Chapter III: Categoriæ (3)

Those among the Aristotelian commentators who denied the title of _Ad Aliquid_ to a place among the Categories or _Summa Genera_ of predicates, might support their views from passages where Aristotle ranks the Genus as a _Relatum_, though he at the same time declares that the Species under it are not _Relata_. Thus _scientia_ is declared by him to be a _Relatum_; because it must be _of something--alicujus scibilis_; while the _something_ thus implied is not specified.[95] But (_scientia_) _musica_, _grammatica_, _medica_, &c., are declared not to be _Relata_; the indeterminate _something_ being there determined, and bound up in one word with the predication of Relativity. Now the truth is that both are alike _Relata_, though both also belong to the Category of Quality; a man is called _Talis_ from being _sciens_, as well as from being _grammaticus_. Again, he gives as illustrative examples of the Category _Ad Aliquid_, the adjectives double, triple. But he ranks in a different Category (that of _Quantum_) the adjectives bicubital, tricubital ([Greek: dipê=chus, tripê=chus]. It is plain that the two last of these predicates are species under the two first, and that all four predicates are alike relative, under any real definition that can be given of Relativity, though all four belong also to the Category of _Quantum_. Yet Aristotle does not recognize any predicates as belonging to _Ad Aliquid_, except such as are logically and grammatically elliptical; that is, such as do not include in themselves the specification of the Correlate, but require to be supplemented by an additional word in the genitive or dative case, specifying the latter. As we have already seen, he lays it down generally, that all _Relata_ (or _Ad Aliquid_) imply a _Correlatum_; and he prescribes that when the _Correlatum_ is indicated, care shall be taken to designate it by a precise and specific term, not of wider import than the _Relatum_,[96] but specially reciprocating therewith: thus he regards _ala_ (a wing) as _Ad Aliquid_, but when you specify its correlate in order to speak with propriety ([Greek: oi)kei/ôs]), you must describe it as _ala alati_ (not as _ala avis_), in order that the _Correlatum_ may be strictly co-extensive and reciprocating with the _Relatum_. Wing, head, hand, &c., are thus _Ad Aliquid_, though there may be no received word in the language to express their exact _Correlata_; and though you may find it necessary to coin a new word expressly for the purpose.[97] In specifying the _Correlatum_ of servant, you must say, servant _of a master_, not servant of a man or of a biped; both of which are in this case accompaniments or accidents of the master, being still accidents, though they may be in fact constantly conjoined. Unless you say master, the terms will not reciprocate; take away master, the servant is no longer to be found, though the man who was called _servant_ is still there; but take away man or biped, and the servant may still continue.[98] You cannot know the _Relatum_ determinately or accurately, unless you know the _Correlatum_ also; without the knowledge of the latter, you can only know the former in a vague and indefinite manner.[99] Aristotle raises, also, the question whether any Essence or Substance can be described as _Ad Aliquid_.[100] He inclines to the negative, though not decisively pronouncing. He seems to think that Simo and Davus, when called men, are Essences or Substances; but that when called master and slave, they are not so; this, however, is surprising, when he had just before spoken of the connotation of man as accidents ([Greek: sumbebêko/ta]) belonging to the connotation of master. He speaks of the members of an organized body (wing, head, foot) as examples of _Ad Aliquid_; while in other treatises, he determines very clearly that these members presuppose, as a _prius naturâ_, the complete organism whereof they are parts, and that the name of each member connotes the performance of, or aptitude to perform, a certain special function: now, such aptitude cannot exist unless the whole organism be held together in co-operative agency, so that if this last condition be wanting, the names, head, eye, foot, can no longer be applied to the separate members, or at least can only be applied equivocally or metaphorically.[101] It would seem therefore that the functioning _something_ is here the Essence, and that all its material properties are accidents ([Greek: sumbebêko/ta]).

[Footnote 95: Categor. p. 6, b. 12, p. 11, a. 24; Topic. iv. p. 124, b. 16. Compare also Topica, iv. p. 121, a. 1, and the Scholia thereupon, p. 278, b. 12-16, Br.; in which Scholia Alexander feels the difficulty of enrolling a generic term as [Greek: pro/s ti], while the specific terms comprised under it are not [Greek: pro/s ti]; and removes the difficulty by suggesting that [Greek: e)pistê/mê] may be at once both [Greek: poio/tês] and [Greek: pro/s ti]; and that as [Greek: poio/tês] (not as [Greek: pro/s ti]) it may be the genus including [Greek: mousikê\] and [Greek: geômetri/a], which are not [Greek: pro/s ti], but [Greek: poio/têtes].]

[Footnote 96: Categor. p. 6, b. 30, p. 7, b. 12.]

[Footnote 97: Categor. p. 7, a. 5. [Greek: e)ni/ote de\ o)nomatopoiei=n I)/sôs a)nagkai=on, e)a\n mê\ kei/menon ê)=| o)/noma pro\s o(\ _oi)kei/ôs_ a)\n a)podothei/ê.]]

[Footnote 98: Categor. p. 7, a. 31. [Greek: e)/ti d' e)a\n me/n ti oi)kei/ôs a)podido/menon ê)=| pro\s o(\ le/getai, pa/ntôn periairoume/nôn tô=n a)/llôn o(/sa _sumbebêko/ta_ e)sti/, kataleipome/nou de\ mo/nou tou/tou pro\s o(\ a)pedo/thê oi)kei/ôs, a)ei\ pro\s au)to\ r(êthê/setai, oi(=on o( dou=los e)a\n pro\s despo/tên le/gêtai, periairoume/nôn tô=n _a)/llôn a(pa/ntôn o(/sa sumbebêko/ta_ e)sti\ _tô=| despo/tê|_ oi(=on to\ di/podi ei)=nai kai\ to\ e)pistê/mês dektikô=| kai\ _to\ a)nthrô/pô|_, kataleipome/nou de\ mo/nou tou= despo/tên ei)=nai, a)ei\ o( dou=los pro\s au)to\ r(êthêsetai.]

This is not only just and useful in regard to accuracy of predication, but deserves attention also in another point of view. In general, it would be said that _man_ and _biped_ belonged to the Essence ([Greek: ou)si/a]); and the being a master to the Accidents or Accompaniments ([Greek: sumbebêko/ta]). Here the case is reversed; man and biped are the accidents or accompaniments; master is the Essence. What is connoted by the term _master_ is here the essential idea, that which is bound up with the idea connoted by _servant_; while the connotation of _man_ or _biped_ sinks into the character of an accessory or accompaniment. The master might possibly not be a man, but a god; the Delphian Apollo (Euripid. Ion, 132), and the Corinthian Aphrodité, had each many slaves belonging to them. Moreover, even if every master were a man, the qualities connoted by _man_ are here accidental, as not being included in those connoted by the term master. Compare Metaphysica, [Greek: D]. p. 1025, a. 32; Topica, i. p. 102, a. 18.]

[Footnote 99: That Plato was fully sensible to the necessity of precision and appropriateness in designating the _Correlatum_ belonging to each _Relatum_, may be seen by the ingenious reasoning in the Platonic Parmenides, pp. 133-134, where [Greek: despo/tês] and [Greek: dou=los] are also the illustrative examples employed.]

[Footnote 100: Categor. p. 8, a. 35, b. 20.]]

[Footnote 101: See Politica, i. p. 1253, a. 18: [Greek: kai\ pro/tero dê\ tê=| phu/sei po/lis ê)\ oi)ki/a kai\ e(/kastos ê(mô=n e)sti/n; to\ ga\r o(/lon pro/teron a)nagkai=on ei)=nai tou= me/rous; a)nairoume/nou ga\r tou= o(/lou ou)k e)/stai pou=s ou)de\ chei\r, ei) mê\ o(mônu/môs, ô(/sper ei)/ tis le/gei **tê\n lithi/nên; diaphtharei=sa ga\r e)/stai toiau/tê. pa/nta de\tô=| e)/rgô| ô(/ristai kai\ tê=| duna/mei, ô/ste _mêke/ti toiau=ta o)/nta ou) lekte/on ta\ au)ta ei)=nai_ a)ll' o(mô/numa]; also p. 1254, a. 9: [Greek: to/ te ga\r mo/rion ou) mo/non a)/llou e)sti\ mo/rion, a)lla\ kai\ a)/llou].

Compare De Animâ, ii. 1, p. 412, b. 20; Meteorologic. iv. p. 390, a. 12.

The doctrine enunciated in these passages is a very important one, in the Aristotelian philosophy.

Trendelenburg (Kategorienlehre, p. 182) touches upon this confusion of the Categories, but faintly and partially.]

In the fourth book of the Metaphysica, Aristotle gives an explanation of _Ad Aliquid_ different from, and superior to, that which we read in the Categoriæ; treating it, not as one among many distinct Categories, but as implicated with all the Categories, and taking a different character according as it is blended with one or the other--_Essentia_, _Quantum_, _Quale_, _Actio_, _Passio_, &c.[102] He there, also, enumerates as one of the varieties of _Relata_, what seems to go beyond the limit, or at least beyond the direct denotation, of the Categories; for, having specified, as one variety, _Relata Numero_, and, as another, _Relata secundum actionem et passionem ([Greek: to\ thermantiko\n pro\s to\ thermanto/n], &c.), he proceeds to a third variety, such as the _mensurabile_ with reference to _mensura_, the _scibile_ with reference to _scientia_, the _cogitabile_ with reference to _cogitatio_; and in regard to this third variety, he draws a nice distinction. He says that _mensura_ and _cogitatio_ are _Ad Aliquid_, not because they are themselves related to _mensurabile_ and _cogitabile_, but because _mensurabile_ and _cogitabile_ are related to them.[103] You cannot say (he thinks) that mensura is referable to the _mensurabile_, or _cogitatio_ to the _cogitabile_, because that would be repeating the same word twice over--_mensura est illius cujus est mensura_--_cogitatio est illius cujus est cogitatio._ So that he regards _mensura_ and _cogitatio_ as _Correlata_, rather than as _Relata_; while _mensurabile_ and _cogitabile_ are the _Relata_ to them. But in point of fact, the distinction is not important; of the relative pair there may be one which is more properly called the _Correlatum_; yet both are alike relative.

[Footnote 102: Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, b. 27-32. At the same time we must remark, that while Aristotle enumerates [Greek: to\ u(pe/rechon] and [Greek: to\ u(perecho/menon] under [Greek: Pro/s ti], he had just before (a. 25) ranked [Greek: to\ me/ga kai\ to\ mikro/n, to\ mei=zon kai\ to\ e(/latton], under the general head [Greek: Poso/n]--as [Greek: posou= pa/thê kath' au(ta/].]

[Footnote 103: Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1021, a. 26, b. 3; also I. p. 1056, b. 34. Bonitz in his note (p. 262) remarks that the distinction here drawn by Aristotle is not tenable; and I agree with him that it is not. But it coincides with what Aristotle asserts in other words in the Categoriæ; viz., that to be _simul naturâ_ is not true of _all_ Relata, but only of the greater part of them; that [Greek: to\ ai)sthêto\n] is [Greek: pro/teron tê=s ai)sthê/seôs], and [Greek: to\ e)pistêto\n pro/teron tê=s e)pistê/mês] (Categor. p. 7, b. 23; p. 8, a. 10). As I have mentioned before (p. 71 n.), Simplikius, in the Scholia (p. 65, b. 14), points out that Aristotle has not been careful here to observe his own precept of selecting [Greek: oi)kei/ôs] the correlative term. He ought to have stated the potential as correlating with the potential, the actual with the actual. If he had done this, the [Greek: sunu/parxis tô=n pro/s ti] would have been seen to be true in all cases. Eudorus noticed a similar inadvertence of Aristotle in the case of [Greek: pte/ron] and [Greek: pterôto/n] (Schol. 63, a. 43). See 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' vol. ii. p. 330, note x.

I transcribe a curious passage of Leibnitz, bearing on the same question:--"On réplique maintenant, que la vérité du mouvement est indépendante de l'observation: et qu'un vaisseau peut avancer, sans que celui qui est dedans s'en aperçoive. Je réponds, que le mouvement est indépendant de l'observation: mais qu'il _n'est point indépendant de l'observabilité_. Il n'y a point de mouvement, quand il n'y a point de changement _observable_. Et même quand il n'y a point de changement observable, il n'y a point de changement du tout. Le contraire est fondé sur la supposition d'un Espace réel absolu, que j'ai réfuté demonstrativement par le principe du besoin d'une Raison suffisante des choses." (Correspondence with Clarke, p. 770. Erdmann's edition.)]

If we compare together the various passages in which Aristotle cites and applies the Ten Categories (not merely in the treatise before us, but also in the Metaphysica, Physica, and elsewhere), we shall see that he cannot keep them apart steadily and constantly; that the same predicate is referred to one head in one place, and to another head in another: what is here spoken of as belonging to _Actio_ or _Passio_, will be treated in another place as an instance of _Quale_ or _Ad Aliquid_; even the derivative noun [Greek: e(/xis] (_habitus_) does not belong to the Category [Greek: e)/chein] (_Habere_), but sometimes to _Quale_, sometimes to _Ad Aliquid_.[104] This is inevitable; for the predicates thus differently referred have really several different aspects, and may be classified in one way or another, according as you take them in this or that aspect. Moreover, this same difficulty of finding impassable lines of demarcation would still be felt, even if the Categories, instead of the full list of Ten, were reduced to the smaller list of the four principal Categories--Substance, Quantity, Quality, and Relation; a reduction which has been recommended by commentators on Aristotle as well as by acute logicians of modern times. Even these four cannot be kept clearly apart: the predicates which declare Quantity or Quality must at the same time declare or imply Relation; while the predicates which declare Relation must also imply the _fundamentum_ either of Quantity or of Quality.[105]

[Footnote 104: Aristot. Categor. p. 6, b. 2; p. 8, b. 27.]

[Footnote 105: See Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, p. 117, seq. The remarks made by Mr. John Stuart Mill (in his System of Logic, book i. ch. iii.) upon the Aristotelian Categories, and the enlarged philosophical arrangement which he introduces in their place, well deserve to be studied. After enumerating the ten Predicaments, Mr. Mill says:--"It is a mere catalogue of the distinctions rudely marked out by the language of familiar life, with little or no attempt to penetrate, by philosophic analysis, to the _rationale_ even of these common distinctions. Such an analysis would have shewn the enumeration to be both redundant and defective. Some objects are omitted, and others repeated several times under different heads." (Compare the remarks of the Stoic commentators, and Porphyry, Schol. p. 48, b. 10 Br.: [Greek: a)thetou=ntes tê\n diai/resin ô(s polla\ pariei=san kai\ mê\ perilamba/nousan, ê)\ kai\ pa/lin pleona/zousan.] And Aristotle himself observes that the same predicates might be ranked often under more than one head.) "That could not be a very comprehensive view of the nature of Relation, which could exclude action, passivity, and local situation from that category. The same objection applies to the categories Quando (or position in time), and Ubi (or position in space); _while the distinction between the latter and Situs ([Greek: Kei=sthai]) is merely verbal_. The incongruity of erecting into a _summum genus_ the tenth Category is manifest. On the other hand, the enumeration takes no notice of any thing but Substances and Attributes. In what Category are we to place sensations, or any other feelings and states of mind? as hope, joy, fear; sound, smell, taste; pain, pleasure; thought, judgment, conception, and the like? Probably all these would have been placed by the Aristotelian school in the Categories of Actio and Passio; and the relation of such of them as are active, to their objects, and of such of them as are passive, to their causes, would have been rightly so placed; but the things themselves, the feelings or states of mind, wrongly. Feelings, or states of consciousness, are assuredly to be counted among realities; but they cannot be reckoned either among substances or among attributes." Among the many deficiencies of the Aristotelian Categories, as a complete catalogue, there is none more glaring than the imperfect conception of [Greek: Pro/s ti] (the Relative), which Mr. Mill here points out. But the Category [Greek: Kei=sthai] (badly translated by commentators _Situs_, from which Aristotle expressly distinguishes it, Categor. p. 6, b. 12: [Greek: to\ de\ a)nakei=sthai ê)\ e(sta/nai ê)\ kathê=sthai au)ta\ me\n ou)k ei)si\ the/seis]) appears to be hardly open to Mr. Mill's remark, that it is only verbally distinguished from [Greek: Pou=], _Ubi_. [Greek: Kei=sthai] is intended to mean _posture_, _attitude_, &c. It is a reply to the question, In what posture is Sokrates? Answer.--He is lying down, standing upright, kneeling, [Greek: pu\x protei/nôn], &c. This is quite different from the question, Where is Sokrates? In the market-place, in the palæstra, &c. [Greek: Kei=sthai] (as Aristotle himself admits, Categ. p. 6, b. 12) is not easily distinguished from [Greek: Pro/s ti]: for the abstract and general word [Greek: _the/sis_] (_position_) is reckoned by Aristotle under Greek: Pro/s ti], though the _paronyma_ [Greek: a)nakei=sthai, e(sta/nai, kathê=sthai] are affirmed not to be [Greek: the/seis], but to come under the separate Category [Greek: _Kei=sthai_]. But [Greek: Kei=sthai] is clearly distinguishable from [Greek: Pou=] _Ubi_.

Again, to Mr. Mill's question, "In what Category are we to place sensations or other states of mind--hope, fear, sound, smell, pain, pleasure, thought, judgment," &c.? Aristotle would have replied (I apprehend) that they come under the Category either of _Quale_ or of _Pati_--[Greek: Poio/têtes] or [Greek: Pa/thê]. They are attributes or modifications of Man, Kallias, Sokrates, &c. If the condition of which we speak be temporary or transitory, it is a [Greek: pa/thos], and we speak of Kallias as [Greek: pa/schôn ti]; if it be a durable disposition or capacity likely to pass into repeated manifestations, it is [Greek: poio/tês], and we describe Kallias as [Greek: poio/s tis] (Categ. p. 9, a. 28-p. 10 a. 9). This equally applies to mental and bodily conditions ([Greek: o(moi/ôs de\ tou/tois kai\ kata\ tê\n psuchê\n pathêtikai\ poio/têtes kai\ pa/thê le/getai.]--p. 9, b. 33). The line is dubious and difficult between [Greek: pa/thos] and [Greek: poio/tês], but one or other of the two will comprehend all the mental states indicated by Mr. Mill. Aristotle would not have admitted that "feelings are to be counted among realities," except as they are now or may be the feelings of Kallias, Sokrates, or some other _Hic Aliquis_--one or many. He would consider feelings as attributes belonging to these [Greek: Prô=tai Ou)si/ai]; and so in fact Mr. Mill himself considers them (p. 83), after having specified the Mind (distinguished from Body or external object) as the Substance to which they belong.

Mr. Mill's classification of Nameable Things is much better and more complete than the Aristotelian Categories, inasmuch as it brings into full prominence the distinction between the subjective and objective points of view, and, likewise, the all-pervading principle of Relativity, which implicates the two; whereas, Aristotle either confuses the one with the other, or conceives them narrowly and inadequately. But we cannot say, I think, that Aristotle, in the Categories, assigns no room for the mental states or elements. He has a place for them, though he treats them altogether objectively. He takes account of _himself_ only as an object--as one among the [Greek: prô=tai ou)si/ai], or individuals, along with Sokrates and Kallias.]

The most capital distinction, however, which is to be found among the Categories is that of Essence or Substance from all the rest. This is sometimes announced as having a standing _per se_; as not only logically distinguishable, but really separable from the other nine, if we preserve the Aristotelian list of ten,[106] or from the other three, if we prefer the reduced list of four. But such real separation cannot be maintained. The _Prima Essentia_ (we are told) is indispensable as a Subject, but cannot appear as Predicate; while all the rest can and do so appear. Now we see that this definition is founded upon the function enacted by each of them in predication, and therefore presupposes the fact of predication, which is in itself a Relation. The Category of Relation is thus implied, in declaring what the First Essence is, together with some _predicabilia_ as correlates, though it is not yet specified what the _predicabilia_ are. But besides this, the distinction drawn by Aristotle, between First and Second Essence or Substance, abolishes the marked line of separation between Substance and Quality, making the former shade down into the latter. The distinction recognizes a more or less in Substance, which graduation Aristotle expressly points out, stating that the Species is _more_ Substance or Essence, and that Genus _less_ so. We see thus that he did not conceive Substance (apart from attributes) according to the modern view, as that which exists _without_ the mind (excluding _within_ the mind or _relation_ to the mind); for in that there can be no graduation. That which is without the mind, must also be within; and that which is within must also be without; the subject and the object correlating. This implication of within and without understood, there is then room for graduation, according as the one or the other aspect may be more or less prominent. Aristotle, in point of fact, confines himself to the mental or logical work of predication, to the conditions thereof, and to the component terms whereby the mind accomplishes that act. When he speaks of the First Essence or Substance, without the Second, all that he can say about it positively is to call it _Unum numero_ and indivisible:[107] even thus, he is compelled to introduce unity, measure, and number, all of which belong to the two Categories of Quantity and Relation; and yet still the First Essence or Substance remains indeterminate. We only begin to determine it when we call it by the name of the Second Substance or Essence; which name connotes certain attributes, the attributes thus connoted being of the essence of the Species; that is, unless they be present, no individual would be considered as belonging to the Species, or would be called by the specific name.[108] When we thus, however, introduce attributes, we find ourselves not merely in the Category of _Substantia_ (_Secunda_), but also in that of _Qualitas_. The boundary between _Substantia_ and _Qualitas_ disappears; the latter being partially contained in the former. The Second Substance or Essence includes attributes or Qualities belonging to the Essence. In fact, the Second Substance or Essence, when distinguished from the First, is both here and elsewhere characterized by Aristotle, as being not Substance at all, but Quality,[109] though when considered as being in implication with the First, it takes on the nature of Substance and becomes substantial or essential Quality. The Differentia belongs thus both to Substance and to Quality (_quale quid_), making up as complement that which is designated by the specific name.[110]

[Footnote 106: Aristotle sometimes speaks of it as [Greek: chôristo/n], the other Categories being not [Greek: chôrista/] (Metaphys. Z. p. 1028, a. 34). It is not easy, however, always to distinguish whether he means by the term [Greek: chôrista\] "_sejuncta re_", or "_sejuncta notione solâ_." See Bonitz ad Metaphysic. ([Greek: D]. p. 1017), p. 244.]

[Footnote 107: Categor. p. 3, b. 12: [Greek: a)/tomon ga\r kai\ e(\n a)rithmô=| to\ dêlou/meno/n e)stin.] Compare Metaphysic. N. p. 1087, b. 33; p. 1088, a. 10.]

[Footnote 108: Hobbes says:--"Now that accident (_i.e._ attribute) for which we give a certain name to any body, or the accident which denominates its Subject, is commonly called the Essence thereof; as rationality is the essence of a man, whiteness of any white thing, and extension the essence of a body" (Hobbes, Philosophy, ch. viii. s. 23). This topic will be found discussed, most completely and philosophically, in Mr. John Stuart Mill's System of Logic, Book I. ch. vi. ss. 2-3; ch. vii. s. 5.]

[Footnote 109: Categor. p. 3, b. 13: [Greek: e)pi\ de\ tô=n deute/rôn ou)siô=n phai/netai me\n o(moi/ôs tô=| schê/mati tê=s prosêgori/as to/de ti sêmai/nein, o(/tan ei)/pê| a)/nthrôpon ê)\ zô=on, ou) mê\n a)lêthe/s ge, a)lla\ ma=llon _poio/n ti sêmai/nei--poia\n ga/r tina ou)si/an_ sêmai/nei] (b. 20).

Metaphysic. Z. p. 1038, b. 35: [Greek: phanero\n o(/ti ou)the\n tô=n katho/lou u(parcho/ntôn ou)si/a e)sti/, kai\ o(/ti ou)the\n sêmai/nei tô=n koinê=| katêgoroume/nôn to/de ti, a)lla\ toio/nde.] Compare Metaphys. M. p. 1087, a. 1; Sophistic. Elench. p. 178, b. 37; 179, a. 9.

That which is called [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a] in the Categoriæ is called [Greek: tri/tê ou)si/a] in Metaphys. [Greek: Ê]. p. 1043, a. 18. In Ethic. Nikom. Z. p. 1143, a. 32, seq., the _generalissima_ are called [Greek: prô=ta], and particulars are called [Greek: e)/schata]. Zell observes in his commentary (p. 224), "[Greek: ta\ e)/schata] sunt res singulæ, quæ et ipsæ sunt extremæ, ratione mentis nostræ, ab universis ad singula delabentis." Patricius remarks upon the different sense of the terms [Greek: Prô/tê Ou)si/a] in the Categoriæ and in the De Interpretatione (Discuss. Peripatetic. p. 21).]

[Footnote 110: Metaphysic. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, b. 13: [Greek: schedo\n dê\ kata\ du/o tro/pous le/goit' a)\n to\ poio/n, kai\ tou/tôn e(/na to\n kuriô/taton; prô/tê me\n ga\r poiotê\s ê( tê=s ou)si/as diaphora/.] Compare Physic. v. p. 226, a. 27. See Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, pp. 56, 93.

The remarks of the different expositors (contained in Scholia, pp. 52, 53, 54, Brand.), are interesting upon the ambiguous position of Differentia, in regard to Substance and Quality. It comes out to be Neither and Both--[Greek: ou)de/tera kai\ a)mpho/tera] (Plato, Euthydemus, p. 300 C.). Dexippus and Porphyry called it something intermediate between [Greek: ou)si/a] and [Greek: poio/tês], or between [Greek: ou)si/a] and [Greek: sumbebêko/s].]

We see, accordingly, that neither is the line of demarcation between the Category of Substance or Essence and the other Categories so impassable, nor the separability of it from the others so marked as some thinkers contend. Substance is represented by Aristotle as admitting of more and less, and as graduating by successive steps down to the other Categories; moreover, neither in its complete manifestation (as First Substance), nor in its incomplete manifestation (as Second Substance), can it be explained or understood without calling in the other Categories of Quantity, Quality, and Relation. It does not correspond to the definition of _Substantia_ given by Spinoza--"_quod in se est et per se concipitur_." It can no more be conceived or described without some of the other Categories, than they can be conceived or described without it. Aristotle defines it by four characteristics, two negative, and two positive. It cannot be predicated of a Subject: it cannot inhere in a Subject: it is, at bottom, the **Subject of all Predicates: it is _Unum numero_ and indivisible.[111] Not one of these four determinations can be conceived or understood, unless we have in our minds the idea of other Categories and its relation to them. Substance is known only as the Subject of predicates, that is, relatively to them; as they also are known relatively to it. Without the Category of Relation, we can no more understand what is meant by a Subject than what is meant by a Predicate. The Category of Substance, as laid out by Aristotle, neither exists by itself, nor can be conceived by itself, without that of Relation and the generic notion of Predicate.[112] All three lie together at the bottom of the analytical process, as the last findings and residuum.

[Footnote 111: Categor. p. 2, a. 14, b. 4; p. 3, b. 12.]

[Footnote 112: Aristotle gives an explanation of what he means by [Greek: kath' au(to/--kath' au(ta/], in the Analytic. Post. I. iv. p. 73, a. 34, b. 13. According to that explanation it will be necessary to include in [Greek: to\ kath' au(to\] of the Category [Greek: Ou)si/a], all that is necessary to make the definition or explanation of that Category understood.

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, in the valuable Preface introducing his translation of the Organon, gives what I think a just view of the Categories generally, and especially of [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a], as simply naming (_i.e._ giving a proper name), and doing nothing more. I transcribe the passage, merely noting that the terms _anterior_ and _posterior_ can mean nothing more than _logical_ anteriority and posteriority.

"Mais comment classer les mots?--C'est à la réalité seule qu'il faut le demander; à la réalité dont le langage n'est que le réflet, dont les mots ne sont que le symbole. Que nous présente la réalité? Des individus, rien que des individus, existant par eux-mêmes, et se groupant, par leurs ressemblances et leurs différences, sous des espèces et sous des genres. Ainsi donc, en étudiant l'individu, l'être individuel, et en analysant avec exactitude tout ce qu'il est possible d'en dire en tant qu'être, on aura les classes les plus générales des mots; les catégories, ou pour prendre le terme français, les attributions, qu'il est possible de lui appliquer. Voilà tout le fondement des Catégories.--Ce n'est pas du reste, une classification des choses à la manière de celles de l'histoire naturelle, qu'il s'agit de faire en logique: c'est une simple énumération de tous les points de vue, d'**où l'esprit peut considérer les choses, non pas, il est vrai, par rapport à l'esprit lui-même, mais par rapport à leur réalité et à leurs appellations.--Aristote distingue ici dix points de vue, dix significations principales des mots.--La Catégorie de la Substance est à la tête de toutes les autres, précisément parceque la première, la plus essentielle, marque d'un être, c'est d'être. Cela revient à dire qu'avant tout, l'être est, l'être existe. Par suite les mots qui expriment la substance sont antérieurs à tous les autres et sont les plus importants. Il faut ajouter que ces mots là participeront en quelque sorte à cet isolement que les individus nous offrent dans la nature. Mais de même que, dans la réalité, les individus subsistant par eux seuls forment des espèces et des genres, qui ont bien aussi une existence substantielle, la substance se divisera de même en substance première et substance seconde.--Les espèces et les genres, s'ils expriment la substance, ne l'expriment pas dans toute sa pureté; c'est **déjà de la substance qualifié, comme le dit Aristote.--Il n'y a bien dans la réalité que des individus et des espèces ou genres. Mais ces individus en soi et pour soi n'existent pas seulement; ils existent sous certaines conditions; leur existence se produit sous certaines modifications, que les mots expriment aussi, tout comme ils expriment l'existence absolue. Ces nouvelles classes de mots formeront les autres Catégories.--Ces modifications, ces accidents, de l'individu sont au nombre de neuf: Aristote n'en reconnaît pas davantage.--**Voilà donc les dix Catégories: les dix seules attributions possibles. _Par la première, on nomme les individus, sans faire plus que les nommer: par les autres, on les qualifie._ On dit d'abord ce qu'est l'individu, et ensuite quel il est." Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Logique d'Aristote, Preface, pp. lxxii.-lxxvii.]

Aristotle, taking his departure from an analysis of the complete sentence or of the act of predication, appears to have regarded the Subject as having a natural priority over the Predicate. The noun-substantive (which to him represents the Subject), even when pronounced alone, carries to the hearer a more complete conception than either the adjective or the verb when pronounced alone; these make themselves felt much more as elliptical and needing complementary adjuncts. But this is only true in so far as the conception, raised by the substantive named alone ([Greek: a)/neu sumplokê=s]), includes by anticipation what would be included, if we added to it some or all of its predicates. If we could deduct from this conception the meaning of all the applicable predicates, it would seem essentially barren or incomplete, awaiting something to come; a mere point of commencement or departure,[113] known only by the various lines which may be drawn from it; a _substratum_ for various attributes to lie upon or to inhere in. That which is known only as a _substratum_, is known only relatively to a superstructure to come; the one is _Relatum_, the other _Correlatum_, and the mention of either involves an implied assumption of the other. There may be a logical priority, founded upon expository convenience, belonging to the _substratum_, because it remains numerically one and the same, while the superstructure is variable. But the priority is nothing more than logical and notional; it does not amount to an ability of prior independent existence. On the contrary, there is simultaneity _by nature_ (according to Aristotle's own definition of the phrase) between Subject, Relation, and Predicate; since they all imply each other as reciprocating correlates, while no one of them is the cause of the others.[114]

[Footnote 113: Plato would not admit the point as as anything more than [Greek: a)rchê\n grammê=s] (Aristot. Metaphys. A. p. 992, a. 21).]

[Footnote 114: Aristot. Categor. p. 14, b. 27: [Greek: phu/sei de\ a(/ma, o(/sa a)ntistre/phei kata\ tê\n tou= ei)=nai a)kolou/thêsin, mêdamô=s de\ ai)/tion tha/teron thate/rô| tou= ei)=nai e)stin, oi(=on e)pi\ tou= diplasi/ou kai\ tou= ê(mi/seos;] &c.]

When Aristotle says, very truly, that if the First Substances were non-existent, none of the other Predicaments could exist, we must understand what he means by the term _first_. That term bears, in this treatise, a sense different from what it bears elsewhere: here it means the extreme concrete and individual; elsewhere it means the extreme abstract and universal. The First Substance or First Essence, in the Categories, is a _Hoc Aliquid_ ([Greek: to/de ti]), illustrated by the examples _hic homo_, _hic equus_. Now, as thus explained and illustrated, it includes not merely the Second Substance, but various accidental attributes besides. When we talk of This man, Sokrates, Kallias, &c., the hearer conceives not only the attributes for which he is called a man, but also various accidental attributes, ranking under one or more of the other Predicaments. The First Substance thus (as explained by Aristotle) is not conceived as a mere _substratum_ without Second Substance and without any Accidents, but as already including both of them, though as yet indeterminately; it waits for specializing words, to determine what its Substance or Essence is, and what its accompanying Accidents are. Being an individual (_Unum numero_), it unites in itself both the essential attributes of its species, and the unessential attributes peculiar to itself.[115] It is already understood as including attributes of both kinds; but we wait for predicates to declare ([Greek: dêlou=n--a)podido/nai][116]) what these attributes are. The First or Complete _Ens_ embodies in itself all the Predicaments, though as yet potential and indeterminate, until the predicating adjuncts are specified. There is no priority, in the order of existence, belonging to Substance over Relation or Quality; take away either one of the three, and the First _Ens_ disappears. But in regard to the order of exposition, there is a natural priority, founded on convenience and facility of understanding. The _Hoc Aliquid_ or _Unum Numero_, which intimates in general outline a certain concretion or co-existence of attributes, though we do not yet know what they are--being as it were a skeleton--comes naturally as Subject before the predicates, whose function is declaratory and specifying as to those attributes: moreover, the essential attributes, which are declared and connoted when we first bestow a specific name on the subject, come naturally before the unessential attributes, which are predicated of the subject already called by a specific name connoting other attributes.[117] The essential characters are native and at home; the accidental attributes are domiciliated foreigners.[118]

[Footnote 115: Aristot. Metaphys. Z. p. 1033, b. 24; p. 1034, a. 8. [Greek: To\ d' a)/pan to/de Kalli/as ê)\ Sôkra/tês e)sti\n ô(/sper ê( sphai=ra ê( chalkê= ê(di/, o( d' a)/nthrôpos kai\ to\ zô=|on ô(/sper sphai=ra chalkê= o(lôs.--to\ d' a(/pan ê)/dê to\ toio/nde ei)=dos e)n tai=sde tai=s sarxi\ kai\ o)stoi=s Kalli/as kai\ Sôkra/tês; kai\ e(/teron me\n dia\ tê\n u(/lên, e(/tera ga/r, tau)to\ de\ tô=| ei)/dei; a)/tomon ga\r to\ ei)=dos.]]

[Footnote 116: Categor. p. 2, b. 29, seq. [Greek: ei)ko/tôs de\ meta\ ta\s prô/tas ou)si/as mo/na tô=n a)/llôn ta\ ei)/dê kai\ ta\ ge/nê deu/terai ou)si/ai le/gontai; mo/na _ga\r dêloi=_ tê\n prô/tên ou)si/an tô=n katêgoroume/nôn.] &c.

[Footnote 117: Analyt. Poster. i. p. 73, b. 6: [Greek: oi(=on to\ badi/zon e(/tero/n ti o(\n badi/zon e)sti\ kai\ leuko/n, ê( d' ou)si/a, kai\ o(/sa to/de ti sêmai/nei, ou)ch e(/tero/n ti o)/nta o(/per e)sti/n.] Also p. 83, a. 31. [Greek: kai\ mê\ ei)=nai/ ti leuko/n, o(\ ou)ch e(/tero/n ti o(\n leuko/n e)stin]: also p. 83, b. 22.]

[Footnote 118: Categor. p. 2, b. 31: [Greek: to\n ga/r tina a)nthrôpon e)a\n a)podidô=| tis ti/ e)sti, to\ me\n ei)=dos ê)\ to\ ge/nos a)podidou\s _oi)kei/ôs_ a)podô/sei--tô=n d' a)/llôn o(/ ti a)\n a)podidô=| tis, _a)llotri/ôs_ e)stai a)podedôkô/s], &c.]

It is thus that Aristotle has dealt with Ontology, in one of the four distinct aspects thereof, which he distinguishes from each other; that is, in the distribution of _Entia_ according to their logical order, and the reciprocal interdependence, in predication. _Ens_ is a multivocal word, neither strictly univocal nor altogether equivocal. It denotes (as has been stated above) not a generic aggregate, divisible into species, but an analogical aggregate, starting from one common terminus and ramifying into many derivatives, having no other community except that of relationship to the same terminus.[119] The different modes of _Ens_ are distinguished by the degree or variety of such relationship. The _Ens Primum_, _Proprium_, _Completum_, is (in Aristotle's view) the concrete individual; with a defined essence or essential constituent attributes ([Greek: ti/ ê(/n ei)=nai]), and with unessential accessories or accidents also--all embodied and implicated in the One _Hoc Aliquid_. In the Categoriæ Aristotle analyses this _Ens Completum_ (not metaphysically, into Form and Matter, as we shall find him doing elsewhere, but) logically into Subject and Predicates. In this logical analysis, the Subject which can never be a Predicate stands first; next, come the near kinsmen, Genus and Species (expressed by substantive names, as the First Substance is), which are sometimes Predicates--as applied to _Substantia Prima_, sometimes Subjects--in regard to the extrinsic accompaniments or accidents;[120] in the third rank, come the more remote kinsmen, Predicates pure and simple. These are the logical factors or constituents into which the _Ens Completum_ may be analysed, and which together make it up as a logical sum-total. But no one of these logical constituents has an absolute or independent _locus standi_, apart from the others. Each is relative to the others; the Subject to its Predicates, not less than the Predicates to their Subject. It is a mistake to describe the Subject as having a real standing separately and alone, and the Predicates as something afterwards tacked on to it. The Subject _per se_ is nothing but a general potentiality or receptivity for Predicates to come; a relative general conception, in which the two, Predicate and Subject, are jointly implicated as _Relatum_ and _Correlatum_.[121]

[Footnote 119: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1017, a. 22. [Greek: kath' au(ta\ de\ ei)=nai le/getai o(/saper sêmai/nei ta\ schê/mata tê=s katêgori/as; o)sachô=s ga\r le/getai, tosautachô=s to\ ei)=nai sêmai/nei.]]

[Footnote 120: Categor. p. 3, a. 1: [Greek: ô(s de/ ge ai( prô=tai ou)si/ai pro\s ta\ a)/lla pa/nta e)/chousin, ou(/tô ta\ ei)/dê kai\ ta\ ge/nê pro\s ta\ loipa\ pa/nta e)/chei; kata\ tou/tôn ga\r pa/nta ta\ loipa\ katêgorei=tai.]]

[Footnote 121: Bonitz has an instructive note upon Form and Matter, the _metaphysical_ constituents of _Prima Substantia_, _Hoc Aliquid_, Sokrates, Kallias (see Aristot. Metaphys. Z. p. 1033, b. 24), which illustrates pertinently the relation between Predicate and Subject, the _logical_ constituents of the same [Greek: su/nolon]. He observes (not. p. 327, **ad Aristot. Metaph. Z. p. 1033, b. 19). "Quoniam ex duabus substantiis, quæ quidem actu sint, nunquam una existit substantia, si et formam et materiem utrumque per se esse poneremus, nunquam ex utroque existeret res definita ac sensibilis, [Greek: to/de ti]. Ponendum potius, si recte assequor Aristotelis sententiam, utrumque (Form and Matter) ita ut alterum exspectet, materia ut formæ definitionem, forma ut materiam definiendam, exspectet, neutra vero per se et absolute sit." What Bonitz says here about Matter and Form is no less true about Subject and Predicate: each is relative to the other--neither of them is absolute or independent of the other. In fact, the explanation given by Aristotle of _Materia_ (Metaph. Z. p. 1028, b. 36) coincides very much with the _Prima Essentia_ of the Categories, if abstracted from the _Secunda Essentia_. _Materia_ is called there by Aristotle [Greek: to\ u(pokei/menon, kath' ou(= ta\ a)/lla le/getai. e)kei=no d' au)to\ mêke/ti kat' a)/llo--le/gô d' u(/lên ê(\ kath' au(tê\n mê/te ti\ mê/te poso\n mê/te a)/llo mêthe\n le/getai oi(=s ô(/ristai to\ o)/n] (p. 1029, a. 20). [Greek: e)/sti ga/r ti kath' ou(= katêgorei=tai tou/tôn e(/kaston, ô(=| _to\ ei)=nai e(/teron_ kai\ tô=n katêgoriô=n e(ka/stê|; ta\ me\n ga\r a)/lla tê=s ou)si/as katêgorei=tai, au(/tê de\ tê=s u(/lês.]

Aristotle proceeds to say that this Subject--the Subject for all Predicates, but never itself a Predicate--cannot be the genuine [Greek: ou)si/a], which must essentially be [Greek: chôristo\n kai\ to\ to/de ti] (p. 1029, a. 28), and which must have a [Greek: ti/ ê)=n ei)=nai] (1029, b. 2). The Subject is in fact not true [Greek: ou)si/a], but is one of the constituent elements thereof, being relative to the Predicates as _Correlata_: it is the potentiality for Predicates generally, as _Materia_ is the potentiality for Forms.]

The logical aspect of Ontology, analysing _Ens_ into a common Subject with its various classes of Predicates, appears to begin with Aristotle. He was, as far as we can see, original, in taking as the point of departure for his theory, the individual man, horse, or other perceivable object; in laying down this Concrete Particular with all its outfit of details, as the type of _Ens_ proper, complete and primary; and in arranging into classes the various secondary modes of _Ens_, according to their different relations to the primary type and the mode in which they contributed to make up its completeness. He thus stood opposed to the Pythagoreans and Platonists, who took their departure from the Universal, as the type of full and true Entity;[122] while he also dissented from Demokritus, who recognized no true _Ens_ except the underlying, imperceptible, eternal atoms and vacuum. Moreover Aristotle seems to have been the first to draw up a logical analysis of Entity in its widest sense, as distinguished from that metaphysical analysis which we read in his other works; the two not being contradictory, but distinct and tending to different purposes. Both in the one and in the other, his principal controversy seems to have been with the Platonists, who disregarded both individual objects and accidental attributes; dwelling upon Universals, Genera and Species, as the only real _Entia_ capable of being known. With the Sophists, Aristotle contends on a different ground, accusing them of neglecting altogether the essential attributes, and confining themselves to the region of accidents, in which no certainty was to be found;[123] in Plato, he points out the opposite mistake, of confining himself to the essentials, and ascribing undue importance to the process of generic and specific subdivision.[124] His own logical analysis takes account both of the essential and accidental, and puts them in what he thinks their proper relation. The Accidental ([Greek: sumbebêko/s]), concomitant, _i.e._ of the essence) is _per se_ not knowable at all (he contends), nor is ever the object of study pursued in any science; it is little better than a name, designating the lowest degree of _Ens_, bordering on _Non-Ens_.[125] It is a term comprehending all that he includes under his nine last Categories; yet it is not a term connoting either generic communion, or even so much as analogical relation.[126] In the treatise now before us, he does not recognize either that or any other general term as common to all those nine Categories; each of the nine is here treated as a _Summum Genus_, having its own mode of relationship, and clinging by its own separate thread to the Subject. He acknowledges the Accidents in his classification, not as a class by themselves, but as subordinated to the Essence, and, as so many threads of distinct, variable, and irregular accompaniments, attaching themselves to this constant root, without uniformity or steadiness.[127]

[Footnote 122: Simplikius ad Categ. p. 2, b. 5; Schol. p. 52, a. 1, Br: [Greek: A)rchu/tas o( Puthagorei=os ou) prosi/etai tê\n nuni\ prokeime/nên tô=n ou)si/ôn diai/resin, a)ll' a)/llên a)nti\ tau/tês e)kei=nos e)gkri/nei--tô=n me/ntoi Puthagorei/ôn ou)dei\s a)\n pro/soito tau/tên tê\n diai/resin tô=n prô/tôn kai\ deute/rôn ou)siô=n, o(/ti toi=s katho/lou to\ prô/tôs u(pa/rchein marturou=si, to\ de\ e)/schaton e)n toi=s meristoi=s a)polei/pousi, kai\ dio/ti e)n toi=s a(plousta/tois tê\n prô/tên kai\ kuriôta/tên ou)si/an a)poti/thentai, a)ll' ou)ch ô(s nu=n le/getai e)n toi=s sunthe/tois kai\ ai)sthêtoi=s, kai\ dio/ti ta\ ge/nê kai\ ta\ ei)/dê o)/nta nomi/zousin, a)ll' ou)chi\ sugkephalaiou/mena tai=s chôristai=s e)pinoi/ais.]]

[Footnote 123: Metaphys. E. p. 1026, b. 15: [Greek: ei)si\ ga\r oi( tô=n sophistô=n lo/goi peri\ to\ sumbebêko\s ô(s ei)pei=n ma/lista pa/ntôn], &c.; also K. p. 1061, b. 8; Analytic. Poster. i. p. 71, b. 10.]

[Footnote 124: Analytic. Priora, i. p. 46, a. 31.]

[Footnote 125: Aristot. Metaph. E. p. 1026, b. 13-21. [Greek: ô(/sper ga\r o)no/mati mo/non to\ sumbebêko/s--phai/netai ga\r to\ sumbebêko\s e)ggu/s ti tou= mê\ o)/ntos.]]

[Footnote 126: Physica, iii. 1, p. 200, b. 34. [Greek: koino\n d' e)pi\ tou/tôn ou)de/n e)sti labei=n], &c.]

[Footnote 127: See the explanation given of [Greek: to\ o)\n kata\ sumbebêko\s] in Metaphys. E. pp. 1026 b., 1027 a. This is the sense in which Aristotle most frequently and usually talks of [Greek: sumbebêko/s], though he sometimes uses it to include also a constant and inseparable accompaniment or Accident, if it be not included in the Essence (_i. e._ not connoted by the specific name); thus, to have the three angles equal to two right angles is a [Greek: sumbebêko\s] of the triangle, Metaph. [Greek: D]. p. 1025, a. 80. The proper sense in which he understands [Greek: to\ sumbebêko\s] is as opposed to [Greek: to\ a)ei\ e)x a)na/gkês], as well as [Greek: to\ ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu/]. See Metaphys. K. p. 1065, a. 2; Analyt. Poster. i. p. 74, b. 12, p. 75, a. 18.

It is that which is by its nature irregular and unpredictable. See the valuable chapter (ii) in Brentano, Von der Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (pp. 8-21), in which the meaning of [Greek: to\ sumbebêko\s] in Aristotle is clearly set forth.]

In discriminating and arranging the Ten Categories, Trendelenburg supposes that Aristotle was guided, consciously or unconsciously, by grammatical considerations, or by a distinction among the parts of speech. It should be remembered that what are now familiarly known as the eight parts of speech, had not yet been distinguished or named in the time of Aristotle, nor did the distinction come into vogue before the time of the Stoic and Alexandrine grammarians, more than a century after him. _Essentia_ or _Substantia_, the first Category, answers (so Trendelenburg thinks[128]) to the Substantive; _Quantum_ and _Quale_ represent the Adjective; _Ad Aliquid_, the comparative Adjective, of which _Quantum_ and _Quale_ are the positive degree; _Ubi_ and _Quando_ the Adverb; _Jacere_, _Habere_, _Agere_, _Pati_ the Verb. Of the last four, _Agere_ and _Pati_ correspond to the active and passive voices of the Verb; _Jacere_ to the neuter or intransitive Verb; and _Habere_ to the peculiar meaning of the Greek perfect--the present result of a past action.

[Footnote 128: Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, pp. 23, 211.]

This general view, which Trendelenburg himself conceives as having been only guiding and not decisive or peremptory in the mind of Aristotle,[129] appears to me likely and plausible, though Bonitz and others have strongly opposed it. We see from Aristotle's own language, that the grammatical point of view had great effect upon his mind; that the form (_e.g._) of a substantive implied in his view a mode of signification belonging to itself, which was to be taken into account in arranging and explaining the Categories.[130] I apprehend that Aristotle was induced to distinguish and set out his Categories by analysing various complete sentences, which would of course include substantives, adjectives, verbs, and adverbs. It is also remarkable that Aristotle should have designated his four last Categories by the indication of verbs, the two immediately preceding by adverbs, the second and third by adjectives, and the first by a substantive. There remains the important Category _Ad Aliquid_, which has no part of speech corresponding to it specially. Even this Category, though not represented by any part of speech, is nevertheless conceived and defined by Aristotle in a very narrow way, with close reference to the form of expression, and to the requirement of a noun immediately following, in the genitive or dative case. And thus, where there is no special part of speech, the mind of Aristotle still seems to receive its guidance from grammatical and syntactic forms.

[Footnote 129: Ibid. p. 209: "Gesichtspunkte der Sprache leiteten den erfindenden Geist, um sie (die Kategorien) zu bestimmen. Aber die grammatischen Beziehungen leiten nur und entscheiden nicht." P. 216: "der grammatische Leitfaden der Satzzergliederung wird anerkannt."]

[Footnote 130: Categor. p. 3, b. 13: [Greek: e)pi\ de\ tô=n deute/rôn ou)siô=n phai/netai me\n o(moi/ôs tô=| _schê/mati tê=s prosêgori/as_ to/de ti sêmai/nein, o(/tan ei)/pê| a)/nthrôpon ê)\ zô=|on, ou) mê\n a)lêthe/s ge, a)lla\ ma=llon poio/n ti sêmai/nei.] &c.]

We may illustrate the ten Categories of Aristotle by comparing them with the four Categories of the Stoics. During the century succeeding Aristotle's death, the Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus (principally the latter), having before them what he had done, proposed a new arrangement for the complete distribution of Subject and Predicates. Their distribution was quadruple instead of decuple. Their first Category was [Greek: ti/], _Aliquid_ or _Quiddam_--[Greek: to\ u(pokei/menon], the _Substratum_ or Subject. Their second was [Greek: poio/n], _Quale_ or Quality. Their third was [Greek: pô\s e)/chon], _certo Modo se habens_. Their fourth was, [Greek: pro/s ti pô\s e)/chon], _Ad Aliquid certo Modo se habens_.[131]

[Footnote 131: Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1, 25; vi. 1, 30: [Greek: ta\ pô\s e)/chonta tri/ta ti/thesthai]. Simplikius ad Categor. f. 7, p. 48, a. 13, Brand. Schol.: [Greek: Oi( Stôi+koi\ ei)s e)la/ttona suste/llein a)xiou=si to\n tô=n prô/tôn genô=n a)rithmo/n kai/ tina e)n toi=s a)la/ttosin u(pêllagme/na paralamba/nousi. poiou=ntai ga\r tê\n tomê\n ei)s te/ssara, ei)s u(pokei/mena, kai\ poia\, kai\ pô\s e)/chonta, kai\ pro/s ti pô\s e)/chonta.]

It would seem from the adverse criticisms of Plotinus, that the Stoics recognized one grand [Greek: **ge/nos] comprehending all the above four as distinct species: see Plotinus, Ennead., vi. 2, 1; vi. 1, 25. He charges them with inconsistency and error for doing so. He admits, however, that Aristotle did not recognize any one supreme [Greek: ge/nos] comprehending all the ten Categories (vi. 1, 1), but treated all the ten as [Greek: prô=ta ge/nê], under an analogous aggregate. I cannot but think that the **Stoics looked upon their four [Greek: ge/nê] in the same manner; for I do not see what they could find more comprehensive to rank generically above [Greek: ti/].]

We do not possess the advantage (which we have in the case of Aristotle) of knowing this quadruple scheme as stated and enforced by its authors. We know it only through the abridgment of Diogenes Laertius, together with incidental remarks and criticisms, chiefly adverse, by Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Plotinus, and some Aristotelian commentators. As far as we can make out upon this evidence, it appears that the first Stoic Category corresponded with the [Greek: Prô/tê Ou)si/a], First Essence or Substance of Aristotle. It was exclusively Subject, and could never become Predicate; but it was indispensable as Subject, to the three other Predicates. Its meaning was concrete and particular; for we are told that all general notions or conceptions were excluded by the Stoics from this Category,[132] and were designated as [Greek: Ou)/tina], Non-Individuals, or Non-Particulars. _Homo_ was counted by them, not under the Category [Greek: ti/], _Quid_, but under the Category [Greek: _poio/n_], _Quale_; in its character of predicate determining the Subject [Greek: ti/s] or [Greek: ti/]. The Stoic Category _Quale_ thus included the Aristotelian Second Essences or Substances, and also the Aristotelian _differentia_. _Quale_ was a _species_-making Category ([Greek: ei)dopoio/s]).[133] It declared what was the Essence of the Subject [Greek: ti/]--the essential qualities or attributes, but also the derivative manifestations thereof, coinciding with what is called the _proprium_ in Porphyry's Eisagoge. It therefore came next in order immediately after [Greek: ti/]: since the Essence of the Subject must be declared, before you proceed to declare its Accidents.

[Footnote 132: Simpl. ad Categ., p. 54, a. 12, Schol. Brand.: [Greek: sumparalêpte/on de\ kai\ tê\n sunê/theian tô=n Stôi+kô=n peri\ tô=n genikô=n poiô=n, pô=s ai( ptô/seis kat' au)tou\s prophe/rontai, kai\ pô=s _ou)/tina_ ta\ koina\ par' au)toi=s le/getai, kai\ o(/pôs para\ tê\n a)/gnoian tou= mê\ pa=san ou)si/an to/de ti sêmai/nein kai\ to\ _para\ to\n ou)/tina_ so/phisma gi/netai para\ to\ schê=ma tê=s le/xeôs; oi(=on ei)/ ti/s e)stin e)n A)thê/nais, ou)k e)/stin e)n Mega/rois; _ o( ga\r a)/nthrôpos ou)/tis e)sti/n, ou) ga/r e)sti/ tis o( koino/s_, ô(s tina\ de\ au)to\n e)la/bomen e)n tô=| lo/gô|, kai\ para\ tou=to to\ o)/noma tou=to e)/schen o( lo/gos ou)/tis klêthei/s.]

Compare Schol. p. 45**, a. 7, where Porphyry says that the Stoics, as well as Aristotle, in arranging Categories, took as their point of departure [Greek: to\ **deu/teron u(pokei/menon], not [Greek: to\ prô=ton u(pokei/menon ( = tê\n a)/poion u(/lên)].]

[Footnote 133: Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre p. 222; Plutarch, De Stoicor. Repugnantiis, p. 1054 a.; Simpl. ad Categor. Schol. p. 67. Br. [Greek: Poia\] were distributed by the Stoics into three varieties; and the abstract word [Greek: Poio/tês], in the Stoic sense, corresponded only to the highest and most complete of these three varieties, not to the second or third variety, so that [Geek: poio/tês] had a narrower extension than [Greek: poio/n]: there were [Greek: poia\] without any [Greek: poiotê\s] corresponding to them. To the third Category, [Greek: Pô\s e)/chonta], which was larger and more varied than the second, they had no abstract term corresponding; nor to the fourth Category, [Greek: Pro/s ti]. Hence, we may see one reason why the Stoics, confining the abstract term [Greek: poio/têtes] to durable attributes, were disposed to maintain that the [Greek: poio/têtes tô=n sôma/tôn] were themselves [Greek: sô/mata] or [Greek: sômatika/]: which Galen takes much pains to refute (vol. xix. p. 463, seq. ed. Kühn). The Stoics considered these qualities as [Greek: a)e/ras tina/s], or [Greek: pneu/mata], &c., spiritual or gaseous agents pervading and holding together the solid substance.