Chapter X: Sophistici Elenchi (3)

Passing to the Fallacies _Extra Dictionem_, where the sophistical refutation is founded upon a Fallacy of Accident, the respondent ought to apply one and the same solution to all. He will say: "The conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premisses"; and he will be prepared with an example, in which the conclusion obtained under this fallacy is notoriously untrue.[114] "Do you know Koriskus?"--"Yes." "Do you know the distant person coming this way?"--"No." "That distant person is Koriskus: therefore you know, and you do not know, the same person." The inference here is not necessary. To be coming this way--is an accident of Koriskus; and, because you do not know the accident, we cannot infer that you do not know the subject; such may or may not be the case.[115]

[Footnote 114: Soph. El. xxiv. p. 179, a. 30: [Greek: r(ête/on ou)=n sumbibasthe/ntas o(moi/ôs pro\s a(/pantas o(/ti ou)k a)nagkai=on; e)/chein de\ dei= prophe/rein to\ oi(=on.]]

[Footnote 115: Ibid. a. 35-b. 7.]

The major premiss upon which the preceding sophistical refutation must rest, is, That it is impossible both to know and not to know the same thing. This must be put as a direct question by the questioner, and must be conceded by the respondent, before the intended refutation can be made good. Now there are some persons who solve the refutation by answering this question in the negative, and by saying that it is possible both to know and not to know the same thing, only not in the same respect: such is the case when we know Koriskus, but do not know Koriskus approaching from a distance.[116] Aristotle disapproves this mode of solution, as well as another mode which refers the fallacy to equivocation of terms. He points out that there are many other sophistical refutations, coming under the general head of _Fallaciæ Accidentis_, to which such solution will not apply; and that there ought to be one uniform mode of solution applicable to every fallacy coming under the same general head; though he admits at the same time that particular sophistical refutations may be vicious in more than one way. He says, moreover, that this contradiction or negation of the premiss is no true solution; for a solution ought to bring to view clearly the reason why the fallacious refutation appears to be a real refutation. Thus the _Fallacia Accidentis_ consists in an inference that what is true of an accident is true also of the subject thereof: you explain that such inference, though apparently cogent, has no real cogency, and in that explanation consists the only proper solution of the fallacy.[117]

[Footnote 116: Ibid. b. 7, 18, 37: [Greek: lu/ousi de/ tines a)nairou=ntes tê\n e)rô/têsin; phasi\ ga\r e)nde/chesthai tau)to\ pra=gma ei)de/nai kai\ a)gnoei=n, a)lla\ mê\ kata\ tau)to/.]

Mr. Poste (pp. 152-157) translates [Greek: a)nairou=ntes tê\n e)rô/têsin]--"contradicting the thesis," and he expresses his surprise at the assertion, observing (very truly) that contradiction of the thesis is the very opposite of a solution; it helps in the very work which the refutation aims at accomplishing. But I cannot think that [Greek: e)rô/têsis] does mean "the thesis," either here or in the other passage to which Mr. Poste refers (xxii. p. 178, b. 14). I think it means a premiss which the respondent has conceded, or must be presumed to have conceded, essential to the validity of the refutation. The term [Greek: e)rô/têsis] cannot surely, with any propriety, be applied to the thesis. It means either a question, or what is conceded in reply to a question; and the _thesis_ cannot come under either one meaning or the other, being the proposition which the respondent sets out by affirming and undertakes to defend.]

[Footnote 117: Soph. El. xxiv. p. 179, b. 23: [Greek: ê)=n ga\r ê( lu/sis e)mpha/nisis pseudou=s sullogismou=, par' o(\ pseudê/s.]]

In like manner, all those Fallacies which come under the general head of _A dicto Secundum Quid ad dictum Simpliciter_, can only be solved by pointing out, in each particular case, in what terms this confusion is concealed--wherein resides the inference apparently cogent which is mistaken for one really cogent. The respondent is driven to an apparent contradiction, by having granted premisses from which the inference is derivable that both sides of the _Antiphasis_ are true--that the same predicate A may be both affirmed and denied of the same subject B. He solves the contradiction by analysing the _Antiphasis_, and by showing that affirmation is _secundum quid_, while denial is _simpliciter_; and that there is a contradiction not real, but only apparent, between the two.[118]

[Footnote 118: Ibid. xxv. p. 180, a. 23-31.]

In like manner, the Fallacy _Ignoratio Elenchi_ will be solved by analysing the two supposed counter-propositions of the _Antiphasis_, and by showing that there is no real contradiction or inconsistency between them.[119]

[Footnote 119: Ibid. xxvi. p. 181, a. 1-14.]

In regard to the Fallacies under _Petitio Principii_, the respondent if he perceives that the premiss asked of him involves such a fallacy, must refuse to grant it, however probable it may be in itself. If he does not perceive this until after he has granted it, he must throw back the charge of mal-procedure upon the questioner; declaring that an Elenchus involving assumption of the matter in question is null, and that the concession was made under the supposition that some separate and independent syllogism was in contemplation.[120]

[Footnote 120: Ibid. xxvii. p. 181, a. 15-21.]

There are two distinct ways in which the _Fallacia Consequentis_ may be employed. The predicate may be an universal, comprehending the subject: because animal always goes along with man, it is falsely inferred that man always goes along with animal; or it is falsely inferred that not-animal always goes along with not-man. The fallacy is solved when this is pointed out. The last inference is only valid when the terms are inverted; if animal always goes along with man, not-man will always go along with not-animal.[121]

[Footnote 121: Ibid. xxviii. p. 181, a. 22-30. [Greek: a)na/palin ga\r ê( a)kolou/thêsis].]

If the sophistical refutation includes more premisses than are indispensable to the conclusion, the respondent, after having satisfied himself that this is the fact, will point out the mal-procedure of the questioner, and will say that he conceded the superfluous premiss, not because it was in itself probable but, because it seemed relevant to the debate; while nevertheless the questioner has made no real or legitimate application of it towards that object.[122] This is the mode of solution applicable in the case of the Fallacies coming under the head _Non Causa pro Causâ_.[123]

[Footnote 122: Soph. El. xxix. p. 181, a. 31-35.]

[Footnote 123: Schol. p. 318, a. 36, Br.]

Where the sophistical questioner tries to refute by the _Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum_ (_i.e._, by putting two or more questions as one), the respondent should forthwith divide the complex question into its component simple questions, and make answer accordingly. He must not give one answer, either affirmative or negative, to that which is more than one question. Even if he does give one answer, he may sometimes not involve himself in any contradiction; for it may happen that the same predicate is truly affirmable, or truly deniable, of two or more distinct and independent subjects. Often, however, the contrary is the case: no one true answer, either affirmative or negative, can be given to one of these complex questions: the one answer given, whatever it be, must always be partially false or inconsistent.[124] Suppose two subjects, A and B, one good, the other bad: if the question be, Whether A and B are good or bad, it will be equally true to say--Both are good, or, Both are bad, or, Both are neither good nor bad. There may indeed be other solutions for this fallacy: Both or All may signify two or more items taken individually, or taken collectively; but the only sure precaution is--one answer to one question.[125]

[Footnote 124: Soph. El. xxx. p. 181, a. 38: [Greek: ou)/te plei/ô kath' e(no\s ou)/te e(\n kata\ pollô=n, a)ll' e(\n kath' e(no\s phate/on ê)\ a)pophate/on.]]

[Footnote 125: Ibid. b. 6-25.]

Suppose that, instead of aiming at a seeming refutation, the Sophist tries to convict the respondent of Tautology. The source of this embarrassment is commonly the fact that a relative term is often used and conveys clear meaning without its correlate, though the correlate is always implied and understood. The respondent must avoid this trap by refusing to grant that the relative has any meaning at all without its correlate; and by requiring that the correlate shall be distinctly enunciated along with it. He ought to treat the relative without its correlate as merely a part of the whole significant expression--as merely syncategorematic; just as ten is in the phrase--ten minus one, or as the affirmative word is in a negative proposition.[126] Thus he will not recognize double as significant by itself without its correlate half, nor half without its correlate double; although in common parlance such correlate is often understood without being formally enunciated.

[Footnote 126: Soph. El. Xxxi. p. 181, b. 26: [Greek: ou) dote/on tô=n pro/s ti legome/nôn sêmai/nein ti chôrizome/nas kath' au(ta\s ta\s katêgori/as.]

Mr. Poste observes in his note:--"The sophistic locus of tautology may be considered as a caricature of a dialectic locus. One fault which dialectic criticism finds with a definition is the introduction of superfluous words." He then cites Topic. VI. ii. (p. 141, a. 4, seq.); but in this passage we find that the repetition of the same word is declared not to be an argumentative impropriety, so that the Sophist would gain nothing by driving his opponent into tautology.]

Lastly, another purpose which Aristotle ascribes to the Sophist, is that of driving the respondent into a Solecism--into some grammatical or syntactical impropriety, such as, using a noun in the wrong case or gender, using a pronoun with a different gender or number from the noun to which it belongs, &c. He points out that the solution of these verbal puzzles must be different for each particular case; in general, when thrown into a regular syllogistic form, even the questioner himself will be found to speak bad Greek. The examples given by Aristotle do not admit of being translated into a modern language, so as to preserve the solecism that constitutes their peculiarity.[127]

[Footnote 127: Soph. El. xxxii. p. 182, a. 7-b. 5.]

After having thus gone through the different artifices ascribed to the Sophist, and the ways of solving or meeting them, Aristotle remarks that there are material distinctions between the different cases which fall under one and the same general head of Sophistical Paralogism. Some cases there are in which both the fallacy itself, and the particular point upon which it turns, are obvious and discernible at first sight. In other cases, again, an ordinary person does not perceive that there is any fallacy at all; or, if he does perceive it, he often does not detect the seat of the fallacy, so that one man will refer the case to one general head, and another, to a different one.[128] Thus, for example, Fallacies of Equivocation are perhaps the most frequent and numerous of all fallacies; some of them are childish and jocular, not really imposing upon any one; but there are others again in which the double meaning of a word is at first unnoticed, and is disputed even when pointed out, so that it can only be brought to light by the most careful and subtle analysis. This happens especially with terms that are highly abstract and general: which are treated by many, including even **philosophers like Parmenides and Zeno, as if they were not equivocal at all, but univocal.[129] Again, the _Fallaciæ Accidentis_, and the other classes _Extra Dictionem_, are also often hard to detect. On the whole, it is often hard to determine, not merely to which of the classes any case of fallacy belongs, but even whether there is any fallacy at all--whether the refutation is, or is not, a valid one.[130]

[Footnote 128: Ibid. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 6-12.]

[Footnote 129: Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 13-25: [Greek: ô(/sper ou)=n e)n toi=s para\ tê\n o(mônumi/an, o(/sper dokei= tro/pos eu)êthe/statos ei)=nai tô=n paralogismô=n, ta\ me\n kai\ toi=s tuchou=si/n e)sti dê=la--ta\ de\ kai\ tou\s e)mpeirota/tous phai/netai lantha/nein; sêmei=on de\ tou/tôn o(/ti ma/chontai polla/kis peri\ o)noma/tôn, oi(=on po/teron tau)to\ sêmai/nei kata\ pa/ntôn to\ o)\n kai\ to\ e(\n ê)\ e(/teron.]]

[Footnote 130: Ibid. b. 27: [Greek: o(moi/ôs de\ kai\ peri\ tou= sumbebêko/tos kai\ peri\ tô=n a)/llôn e(/kaston, oi( me\n e)/sontai r(a/|ous i)dei=n oi( de\ chalepô/teroi tô=n lo/gôn; kai\ labei=n e)/n tini ge/nei, kai\ po/teron e)/legchos ê)\ ou)k e)/legchos, ou) r(a/|dion o(moi/ôs peri\ pa/ntôn.]]

The pungent arguments in debate are those which bite most keenly, and create the greatest amount of embarrassment and puzzle.[131] In dialectical debate a puzzle arises, when the respondent finds that a correct syllogism has been established against him, and when he does not at once see which among its premisses he ought to controvert, in order to overthrow the conclusion. In the eristic or sophistic debate the puzzle of the respondent is, in what language to enunciate his propositions so as to keep clear of the subtle objections which will be brought against him by the questioner.[132] It is these pungent arguments that most effectually stimulate the mind to investigation. The most pungent of all is, where the syllogistic premisses are highly probable, yet where they nevertheless negative a conclusion which is also highly probable. Here we have an equal antithesis as to presumptive credibility, between the premisses taken together on one side and the conclusion on the other.[133] We do not know whether it is in the premisses only, or in the conclusion, that we are to look for untruth: the conclusion, though improbable, may yet be true, while we may find that the true conclusion has been obtained from untrue premisses; or the conclusion may be both improbable and untrue, in which case we must look for untruth in one of the premisses also--either the major or the minor. This is the most embarrassing position of all. Another, rather less embarrassing, is, where our thesis will be confuted unless we can show the confuting conclusion to be untrue, but where each of the premisses on which the conclusion depends is equally probable, so that we do not at once see in which of them the cause of its untruth is to be sought. These two are the most pungent and perplexing argumentative conjunctures of dialectical debate.

[Footnote 131: Ibid. 32: [Greek: e)/sti de\ drimu\s lo/gos o(/stis a)porei=n poiei= ma/lista; da/knei ga\r ou(=tos ma/lista.]]

[Footnote 132: Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 33: [Greek: a)pori/a d' e)sti\ dittê/, ê( me\n e)n toi=s sullelogisme/nois, o(/ ti a)ne/lê| tis tô=n e)rôtêma/tôn, ê( d' e)n toi=s e)ristikoi=s, pô=s ei)/pê| tis to\ protathe/n.] The difficulty here pointed out, of finding language not open to some logical objection by an acute Sophist, is illustrated by what he himself states about the caution required for guarding his definitions against attack; see De Interpret. vi. p. 17, a. 34: [Greek: le/gô de\ a)ntikei=sthai tê\n tou= au)tou= kata\ tou= au)tou=, mê\ o(mônu/môs de/, _kai\ o(/sa a)/lla prosdiorizo/metha pro\s ta\s sophistika\s e)nochlê/seis_.] What is here meant by [Greek: sophistikai\ e)nochlê/seis] is expressed elsewhere by [Greek: pro\s ta\s logika\s duscherei/as]--Metaphys. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, b. 21; N. i. p. 1087, b. 20. See the Scholia (pp. 112, 651, Br.) of Ammonius and Alexander upon the above passages of De Interpr. and Metaphys.]

[Footnote 133: Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 37-p. 183, a. 4: [Greek: e)/sti de\ sullogistiko\s me\n lo/gos drimu/tatos, a)\n e)x o(/ti ma/lista dokou/ntôn o(/ti ma/lista e)/ndoxon a)nairê=|; ei(=s ga\r ô)\n o( lo/gos, metatitheme/nês tê=s a)ntipha/seôs, a(/pantas o(moi/ous e(/xei tou\s sullogismou/s; a)ei\ ga\r e)x e)ndo/xôn o(moi/ôs e)/ndoxon a)nairê/sei [ê)\ kataskeua/sei]; dio/per a)porei=n a)nagkai=on. ma/lista me\n ou)=n o( toiou=tos drimu/s, o( e)x i)/sou to\ sumpe/rasma poiô=n toi=s e)rôtê/masi.] I transcribe this text as it is given by Bekker, Waitz, Bussemaker, and Mr. Poste. The editions anterior to Bekker had the additional words [Greek: ê)\ kataskeua/zê|] after [Greek: a)nairê=|] in the fourth line; and M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire in his translation defends and retains them. Bekker and the subsequent editors have omitted them, but have retained the last words [Greek: ê)\ kataskeua/sei] in the seventh line. To me this seems inconsistent: the words ought either to be retained in both places or omitted in both. I think they ought to be omitted in both. I have enclosed them in brackets in the fifth line.

This difficult passage (not well explained by Alexander, Schol. p. 320, b. 9) requires the explanations of Waitz and Mr. Poste. The note of Mr. Poste is particularly instructive, because he expands in full (p. 164) the three "similar syllogisms" to which Aristotle here briefly alludes. The phrase [Greek: metatitheme/nês tê=s a)ntipha/seôs] is determined by a passage in Analyt. Priora, II. viii. p. 59, b. 1: it means "employment of the contradictory of the conclusion, in combination with either one of the premisses, to upset the other." The original syllogism is assumed to have two premisses, each highly probable, while the conclusion is highly improbable, being the negation of a highly probable proposition. The original syllogism will stand thus: All M is P; All S is M; _Ergo_, All S is P: the two premisses being supposed highly probable, and the conclusion highly improbable. Of course, therefore, the contradictory of the conclusion will be highly probable--Some S is not P. We take this contradictory and employ it to construct two new syllogisms as follows:--"All M is P; Some S is not P; _Ergo_ Some S is not M. And again, Some S is not P: All S is M; _Ergo_, Some M is not P. All these three syllogisms are similar in this respect: that each has two highly probable premisses, while the conclusion is highly improbable.]

But in eristic or sophistic debate our greatest embarrassment as respondents will arise when we do not at once see whether the refutative syllogism brought against us is conclusive or not, and whether it is to be solved by negation or by distinction.[134] Next in order as to embarrassment stands the case, where we see in which of the two processes (negation or distinction) we are to find our solution, yet without seeing on which of the premisses we are to bring the process to bear; or whether, if distinction be the process required, we are to apply it to the conclusion, or to one of the premisses.[135] A defective syllogistic argument is silly, when the deficient points are of capital importance--relating to the minor or to the middle term, or when the assumptions are false and strange; but it will sometimes be worthy of attention, if the points deficient are outlying and easily supplied; in which cases it is the carelessness of the questioner that is to blame, rather than the argument itself.[136] Both the line of argument taken by the questioner, and the mode of solution adopted by the respondent, may be directed towards any one of three distinct purposes: either to the thesis and main subject discussed; or to the adversary personally (_i.e._, to the particular way in which he has been arguing); or to neither of these, but simply to prolong the discussion (_i.e._, against time). The solution may thus be sometimes such that it would take more time to argue upon it than the patience of the auditors will allow.[137]

[Footnote 134: Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 183, a. 7.]

[Footnote 135: Ibid. a. 9: [Greek: deu/teros de\ tô=n a)/llôn o( dê=los me\n o(/ti para\ diai/resin ê)\ a)nai/resi/n e)sti, mê\ phanero\s d' ô)\n dia\ ti/nos tô=n ê)rôtême/nôn a)nai/resin ê)\ diai/resin lute/os e)sti/n, a)lla\ po/teron au(/tê para\ to\ sumpe/rasma ê)\ para/ ti tô=n e)rôtêma/tôn e)sti/n.]

Mr. Poste translates these last words very correctly:--"Whether it is one of the premisses or the conclusion that requires distinction." Here Aristotle again speaks of a mode of solution furnished by applying _distinction_ ([Greek: diai/resis]) to _the conclusion_ as well as to the premisses, though he does not say that solution can be furnished by applying _disproof_ ([Greek: a)nai/resis]) to _the conclusion_. See my remarks, a few pages above, on Mr. Poste's note respecting ch. xviii. (supra, p. 406).]

[Footnote 136: Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 183, a. 14-20.]

[Footnote 137: Ibid. a. 21.]

The last chapter of the Sophistici Elenchi is employed by Aristotle in recapitulating the scope and procedure of the nine Books of Topica (reckoning the Sophistici Elenchi as the Ninth, as we ought in propriety to do); and in appreciating the general bearing and value of that treatise, having regard to the practice and theory of the day.

The business of Dialectic and Peirastic is to find and apply the syllogizing process to any given thesis, with premisses the most probable that can be obtained bearing on the thesis. This Aristotle treats as the proper function of Dialectic _per se_ and of Peirastic; considering both--the last, of course--as referring wholly to the questioner. His purpose is to investigate and impart this syllogizing power--the power of questioning and cross-examining a respondent who sets up a given thesis, so as to drive him into inconsistent answers. It appears that Aristotle would not have cared to teach the respondent how he might defend himself against this procedure, if there had not happened to be another art--Sophistic, closely bordering on Dialectic and Peirastic. He considers it indispensable to furnish the respondent with defensive armour against sophistical cross-examination; and this could not be done without teaching him at the same time modes of defence against the cross-examination of Dialectic and Peirastic. For this reason it is (Aristotle **tells us[138]) that he has included in the Topica precepts on the best mode of defending the thesis by the most probable arguments, as well as of impugning it. The respondent professes to know (while the questioner does not), and must be taught how to maintain his thesis like a man of knowledge. Sokrates, the prince of dialecticians, did nothing but question and cross-examine: he would never be respondent at all; for he explicitly disclaimed knowledge. And if it were not for the neighbourhood of Sophistic, Aristotle would have thought it sufficient to teach a procedure like that of Sokrates. It was the danger from sophistical cross-examination that led him to enlarge his scheme--to unmask the Sophists by enumerating the paralogisms peculiar to them, and to indicate the proper scheme of the responses and solutions whereby the respondent might defend himself against them. We remember that Aristotle treats all paralogisms and fallacies as if they belonged to a peculiar art or profession called Sophistic, and as if they were employed by Sophists exclusively; as if the Dialecticians and the Peirasts, including among them Sokrates and Plato, put all their questions without ever resorting to or falling into paralogisms.

[Footnote 138: Ibid. xxxiv. p. 183, a. 37-b. 8: [Greek: proeilo/metha me\n ou)=n eu(rei=n du/nami/n tina sullogistikê\n peri\ tou= problêthe/ntos e)k tô=n u(parcho/ntôn ô(s e)ndoxota/tôn; _tou=to ga\r e)/rgon e)sti\_ tê=s _dialektikê=s kath' au(tê\n kai\ tê=s peirastikê=s_. e)pei\ de\ _proskataskeua/zetai pro\s au)tê\n dia\ tê\n tê=s sophistikê=s geitni/asin_, ô(s ou) mo/non pei=ran du/natai labei=n dialektikô=s, a)lla\ kai\ ô(s ei)dô/s, _dia\ tou=to ou) mo/non to\ lechthe\n_ e)/rgon u(pethe/metha tê=s pragmatei/as to\ lo/gon du/nasthai labei=n, a)lla\ kai\ o(/pôs lo/gon u(pe/chontes phula/xomen tê\n the/sin ô(s di' e)ndoxota/tôn o(motro/pôs. tê\n d' ai)ti/an ei)rê/kamen tou/tou, e)pei\ kai\ dia\ tou=to Sôkra/tês ê)rô/ta a)ll' ou)k a)pekri/neto; ô(molo/gei ga\r ou)k ei)de/nai.]

It appears to me that in one line of this remarkable passage a word has dropped out which is necessary to the sense. We now read (about the middle) [Greek: ô(s ou) mo/non pei=ran du/natai labei=n dialektikô=s, a)lla\ kai\ ô(s ei)dô/s]. Now the words [Greek: pei=ran labei=n] as the passage stands, must be construed along with [Greek: ô(s ei)dô/s], and this makes no meaning at all, or an inadmissible meaning. I think it clear that the word [Greek: u(pe/chein] or [Greek: dou=nai] has dropped out before [Greek: ei)dô/s]. The passage will then stand:--[Greek: ô(s ou) mo/non pei=ran du/natai labei=n dialektikô=s, a)lla\ kai\ _u(pe/chein_] (or [Greek: _dou=nai_) ô(s ei)dô/s]. When this verb is supplied the sense will be quite in harmony with what follows, which at present it is not. [Greek: Pei=ran labei=n] applies to the questioner, but not to the respondent; [Greek: ô(s ei)dô/s] applies to the respondent, but not to the questioner; [Greek: pei=ran u(pe/chein] applies to the respondent, and is therefore the fit concomitant of [Greek: ô(s ei)dô/s]. The translation given by Mr. Poste _first_ (p. 93):--"professing not only to test knowledge with the resources of Dialectic, but also to maintain any thesis with the infallibility of science" appears to me (excepting the word _infallibility_, which is unsuitable) to render Aristotle's thought, though not his words as they now stand; but Mr. Poste has given what he thinks an amended translation (p. 175):--"Since it claims the power of catechizing or cross-examining not only dialectically but also scientifically." This second translation may approach more nearly to the present words of Aristotle, but it departs more widely from his sense and doctrine. Aristotle does not claim for either Dialecticians or Sophists the power of cross-examining scientifically. He ascribes to the Sophists nothing but cavil and fallacy--verbal and extra-verbal--the pretence and sham of being wise or knowing (Soph. El. i., ii. p. 165).]

Aristotle, we have already more than once seen, asserts emphatically his claim to originality as having been the first to treat these subjects theoretically, and to suggest precepts founded on the theory. On all important subjects (he remarks) the elaboration of any good theory is a gradual process, the work of several successive authors. The first beginnings are very imperfect and rudimentary; upon these, however, subsequent authors build, both correcting and enlarging, until, after some considerable time, a tolerably complete scheme or system comes to be constructed. Such has been the case with Rhetoric and other arts. Tisias was the first writer and preceptor on Rhetoric, yet with poor and insufficient effect. To him succeeded Thrasymachus, next Theodorus, and various others; from each of whom partial improvements and additions were derived, until at length we have now (it is Aristotle that speaks) a copious body of rhetorical theory and precept, inherited from predecessors and accumulated by successive traditions. Compared with this, the earliest attempt at theory was indeed narrow and imperfect; but it was nevertheless the first step in a great work, and, as such, it was the most difficult and the most important. The task of building on a foundation already laid, is far easier.[139]

[Footnote 139: Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 183, b. 17-26: [Greek: tô=n ga\r eu(riskome/nôn a(pa/ntôn ta\ me\n par' e(te/rôn lêphthe/nta pro/teron peponême/na kata\ me/ros e)pide/dôken u(po\ tô=n paralabo/ntôn u(/steron; ta\ d' e)x u(parchê=s eu(risko/mena mikra\n to\ prô=ton e)pi/dosin lamba/nein ei)/ôthe, chrêsimôte/ran me/ntoi pollô=| tê=s u(/steron e)k tou/tôn au)xê/seôs; me/giston ga\r i)/sôs a)rchê\ panto/s, ô(/sper le/getai; dio\ kai\ chalepô/taton; o(/sô| ga\r kra/tiston tê=| duna/mei, tosou/tô| mikro/taton o(\n tô=| mege/thei chalepô/tato/n e)stin o)phthê=nai; tau/tês d' eu(rême/nês r(a=|on prostithe/nai kai\ sunau/xein to\ loipo/n e)stin.]]

While rhetorical theory has thus been gradually worked up to maturity, the case has been altogether different with Dialectic. In this I (Aristotle) found no basis prepared; no predecessor to follow; no models to copy. I had to begin from the beginning, and to make good the first step myself. The process of syllogizing had never yet been analysed or explained by any one; much less had anything been set forth about the different applications of it in detail. I worked it out for myself, without any assistance, by long and laborious application.[140] There existed indeed paid teachers, both in Dialectic and in Eristic (or Sophistic); but their teaching has been entirely without analysis, or theory, or system. Just as rhetoricians gave to their pupils orations to learn by heart, so these dialectical teachers gave out dialogues to learn by heart upon those subjects which they thought most likely to become the topics of discourse. They thus imparted to their pupils a certain readiness and fluency; but they communicated no art, no rational conception of what was to be sought or avoided, no skill or power of dealing with new circumstances.[141] They proceeded like men, who, professing to show how comfortable covering might be provided for the feet, should not teach the pupil how he could make shoes for himself, but should merely furnish him with a good stock of ready-made shoes--a present valuable indeed for use, but quite unconnected with any skill as an artificer. The syllogism as a system and theory, with precepts founded on that theory for Demonstration and Dialectic, has originated first with me (Aristotle). Mine is the first step, and therefore a small one, though worked out with much thought and hard labour: it must be looked at as a first step, and judged with indulgence. You, my readers, or hearers of my lectures, if you think that I have done as much as can fairly be required for an initiatory start, compared with other more advanced departments of theory, will acknowledge what I have achieved, and pardon what I have left for others to accomplish.[142]

[Footnote 140: Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 184, a. 8: [Greek: kai\ peri\ me\n tô=n r(êtorikô=n u(pê=rche polla\ kai\ palaia\ ta\ lego/mena, peri\ _de\ tou= sullogi/zesthai pantelô=s ou)de\n ei)/chomen pro/teron a)/llo le/gein_, a)ll' ê)\ tribê=| zêtou=ntes polu\n chro/non e)ponou=men.]]

[Footnote 141: Ibid. a. 1: [Greek: dio/per tachei=a me\n a)/technos d' ê)=n ê( didaskali/a toi=s mantha/nousi par' au)tô=n; ou) ga\r te/chnên a)lla\ ta\ a)po\ tê=s te/chnês dido/ntes paideu/ein u(pela/mbanon.]

Cicero, in describing his own treatise De Oratore, insists upon the marked difference between his mode of treatment and the common rhetorical precepts; he claims to have followed the manner of the Aristotelian Dialogues:--"Scripsi Aristoteleo more, quemadmodum quidem volui, tres libros in disputatione ac dialogo de Oratore, quos arbitror Lentulo tuo fore non inutiles. Abhorrent enim a communibus præceptis, atque omnem antiquorum et Aristoteleam et Isocrateam rationem oratoriam complectuntur" (Cicero, Epist. ad Famill. i. 9).]

[Footnote 142: Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 184, b. 3: [Greek: ei) de\ phai/netai theasame/nois u(mi=n ô(s e)k toiou/tôn e)x a)rchê=s u(parcho/ntôn e)/chein ê( metho/dos i(kanô=s para\ ta\s a)/llas pragmatei/as ta\s e)k parado/seôs ê)uxême/nas, loipo\n a)\n ei)/ê pa/ntôn u(mô=n ê)\ tô=n ê)kroame/nôn e)/rgon toi=s me\n paraleleimme/nois tê=s metho/dou suggnô/mên toi=s d' eu(rême/nois pollê\n e)/chein cha/rin.]

It would seem that by [Greek: toi=s theasame/nois] Aristotle means to address the readers of the present treatise, while by [Greek: tô=n ê)kroame/nôn] he designates those who had heard his oral expositions on the same subject.]

Such is the impressive closing chapter of the Sophistici Elenchi. It is remarkable in two ways: first, that Aristotle expressly addresses himself to hearers and readers in the second person; next, that he asserts emphatically his own claim to originality as a theorist on Logic, and declares himself to have worked out even the first beginnings of such theory by laborious application. I understand his claim to originality as intended to bear, not simply on the treatise called Sophistici Elenchi and on the enumeration of Fallacies therein contained, but, in a larger sense, on the theory of the Syllogism; as first unfolded in the Analytica Priora, applied to Demonstration in the Analytica Posteriora, applied afterwards to Dialectic in the Topica, applied lastly to Sophistic (or Eristic) in the Sophistici Elenchi. The phrase, "Respecting the _process of syllogizing_,[143] I found absolutely nothing prepared, but worked it out by laborious application for myself"--seems plainly to denote this large comprehension. And, indeed, in respect to Sophistic separately, the remark of Aristotle that nothing whatever had been done before him, would not be well founded: we find in his own treatise of the Sophistici Elenchi allusion to various prior doctrines, from which he dissents.[144] In these prior doctrines, however, his predecessors had treated the sophistical modes of refutation without reference to the Syllogism and its general theory.[145] It is against such separation that Aristotle distinctly protests. He insists upon the necessity of first expounding the Syllogism, and of discussing the laws of good or bad Refutation as a corollary or dependant of the syllogistic theory. Accordingly he begins this treatise by intimating that he intends to deduce these laws from the first and highest generalities of the subject;[146] and he concludes it by claiming this method of philosophizing as original with himself.

[Footnote 143: Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 184, b. 1: [Greek: peri\ de\ tou= sullogi/zesthai pantelô=s ou)de\n ei)/chomen pro/teron a)/llo le/gein], &c. (cited in a preceding note).]

[Footnote 144: See note p. 402.]

[Footnote 145: Soph. El. x. p. 171, a. 1: [Greek: o(/lôs te a)/topon, to\ peri\ e)le/gchou diale/gesthai, a)lla' mê\ pro/teron peri\ sullogismou=; _ o( ga\r e)/legchos sullogismo/s e)stin, ô(/ste chrê\ kai\ peri\ sullogismou= pro/teron ê)\ peri\ pseudou=s e)le/gchou_.]]

[Footnote 146: Ibid. i. p. 164, a. 21: [Greek: le/gômen, a)rxa/menoi kata\ phu/sin a)po\ tô=n prô/tôn.]]