Chapter III: Categoriæ (1)

Of the prodigious total of works composed by Aristotle, I have already mentioned that the larger number have perished. But there still remain about forty treatises, of authenticity not open to any reasonable suspicion, which attest the grandeur of his intelligence, in respect of speculative force, positive as well as negative, systematizing patience, comprehensive curiosity as to matters of fact, and diversified applications of detail. In taking account of these treatises, we perceive some in which the order of sequence is determined by assignable reasons; as regards others, no similar grounds of preference appear. The works called 1. De Coelo; 2. De Generatione et Corruptione; 3. Meteorologica,--are marked out as intended to be studied in immediate succession, and the various Zoological treatises after them. The cluster entitled Parva Naturalia is complementary to the treatise De Animâ. The Physica Auscultatio is referred to in the Metaphysica, and discusses many questions identical or analogous, standing in the relation of prior to a posterior, as the titles indicate; though the title 'Metaphysica' is not affixed or recognized by Aristotle himself, and the treatise so called includes much that goes beyond the reach of the Physica. As to the treatises on Logic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Poetics, Mechanics, &c., we are left to fix for ourselves the most convenient order of study. Of no one among them can we assign the date of composition or publication. There are indeed in the Rhetorica, Politics, and Meteorologica, various allusions which must have been written later than some given events of known date; but these allusions may have been later additions, and cannot be considered as conclusively proving, though they certainly raise a presumption, that the entire work was written subsequently to those events.

The proper order in which the works of Aristotle ought to be studied (like the order proper for studying the Platonic dialogues),[1] was matter of debate from the time of his earliest editors and commentators, in the century immediately preceding the Christian era. Boêthus the Sidonian (Strabo's contemporary and fellow-student) recommended that the works on natural philosophy and physiology should be perused first; contending that these were the easiest, the most interesting, and, on the whole, the most successful among all the Aristotelian productions. Some Platonists advised that the ethical treatises should be put in the front rank, on the ground of their superior importance for correcting bad habits and character; others assigned the first place to the mathematics, as exhibiting superior firmness in the demonstrations. But Andronikus himself, the earliest known editor of Aristotle's works, arranged them in a different order, placing the logical treatises at the commencement of his edition. He considered these treatises, taken collectively, to be not so much a part of philosophy as an _Organon_ or instrument, the use of which must be acquired by the reader before he became competent to grasp or comprehend philosophy; as an exposition of method rather than of doctrine.[2] From the time of Andronikus downward, the logical treatises have always stood first among the written or printed works of Aristotle. They have been known under the collective title of the 'Organon,' and as such it will be convenient still to regard them.[3]

[Footnote 1: Scholia, p. 25, b. 37, seq. Br.; p. 321, b. 30; Diogen. L. iii. 62. The order in which the forty-six Aristotelian treatises stand printed in the Berlin edition, and in other preceding editions, corresponds to the tripartite division, set forth by Aristotle himself, of sciences or cognitions generally: 1. Theoretical; [Greek: theôrêtikai/] 2. Practical; [Greek: praktikai/]. 3. Constructive or Technical; [Greek: poiêtikai/].

Patricius, in his Discussiones Peripateticæ, published in 1581 (tom. i. lib. xiii. p. 173), proclaims himself to be the first author who will undertake to give an account of Aristotle's philosophy _from Aristotle himself_ (instead of taking it, as others before him had done, from the Aristotelian expositors, Andronikus, Alexander, Porphyry, or Averroes); likewise, to be the first author who will consult _all_ the works of Aristotle, instead of confining himself, as his predecessors had done, to a select few of the works. Patricius then proceeds to enumerate those works upon which alone the professors "in Italicis scholis" lectured, and to which the attention of all readers was restricted. 1. The Predicabilia, or Eisagoge of Porphyry. 2. The Categoriæ. 3. The De Interpretatione. 4. The Analytica Priora; but only the four first chapters of the first book. 5. The Analytica Posteriora; but only a few chapters of the first book; nothing of the second. 6. The Physica; books first and second; then parts of the third and fourth; lastly, the eighth book. 7. The De Coelo; books first and second. 8. The De Generatione et Corruptione; books first and second. 9. The De Animâ; all the three books. 10. The Metaphysica; books Alpha major, Alpha minor, third, sixth, and eleventh. "Idque, quadriennio integro, quadruplicis ordinis Philosophi perlegunt auditoribus. De reliquis omnibus tot libris, mirum silentium." Patricius expressly remarks that neither the Topica nor the De Sophisticis Elenchis was touched in this full course of four years. But he does not remark--what to a modern reader will seem more surprising--that neither the Ethica, nor the Politica, nor the Rhetorica, is included in the course.]

[Footnote 2: Aristot. Topica, i. p. 104, b. 1, with the Scholia of Alexander, p. 259, a. 48 Br.; Scholia ad Analyt. Prior. p. 140, a. 47, p. 141, a. 25; also Schol. ad Categor. p. 36, a., p. 40, a., 8. This conception of the Organon is not explicitly announced by Aristotle, but seems quite in harmony with his views. The contemptuous terms in which Prantl speaks of it (Gesch. der Logik, i. 136), as a silly innovation of the Stoics, are unwarranted.

Aristotle (Metaph. E. i. p. 1025, b. 26) classifies the sciences as [Greek: theôrêtikai/, praktikai/, poiêtikai/]; next he subdivides the first of the three into [Greek: phusikê/, mathêmatikê/, prô/tê philosophi/a]. Brentano, after remarking that no place in this distribution is expressly provided for Logic, explains the omission as follows: "Diese auffallende Erscheinung erklärt sich daraus, dass diese [the three above-named theoretical sciences] allein das reelle Sein betrachten, und nach den drei Graden der Abstraktion in ihrer Betrachtungsweise verschieden, geschieden werden; während die Logik das bloss rationelle Sein, das [Greek: o(\n ô(s a)lêthe/s], behandelt." (Ueber die Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles, p. 39.)--Investigations [Greek: peri\ tê=s a)lêthei/as, o(\n tro/pon dei= a)pode/chesthai] are considered by Aristotle as belonging to [Greek: ta\ A)naluktika]; enquiries into method in the first instance, and into doctrine chiefly with a view to method (Metaphys. [Greek: G]. p. 1005, b. 2. In Metaphys. ]Greek: G]. 1005, b. 7, he declares that these enquiries into method, or analysis of the _principia_ of syllogistic reasoning, belong to the Philosophia Prima (compare Metaphys. Z. 12, p. 1037, b. 8). Schwegler in his Commentary (p. 161) remarks that this is one of the few passages in which Aristotle indicates the relation in which Logic stands to Metaphysics, or First Philosophy. The question has been started among his [Greek: A)pori/ai] Metaph. B. 2, p. 999, b. 30.]

[Footnote 3: Respecting the title of Organon which was sometimes applied to the Analytica Posteriora only, see Waitz ad Organ, ii. p. 294.]

These treatises are six in number:--1. Categoriæ;[4] 2. De Interpretatione, or De Enunciatione; 3. Analytica Priora; 4. Analytica Posteriora; 5. Topica; 6. De Sophisticis Elenchis. This last short treatise--De Sophisticis Elenchis--belongs naturally to the Topica which precedes it, and of which it ought to be ranked as the ninth or concluding book. Waitz has printed it as such in his edition of the Organon; but as it has been generally known with a separate place and title, I shall not depart from the received understanding.

[Footnote 4: Some eminent critics, Prantl and Bonitz among them, consider the treatise Categoriæ not to be the work of Aristotle. The arguments on which this opinion rests are not convincing to me; and even if they were, the treatise could not be left out of consideration, since the _doctrine_ of the Ten Categories is indisputably Aristotelian. See Zeller, Die Phil. der Griech. ii. 2, pp. 50, 51, 2nd ed.]

Aristotle himself does not announce these six treatises as forming a distinct aggregate, nor as belonging to one and the same department, nor as bearing one comprehensive name. We find indeed in the Topica references to the Analytica, and in the Analytica references to the Topica. In both of them, the ten Categories are assumed and presupposed, though the treatise describing them is not expressly mentioned: to both also, the contents of the treatise De Interpretatione or Enunciatione, though it is not named, are indispensable. The affinity and interdependence of the six is evident, and justifies the practice of the commentators in treating them as belonging to one and the same department. To that department there belonged also several other treatises of Aristotle, not now preserved, but specified in the catalogue of his lost works; and these his disciple Theophrastus, Eudemus, and Phanias, had before them. As all these three disciples composed treatises of their own on the same or similar topics,[5] amplifying, elucidating, or controverting the views of their master, the Peripatetics immediately succeeding them must have possessed a copious logical literature, in which the six treatises now constituting the Organon appeared as portions, but not as a special aggregate in themselves.

[Footnote 5: Ammonius ap. Schol. p. 28, a. 41; p. 33, b. 27, Br.]

Of the two treatises which stand first in the Aristotelian Organon--the Categoriæ and the De Interpretatione--each forms in a certain sense the complement of the other. The treatise De Interpretatione handles Propositions (combinations of terms in the way of Subject and Predicate), with prominent reference to the specific attribute of a Proposition--the being true or false, the object of belief or disbelief; the treatise Categoriæ deals with these same Terms (to use Aristotle's own phrase) pronounced without or apart from such combination. In his definition of the simple Term, the Proposition is at the same time assumed to be foreknown as the correlate or antithesis to it.[6]

[Footnote 6: [Greek: Ta\ a)/neu sumplokê=s lego/mena--tô=n kata\ mêdemi/an sumplokê\n legome/nôna] Categ. p. 1, a. 16, b. 25). See Schol. ad Aristot. Physica, p. 323, b. 25, Br.; and Bonitz ad Aristotel. Metaph. (A. p. 987) p. 90.

The Categories of Aristotle appear to formed one of the most prominent topics of the teaching of Themistius: rebutting the charge, advanced both against himself, and, in earlier days, against Sokrates and the Sophists, of rendering his pupils presumptuous and conceited, he asks, [Greek: ê)kou/sate de\ au)= tinos tô=n e)mô=n e)pitêdei/ôn u(psêlogoume/nou kai\ brenthuome/nou _e)pi\ toi=s sunônu/mois ê)\ o(mônu/moi=s ê)\ parônu/mois_]; (Orat. xxiii. p. 351.)

Reference is made (in the Scholia on the Categoriæ, p. 43, b. 19) to a classification of names made by Speusippus, which must have been at least as early as that of Aristotle; perhaps earlier, since Speusippus died in 339 B.C. We do not hear enough of this to understand clearly what it was. Boêthus remarked that Aristotle had omitted to notice some distinctions drawn by Speusippus on this matter, Schol. p. 43, a. 29. Compare a remark in Aristot. De Coelo, i. p. 280, b. 2.]

The first distinction pointed out by Aristotle among simple, uncombined Terms, or the things denoted thereby, is the Homonymous, the Synonymous, and the Paronymous. _Homonymous_ are those which are called by the same name, used in a different sense or with a different definition or rational explanation. _Synonymous_ are those called by the same name in the same sense. _Paronymous_ are those called by two names, of which the one is derived from the other by varying the inflexion or termination.[7]

[Footnote 7: Aristot. Categor. p. 1, a. 1-15.]

We can hardly doubt that it was Aristotle who first gave this peculiar distinctive meaning to the two words Homonymous and Synonymous, rendered in modern phraseology (through the Latin) _Equivocal_ and _Univocal_. Before his time this important distinction between different terms had no technical name to designate it. The service rendered to Logic by introducing such a technical term, and by calling attention to the lax mode of speaking which it indicated, was great. In every branch of his writings Aristotle perpetually reverts to it, applying it to new cases, and especially to those familiar universal words uttered most freely and frequently, under the common persuasion that their meaning is not only thoroughly known but constant and uniform. As a general fact, students are now well acquainted with this source of error, though the stream of particular errors flowing from it is still abundant, ever renewed and diversified. But in the time of Aristotle the source itself had never yet been pointed out emphatically to notice, nor signalized by any characteristic term as by a beacon. The natural bias which lead us to suppose that one term always carries one and the same meaning, was not counteracted by any systematic warning or generalized expression. Sokrates and Plato did indeed expose many particular examples of undefined and equivocal phraseology. No part of the Platonic writings is more valuable than the dialogues in which this operation is performed, forcing the respondent to feel how imperfectly he understands the phrases constantly in use. But it is rarely Plato's practice to furnish generalized positive warnings or systematic distinctions. He has no general term corresponding to homonymous or equivocal; and there are even passages where (under the name of Prodikus) he derides or disparages a careful distinctive analysis of different significations of the same name. To recognize a class of equivocal terms and assign thereto a special class-name, was an important step in logical procedure; and that step, among so many others, was made by Aristotle.[8]

[Footnote 8: In the instructive commentary of Dexippus on the Categoriæ (contained in a supposed dialogue between Dexippus and his pupil Seleukus, of which all that remains has been recently published by Spengel, Munich, 1859), that commentator defends Aristotle against some critics who wondered why he began with these Ante-predicaments ([Greek: o(mô/numa, sunô/numa], &c.), instead of proceeding at once to the Predicaments or Categories themselves. Dexippus remarks that without understanding this distinction between _equivoca_ and _univoca_, the Categories themselves could not be properly appreciated; for Ens--[Greek: to\ o)\n]--is homonymous in reference to all the Categories, and not a Summum Genus, comprehending the Categories as distinct species under it; while each Category is a Genus in reference to its particulars. Moreover, Dexippus observes that this distinction of homonyms and synonyms was altogether unknown and never self-suggested to the ordinary mind ([Greek: o(/sôn ga\r e)/nnoian ou)k e)/chomen, tou/tôn pro/lêpsin ou)k e)/chomen], p. 20), and therefore required to be brought out first of all at the beginning; whereas the Post-predicaments (to which we shall come later on) were postponed to the end, because they were cases of familiar terms loosely employed, (See Spengel, Dexipp. pp. 19, 20, 21.)]

Though Aristotle has professed to distinguish between terms implicated in predication, and terms not so implicated,[9] yet when he comes to explain the functions of the latter class, he considers them in reference to their functions as constituent members of propositions. He immediately begins by distinguishing four sorts of matters (_Entia_): That which is affirmable of a Subject, but is not in a Subject; That which is in a Subject, but is not affirmable of a Subject; That which is both in a Subject, and affirmable of a Subject; That which is neither in a Subject, nor affirmable of a Subject.[10]

[Footnote 9: Aristot. Categor. p. 1, a. 16. [Greek: tô=n legome/nôn ta\ me\n kata\ sumplokê\n le/getai, ta\ d' a)/neu sumplokê=s; ta\ me\n ou)=n kata\ sumplokê\n oi(=on a)/nthrôpos tre/chei, a)/nthrôpos nika=|; ta\ d' a)/neu sumplokê=s oi)=on a)/nthrôpos, bou=s, tre/chei, nika=|.]

It will be seen that the meaning and function of the single word can only explained relatively to the complete proposition, which must be assumed as foreknown. That which Aristotle discriminates in this treatise, in the phrases--[Greek: le/gesthai kata\ sumplokê\n] and [Greek: le/gesthai a)/neu sumplokê=s] is equivalent to what we read in the De Interpretatione (p. 16, b. 27, p. 17, a. 17) differently expressed, [Greek: phônê\ sêmantikê\ ô(s kata/phasis] and [Greek: phônê\ sêmantikê\ ô(s pha/sis].]

[Footnote 10: Aristot. Categor. p. 1, a. 20.]

This fundamental quadruple distinction of _Entia_, which serves as an introduction to the ten Categories or Predicaments, belongs to words altogether according to their relative places or functions in the proposition; the meanings of the words being classified accordingly. That the learner may understand it, he ought properly to be master of the first part of the treatise De Interpretatione, wherein the constituent elements of a proposition are explained: so intimate is the connection between that treatise and this.

The classification applies to _Entia_ (Things or Matters) universally, and is thus a first step in Ontology. He here looks at Ontology in one of its several diverse aspects--as it enters into predication, and furnishes the material for Subjects and Predicates, the constituent members of a proposition.

Ontology, or the Science of _Ens quatenus Ens_, occupies an important place in Aristotle's scientific programme; bearing usually the title of First Philosophy, sometimes Theology, though never (in his works) the more modern title of Metaphysica. He describes it as the universal and comprehensive Science, to which all other sciences are related as parts or fractions. Ontology deals with _Ens_ in its widest sense, as an _Unum_ not generic but analogical--distinguishing the derivative varieties into which it may be distributed, and setting out the attributes and accompaniments of _Essentia_ universally; while other sciences, such as Geometry, Astronomy, &c., confine themselves to distinct branches of that whole;[11] each having its own separate class of _Entia_ for special and exclusive study. This is the characteristic distinction of Ontology, as Aristotle conceives it; he does not set it in antithesis to Phenomenology, according to the distinction that has become current among modern metaphysicians.

[Footnote 11: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: G]. p. 1003, a. 21, 25-33, E. p. 1025, b. 8. [Greek: e)/stin e)pistê/mê tis ê)\ theôrei= to\ o)\n ê(=| o)\n kai\ ta\ tou/tô| u(pa/rchonta kath' au(to/; au(/tê d' e)sti\n ou)demia=| tô=n a)/llôn e)piskopei= _katho/lou peri\ tou= o)/ntos ê(=| o(/n, a)lla\ me/ros au)tou= ti a)potemo/menai peri\ tou/tou theôrou=si to\ sumbebêko/s], &c. Compare p. 1005, a. 2-14.]

Now _Ens_ (or _Entia_), in the doctrine of Aristotle, is not a synonymous or univocal word, but an homonymous or equivocal word; or, rather, it is something between the two, being equivocal, with a certain qualification. Though not a _Summum Genus_, _i.e._ not manifesting throughout all its particulars generic unity, nor divisible into species by the addition of well-marked essential _differentiæ_, it is an analogical aggregate, or a _Summum Analogon_, comprehending under it many subordinates which bear the same name from being all related in some way or other to a common root or _fundamentum_, the relationship being both diverse in kind and nearer or more distant in degree. The word _Ens_ is thus homonymous, yet in a qualified sense. While it is not univocal, it is at the same time not absolutely equivocal. It is _multivocal_ (if we may coin such a word), having many meanings held together by a multifarious and graduated relationship to one common _fundamentum_.[12] _Ens_ (or _Entia_), in this widest sense, is the theme of Ontology or First Philosophy, and is looked at by Aristotle in four different principal aspects.[13]

[Footnote 12: Simplikius speaks of these Analoga as [Greek: to\ me/son tô=n te sunônu/môn kai\ tô=n o(mônu/môn, to\ a)ph' e(no/s], &c. Schol. ad Categor. p. 69, b. 29, Brand. See also Metaphys. Z. p. 1030, a. 34.

Dexippus does not recognize, formally and under a distinct title, this intermediate stage between [Greek: sunô/numa] and [Greek: o(mô/numa]. He states that Aristotle considered Ens as [Greek: o(mô/numon], while other philosophers considered it as [Greek: sunô/numon] (Dexippus, p. 26, book i. sect. 19, ed. Spengel). But he intimates that the ten general heads called Categories have a certain continuity and interdependence ([Greek: sune/cheian kai\ a)llêlouchi/an]) each with the others, branching out from [Greek: ou)si/a] in ramifications more or less straggling (p. 48, book ii. sects. 1, 2, Spengel). The list (he says, p. 47) does not depend upon [Greek: diai/resis] (generic division), nor yet is it simple enumeration ([Greek: a)pari/thmêsis] of incoherent items. In the Physica, vii. 4, p. 249, a. 23, Aristotle observes: [Greek: ei)si\ de\ tô=n o(mônumiôn ai( me\n polu\ a)pe/chousi ai( de\ e)/chousai/ tina o(moio/têta, ai( d' e)ggu\s ê)\ ge/nei ê)\ a)nalogi/a|, dio\ ou) dokou=sin o(mônumi/ai ei)=nai ou)=sai.]]

[Footnote 13: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1017, a. 7, E. p. 1025, a. 34, p. 1026, a. 33, b. 4; upon which last passage see the note of Bonitz.]

1. [Greek: To\ o)\n kata\ sumbebêko/s]--_Ens per Accidens_--_Ens_ accidental, or rather concomitant, either as rare and exceptional attribute to a subject, or along with some other accident in the same common subject.

2. [Greek: To\ o)\n ô(s a)lêthe/s, kai\ to\ mê\ o)\n ô(s pseu=dos]--_Ens_, in the sense /of Truth, _Non-Ens_, in the sense of Falsehood. This is the _Ens_ of the Proposition; a true affirmation or denial falls under _Ens_ in this mode, when the mental conjunction of terms agrees with reality; a false affirmation or denial, where no such agreement exists, falls under _Non-Ens_.[14]

[Footnote 14: Aristot. Metaph. E. 4, p. 1027, b. 18,--p. 1028, a. 4. [Greek: ou) ga\r e)sti to\ pseu=dos kai\ to\ a)lêthe\s e)n toi=s pra/gmasin--a)ll' e)n dianoi/a|--ou)k e)/xô dêlou=sin ou)=sa/n tina phu/sin tou= o)/ntos.] Also [Greek: Th]. 10, p. 1051, b. 1: [Greek: to\ kuriô/tata o)\n a)lêthes kai\ pseu=dos]. In a Scholion, Alexander remarks: [Greek: to\ de\ ô(s a)lêthô=s o)\n pa/thos e)sti\ kai\ bou/lêma dianoi/as, to\ de\ zêtei=n to\ e(ka/stô| dokou=n ou) spho/dra a)nagkai=on.]]

3. [Greek: To\ o)\n duna/mei kai\ to\ o)\n e)nergei/a|]--_Ens_, potential, actual.

4. [Greek: To\ o)\n kata\ ta\ schê/mata tô=n katêgoriô=n]--_Ens_, according to the ten varieties of the Categories, to be presently explained.

These four are the principal aspects under which Aristotle looks at the aggregate comprised by the equivocal or multivocal word _Entia_. In all the four branches, the varieties comprised are not species under a common genus, correlating, either as co-ordinate or subordinate, one to the other; they are _analoga_, all having relationship with a common term, but having no other necessary relationship with each other. Aristotle does not mean that these four modes of distributing this vast aggregate, are the only modes possible; for he himself sometimes alludes to other modes of distributions.[15] Nor would he maintain that the four distributions were completely distinguished from each other, so that the same subordinate fractions are not comprehended in any two; for on the contrary, the branches overlap each other and coincide to a great degree, especially the first and fourth. But he considers the four as discriminating certain distinct aspects of _Entia_ or _Entitas_, more important than any other aspects thereof that could be pointed out, and as affording thus the best basis and commencement for the Science called Ontology.

[Footnote 15: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. p. 1003, a. 33, b. 10. Compare the able treatise of Brentano, "Ueber die Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles," pp. 6, 7.]

Of these four heads, however, the first and second are rapidly dismissed by Aristotle in the Metaphysica,[16] being conceived as having little reference to real essence, and therefore belonging more to Logic than to Ontology; _i.e._ to the subjective processes of naming, predicating, believing, and inferring rather than to the objective world of Perceivables and Cogitables.[17] It is the third and fourth that are treated in the Metaphysica; while it is the fourth only (_Ens_ according to the ten figures of the Categories) which is set forth and elucidated in this first treatise of the Organon, where Aristotle appears to blend Logic and Ontology into one.

[Footnote 16: Aristot. Metaph. E. p. 1027, b. 16, p. 1028. a. 6.]

[Footnote 17: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: Th]. 10, p. 1051, b. 2-15, with Schwegler's Comment, p. 186. This is the distinction drawn by Simplikius (Schol. ad Categ. p. 76, b. 47) between the Organon and the Metaphysica: [Greek: Ai( ga\r a)rchai\ kata\ me\n tê/n sêmantikê\n au)tô=n le/xin e)n tê=| logikê=| pragmatei/a| dêlou=ntai, kata\ de\ ta\ sêmaino/mena e)n tê=| Meta\ ta\ Phusika\ oi)kei/ôs.]

[Greek: Ta\ o)/nta] are equivalent to [Greek: ta\ lego/mena], in this and the other logical treatises of Aristotle. Categ. p. 1, a. 16-20, b. 25; Analyt. Prior. i. p. 43, a. 25.

This is the logical aspect of Ontology; that is, Entia are considered as Objects to be named, and to serve as Subjects or Predicates for propositions: every such term having a fixed denotation, and (with the exception of proper names) a fixed connotation, known to speakers and hearers.

[Greek: Ta\ lego/mena] (or Entia considered in this aspect) are distinguished by Aristotle into two classes: 1. [Greek: Ta\ lego/mena _kata\ sumplokê/n_, oi(=on a)/nthrôpos tre/chei, a)/nthropos nika=|.] 2. [Greek: Ta\ lego/mena _a)/neu sumplokê=s_] (or [Greek: kata\ mêdemi/an sumplokê/n]) [Greek: oi(=on a)/nthrôpos, bou=s, tre/chei, nika=|.]

We are to observe here, that in Logic the Proposition or Enunciation is the Prius Naturâ, which must be presupposed as known before we can understand what the separate terms are (Analytic. Prior. i. p. 24, a. 16): just as the right angle must be understood before we can explain what is an acute or an obtuse angle (to use an illustration of Aristotle; see Metaphys. Z. p. 1035, b. 7). We must understand the entire logical act, called Affirming or Denying, before we can understand the functions of the two factors or correlates with which that act is performed. Aristotle defines the Term by means of the Proposition, [Greek: o(/ron de\ kalô= ei) o)\n dialu/etai ê( pro/tasis] (Anal. Pr. i. 24, b. 16).

[Greek: Ta\ lego/mena], as here used by Aristotle, coincides in meaning with what the Stoics afterwards called [Greek: Ta\ lekta/]--of two classes: 1. [Greek: _lekta\ au)totelê=_], one branch of which, [Greek: ta\ a)xiô/mata], are equivalent to the Aristotelian [Greek: ta\ kata\ sumplokê\n lego/mena]. 2. [Greek: _lekta\ e)llipê=_], equivalent to [Greek: ta\ a)/neu sumplokê=s lego/mena] (Diogen. Laert. vii. 43, 44, 63, 64; Sext. Emp. adv. Mathemat. viii. 69, 70, 74): equivalent also, seemingly, to [Greek: ta\ dianoêta\] in Aristotle: [Greek: o( dianoêto\s A)ristome/nês] (Anal. Pr. I. p. 47, b. 22).

Hobbes observes (Computation or Logic, part i. 2, 5): "Nor is it at all necessary that every name should be the name of something. For as these, _a man_, _a tree_, _a stone_, are the names of the things themselves, so the images of a man, of a tree, of a stone, which are represented to men sleeping, have their names also, though they be not things, but only fictions and phantasms of things. For we can remember these; and therefore it is no less necessary that they have names to mark and signify them, than the things themselves. Also this word _future_ is a name; but no future thing has yet any being. Moreover, that which neither is, nor has been, nor ever shall or ever can be, has a name--_impossible_. To conclude, this word _nothing_ is a name, which yet cannot be name of any thing; for when we subtract two and three from five, and, so nothing remaining, we would call that subtraction to mind, this speech _nothing remains_, and in it the word _nothing_, is not unuseful. And for the same reason we say truly, _less than nothing_ remains, when we subtract more from less; for the mind feigns such remains as these for doctrine's sake, and desires, as often as is necessary, to call the same to memory. But seeing every name has some relation to that which is named, though that which we name be not always a thing that has a being in nature, yet is lawful for doctrine's sake to apply the word _thing_ to whatsoever we name; as it were all one whether that thing truly existent, or be only feigned."

The Greek neuter gender ([Greek: to\ lego/menon] or [Greek: to\ lekto/n, ta\ lego/mena] or [Greek: ta\ lekta/]) covers all that Hobbes here includes under the word _thing_.--Scholia ad Aristot. Physic. I. i. p. 323, a. 21, Brand.: [Greek: o)noma/zontai me\n kai\ ta\ mê\ o)/nta, o(ri/zontai de\ mo/na ta\ o)/nta.]]

Of this mixed character, partly logical, partly ontological, is the first distinction set forth in the Categoriæ--the distinction between matters _predicated of_ a Subject, and matters which are _in_ a Subject--the Subject itself being assumed as the _fundamentum_ correlative to both of them. The definition given of that which is _in_ a Subject is ontological: viz., "_In_ a Subject, I call that which is in anything, not as a part, yet so that it cannot exist separately from that in which it is."[18] By these two negative characteristics, without any mark positive, does Aristotle define what is meant by being _in_ a Subject. Modern logicians, and Hobbes among them, can find no better definition for an Accident; though Hobbes remarks truly, that Accident cannot be properly defined, but must be elucidated by examples.[19]

[Footnote 18: Aristot. Categ. p. 1, a. 24.]

[Footnote 19: Hobbes, Computation or Logic, part i. 3, 3, i. 6, 2, ii. 8, 2-3.]

The distinction here drawn by Aristotle between being _predicated of_ a Subject, and being in a Subject, coincides with that between essential and non-essential predication: all the predicates (including the _differentia_) which belong to the essence, fall under the first division;[20] all those which do not belong to the essence, under the latter. The Subjects--what Aristotle calls the First Essences or Substances, those which are essences or substances in the fullest and strictest meaning of the word--are concrete individual things or persons; such as Sokrates, this man, that horse or tree. These are never employed as predicates at all (except by a distorted and unnatural structure of the proposition, which Aristotle indicates as possible, but declines to take into account); they are always Subjects of different predicates, and are, in the last analysis, the Subjects of all predicates. But besides these First Essences, there are also Second Essences--Species and Genus, which stand to the first Essence in the relation of predicates to a Subject, and to the other Categories in the relation of Subjects to predicates.[21] These Second Essences are less of Essences than the First, which alone is an Essence in the fullest and most appropriate sense. Among the Second Essences, Species is more of an Essence than Genus, because it belongs more closely and specially to the First Essence; while Genus is farther removed from it. Aristotle thus recognizes a graduation of _more or less_ in Essence; the individual is more Essence, or more complete as an Essence, than the Species, the Species more than the Genus. As he recognizes a First Essence, _i.e._ an individual object (such as Sokrates, this horse, &c.), so he also recognizes an individual accident (this particular white colour, that particular grammatical knowledge) which is _in_ a Subject, but is not _predicated of_ a Subject; this particular white colour exists _in_ some given body, but is not _predicable of_ any body.[22]

[Footnote 20: Aristot. Categ. p. 3, a. 20. It appears that Andronikus did not draw the line between these two classes of predicates in same manner as Aristotle: he included many non-essential predicates in [Greek: ta\ kath' u(pokeime/nou]. See Simplikius, ad Categorias, Basil. 1551, fol. 13, 21, B. Nor was either Alexander or Porphyry careful to observe the distinction between the two classes. See Schol. ad Metaphys. p. 701. b. 23, Br.; Schol. ad De Interpret. p. 106, a. 29, Br. And when Aristotle says, Analyt. Prior. i. p. 24, b. 26, [Greek: to\ de\ e)n o(/lô| ei)nai e(/teron e(te/rô|, kai\ to\ kata\ panto\s katêgorei=sthai thate/rou tha/teron, tau)to/n e)stin], he seems himself to forget the distinction entirely.]

[Footnote 21: Categor. p. 2, a. 15, seq. In Aristotle phraseology it is not said that Second Essences are contained in First Essences, but that First Essences are contained in Second Essences, _i.e._ in the species which Second Essences signify. See the Scholion to p. 3, a. 9, in Waitz, vol. i. p. 32.]

[Footnote 22: Arist. Categ. p. 1, a. 26; b. 7: [Greek: A)nplô=s de\ ta\ a)/toma kai\ e(\n a)rithmô=| kat' ou)deno\s u(pokeime/nou le/getai, e)n u(pokeime/nô| de\ e(/nia ou)de\n kôlu/ei ei)=nai; ê( ga/r tis grammatikê\ tô=n e)n u(pokeime/nô| e)sti/n.] Aristotle here recognizes an attribute as "individual and as numerically one;" and various other logicians have followed him. But is it correct to say, that an attribute, when it cannot be farther divided specifically, and is thus the lowest in its own predicamental series, is _Unum Numero_? The attribute may belong to an indefinite number of different objects; and can we count it as _One_, in the same sense in which we count each of these objects as _One_? I doubt whether _Unum Numero_ be applicable to attributes. Aristotle declares that the [Greek: deute/ra ou)si/a] is not _Unum Numero_ like the [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a--ou) ga\r e)n e)sti to\ u(pokei/menon Ô(/sper ê( prô/tê ou)si/a, a)lla\ kata\ pollô=n o( a)/nthrôpos le/getai kai\ to\ zô=|on (Categ. p. 3, b. 16). Upon the same principle, I think, he ought to declare that the attribute is not _Unum Numero_; for though it is not (in his language) _predicable of_ many Subjects, yet it is _in_ many Subjects. It cannot correctly be called _Unum Numero_, according to the explanation which he gives of that phrase in two passages of the Metaphysica, B. p. 999, b. 33; [Greek: D]. p. 1016, b. 32: [Greek: a)rithmô=| me\n ô(=n ê( u(/lê mi/a], &c.]

Respecting the logical distinction, which Aristotle places in the commencement of this treatise on the Categories--between predicates which are _affirmed of_ a Subject, and predicates which are _in_ a Subject[23]--we may remark that it turns altogether upon the name by which you describe the predicate. Thus he tells us that the Species and Genus (man, animal), and the Differentia (rational), may be _predicated of_ Sokrates, but are not _in_ Sokrates; while knowledge is _in_ Sokrates, but cannot be _predicated of_ Sokrates; and may be _predicated of_ grammar, but is not _in_ grammar. But if we look at this comparison, we shall see that in the last-mentioned example, the predicate is described by an abstract word (knowledge); while in the preceding examples it is described by a concrete word (man, animal, rational).[24] If, in place of these three last words, we substitute the abstract words corresponding to them--humanity, animality, rationality--we shall have to say that these are _in_ Sokrates, though they cannot (in their abstract form) be _predicated of_ Sokrates, but only in the form of their concrete paronyms, which Aristotle treats as a distinct predication. So if, instead of the abstract word knowledge, we employ the concrete word knowing or wise, we can no longer say that this is _in_ Sokrates, and that it may be _predicated of_ grammar. Abstract alone can be _predicated of_ abstract; concrete alone can be _predicated of_ concrete; if we describe the relation between Abstract and Concrete, we must say, The Abstract is _in_ the Concrete--the Concrete contains or embodies the Abstract. Indeed we find Aristotle referring the same predicate, when described by the abstract name, to one Category; and when described by the concrete paronymous adjective, to another and different Category.[25] The names Concrete and Abstract were not in the philosophical vocabulary of his day. In this passage of the Categoriæ, he establishes a distinction between predicates essential and predicates non-essential; the latter he here declares to be _in_ the Subject, the former not to be in it, but to be _co-efficients of_ its essence. But we shall find that he does not adhere to this distinction even throughout the present treatise, still less in other works. It seems to be a point of difference between the Categoriæ on one side, and the Physica and Metaphysica on the other, that in the Categoriæ he is more disposed to found supposed real distinctions on verbal etiquette, and on precise adherence to the syntactical structure of a proposition.[26]

[Footnote 23: The distinction is expressed by Ammonius (Schol. p. 51, b. 46) as follows:--[Greek: ai( prô=tai ou)si/ai u(pokeu=ntai pa=sin, a)ll' ou)ch o(moi/ôs; toi=s me\n ga\r _pro\s u(/parxin_, tou/testi toi=s sumbebêko/sin, toi=s de\ _pro\s katêgori/an_, tou/testi tai=s katho/lou ou)si/ais.]]

[Footnote 24: Ueberweg makes a remark similar to this.--System der Logik, sect. 56, note, p. 110, ed. second.]

[Footnote 25: The difference of opinion as to the proper mode of describing the Differentia--whether by the concrete word [Greek: pezo\n], or by the abstract [Greek: pezo/tês]--gives occasion to an objection against Aristotle's view, and to a reply from Dexippus not very conclusive (Dexippus, book ii. s. 22, pp. 60, 61, ed. Spengel).]

[Footnote 26: Categor. p. 3, a. 3. In the Physica, iv. p. 210, a. 14-30, Aristotle enumerates nine different senses of the phrase [Greek: e(/n tini]. His own use of the phrase is not always uniform or consistent. If we compare the Scholia on the Categoriæ, pp. 44, 45, 53, 58, 59, Br., with the Scholia on the Physica, pp. 372, 373, Br., we shall see that the Commentators were somewhat embarrassed by his fluctuation. The doctrine of the Categoriæ was found especially difficult in its application to the Differentia.

In Analyt. Post. i. p. 83, a. 30, Aristotle says, [Greek: o(/sa de\ mê\ ou)si/an sêmai/nei, dei= kata/ tinos u(pokeime/nou katêgorei=sthai], which is at variance with the language of the Categoriæ, as the Scholiast remarks, p. 228, a. 33. The like may be said about Metaphys. B. p. 1001, b. 29; [Greek: D]. p. 1017, b. 13. See the Scholia of Alexander, p. 701, b. 25, Br.

See also De Gener. et Corrupt. p. 319, b. 8; Physic. i. p. 185, a. 31: [Greek: ou)the\n ga\r tô=n a)/llôn chôristo/n e)sti para\ tê\n ou)si/an; pa/nta ga\r kath' u(pokeime/nou tê=s ou)si/as le/getai], where Simplikius remarks that the phrase is used [Greek: a)nti\ tou= e)n u(pokeime/nô|] (Schol. p. 328, b. 43).]

Lastly, Aristotle here makes one important observation respecting those predicates which he describes as (not _in a Subject_ but) _affirmed_ or _denied of_ a Subject--_i.e._ the essential predicates. In these (he says) whatever predicate can be truly affirmed or denied of the predicate, the same can be truly affirmed or denied of the Subject.[27] This observation deserves notice, because it is in fact a brief but distinct announcement of his main theory of the Syllogism; which theory he afterwards expands in the Analytica Priora, and traces into its varieties and ramifications.

[Footnote 27: Categor. p. 1, b. 10-15.]

After such preliminaries, Aristotle proceeds[28] to give the enumeration of his Ten Categories or Predicaments; under one or other of which, every subject or predicate, considered as capable of entering into a proposition, must belong: 1. _Essence_ or _Substance_; such as, man, horse. 2. _How much_ or _Quantity_; such as, two cubits long, three cubits long. 3. _What manner of_ or _Quality_; such as, white, erudite. 4. _Ad aliquid_--_To something_ or _Relation_; such as, double, half, greater. 5. _Where_; such as, in the market-place, in the Lykeium. 6. _When_; such as, yesterday, last year. 7. _In what posture_; such as, he stands up, he is sitting down. 8. _To have_; such as, to be shod, to be armed. 9. _Activity_; such as, he is cutting, he is turning. 10. _Passivity_; such as, he is being cut, he is being burned.

[Footnote 28: Ibid. p. 1, b. 25, seq.]

_Ens_ in its complete state--concrete, individual, determinate-- includes an embodiment of all these ten Categories; the First _Ens_ being the Subject of which the rest are predicates. Whatever question be asked respecting any individual Subject, the information given in the answer must fall, according to Aristotle, under one or more of these ten general heads; while the full outfit of the individual will comprise some predicate under each of them. Moreover, each of the ten is a _Generalissimum_; having more or fewer species contained under it, but not being itself contained under any larger genus (_Ens_ not being a genus) So that Aristotle does not attempt to define or describe any one of the ten; his only way of explaining is by citing two or three illustrative examples of each. Some of the ten are even of wider extent than _Summa Genera_; thus, Quality cannot be considered as a true genus, comprehending generically all the cases falling under it. It is a _Summum Analogon_, reaching beyond the comprehension of a genus; an analogous or multivocal name, applied to many cases vaguely and remotely akin to each other.[29] And again the same particular predicate may be ranked both under Quality and under Relation; it need not belong exclusively to either one of them.[30] Moreover, Good, like _Ens_ or _Unum_, is common to all the Categories, but is differently represented in each.[31]

[Footnote 29: Aristot. Categor. p. 8, b. 26. [Greek: e)/sti de\ ê( poio/tês tô=n pleonachô=s legome/nôn], &c.

See the Scholia, p. 68, b. 69 a., Brandis. Ammonius gives the true explanation of this phrase, [Greek: tô=n pleonachô=s legome/nôn] (p. 69, b. 7). Alexander and Simplikius try to make out that it implies here a [Greek: sunô/nomon].]

[Footnote 30: Aristot. Categor. p. 11, a. 37. Compare the Scholion of Dexippus, p. 48, a. 28-37.]

[Footnote 31: Aristot. Ethic. Nikomach. i. p. 1096, a. 25; Ethic. Eudem. i. p. 1217, b. 25.]

Aristotle comments at considerable length upon the four first of the ten Categories. 1. Essence or Substance. 2. Quantity. 3. Quality. 4. Relation. As to the six last, he says little upon any of them; upon some, nothing at all.

His decuple partition of _Entia_ or _Enunciata_ is founded entirely upon a logical principle. He looks at them in their relation to Propositions; and his ten classes discriminate the relation which they bear to each other as parts or constituent elements of a proposition. Aristotle takes his departure, not from any results of scientific research, but from common speech; and from the dialectic, frequent in his time, which debated about matters of common life and talk, about received and current opinions.[32] We may presume him to have studied and compared a variety of current propositions, so as to discover what were the different relations in which Subjects and Predicates did stand or could stand to each other; also the various questions which might be put respecting any given subject, with the answers suitable to be returned.[33]

[Footnote 32: Waitz, ad Aristot. Categor. p. 284: "Id Categoriis non de ipsâ rerum natura et veritate exponit, sed res tales capit, quales apparent in communi vita homini philosophia non imbuto, unde fit, ut in Categoriis alia sit [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a] et in prima philosophia: illa enim partes habet, hæc vero non componitor ex partibus."

Compare Metaphys. Z. p. 1032, b. 2, and the [Greek: a)pori/a] in Z. p. 1029, a., p. 1037, a. 28.

The different meaning of [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a] in the Categoriæ and in the Metaphysica, is connected with various difficulties and seeming discrepancies in the Aristotelian theory of cognition, which I shall advert to in a future chapter. See Zeller, Philos. der Griech. ii. 2, pp. 234, 262; Heyder, Aristotelische und Hegelsche Dialektik, p. 141, seq.]

[Footnote 33: Thus he frequently supposes a question put, an answer given, and the proper mode of answering. Categor. p. 2, b. 8: [Greek: e)a\n ga\r a)podidô=| tis tê\n prô/tên ou)si/an ti/ e)sti, gnôrimô/teron kai\ oi)keio/teron a)podô/sei], &c.; also ibid. p. 2, b. 32; p. 3, a. 4, 20.]

Aristotle ranks as his first and fundamental Category Substance or Essence--[Greek: Ou)si/a]; the abstract substantive word corresponding to [Greek: To\ o)/n]; which last is the vast aggregate, not generically One but only analogically One, destined to be distributed among the ten Categories as _Summa Genera_. The First _Ens_ or First Essence--that which is _Ens_ in the fullest sense--is the _individual_ concrete person or thing in nature; Sokrates, Bukephalus, this man, that horse, that oak-tree, &c. This First _Ens_ is indispensable as Subject or _Substratum_ for all the other Categories, and even for predication generally. It is a Subject only; it never appears as a predicate of anything else. As _Hic Aliquis_ or _Hoc Aliquid_, it lies at the bottom (either expressed or implied) of all the work of predication. It is _Ens_ or Essence most of all, _par excellence_; and is so absolutely indispensable, that if all First _Entia_ were supposed to be removed, neither Second _Entia_ nor any of the other Categories could exist.[34]

[Footnote 34: Aristot. Categ. p. 2, a. 11, b. 6. [Greek: Ou)si/a ê( kuriô/tata kai\ prô/tôs kai\ ma/lista legome/nê--mê\ ou)sô=n ou)=n tô=n prô/tôn ou)siô=n, a)du/naton tô=n a)/llôn ti ei)=nai.]]

The Species is recognized by Aristotle as a Second _Ens_ or Essence, in which these First Essences reside; it is less (has less completely the character) of Essence than the First, to which it serves as Predicate. The Genus is (strictly speaking) a Third Essence,[35] in which both the First and the Second Essence are included; it is farther removed than the Species from the First Essence, and has therefore still less of the character of Essence. It stands as predicate both to the First and to the Second Essence. While the First Essence is more Essence than the Second, and the Second more than the Third, all the varieties of the First Essence are in this respect upon an equal footing with each other. This man, this horse, that tree, &c., are all Essence, equally and alike.[36] The First Essence admits of much variety, but does not admit graduation, or degrees of more or less.

[Footnote 35: Aristotle here, in the Categoriæ, ranks Genus and Species as being, both of them, [Greek: deu/terai ou)si/ai]. Yet since he admits Genus to be farther removed from [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a] than Species is, he ought rather to have called Genus a Third Essence. In the Metaphysica he recognizes a gradation or ordination of [Greek: ou)si/a] into First, Second, and Third, founded upon a totally different principle: the Concrete, which in the Categoriæ ranks as [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a], ranks as [Greek: tri/tê ou)si/a] in the Metaphysica. See Metaphys. [Greek: Ê]. p. 1043. a. 18-28.]

[Footnote 36: Aristot. Categ. p. 2, b. 20; p. 3, b. 35.

Nothing else except Genera and Species can be called Second Essences, or said to belong to the Category Essence; for they alone declare what the First Essence is. If you are asked respecting Sokrates, _What_ he _is_? and if you answer by stating the Species or the Genus to which he belongs--that he is a man or an animal--your answer will be appropriate to the question; and it will be more fully understood if you state the Species than if you state the Genus. But if you answer by stating what belongs to any of the other Categories (viz., that he is white, that he is running), your answer will be inappropriate, and foreign to the question; it will not declare _what_ Sokrates _is_.[37] Accordingly, none of these other Categories can be called Essences. All of them rank as predicates both of First and of Second Essence; just as Second Essences rank as predicates of First Essences.[38]

[Footnote 37: Ibid. p. 2, b. 29-37. [Greek: ei)ko/tôs de\ meta\ ta\s prô/tas ou)si/as mo/na tô=n a)/llôn ta\ ei)/dê kai\ ta\ ge/nê deu/terai ou)si/ai le/gontai; mo/na ga\r dêloi= tê\n prô/tên ou)si/an tô=n katêgoroume/nôn. to\n ga/r tina a)/nthrôpon e)a\n a)podidô=| tis ti/ e)sti, to\ me\n ei)=dos ê)\ to\ ge/nos a)podidou\s _oi)kei/ôs a)podô/sei_, kai\ gnôrimô/teron poiê/sei a)/nthrôpon ê)\ zô=|on a)podidou/s; tô=n de\ a)/llôn o(/, ti a)\n a)podidô=| tis, _a)llotri/ôs e)/stai a)podedôkô/s_, oi(=on leuko/n ê)\ tre/chei ê)\ o(tiou=n tô=n toiou/tôn a)podidou/s. Ô(/ste ei)ko/tôs tô=n a)/llôn tau=ta mo/na ou)si/ai le/gontai.]]

[Footnote 38: Ibid. p. 3, a. 2.]

Essence or Substance is not _in_ a Subject; neither First nor Second Essence. The First Essence is neither _in_ a Subject nor _predicated of_ a Subject; the Second Essences are not _in_ the First, but are _predicated of_ the First. Both the Second Essence, and the definition of the word describing it, may be _predicated of_ the First; that is, the predication is synonymous or univocal; whereas, of that which is _in_ a Subject, the name may often be predicated, but never the definition of the name. What is true of the Second Essence, is true also of the Differentia; that it is not _in_ a Subject, but that it may be _predicated_ univocally _of_ a Subject-- not only its name, but also the definition of its name.[39]

[Footnote 39: Ibid. p. 3, a. 7, 21, 34. [Greek: koino\n de\ kata\ pa/sês ou)si/as to\ mê\ e)n u(pokeime/nô| ei)=nai--ou)k i)/dion de\ tê=s tou=to ou)si/as, a)lla\ kai\ ê( diaphora\ tô=n mê\ e)n u(pokeime/nô| e)sti/n--u(pa/rchei de\ tai=s ou)si/ais kai\ tai\s diaphorai=s to\ pa/nta sunônu/môs a)p' au)tô=n le/gesthai.]]

All Essence or Substance seems to signify _Hoc Aliquid Unum Numero_. The First Essence really does so signify, but the Second Essence does not really so signify: it only seems to do so, because it is enunciated by a substantive name, like the First.[40] It signifies really _Tale Aliquid_, answering to the enquiry _Quale Quid_? for it is said not merely of one thing numerically, but of many things each numerically one. Nevertheless, a distinction must be drawn. The Second Essence does not (like the Accident, such as white) signify _Tale Aliquid_ simply and absolutely, or that and nothing more. It signifies _Talem Aliquam Essentiam_; it declares what the Essence is, or marks off the characteristic feature of various First Essences, each _Unum Numero_. The Genus marks off a greater number of such than the Species.[41]

[Footnote 40: Aristot. Categ. p. 3, b. 10-16: [Greek: Pa=sa de\ ou)si/a _dokei=_ to/de ti sêmai/nein. e)pi\ me\n ou)=n tô=n prô/tôn ou)siô=n a)namphisbê/têton kai\ a)lêthe/s e)stin o(/ti to/de ti sêmai/nei; a)/tomon ga\r kai\ e(\n a)rithmô=| to\ dêlou/meno/n e)stin; e)pi\ de\ tô=n deute/rôn ou)siô=n _phai/netai me\n o(moi/ôs tô=| schê/mati tê=s prosêgori/as to/de ti sêmai/nein_, o(/tan ei)/pê| a)/nthrôpon ê)\ zô=|on, _ou) mê\n a)lêthe/s ge_, a)lla\ ma=llon poio/n ti sêmai/nei.]]

[Footnote 41: Ibid. p. 3, b. 18-24.]

Again, Essences have no contraries.[42] But this is not peculiar to Essences, for _Quanta_ also have no contraries; there is nothing contrary to ten, or to that which is two cubits long. Nor is any one of the varieties of First Essence more or less Essence than any other variety. An individual man is as much Essence as an individual horse, neither more nor less. Nor is he at one time more a man than he was at another time; though he may become more or less white, more or less handsome.[43]

[Footnote 42: Ibid. b. 24-30.]

[Footnote 43: Ibid. b. 34, seq.]

But that which is most peculiar to Essence, is, that while remaining _Unum et Idem Numero_, it is capable by change in itself of receiving alternately contrary Accidents. This is true of no other Category. For example, this particular colour, being one and the same in number, will never be now black, and then white; this particular action, being one and the same in number, will not be at one time virtuous, at another time vicious. The like is true respecting all the other Categories. But one and the same man will be now white, hot, virtuous; at another time, he will be black, cold, vicious. An objector may say that this is true, not merely of Essence, but also of Discourse and of Opinion; each of which (he will urge) remains _Unum Numero_, but is nevertheless recipient of contrary attributes; for the proposition or assertion, Sokrates is sitting, may now be true and may presently become false. But this case is different, because there is no change in the proposition itself, but in the person or thing to which the proposition refers; while one and the same man, by new affections in himself, is now healthy, then sick; now hot, then cold.[44]

[Footnote 44: Aristot. Categ. p. 4, a. 10-b. 20.]

Here Aristotle concludes his first Category or Predicament--Essence or Substance. He proceeds to the other nine, and ranks Quantity first among them.[45] _Quantum_ is either Continual or Discrete; it consists either of parts having position in reference to each other, or of parts not having position in reference to each other. Discrete _Quanta_ are Number and Speech; Continual _Quanta_ are Line, Surface, Body, and besides these, Time and Place. The parts of Number have no position in reference to each other; the parts of Line, Surface, Body, have position in reference to each other. These are called _Quanta_, primarily; other things are called _Quanta_ in a secondary way, [Greek: kata\ sumbebêko/s].[46] Thus we say _much white_, when the surface of white is large; we say, _the action is long_, because much time and movement have been consumed in it. If we are asked, _how long the action_ is? we must answer by specifying its length in time--a year or a month.

[Footnote 45: Ibid. b. 21, seq.]

[Footnote 46: Ibid. p. 5, a. 38, seq.]

To _Quantum_ (as to Essence or Substance) there exists no contrary.[47] There is nothing contrary to a length of three cubits or an area of four square feet. Great, little, long, short, are more properly terms of Relation than terms of Quantity; thus belonging to another Category. Nor is _Quantum_ ever more or less _Quantum_; it does not admit of degree. The _Quantum_ a yard is neither more nor less _Quantum_ than that called a foot. That which is peculiar to _Quanta_ is to be equal or unequal:[48] the relations of equality and inequality are not properly affirmed of anything else except of _Quanta_.

[Footnote 47: Ibid. b. 11, seq.]

[Footnote 48: Ibid. p. 6, a. 26-35.]

From the Category of Quantity, Aristotle proceeds next to that of Relation;[49] which he discusses in immediate sequence after Quantity, and before Quality, probably because in the course of his exposition about Quantity, he had been obliged to intimate how closely Quantity was implicated with Relation, and how essential it was that the distinction between the two should be made clear.