\ u(/steron, kai\ sunechê/s (sunechou=s ga\r)]--which he declares to be [Greek: phanero/n], p. 220, a. 25.

It is plain that the phrase [Greek: e)xôterikoi\ lo/goi] here designates the preliminary dialectic tentative process, before the final affirmative is directly attempted, as we read in De Gener. et Corr. i. 3, p. 317, b. 13: [Greek: peri\ me\n ou)=n tou/tôn e)n a)/llois _te diêpo/rêtai kai\ diô/ristai_ toi=s lo/gois e)pi\ plei=on]--first, [Greek: to\ _diaporei=n_], next, [Greek: to\ _diori/zein_].]

Now what is it that Aristotle here means by "exoteric discourse?" We may discover by reading the matter comprised between the two foregoing citations. We find a string of perplexing difficulties connected with the supposition that Time exists: such as, "That all Time is either past or future, of which the former no longer exists, and the latter does not yet exist; that the Now is no part of Time, for every Whole is composed of its Parts, and Time is not composed of Nows," &c. I do not go farther here into these subtle suggestions, because my present purpose is only to illustrate what Aristotle calls "exoteric discourse," by exhibiting what he himself announces to be a specimen thereof. It is the process of noticing and tracing out all the doubts and difficulties ([Greek: a)pori/as]) which beset the enquiry in hand, along with the different opinions entertained about it either by the vulgar, or by individual philosophers, and the various reasons whereby such opinions may be sustained or impugned. It is in fact the same process as that which, when performed (as it was habitually and actively in his age) between two disputants, he calls _dialectic debate_; and which he seeks to encourage as well as to regulate in his treatise entitled Topica. He contrasts it with philosophy, or with the strictly didactic and demonstrative procedure: wherein the teacher lays down principles which he requires the learner to admit, and then deduces from them, by syllogisms constructed in regular form, consequences indisputably binding on all who have admitted the principles. But though Aristotle thus distinguishes Dialectic from Philosophy, he at the same time declares it to be valuable as an auxiliary towards the purpose of philosophy, and as an introductory exercise before the didactic stage begins. The philosopher ought to show his competence as a dialectician, by indicating and handling those various difficulties and controversies bearing on his subject, which have already been made known, either in writings or in oral debate.[40]

[Footnote 40: See Aristot. Topic. i. p. 100, b. 21, p. 101, a. 25, 34-36, b. 2. [Greek: Pro\s de\ ta\s kata\ philosophi/an e)pistê/mas (chrê/simos ê( pragmatei/a), o(/ti duna/menoi pro\s a)mpho/tera diaporê=sai r(a=|on e)n e(ka/stois katopso/metha ta)lêthe/s te kai\ to\ pseu=dos], p. 105, b. 30. [Greek: Pro\s me\n ou)=n philosophi/an kat' a)lêtheian peri\ **au)tô=n pragmateue/on, _**dialektikô=s de\ pro\s do/xan_.]

Compare also the commencement of book B. in the Metaphysica, p. 995, a. 28 seq., and, indeed, the whole of book B., which contains a dialectic discussion of numerous [Greek: a)pori/ai]. Aristotle himself refers to it afterwards ([Greek: G]. p. 1004, a. 32) in the words [Greek: u(/per e)n tai=s a)pori/ais e)lechthê].

The Scholia of Alexander on the beginning of the Topica (pp. 251, 252, Brandis) are instructive; also his Scholia on p. 105, b. 30, p. 260, a. 24. [Greek: _dialektikô=s de\ pro\s do/xan_, ô(s e)n tau/tê| tê=| pragmatei/a|] (_i.e._ the Topica) [Greek: kai\ e)n toi=s r(êtorikoi=s, kai\ _e)n toi=s e)xôterikoi=s_. kai\ ga\r e)n e)kei/nois plei=sta kai\ peri\ tô=n** ê)thikô=n kai\ peri\ tô=n phusikô=n _e)ndo/xôs_ le/getai.]

We see here that Alexander understands by the _exoteric_ the dialectic handling of opinions on physics and ethics.

In the Eudemian Ethica also (i. 8, p. 1217, b. 16) we find [Greek: e)pe/skeptai de\ polloi=s peri\ au)tou= tro/pois, kai\ e)n toi=s e)xôterikoi=s lo/gois kai\ e)n toi=s kata\ philosophi/an], where we have the same antithesis in other words--Exoteric or Dialectic _versus_ Philosophical or Didactic. Compare a clear statement in Simplikius (Schol. ad Physic. p. 364, b. 19). [Greek: Prô=ton me\n logikô=s e)picheirei=, tou/testi pithanô=s kai\ e)ndo/xôs, kai\ e)/ti koino/tero/n pôs kai\ dialektikô/teron. Ê( ga\r dialektikê\ ê( A)ristote/lous koinê/ e)sti me/thodos peri\ panto\s tou= protethe/ntos e)x e)ndo/xôn sullogizome/nê--to\ ga\r logiko\n ô(s koino\n ei)/ôthen a)ntidiaste/llein ta| oi)kei/ô| kai\ kata\ phu/sin tou= pra/gmatos kai\ a)podeiktikô=|.]]

We thus learn, from the example furnished by Aristotle himself, what he means by "exoteric discourses." The epithet means literally, _extraneous to_, _lying on the outside of_; in the present case, on the outside of philosophy, considered in its special didactic and demonstrative march.[41] Yet what thus lies outside philosophy, is nevertheless useful as an accompaniment and preparation for philosophy. We shall find Aristotle insisting upon this in his Topica and Analytica; and we shall also find him introducing the exoteric treatment into his most abstruse philosophical treatises (the Physica is one of the most abstruse) as an accompaniment and auxiliary--a dialectic survey of opinions, puzzles, and controverted points, before he begins to lay down and follow out affirmative principles of his own. He does this not only throughout the Physica (in several other passages besides that which I have just cited),[42] but also in the Metaphysica, the treatises De Animâ, De Generatione et Corruptione, &c.

[Footnote 41: We find the epithet [Greek: e)xôteriko\s] used once by Aristotle, not in conjunction with [Greek: lo/goi], but with [Greek: pra/xeis], designating those acts which are performed with a view to some ulterior and extraneous end ([Greek: tô=n a)pobaino/ntôn cha/rin], as contrasted with [Greek: pra/xeis au)totelei=s--oi)kei=ai]): Polit. vii. p. 1325, b. 22-29. [Greek: scholê=| **ga\r a)\n o( theo\s e)/choi kalô=s kai\ pa=s o( ko/smos, oi(=s ou)k ei)si\n e)xôterikai\ pra/xeis para\ ta\s oi)kei/as ta\s au)tô=n.] In the Eudemian Ethics the phrase [Greek: _toi=s a)llotri/ois lo/gois_ sophi/zontai] is used much in the same sense as [Greek: _toi=s e)xôterikoi=s_ lo/gois]: _i.e._ opposed to [Greek: toi=s oi)kei/ois]--to that which belongs specially to the scientific determination of the problem (Ethic. Eudem. i. p. 1218, b. 18).

The phrase [Greek: dia\ tô=n e)xôterikô=n lo/gôn], in Aristot. Physic. iv. 10, p. 217, b. 31, and the different phrase [Greek: e)k tô=n ei)ôtho/tôn lo/gôn le/gesthai], in Phys. vi. 2, p. 233, a. 13, appear to have the same meaning and reference. Compare Prantl not. ad Arist. Phys. p. 501.]

[Footnote 42: If we turn to the beginning of book iv. of the Physica, where Aristotle undertakes to examine [Greek: To/pos], _Place_, we shall see that he begins by a dialectic handling of [Greek: a)pori/ai], exactly analogous to that which he himself calls [Greek: e)xôterikoi\ lo/goi], when he proceeds to examine [Greek: Chro/nos], _Time_: see Physica, iv. pp. 208, a. 32-35, 209, a. 30; 210, a. 12, b. 31. He does the like also about [Greek: Keno/n], _Vacuum_, p. 213, a. 20, b. 28, and about [Greek: A)/peiron], _Infinitum_, iii. p. 204, b. 4 (with the Scholia of Simplikius, p. 364, b. 20, Br.).

Compare the Scholion of Simplikius ad Physica (i. p. 329, b. 1, Br.)--[Greek: _i)/sôs_ de\] (Simplikius uses this indecisive word [Greek: i)/sôs]) [Greek: o(/ti ê( e)ph' e(ka/tera a)pori/a tou= lo/gou e)xôterikê/ tis ê)=n, ô(s Eu)/dêmo/s phêsi, dialektikê\ ma=llon ou)=sa], with this last Scholion, on p. 364, b. 20, which describes the same dialectic handling, though without directly calling it _exoteric_.]

Having thus learnt to understand, from one distinct passage of Aristotle himself, what he means by "exoteric discourses," we must interpret by the light of this analogy the other indistinct passages in which the phrase occurs. We see clearly that in using the phrase, he does not of necessity intend to refer to any other writings of his own--nor even to any other writings at all. He may possibly mean this; but we cannot be sure of it. He means by the phrase, a dialectic process of turning over and criticizing diverse opinions and probabilities: whether in his own writings, or in those of others, or in no writings at all, but simply in those oral debates which his treatise called Topica presupposes--this is a point which the phrase itself does not determine. He _may_ mean to allude, in some cases where he uses the phrase, to his own lost dialogues; but he may also allude to Platonic and other dialogues, or to colloquies carried on orally by himself with his pupils, or to oral debates on intellectual topics between other active-minded men. When Bernays refers "exoteric discourse" to the lost Aristotelian Dialogues; when Madvig, Zeller, Torstrick, Forchhammer, and others, refer it to the contemporary oral dialectic[43]--I think that neither of these explanations is in itself inadmissible. The context of each particular passage must decide which of the two is the more probable. We cannot go farther, in explaining the seven doubtful passages where Aristotle alludes to the "exoteric discourses," than to understand the general character and scope of the reasonings which he thus designates. Extra-philosophical, double-sided, dialectic, is in general (he holds) insufficient by itself, and valuable only as a preparation and auxiliary to the didactic process. But there are some particular points on which such dialectic leaves a result sufficient and satisfactory, which can be safely accepted as the basis of future deduction. These points he indicates in the passages above cited; without informing us more particularly whether the dialectic was written or spoken, and whether by himself or by others.[44]

[Footnote 43: Ueberweg (Geschichte der Philos. des Alterthums, vol. i. § 46, p. 127, 2nd ed.) gives a just and accurate view of [Greek: e)xôterikoi\ lo/goi], as conceived by Aristotle. See also the dissertation of Buhle, prefixed to his unfinished edition of Aristotle, De Aristotelis Libris Exotericis et Acroamaticis, pp. 107-152--which discusses this subject copiously, and gives a collection both of the passages and comments which bear upon it. It is instructive, though his opinion leans too much towards the supposition of a double doctrine. Bernays, in his dissertation, Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, maintains that by _exoteric books_ are always meant the lost dialogues of Aristotle; and he employs much reasoning to refute the supposition of Madvig (Excurs. VII. ad Cicero, de Fin. p. 861), of Torstrick (ad Aristotel. de Animâ, p. 123), and also of Zeller, that by exoteric discourses are not meant any writings at all, but simply the colloquies and debates of cultivated men, apart from the philosophical schools. On the other hand, Forchhammer has espoused this last-mentioned opinion, and has defended it against the objections of Bernays (Forchhammer, Aristoteles und die exoterischen Reden, p. 16, seq.). The question is thus fully argued on both sides. To me it seems that each of these two opinions is partially right, and neither of them exclusively right. "Exoteric discourse," as I understand it, might be found both in the Aristotelian dialogues, and in the debates of cultivated men out of the schools, and also in parts of the Aristotelian akroamatic works. The argument of Bernays (p. 36, seq.), that the points which Aristotle alludes to as having been debated and settled in exoteric discourses, were too abstruse and subtle to have been much handled by cultivated men out of the schools, or (as he expresses it) in the _salons_ or coffee-houses (or what corresponded thereto) at Athens--this argument seems to me untenable. We know well, from the Topica of Aristotle, that the most abstruse subjects were handled dialectically, in a manner which he called extra-philosophical; and that this was a frequent occupation of active-minded men at Athens. To discuss these matters in the way which he calls [Greek: pro\s do/xan], was more frequent than to discuss them [Greek: pro\s a)lê/theian].

Zell remarks (ad Ethica Nikom. i. 13), after referring to the passage in Aristotle's Physica, iv. 10 (to which I have called attention in a previous note), "quo loco, à Buhlio neglecto, [Greek: e)xôterikoi\ lo/goi] idem significant quod alibi [Greek: koinai\ do/xai, ei)ôtho/tes lo/goi], vel [Greek: ta\ lego/mena]: quæ semper, priusquam suas rationes in disputando proponat, disquirere solet Aristoteles. Vide supra, ad cap. viii. 1." I find also in Weisse (Translation of and Comment on the Physica of Aristotle, p. 517) a fair explanation of what Aristotle really means by _exoteric_; an explanation, however, which Ritter sets aside, in my judgment erroneously (Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. iii. p. 23).]

[Footnote 44: Thus, for example, the passage in the Ethica Nikom. i. 13, p. 1102, a. 26. [Greek: le/getai de\ peri\ au)tô=n kai\ e)n toi=s e)xôterikoi=s lo/gois a)rkou/ntôs e)/nia, kai\ chrêste/on au)toi=s], is explained in the Paraphrase of the Pseudo-Andronikus as referring to oral colloquy of Aristotle himself with pupils or interlocutors; and this _may_ possibly be a correct explanation.]

From the time of Cicero downward, a distinction has been drawn between some books of Aristotle which were exoteric, and others that were not so; these last being occasionally designated as _akroamatic_. Some modern critics have farther tried to point out which, among the preserved works of Aristotle, belonged to each of these heads. Now there existed, doubtless, in the days of Cicero, Strabo, Plutarch, and Gellius, books of Aristotle properly called _exoteric_, _i.e._ consisting almost entirely of exoteric discourse and debate; though whether Aristotle himself would have spoken of an exoteric _book_, I have some doubt. Of such a character were his Dialogues. But all the works designated as akroamatic (or non-exoteric) must probably have contained a certain admixture of "exoteric discourse"; as the Physica ([Greek: Phusikê\ A)kro/asis]) and the Metaphysica are seen to contain now. The distinction indicated by Cicero would thus be really between one class of works, wherein "exoteric discourse" was exclusive or paramount,--and another, in which it was partially introduced, subordinate to some specified didactic purpose.[45] To this last class belong all the works of Aristotle that we possess at present. Cicero would have found none of them corresponding to his notion of an exoteric book.

[Footnote 45: To this extent I go along with the opinion expressed by Weisse in his translation of the Physica of Aristotle, p. 517: "Dass dieser Gegensatz kein absoluter von zwei durchaus getrennten Bücherclassen ist, sondern dass ein und dasselbe Werk zugleich _exoterisch_ und _esoterisch_ sein konnte; und zweitens, dass _exoterisch_ überhaupt dasjenige heisst, was nicht in den positiv-dogmatischen Zusammenhang der Lehre des Philosophen unmittelbar als Glied eintritt." But Weisse goes on afterwards to give a different opinion (about the meaning of _exoteric_ books), conformable to what I have cited in a previous note from Sepulveda; and in that I do not concur. However, he remarks that the manner in which Aristotle handled the Abstracta, _Place_ and _Infinite_, is just the same as that which he declares to be _exoteric_ in the case of _Time_. The distinction drawn by Aulus Gellius (xx. 5) is not accurate: "[Greek: E)xôterika\] dicebantur, quæ ad rhetoricas meditationes, facultatem argutiarum, civiliumque rerum notitiam conducebant. [Greek: A)kroatika\] autem vocabantur, in quibus philosophia remotior subtiliorque agitabatur; quæque ad naturæ contemplationes, disceptationesque dialecticas pertinebant." It appears to me that _disceptationes dialecticæ_ ought to be transferred to the department [Greek: e)xôterika/], and that _civilium rerum notitia_ belongs as much to [Greek: a)kroatika\] as to [Greek: e)xôterika/]. M. Ravaisson has discussed this question very ably and instructively, Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote, pp. 224-244. He professes indeed to defend the opinion which I have cited from Sepulveda, and which I think erroneous; but his reasonings go really to the support of the opinion given in my text. He remarks, justly, that the dialogues of Plato (at least all the dialogues of Search) are specimens of exoteric handling; of which attribute Forchhammer speaks as if it were peculiar to the Charmides (Aristot. Exot. Reden. p. 22). Brandis (Aristoteles, p. 105) thinks that when Aristotle says in the Politica, vii. 1, p. 1323, a. 21: [Greek: nomi/santas ou)=n i(kanô=s polla\ le/gesthai kai\ tô=n e)n toi=s e)xôterikoi=s lo/gois peri\ tê=s a)ri/stês zô/ês, kai\ nu=n chrêste/on au)toi=s], he intends to designate the Ethica. It may be so; yet the Politica seems a continuation of the Ethica: moreover, even in the Ethica, we find reference made to previous discussions, [Greek: e)n toi=s e)xôterikô=s lo/gois] (Eth. N. I. 13).]

To understand fully the extent comprehended by the word _exoteric_, we must recollect that its direct and immediate meaning is negative-- _extraneous to philosophy_, and suitable to an audience not specially taught or prepared for philosophy. Now this negative characteristic belongs not merely to dialectic (as we see it in the example above cited from the Aristotelian Physica), but also to rhetoric or rhetorical argument. We know that, in Aristotle's mind, the rhetorical handling and the dialectical handling, are placed both of them under the same head, as dealing with opinions rather than with truth.[46] Both the one and the other are parted off from the didactic or demonstrative march which leads to philosophical truth; though dialectic has a distant affinity with that march, and is indeed available as an auxiliary skirmisher. The term _exoteric_ will thus comprehend both rhetorical argument and dialectical argument.[47] Of the latter, we have just seen a specimen extracted from the Physica; of the former, I know no specimen remaining, but there probably were many of them in the Aristotelian dialogues now lost--that which was called 'Eudemus,' and others. With these dialogues Cicero was probably more familiar than with any other composition of Aristotle. I think it highly probable that Aristotle alludes to the dialogues in some of the passages where he refers to "exoteric discourses." To that extent I agree with Bernays; but I see no reason to believe (as he does) that the case is the same with all the passages, or that the epithet is to be understood _always_ as implying one of these lost Aristotelian dialogues.[48]

[Footnote 46: See the first two chapters of Aristotle's Rhetorica, especially pp. 1355 a. 24-35, 1358 a. 5, 11, 25, also p. 1404 a. 1.: [Greek: o(/lôs ou)/sês _pro\s do/xan_ tê=s pragmatei/as tê=s peri\ tê\n r(êtorikê/n], which is exactly what he says also about Dialectic, in the commencement of the Topica.]

[Footnote 47: Octavianus Ferrarius observes, in his treatise De Sermonibus Exotericis (Venet. 1575), p. 24: "Quod si Dialecticus et Rhetor inter se mutant, ut aiunt, ita ut Dialecticus Rhetorem et Rhetor Dialecticum vicissim induat--de his ipsis veteribus Dialecticis minime nobis dubitandum est, quin iidem dialectice simul et rhetorice loqui in utramque partem potuerint. Nec valde mirum debet hoc videri; libros enim exotericos prope solos habuerunt: qui cum scripti essent (ut posterius planum faciam) dialectico more, illorum lectio cum libris peperit philosophos congruentes"--Ferrari adverts well to the distinction between the philosopher and the dialectician (_sensu Aristotelico_), handling often the same subjects, but in a different way: between the [Greek: oi)kei=ai a)rchai/], upon which didactic method rested, and the [Greek: do/xai] or diverse opinions, each countenanced by more or less authority, from which dialectic took its departure (pp. 36, 86, 89).]

[Footnote 48: I agree very much with the manner in which Bernays puts his case, pp. 79, 80, 92, 93: though there is a contradiction between p. 80 and p. 92, in respect to the taste and aptitude of the exterior public for dialectic debate; which is affirmed in the former page, denied in the latter. But the doctrine asserted in the pages just indicated amounts only to this--that the dialogues were _included in_ Aristotle's phrase, [Greek: e)xôterikoi\ lo/goi]; which appears to me true.]

There grew up, in the minds of some commentators, a supposition of "exoteric doctrine" as denoting what Aristotle promulgated to the public, contrasted with another secret or mystic doctrine reserved for a special few, and denoted by the term _esoteric_; though this term is not found in use before the days of Lucian.[49] I believe the supposition of a double doctrine to be mistaken in regard to Aristotle; but it is true as to the Pythagoreans, and is not without some colour of truth even as to Plato. That Aristotle employed one manner of explanation and illustration, when discussing with advanced pupils, and another, more or less different, when addressing an unprepared audience, we may hold as certain and even unavoidable; but this does not amount to a double positive doctrine. Properly speaking, indeed, the term "exoteric" (as I have just explained it out of Aristotle himself) does not designate, or even imply, any positive doctrine at all. It denotes a many-sided controversial debate, in which numerous points are canvassed and few settled; the express purpose being to bring into full daylight the perplexing aspects of each. There are indeed a few exceptional cases, in which "exoteric discourse" will itself have thrown up a tolerably trustworthy result: these few (as I have above shown) Aristotle occasionally singles out and appeals to. But as a general rule, there is no _doctrine_ which can properly be called _exoteric_: the "exoteric discourse" suggests many new puzzles, but terminates without any solution at all. The doctrine, whenever any such is proved, emerges out of the didactic process which follows.

[Footnote 49: Luc. Vit. Auct. 26.]