Chapter IX: Topica (3)

[Footnote 140: Ibid. p. 118, a. 6-14. [Greek: ou) ga\r ei) belti/ô, a)nagkai=on kai\ ai(retô/tera; to\ gou=n philosophei=n be/ltion tou= chrêmati/zesthai, a)ll' ou)ch ai(retô/teron tô=| e)ndeei= tô=n a)nagkai/ôn. to\ d' e)k periousi/as e)sti/n, o(/tan u(parcho/ntôn tô=n a)nagkai/ôn a)/lla tina\ proskataskeua/zêtai/ tis tô=n kalô=n. schedo\n d' i)/sôs ai(retô/teron to\ a)nagkai=o/n e)sti, be/ltion de\ to\ e)k periousi/as.]]

Among many other _loci_, applicable to this same question of comparative excellence between two different subjects, one more will suffice here. You must distinguish the various ends in relation to which any given subject is declared to be eligible: the advantageous, the beautiful, the agreeable. That which conduces to all the three is more eligible than that which conduces to one or two of them only. If there be two subjects, both of them conducive to the same end among the three, you must examine which of them conduces to it most. Again, that which conduces to the better end (_e.g._, to virtue rather than to pleasure) is the more eligible. The like comparison may be applied to the _Fugienda_ as well as to the _Expetenda_. That is most to be avoided which shuts us out most from the desirable acquisitions: _e.g._, sickness is more to be avoided than ungraceful form; for sickness shuts us out more completely both from virtue and from pleasure.[141]

[Footnote 141: Ibid. iii. p. 118, b. 27-36.]

The same _loci_ which are available for the question of comparison will also be available in the question of positive eligibility or positive ineligibility.[142] Further, it holds for all cases of the kind that you should enunciate the argument in the most general terms that each case admits: in this way it will cover a greater number of particulars. Slight mutations of language will often here strengthen your case: that which is (good) by nature is more (good) than that which is (good) not by nature; that which makes the subject to which it is better than that which does not make the subject good.[143]

[Footnote 142: Ibid. iv. p. 119, a. 1.]

[Footnote 143: Topic. III. v. p. 119, a. 12: [Greek: lêpte/on d' o(/ti ma/lista katho/lou tou\s to/pous peri\ tou= ma=llon kai\ tou= mei/zonos; lêphthe/ntes ga\r ou(/tôs pro\s plei/ô chrê/simoi a)\n ei)/êsan.]]

The _loci_ just enumerated are Universal, and applicable to the debate of theses propounded in universal terms; but they will also be applicable, if the thesis propounded be a Particular proposition.

If you prove the universal affirmative, you will at the same time prove the particular; if you prove the universal negative, you prove the particular negative also. The universal _loci_ from Opposites, from Conjugates, from Inflections, will be alike applicable to particular propositions. Thus, if we look at the universal _locus_ from Contraries, If all pleasure is good, then all pain is evil,--this will apply also to the particular, If some pleasure is good, then some pain is evil: in the particular as in the universal form the proposition is alike an _Endox_ or conformable to common received opinion. The like may be said about the _loci_ from _Habitus_ and _Privatio_; also about those from Generation and Destruction;[144] again, from More, Less, and Equally--this last, however, with some restriction, for the _locus_ from Less will serve only for proving an affirmative. Thus, if some capacity is a less good than science, while yet some capacity is a good, then, _à fortiori_, some science is a good. But, if you take the same _locus_ in the negative and say that the capacity is a good, you will not be warranted in saying, for that reason, that no science is a good.[145] You may apply this same _locus_ from Less to compare, not merely two subjects in different genera, but also two subjects of different degrees under the same genus. Thus, let the thesis be, Some science or cognition is a good. You will disprove this thesis, if you can show that prudence ([Greek: phro/nêsis]) is not a good; for, if prudence, which in common opinion is most confidently held to be a good, be really not so, you may argue that, _à fortiori_ no other science can be so. Again, let the thesis be propounded with the assumption that, if it can be proved true or false in any one case, it shall be accepted as true or false in all universally (for example, that, if the human soul is immortal, all other souls are immortal also; or if not that, then none of the others): evidently, the propounder of such a thesis extends the particular into an universal. If he propounds his thesis affirmatively, you must try to prove the negative in some particular case; for this, under the conditions supposed, will be equivalent to proving an universal negative. If, on the other hand, he puts his thesis negatively, you will try to prove some particular affirmative; which (always under the given conditions) will carry the universal affirmative also.[146]

[Footnote 144: Ibid. vi. p. 119, a. 32-b. 16. [Greek: o(moi/ôs ga\r e)/ndoxon to\ a)xiô=sai, ei) pa=sa ê(donê\ a)gatho/n, kai\ lu/pên pa=san ei)=nai kako/n, tô=| ei)/ tis ê(donê\ a)gatho/n, kai\ lu/pên ei)=nai/ tina kako/n--e)n a(/pasi ga\r o(moi/ôs to\ e)/ndoxon.]]

[Footnote 145: Ibid. b. 17-30. [Greek: dê=lon ou)=n o(/ti kataskeua/zein mo/non e)k tou= ê(=tton e)/stin.]]

[Footnote 146: Topic. III. vi. p. 119, b. 31-p. 120, a. 5.]

Suppose the respondent to propound his thesis indefinitely, not carrying the indication either of universal or particular; _e.g._, Pleasure is good. This can be proved by showing either that all pleasure is good, or that some pleasure is good; while it can be refuted only through the universal negative--by showing that no pleasure is good.[147] But, if the thesis be divested of its indefinite character and propounded either as universal or as particular, there will then be two distinct ways of refuting it. If it be farther specialized--_e.g._, One pleasure only is good--there will be three ways of refuting: you may show either that all pleasures are good; or that no pleasure is good; or that more pleasures than one are good. If the proposition be specialized farther still--_e.g._, Prudence alone among all the virtues is science,--there are four lines of argument open for refuting it: you may prove either that all virtue is science; or that no virtue is science; or that some other virtue (such as justice) is science; or that prudence is not science.[148]

[Footnote 147: Ibid. p. 120, a. 6-20: [Greek: a)diori/stou me\n ou)=n o)/ntos tou= problê/matos monachô=s a)naskeua/zein e)nde/chetai--a)nairei=n me\n monachô=s e)nde/chetai, kataskeua/zein de\ dichô=s.] &c.]

[Footnote 148: Ibid. a. 15-31.]

In dealing with a particular proposition as thesis, still other _loci_ already indicated for dealing with universal propositions will be available. You will run through the particulars comprised in the subject, distributed into genera and species. When you have produced a number of particulars successively to establish the universal, affirmative or negative, you are warranted in calling on the respondent either to admit the universal, or to produce on his side some adverse particular.[149] You will also (as was before recommended) distribute the predicate of the thesis into the various species which it comprehends. If no one of these species be truly affirmable of the subject, then neither can the genus be truly affirmable; so that you will have refuted the thesis, supposing it to be affirmative. If, on the contrary, any one of the species be truly affirmable of the subject, then the genus will also be truly affirmable; so that you will have refuted the thesis, supposing it to be negative. Thus, if the thesis propounded be, The soul is a number: you divide number into its two species, odd and even, and prove that the soul is neither odd nor even; wherefore, it is not a number.[150]

[Footnote 149: Ibid. a. 32-38: [Greek: a)/n te ga\r panti\ phai/nêtai u(pa/rchon a)/n te mêdeni/, polla\ proene/gkanti a)xiôte/on katho/lou o(mologei=n, ê)\ phe/rein e)/nstasin e)pi\ ti/nos ou)ch ou(/tôs.]]

[Footnote 150: Topic. III. vi. p. 120, a. 37-b. 6. It would appear from the examples here given by Aristotle--[Greek: o( chro/nos ou) kinei=tai, o( chro/nos ou)/k e)sti ki/nêsis, ê( psuchê\ ou)/k e)stin a)rithmo/s], that he considers these propositions as either indefinite or particular.]

IV.

After this long catalogue of _Loci_ belonging to debate on propositions of Accident, Aristotle proceeds to enumerate those applicable to propositions of Genus and of Proprium. Neither Genus nor Proprium is often made subject of debate as such; but both of them are constituent elements of the debate respecting Definition, which is of frequent occurrence.[151] For that reason, both deserve to be studied.

[Footnote 151: Ibid. IV. i. p. 120, b. 12: [Greek: meta\ de\ tau=ta peri\ tô=n pro\s to\ ge/nos kai\ to\ i)/dion e)piskepte/on; e)/sti de\ tau=ta stoichei=a tô=n pro\s tou\s o(/rous; peri\ au)tô=n de\ tou/tôn o)liga/kis ai( ske/pseis gi/nontai toi=s dialegome/nois.]]

When the thesis propounded affirms that A is genus of B, you will run over all the cognates of B, and see whether there is any one among them respecting which A cannot be affirmed as genus. If there be, this is a good argument against the thesis; for the genus ought to be predicable of all. Next, whether what is really no more than an accident is affirmed as genus, which ought to belong to the essence of the subject. Perhaps (_e.g._) white is affirmed in the thesis as being genus of snow; but white cannot be truly so affirmed; for it is not of the essence of snow, but is only a quality or accident.[152] Examine whether the predicate A comes under the definition already given of an Accident,--that which may or may not be predicated of the subject; also, whether A and B both fall under the same one out of the ten Categories or Predicaments. If B the subject comes under _Essentia_, or _Quale_, or _Ad Aliquid_, the predicate ought also to belong to _Essentia_, or _Quale_, or _Ad Aliquid_: the species and the genus ought to come under the same Category.[153] If this be not the case in a thesis of Genus, the thesis cannot be maintained.

[Footnote 152: Ibid. b. 23-29.]

[Footnote 153: Ibid. p. 120, b. 36-p. 121, a. 9. [Greek: katho/lou d' ei)pei=n u(po\ tê\n au)tê\n diai/resin dei= to\ ge/nos tô=| ei)/dei ei)=nai.]

Aristotle here enunciates this as universally true, whereas if we turn to Categor. p. 11, a. 24, seq. we shall find him declaring it not to be universally true. Compare also Topic. IV. iv. p. 124, b. 15.]

You are aware that the species always partakes of the genus, while the genus never partakes of the species; to _partake_ meaning that the species includes the essence or definition of the genus, but the genus never includes the essence or definition of the species. You will examine, therefore, whether in the thesis propounded to you this condition is realized; if not, the thesis may be refuted. Suppose, _e.g._, that it enunciates some superior genus as including _Ens_ or _Unum_. If this were true, the genus so assigned would still partake of _Ens_ and _Unum_; for _Ens_ and _Unum_ maybe predicated of all existences whatever. Therefore what is enunciated in the thesis as a genus, cannot be a real genus.[154]

[Footnote 154: Topic. IV. i. p. 121, a. 10-19.]

Perhaps you may find something respecting which the subject (species) may be truly affirmed, while the predicate (genus) cannot be truly affirmed. If so, the predicate is not a real genus. Thus, the thesis may enunciate _Ens_ or _Scibile_ as being the genus of _Opinabile_. But this last, the species or subject _Opinabile_, may be affirmed respecting _Non-Ens_ also; while the predicates _Ens_ or _Scibile_ (given as the pretended genus of _Opinabile_) cannot be affirmed respecting _Non-Ens_. You can thus show that _Ens_ or _Scibile_ is not the real genus of _Opinabile_.[155] The pretended species _Opinabile_ (comprising as it does both _Ens_ and _Non-Ens_) stretches farther than the pretended genus _Ens_ or _Scibile_: whereas every real genus ought to stretch farther than any one or any portion of its constituent species.[156] The thesis may thus be overthrown, if there be any one species which stretches even equally far or is co-extensive with the pretended genus.[157]

[Footnote 155: Ibid. a. 20-26.]

[Footnote 156: Ibid. b. 1-14. [Greek: stoichei=on de\ pro\s a(/panta ta\ toiau=ta, to\ e)pi\ ple/on to\ ge/nos ê)\ to\ ei)=dos kai\ tê\n diaphora\n le/gesthai; e)p' e)/latton ga\r kai\ ê( diaphora\ tou= ge/nous le/getai.]]

[Footnote 157: Ibid. b. 4.]

It is a general truth that the same species cannot belong to two distinct genera, unless one of the two be subordinate to the other, or unless both of them be comprehended under some common higher genus. You will examine, therefore, whether there is any other genus, besides the predicate of the thesis, to which the subject of the thesis can be referred. If there be some other genus, not under either of the two conditions above indicated, the predicate enunciated by the thesis cannot be the real genus of the subject. Thus, if the thesis declares justice to be science (or to belong to the genus science), you may remark that there is another distinct genus (virtue) to which justice also belongs. In this particular case, however, it would be replied that science and virtue can both be referred to one and the same higher genus, viz., habit and disposition. Therefore the thesis, Justice is science, will not be truly open to objection on this ground.[158]

[Footnote 158: Topic. IV. ii. p. 121, b. 24, seq.]

Again, if the predicate of the thesis be the true genus of the subject, all the higher genera in which the predicate is contained must also be predicated _in Quid_ (as the predicate itself is**) respecting the subject. This you must show by an induction of particular instances, no counter-instance being producible.[159] If the thesis enunciated does not conform to this condition, you will have a good argument against it. You will also run over the sub-species that are comprehended in the subject of the thesis, considered as a genus; and you will examine whether the predicate of the thesis (together with all its superior genera) is predicable essentially or _in Quid_ of all these sub-species. If you can find any one among these sub-species, of which it is not essentially predicable, the predicate of the thesis is not the true genus of the subject;[160] the like also, if the definitions of those genera are not predicable of the subject or its sub-species.[161]

[Footnote 159: Ibid. p. 122, a. 5-19. [Greek: o(/ti de\ e(no\s e)n tô=| ti/ e)sti katêgoroume/nou pa/nta ta\ loipa/, a)/nper katêgorê=tai, e)n tô=| ti/ e)sti katêgorêthê/setai, di' e)pagôgê=s lêpte/on.]]

[Footnote 160: Ibid. a. 21-b. 6.]

[Footnote 161: Ibid. b. 7-11. [Greek: ei) ou)=n diaphônei=, dê=lon o(/ti ou) ge/nos to\ a)podothe/n.]]

Perhaps the thesis may enunciate as a genus what is really nothing more than a differentia. It may also enunciate the differentia either as a part of the genus or as a part of the species; or it may enunciate the genus either as a part of the differentia or as a part of the species. All these are attackable. The differentia is not a genus, nor does it respond to the question _Quid est_, but to the question _Quale quid est_. It is always either **more extensive than the species, or co-extensive therewith.[162] If none of the differentiæ belonging to a genus can be predicated of a species, neither can the genus itself be predicated thereof. Thus, neither odd nor even can be predicated of the soul; accordingly, neither can the genus (number) be predicated of the soul.[163] If the species be _prius naturâ_, so that when it disappears the enunciated genus disappears along with it, this cannot be the real genus; nor, if the enunciated genus or differentia can be supposed to disappear and yet the species does not disappear along with them.[164] If the species partakes of (includes in its essence) something contrary to the enunciated genus, this last cannot be the real genus; nor, if the species includes something which cannot possibly belong to what is in that genus. Thus, if the soul partakes of (or includes in its essence) life, and if no number can possibly live, the soul cannot be a species of number.[165]

[Footnote 162: Ibid. b. 12-p. 123, a. 10. [Greek: ou)de\ dokei= mete/chein ê( diaphora\ tou= ge/nous; pa=n ga\r to\ mete/chon tou= ge/nous ê)\ ei)=dos ê)\ a)/tomo/n e)stin. a)ei\ ga\r ê( diaphora\ e)p' i)/sês ê)\ e)pi\ plei=on tou= ei)/dous le/getai.--e)pi\ ple/on te ga\r to\ ge/nos tê=s diaphora=s dei= le/gesthai, kai\ mê\ mete/chein tê=s diaphora=s.]

As an example to illustrate the enclosing of the genus within the species ([Greek: ei) to\ ge/nos ei)s to\ ei)=dos e)/thêken]), Aristotle cites a definition given by Plato, who defined [Greek: tê\n kata\ to/pon ki/nêsin], as [Greek: phora/n]. Now [Greek: phora\] is less extensive in its meaning than [Greek: ê( kata\ to/pon ki/nêsis], which includes [Greek: ba/disis] and other terms of motion apart from or foreign to [Greek: phora/].--Example of enunciating differentia as a genus is, if immortal be given as the genus to which a god belongs. Immortal is the differentia belonging to [Greek: zô=|on], and constituting therewith the species god.--Example of enclosing the differentia in the genus is, if odd be given as the essence of number ([Greek: o(/per a)rithmo/n]).--Example of enclosing differentia in the species is, if immortal be put forward as the essence of a god ([Greek: o(/per theo/n]).--Example of enclosing the genus in the differentia is, number given as the essence of the odd.--Example of enunciating the genus as a differentia is, when change of place is given as the differentia of [Greek: phora/].]

[Footnote 163: Topic. IV. ii. p. 123, a. 11-14.]

[Footnote 164: Ibid. a. 14-19.]

[Footnote 165: Ibid. iii. a. 20-26.]

Again, the generic term and the specific term ought to be univocal in signification. You must examine (according to the tests indicated in the First Book of the Topica) whether it be taken equivocally in the thesis. If it be so, you have a ground of attack, and also if it be taken metaphorically; for every genus ought to be enunciated in the proper sense of the term, and no metaphor can be allowed to pass as a genus.[166] Note farther that every true genus has more than one distinct species. You will, therefore, examine whether any other species, besides the subject of the thesis, can be suggested as belonging to the predicate of the thesis. If none, that predicate cannot be the true genus of the subject.[167]

[Footnote 166: Ibid. a. 27-37. [Greek: skopei=n de\ kai\ ei) to\ metaphora=| lego/menon ô(s ge/nos a)pode/dôken, oi(=on tê\n sôphrosu/nên sumphôni/an; pa=n ga\r ge/nos kuri/ôs kata\ tô=n ei)dô=n katêgorei=tai, ê( de\ sumphôni/a kata\ tê=s sôphrosu/nês ou) kuri/ôs a)lla\ metaphora=|; pa=sa ga\r sumphôni/a e)n phtho/ggois.]]

[Footnote 167: Topic. IV. iii. p. 123, a. 30.]

Several _loci_ are furnished by Contraries, either to the species or the genus. If there be something contrary to the species, but nothing contrary to the genus, then that which is contrary to the species ought to be included under the same genus as the species itself; but, if there be something contrary to the species, and also something contrary to the genus, then that which is contrary to the species ought to be included in that which is contrary to the genus. Each of these doctrines you will have to make good by induction of particular cases.[168] If that which is contrary to the species be a genus itself (_e.g._, _bonum_) and not included in any superior genus, then the like will be true respecting the species itself: it will not be included in any genus; and the predicate of the thesis will not be a true genus. _Bonum_ and _malum_ are not included in any common superior genus; each is a genus _per se_.[169] Or suppose that the subject (species) of the thesis, and the predicate (genus) of the thesis, have both of them contraries; but that in the one there is an intermediate between the two contraries, and in the other, not. This shows that the predicate cannot be the true genus of the species; for, wherever there is an intermediate between the two contraries of the species, there also is an intermediate between the two contraries of the genus; and _vice versâ_.[170] If there be an intermediate between the two contraries of the species, and also an intermediate between the two contraries of the genus, you will examine whether both intermediates are of like nature, designated by analogous terms. If it be not so (if, _e.g._, the one intermediate is designated by a positive term, and the other only by a negative term), you will have ground for contending against the thesis, that the predicate enunciated therein is not the true genus of the subject. At any rate, this is a probable ([Greek: e)/ndoxon]) dialectical argument--to insist upon analogy between the two intermediates; though there are some particular cases in which the doctrine does not hold.[171]

[Footnote 168: Ibid. b. 1-8. [Greek: phanero\n de\ tou/tôn e(/kaston dia\ tê=s e)pagôgê=s].]

[Footnote 169: Ibid. b. 8-12.]

[Footnote 170: Topic. IV. iii. p. 123, b. 12, seq.]

[Footnote 171: Ibid. b. 17-23: [Greek: e)/nstasis tou/tou o(/ti u(giei/as kai\ no/sou ou)de\n metaxu/, kakou= de\ kai\ a)gathou=; ê)\ ei) e)/sti me/n ti a)mphoi=n a)na\ me/son, kai\ tô=n ei)dô=n kai\ tô=n genô=n, mê\ o(moi/ôs de/, a)lla\ tô=n me\n kat' a)po/phasin, tô=n d' ô(s u(pokei/menon. _e)/ndoxon ga\r to\ o(moi/ôs a)mphoi=n_, katha/per e)p' a)retê=s kai\ kaki/as, kai\ dikaiosu/nês kai\ a)diki/as; a)mphoi=n ga\r kata\ a)po/phasin ta\ a)na\ me/son.]]

Again, suppose different conditions: that there is no contrary to the genus, but that there is a contrary to the species. You will examine whether not merely the contrary of the species, but also the intermediate between its two contraries, is included in the same genus; for, if the two contraries are included therein, the intermediate ought also to be included. This is a line of argument _probable_ (_i.e._, conformable to general presumption, and recommendable in a dialectical debate), though there are not wanting examples adverse to it: thus, excess and defect are included in the same genus evil, but the moderate or measured ([Greek: to\ me/trion]) is not in the genus evil, but in the genus good.[172] We must remark, moreover, that though it be a probable dialectical argument, that, wherever the genus has a contrary, the species will also have a contrary, yet there are cases adverse to this principle. Thus, sickness in general has for its contrary health in general; but particular species of sickness (such as fever, ophthalmia, gout, &c.) have no contrary.[173]

[Footnote 172: Ibid. b. 23-30.]

[Footnote 173: Ibid. b. 30-37.]

Such will be your way of procedure, if the thesis propounded be Affirmative, and if you have to make out a negative against it. But if, on the contrary, the thesis be Negative, so that you have to make out an affirmative against it, you have then three lines of procedure open. 1. The genus may have no contrary, while the species has a contrary: in that case, you may perhaps be able to show that the contrary of the species (subject) is included in the predicate of the thesis (genus); if so, then the species also will be included therein. 2. Or, if you can show that the intermediate between the species and its contrary is included in the predicate (genus), then that same genus will also include the species and its contrary; for, wherever the intermediate is, there also are the two extremes between which it is intermediate. 3. Lastly, if the genus has a contrary as well as the species, you may be able to show that the contrary of the species is included in the contrary of the genus; assuming which to be the case, then the species itself will be included in the genus.[174] These are the three modes of procedure, if your task is to make out the negative.

[Footnote 174: Topic. IV. iii. p. 124, a. 1-9.]

If the genus enunciated by the thesis be a true one, all the Derivatives and Collaterals of the predicate will be fit and suitable for those of the subject. Thus, if justice be a sort of science, justly will be scientifically, and the just man will be a scientific man. This _locus_ is useful to be kept in mind, whether you have to make out an affirmative or a negative.[175] You may reason in the same way about the _Analoga_ of the predicate and the subject; about the productive and destructive causes of each; the manifestations present, past, and future, of each, &c.[176]

[Footnote 175: Ibid. a. 10-14.]

[Footnote 176: Ibid. iv. p. 124, a. 15-34.]

When the opposite of the species (subject) is Privative, the thesis will be open to attack in two ways. 1. If the privative opposite be contained in the predicate, the subject itself will not be contained therein; for it is a general truth that a subject and its privative opposite are never both of them contained in the same lowest genus: thus, if vision is sensible perception, blindness is not sensible perception. 2. If both the species and the genus have privative opposites, then if the privative opposite of the species be contained in the privative opposite of the genus, the species itself will also be contained in the genus; if not, not. Thus, if blindness be an inability of sensible perception, vision will be a sensible perception. This last _locus_ will be available, whether you are making out an affirmative or a negative.[177]

[Footnote 177: Ibid. a. 35-b. 6.]

If the predicate of the thesis be a true genus, you may convert the thesis simply, having substituted for the predicate the denial of its Contradictory; if not, not. _Vice versâ_, if the new proposition so formed be true, the predicate of the thesis will be a true genus; if not, not. Thus, if good be the true genus of pleasurable, nothing that is not good will be pleasurable. This _locus_ also will serve both for making out an affirmative and for making out a negative.[178]

[Footnote 178: Topic. IV. iv. p. 124, b. 7-14: [Greek: pa/lin e)pi\ tô=n a)popha/seôn skopei=n a)na/palin], &c.]

If the subject (species) of the thesis be a Relative, you will examine whether the predicate (genus) be relative also; if not, it will not be the true genus of the subject. The converse of this rule, however, will not hold; and indeed the rule itself is not absolutely universal.[179] You may also argue that, if the correlate of the genus be not the same as the correlate of the species, the genus cannot be truly predicated of that species: thus, half is the correlate of double, but half is not the proper correlate of multiple; therefore, multiple is not the true genus of double. But your argument may here be met by contradictory instances; thus, cognition has reference to the _cognitum_, but _habitus_ and _dispositio_ (the genera to which _cognitio_ belongs) do not refer to _cognitum_ but to _anima_.[180] You may also examine whether the correlate, when applied to the genus, is put in the same case (_e.g._, genitive, dative, &c.) as when it is applied to the species: if it be put into a different case, this affords presumption that the genus is not a true genus; though here again instances may be produced showing that your presumption will not hold universally. Farther, you will observe whether the correlates thus similarly inflected reciprocate like the species and genus; if not, this will furnish you with the same adverse presumption.[181]

[Footnote 179: Ibid. b. 15-22.]

[Footnote 180: Ibid. b. 23-34.]

[Footnote 181: Ibid. b. 35, seq.]

Again, examine whether the correlate of the genus is genus to the correlate of the species; if it be not so, you may argue that the genus is not truly predicated. Thus, if the thesis affirms that _perceptio_ is the genus of _cognitio_, it will follow that _percipibile_ is the genus of _cognoscibile_. Now this cannot be maintained; for there are some _cognoscibilia_ which are not perceivable, _e.g._, some _cogitabilia_ (_intelligibilia_, [Greek: noêta/]). Since therefore _percipibile_ is not the true genus of _cognoscibile_, neither can _perceptio_ be the true genus of _cognitio_.[182]

[Footnote 182: Ibid. p. 125, a. 25-32: [Greek: o(ra=n de\ kai\ ei) tou= a)ntikeime/nou to\ a)ntikei/menon ge/nos, oi(=on ei) tou= diplasi/ou to\ pollapla/sion kai\ tou= ê(mi/seos to\ pollostêmo/rion; dei= ga\r to\ a)ntikei/menon tou= a)ntikeime/nou ge/nos ei)=nai.]

We must take note here of the large sense in which Aristotle uses [Greek: A)ntikei/mena]--_Opposita_, including as one of the four varieties _Relata_ and _Correlata_ = _Relativé-Opposita_ (to use a technical word familiar in logical manuals). I have before (_supra_, p. 105) remarked the inconvenience of calling the Relative _opposite_ to its Correlate; and have observed that it is logically incorrect to treat _Relata_ as a species or mode of the genus _Opposita_. The reverse would be more correct: we ought to rank _Opposita_ or a species or mode under the genus _Relata_. Since Aristotle numbers _Relata_ among the ten Categories, he ought to have seen that it cannot be included as a subordinate under any superior genus.]

Suppose the thesis predicates of memory that it is--a continuance of cognition. This will be open to attack, if the predicate be affirmed as the genus (or even as the accident) of the subject. For every continuance must be _in_ that which continues. But memory is of necessity _in_ the soul; it cannot therefore be _in_ cognition.[183] There is another ground on which the thesis will be assailable, if it defines memory to be--a habit or acquirement retentive of belief. This will not hold, because it confounds habit or disposition with act; which last is the true description of memory. The opposite error will be committed if the respondent defines perceptivity to be a--movement through or by means of the body. Here perceptivity, which is a habit or disposition, is ranked under movement, which is the act exercising the same, _i.e._, perceptivity in actual exercise.[184] Or, the mistake may be made of ranking some habit or disposition under the power consequent on the possession thereof, as if this power were the superior genus: thus the respondent may define gentleness to be a continence of anger; courage, a continence of fears; justice, a continence of appetite of lucre. But the genus here assigned is not a good one: for a man who feels no anger is called gentle; a man who feels no fear is called courageous; whereas the continent man is he who feels anger or fear, but controls them. Such controlling power is a natural consequence of gentleness and courage, insomuch that, if the gentle man happened to feel anger, or the courageous man to feel fear, each would control these impulses; but it is no part of the essence thereof, and therefore cannot be the genus under which they fall.[185] A like mistake is made if pain be predicated as the genus of anger, or supposition as the genus of belief. The angry man doubtless feels pain, but his pain precedes his anger in time, and is the antecedent cause thereof; now the genus can never precede its species in time. So also a man may have the same supposition sometimes with belief, sometimes without it; accordingly, supposition cannot be the genus of belief any more than the same animal can be sometimes a man, sometimes a brute.[186] And indeed the same negative conclusion would follow, even if we granted that every supposition was always attended with belief. For, in that case, supposition and belief would be co-extensive terms; but the generic term must always be more extensive than its specific.[187]

[Footnote 183: Topic. IV. iv. p. 125, b. 6: [Greek: oi(=on ei) tê\n mnê/mên _monê\n e)pistê/mês_ ei)=pen. pa=sa ga\r monê\ e)n tô=| me/nonti kai\ peri\ e)kei=no, ô(/ste kai\ ê( tê=s e)pistê/mês monê\ e)n tê=| e)pistê/mê|. ê( mnê/mê a)/ra e)n tê=| e)pistê/mê|, e)peidê\ monê\ tê=s e)pistê/mês e)sti/n. tou=to d' ou)k e)nde/chetai; mnê/mê ga\r pa=sa e)n psuchê=|.] A definition similar to this is found in the Kratylus of Plato, p. 437, B.: [Greek: e)/peita de\ ê( mnê/mê panti/ pou mênu/ei o(/ti monê/ e)stin e)n tê=| psuchê=|, a)ll' ou) phora/.]]

[Footnote 184: Ibid. v. p. 125, b. 15-19. [Greek: oi(=on tê\n ai)/sthêsin _ki/nêsin dia\ sô/matos_; ê( me\n ga\r ai)/sthêsis e(/xis, ê( de\ ki/nêsis e)ne/rgeia.] This, too, seems to allude to Plato's explanation of [Greek: ai)/sthêsis] in the Timæus, pp. 43, C, 64, B; compare also the Platonic or pseudo-Platonic Definitiones, p. 414, C.]

[Footnote 185: Topic. IV. v. p. 125, b. 20-27.]

[Footnote 186: Waitz, in his notes (p. 478), says that Aristotle is here in the wrong. But I do not agree with Waitz. Aristotle considers [Greek: pi/stis] to be an accidental accompaniment of [Greek: u(po/lêpsis], not a species thereof. It may be present or absent without determining any new specific name to [Greek: u(po/lêpsis], which term has reference only to the intellectual or conceptive part of the mental supposition. At least there seems to be nothing contradictory or erroneous in what Aristotle here says, though he does not adhere everywhere to this restricted meaning of [Greek: u(po/lêpsis]]

[Footnote 187: Topic. IV. v. p. 125, b. 28-p. 126, a. 2.]

You will farther examine whether the predicate of the thesis be of a nature to inhere in the same substance as the subject. If it be not, it cannot be truly predicated thereof, either as genus or even as accident. White (species) and colour (genus) are of a nature to inhere or belong to the same substance. But, if the thesis declares that shame is a species of fear, or that anger is a species of pain, you may impugn it on the ground that shame belongs to the reasoning element in man, fear to the courageous or energetic element; and that pain belongs to the appetitive element, anger to the courageous. This proves that fear can neither be the genus nor the accident of shame; that pain can neither be the genus nor the accident of anger.[188]

[Footnote 188: Ibid. p. 126, a. 3-16. Compare V. iv. p. 133, a. 31. Aristotle appears here to recognize the Platonic doctrine as laid down in the Republic and Timæus, asserting either three distinct parts of the soul, or, rather, three distinct souls. In the treatise De Animâ (III. ix. p. 432, a. 25; I. v. p. 411, b. 25), he dissents from and impugns this same doctrine.]

Suppose the thesis declares that animal is a species under the genus _visibile_ or _percepibile_. You may oppose it by pointing out that animal is only _visibile secundum quid_, or partially; that is, only so far as regards body, not as regards mind. But the species always partakes of its genus wholly, not partially or _secundum quid_; thus, man is not partially animal, but wholly or essentially animal. If what is predicated as the genus be not thus essentially partaken, it cannot be a true genus; hence neither _visibile_ nor _percepibile_ is a true genus of animal.[189]

[Footnote 189: Topic. IV. v. p. 126, a. 17-25.]

Sometimes what is predicated as the genus is, when compared to its species, only as a part to the whole; which is never the case with a true genus. Some refer animal to the genus living body; but body is only part of the whole animal, and therefore cannot be the true genus thereof.[190] Sometimes a species which is blameworthy and hateful, or a species which is praiseworthy and eligible, may be referred to the power or capacity from which it springs, as genus; thus, the thief, a blameworthy and hateful character, may be referred to the predicate--capable of stealing another man's property. But this, though true as a predicate, is not the true genus; for the honest man is also capable of so acting, but he is distinguished from the thief by not acting so, nor having the disposition so to act. All power and capacity is eligible; if the above were the true genus of thief, it would be a case in which power and capacity is blameworthy and hateful. Neither, on the other hand, can any thing in its own nature praiseworthy and eligible, be referred to power and capacity as its genus; for all power and capacity is praiseworthy and eligible not in itself or its own nature, but by reason of something else, namely, its realizable consequences.[191]

[Footnote 190: Ibid. a. 26-29.]

[Footnote 191: Topic. IV. v. p. 126, a. 30-b. 6: [Greek: o(ra=n de\ kai\ ei)/ ti tô=n psektô=n ê)\ pheutô=n ei)s du/namin ê)\ to\ dunato\n e)/thêken, oi(=on to\n sophistê\n ê)\ dia/bolon ê)\ kle/ptên to\n duna/menon la/thra ta\ a)llo/tria kle/ptein.]

The general drift of Aristotle is here illustrated better by taking the thief separately, apart from the other two. But we must notice here the proof of his temper or judgment concerning the persons called Sophists, when we find him grouping them in the bunch of [Greek: psekta\] and [Greek: pheukta\] along with thieves. The majority of his uninstructed contemporaries would probably have agreed in this judgment, but they would certainly have enrolled Aristotle himself among the Sophists thus depreciated.]

Again, you may detect in the thesis sometimes the mistake of putting under one genus a species which properly comes under two genera conjointly, not subalternate one to the other; sometimes, the mistake of predicating the genus as a differentia, or the differentia as a genus.[192] Sometimes, also, the subject in which the attribute or affection resides is predicated as if it were the genus of such affection; or, _è converso_, the attribute or affection is predicated as the genus of the subject wherein it resides; _e.g._, when breath or wind, which is really a movement of air, is affirmed to be air put in motion, and thus constituted as a species under the genus air; or when snow is declared to be water congelated; or mud, to be earth mixed with moisture.[193] In none of these cases is the predicate a true genus; for it cannot be always affirmed of the subject.

[Footnote 192: Ibid. b. 7-33.]

[Footnote 193: Ibid. b. 34-p. 127, a. 19.]

Or perhaps the predicate affirmed as genus may be no genus at all; for nothing can be a genus unless there are species contained under it; _e.g._, if the thesis declare white to be a genus, this may be impugned, because white objects do not differ _in specie_ from each other. Or a mere universal predicate (such as _Ens_ or _Unum_) may be put forward as a genus or differentia; or a simple concomitant attribute, or an equivocal term, may be so put forward.[194]

[Footnote 194: Topic. IV. vi. p. 127, a. 20-b. 7.]

Perhaps it may happen that the subject (species) and the predicate (genus) of the thesis may each have a contrary term; and that in each pair of contrary terms one may be better, the other worse. If, in that case, the better species be referred to the worse genus, or _vice versâ_, this will render the thesis assailable. Or perhaps the species may be fit to be referred equally to both the contrary genera; in which case, if the thesis should refer it to the worse of the two, that will be a ground of objection. Thus, if the soul be referred to the genus _mobile_, you are at liberty to object that it is equally referable to the genus _stabile_: and that, as the latter is the better of the two, it ought to be referred to the better in preference to the worse.[195]

[Footnote 195: Ibid. b. 8-17.]

There is a _locus_ of More and Less, which may be made available in various ways. Thus, if the genus predicated admits of being graduated as more or less, while the species of which it is predicated does not admit of such graduation, you may question the applicability of the genus to the species.[196] You may raise the question also, if there be any thing else which looks equally like the true genus, or more like it than the genus predicated by the thesis. This will happen often, when the essence of the species includes several distinct elements; _e.g._, in the essence of anger, there is included both pain (an emotional element), and the supposition or belief of being undervalued (an intellectual element); hence, if the thesis ranks anger under the genus pain, you may object that it equally belongs to the genus supposition[197] This _locus_ is useful for raising a negative question, but will serve little for establishing an affirmative. Towards the affirmative, you will find advantage in examining the subject (species) respecting which the thesis predicates a given genus; for, if it can be shown that this supposed species is no real species but a genus, the genus predicated thereof will be _à fortiori_ a genus.[198]

[Footnote 196: Ibid. b. 18-25: [Greek: e)/ti e)k tou= ma=llon kai\ ê(=tton, a)naskeua/zonti me/n, ei) to\ ge/nos de/chetai to\ ma=llon, to\ d' ei)=dos mê\ de/chetai mê/t' au)to\ mê/te to\ kat' e)kei=no lego/menon.]]

[Footnote 197: Ibid. b. 26-37: [Greek: chrê/simos d' o( to/pos e)pi\ tô=n toiou/tôn ma/lista e)ph' ô(=n plei/ô phai/netai tou= ei)/dous e)n tô=| ti/ e)sti katêgorou/mena, kai\ mê\ diô/ristai, mê/d' e)/chomen ei)pei=n poi=on au)tô=n ge/nos,] &c.]

[Footnote 198: Ibid. b. 38-p. 128, a. 12.]

Some think (says Aristotle)[199] that Differentia as well as Genus is predicated essentially respecting the Species. Accordingly, Genus must be discriminated from Differentia. For such discrimination the following characteristics are pointed out:--1. Genus has greater extent in predication than Differentia. 2. In replying to the enquiry, _Quid est?_ it is more suitable and significant to declare the Genus than the Differentia. 3. Differentia declares a quality of Genus, and therefore presupposes Genus as already known; but Genus does not in like manner presuppose Differentia. If you wish to show that belief is the genus to which cognition belongs, you must examine whether the _cognoscens_ believes _quâ cognoscens_. If he does so, your point is made out.[200]

[Footnote 199: Ibid. a. 20, seq.: [Greek: e)pei\ de\ dokei= tisi\ kai\ ê( diaphora\ e)n tô=| ti/ e)sti tô=n ei)dô=n katêgorei=sthai, chôriste/on to\ ge/nos a)po\ tê=s diaphora=s], &c.]

[Footnote 200: Topic. IV. vi. p. 128, a. 35. If you are trying to show [Greek: tê\n e)pistê/mên o(/per pi/stin], you must examine [Greek: ei) o( e)pista/menos ê(=| e)pi/statai pisteu/ei; dê=lon ga\r o(/ti ê( e)pistê/mê pi/stis a)/n tis ei)/ê.]]

Wherever a predicate is universally true of its subject, while the proposition is not true if simply converted (_i.e._, wherever the predicate is of larger extension than the subject), there is difficulty in distinguishing it from a genus. Accordingly, when you are respondent, maintaining the affirmative side, you will use such predicate as if it were a genus; but, when you are assailant, you will not allow the respondent to do so. You may quote against him the instance of _Non-Ens_; which is predicable of every thing generated, but which is not a genus, since it has no species under it.[201]

[Footnote 201: Ibid. a. 38-b. 9.]

V.

Aristotle passes, in the Fifth book of the Topica, to those debates in which the thesis set up declares the predicate as Proprium of the subject.

A Proprium may belong to its subject either _per se_ and _semper_, or relatively to something else and occasionally or sometimes. It is a proprium _per se_ of man to be an animal by nature tractable. It is a relative proprium of the soul in regard to the body, to exercise command; of the body in regard to the soul, to obey command. It is a proprium _semper_ of a god, to be immortal; it is an occasional _proprium_ (_i.e._, sometimes) of this or that man, to be walking in the market-place.[202] When the proprium is set out relatively to something else, the debate must involve two questions, and may involve four. Thus, if the thesis affirms that it is a proprium of man relatively to horse (discriminating man from horse) to be by nature two-footed, you may (as opponent) either deny that man is two-footed, or affirm that horse is two-footed; or you may go farther and affirm that man is by nature four-footed, or deny that horse is by nature four-footed. If you can succeed in showing any one of these four, you will have refuted the thesis.[203]

[Footnote 202: Ibid. V. i. p. 128, b. 14-21. That which Aristotle calls Proprium _per se_ is a proprium of the subject as much _relative_ as what he calls specially the _relative_ Proprium. The Proprium _per se_ discriminates the subject from everything else; the _relative_ Proprium discriminates it from some given correlate.]

[Footnote 203: Topic. V. i. p. 128, b. 22-33.]

The Proprium _per se_ discriminates its subject from everything else, and is universally true thereof; the _relative_ Proprium discriminates its subject only from some other assignable subject. The relative Proprium may be either constant and universally true, or true with exceptions--true and applicable in the ordinary course of things: it may be tested through those _Loci_ which have been enumerated as applicable to the Accident. The Proprium _per se_, and the _constant_ Proprium, have certain _Loci_ of their own, which we shall now indicate. These are the most logical (_sensu Aristotelico_) or suitable for Dialectic; furnishing the most ample matter for debates.[204]

[Footnote 204: Ibid. b. 34-p. 129, a. 35. [Greek: tô=n d' i)di/ôn e)sti\ _lo/gika\_ ma/lista;] &c. He explains presently what he means by [Greek: logika/--logiko\n de\ tou=t' e)sti\ pro/blêma, pro\s o(\ lo/goi ge/noit' a)\n kai\ suchnoi\ kai\ kaloi/]. The distinctions in this paragraph are not very sharply drawn.]

Aristotle distinguishes (1) those cases in which the alleged proprium is a true proprium, but is incorrectly or informally set out in the thesis, from those (2) in which it is untruly predicated, or is no proprium at all.

To set out a proprium well, that which is predicated ought to be clearer and better known than the subject of which it is predicated, since the purpose of predicating the proprium is to communicate knowledge.[205] If it be more obscure or less known, you may impugn the thesis as bad in form, or badly set out. Thus, if the thesis declare, as a proprium of fire, that fire is of all things the most like to the soul, this is not well set out, because the essence of the soul is not so well known as the essence of fire. Moreover, the fact that the predicate belongs to the subject, ought to be better known even than the subject itself; for whoever is ignorant that A belongs to B at all, cannot possibly know that A is the proprium of B.[206] Thus, if the thesis declare, as proprium of fire, that it is the first or most universal subject in which it is the nature of soul to be found, the predicate is here doubly unknowable: first, the hearer does not know that the soul is found in fire at all; next, he does not know that fire is the _first_ subject in which soul is found. On the other hand, the respondent will repel your attack if he can show that his proprium is more knowable in both the two above-mentioned ways. If, for example, he declares as thesis, To have sensible perception is the proprium of an animal, here the proprium is both well known in itself, and well known as belonging to the given subject. Accordingly, it is well set out, as far as this condition is concerned.[207]

[Footnote 205: Ibid. p. 129, b. 7: [Greek: gnô/seôs ga\r e(/neka to\ i)/dion poiou/metha; dia\ gnôrimôte/ron ou)=n a)podote/on; ou(/tô ga\r e)/stai katanoei=n i(kanô=s ma=llon.]

He repeats the same dictum, substantially, in the next page, p. 130, a. 4: [Greek: to\ ga\r i)/dion tou= mathei=n cha/rin a)podi/dotai]; and, again, p. 131, a. 1.]

[Footnote 206: Ibid. b. 15: [Greek: o( mê\ ga\r ei)dô\s ei) tô=|d' u(pa/rchei, ou)d' ei) tô=|d' u(pa/rchei mo/nô| gnôriei=.]]

[Footnote 207: Topic. V. ii. p. 129, b. 21-29.]

A second condition of its being well set out is, that it shall contain neither equivocal term nor equivocal or amphibolical proposition. Thus, if the thesis declares, To perceive is the proprium of an animal, it is equivocal; for it may mean either to have sensible perception, or to exercise sensible perception actually. You may apply the test to such a thesis, by syllogizing from one or both of these equivocal meanings. The respondent will make good his defence, if he shows that there is no such equivocation: as, for example, if the thesis be, It is a proprium of fire to be the body most easily moved into the upper region; where there is no equivocation, either of term or proposition.[208] Sometimes the equivocation may be, not in the name of the proprium itself, but in the name of the subject to which it is applied. Where this last is not _unum et simplex_ but equivocal, the thesis must specify which among the several senses is intended; and, if that be neglected, the manner of setting out is incorrect.[209]

[Footnote 208: Ibid. b. 30-p. 130, a. 13.]

[Footnote 209: Ibid. p. 130, a. 15-28.]

Another form of the like mistake is, where the same term is repeated both in the predicate and in the subject; which is often done, both as to Proprium and as to Definition, though it is a cause of obscurity, as well as a tiresome repetition.[210] The repetition may be made in two ways: either directly, by the same term occurring twice; or indirectly, when the second term given is such that it cannot be defined without repeating the first. An example of direct repetition is, Fire is a _body_ the rarest among _bodies_ (for proprium of fire). An example of indirect repetition is, Earth is a _substance_ which tends most of all _bodies_ downwards to the lowest region (as proprium of earth); for, when the respondent is required to define _bodies_, he must define them--such and such _substances_.[211] An example free from objection on this ground is, Man is an animal capable of receiving cognition (as proprium of man).

[Footnote 210: Ibid. a. 30-34. [Greek: tara/ttei ga\r to\n a)kou/onta pleona/kis lechthe/n--kai\ pro\s tou/tois a)doleschei=n dokou=sin.]]

[Footnote 211: Ibid. a. 34-b. 5. [Greek: e(/n ga\r kai\ tau)to/n e)sti sô=ma kai\ ou)si/a toiadi/; e)/stai **ga\r ou(=tos to\ _ou)si/a_ pleona/kis ei)rêkô/s.]]

Another mode of bad or incorrect setting out is, when the term predicated as proprium belongs not only to the subject, but also to all other subjects. Such a proposition is useless; for it furnishes no means of discriminating the subject from anything; whereas discrimination is one express purpose of the Proprium as well as of the Definition.[212] Again, another mode is, when the thesis declares several propria belonging to the same subject, without announcing that they are several. As the definer ought not to introduce into his definition any words beyond what are required for declaring the essence of the subject, so neither should the person who sets out a proprium add any words beyond those requisite for constituting the proprium. Thus, if the thesis enunciates, as proprium of fire, that it is the thinnest and lightest body, here are two propria instead of one. Contrast with this another proprium, free from the objection just pointed out--Moist is that which may assume every variety of figure.[213]

[Footnote 212: Topic. V. ii. p. 130, b. 12: [Greek: a)chrei=on **ga\r e)/stai to\ mê\ chôri/zon a)po/ tinôn, **to\ d' e)n toi=s i)di/ois lego/menon chôri/zein dei=, katha/per kai\ ta\ e)n toi=s o(/rois.]]

[Footnote 213: Ibid. b. 23-37.]

A farther mistake is, when the predicate declaring the proprium includes either the subject itself or some species comprehended under the subject; for example, when we are told, as a proprium of animal, that animal is a substance of which man is a species. We have already seen that the proprium ought to be better known than its subject; but man is even less known (posterior in respect to cognition) than animal, because it is a species under the genus animal.[214]

[Footnote 214: Ibid. iii. p. 130, b. 38.]

Again, our canon--That the Proprium should be better known than its subject, or should make the subject better known--will be violated in another way, if the proprium enunciated be something opposite to the subject, or in any other way _simul naturâ_ as compared with the subject; and still more, if it be _posterius naturâ_ as compared with the subject. Thus, if a man enunciates, as proprium of good, that good is that which is most opposite to evil, his proprium will not be well or correctly set out.[215]

[Footnote 215: Ibid. p. 131, a. 12-26. This _locus_ is not clear or satisfactory, as Alexander remarks in Scholia (p. 284, b. 12-23, Br.). He says that it may pass as an [Greek: e)/ndoxon]--something sufficiently plausible to be employed in Dialectic. In fact, Alexander virtually controverts this _locus_ in what he says a little farther down (Schol. p. 285, a. 31), that the Proprium is always _simul naturâ_ with its subject.]

Perhaps, again, the thesis may enunciate as proprium what is not constantly appurtenant to the subject, but is sometimes absent therefrom; or, intending to enunciate an occasional proprium, it may omit to specify the qualifying epithet _occasional_. In either case the proprium is not well set out, and a ground is furnished for censure, which ought always to be avoided.[216]

[Footnote 216: Topic. V. iii. p. 131, a. 27-b. 18. [Greek: ou)k e)/stai kalô=s kei/menon to\ i)/dion--ou)/koun dote/on e)sti\n e)pitimê/seôs skê=psin.]]