Chapter XLVII: Appendix: I (8)

Now, since the preceding views are consistent with the facts and may be true ([Greek: e)pei\ d' ou(/tô t' e)nde/chetai]--p. 1072, a. 18)--and, if they be not true, we shall be compelled to admit that every thing proceeds either from Night, or from confused Chaos or Non-Ens--we may consider the problem as solved. There exists something always in unceasing circular motion: this is evident not merely from reason, but from fact. The First Heaven (Aplanês or Fixed Star sphere) will therefore be eternal. There must therefore exist something which causes this unceasing motion, or some Prime Movent. But, since Movens Immobile, Movens Motum, Motum non Movens, form a series of three terms, and since the two last of these certainly exist, we may infer that the first exists also; and that the Prime Movent, which causes the motion of the Aplanês, is immoveable (a. **20-25.--This passage perplexes all the commentators--Schwegler, Bonitz, Alexander, &c. It can hardly be construed without more or less change of the text. I do not see to what real things Aristotle can allude under the description of Mota which are not Moventia. There is much to be said for Pierron and Zévort's translation, p. 220: "Comme il n'y a que trois sortes d'êtres--ce qui est mu, ce qui meut, et le moyen terme entre ce qui est mu et ce qui meut: c'est un être (_i.e._, this middle term is an être) qui meut sans être mu."--Bonitz disapproves this interpretation of the word [Greek: me/son], and it is certainly singular to say that between _Movens_ and _Motum_, the term _Movens sed non Motum_ forms a medium: _Motum sed non Movens_ would form just as good a medium**.). This Prime Movent, which causes motion without being itself moved, must be eternal, must be Essentia, and must be an Actuality.

Now both the Appetibile ([Greek: to\ o)rekto/n]) and the Cogitabile ([Greek: to\ noêto/n]) cause motion in this way, _i.e._, without being moved themselves; moreover the Primum Appetibile and the Primum Cogitabile are coincident or identical (p. 1072, a. 27). For that which appears beautiful, is the object of desire; but that which is beautiful, is the first object of will (a. 28). Cogitation is the principium of the two (the primary fact or fundamental element): we will so and so, because we think it good; it is not true that we think it good because we will it ([Greek: o)rego/metha de\ dio/ti dokei=, ma=llon ê)\ dokei= dio/ti o)rego/metha]--a. 29). Now the Cogitant Mind ([Greek: nou=s]) is moved by the Cogitabile, and, in the series of fundamental Contraries, the members of one side of the series are Cogitabilia _per se_ (while those of the other side are only Cogitabilia _per aliud_--[Greek: noêtê\ d' ê( e(te/ra sustoichi/a kath' au(tê/n]--a. 31; see Alex., p. 668, 16, Bon.). These Cogitabilia _per se_ are first as to Essentia (_i.e._, compared with the Cogitabilia _per aliud_, they are logically _priora_): and again, among Essentiæ, that variety which is simple and actual comes first (_i.e._, it is logically _prius_, as compared with the compound and the potential). Now Unum is not identical with Simplex: Unum signifies that which is a measure of something else, while Simplex denotes a peculiar attribute of the subject in itself (a. 34). But the Pulchrum and the Eligibile _per se_ belongs to the same side of the series of Contraries, as the Cogitabilia _per se_: and the Primum Pulchrum or Eligibile is the Best or akin thereunto, in its own particular ascending scale (b. 1).

That [Greek: to\ ou(= e(/neka] is among the Immoveables, may be seen by our Treatise De Bono, where we give a string of generic and specific distributions ([Greek: ê( diai/resis dêloi=]--p. 1072, b. 2; see the interpretation of Alexander, adopted both by Schwegler and by Bonitz). For [Greek: to\ ou(= e(/neka] is used in a double sense: in one of the two senses it ranks among the Immoveables: in another it does not ([Greek: e)/sti ga\r ditto\n to\ ou(= e(/neka], b. 3--[Greek: ditto/n] is Schwegler's correction, adopted by Bonitz). It causes motion, in the manner of a beloved object; and that which it causes to move, causes motion in the other things ([Greek: kinei= de\ ô(s e)rô/menon; to\ de\ kinou/menon ta)/lla kinei=]--b. 3; [Greek: to\ de\ kinou/menon] is the conjecture of Schwegler and Bonitz).

Now, if any thing be moved, there is a possibility that it may be in a condition different from that in which it actually is. If the first actuality of the Moveable be translation or motion in space, there is a possibility that it may be otherwise than it is as to place, even though it cannot be otherwise than it is as to Essentia (p. 1072, b. 7).

But, as to the Prime Movent, which is itself immoveable, and which exists in actuality, it is impossible that _that_ can be other than what it is, in any respect whatever (p. 1072, b. 8). For the first of all changes is local motion, or rotation in a circle, and this is exactly what the Prime Movent imparts (but does not itself possess). It exists by necessity, and by that species of necessity which implies the perfect and beautiful: and in this character it is the originating principle. For there are three varieties of necessity: (1) That of violence, in contradiction to the natural impulse; (2) That without which good or perfection cannot be had; (3) That which is what it is absolutely, without possibility of being otherwise. From a principle of this nature (_i.e._, necessary in the two last senses) depend the Heaven and all Nature (b. 14).

The mode of existence ([Greek: diagôgê/]) of this Prime Movent is for ever that which _we_ enjoy in our best moments, but which we cannot obtain permanently; for its actuality itself is also pleasure (p. 1072, b. 16). As actuality is pleasure, so the various actualities of waking, perceiving, cogitating, are to us the pleasantest part of our life; while hopes and remembrances are pleasing by derivation from them (but these states we men cannot enjoy permanently and without intermittence). Cogitation _per se_ (_i.e._, cogitation in its most perfect condition) embraces that which is best _per se_; and most of all when it is most perfect. The Noûs thus cogitates itself through participation of the Cogitabile: for it becomes itself cogitable by touching the Cogitabile and cogitating: so that Cogitans and Cogitabile become identical. For Noûs in general (the human Noûs also) is in potentiality the recipient of the Cogitabile, and of Essentia or Forms; and it comes into actuality by possessing these Forms. So that what the Prime Movent possesses is more divine than the divine element which Noûs in general involves; and the actuality of theorizing is the pleasantest and best of all conditions ([Greek: noêto\s ga\r gi/gnetai thigga/nôn kai\ noô=n, ô(/ste tau)to\n nou=s kai\ noêto/n. to\ ga\r dektiko\n tou= noêtou= kai\ tê=s ou)si/as nou=s. e)nergei= de\ e)/chôn; ô(/st' e)kei=no ma=llon tou/tou o(\ dokei= o( nou=s thei=on e)/chein, kai\ ê( theôri/a to\ ê(/diston kai\ a)/riston]--b. 24. This is a very difficult passage, in which one cannot be sure of interpreting rightly. None of the commentators are perfectly satisfactory. The pronoun [Greek: e)kei=no] seems to refer to [Greek: ê( no/êsis ê( kath' au(tê/n]--three lines back. The contrast seems to be between the Prime Movent, and Noûs in general, including the human Noûs. [Greek: To\ dektiko/n] cannot refer to the Prime Movent, which has no potentiality, but must refer to the human Noûs, which is not at first, nor always, in a state of actuality. [Greek: Ma=llon] seems equivalent to [Greek: theio/teron]. The human Noûs has [Greek: thei=o/n ti], by reason of its potentiality to theorize.).

Thus it is wonderful, if God has perpetually an existence like that of our best moments; and still more wonderful, if he has a better. Yet such is the fact. Life belongs to him: for the actuality of Noûs is life, and God is actuality. His life, eternal and best, is actuality _per se_ (or _par excellence_). We declare God to be an Animal Optimum Æternum, so that duration eternal and continuous ([Greek: ai)ô\n sunechê/s]) belongs to him: for _that_ is God ([Greek: tou=to ga\r o( theo/s]--p. 1072, b. 30).

The Pythagoreans and Speusippus are mistaken in affirming that Optimum and Pulcherrimum is not to be found in the originating principle ([Greek: e)n a)rchê=|]); on the ground that the principles of plants and animals are indeed causes, but that the beautiful and perfect appears first in the results of those principles. For the seed first proceeds out of antecedent perfect animals: the first is not seed, but the perfect animal. Thus we must say that the man is prior to the seed: I do not mean the man who sprang from the seed, but the other man from whom the seed proceeded (p. 1073, a. 2).

From the preceding reasonings, it is evident that there exists an Essence eternal, immoveable, and separated from all the perceivable Essences. We have shown (in Physica; see Schwegler's note) that this Essence can have no magnitude; that it is without parts and indivisible (p, 1073, a. 6). For it causes in other subjects motion for an infinite time; and nothing finite can have infinite power. For this reason the Prime Movent cannot have finite magnitude; but every magnitude is either finite or infinite, and there is no such thing as infinite magnitude; therefore the Prime Movent can have no magnitude at all. We have also shown that it is unchangeable in quality, and without any affections ([Greek: a)pathe\s kai\ a)nalloi/ôton]). For all other varieties of change are posterior as compared with locomotive change or motion in space, which is the first of all. As the Prime Movent is exempt from this first, much more is it exempt from the others (a. 13).

We must now consider whether we ought to recognize one such Movent or Essence only, or several of the same Essences? and, if several, how many? Respecting the number thereof we must remember that our predecessors have laid down no clear or decisive doctrines ([Greek: a)popha/seis], p. 1073, a. 16). The Platonic theory of Ideas includes no peculiar research on this subject (a. 18). The Platonists call these Ideas Numbers: about which they talk sometimes as if there were an infinite multitude of them, sometimes as if they were fixed as reaching to the dekad and not higher--but they furnish no demonstrative reason why they should stop at the dekad. We shall proceed to discuss the point consistently with our preceding definitions and with the nature of the subjects (a. 23). The Principium, the First of all Entia, is immoveable both _per se_ and _per accidens_: it causes motion in another subject, to which it imparts the first or locomotive change, one and eternal (a. 25). The Motum must necessarily be moved by something; the Prime Movent must be immoveable _per se_; eternal motion must be caused by an eternal Movent; and one motion by one Movent (a. 30). But we see that, over and above the simple rotation of the All (or First Heaven), which rotation we affirm to be caused by the Primum Movens Immobile, there are also other eternal rotations of the Planets; for the circular Celestial Body, as we have shown in the Physica, is eternal and never at rest (a. 32). We must therefore necessarily assume that each of these rotations of the Planets is caused by a Movent Immoveable _per se_--by an eternal Essence (a. 35). For the Stars and Planets are in their nature eternal Essences: that which moves them must be itself eternal, and prior to that which it causes to be moved; likewise that which, is prior to Essence must itself be Essence, and cannot be any thing else (a. 37). It is plain, therefore, that there must necessarily exist a number of Essences, each eternal by nature, immoveable _per se_, and without magnitude, as Movents to the Heavenly Bodies and equal in number thereto (a. 38). These Essences are arranged in an order of first, second, &c., corresponding to the order of the planetary rotations (b. 2), But what the number of these rotations is, we must learn from Astronomy--that one among the mathematical sciences which is most akin ([Greek: oi)keiota/tês]) to the First Philosophy; for Astronomy theorizes about Essence perceivable but eternal, while Arithmetic and Geometry do not treat of any Essence at all ([Greek: peri\ ou)demia=s ou)si/as]--b. 7). That the rotations are more in number than the rotating bodies, is known to all who have any tincture of Astronomy; for each of the Planets is carried round in more than one rotation (b. 10). But what the exact number of these rotations is, we shall proceed to state upon the authority of some mathematicians, for the sake of instruction, that the reader may have some definite number present to his mind: for the rest, he must both investigate for himself and put questions to other investigators; and, if he learns from the scientific men any thing dissenting from what we here lay down, he must love both dissentients but follow that one who reasons most accurately ([Greek: philei=n me\n a)mphote/rous, pei/thesthai de\ toi=s a)kribeste/rois]--b. 16).

Aristotle then proceeds to unfold the number and arrangement of the planetary spheres and the corrective or counter-rolling ([Greek: a)nelittou/sas]) spheres implicated with them (p. 1073, b. 17--p. 1074, a. 14). He afterwards proceeds: Let the number of spheres thus be forty-seven; so that it will be reasonable to assume the Immoveable Movent Essences and Principles to be forty-seven also, as well as the perceivable spheres ([Greek: ai)sthêta/s]--p. 1074, a. 16): we say _reasonable_ ([Greek: eu)/logon]), for we shall leave to stronger heads to declare it necessary. But, since there cannot be any rotation except such as contributes to the rotation of one of the Planets, and since we must assume that each Nature and each Essence is exempt from extraneous affection and possessed _per se_ of the Best as an end, so there will be no other Nature besides the forty-seven above enumerated, and this number will be the _necessary_ total of the Essences (a. 21). For, if there were any others, they would cause motion by serving as an end for some rotation to aspire to ([Greek: kinoi=en a)\n ô(s te/los ou)=sai phora=s]--a. 23); but it is impossible that there can be any other rotation besides those that have been enumerated.

We may fairly infer this from the bodies which are carried in rotation ([Greek: e)k tô=n pherome/nôn]--p. 1074, a. 24). For, if every carrier exists naturally for the sake of the thing carried, and if every current or rotation is a current of something carried, there can exist no current either for the sake of itself or for the sake of some other current. Every current must exist for the sake of the Planets, and with a view to their rotation. For, if one current existed for the sake of another, this last must exist for the sake of a third, and so on; but you cannot go on in this way _ad infinitum_; and therefore the end of every current must be, one or other of the Divine Bodies which are carried round in the heavens (a. 31).

That there is only one Heaven, we may plainly see. For, if there were many heavens, as there are many men, the principium of each would be one _in specie_, though the principia would be many _in numero_ (p. 1074, a. 33). But all things that are many in number, have Matter, and are many, by reason of their Matter; for to all these many, there is one and the same Form ([Greek: lo/gos])--definition or rational explanation: _e.g._, one for all men, among whom Sokrates is one (a. 35). But the First Essence has no Matter; for it is an Actual ([Greek: to\ de\ ti/ ê)=n ei)=nai ou)k e)/chei u(/lên to\ prô=ton; e)ntele/cheia **ga/r]--a. 36). The Primum Movens Immobile is therefore One, both in definition and in number; accordingly, the Motum--that which is moved both eternally and continuously--is One also. There exists therefore only one Heaven (p. 1074, a. 38).

Now it has been handed down in a mythical way, from the old and most ancient teachers (p. 1074, b. 1) to their successors, that these (Eternal Essences) are gods, and that the divine element comprehends all nature ([Greek: o(/ti theoi/ te/ ei)sin ou(=toi kai\ perie/chei to\ thei=on tê\n o(/lên phu/sin]--b. 3). The other accompaniments of the received creed have been superadded with a view to persuading the multitude and to useful purposes for the laws and the common interest (b. 4); wherefore the gods have been depicted as like to men and to some other animals, combined with other similar accompaniments. If a man, abstracting from these stories, accepts only the first and fundamental truth--That they conceived the First Essences as gods, he will consider it as a divine doctrine ([Greek: thei/ôs a)\n ei)rê=sthai nomi/seien]--b. 9), preserved and handed down as fragments of truth from the most ancient times. For probably all art and philosophy and truth have been many times discovered, lost, and rediscovered. To this point alone, and thus far, the opinion of our fathers and of the first men is evident to us (b. 14).

There are however various difficulties connected with the Noûs; for it would seem to be more divine than the visible celestial objects, and yet we do not understand what its condition can be to be such (p. 1074, b. 17). For, if it cogitates nothing but is in the condition of slumber and inaction, what ground can there be for respecting it ([Greek: ti/ a)\n ei)/ê to\ semno/n]--b. 18)? And, if it cogitates something actually, yet if this process depends upon something foreign and independent (_i.e._, upon the Cogitatum), the Noûs cannot be the best Essence; since it is then essentially not Cogitation in act, but only the potentiality of Cogitation; while its title to respect arises from actual Cogitation. Again, whether we assume its Essence to be Cogitation actual or Cogitation potential, _what_ does it cogitate? It must cogitate either itself, or something different from itself; and, if the latter, either always the same Cogitatum, or sometimes one, sometimes another. But is there no difference whether its Cogitatum is honourable or vulgar? Are there not some things which it is absurd to cogitate? Evidently the Noûs must cogitate what is most divine and most honourable, without any change; for, if it did change, it must change for the worse, and that very change would at once ([Greek: ê)/dê]) be a certain motion; whereas the Noûs is essentially immoveable (b. 27). First of all, if the Essence of the Noûs be, not Cogitation actual but Cogitation potential, we may reasonably conceive that the perpetuity of Cogitation would be fatiguing to it (b. 29); next, we see plainly that there must exist something else more honourable than the Noûs; namely, the Cogitatum; for to cogitate, and the act of cogitation, will belong even to one who cogitates the vilest object. If cogitation of vile objects be detestable ([Greek: pheukto/n], b. 32)--for not to see some things is better than to see them--Cogitation cannot be the best of all things (_i.e._, Cogitation absolutely, whatever be the Cogitatum).

Since the Noûs is itself the best of all things, it must employ its cogitation upon itself and nothing else. Its cogitation will thus be Cogitation of Cogitation ([Greek: au(to\n a)/ra noei=, ei)/per e)sti\ to\ kra/tiston, kai\ e)/stin ê( no/êsis noê/seôs no/êsis]--p. 1074, b. 35). Yet, if we look to the human mind, Cognition, Perception, Opinion, Mental Discourse, &c., appear always as having direct reference to something else, and as referring each to itself only in an indirect and secondary way ([Greek: a)ei\ a)/llou--au(tê=s d' e)n pare/rgô|]--b. 36); and farther, if to cogitate is one thing and to be cogitated another thing, in which of the two points of view will the _bene_ of the Noûs consist? To be Cogitation, and to be a Cogitatum, are not logically the same ([Greek: ou)de\ ga\r tau)to\ to\ ei)=nai noê/sei kai\ nooume/nô|]--b. 38).

But may we not meet these difficulties by replying that there are some things in which Cognition is identical with the Cognitum? that is, in those Cognita which are altogether exempt from Matter? In Constructive cognitions without Matter, the Form and the [Greek: t.ê.e.] is both Cognitum and Cognitio; in Theoretical cognitions without Matter, the Notion and the Cogitation is itself the Cognitum ([Greek: o( lo/gos to\ pra=gma kai\ ê( no/êsis]). Since it appears, therefore, that, wherever there is no Matter, Cogitatum and Noûs are not different, the same will be true of the divine Noûs: its Cogitatio and its Cogitatum will be identical (p. 1075, a. 5).

One farther difficulty remains, if we suppose the Cogitatum to be a Compound ([Greek: su/ntheton]); for, on that supposition, the Cogitans would change in running through the different parts of the whole. But the reply seems to be, that every thing which has not Matter is indivisible and not compound (p. 1075, a. 7). As the human Noûs, being that which deals with compounds, comports itself for a certain time--for it does not attain its _bene_ in cogitating this or that part of the compound, but in apprehending a certain total or completion which is something different from any of the parts--so does the divine Noûs, engaged in cogitation of itself, comport itself in perpetuity (a. 10).

Another point to be considered is--in what manner the nature of the Universe ([Greek: ê( tou= o(/lou phu/sis]--p. 1075, a. 11) includes Bonum and Optimum. Is Bonum included as something separate and as an adjunct by itself transcendent? Or is it immanent, pervading the whole arrangement of the constituent parts? Or does it exist in both ways at once, as in the case of a disciplined army; for, in this latter, Bonum belongs both to the array and to the general, and indeed more to the latter, since the array is directed by the general, not the general by the array. All things in the universe are marshalled in a certain orderly way--the aquatic creatures, the aërial, and the plants; but all things are not marshalled alike. The universe is not such that there is no relation between one thing and another: there is such a relation; for every thing is marshalled with a view to one end, though in different degrees. As, in a family, the freemen have least discretion left to them to act at haphazard, but all or most of their proceedings are regulated, while slaves and oxen are not required to do much towards the common good, but are left for the most part to act at hazard,--in this way the principium of each is arranged by nature (a. 23). For example, every thing must necessarily come to the termination of one individual existence to make room for another: there are also some other facts and conditions common to all things in the universe ([Greek: le/gô d' oi(=on ei)/s ge to\ diakrithê=nai a)na/gkê a(pa=sin e)lthei=n]--a. 23; see the explanation of [Greek: diakrithê=nai], given by Bonitz, Comm. p. 519--not very certain).

In concluding this exposition, we must not lose sight of the absurdities and impossibilities which attach to all other, nor what is advanced by the most ingenious philosophers before us, nor which of their theories carries with it the fewest difficulties (p. 1075, a. 27).

That all things proceed from Contraries, all these philosophers agree in affirming. But it is not true that all things are generated, nor that they are generated from contraries; for the celestial substance is not generated at all, nor has it any contrary. Moreover, in those cases where there really are contraries, these philosophers do not teach us how generation can take place out of them; for contraries themselves have no effect upon each other. Now our doctrine solves this difficulty reasonably, by introducing a _tertium quid_ (p. 1075, a. 31)--Matter. Some of these philosophers erroneously consider Matter to be itself one of the contraries: they consider the Unequal as matter or substratum to the Equal; or the Many as matter or substratum to the One; (Evil, as opposed to Good). We resolve this in the same way: our Matter is one, is contrary itself to nothing, but may be potentially either of two contraries. Farthermore, if we admit the doctrine that Evil itself is Matter or one of the elements, the inference will follow that every thing whatever, except the Unum itself, partakes of Evil (a. 6).

Some philosophers do not admit either Good or Evil to be principles at all; but they are manifestly wrong; for in all things Good is most of all the principle (p. 1075, a. 37). Others again are so far right that they recognize Good as a principle: but they do not tell us _how_ it is a principle--whether as End, or as Movent, or as Form.

Empedokles lays down a strange doctrine: he makes Friendship to be the Good (p. 1075, b. 2). But, in his theory, Friendship is principle partly as Movent, for its function is to bring together ([Greek: suna/gei ga\r]--b. 3); partly as Matter, for it is itself a portion of the mixture ([Greek: mo/rion tou= mi/gmatos]--b. 4). Now, even granting the possibility that the same thing may be _per accidens_ ([Greek: kata\ sumbebêko/s]--b. 5, _i.e._, by special coincidence in any one particular case) principle as Movent, and also principle as Matter, nevertheless the two are not the same logically and by definition. Under which of the two, therefore, are we to reckon Friendship? It is moreover another strange feature in the theory of Empedokles, that he makes Enmity to be indestructible; for this very Enmity is with him the nature and principle of Evil (b. 8).

Anaxagoras declares Good to be the principle as Movent; for, in his theory, Noûs causes motion; but it causes motion with a view to some end, which is of course different from itself; so that the real principle is different from Noûs: unless indeed he adopted one of our tenets; for we too say that, in a certain sense, the medical art is health (p. 1075, b. 10; Z. vii. p. 1032, b. 10). It is moreover absurd, that Anaxagoras does not recognize any contrary to Good and to the Noûs (b. 11). (Bonitz remarks, Comm. p. 522:--Aristotle means that Anaxagoras was wrong, because he failed "ad eam devenire rationem, ut intellectum sui ipsius intelligentiam ideoque sui ipsius [Greek: te/los] esse statueret"; farther, he remarks, on the line b. 10--[Greek: a)/topon de\ kai\ to\ e)nanti/on mê\ poiê=sai tô=| a)gathô=| kai\ tô=| nô=|]: "Quid enim? nonne pariter et eodem jure [Greek: nou=s a)migê/s], quem posuit Anaxagoras, ab omni contrarietate et oppositione immunis sit, ac primus motor apud Aristotelem?"--Aristotle would have replied to this: "I recognize principles of Evil under the names of [Greek: u(/lê] and [Greek: ste/rêsis]; the last of the two being directly opposed to Form (Regularity or Good), the first of the two being indifferent and equally ready as a recipient both for evil and for good. My Prime Movent acts like an [Greek: e)rô/menon] in causing motion in the Celestial Substance: the motion of this last is pure Good, without any mixture of Evil. But, when this motion is transmitted to the sublunary elements, it becomes corrupted by [Greek: u(/lê] and [Greek: ste/rêsis], so that Evil becomes mingled with the Good. Anaxagoras recognizes no counteracting principles, analogous to [Greek: u(/lê] and [Greek: ste/rêsis], so that Evil, on his theory, remains unexplained.")

Those philosophers who lay down Contraries as their principles, do not make proper use of these Contraries, unless their language be improved or modified (p. 1075, b. 12). Nor do they tell us why some things are destructible, other things indestructible; for they trace all things to the same principles. Some make all things to proceed from Non-Ens; others, to escape that necessity, make all things One (and thus recognize no real change or generation at all--the Eleates, b. 16). Again, not one of them tells us why generation must always be, or what is the cause of generation. Once more, those who recognize two contrary principles must necessarily recognize a third superior to both (b. 18); and the Platonists with their Ideas are under the like necessity. For they must assign some reason why particular things partake of these Ideas.

Other philosophers, moreover, must consistently with their theories recognize something contrary to Wisdom and to the most venerable Cognition. But we are under no such necessity; for there is nothing contrary to the First ([Greek: tô=| prô/tô|]). All contraries involve Matter, and are in potentiality the same: one of the two contraries is ignorance in regard to the other; but the First has no contrary (p. 1075, b. 24).

Again, if there be no Entia beyond the Perceptibilia, there can be no beginning, no arrangement in order, no generation, no celestial bodies or proceedings (_i.e._, all these will remain unexplained). There will always be a beginning behind the beginning, _ad infinitum_; as there is in the theories of all the theologians and physical philosophers (p. 1075, b. 27). And, even if we recognize, beyond the Perceptibilia, Ideas or Numbers, these are causes of nothing; or, if causes of any thing, they are certainly not causes of motion. How, moreover, can Magnitude, and a Continuum arise out of that which has no Magnitude? Number cannot, either as Movent or as Form, produce a Continuum (b. 30).

Again, (Contraries cannot be principles, because) no Contrary can be essentially Constructive and essentially Movent (p. 1075, b. 31); for Contraries involve Matter and Potentiality, and may possibly, therefore, not exist. And, if there be Potentiality, it will come prior to Actuality: upon that supposition therefore (_i.e._, of Contraries as the fundamental principles) Entia could not be eternal. But Entia are eternal; therefore these theories must be in part amended: we have shown how (b. 34).

Farther, none of these theories explains how it is that numbers coalesce into One; or soul and body into One; or Form and Matter into one Concrete. Nor can they explain this, unless they adopt our doctrine, that the Movent brings about this coalition (p. 1075, b. 37).

Those philosophers (like Speusippus) who recognize many different grades and species of Entia (first the Mathematical Number, &c.), with separate principles for each, make the Essence of the Universe to be incoherent ([Greek: e)peisodiô/dê]--p. 1076, a. 1) and set up many distinct principles; for none of these Essences contributes to or bears upon the remainder, whether it exists or does not exist. Now Entia are not willing to be badly governed ([Greek: ta\ de\ o)/nta ou) bou/letai politeu/esthai kakô=s. "ou)k a)gatho\n polukoirani/ê; ei(=s koi/ranos."]--p. 1076, a. 4).

IV.

DE COELO.