Chapter XLVI: Appendix: I (7)

Among these principles of change, some reside in the inanimate substances, others in the animated; not only in the soul generally, but also in the rational branch of the soul (p. 1046, a. 38). Accordingly some [Greek: duna/meis] are Rational, others Irrational. All arts and constructive sciences are [Greek: duna/meis] (or [Greek: a)rchai\ metablêtikai\ e)n a)/llô| ê)\ ê(=| a)/llo]--b. 3). In the rational capacities, the same capacity covers both contraries; in the irrational, each bears upon one of the two contraries exclusively; thus, fire will only heat but not chill, while the medical art will produce either sickness or health. The reason is, that Science is based upon rational explanations or definitions; and the same rational explanation declares both the thing itself and the privation thereof; though not indeed in the same manner: it declares, in a certain way, both together, and, in a certain way, chiefly the positive side (b. 10). Accordingly these sciences are sciences of both the contraries at once: namely, _per se_, of one side of the Antiphasis; not _per se_, of the other side; since the rational explanation also declares, directly and _per se_, only one side, while it declares the other side in a certain way indirectly, mediately, _per accidens_--_i.e._, by negation and exclusion ([Greek: a)popha/sei kai\ a)pophora=|].--b. 14). For the Contrary is the highest grade of privation; and this is the exclusion of one side of the alternative ([Greek: ê( ga\r ste/rêsis ê( prô/tê to\ e)nanti/on, au(/tê d' a)pophora\ thate/rou]--p. 1046 b. 15; Bonitz says that [Greek: to\ e)nanti/on] is the subject of this proposition, and [Greek: ê( ste/rêsis] the predicate). Both of two contraries cannot reside, indeed, in the same subject; but Science is a [Greek: du/namis] through rational explanation or reason in the soul which has within it a principle of motion; accordingly the soul can bring to pass either of the two contraries, through reference to the same rational notion or explanation which comprises both (b. 22).

The Megaric philosophers recognize no [Greek: du/namis] apart from [Greek: e)ne/rgeia]; affirming that no one has any power, except at the moment when he is actually exercising it. These philosophers are wrong (for various reasons indicated: p. 1046, b. 30--p. 1047, a. 20). Power and Act are distinct. A particular event is possible to happen, yet it does not happen; or possible not to happen, yet it does happen (p, 1047, a. 22). That is possible, to which, if the act supervene whereto such possibility relates, nothing impossible will ensue (a. 25). The name [Greek: e)ne/rgeia], appended to that of [Greek: e)ntele/cheia] ([Greek: ê( pro\s tê\n e)ntele/cheian suntitheme/nê]--a. 30), has come to be applied to other things chiefly from reference to motions; for motion is _par excellence_ [Greek: e)ne/rgeia]. Hence Non-Entia are never said to be moved, though other predicates may be applied to them: we may call them [Greek: dianoêta/] and [Greek: e)pithumêta/], but never [Greek: kinou/mena]; for, if we did, we should be guilty of contradiction, saying that things which are not [Greek: e)nergei/a|] are [Greek: e)nergei/a|]. Among the Non-Entia there are some which are Entia [Greek: duna/mei]: we call them Non-Entia, because they are not [Greek: e)ntelechei/a|] (b. 2).

If the definition above given of [Greek: to\ dunato/n] be admitted, we see plainly that no one can say truly: This is possible, yet it will never happen (p. 1047, b. 3, seq.).

Among all the various [Greek: duna/meis], some are congenital, such as the perceptive powers ([Greek: ai)sthê/seôn]--p. 1047, b. 31); others are acquired by practice, such as playing the flute; others by learning, like the arts: these two last varieties we cannot possess without having previously exercised ourselves in them actively (b. 34), but the others, which are more of a passive character, we may possess without such condition. This distinction coincides with that which was drawn previously between the rational and the irrational [Greek: duna/meis] or capacities: the rational capacities belonging only to a soul, and to the rational branch thereof. Now every [Greek: dunato/n] has its own specialities and conditions: it is itself a given something, and it is surrounded with concomitants of special time, place, neighbourhood, &c. (p. 1048, a. 1). The irrational capacities must necessarily pass into reality, whenever the active and the passive conditions come together, because there is but one reality to arise; but the rational capacities not necessarily, because they tend to either one of two contrary realities, both of which cannot be produced. Which of the two contraries shall be brought to reality, will depend upon another authority--the appetency or deliberate resolution of the soul: to whichsoever of the two, each possible, such sovereign appetency tends, that one will be brought to pass, when agent and patient come together and both are in suitable condition (a. 11); and under those circumstances, it will _necessarily_ ([Greek: a)na/gkê]--a. 14) be brought to pass. We need not formally enunciate the clause--"if nothing extrinsic occurs to prevent it": for this is already implied in the definition of [Greek: du/namis] which is never affirmed as absolute and unconditional, but always under certain given conditions (a. 18: [Greek: e)/sti d' ou) pa/ntôs, a)ll' e)cho/ntôn pô=s]). Accordingly the agent will not be able to bring about both sides of the alternative at once, even though appetite or deliberate resolution may prompt him to do it (a. 21).

Having thus gone through the variety of [Greek: du/namis] called [Greek: ê( kata\ ki/nêsin], we shall now give some explanations of [Greek: e)ne/rgeia]; in the course of which we shall be able to illustrate by contrast, the other variety of [Greek: du/namis], which was indicated above (p. 1048, a. 30). [Greek: E)ne/rgeia] is used when the thing exists, not [Greek: duna/mei]: meaning by [Greek: duna/mei] such as Hermes in the wood or the half-yard in the whole yard. We shall explain our meaning, by giving an induction of particulars; for definition cannot be given of every thing. We must group into one view the analogies following ([Greek: ou) dei= panto\s o(/ron zêtei=n, a)lla\ kai\ to\ a)na/logon sunora=n]--a. 37): As the person now actually building is to the professional builder not so engaged; as the animal awake is to the animal asleep; as the animal seeing is to the animal possessed of good eyes but having them closed; as that which is severed from matter is to matter ([Greek: to\ a)pokekrime/non]--b. 3); as the work completed is to the material yet unworked;--so is [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] to [Greek: du/namis]. The antithesis is not similar in all these pairs of instances, but there is a relationship or analogy pervading all ([Greek: ô(s tou=to e)n tou/tô| ê)\ pro\s tou=to, to/d' e)n tô=|de ê)\ pro\s to/de]--b. 8). In some of the pairs, the antithesis is the same as that of [Greek: ki/nêsis pro\s du/namin]; in others, it is the same as that of [Greek: ou)si/a pro/s tina u(/lên] (b. 9). In one member of each pair, we have [Greek: ê( e)ne/rgeia a)phôrisme/nê]; in the other [Greek: to\ dunato/n] (b. 5--[Greek: e)ne/rgeia] here is _reality severed and determinate_, as contrasted with [Greek: du/namis] _potentiality huddled together and indeterminate_.--See Schwegler's note: "Potenzialität und Aktualität sind reine Verhältnissbegriffe"--p. 172, seq.). But in all the above-named examples, that which is now [Greek: duna/mei] may come actually to be [Greek: e)nergei/a|]: the person now sleeping may awake; the person whose eyes are now closed may open them and see; the Hermes now in the wood may be brought out of the wood and exist as a real statue. It is otherwise with The Infinite, Vacuum, &c. These exist [Greek: duna/mei] only, and can never come to exist [Greek: e)nergei/a|], or independently. The Infinite can exist [Greek: e)nergei/a|] only for our cognition. The fact that the bisection thereof is never exhausted--that we may go on dividing as long as we choose--gives to the potential Infinite a certain actuality, though it cannot be truly separated (b. 16).

We must farther explain in what cases it is proper to say that a thing is [Greek: duna/mei], and in what cases it is not proper. You cannot properly say that earth is potentially a man: you may perhaps say that the semen is potentially a man; yet even _this_ not certainly, since other conditions besides semen are required (p. 1049, a. 2). The physician cannot cure every patient, yet neither is the cure altogether a matter of chance ([Greek: a)po\ tu/chês]--a. 4): there is a certain measure of cure possible, and that is called [Greek: to\ u(giai=non duna/mei]. The definition thereof, taken from the side of the agent, would be--that which will come to pass if he wills it, without any impediment from without; from the side of the patient--when no impediment occurs from within him (a. 8). In like manner, a house exists [Greek: duna/mei], when all the matter for it is brought together, without need either of addition or subtraction or change, and when there is no internal impediment; and so with other products of art, where the principle of generation is extrinsic to themselves. In natural products, where the principle of generation is intrinsic, we treat them as potentially existing, when this principle is in a condition to realize itself through itself, assuming no external impediments to interfere. Thus we do not call the semen potentially a man, because, before it becomes such, it must undergo change in something else, and therefore stands in need of some other principle; we call it so only when it is in such conditions that its own principle suffices. Earth is not said to be a statue [Greek: duna/mei], until it has first been changed into brass (a. 17). We call the product not by the name of the Matter itself, but by an adjective appellation derived from the next adjacent Matter; thus we call a box, not wood, but wooden: wood is then a box [Greek: duna/mei]. But we say this only of the proximate or immediate Matter, not of the remote or primary Matter. We must go back through successive stages to the first or most remote Matter; thus wood is not earth, but earthy: earth therefore is potentially wood. The earth may be aeriform; the air may be fiery; the fire has no analogous adjective whereby it can be called, and is thus the first or last Matter. But it is not said to be potentially any thing except the [Greek: su/ntheton] combined with Form immediately above it. Matter may be either proximate or remote: Potentiality is affirmed only of the proximate Matter.

Since all the different meanings of Prius have been enumerated and distinguished, it is plain that in all those meanings Actuality is _prius_ as compared with Potentiality: whether the [Greek: du/namis] be [Greek: a)rchê\ metablêtikê\ ( = kinêtikê\) e)n a)/llô| ê(=| a)/llo], like Art; or [Greek: a)rchê\ kinêtikê\ ê)\ statikê\ e)n au)tô=| ê(=| au)to/], like Nature (p. 1049, b. 5-10). Actuality is _prius_ both [Greek: lo/gô|] and [Greek: ou)si/a|]: it is also _prius_ [Greek: chro/nô|] in a certain sense, though not in a certain other sense.

It is _prius_ [Greek: lo/gô|], because the Actual is included in the definition of the Potential; that is, it must be presupposed and foreknown, before you can understand what the Potential is (p. 1049, b. 17). You explain [Greek: oi)kodomiko/s] or [Greek: o(ratiko/s] by saying that he is [Greek: duna/menos oi)kodomei=n ê)\ o(ra=n]: you explain [Greek: o(rato/n] by saying that it is [Greek: dunato\n o(ra=sthai]: [Greek: to\ dunato/n], in its first and absolute meaning, is [Greek: dunato/n] because it may come into Actuality (b. 13).

It is _prius_ [Greek: chronô=|] in the sense that the Potential always presupposes an Actual identical _specie_, though not identical _numero_, with that Actual to which the Potential tends. Take a man now existing and now seeing, or corn now ripe in the field: these doubtless, before they came into their present condition, must have pre-existed in Potentiality; that is, there must have pre-existed a certain matter--seed or a something capable of vision--which at one time was not yet in a state of Actuality (p. 1049, b. 23). But prior to this matter there must have existed other Actualities, by which this matter was generated: the Actual is always generated out of its Potential by a prior Actual, _e.g._, a man by a man, a musical man by a musical man; there being always some prior movent, which must be itself already in Actuality (b. 27). We have already declared that every thing generated is something generated out of something, and by something which is identical in species with the thing generated (b. 29). Hence it seems that there can be no builder who has built nothing, no harper who has never harped; for the man who is learning to harp learns by harping (b. 32); which gave occasion to the sophistical puzzle--That one, who does not possess the knowledge, will nevertheless do that to which the knowledge relates. The learner does not possess the knowledge; yet still he must have possessed some fragments of the knowledge: just as, in every thing which is in course of generation, some fraction must have been already generated; in every thing which is moved, some fraction has been already moved (b. 36).

Lastly, Actuality is _prius_ as compared with Potentiality (not merely [Greek: lo/gô|, kai\ chro/nô| e)/stin ô(/s], but also) [Greek: ou)si/a|] (p. 1050, a. 4). In the first place, that which is latest in generation is first in Form and in Essence; a man compared with a child, man as compared with semen. Man already possesses the Form, semen does not. Next, every thing generated marches or gradually progresses towards its principle and towards its end. The principle is the [Greek: ou(= e(/neka], and the generation is for the sake of the end. Now the end or consummation is Actuality, and for the sake of this the Potentiality is taken on ([Greek: lamba/netai]--a. 10). Animals do not see in order that they may have sight; they have sight in order that they may see: they do not theorize in order that they may possess theoretical aptitude, but the converse; except indeed those who are practising as learners. Moreover, Matter is said to exist potentially, because it may come into Form; but, when it exists actually, it is then in Form (a. 16). (Alexander says: [Greek: ô(/ste ka)\n tou/tô| prote/ra (ê( e)ne/rgeia) ô(s _e)pheto\n_ kai\ ta/sson kai\ ei)s ko/smon a)/gon duna/meôs]--p. 559, 10, Bon.) The case is the same where the end is nothing beyond a particular mode of motion (_e.g._, dancing): the dancing-master has attained his end when he exhibits his pupil actually dancing. In natural productions this is no less true than in artificial: Nature has attained her end, when the product comes into [Greek: e)ne/rgeia]; that is, when it is actually at work, from whence the name [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] is derived ([Greek: to\ ga\r e)/rgon te/los, ê( de\ e)ne/rgeia to\ e)/rgon--kai\ suntei/nei pro\s tê\n e)ntele/cheian]--a. 23).

In some cases (as we have often remarked) the ultimatum is use, without any ulterior product distinct from the use, _e.g._, the act of seeing is the ultimatum of the visual power (p. 1050, a. 24); in other cases there is something ulterior and distinct as a house from the building power. In the former of these cases, Actuality is the end of [Greek: du/namis]; in the latter it is more the end than [Greek: du/namis]. ([Greek: O(/môs ou)the\n ê(=tton e)/ntha me\n te/los e)/ntha de\ ma=llon te/los tê=s duna/meô/s e)stin; ê( ga\r oi)kodo/mêsis e)n tô=| oi)kodomoume/nô|, kai\ a(/ma gi/gnetai kai\ e)/sti tê=| oi)ki/a|]--a. 29. This passage is obscure: see the comments of Alexander, with the notes of Schwegler and Bonitz, who accuse Alexander of misunderstanding it; though it appears to me that neither of them is quite clear. I understand Aristotle to reason as follows:--[Greek: O(/rasis] is the [Greek: te/los], the [Greek: e)ne/rgeia], the consummation of the visual power called [Greek: o)/psis]; but [Greek: oi)kodo/mêsis], is not the [Greek: te/los], the [Greek: e)ne/rgeia], the consummation of the building power called [Greek: oi)kodomikê/]. This last has its [Greek: te/los], [Greek: e)ne/rgeia], consummation, in the ulterior product [Greek: oi)ki/a]. Nevertheless [Greek: oi)kodo/mêsis], residing as it does [Greek: e)n tô=| oi)kodomoume/nô|], and coming into existence simultaneously with the house, is more the end, more akin to the end or consummation than the building power called [Greek: oi)kodomikê/].)

In cases where there is an ulterior product beyond and apart from the exercise of the power, the Actuality (consummation) resides in that product (p. 1050, a. 31). In cases where is no such ulterior product, the Actuality resides in the same subject wherein the power resides. Thus sight resides in him who sees, and life in the soul. Hence also happiness resides in the soul; for happiness is a certain kind of life (b. 1).

It is thus plain that Actuality is the Essence and the Form, and that it is _prius_ [Greek: tê=| ou)si/a|] compared with Potentiality. And, as has been already remarked, one Actuality always precedes another, in time, up to the eternal Prime Movent (p. 1050, b. 5). Moreover, [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] is _prius_ to [Greek: du/namis] in respect to speciality and dignity ([Greek: kuriôte/rôs]--b. 6). For eternal things are _priora_ in essence to destructible things, and nothing is eternal [Greek: duna/mei], as the reason of the case will show us (b. 8).

All Potentiality applies at once to both sides of the Antiphasis--to the affirmative as well as to the negative. That which is not possible, will never occur to any thing; but every thing which is possible may never come to Actuality ([Greek: to\ dunato\n de\ pa=n e)nde/chetai mê\ e)nergei=n]--p. 1050, b. 10). That which is possible to be, is also possible not to be. Now that which is possible not to be, may perhaps not be ([Greek: e)nde/chetai mê\ ei)=nai]--b. 13); but that which may not be, is destructible, either absolutely (that is, in respect to Essence), or in respect to such portions of its nature as may not be, that is, in respect to locality or quantity or quality. Accordingly, of those things which are absolutely, or in respect to Essence, indestructible, nothing exists [Greek: duna/mei] absolutely or in respect to Essence, though it may exist [Greek: duna/mei] in certain respects, as in respect to quality or locality); all of them exist [Greek: e)nergei/a|] (b. 18). Nor does any thing exist [Greek: duna/mei], which exists by necessity; yet the things which exist by necessity are first of all (_i.e._, _priora_ in regard to every thing else); for, if they did not exist, nothing would have existed. Moreover, if there be any Eternal Motion, or any Eternal Motum, it cannot be Motum [Greek: duna/mei] except in respect to whence and whither; in that special respect, it may have Matter or Potentiality (b. 21).

Accordingly, the Sun, the Stars, and the whole Heaven, are always at work, and there is no danger of their ever standing still, which some physical philosophers fear ([Greek: a)ei\ e)nergei= o( ê(/lios]--p. 1050, b. 22); nor are they fatigued in doing this. Motion with them is not a potentiality of both members of the Antiphasis, either to be moved or not to be moved. If the fact were so--if their Essence were Matter and Power, and not Act--the perpetual continuity of (one side of the alternative) motion would be toilsome to them; but it is not toilsome, since Actuality is their very Essence (b. 28). Likewise mutable things (which are destructible), such as earth and fire, imitate these indestructible entities, being ever at work; for these elements possess motion by themselves and in themselves, each changing into another (b. 30; compare De Gen. et Corr. p. 337, a. 2). But the other [Greek: duna/meis] are all potentialities of both sides of the Antiphasis, or of both alternatives. The rational [Greek: duna/meis] can cause motion in such and such way, or not in such and such way; the irrational [Greek: duna/meis] may be present or absent, and thus embrace both sides of the alternative (b. 33).

Hence we draw another argument for not admitting the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, affirmed by the dialecticians ([Greek: oi( e)n toi=s lo/gois]--p. 1050, b. 35). If there existed such Ideas, they would be only [Greek: duna/neis**duna/meis] in respect to the [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] existing in their particular embodiments. Thus an individual cognizing man would be much more cognizant than [Greek: au)toepistê/mê]; a particular substance in motion would be much more in motion than [Greek: ki/nêsis] or [Greek: au)toki/nêsis] itself. For [Greek: au)toepistê/mê] or [Greek: au)toki/nêsis] are only [Greek: duna/meis] to the [Greek: e)pistê=mo/n ti] or the [Greek: kinou/meno/n ti], which belong to [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] (b. 36). (We may remark that in the Platonic Parmenides, p. 134, C., an argument the very opposite to this is urged. It is there contended that Cognitio _per se_ (the Idea) must be far more complete and accurate than any cognition which _we_ possess.)

It is thus plain that [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] is _prius_ to [Greek: du/namis], and to every principle of change (p. 1051, a. 2). It is also better and more honourable than [Greek: du/namis] even in the direction of good. We have already observed that [Greek: du/namis] always includes both of two contraries, in the way of alternative: one of these must be the good, the other the bad. Now the actuality of good is better than the potentiality of good; the actuality of health is better than the potentiality of health, which latter must also include the potentiality of sickness, while the actuality of health excludes the actuality of sickness. On the other hand, the actuality of evil is worse than the potentiality of evil; for the potentiality is neither of the two contraries or both of them at once (a. 17). Hence we see that evil is nothing apart from particular things; since it is posterior in its nature even to Potentiality: there is therefore neither evil, nor error, nor destruction, in any of the principia or eternal Essences (a. 19). (The note of Bonitz here is just:--"Quem in hac argumentatione significavi errorem--judicium morale de bono et malo immisceri falso iis rebus, a quibus illud est alienum--ei non dissimilem Arist. in proximâ argumentatione, si recte ejus sententiam intelligo, videtur admisisse, quum quidem malum non esse [Greek: para\ ta\ pra/gmata], seorsim ac per se existens, demonstrare conatur." Aristotle here as elsewhere confounds the idea of Good, Perfection, Completeness, &c., with that of essential Priority. But what he says here--[Greek: ou)k e)/sti to\ kako\n para\ ta\ pra/gmata]--can hardly be reconciled with what he says in the Physica (pp. 189, 191, 192) about [Greek: ste/rêsis], which he includes among the three [Greek: a)rchai/], and which he declares to be [Greek: kakopoio/s]--p. 192, a. 15.)

Lastly, we discover geometrical truths by drawing visible diagrams, and thus translating the Potentialities into Actuality. If these diagrams were ready drawn for us by nature, there would be no difficulty in seeing these truths; but, as the case stands, the truths only inhere in the figures potentially (p. 1051, a. 23: [Greek: ei) d' ê)=n diê|rêne/na, phanera\ a)\n ê)=n; nu=n d' e)nupa/rchei duna/mei]). If the triangle had a line ready drawn parallel to its side, we should have seen at once that its three angles were equal to two right angles. Potential truths are thus discovered by being translated into Actuality. The reason of this is, that the Actuality is itself an act of cogitation, so that the Potentiality springs from Actuality ([Greek: ai)/tion d' o(/ti no/êsis ê( e)ne/rgeia; ô(/st' e)x e)nergei/as ê( du/namis]--a. 30. It is not therefore true--what the Platonists say--that the mathematical bodies and their properties are [Greek: ou)si/ai kai\ e)nergei=ai]: they are only [Greek: duna/meis], and they are brought into being by our cogitation or abstraction). It is true that each individual diagram drawn is posterior to the power of drawing it (a. 32).

Having gone through the discussion of Ens according to the first of the ten Categories, and of Ens Potential and Actual, we have now to say something about Ens as True or False in the strictest sense of the words ([Greek: to\ de\ kuriô/tata o)\n a)lêthe\s ê)\ pseu=dos]--p. 1051, b. 1). These words mean, in reference to things, either that they are conjoined or that they are disjoined. To speak truth is to affirm that things which are disjoined or conjoined in fact, are disjoined or conjoined; to speak falsely, the reverse. The appeal is to the fact: it is not because we truly call you white, that you are white; it is because you really are white, that we who call you white speak truth (b. 9). If there are some things which are always conjoined, others always disjoined, others again sometimes conjoined sometimes disjoined, propositions in reference to the first two classes affirming conjunction or disjunction, will be always true or always false, while in reference to the third class propositions may be either true or false, according to the case (b. 10).

But what shall we say in regard to things Uncompounded? In respect to them, what is truth or falsehood--to be or not to be? ([Greek: ta\ a)su/ntheta]--p. 1051, b. 18). If we affirm white of the wood, or incommensurability of the diagonal, such conjunction of predicate and subject may be true or false; but how, if there be no predicate distinct from the subject? Where there is no distinction between predicate and subject, where the subject stands alone,--in these cases, there is no truth or falsehood in the sense explained above: no other truth except that the mind apprehends and names the subject, or fails to do so. You either know the subject, or you do not know it: there is no alternative but that of knowledge or ignorance; to be deceived is impossible about the question _Quid est_ ([Greek: to\ me\n thigei=n kai\ pha/nai a)lêthe/s, ou) ga\r tau)to\ kata/phasis kai\ pha/sis, to\ d' a)gnoei=n mê\ thigga/nein; a)patêthê=nai ga\r peri\ to\ ti/ e)stin ou)k e)/stin a)ll' ê)\ kata\ sumbebêko/s]--b. 25. The last words are thus explained by Bonitz: "nisi forte per abusum quendam vocabuli ipsam ignorantiam dixeris errorem"--p. 411.). All these uncompounded subjects exist actually, not potentially: if the latter had been true, they would have been generated and destroyed; but Ens Ipsum ([Greek: to\ o)\n au)to/]--b. 29) is neither generated nor destroyed; for, if it had been, it must have been generated out of something. Respecting all those things which exist in Essence and Actuality, you cannot be deceived: you may apprehend them in cogitation, or fail to apprehend them. The essential question respecting them is, whether they exist in such or such manner or not; as it is respecting the One and the Uncompounded--whether, being an existent, it exists thus and thus or not (b. 35). Truth consists in apprehending or cogitating them (p. 1052, a. 1): the contrary thereof is non-apprehension of them or ignorance ([Greek: a)/gnoia]), yet not analogous to blindness; for that would be equivalent to having no apprehensive intelligence ([Greek: ô(s a)\n ei) to\ noêtiko\n o(/lôs mê\ e)/choi tis]--a. 3; one is not absolutely without [Greek: noêtiko/n], but one's [Greek: no/êsis] does not suffice for apprehending these particular objects).

Respecting objects immoveable and unchangeable, and apprehended as such, it is plain that there can be no mistake as to the When ([Greek: kata\ to/ pote/]--p. 1052, a. 5; _i.e._, a proposition which is true of them at one time cannot be false at another time). No man will suppose a triangle to have its three angles equal to two right angles at one time, but not at another. Even in these unchangeables, indeed, a man may mistake as to the What: he may suppose that there is no even number which is a prime number, or he may suppose that there are some even numbers which are prime, others which are not so; but, respecting any particular number, he will never suppose it to be sometimes prime, sometimes not prime (a. 10).

(In respect to the meaning of [Greek: ta\ a)su/ntheta]--p. 1051, b. 17--Bonitz and Schwegler differ. Bonitz says, Comm. p. 409: "Compositæ quas dicit non sunt intelligendæ eæ quæ ex pluribus elementis coaluerunt, sed eæ potius, in quibus cum substantia conjungitur accidens aliquod, veluti homo albus, homo sedens, diagonalis irrationalis, et similia." Schwegler says, p. 187: "Unter den [Greek: mê\ sunthetai\ ou)si/ai] versteht Arist. näher diejenigen Substanzen, die nicht ein [Greek: su/ntheton] oder [Greek: su/nolon] sondern [Greek: a)/neu u(/lês (ou) duna/mei)] und schlechthin [Greek: e)nergei/a|], also reine Formen sind, und als solche kein Werden und Vergehen haben." Of these two different explanations, I think that the explanation given by Bonitz is the more correct, or at least the more probable.)

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Book [Greek: L].

We have to speculate respecting Essence; for that which we are in search of is the principles and causes of Essences (p. 1069, a. 18). If we look upon the universe as one whole, Essence is the first part thereof: if we look upon it as a series of distinct units ([Greek: ei) tô=| e)phexê=s], a. 20), even in that view [Greek: ou)si/a] stands first, [Greek: poio/n] next, [Greek: poso/n] third; indeed these last are not Entia at all, strictly speaking (a. 21)--I mean, for example, qualities and movements, and negative attributes such as not-white and not-straight; though we do talk of these last too as Entia, when we say _Est non-album_. Moreover Essence alone, and none of the other Categories, is separable. The old philosophers ([Greek: oi( a)rchai=oi]) are in the main concurrent with us on this point, that Essence is _prius_ to all others; for they investigated the principles, the elements, and the causes of Essence. The philosophers of the present day (Plato, &c.) declare Universals, rather than Particulars, to be Essences; for the genera are universal, which these philosophers, from devoting themselves to dialectical discussions, affirm to be more properly considered as Principles and Essences (a. 28); but the old philosophers considered particular things to be Essences, as fire and earth, for example, not the common body or Body in general ([Greek: ou) to\ koino\n sô=ma]--a. 30).

Now there are three Essences. The Perceivable includes two varieties: one, the Perishable, acknowledged by all, _e.g._, animals and plants; the other Eternal, of which we must determine the elements, be they many or one. There is also the Immoveable, which some consider to be separable ([Greek: a)/llê de\ a)ki/nêtos kai\ tau/tên tine\s ei)=nai phasi chôristê/n]--p. 1069, a. 33; [Greek: ou)si/a noêtê\ kai\ a)ki/nêtos]--Schwegler's note): either recognizing two varieties thereof, distinct from each other--the Forms and Mathematical Entia; or not recognizing Forms as separable Entia, but only the Mathematical Entia (a. 36). Now the first, or Perceivable Essences, belong to physical science, since they are moveable or endued with motion; the Immoveable Essences, whether there be two varieties of them or only one, belong to a science distinct from physical. The Perceivable and the Immoveable Essences have no common principles (b. 2).

The Perceivable Essence is subject to change ([Greek: metablêtê/]). Since change takes place either out of Opposites or out of Intermediates, and not out of every variety of Opposites, but only out of Contraries ([Greek: e)k tê=s oi)kei/as a)popha/seôs, e)k tê=s oi)kei/as sterê/seôs]--Alexander, pp. 644, 645, Bon.; the voice, _e.g._, is not white, yet change does not take place from voice to white, these being disparates, or of different genera: [Greek: ta\ ge/nei diaphe/ronta ou)k e)/chei o(do\n ei)s a)/llêla]--I. iv. p. 1055, a. 6), there must of necessity be a certain Substratum which changes into the contrary condition; for contraries do not change into each other. The substratum remains, but the contraries do not remain: there is therefore a third something besides the contraries; and that is Matter (p. 1069, b. 9). Since then the varieties of change are four: (1) [Greek: ge/nesis] and [Greek: phthora/ (kata\ to\ ti/)], (2) [Greek: au)/xêsis kai\ phthi/sis (kata\ to\ poso/n)], (3) [Greek: a)lloi/ôsis (kata\ to\ pa/thos] or [Greek: kata\ to\ poio/n]), (4) [Greek: phora/ (kata\ to/pon] or [Greek: kata\ to\ pou=]), each of these changes will take place into its respective contrary: the Matter will necessarily change, having the potentiality of both contraries (b. 14). Ens being two-fold, all change takes place out of Ens Potentiâ into Ens Actu, _e.g._, out of potential white into actual white; and the like holds for Increase and Decrease. Thus not only may there be generation from Non-Ens accidentally but all generation takes place also out of Ens; that is, out of Ens Potentiâ, not Ens Actu (b. 20). This Ens Potentiâ is what Anaxagoras really means by his Unum, which is a better phrase than [Greek: o(mou= pa/nta]; what Empedokles and Anaxagoras mean by their [Greek: mi=gma]; what Demokritus means when he says [Greek: o(mou= pa/nta]. They mean that all things existed at once potentially, though not actually; and we see that these philosophers got partial hold of the idea of Matter ([Greek: ô(/ste tê=s u(/lês a)\n ei)=en ê(mme/noi]--b. 24). All things subject to change possess Matter, but each of them a different Matter; even the eternal things which are not generated but moved in place, possess Matter--not generated, but _from whence whither_ (_i.e._, the Matter of local movement pure and simple--direction: [Greek: kai\ tô=n a)i+di/ôn o(/sa mê\ gennêta\ kinêta\ de\ phora=|, a)ll' ou) gennêtê/n (u(/lên), a)lla\ po/then poi=]--b. 26).

Since there are three varieties of Non-Ens (p. 1069, b. 27; Alexander and Bonitz explain this [Greek: trichô=s] differently), it may seem difficult to determine, out of which among the three Generation takes place. But the answer is, that the Potential Ens is not potential of every thing alike and at haphazard, but potential in each case from something towards something ([Greek: ei) dê\ ti/ e)sti duna/mei, a)ll' o(/môs ou) tou= tucho/ntos, a)ll' e(/teron e)x e(te/rou]--b. 29). Nor is it enough to tell us that all things are huddled together ([Greek: o(mou= pa/nta chrê/mata]--b. 30); for they differ in respect to Matter or Potentiality. If this were not so, how is it that they are of infinite diversity, and not all One? The Noûs (_i.e._, according to the theory of Anaxagoras) is One; so that, if the Matter were One also, it would become in actuality that which it was at first in potentiality, and the result would be all One and the Same (b. 32).

The Causes are thus three and the Principles are three: the pair of Contraries, one of them Form ([Greek: lo/gos kai\ ei)=dos]), the other Privation, and the third Matter (p. 1069, b. 35). But we must keep in mind that neither Materia Prima nor Forma Prima is generated. For in all Change, there is something (the Matter) which undergoes change; something by which the change is effected (the Prime Movent, [Greek: u(ph' ou(= me/n, tou= prô/tou kinou=ntos]--p. 1070, a. 1); and something into which the change takes place (the Form). The brass becomes round; but, if both the brass becomes and the round becomes, you will be condemned to an infinite regression: you must stop somewhere ([Greek: a)na/gkê dê\ stê=nai]--a. 4). Moreover, every Essentia is generated out of another Essentia of the same name and form ([Greek: e)k sunônu/mou]--a. 5). All generated things proceed either from Nature, Art, Fortune, or Spontaneity. It is Nature, where the principle or beginning is in the subject itself; it is Art, where the principle or beginning is in something apart from the subject; Fortune is the privation of Art; Spontaneity is the privation of Nature ([Greek: ai( de\ loipai\ ai)/tiai sterê/seis tou/tôn]--a. 9). Essentiæ are threefold: (1) Matter, which appears to be Hoc Aliquid but is not so, for detached members or fragments, simply touching each other without coalescing, are matter and substratum (_i.e._, prepared for something ulterior); (2) Nature, which is really Hoc Aliquid--a certain definite condition, into which generation takes place ([Greek: ê( de\ phu/sis kai\ to/de ti, ei)s ê(/n, kai\ e(/xis tis]--a. 12); (3) The Concrete of the two preceding--the individual object called Sokrates or Kallias. In some cases there is no Hoc Aliquid except in this Concrete or Compound; thus in artificial objects or productions, such as a house or health, there is no Form except the Art itself: the ideal house, pre-existing in the mind of the builder, is generated and destroyed in a different sense from the real house. It is in the case of natural objects, if in any case, that there exists a Hoc Aliquid independent of the concrete individual (a. 17).

Hence Plato was not wrong in saying that Forms were coextensive with natural objects ([Greek: o(po/sa phu/sei]--p. 1070, a. 18), if there are Forms distinct from these objects: such as fire, flesh, head, which are all properly Matter. The Last Matter (or that which has come most under the influence of Form) belongs to that which is in the fullest sense Essentia (or the individual concrete named Sokrates or Kallias--a. 20). The Moving Causes pre-exist, as real individual beings or objects: the Formal Causes come into existence simultaneously with the individual real compound. When the patient becomes well, then health comes at the same time into existence: when the brazen sphere comes, the sphericity of it comes at the same time (a. 24). Whether any thing of the Form continues after the dissolution of the individual compound, is a problem to be investigated (a. 25). In some cases nothing hinders but what it may continue; for example, the soul may be of such a nature: I do not mean every soul--for every soul perhaps cannot continue--but the [Greek: Nou=s] or rational soul (a. 27). Still it is plain that this affords no support to the theory of self-existent separate Ideas; for every individual man is begotten by another individual man. In like manner also with respect to the arts; for the medical art affords the Form or rational explanation of health (a. 30; _i.e._, health is generated, not by the Idea of Health, but by the medical art, or by the artist in whom that art is embodied).

Causes and principles, in one point of view, are different: different subjects; but in another point of view, they are the same for all; that is, if we speak generally and according to analogy (if we confine ourselves to the most general terms, Form, Privation, Matter, &c.). In respect to Essentia, Relatio, and the remainder of the Categories, a difficulty arises to say whether the causes, elements, and principles of all the Categories are the same. It would be strange if they were all the same; because then Essentiæ, as well as Relata, would proceed out of the same causes and elements. For, what can these latter be? They cannot be extra-categorical; since there exists no general class apart from or besides Essentia and the other Categories (p. 1070, b. 1). Nor can any one Category be the element of the others: for the element is _prius_ to that of which it is the element. Nor again can Essentia be the element of Relata; nor is any one of the nine Categories the element of Essentia. Again, how is it possible that the elements of all the Categories can be the same? No element can be the same as that compound of which it is an element: neither B nor A can be the same as B A. If, therefore, there were such elements, they must be extra-categorical; which is impossible. Nor can the element in question (the supposed one and the same) be any cogitable, such as Ens or Unum; for every individual Concrete is both Ens and Unum and the element cannot be identical with the compound put together out of it. Neither Essentia nor Relatio could be said to exist, if Ens were the element out of which they are composed; but these Categories exist necessarily: therefore there is no one and the same element common to all the Categories (b. 9).

Yet we ought perhaps rather to repeat, what was observed before, that in one sense, the elements of all are the same; in another sense, different. Take for example the perceivable bodies. We find here hot as the Form, cold as the Privation; as Matter, there is that which is, primarily and _per se_, both hot and cold potentially: the hot and the cold are both Essentiæ; likewise other things of which these are the principles, _e.g._, flesh and bone, which of necessity are different from the principles out of which they proceed (b. 15). Flesh and bone have these elements and principles; other things have other elements and principles. The same specific principles cannot be assigned to all, but only principles analogous to these in each case, as saying, in general terms, that there are three principles--Form, Privation, Matter. Each of these is different in every different genus; thus in colour, the principles are white, black, surface, light, darkness, air, and out of these are generated day and night (b. 21).

The three preceding causes are all intrinsic or immanent ([Greek: e)nupa/rchonta]). But there are other causes also extrinsic, such as the Movent. So that Principle and Element are not exactly identical; for Principle as well as Cause includes all the four: [Greek: to\ kinou=n ê)\ i(sta/n] is a Principle, and is itself an Essentia (p. 1070, b. 25). Thus the analogous Elements are three, while the Principles or Causes are four; but the four are specifically different in each different case. Thus, health is Form; sickness is Privation; body is Matter; the medical art is Movent. House is Form; disorder of a certain sort is Privation; bricks are Matter; the building art is Movent. We thus make out four Causes; yet, in a certain sense, there will be only three (b. 32). For, in natural products, a man is the Movent Cause of a man; in artificial products ([Greek: e)n toi=s a)po\ dianoi/as]) the Movent is Form or Privation. In a certain sense, the medical art is health, and the building art is the Form of a house, and a man begets a man. And farther, over and above these special movent causes, there is the Primum Movens of all (b. 35).

We distinguish what is separable from what is not separable. Now Essentiæ, and they only, are separable; accordingly they are the causes of every thing else, since without Essentiæ there cannot be either affections or movements (p. 1071, a. 2). Such causes would be soul and body, or reason, appetite, and body. Again, in another sense, the principles of all things are generically the same, though specifically different; such are Potentia and Actus. In some cases, the same thing exists now potentially, at another time actually; thus wine, though actually wine, is potentially vinegar; flesh is actually flesh, potentially a man, Potentia and Actus will merge in the above-mentioned causes--Form, Privation, Matter, Movent (a. 7). For the Form (if it be separable), the Concrete (of Form and Matter), and Privation (like darkness or sickness)--all these exist actually; while Matter exists potentially, capable either of Form or Privation. Things differ potentially and actually sometimes through difference in the Matter, sometime through difference in the Form. Thus, the cause of a man is, in the way of Matter, the elements fire and earth; in the way of Form his own Form, and the same Form in another individual--his father and besides these, the Sun with its oblique motion; which last neither Matter, nor Form, nor Privation, nor the like Form in another individual, but a Movent Cause ([Greek: a)lla\ kinou=nta]--a. 17).

We must remember, besides, that some things may be described in general terms, others cannot be so described. The first principles of all things are, speaking in general terms, Hoc Primum Actu and Aliud Primum Potentiâ. These universals do not really exist (p. 1071, a. 19), for the principium of all individuals is some other individual. Man indeed is the principium of the Universal Man but no Universal Man exists (a. 21). Peleus is the principium of Achilles; your father, of you; this B, of that B A; B, the universal, of B A the universal. Next (after the Movent) come the Forms of Essences; but the different genera thereof (as has been already stated), colours, sounds, essences, quantities, &c., have different causes and elements, though the same when described in general terms and by analogy; also different individuals in the same species have different causes and elements, not indeed different in species, but different individually; that is, your Matter, your Movent, your Form, are different from mine, though in general terms and definition they are the same ([Greek: tô=| katho/lou de\ lo/gô| tau)ta/]--a. 29).

When therefore, we enquire, What are the principles or elements of Essences, of Relata, of Qualities &c., and whether they are the same or different? it is plain that, generically speaking (allowing for difference of meaning--[Greek: pollachô=s], p. 1071, a. 31), they are the same in each; but, speaking distributively and with reference to particulars, they are different, and not the same. In the following sense ([Greek: ô(di/]--a. 34), they are the same, namely, in the way of Analogy ([Greek: tô=| a)na/logon]). They are always Matter, Form, Privation, the Movent; hence the causes of Essences are causes of all other things, since, when Essences disappear, all the rest disappears along with them: besides all these, there is the Primum Movens Actuale, common to all ([Greek: e)/ti to\ prô=ton e)ntelechei/a|]--a. 36). In the following sense, again, they are different--when we cease to speak of genera, and pass from equivocal terms to particulars: wherever there are different opposites (as white and black, health and sickness) and wherever there are different Matters ([Greek: kai\ e)/ti ai( u(=lai]--p. 1071, b. 1; [Greek: u(=lai] in the plural, rare).

We have thus declared, respecting the principles of Perceivable Essences, what and how many they are; in what respect the same, and in what respect they are different. Essences are threefold; two Physical and one Immoveable. We shall proceed to speak of this last. There exists, of necessity, some Eternal, Immoveable Essence. For Essences are the first of all existent things; and, if they all be perishable, every thing is perishable. But it is impossible that Motion can ever have been generated or can ever be destroyed; for it always existed: it is eternal. There is the like impossibility about Time: for, if Time did not exist, there could be nothing _prius_ and nothing _posterius_ (p. 1071, b. 8). Both Motion and Time are thus eternal; both are also continuous; for either the two are identical, or Time is an affection ([Greek: pa/thos]) of Motion. Now no mode of Motion is continuous except local motion; and that in a circle (for rectilinear motion cannot be continuous and eternal). There must be a Movent or Producent Principle ([Greek: kinêtiko\n ê)\ poiêtiko/n]--b. 12); but, if the Movent existed potentially and not actually, there could not be motion continuous and eternal; for that which has mere power may never come into act. There will be no use therefore in such eternal Essences as Plato assumes in his Ideas, unless there be along with them some principle of potential change ([Greek: ei) mê/ tis duname/nê e)ne/stai a)rchê\ metaba/llein]--b. 15). Nor indeed will even that be sufficient (_i.e._, any principle of _merely potential_ change), nor any other Essence (such as Numbers--Schwegler) besides or along with the Platonic Ideas; for, if this _principium_ shall not come into Actuality ([Greek: ei) mê\ e)nergê/sei]--b. 17), the motion which we postulate, continuous and eternal, will not result from it. Nor will it even be sufficient that the Movent Principle should be supposed to be in actuality or operation ([Greek: ou)d' ei) e)nergê/sei], p. 1071, b. 18), if its Essence be Potentiality: the motion resulting therefrom cannot be eternal; for that which exists potentially may perhaps not exist at all. The Movent Principles therefore must be something of which the Essence is Actuality (b. 19), and which shall be without Matter, for they must be eternal, otherwise nothing else can be eternal. They must therefore be essential Actualities (b. 22).

Here however, a difficulty suggests itself. It seems that every thing which is in actuality must also be in potentiality, but that every thing which is in potentiality does not in every case come into actuality: so that Potentiality seems the _prius_ of the two ([Greek: dokei= ga\r to\ me\n e)nergou=n pa=n du/nasthai, to\ de\ duna/menon ou) pa=n e)nergei=n]--p. 1071, b. 24; Bonitz compares p. 1060, a. 1: [Greek: a)rchê\ ga\r to\ sunanairou=n]). But, if this were true, no Entia could exist; for it may be that they exist potentially, but not yet exist actually (b. 26). There is the like impossibility, if we adopt the theory of those theologians (Orpheus, Hesiod, &c.) who take their departure from Night, or of those physical philosophers who begin with a chaotic huddle of all things. In both cases such original condition is one of mere potentiality; and how can it ever be put in motion, if there is to be no cause in actuality ([Greek: ei) mêthe\n e)/stai e)nergei/a| ai)/tion]--b. 29)? Matter will never cause motion in itself, but must wait for the carpenter's art; nor will the earth, but must wait for seed.

It is for this reason that some philosophers, like Plato and Leukippus, represent Actuality as eternal; for they say that motion has always existed. But they do not say what variety of motion, nor why that variety, to the exclusion of others. For nothing is moved at haphazard; there must always be some reason why it is moved in one way rather than another: for example, by nature in one way; by other causes, such as violence or Noûs, in some other way (p. 1071, b. 36). But it is not competent to Plato to assume what he sometimes does assume as principium (p. 1072, a. 2--allusion to Plato Phædrus 245, E), viz., a Self-Movent; for Plato affirms (in Timæus 34, B) that the soul is _posterius_, and coæval with the Kosmos. The doctrine just mentioned--That the Potential is prior to the Actual--is true in one sense, but not true in another; we have already explained _how_ ([Greek: ei)/rêtai de\ pô=s]--a. 4. Schwegler thinks, note p. 254, that this [Greek: ei)/rêtai] refers to what has been said in Book [Greek: Th], p. 1049, b. 3, seq.; and this seems probable, though Bonitz in his note contests it, and refers to his own theory, set forth in his Prooemium pp. 24, 25, that Book [Greek: L] is a separate treatise of Aristotle, completely distinct from all the rest of the Metaphysica. This theory of Bonitz may be in the main true; but it is still possible that Book [Greek: Th] may have been written previously, and that Aristotle may here refer to it, as Schwegler suppose**.).

That Actuality is prior to Potentiality, is conformable to the doctrine of Anaxagoras, Noûs in his doctrine existing in Actuality; also to that of Empedokles, who introduces Friendship and Enmity; and again, to that of Leukippus, who affirms Motion to be eternal. So that Chaos or Night (_i.e._, mere Potentiality) did not prevail for an infinite anterior time, but the same things came round in perpetual vicissitude or rotation; which consists with the doctrine that Actuality is prior to Potentiality. If the same condition comes round periodically, we must necessarily assume something Actual, which perpetually actualizes in the same manner ([Greek: dei= ti a)ei\ me/nein ô(sau/tôs e)nergou=n]--p. 1072, a. 10). Again, if generation and destruction are to take place, we must assume something else Actual, which actualizes in a manner perpetually changing ([Greek: a)/llo dei= ei)=nai a)ei\ e)nergou=n a)/llôs kai\ a)/llôs]--a. 12). This last must actualize sometimes _per se_, sometimes in a different way; that is, according to some other influence, or according to the First (or Uniform) Actual. But it will necessarily actualize according to the First Actual; which will thus be a cause both to itself, and to the variable Actual. Now the First Actual is the best; for it is the cause of perpetual sameness, while the other is cause of variety; both together are the cause of unceasing variety. But this is how the motions really stand. Why then, should we look out for other principles (a. 18)?