Chapter XLV: Appendix: I (6)

We are now in a position to clear up what was touched upon in the Analytica (Anal. Poster. II. p. 92, a. 27; also, De Interp. v. p. 17, a. 13), but not completed, respecting Definition. How is it that the definition is One? We define man _animal bipes_: How is it that this is One and not Many? Man and white are two, when the latter does not belong to the former: when it does so belong to and affects the former, the two are One--white man (p. 1037, b. 16): that is, they are One [Greek: kata\ pa/thos]. But the parts included in the definition are not One [Greek: kata\ pa/thos], nor are they one [Greek: kata\ me/thexin]; for the Genus cannot be said to partake of the Differentiæ. If it did, it would at one and the same time partake of Opposita, for the Differentiæ are Opposita to each other. And, even if we say that the Genus does partake of the Differentiæ, the same difficulty recurs, when the Differentiæ are numerous. The Genus must partake alike and equally of all of them; but how is it that all of them are One, and not Many? It cannot be meant that all of them belong essentially to the thing; for, if that were so, all would be included in the definition, which they are not. We want to know why or how those Differentiæ which are included in the definition coalesce into One, without the rest: for we call the _definiend_ [Greek: e(/n ti kai\ to/de ti] (b. 27).

In answering this question, we take, as a specimen, a definition which arises out of the logical subdivision of a Genus (p. 1037, b. 28). Definition is given by assigning the Genus and Difference: the Genus is the Matter, the Difference is the Form or Essence; the two coalesce into one as Form and Matter. In the definition of man--_animal bipes_--_animal_ is the Matter and _bipes_ the Form; so that the two coalescing form an essential One. It does not signify through how many stages the logical subdivision is carried, provided it be well done; that is, provided each stage be a special and appropriate division of all that has preceded. If this condition be complied with, the last differentia will include all the preceding, and will itself be the Form of which the genus serves as Matter. You divide the genus animal first into [Greek: zô=|on u(po/poun--zô=|on a)pou=n]; you next divide [Greek: zô=|on u(po/poun] into [Greek: zô=|on u(po/poun di/poun--zô=|on u(po/poun polu/poun]; or perhaps into [Greek: zô=|on u(po/poun schizo/pun--zô=|on u(po/poun a)/schiston]. It is essential that the next subdivision applied to [Greek: zô=|on u(po/poun] should be founded upon some subordinate differentia specially applying to the feet (p. 1038, a. 14: [Greek: au(=tai ga\r diaphorai\ podo/s; ê( ga\r schizopodi/a podo/tês tis]). If it does not specially apply to the feet, but takes in some new attribute (_e. g._, [Greek: pterôto/n, a)/pteron]), the division will be unphilosophical. The last differentia [Greek: zô=|on di/poun] includes the preceding differentia [Greek: u(po/poun]: to say [Greek: zô=|on u(po/poun di/poun] would be tautology. Where each differentia is a differentia of the preceding differentiæ, the last differentia includes them all and is itself the Form and Essence, along with the genus as Matter (a. 25). The definition is the rational explanation arising out of these differences, and by specifying the last it virtually includes all the preceding (a. 29: [Greek: o( o(rismo\s lo/gos e)sti\n o( e)k tô=n diaphorô=n, kai\ tou/tôn tê=s teleutai/as kata/ ge to\ o)rtho/n]).

In the constituents of the Essence, there is no distinctive order of parts; no subordination of _prius_ and _posterius_; all are equally essential and coordinate ([Greek: ta/xis d' ou)k e)/stin e)n tê=| ou)si/a|]--p. 1038, a. 33).

As we are treating now about Essence, it will be convenient to go back to the point from which we departed, when we enumerated the four varieties recognized by different philosophers. These were (1) The Subject--Substratum--Matter, which is a subject of predicates in two different ways: either as already an Hoc Aliquid and affected by various accidents, or as not yet an Hoc Aliquid, but simply Matter implicated with Entelechy (p. 1038, b. 6); (2) Form--Essence--the [Greek: t.ê.e.]; (3) The Compound or Product of the preceding two; (4) The Universal ([Greek: to\ katho/lou]). Of these four, we have already examined the first three; we now proceed to the fourth.

Some philosophers consider the Universal to be primarily and eminently Cause and Principle (p. 1038, b. 7). But it seems impossible that any thing which is affirmed universally can be Essence. For that is the First Essence of each thing which belongs to nothing but itself; but the Universal is by its nature common to many things. Of which among these things is it the Essence? Either of all or of no one. Not of all certainly; and, if it be the Essence of any one, the rest of them will be identical with that one; for, where the Essence is one, the things themselves are one (b. 15). Besides, the Essence is that which is not predicated of any subject: but the Universal is always predicated of a subject.

Perhaps, however, we shall be told, that the Universal is not identical with [Greek: t.ê.e.], but is Essence which is immanent in or belongs to [Greek: t.ê.e.], as animal in man and horse. But this cannot be admitted. For, whether we suppose animal to be definable or not, if it be essence of any thing, it must be the essence of something to which it belongs peculiarly, as _homo_ is the essence of man peculiarly; but, if animal is to be reckoned as the essence of man, it will be the essence of something to which it does not peculiarly belong; and this contradicts the definition of Essence (p. 1038, b. 15-23. This passage is very obscure, even after Bonitz and Schwegler's explanatory notes. I incline to Schwegler, and to his remark, Comm. II. p. 115, that the text of b. 23 ought to be written [Greek: e)n ô(=| _mê\_ ô(s i)/dion u(pa/rchei].).

Again, it is impossible that Essence, if composed of any elements, can be composed of what is not Essence, as of Quality; for this would make Quality _prius_ as regards Essence; which it cannot be, either in reason ([Greek: lo/gô|]), or in time, or in generation. If this were so, the affections would be separable from Essences (p. 1038, b. 28). Essence, if composed of any thing, must be composed of Essence.

Once more, if the individual man or horse are Essences, nothing which is in the definition of these can be Essence; nor apart from that of which it is Essence; nor in any thing else. There cannot be any man, apart from individual men (p. 1038, b. 34).

Hence we see clearly that none of the universal predicates are Essence: none of them signify Hoc Aliquid, but Tale. To suppose otherwise, would open the door to many inadmissible consequences, especially to the argument of the 'Third Man' (p. 1039, a. 2).

Another argument to the same purpose:--It is impossible that Essence can be composed of different Essences immanent in one Entelechy. Two in the same Entelechy can never be One in Entelechy. If indeed they be two _in potentiâ_, they may coalesce into one Entelechy, like one double out of two potential halves. But Entelechy establishes a separate and complete existence (p. 1039, a. 7); so that, if Essence is One, it cannot be made up of distinct Essences immanent or inherent. Demokritus, who recognized only the atoms as Essences, was right in saying, that two of them could not be One, nor one of them Two. The like is true about number, if number be, as some contend, a synthesis of monads. For either the dyad is not One; or else the monads included therein are not monads [Greek: e)ntelechei/a|] (a. 14).

Here however we stumble upon a difficulty. For, if no Essence can be put together out of Universals, nor any compound Essence out of other Essences existing as Entelechies, all Essence must necessarily be simple and uncompounded, so that no definition can be given of it. But this is opposed to every one's opinion, and to what has been said long ago, that Essence alone could be defined; or at least Essence most of all. It now appears that there can be no definition of Essence, nor by consequence of any thing else. Perhaps, however this may be only true in a certain sense: in one way, definition is possible; in another way, not. We shall endeavour to clear up the point presently (p. 1039, a. 22.--Schwegler says in his note upon this passage: "Die von Aristoteles häufig berührte, doch nie zur abschliessenden Lösung gebrachte, Grundaporie des aristotelischen Systems"--Comm. II. p. 117).

Those who maintain that Ideas are self-existent are involved in farther contradictions by admitting at the same time that the Species is composed out of Genus and Differentia. For, suppose that these Ideas are self-existent and that [Greek: au)tozô=|on] exists both in man and horse: [Greek: au)tozô=|on] is, in these two, either the same or different numerically. It is, of course, the same in definition or notion ([Greek: lo/gô|]); of that there can be no doubt. If it be numerically same ([Greek: ô(/sper su= sautô=|]) in man and in horse, how can this same exist at once in separate beings, unless we suppose the absurdity that it exists apart from itself (p. 1039, b. 1)? Again, are we to imagine that this generic Ens, [Greek: au)tozô=|on], partakes at the same time of contrary differentiæ--the dipod, polypod, apod? If it does not, how can dipodic or polypodic animals really exist? Nor is the difficulty at all lessened, if, instead of saying that the generic Ens partakes of differentiæ, you say that it is _mixed_ with them, or _compounded_ of them, or _in contact_ with them. There is nothing but a tissue of absurdities ([Greek: pa/nta a)/toma]--b. 6).

But take the contrary supposition and suppose that the [Greek: au)tozô=|on] is numerically different in man, horse, &c. On this admission, there will be an infinite number of distinct beings of whom the [Greek: au)tozô=|on] is the Essence; man, for example, since animal is not accidental, but essential, as a constituent of man (p. 1039, b. 8). [Greek: Au)tozô=|on] will thus be Many ("ein Vielerlei"--Schwegler); for it will be the Essence of each particular animal, of whom it will be predicated essentially and not accidentally ([Greek: ou) ga\r ka/t' a)/llo le/getai]--_i.e._, this is not a case where the predicate is something distinct from the subject). Moreover all the constituents of man will be alike Ideas (_e.g._, not merely [Greek: zô=|on], but [Greek: di/poun]): now the same cannot be Idea of one thing and Essence of another; accordingly, [Greek: au)tozô=|on] will be each one of the essential constituents of particular animals ([Greek: di/poun, polu/poun], b. 14).

Again, whence comes [Greek: au)tozô=|on] itself, and how do the particular animals arise out of it? How can the [Greek: zô=|on] which is Essence, exist apart from and alongside of [Greek: au)to\ to\ zô=|on]? (p. 1039, b. 15.)

These arguments show how impossible it is that there can exist any such Ideas as some philosophers affirm (p. 1039, b. 18).

We have already said that there are two varieties of Essence: (1) The Form alone, (2) The Form embodied in Matter. The Form or Essence in the first meaning, is neither generable nor destructible; in the second meaning it is both. [Greek: To\ oi)ki/a| ei)=nai] is neither generable nor destructible; [Greek: to\ tê=|de tê=| oi)ki/a| ei)=nai] is both the one and the other (p. 1039, b. 25). Of these last, therefore, the perceivable or concrete Essences, there can be no definition nor demonstration, because they are implicated with Matter, which is noway necessary, or unchangeable, but may exist or not exist, change or not change. Demonstration belongs only to what is necessary; Definition only to Science, which cannot be to-day Science and to-morrow Ignorance. Neither Science, nor Demonstration, nor Definition, applies to such things as may be otherwise: these latter belong to Opinion ([Greek: tou= e)ndechome/nou a)/llôs e)/chein]--p. 1040, a. 1). You cannot have Science or Demonstration or Definition about particular or perceivable things, because they are destroyed and pass out of perception, so that you do not know what continues to be true about them; even though you preserve the definition in your memory, you cannot tell how far it continues applicable to them (a. 7). Any definition given is liable to be overthrown.

Upon the same principle, there cannot be any definition of the Platonic Ideas; each of which is announced as a particular, distinct, separable, Ens (p. 1040, a. 8). The definition must be composed of words--of the words of a language generally understood--and of words which, being used by many persons, are applicable to other particulars besides the definiend (you define Alexander as white, thin, a philosopher, a native of Aphrodisias, &c., all of which are characteristics applicable to many other persons besides). The definer may say that each characteristic taken separately will apply to many things, but that the aggregate of all together will apply to none except the definiend. We reply however, that [Greek: zô=|on di/poun] must have at least two subjects to which it applies--[Greek: to\ zô=|on] and [Greek: to\ di/poun]. Of course this is all the more evident about eternal Entia like the Platonic Ideas, which are prior to the compound and parts thereof ([Greek: zô=|on] and [Greek: di/poun] are each prior and both of them parts of [Greek: au)toa/nthrôpos]), and separable, just as [Greek: au)toa/nthrôpos] is separable (a. 14-20); for either neither of them is separable, or both are so. If neither of them is separable, then the Genus is nothing apart from the Species, and the Platonic assumption of self-existent Ideas falls to the ground; if both are separable, then the Differentia is self-existent as well as the Genus (a. 21): there exist some Ideas prior to other Ideas. Moreover, the Genus and Differentia, the component elements of the Species, are logically prior to the Species: suppress the Species, and you do not suppress its component elements; suppress these, and you _do_ suppress the Species (a. 21). We reply farther that, if the more compound Ideas arise out of the less compound, the component elements (like [Greek: zô=|on di/poun]) must needs be predicable of many distinct subjects. If this be not so always, how are we to distinguish the cases in which it is true from those in which it is not? You must assume the existence of some Idea which can only be predicated of some one subject, and no others. But this seems impossible. Every Idea is participable (a. 27).

These philosophers do not reflect that definition is impossible of eternal Essences (which the Platonic Ideas are), especially in cases where the objects are essentially unique, as Sun, or Moon, or Earth (p. 1040, a. 29). When they try to define Sun, they are forced to use phrases which are applicable to many in common; but Sun, (and each Idea) is particular and individual, like Kleon or Sokrates. Why does none of them produce a definition of an Idea? If any one tried, he would soon see the pertinence of the above remarks (b. 3). (Alexander, Bonitz, and Schwegler, all observe incidentally that the reasoning of what immediately precedes is weak and sophistical. Bonitz, p. 352, gives a good summary of the chapter, concluding: "Hoc capite non id ipsum demonstrat, res singulas non esse substantias, sed rerum singularum non esse definitionem neque scientiam; nimirum quum substantiæ vel unice vel potissimum esse definitionem demonstratum sit, c. 4, hoc si comprobat, illud simul est comprobatum.")

It is farther evident that many apparent Essences are not strictly and truly Essences; for example, the parts of animals; since not one of them is separated from the whole ([Greek: ou)the\n ga\r kechôrisme/non au)tô=n e)sti/n]--p. 1040, b. 6; Alexander says _ad loc._: [Greek: ou)si/as e)kei=na/ phamen o(/sa kath' au(ta\ o)/nta du/natai to\ oi)kei=on e)/rgon a)potelei=n; ou)si/a ga\r ou)de\n a)/llo e)sti\n ê)\ to\ a)ph' ou(= to\ e(ka/stou e)/rgon e)kplêrou=tai; ou)si/a ga\r kai\ ei)=dos Sôkra/tous ê( tou= Sôkra/tous psuchê/, a)ph' ê(=s au)tô=| to\ tou= a)nthrô/pou ê(=| a)/nthrôpos e)/rgon e)kplêrou=n]). When any one of them is separated, it exists only in the character of Matter--earth, fire, air; none of them, in this separate condition, being an unity, but only like a heap of grains of gold or tin before they are melted and combined into one. We might suppose, indeed, that the parts of the body, and the parts of the soul, of animated beings, come near to Essence, both one and the other, alike potentially and actually (b. 12), because they have principles of motion in their turnings ([Greek: kampai=s]), so that in some cases they continue separately alive after division. Still the functions of the part alone must be really regarded as nothing more than potential, wherever the oneness and continuity of the whole is the work of Nature (b. 15), and not a mere case of contact or forcible conjunction.

Nevertheless the being One, or Unity (p. 1040, b. 16), is not itself the Essence of things. Unum is predicated in the same manner as Ens; the two may always be predicated together: the Essence of Unum is One; and things of which the Essence is Unum Numero, are themselves numerically one. Neither Unum nor Ens is the Essence of things any more than the being an Element, or the being a Principle, can be the Essence thereof: we have farther to enquire what the Principle is, in order to bring the problem into a more cognizable shape (b. 20). Unum and Ens are more near to Essence than either Element, Principle, or Cause; nevertheless neither Unum nor Ens is Essence; for nothing which is common to many things is Essence. Essence belongs only to itself and to that which has itself. Farther, Unum cannot be in many places at once; but that which is common is in many places at once. It is thus plain that nothing Universal exists apart or separate from particulars (b. 27).

The advocates of the (Platonic) Ideas are right in affirming them to be separate, if they be Essences; but they are wrong in calling that which is predicable of many things (the Universal) an Idea (p. 1040, b. 29). When asked, What are these indestructible Essences of which you speak, as apart from the visible individual objects?--they had no intelligible answer to give. Accordingly they were forced to make these Essences the same specifically with the destructible (individual) objects; for _these_ we do know (b. 33). They simply prefixed the word [Greek: au)to/] to the names of sensible objects--[Greek: au)toa/nthrôpos, au)toi+/ppos]. But these Ideas might still exist, even though we knew not what they were; just as eternal Essences like the stars would still exist, even though we had never seen them (p. 1041, a. 2).

Let us again examine what we call Essence, and what sort of thing it is; and let us take another point of departure, which may perhaps help us to understand what that Essence is which is apart and separate from perceivable Essences (p. 1041, a. 9). We know that Essence is a certain variety of Principle or Cause; and from this premiss we will reason (a. 10). Now the enquiry into Cause, or the Why, always comes in this shape: Why does one thing belong to another? The enquiry, Why a thing is itself? is idle. The fact--the [Greek: o(/ti]--must be assumed to be clear and known in the first instance. You know that the moon is eclipsed, as matter of fact; you proceed to enquire into the cause thereof (a. 11-24). Why does it thunder? or, to enunciate the same question more fully, Why is there noise in the clouds? The _quæsitum_ is always one thing predicated of another (a. 26). Why are these materials, bricks and stones, a house? Here the answer sought is, the Cause; and that is the [Greek: t.ê.e.], speaking in logical or analytical phraseology ([Greek: _logikô=s_]--_i.e._, that which belongs to the [Greek: _lo/gos_ tê=s ou)si/as]). In some cases, this _quæsitum_ is a Final Cause, as in the case of a bed or a house; in others, an Efficient or Movent Cause; for that also is a variety of Cause, generally sought for in regard to things generated or destroyed; but the other (viz., [Greek: to\ t.ê.e.], "ipsa rei forma ac notio, aut concepta in animo artificis, aut inclusa [Greek: duna/mei] in ipsâ naturâ ac semine rei"--Bonitz, Comm. p. 359) is sought for in regard to [Greek: ei)=nai].

The true nature of the _quæsitum_ is often unperceived, when the problem is announced without stating distinctly the subject and predicate in their mutual relations ([Greek: e)n toi=s mê\ katallê/lôs legome/nois], p. 1041, a. 33). For example, [Greek: a)/nthrôpos dia\ ti/ e)stin?] is ambiguous by imperfect enunciation. As it stands, it might be supposed to be intended as [Greek: a)/nthrôpos dia\ ti/ e)stin a)/nthrôpos?] which would be a question idle or null. To make it clear, you ought to distinguish the two members to which the real _quæsitum_ refers (b. 2), and say [Greek: dia\ ti/ ta/de ê)\ to/de e)sti\n a)/nthrôpos?] your real enquiry is about the [Greek: u(/lê] or Matter, why it exists in this or that manner. Why are these materials a house? Because the Essence of a house belongs to them (b. 6). Some [Greek: t.ê.e.], some sort of [Greek: ei)=nai], must belong to the Matter (b. 4). Why is this Matter a man? or why is the body disposed in this particular way a man? Here we enquire as to the Cause which acts upon a certain Matter; and that is the Form whereby the thing is; which again is the Essence (b. 8).

Hence it is plain that a distinction must be taken between the Simple and the Compound. The enquiry above described, and the teaching above described, cannot apply to the Simple, which must be investigated in another way (p. 1041, b. 9). Compounds are of two sorts--aggregates like a _heap_ (mechanical), and aggregates like a _syllable_ (organic or formal). In these last there are not merely the constituent elements, but something else besides (b. 16). The syllable _ba_ is something more than the letters _b_ and _a_; flesh is something more than fire and earth, its constituent elements. Now this _something more_ cannot be itself a constituent element; for, if that were so, flesh would be composed of three constituent elements instead of two, and we should still have to search for the _something beyond_, and this ulterior process might be repeated _ad infinitum_ (b. 22). Nor can the _something beyond_ be itself a compound of several elements, for we should still have to find the independent something which binds these into a compound. It is plain that this _something beyond_ must be in its nature quite distinct from an element, and must be the cause why one compound is flesh, another compound a syllable, and so about all the remaining compounds. Now this is the Essence of each compound--the First Cause of existence to each (b. 25). The Element ([Greek: stoichei=on]) is that into which the compound is separated, as included Matter ([Greek: e)nupa/rchon ô(s u(/lên]): _b_ and _a_, in the syllable _ba_ (b. 32). There are some things which are not the Essences of objects (white, for example, is not of the Essence of man, but an attribute); but, in all cases where compounds have come together according to Nature and by natural process, that Nature also which is not Element but Principle is the Essence (b. 28: [Greek: e)pei\ d' e)/nia ou)k ou)si/ai tô=n pragma/tôn, a)ll' o(/sai ou)si/ai kata\ phu/sin kai\ phu/sei sunestê/kasi, phanei/ê a)\n kai\ au(/tê ê( phu/sis ou)si/a, ê(/ e)stin ou) stoichei=on a)ll' a)rchê/.] Schwegler in his note, p. 135, proposes to correct this passage by striking out [Greek: kai/] before the words [Greek: au(tê\ ê( phu/sis ou)si/a]. But, if this were done, it would make the passage mean that [Greek: u(/lê] or [Greek: stoichei=on] is not [Greek: ou)si/a], and that the other [Greek: phu/sis] which is not [Greek: stoichei=on], is to be regarded exclusively as [Greek: ou)si/a]. Now this is certainly not the doctrine of Aristotle, who expressly declares [Greek: u(/lê] to be [Greek: ou)si/a]; see H, p. 1042, a. 32. Retaining the [Greek: kai/], the passage will then mean that not merely [Greek: u(/lê], but _also_ [Greek: phu/sis] which is not [Greek: u(/lê], is [Greek: ou)si/a]).

. . . . . .

Book [Greek: Ê].

In this Book, Aristotle begins by recapitulating the doctrines and discussions of the preceding. His purpose had been declared to be the investigation of the Causes, Principles, and Elements of Essences. Now Essences are diverse: some universally admitted, as the natural elements and simple bodies, also plants, animals, and the parts of each, lastly, the heaven and the parts thereof; others not universally admitted, but advocated by some philosophers, as the Ideas and Mathematical Entia; others, again, which we arrive at by dialectical discussion, as [Greek: to\ t.ê.e.], the Substratum (Logical Entia--[Greek: e)k tô=n lo/gôn], p. 1042, a. 12), the Genus more Essence than the Species, the Universal more Essence than Particulars. The (Platonic) Ideas make a near approach to the Genus and the Universal; they are vindicated as Essences upon similar grounds. Next, since [Greek: to\ t.ê.e.] is Essence, and since the Definition is the rational explanation of [Greek: t.ê.e.], we found it necessary to discuss Definition; and, since the Definition is a sentence having parts, we were called upon to examine these parts, and to explain what parts belonged both to Essence and to Definition. We decided farther, after discussion, that the Universal and the Genus were not Essence; the Platonic Ideas and the Mathematical Entia we postponed for the moment, and we confined ourselves to the perceivable Essences, recognized by all (a. 25).

Now all these perceivable Essentiæ include Matter. The Substratum--Matter in one way--is Essence; while, in another way, the Form and the [Greek: lo/gos] is Essence; and finally the Compound of the two is Essence. Matter is Hoc Aliquid, not [Greek: e)nergei/a|] but only [Greek: duna/mei]. Form is an Hoc Aliquid separable by reason ([Greek: tô=| lo/gô| chôristo/n], p. 1042, a. 29). The Compound of the two, the complete Hoc Aliquid, is capable of existing separably, in an absolute sense (which is true also of some Forms), and is liable alone to generation and destruction (a. 30).

It is clear that Matter also, not less than Form, is Essence; for in all changes from opposite to opposite, there is a certain substratum to such changes. Thus, in changes of Place, there is a substratum which is now here, presently there; in changes of Quantity, what is now of such and such a size, is presently greater or less; in changes of Quality, what is now healthy is presently sick; in changes of Essence, what is now in course of generation is presently in course of destruction, or what is now the substratum of some given Form (and is thus Hoc Aliquid) is presently the substratum of Privation, and thus no longer Hoc Aliquid. Among these four varieties of change ([Greek: kat' ou)si/an, kata\ poso/n, kata\ poio/n, kata\ to/pon]) the three last are consequent upon the first, but the first is not consequent upon all the three last; for we cannot maintain that, because a thing has Matter capable of local movement, it must therefore have generable and destructible Matter (p. 1042, b. 6).

Having discussed the Essence of perceivable things so far forth as _potential_, we now proceed to the same Essence so far forth as _actual_ ([Greek: ê( duna/mei ou)si/a--ê( ô(s e)ne/rgeia ou)si/a tô=n ai)sthêtô=n]--p. 1042, b. 10). What is this last? Demokritus recognizes a primordial body one and the same as to Matter, but having three differences--in figure, in position, in arrangement. But it is plain that this enumeration is not sufficient and that there are many other differences, to each of which corresponds a special acceptation of [Greek: e)/sti] ([Greek: to\ e)/sti tosautachô=s le/getai]--b. 26). Some differences depend upon the mode of putting together constituent materials ([Greek: sunthe/sei tê=s u(/lês]--b. 16), as mixture, tying, gluing, pegging, &c.; some upon position, as threshold, coping, &c.; some upon time; some upon place; some upon affections of perceivable things, such as hardness, softness, dryness, moisture, density, rarity, &c.; some upon combinations of the foregoing; some again simply upon excess or defect in quantity. To one or other of these, [Greek: e)/stin] has reference in each particular case. We say--This _is_ a threshold, because it lies in a particular manner: _Is_ (or _To be_--[Greek: to\ ei)=nai]) signifies in this case that particular manner of lying. To be ice, is to have become solidified in this particular manner (b. 28). We must therefore look for the summa genera of the differences; in some cases [Greek: to\ ei)=nai] will be defined by all these differences: thus more or less dense, more or less rare, belong to the genus excess and defect; differences of figure, smoothness, roughness, &c., belong to the genus straight and curve; in other cases, to be, or not to be, will depend upon mixture, as the genus (p. 1043, a. 1).

If then the Essence is the cause why each thing is what it is, we must seek in these differences the cause why each thing is what it is (p. 1043, a. 3). None of these differences indeed is itself Essence,--not even when it is embodied or combined with Matter; but it is in each the analogue of Essence, and must be employed in defining, just as in real and true Essence we define by predicating of Matter the Actuality or Formality ([Greek: ô(s e)n tai=s ou)si/ais to\ tê=s u(/lês katêgorou/menon au)tê\ ê( e)ne/rgeia]--a. 6). Thus, if we define a threshold, we say--a piece of wood or stone lying in this particular way; if we define ice, we say--water frozen or solidified in this particular way, &c. The Form or Actuality of one Matter is different from that of another; so also is the rational explanation or Definition; in some cases it is composition, in others mixture, &c., and so forth. If any one defines a house by saying that it is stone or brick, he indicates only the potential house, for these are the Matter (a. 15); if he defines it--a vessel protecting bodies or property, he then assigns the Actuality ([Greek: e)ne/rgeian]); if he includes both of the above in his definition, he then gives the third Essence completed out of the two together ([Greek: tê\n tri/tên kai\ tê\n e)k tou/tôn ou)si/an]--a. 18). To define from the differences, is to define from the side of the Actuality or Form; to define from the included elements ([Greek: e)k tô=n e)nuparcho/ntôn]) is to define from the side of the Matter (a. 20).

We see herefrom what perceivable Essence is, and how it is: partly, of the nature of Matter; partly, of Form and Actuality or Energy: again, the third or Concrete, out of both combined (p. 1043, a. 28). Sometimes, it is not clear whether the name signifies this third Concrete, or the Form and Energy. Thus, when you say a house, do you mean a protective receptacle built of bricks? or do you mean simply a protective receptacle--the Form simply, without specifying the Matter? When you say a line, do you mean a dyad in length--Form in Matter? or simply a dyad--Form alone? When you talk of an animal, do you mean soul in body? or simply soul, which is the Essence and Actuality of a certain body? The word animal may be applied to both, not indeed univocally, as implying generic resemblance, but (quasi-univocally, or semi-univocally) by analogical relationship to a common term ([Greek: ou)ch ô(s e(ni\ lo/gô| lego/menon, a)ll' ô(s pro\s e(\n]--a. 36). This distinction however, though important in some respects, is unimportant so far as regards the investigation about perceivable Essence; for the [Greek: t.ê.e.] belongs to the Form and the Actuality (a. 38). Soul, and the being soul, are identical; but man, and the being man, are not identical; unless the soul be called man. Thus this identity exists in some cases, but not in others (b. 4). A syllable is not composed merely of letters and synthesis, nor is a house simply of bricks and synthesis; for the synthesis or the mixture does not proceed out of the elements which are put together or mixed (b. 8). The like is true in other cases; _e.g._, if the threshold is a threshold by position, the position does not proceed out of the threshold, but rather the threshold out of the position. Nor again is man simply animal and biped. If these two are the Matter, there must be something apart from and beyond them, something not itself an element nor proceeding out of an element--the Essence; which is indicated by abstracting from the Matter (b. 13). This, as being the Cause of Existence and of Essence ([Greek: ai)/tion tou= ei)=nai kai\ tê=s ou)si/as]--b. 14) is what is meant when Essence is spoken of.

This Essence or Form must be eternal; or at least, if destructible, it has never been destroyed; if generable, it has never been generated. For we have shown already that no one either constructs or generates Form: the Hoc Aliquid is constructed; the product of Form and Matter is generated (p. 1043, b. 18). As yet it has not been made clear whether the Essences of destructible things are separable or not: in some cases at least, they certainly are not--in those cases, namely, where there can exist nothing beyond the particular things, as a house or an implement (b. 21). Perhaps, indeed, these are not truly Essences--neither these particular things nor any other things which have come together not by natural process; for we might indicate Nature alone as the Essence in destructible things ([Greek: tê\n ga\r phu/sin mo/nên a)/n tis thei/ê tê\n e)n toi=s phthartoi=s ou)si/an])--b. 23. Aristotle seems to say in what precedes, that there is no [Greek: ge/nesis] or [Greek: phthora/] of [Greek: ou)si/a]; see Z. p. 1033, b. 17. But how is this to be reconciled with K. p. 1060, b. 18: [Greek: ou)si/as me\n ga\r pa/sês ge/nesi/s e)stin, stigmê=s d' ou)k e)/stin]? See Schwegler's Comm. explaining [Greek: gigno/menon] and [Greek: phtheiro/menon], Pt. II. pp. 82, 83).

Hence we see that the difficulty started by Antisthenes and others equally unschooled ([Greek: a)pai/deutoi]) is not without pertinence. They say that, as a definition is a sentence of many words, predicating something of something, so you cannot define _Quid est_: you can only define and inform persons _Quale Quid est_: you can only tell people what the definiend is like, not what it is in itself: you can tell them that silver is like tin, but you cannot tell what silver is. Upon this theory, definition may be given of Compound Essence, whether perceivable or cogitable; but not of the _primordia_ of which the compound consists. The definition must predicate a something, which is of the nature of Form, of another something, which is of the nature of Matter (p. 1043, b. 31).

If Essences are (as the Platonists say) in a certain sense Numbers, they are so in _this_ sense; not (as these philosophers affirm) in the character of assemblages of Monads. For the definition is a sort of number, divisible into indivisible units; and the number is so likewise. If you add any thing to, or deduct any thing from, a number (let the thing added or deducted be never so small), it will be no longer the same number; in like manner, neither the definition nor the [Greek: t.ê.e.], will be the same, if any thing be added or subtracted (p. 1044, a. 1). Each number must have something which makes its component units coalesce into one number, though the Platonic philosophers cannot tell what that something is; either the units are a mere (uncemented) heap, or else you must say what is that something which makes them _one_ out of many (a. 5). The definition also is one; yet these philosophers cannot explain what makes it one. The units of the number and that of the definition, is to be explained in the same way, and that of the Essence also; not as a monad or a point, but in each case like an Entelechy and a peculiar nature ([Greek: ou)ch, ô(s le/gousi/ tines, oi(=on mona/s tis ou)=sa ê)\ stigmê/, a)ll' e)ntele/cheia kai\ phu/sis tis e(ka/stê]--a. 9). A given number admits of no degrees, more or less: neither does a given Essence, unless it be taken embodied in Matter (a. 10).

Respecting the Material Essence ([Greek: peri\ de\ tê=s u(likê=s ou)si/as]--p. 1044, a. 15), we must not forget that, if there be one and the same First Matter common as a principle to all Generata or Fientia, there is nevertheless a certain Matter special or peculiar (proximate) to each ([Greek: o(/môs e)/sti tis oi)kei/a e(ka/stou]--a. 18; [Greek: oi)kei/a kai\ prosechê/s]--Alexander). Thus the Materia Prima of phlegm is, sweet or fat things; that of bile is, bitter things and such like. Perhaps these two come both from the same Matter; and there are several different Matters of the same product, in cases where one Matter proceeds from another. Thus phlegm proceeds from fat and sweet, if fat proceeds from sweet; and even from bile, if bile be analysed into its First Matter from whence phlegm may proceed by a different road (a. 23). One thing may proceed from another in two different ways: either D may proceed from C, because C is its immediate Matter, already preformed up to a certain point, and thus on the way to a perfectly formed state; or D may proceed from C, after the destruction of C and the resolution of C into its Materia Prima ([Greek: dichô=s ga\r to/d' e)k tou=de, ê)\ o(/ti pro\ o(dou= e)/stai ê)\ o(/ti a)naluthe/ntos ei)s tê\n a)rchê/n]--a. 24). From one and the same Matter different products may proceed, if the moving cause be different: from the same wood there may proceed a box or a bed. What product shall emerge does not, however, depend only upon the Moving Cause, but often upon the Matter also; thus a saw cannot be made out of wool or wood. If the same product can proceed out of different Matter, this is evidently because the Art or Moving Cause is the same: if this last be different, and the Matter different also, the product will of course be different (p. 1044, a. 32).

When a man asks us, What is the Cause? we ought to reply, since the word has many senses, by specifying all the causes which can have a bearing on the case (p. 1044, a. 34). Thus, What is the Cause of man, as Matter? Perhaps the katamenia. What, as Movent? Perhaps the seed. What, as Form? The [Greek: t.ê.e.] What, as [Greek: ou(= e(/neka]? The End. These two last are perhaps both the same (a. 36). Moreover we ought to make answer by specifying the proximate causes (not the remote and ultimate). Thus, What is the Matter of man? We must answer by specifying the proximate matter; not fire and earth, the ultimate and elemental (b. 2).

This is the only right way of proceeding in regard to Essences natural and generable; since the Causes are many, and are what we seek to know. But the case is different in regard to Essences natural, yet eternal. Some of these last perhaps have no Matter at all; or at least a different Matter, having no attribute except local movability (b. 8. Alexander says in explanation: [Greek: le/gei de\ tê\n xu/mpasan tô=n o)ktô\ sphairô=n e(na/da--u(/lên ou) gennêtê\n kai\ phthartê\n a)lla\ mo/non kata\ to/pon kinêtê/n]--p. 527, 20-25, Bon.).

Again, in regard to circumstances which occur by Nature, but not in the way of Essence, there is no Matter at all: the subject itself is the Essence. Thus in regard to an eclipse: What is its Cause? What is its Matter? There is no Matter, except the moon which is affected in a certain way. What is the Cause, as Movent--here light-destroying? The earth. Perhaps there is no [Greek: ou(= e(/neka] in the case. But the Cause in the way of Form is the rational explanation or definition; and this must include a specification of the Movent Cause, otherwise it will be obscure. Thus, the eclipse is, privation of light; and, when you add--by the earth intervening, you then specify the Movent, and make your definition satisfactory (b. 15).

In defining sleep we ought to say what part of the system is first affected thereby; but this is not clear. Shall we indicate only the animal (as substratum)? But this is not enough. We shall be asked, What part of the animal? Which part first? The heart, or what other part? Next, by what Cause? Lastly, how is the heart affected, apart from the rest of the system? To say--Sleep is a certain sort of immobility, will not be a sufficient definition. We must specify from what primary affection such immobility arises (p. 1044, b. 20).

Since some things exist, and do not exist, without generation or destruction (as Forms, and Points, if there be such things as Points), it is impossible that all Contraries can be generated out of each other, if every generation be both _aliquid_ and _ex aliquo_. _Albus homo ex nigro homine_ must be generated in a different way from _album ex nigro_. Now Matter is only to be found in those cases where there is generation and change into each other; in other cases, where no change takes place, there is no Matter. There is a difficulty in understanding how the Matter of each substance stands in regard to the contrary modifications of that substance (p. 1044, b. 29). If the body is potentially healthy, and if disease is the contrary of health, are we to say that both these states are potential? Is water potentially both wine and vinegar? Or are we to say rather that the body is the Matter of health, and that water is the Matter of wine, in the way of acquisition by nature and by taking on the Form to which it tends; and that the body is the Matter of sickness, and wine the Matter of vinegar in the way of privation and of destruction contrary to nature (b. 34)? However, there is here some difficulty: Since vinegar is generated out of wine, why is not wine the Matter of vinegar, and potentially vinegar? Why is not the living man potentially a corpse? Is it not rather the truth, however, that these are accidental or contra-natural destructions ([Greek: kata\ sumbebêko\s ai( phthorai/]--b. 36, _i.e._, not in the regular appetency and aspirations, according to which the destruction of one Form gives place to a better); and that through such destruction the same Matter which belonged to the living man becomes afterwards the Matter of the corpse; likewise the Matter of wine becomes, through the like destruction, Matter of vinegar--by a generation like that of night out of day? Changes of this sort must take place by complete resolution into the original Materia Prima ([Greek: ei)s tê\n u(/lên dei= e)panelthei=n]--a. 3); thus, if a living animal comes out of a dead one, the latter is first resolved into its elements, and then out of them comes the living animal. So vinegar is first resolved into water, then out of the water comes wine (a. 5).

We shall now revert to the difficulty recently noticed, about Definitions and Numbers. What is the cause that each number and each definition is One? In all cases where there are several parts not put together as a mere heap, but where there is a Whole besides the parts, there must be some cause of this kind. With some bodies, contact is such cause; with others, viscosity ([Greek: glischro/tês]--p. 1045, a. 12), or some other affection. But the definition is one complex phrase, not by conjunction like the Iliad, but One by being the definition of one subject (a. 14). Now what is it which makes the subject man, One? Why is he One and not Many, say animal and a biped--more especially if there exist, as the Platonists say, a Self-animal and a Self-biped? Why are not these two [Greek: au)ta/] the man ([Greek: dia\ ti/ ga\r ou)k e)kei=na au)ta\ o( a)/nthrôpo/s e)sti?]--a. 17), so that individuals are men by participation not of one Self-man, but of the two--Self-animal, Self-biped? On this theory altogether, it would seem that a man cannot be One, but must be Many--animal and biped. It is plain that in this way of investigation the problem is insoluble.

But if, as _we_ say (p. 1045, a. 23), there be on one side Matter, on the other side Form--on one side that which is in Potency, on the other side that which is in Act (a. 24)--the problem ceases to be difficult. The difficulty is the same as it would be if the definition of _himation_ were, round brass: the word _himation_ would be the sign of that definition, and the problem would be, What is the Cause why round and brass are One? But the difficulty vanishes, when we reply that one is Matter, the other Form. And, in cases where generation intervenes, what is the Cause why the potential Ens is actual Ens, except the Efficient ([Greek: para\ to\ poiê=san]--a. 31)? There is no other Cause why the sphere in potency is a sphere in actuality: such was the [Greek: t.ê.e.] of each ([Greek: tou=t' ê)=n to\ t.ê.e. e(kate/rô|]--a. 33). Of Matter there are two varieties, the Cogitable and the Perceivable; and, in the Definition, a part is always Matter, a part is Form or Energy; as when we define the circle--a plane figure. (Aristotle argues:--On the Platonic theory that Ideas or Forms are Entia, separate from particulars, self-existent, and independent of each other, no cause can be assigned for the coalescence of any two or more of them into one; _e.g._ animal and biped, into man. But upon my theory, Form and Matter, Power and Act, are in their own nature relative to each other. It is their own inherent nature to coalesce into one, or for Power to pass into Act. This is the cause of their unity: no other cause can be found or is necessary. See Alexander, p. 531.)

In those cases where there is no Matter, either cogitable or perceivable, as in the Categories, Hoc Aliquid, Quale, Quantum, &c., each of them is, in itself and at once, both Ens and Unum (p. 1045, b. 2). Hence neither Ens nor Unum is included in the Definitions, and the [Greek: t.ê.e.] is, in itself and at once, both Ens and Unum. No other cause can be assigned why each of these is Ens and Unum; each of them is so, at once and immediately; yet not as if they were all included in Ens or Unum as common genera; nor as if they were apart and separable from particulars (b. 7).

Philosophers, who do not adopt this opinion, resort to various phrases, all unsatisfactory, to explain the coalescence or unity of the elements included in the Definition. Some call it [Greek: me/thexis], but they give no cause of the [Greek: me/thexis]; others [Greek: sunousi/a], or [Greek: su/ndesmos], or [Greek: su/nthesis]--of soul with body, as definition of life. But we might just as well use these phrases on other occasions, and say that to be well was a synthesis of the soul with health; that the brazen triangle was a [Greek: su/ndesmos] of brass with triangle; that white was a synthesis of superficies with whiteness (p. 1045, b. 15). These phrases carry no explanation; and these philosophers get into the difficulty by taking a wrong point of departure. They first lay down Power as different from Entelechy, and then look for an explanation which makes them one ([Greek: ai)/tion d' o(/ti duna/meôs kai\ e)ntelechei/as zêtou=si lo/gon e(nopoio\n kai\ diaphora/n]--p. 1045, b. 16, Schwegler observes that the two last words are loosely put, and that the clear words to express what Aristotle means would be: [Greek: zêtou=si lo/gon e(nopoio\n u(potithe/ntes diaphora/n]--Comm. II. p. 154.). But the truth is that Power and Entelechy are not essentially two, but only different aspects of one and the same. The Last Matter and the Form are the same; but the first is in potency, the second in perfect actuality ("Stoff und Form, Potenzielles und Actuelles, sind eins und dasselbe auf verschiedenen Entwicklungsstufen"--Schwegler II. p. 151). To enquire in any particular case what is the cause of this One, is the same as to enquire generally the cause of Unity. Each thing is a certain One; the Potential and the Actual are One, in a certain way (b. 20). So that no other Cause can be found except the Movent or Efficient--that which moved the matter out of Potency into Actuality. As to those things which have no Matter, each of them is One immediately and _per se_ (b. 23).

. . . . . .

Book [Greek: Th].

In discriminating the meanings of Ens, we noticed one [Greek: kata\ du/namin kai\ e)ne/rgeian] (apart from Ens according to the Categories). We shall now proceed to discuss these two terms [Greek: du/namis] and [Greek: e(ntele/cheia = e)ne/rgeia] (p. 1045, b. 35).

It is elsewhere mentioned ([Greek: D]. p. 1019) that [Greek: du/namis] has many senses, of which some (like the geometrical, &c.) are equivocal or metaphorical, so that we shall pass them over here (p. 1046, a. 6). But there is one first and proper sense of [Greek: du/namis], from which many others diverge in different directions of relationship or analogy (a. 10). That first and proper sense is--a principle of change _in alio vel quatenus aliud_, or a principle of change _ab alio vel quatenus aliud_ ([Greek: a)rchê\ metabolê=s e)n a)/llô| ê)\ ê(=| a)/llo--a)rchê\ metabolê=s u(p' a)/llou ê)\ ê(=| a)/llo]--a. 11, 14. The same definition is given in terms somewhat different at p. 1048, a. 28: [Greek: tou=to le/gomen dunato\n o(\ pe/phuke kinei=n a)/llo ê)\ kinei=sthai u(p' a)/llou, ê)\ a(plô=s ê)\ tro/pon tina/.] This Aristotle calls [Greek: ê( kata\ ki/nêsin du/namis]--expressed by Bonitz, Comm., p. 379: "agendi patiendive nisum quendam."). The notion of [Greek: du/namis] however extends more widely than this first sense of [Greek: du/namis kata\ ki/nêsin]. It includes other cases, as where we say that Hermes is [Greek: duna/mei] in the wood, and that the half foot is [Greek: duna/mei] in the whole foot (p. 1048, a. 33; Bonitz distinguishes this last sense as Möglichkeit, from the first sense as Vermögen, p. 379).

We begin by speaking about the first and proper sense--[Greek: du/namis ê( kata\ ki/nêsin]. One variety thereof is, when a thing has power of being passively affected so and so--when there resides in the thing a principle of passive change ([Greek: a)rchê\ metabolê=s pathêtikê=s]--p. 1046, a. 13) by something else or by itself _quatenus_ something else. (These last words are added because a sick man has the [Greek: du/namis] of being cured either by a physician, or by himself if he be a physician; but then in this last case he is to be looked upon in two different characters, as physician and as patient: he cures himself as physician, he is cured as patient.) Another variety of [Greek: du/namis kata\ ki/nêsin] is, when a thing has power of resisting change for the worse or destruction by any exterior principle of change (a. 14); as hardness in iron. Sometimes this [Greek: du/namis] is restricted to the cases in which a person can do the thing in question well: no man is said to have the power of speaking or singing unless he can perform these functions pretty well (a. 18).

In all these varieties, the general notion of [Greek: du/namis kata\ ki/nêsin] is included (p. 1046, a. 16). The active and passive [Greek: du/namis] are, in one sense, one and the same; in another sense, distinct and different. For one of them resides in the patient, the other in the agent (a. 27): sometimes the two come by nature together in the same thing; yet the patient does not suffer from itself as patient, but from itself as agent. Impotence ([Greek: a)dunami/a]) is the privation contrary to this [Greek: **du/namis]. Privation has many different meanings (a. 32).