Chapter XLIV: Appendix: I (5)

We have already stated that Ens is a [Greek: pollachô=s lego/menon]--distinguished according to the ten figures or genera called Categories. The first is [Greek: ti/ e)stin], or [Greek: ou)si/a] (_sensu dignissimo_)--Essentia, Substantia (p. 1028, a. 15). The remaining Categories are all appendages of Essentia, presupposing it, and inseparable from it; whereas Essentia is separable from all of them, and stands first in reason, in cognition, and in time. All the other Categories are called Entia only because they are quantities, qualities, affections, &c., of this Essentia Prima. A man may even doubt whether they are Entia or Non-Entia, since none of them is either _per se_ or separable. We ought hardly to say that a quality or an affection, enunciated abstractedly, is Ens at all--such as _currere_, _sedere_, _sanitas_: we ought more properly to say that _currens equus_, _sedens homo_, _sanus miles_, are Entia, enunciating along with the quality the definite Essence or Individual Substance to which it belongs (a. 24). The quality then becomes Ens, because the subject to which it belongs is an individual Ens (a. 27). Essentia Prima is first in reason or rational explanation ([Greek: lo/gô|], a. 34), because in the rational explanation of each of the rest that of Essentia is implicated. It is first also in cognition, because we believe ourselves to know any thing fully, when we are able to answer _Quid est_? and say that it is _homo_ or _ignis_; not simply when we are able to answer _Quale_ or _Quantum est_? So that in answering the great and often-considered question, _Quid est Ens_? we shall first understand it as meaning Essentia (_hoc sensu dignissimo_), and shall try to solve it so (b. 3, [Greek: peri\ tou= _ou(/tôs_ o)/ntos]).

Essentia (understood in this sense) appears to belong in the most manifest manner to bodies: we predicate it of animals, plants, the parts thereof, the natural bodies such as fire, water, and such like, as well as the parts and aggregates thereof, such as the heaven and its parts, the stars, moon, and sun (p. 1028, b. 7-13). But are these the only Essences, or are there others besides? Or again, is it an error to call _these_ Essences, and are all Essences really something different from these? This is a point to be examined. Some think that the limits of bodies (surface, line, point, monad) are Essences even more than the body and the solid: others admit no Essences at all beyond or apart from Percipienda; others again recognize other Essences distinct from and more eternal than the Percipienda; for example, Plato, who ranks Ideas or Forms, and the Mathematica, as two distinct Essences, while he places the Percipienda only third in the scale of Essence. Speusippus even enumerates a still greater number of Essences, beginning with the One, and proceeding to Numbers, Magnitudes, Soul, &c., with a distinct [Greek: a)rchê/] or principle for each (b. 21). Some others hold that Forms and Numbers have the same nature, and that there are other things coming near to these, such as lines and surfaces, in a descending scale to the Heaven and the Percipienda (b. 24). We must thus investigate which of these doctrines are true or false, whether there are any Essences beyond the Percipienda; and, if so, how they exist: whether there is any separable essence apart from Percipienda, and, if so, how and why; or whether there is nothing of the kind. But first we must give a vague outline what Essence is generally ([Greek: u(potupôsame/nois], b. 31).

There are four principal varieties of meaning in this Essentia, [Greek: kuri/ôs] or _sensu dignissimo_: (1) [Greek: to\ ti/ ê)=n ei)=nai], (2) [Greek: to\ katho/lou], (3) [Greek: to\ ge/nos], (4) [Greek: to\ u(pokei/menon].

We shall first speak about the fourth--Substratum--which is the subject of all predicates, but never itself the predicate of any subject. That which appears most of all to be Essentia is, [Greek: to\ u(pokei/menon prô=ton]. This name applies, in one point of view, to Matter; in another, to Form; in a third, to the total result of the two implicated together (p. 1029, a. 1): _e.g._, the brass, the figure, and the complete statue of figured brass. If, therefore, the Form be _prius_, and more Ens, as compared with the Matter, it will be also _prius_ and more Ens as compared with the complete result. We get thus far in the adumbration of Essentia--that it is the subject of all predicates, but never itself a predicate.

But this is not sufficient to define it: there still remains obscurity. It would seem that Matter is Essentia; and that, if it be not so, nothing else is discernible to be so; for, if every thing else be subtracted, nothing (save Matter) remains. All things else are either affections, or agencies, or powers, of bodies; and, while length, breadth, depth, &c., are quantities belonging to Essence, Quantity is not Essence, but something belonging to Essence as First Subject. Take away length, breadth, depth, and there will remain only that something which these three circumscribe; in other words, Matter--that which, in itself and in its own nature, is neither Quantity, nor Quality, but of which, Quantity, Quality, and the other Categories, are predicated. All these Categories are predicated of Essence, and Essence of Matter; so that Matter is the last remaining _per se_ (p. 1029, a. 12-24). Take away Matter, and there remain neither affirmative nor negative predicates; for these negative predicates are just as much concomitants or accidents as the others (a. 25).

Upon this reasoning, it seems that Matter is the true Essence. Yet, on the other hand, this will be seen to be impossible. For the principal characteristic of Essence is to be separable and Hoc Aliquid. So that either Form, or the Compound of Form and Matter together, must be the true Essence. But this last, the Compound, may be dismissed as evidently unsuitable for the enquiry, not less than Matter separately; for it is manifestly posterior to either of the two components (p. 1029, a. 30). We must therefore investigate the Form, though it is full of difficulty (a. 33).

We shall begin the investigation from some of the Percipienda, which are acknowledged as Essence; for it is useful to go across from this starting-point to what is more cognizable ([Greek: pro\ e)/rgou ga\r to\ metabai/nein ei)s to\ gnôrimô/teron]--p. 1029, b. 3. These words ought properly to come immediately after [Greek: zêtête/on prô=ton]--p. 1028, a. 35, and the intervening words now standing in the text, [Greek: e)pei\ d' e)n a)rchê=|--peri\ au)tou=], ought to be transferred to a more proper place some lines lower down, immediately before the words, [Greek: kai\ prô=ton ei)/pômen]--p. 1029, b. 12. Bonitz has made this very just correction in his Observatt. pp. 129-130, referred to in his Notes on the Metaphysica.). Every man learns in this way--by proceeding from what is less cognizable by nature to what is more cognizable by nature. And the business ([Greek: e)/rgon]) of learning consists in making what is most cognizable to nature, most cognizable to ourselves also; just as, in practical matters, proceeding from what is good for each, to make what is good by nature good also for each man's self. For it will often happen that things first and most cognizable to each man's self, are only faintly cognizable, and have little or nothing of Ens (b. 9). Yet still, we must try to become cognizant of things fully knowable, by beginning with things poorly knowable, but knowable to us (b. 12).

Taking up these Percipienda, for the purpose of searching for Essentia in them, we shall first advert to [Greek: ti/ ê)=n ei)=nai], which we discriminated as one of the characteristics of Essentia, saying something about the rational explanation or definition of it (p. 1029, a. 12). The [Greek: t.ê.e.] of each subject is what is affirmed of it _per se_ ([Greek: e)/sti to\ t.ê.e. e(ka/stô| o(\ le/getai kath' au(to/]--a. 13). Your essence is not to be musical; you are not musical by yourself: your essence is, what you are _by yourself_. Nor does it even include all that you are by yourself. Surface is not included in the essence of white; for the essence of surface is not the same thing as the essence of white. Moreover white surface, the compound of both, is not the essence of white; because white itself is included in the definition of white--which cannot be tolerated. The definition, which explains [Greek: t.ê.e.], must not include the very word of which you intend to declare the [Greek: t.ê.e.] If you intend to declare the [Greek: t.ê.e.] of white surface by the words smooth surface, this does not declare it all: you only declare that white is identical in meaning with smooth (b. 22).

Now, since there are compounds in every one of the Categories, we must enquire whether there is a [Greek: t.ê.e.] belonging to each of these. Is there, for example, a [Greek: t.ê.e.] for white man? Let the meaning of these two words be included in the single word garment. Is there a [Greek: t.ê.e.] for garment? What is it to be a garment? You cannot answer; for neither is this an enunciation _per se_ (p. 1029, b. 29). Are we to say, indeed, that there are two distinct sorts of enunciation _per se_: one including an addition ([Greek: e)k prosthe/seôs]), the other, not? You may define by intimating something to which the matter defined belongs; _e.g._, in defining white you may give the definition of white man. Or you may define by intimating something which is not essential but accessory to the matter defined; _e.g._, garment signifying white man, you may define garment as white. Whereas the truth is, that, though a white man is white, yet to be white is accessory and not essential to him (p. 1030, a. 1).

But can we in any way affirm that there is any [Greek: t.ê.e.] to garment (taken in the above sense)? Or ought we to say that there is none (p. 1030, a. 2; Bonitz. Obss. p. 120)? For the [Greek: t.ê.e.] is of the nature of [Greek: to/de ti] ([Greek: o(/per ga\r to/de ti e)/sti to\ t.ê.e.]--a. 3), or Hoc Aliquid, _i.e._, a particular concrete; but, when one thing is affirmed of another, as when we say white man, this is not of the nature of [Greek: to/de ti], if [Greek: to/de ti] belongs to Essences alone (a. 5). Thus it appears that [Greek: to/de ti] belongs to all those matters of which the rational explanation can be given by Definition. For to give the equivalent of a name in many other words is not always to give a definition: if this were so, a paraphrase of any length, even the Iliad, might be called a definition. There can be no definition except of a primary something; which is affirmed, without being affirmed as something about another (a. 10). There will be no [Greek: t.ê.e.], therefore, except for species of a genus; for in these alone what is affirmed is not an affection or an accessory or by way of participation. Respecting every thing besides, there will be no [Greek: t.ê.e.] or definition, but there may be a rational explanation ([Greek: lo/gos]) of what the name signifies, or a more precise explanation substituted in place of a simpler (a. 16).

Yet have we not gone too far in restricting the applicability of [Greek: t.ê.e.] and Definition? and ought we not rather to say, that both the one and the other are used in many different senses (p. 1030, a. 18)? For the _Quid est_ ([Greek: to\ ti/ e)stin]) signifies in one way Essence and Hoc Aliquid, and in different ways all the other Categories each respectively. To all of them _Est_ belongs, though not in like manner, but primarily to one and consequentially to the rest; so also _Quid est_ belongs simply and directly to Essence, but in a certain way to the others (a. 21). Respecting Quale, Quantum, and the rest, we may enquire _Quid Est_? so that Quale also comes under the _Quid est_, though not absolutely or directly ([Greek: ou)ch a(plô=s], a. 25), but analogously to Non-Ens; for some assert in words that _Est_ belongs to Non-Ens also though not absolutely, viz., Non Ens _est_ Non-Ens--(a. 26).

Now we ought to be careful how we express ourselves about any particular matter, but we ought not to be less careful to determine how the matter itself really stands (p. 1030, a. 27: [Greek: dei= me\n ou)=n skopei=n kai\ to\ pô=s dei= le/gein peri\ e(/kaston, ou) mê\n ma=llo/n ge ê)\ to\ pô=s e)/chei.] This contrast of [Greek: pô=s dei= le/gein] with [Greek: pô=s e)/chei] appears to refer to what had been said two lines before: [Greek: _logikô=s_ phasi/ tines ei)=nai to\ mê\ o)/n]--verbal propositions distinguished from real.). The phraseology used just before is clear, and we must therefore recognize that [Greek: t.ê.e.], as well as [Greek: ti/ e)sti], belongs absolutely and primarily to Essentia, but in a secondary way to the other Categories; that is not absolutely, but [Greek: poiô=| t.ê.e., po/sô| t.ê.e.], &c. (a. 31). For we must either declare the Categories to be simply _æquivoca_, or we must recognize this addition and subtraction of the separate title of each, like the non-cognizable cognizable ([Greek: ô(/sper kai\ to\ mê\ e)pistêto\n e)pistêto/n]--a. 33. I do not understand these words, nor does the Scholiast or Bonitz explain them satisfactorily.). But the truth is, that they are neither _æquivoca_ nor _univoca_, but in an intermediate grade of relation--not [Greek: kath' e(/n], but [Greek: pro\s e(/n] (b. 3.). People may express this in what phrases they like; but the truth is, that there is both [Greek: t.ê.e.] and Definition, directly and primarily, of Essence; and of the other Categories also, but not directly and primarily. Of white man, you may give a rational explanation and a definition; but it will apply in a different manner to white and to the essence of man (b. 12).

There is a farther difficulty to be noticed. How are you to define any matter not simple but essentially compound, where two or more elements coalesce into an indivisible whole, like hollow-nosedness out of nose and hollowness. Here we have hollow-nosedness and hollowness belonging to the nose _per se_, not as an affection or accessory; not as white belongs to Kallias or man, but as male belongs to animal, or equal to quantity, _i.e._, _per se_ (p. 1030, b. 20). The subject is implicated with the predicate in one name, and you cannot enunciate the one apart from the other. Such predicates belong to their subject _per se_, but in a different sense (see Bonitz's note). You cannot properly define them, in the sense given above (b. 27). If definitions of such are to be admitted, it must be in a different sense: Definition and [Greek: t.ê.e.] being recognized both of them as [Greek: pollachô=s lego/mena]. Definition therefore is the mode of explanation which declares the [Greek: t.ê.e.], and belongs to Essences, either exclusively, or at least primarily, directly, and chiefly (p. 1031, a. 7-14).

We have now to enquire--Whether each particular thing, and its [Greek: t.ê.e.], are the same, or different (p. 1031, a. 15). This will assist us in the investigation of Essence; for apparently each thing is not different from its own Essence, and the [Greek: t.ê.e.] is said to be the Essence of each thing.

In regard to subjects enunciated _per accidens_, the above two would seem to be distinct. White man is different from the being a white man. If these two were the same, the being a man would be the same as the being a white man; for those who hold this opinion affirm that man, and white man, are the same; and, if this be so, of course the being a man must also be the same as the being a white man. Yet this last inference is not necessary; for _same_ is used in a different sense, when you say, Man and white man are the same, and when you say, The being a man and the being a white man are the same. But perhaps you may urge that the two predicates may become the same _per accidens_ (_i.e._, by being truly predicated of the same subject); and that, because you say truly, Sokrates is white--Sokrates is musical, therefore you may also say truly, The being white is the same as the being musical. But this will be denied ([Greek: dokei= d' ou)/]--p. 1031, a. 28).

In regard to subjects enunciated _per se_, the case is otherwise: here each thing is the same with its [Greek: t.ê.e.] Suppose, _e.g._, there exist any Essentiæ (such as Plato and others make the Ideas) prior to all others; in that case, if the [Greek: au)toagatho/n] were distinct from [Greek: to\ a)gathô=| ei)=nai], and the [Greek: au)tozô=|on] distinct from [Greek: to\ zô/|ô| ei)=nai], there must be other Essences and Ideas anterior to the Platonic Ideas. If we believe [Greek: t.ê.e.] to be Essentia, it must be an Essentia anterior and superior in dignity to these Ideas of Plato. Moreover, if the Essentiæ or Ideas, and the [Greek: t.ê.e.], be disjoined ([Greek: a)polelume/nai]--p. 1031, b. 3), the first will be uncognizable, and the last will be non-existent ([Greek: ta\ d' ou)k e)/stai]--b. 4). For to have cognition of a thing, is, to know its [Greek: t.ê.e.] This will be alike true of all [Greek: t.ê.e.]; all of them are alike existent or alike non-existent (b. 9). If [Greek: to\ o)/nti ei)=nai] be not identical with [Greek: to\ o)/n], neither is [Greek: to\ a)gathô=| ei)=nai] identical with [Greek: to\ a)gatho/n], &c. But that of which [Greek: to\ a)gathô=| ei)=nai] is not truly predicable, is not [Greek: a)gatho/n] (b. 11).

Hence we see that of necessity [Greek: to\ a)gatho/n] is one and the same with [Greek: to\ a)gathô=| ei)=nai]; likewise [Greek: to\ kalo/n], with [Greek: to\ kalô=| ei)=nai]; and so in all cases where the term enunciates a subject primarily and _per se_, not a predicate of some other and distinct subject (p. 1031, b. 13: [Greek: o(/sa mê\ kat' a)/llo le/gêtai, a)lla\ kath' au(ta\ kai\ prô=ta]). This last is the characteristic and sufficient mark, even if the Platonic Ideas be not admitted; and even more evidently so, if they be admitted (b. 14). It is at the same time clear that, if the Ideas be what Plato declares them to be, the individual perceivable subjects here cannot be Essences; for the Ideas are necessarily Essences, but not as predicable of a subject. If they were Essences, in this last sense, they would be Essences _per participationem_; which is inconsistent with what is said about them by Plato ([Greek: e)/sontai ga\r kata\ me/thexin]--b. 18).

These reasonings show that each separate thing, enunciated _per se_ and not _per accidens_, is the same with its [Greek: t.ê.e.]; that to know each thing, is, to know its [Greek: t.ê.e.]; that, if you proceed to expose or lay them out, both are one and the same ([Greek: ô(/ste kata\ tê\n e)/kthesin a)na/gkê e(/n ti ei)=nai a)/mphô]--p. 1031, b. 21; with Bonitz's explanation of [Greek: e)/kthesis] in his Note).

But that which is enunciated _per accidens_ (_e.g._, _album_, _musicum_) cannot be truly affirmed to be one and the same with its [Greek: t.ê.e.], because it has a double signification: it signifies both the accident and the subject to which such accident belongs; so that in a certain aspect it is identical with its [Greek: t.ê.e.], and in another aspect it is not identical therewith (p. 1031, b. 26). The being a man, and the being a white man, are not the same; but the subject for affection is the same in both (b. 28: [Greek: ou) tau)to\, pa/thei de\ tau)to/]--obscure). The absurdity of supposing, that the [Greek: t.ê.e.] of a thing is different from the thing itself, would appear plainly, if we gave a distinct name to the [Greek: t.ê.e.] For there must be another [Greek: t.ê.e.] above this, being the [Greek: t.ê.e.] of the first [Greek: t.ê.e.]; and it would be necessary to provide a new name for the second [Greek: t.ê.e.]; and so forward, in an ascending march _ad infinitum_. What hinders us from admitting some things at once, as identical with their [Greek: t.ê.e.], if the [Greek: t.ê.e.] be Essentia? (b. 31). We see from the preceding reasoning that not only the thing itself is the same with its [Greek: t.ê.e.], but that the rational explanation ([Greek: lo/gos]) of both is the same; for One, and the being One, are one and the same not _per accidens_, but _per se_ (p. 1032, a. 2). If they were different, you would have to ascend to a higher [Greek: t.ê.e.] of the being One; and above this, to a higher still, without end (a. 4).

It is therefore clear that, in matters enunciated _per se_ and primarily, each individual thing is one and the same with its [Greek: t.ê.e.] The refutations brought by the Sophists against this doctrine, and the puzzles which they start, _e.g._, Whether Sokrates and the being Sokrates are the same,--may be cleared up by the explanations just offered (p. 1032, a. 8). It makes no difference what particular questions the objector asks: one is as easy to solve as another (a. 10).

Of things generated, some come by Nature, some by Art, some Spontaneously. All generated things are generated out of something, by something, and into or according to something (p. 1032, a. 12). The word _something_ applies to each and all the Categories. Natural generation belongs to all the things whose generation comes from Nature ([Greek: e)k phu/seôs]); having [Greek: to\ e)x ou(=]--what we call Matter, [Greek: to\ u(ph' ou(=]--one of the things existing by nature ([Greek: tô=n phu/sei ti o)/ntôn]--a. 17), and [Greek: to\ ti/], such as a man, a plant, or the like, which we call Essences in the fullest sense ([Greek: ma/lista ou)si/as]). All things generated either by Nature or Art have Matter: it is possible that each of them may be, or may not be; and this is what we call Matter in each (a. 20). As an universal truth ([Greek: katho/lou]), Nature includes (1) That _out of which_, or Matter; (2) That _according to which_ ([Greek: kath' o(/]), every thing which is generated having a definite nature or Form, such as plant or animal; That _by which_, or nature characterized according to the Form, being the same Form as the thing generated but in another individual; for a man begets a man (a. 24).

The other generations are called Constructions ([Greek: poiê/seis]), which are either from Art, or from Power, or from Intelligence. It is with these as with natural generations: some of them occur both by spontaneity and by chance ([Greek: kai\ a)po\ tau)toma/tou kai\ a)po\ tu/chês]--p. 1032, a. 29; the principle of these last is apparently [Greek: _du/namis_], the second of the three _principia_ announced just before (?)); both in the one and in the other, some products arise without seed as well as with seed, which we shall presently advert to.

The generations from Art are those of which the Form is in the mind. By Form I mean the [Greek: t.ê.e.] of each thing and its First Essence ([Greek: tê\n prô/tên ou)si/an], p. 1032, b. 1). For, in a certain way, the Form even of contraries is the same; since the essence of privation is the opposite essence: for example, health is the essence of disease; for disease is declared or described as absence of health, and health is the rational notion existing in the mind and in science. Now a healthy subject is generated by such an antecedent train of thought as follows ([Greek: gi/gnetai dê\ to\ u(gie\s noê/santos ou(/tôs]--b. 6):--Since health is so and so, there is necessity, if the subject is to attain health, that such and such things should occur, _e.g._, an even temperature of the body, for which latter purpose heat must be produced; and so on farther, until the thought rests upon something which is in the physician's power to construct. The motion proceeding from this last thought is called Construction (b. 10), tending as it does towards health. So that, in a certain point of view, health may be said to be generated out of health, and a house out of a house; for the medical art is the form of health and the building art the form of the house: I mean the [Greek: t.ê.e.], or the Essence without Matter, thereof (b. 14). Of the generations and motions here enumerated, one is called Rational Apprehension, viz., that one which takes its departure from the Principle and the Form; the other, Construction, viz., that which takes its departure from the conclusion of the process of rational apprehension ([Greek: a)po\ tou= teleutai/ou tê=s noê/seôs]--b. 17). The like may be said about each of the intermediate steps: I mean, if the patient is to be restored to health, he must be brought to an even temperature. But the being brought to an even temperature, what is it? It is so and so; it will be a consequence of his being warmed. And this last again--what is it? So and so; which already exists potentially, since it depends upon the physician to produce it, the means being at his command ([Greek: tou=to d' ê)/dê e)p' au)tô=|]--b. 21).

We see thus that the Constructive Agency ([Greek: to\ poiou=n]) and the point from which the motion towards producing health takes its origin, is, when the process is one of Art, the Form present in the mind; and, when the process is one of Spontaneity, it proceeds from that which would be the first proceeding of the artist, if Art had been concerned. In the medical art, _e.g._, the artist begins by imparting warmth. He does this by rubbing. But this warmth might perhaps arise in the body without any such rubbing or interference by the artist. The warmth is the prime agent, in the case of spontaneous production. The warmth is either a part of health, or a condition to the existence of health, as bricks are to that of a house (p. 1032, b. 30).

Nothing can be generated, if nothing pre-existed--as has been already said before. Some part of what is generated must exist before: Matter pre-exists, as in-dwelling and not generated ([Greek: ê( ga\r u(/lê me/ros; e)nupa/rchei ga\r kai\ gi/gnetai au(/tê]--p. 1033, a. 1. I do not understand these last words: it ought surely to be--[Greek: e)nupa/rchei ga\r kai\ _ou)_ gi/gnetai au(/tê]. Bonitz's explanation suits these last words better than it suits the words in the actual text.).

But something of the Form or rational explanation ([Greek: tô=n e)n tô=| lo/gô|]) must also pre-exist. In regard to a brazen circle, if we are asked, _Quid est_? we answer in two ways: We say of the Matter--It is brass; We say of the Form--It is such and such a figure. And this is the genus in which it is first placed (p. 1033, a. 4).

The brazen circle has Matter in its rational explanation. But that which is generated, is called not by the name of the Matter out of which it is generated, but by a derivative name formed therefrom; not [Greek: e)kei=no], but [Greek: e)kei/ninon]. A statue is called not [Greek: li/thos], but [Greek: li/thinos]. But, when a man is made healthy, he is not said to be the Matter out of which the health is generated; because that which we call the Matter is generated out of Privation along with the subject. Thus, both the man becomes healthy, and the patient becomes healthy; but the generation is more properly said to come out of Privation: we say, _Sanus ex ægroto generatur_, rather than, _Sanus ex homine generatur_ (p. 1033, a. 12). In cases where the Privation is unmarked and unnamed, as, in the case of brass, privation of the spherical, or any other, figure, and, in the case of a house, the privation of bricks or wood, the work is said to be generated out of them like a healthy man out of a sick man (a. 14). Nevertheless the work is not called by the same name as the material out of which it is made, but by a paronym thereof; not [Greek: xu/lon] but [Greek: xu/linon] (a. 18). In strict propriety, indeed, we can hardly say that the statue is made out of brass, nor the house out of wood; for the _materia ex quâ_ ought to be something which undergoes change, not something which remains unchanged (a. 21).

It was remarked that in Generation there are three things or aspects to be distinguished--

1. [Greek: To\ u(ph' ou(=, o(/then ê( a)rchê\ tê=s gene/seôs].

2. [Greek: To\ e)x ou(=]--rather [Greek: u(/lê] than [Greek: ste/rêsis].

3. [Greek: Ti/ gi/gnetai].

Having already touched upon the two first, I now proceed to the third. What is it that is generated? Neither the Matter, nor the Form, but the embodiment or combination of the two. An artisan does not construct either the brass or the sphere, but the brazen sphere. If he be said to construct the sphere, it is only by accident ([Greek: kata\ sumbebêko/s]), since the sphere in this particular case happens to be of brass. Out of the entire subject-matter, he constructs a distinct individual Something (p. 1033, a. 31). To make the brass round, is not to make the round, or to make the sphere, but to make a something different: that is the Form (of sphericity) embodied in another thing (a. 32). For, if the artisan made the round or the sphere, he must make them out of something different, pre-existing as a subject: _e.g._, he makes a brazen sphere, and in this sense--that he makes out of that Matter, which is brass, this different something, which is a sphere. If he made the sphere itself--the Form of sphere--he must make it out of some pre-existent subject; and you would thus carry back _ad infinitum_ the different acts of generation and different pre-existent subjects (b. 4).

It is, therefore, clear that [Greek: to\ ei)=dos], or by whatever name the shape of the percipiend is to be called, is not generated, nor is generation thereof possible; nor is there any [Greek: t.ê.e.] thereof; that is, of the Form abstractedly: for it is this very [Greek: t.ê.e.] which is generated or becomes embodied in something else, either by nature, or by art, or by spontaneous power (p. 1033, b. 8). The artisan makes a brazen sphere to exist, for he makes it out of brass (Matter), and the sphere (Form): he makes or embodies the Form into this Matter, and that is a brazen sphere (b. 11). If there be any generation of the sphere _per se_ ([Greek: tou= sphaira=| ei)=nai]), it must be Something out of Something; for the Generatum must always be resolvable into a certain Matter and a certain Form. Let the brazen sphere be a figure in which all points of the circumference are equidistant from the centre; here are three things to be considered: (1) That in which what is constructed resides; (2) That which does so reside; (3) The entire Something generated or constructed--the brazen sphere. We see thus plainly that what is called the Form or Essence itself is not generated, but the combination called _according to the Form_ is generated; moreover that in every Generatum there is Matter, so that the Generatum is in each case this or that (b. 19).

Can it be true, then, that there exists any sphere or house beyond those which we see or touch (_i.e._, any Form or Idea of a sphere, such as Plato advocates)? If there existed any such, it could never have become or been generated into Hoc Aliquid. It signifies only _tale_. It is neither This nor That nor any thing defined: but it (or rather the Constructive Agency) makes or generates _ex hoc tale_; and when this last has been generated, it is Tale Hoc (p. 1033, b. 22), and the entire compound is Kallias, or Sokrates, or _this_ brazen sphere, while man, animal, &c., are analogous to brazen sphere generally. Even if there exist Platonic Forms by themselves, they could be of no use towards generation or the production of Essences. Frequently it is obvious that the Generans is like the Generatum, only a different individual. There is no occasion to assume the Platonic Form as an Exemplar; for the generating individual is quite sufficient of itself to be the cause of the Form in a new mass of Matter. The entire result is the given Form in these particular bones and flesh--called Kallias or Sokrates: each is different so far as Matter, but the same in the Form; for the Form is indivisible (p. 1034, a. 7).

But how does it happen that there are some things which are generated sometimes by art, sometimes spontaneously (_e.g._, health), while in other things (_e.g._, a house) spontaneous production never takes place? The reason is, that, in the first class of cases, the Matter which governs the work of generation by the artist, and in which itself a part of the finished product resides, is of a nature to be moved or modified by itself, while, in the second, this is not the fact; and to be moved, besides, in a certain manner and direction; for there are many things which are movable by themselves, but not in such manner and direction as the case which we are supposing requires. For example, stones are incapable of being moved in certain directions except by some other force, but they are capable of being moved by themselves in another direction; the like with fire. It is upon this that the distinction turns between some results which cannot be realized without an artist, and others which may perhaps be so realized (a. 17).

It is plain from what has been said that, in a certain sense, everything is generated from something of the same name, as natural objects are (_e.g._, a man); or from something in part bearing the same name (as a house out of the ideal form of a house), or from something which possesses that which in part bears the same name; for the first cause of the generation is itself part of the thing generated. The heat in the motion generates heat in the body; and this is either health, or a part of health, or the antecedent of one or other of these; hence it is said to produce or generate health, because it produces that of which health is concomitant and consequent (p. 1034, a. 30; see Bonitz's correction in his Note). Essence is in these cases the beginning or principle of all generations, just as in Demonstration it is the beginning or principle of all syllogisms (a. 33). In the combinations and growths of Nature, the case is similar. The seed constructs, as Art constructs its products; for the seed has in it potentially the Form, and that from which comes the seed is, in a certain manner, of the same name with the product (b. 1). For we must not expect to find _all_ generations analogous to that of man from man--woman also is generated from man, moreover, mule is not generated from mule--though this is the usual case, when there is no natural bodily defect (b. 3). Spontaneous generation occurs in the department of Nature, as in that of Art, wherever the Matter can be moved by itself in the same manner as the seed moves it: wherever the Matter cannot be so moved by itself, there can be no generation except the natural, from similar predecessors (b. 7, [Greek: e)x au)tô=n]--compare Bonitz's note: "non ex ipsis, sed [Greek: e)x au)tô=n tô=n poiou/ntôn]").

This doctrine--That the Form is not generated, does not belong to Essence alone, but also to all the other Categories alike--Quality, Quantity, and the rest (p. 1034, b. 9). It is not the Form Quality _per se_ which is generated, but _tale lignum_, _talis homo_: nor the Form Quantity _per se_, but _tantum lignum_ or _animal_ (b. 15). But, in regard to Essence, there is thus much peculiar and distinctive as compared with the other Categories: in the generation of Essence, there must pre-exist as generator another _actual_ and _complete_ Essence; in the generation of Quality or Quantity, you need nothing pre-existing beyond a _potential_ Quality or a _potential_ Quantity (b. 16).

A difficult question arises in this way: Every definition is a rational explanation consisting of parts; and, as the parts of the explanation are to the whole explanation, so are the parts of the thing explained to the whole thing explained. Now is it necessary or not, that the rational explanation of the parts shall be embodied in the rational explanation of the whole (p. 1034, b. 22)? In some cases it appears to be so; in others, not. The rational explanation of a circle does not include that of its segments; but the rational explanation of a syllable does include that of its component letters. Moreover, if the parts are prior to the whole, and if the acute angle be a part of the right angle, and the finger a part of the man, the acute angle must be prior to the right angle, and the finger to the man. Yet the contrary seems to be the truth: the right angle seems prior, also the man; for the rational explanation of acute angle is given from right angle, that of finger from man: in respect to existing without the other, right angle and man seem _priora_. In fact the word _part_ is equivocal, and it is only one of its meanings to call it--that which quantitatively measures another (b. 33). But let us dismiss this consideration, and let us enquire of what it is that Essence consists, as parts (b. 34). If these are (1) Matter, (2) Form, (3) The Compound of the two, and if each of these three be Essence, Matter must be considered, in a certain way, as a part of something, yet in a certain way as not so; in this latter point of view, nothing being a part except those elements out of which the rational explanation of the Form is framed (p. 1035, a. 2). Thus, flesh is not a part of flatness, being the matter upon which flatness is generated or superinduced, but flesh is a part of flat-nosedness; the brass is a part of the entire statue, but not a part of the statue when enunciated as Form, or of the ideal statue. You may discriminate and reason separately upon the statue considered as Form (apart from the complete statue); but you cannot so discriminate the material part _per se_, or the statue considered as Matter only (a. 7). Hence the rational explanation of the circle does not contain that of the segments of the circle; but the rational explanation of the syllable does contain that of the component letters. The letters are parts of the Form, and not simply the Matter upon which the Form is superinduced; but the segments are parts in the sense of being the Matter upon which the Form of the circle is superinduced (a. 12): they are, however, nearer to the Form than the brass, when the Form of a circle or roundness is generated in brass (a. 13). In a certain way, indeed, it cannot be said that _all_ the letters are contained in the rational explanation of the syllables; _e.g._, the letters inscribed in wax are not so contained, nor the sounds of those letters vibrating in the air; both these are a part of the syllable, in the sense of being the perceivable matter thereof (a. 17: [Greek: ô(s u(/lê ai)sthêtê/]). If a man be destroyed by being reduced to bones, ligaments, and flesh, you cannot for that reason say, that the man is composed of these as of parts of his Essence, but as parts of his Matter: they are parts of the entire man, but not of the Form, nor of what is contained in the rational explanation; accordingly they do not figure in the discussions which turn upon rational explanation, but only when the discussions turn upon the entire or concrete subject (a. 23). Hence, in some cases, things are destroyed into the same _principia_ out of which they are formed; in other cases, not. To the first class, belong all things which are taken in conjunction with Matter, such as the flat-nosed or, the brazen circle; to the second class, those which are taken disjoined from Matter, with Form only. Objects of the first class, (_i.e._, the concretes) have thus both _principia_ and parts subordinate; but neither the one nor the other belong to the Form alone (a. 31). The plaster-statue passes when destroyed into plaster, the brazen circle into brass, Kallias into flesh and bones; and even the circle, when understood in a certain sense, into its segments, for the term circle is used equivocally, sometimes to designate the Form of a circle, sometimes to designate this or that particular circle--particular circles having no name peculiar to themselves (b. 3).

That which has been already said is the truth; yet let us try to recapitulate it in a still clearer manner (p. 1035, b. 4). The parts of the rational explanation or notion, into which that notion is divided, are prior to the notion, at least in some instances. But the notion of a right angle is prior to that of an acute angle or is one of the elements into which the notion of an acute angle is divided; for you cannot define an acute angle without introducing the right angle into your definition, nor can you define the semicircle without introducing the circle, nor the finger without introducing the man--the finger being such and such a part of the man. The parts into which man is divided as Matter, are posterior to man; those into which man is divided as parts of his Form or Formal Essence, are prior to man--at least some of them are so (b. 14). Now, since the soul of animals (which is the Essence of the animated being--b. 15) is the Essence and the Form and the [Greek: t.ê.e.] of a suitably arranged body; and, since no good definition of any one part can be given, which does not include the function of that part, and this cannot be given without the mechanism of sense (b. 18), it follows that the parts of this soul, or some of them at least, are prior to the entire animal, alike in the general and in each particular case. But the body and its parts are posterior to the soul or Form, and into these, as parts, the entire man (not the Essence or Form) is divided. These parts are, in a certain sense, prior to the entire man, and, in a certain sense, not; for they cannot even exist at all separately (b. 23): the finger is not a finger unless it can perform its functions, _i.e._, unless it be animated by a central soul; it is not a finger in every possible state of the body to which it belongs; after death, it is merely a finger by equivocation of language. There are, however, some parts, such, as the brain or heart, to which the Form or Essence is specially attached which are neither prior nor posterior but _simul_ to the entire animal (b. 25).

Man, horse, and such like, which are predicated universally of particular things, are not Essentia; they are compounds of a given Form and a given Matter (but of that first Matter) which goes to compose Universals. It is out of the last Matter, which comes lowest in the series, and is already partially invested with Form, that Sokrates and other particular beings are constituted (p. 1035, b. 30).

Thus, there are parts of the Form or [Greek: t.ê.e.], parts of the Matter, and parts of the Compound including both. But it is only the parts of the Form that are included as parts in the rational explanation or notion; and this notion belongs to the Universal; for circle and the being a circle, soul and the being a soul--are one and the same (p. 1036, a. 2). Of the total compound (this particular circle), no notion, no definition, can be given: whether it be a particular circle perceivable by sense, in wood or brass, or merely conceivable, such as the mathematical figures. Such particular circles are known only along with actual perception or conception (a. 6. [Greek: Noei=n] here means the equivalent of [Greek: a)phairei=n = chôri/zein tê=| dianoi/a|]--"die Thätigkeit des Abstrahirens, durch welche das Mathematische gewonnen wird"--Schwegler ad loc. Comm., p. 101, Pt. II.): when we dismiss them as actualities from our view or imagination, we cannot say clearly whether they continue to exist or not; but we always talk of them and know them by the rational explanation or definition of the universal circle (a. 7: [Greek: a)peltho/ntas d' e)k tê=s e)ntelechei/as ou) dê=lon po/tero/n pote/ ei)sin ê)\ ou)k ei)si/n, a)ll' a)ei\ le/gontai kai\ gnôri/zontai tô=| katho/lou lo/gô|.] I apprehend that Aristotle is here speaking of the [Greek: ku/klos noêto/s] only, not of the [Greek: ku/klos ai)sthêto/s] or [Greek: chalkou=s ku/klos]. He had before told us that, when the [Greek: chalkou=s ku/klos] passes out of [Greek: e)ntele/cheia] or [Greek: phthei/retai], it passes into [Greek: chalko/s]. He can hardly therefore mean to say that, when the [Greek: chalkou=s ku/klos] passes out of [Greek: e)ntele/cheia], we do not clearly know whether it exists or not. But respecting the [Greek: ku/klos noêto/s] or mathematical circle, he might well say that we did not clearly know whether it existed at all under the circumstances supposed: if it cease to exist, we cannot say [Greek: ei)s o(\ phthei/retai]). Matter is unknowable _per se_ ([Greek: kath' au(tê/n]--a. 9, _i.e._, if altogether without Form). One variety of Matter is perceivable by sense, as brass, wood, and all moveable matter; another variety is conceivable, viz., that which exists in the perceivable variety, but not _quâ_ perceivable--the mathematical figures ([Greek: noêtê\ de\ ê( e)n toi=s ai)sthêtoi=s u(pa/rchousa mê\ ê(=| ai)sthêta/, oi(=on ta\ mathêmatika/]--a. 12; _i.e._, making abstraction of the acts of sense, or of what is seen and felt by sense, viz., colour by the eye, resistance by the touch; and leaving behind simply the extension or possibility of motion, which is a geometrical line).

We have now laid down the true doctrine respecting Whole and Part, Prius and Posterius. And, if any one asks whether the right angle, the circle, the animal, is prior or not to the parts into which it is divided and out of which it is formed, we cannot answer absolutely either Yes or No. We must add some distinguishing words, specifying what we assert to be prior, and to what it is prior (p. 1036, a. 19). If by the soul you mean the Form or Essence of the living animal, by the circle, the Form of the circle, by the right angle, the Form or Essence thereof,--then this Form is posterior in regard to the notional parts of which it is constituted, but prior in regard to the particular circle or right angle. But, if by soul you meant the entire concrete animal, by right angle or circle, these two figures realized in brass or wood, then we must reply that any one of these is prior as regards the material parts of which it is constituted (a. 25).

Another reasonable doubt arises here ([Greek: a)porei=tai d' ei)ko/tôs]--p. 1036, a. 26) as to which parts belong to the Form alone, which to the entire Concrete. Unless this be made clear, we can define nothing; for that which we define is the Universal and the Form, and, unless we know what parts belong to the Matter and what do not, the definition of the thing can never be made plain (a. 30). Now, wherever the Form is seen to be superinduced upon matters diverse in their own Form, the case presents no difficulty: every one sees circles in brass, stone, wood, &c., and is well aware that neither the brass, nor the stone, belongs to the Form or Essence of the circle, since he easily conceives a circle without either. But, if a man had never seen any circles except brazen circles, he would have more difficulty in detaching mentally the circle from the brass, and would be more likely to look upon brass as belonging to the Form of circle; although, in point of fact, he would have no more logical ground for supposing so than in the case just before supposed; for the brass might still belong only to the Matter of circle (b. 2). This is the case with the Form of man. It is always seen implicated with flesh, bones, and such like parts. Are these parts of the Form of man? Or are they not rather parts of the Matter, though we are unable to conceive the Form apart from them, because we never see it in conjunction with any other Matter? This is at least a possibility, and we cannot see clearly in what cases it must be admitted. Some theorists are so impressed by it as to push the case farther, and apply the same reasoning to the circle and triangle. These theorists contend that it is improper to define a circle and a triangle by figure, lines, continuity, &c., which (they affirm) are only parts of the Matter of circle and triangle; as flesh and bones are parts of the Matter of man. They refer all of them to numbers as the Form, and they affirm that the definition of the dyad is also the definition of a line (b. 12). Among the partisans of Ideas, some call the dyad [Greek: au)togrammê/] others call it the Form of a line; saying that in some cases the Form and that of which it is the Form are the same, as the dyad and the Form of the dyad, but that this is not true about line. (These two opinions seem to be substantially the same, and only to differ in the phrase. [Greek: Au)togrammê/] means the same as [Greek: to\ ei)=dos tê=s grammê=s]: it seems to have been a peculiar phrase adopted by some Platonists, but not by all. Others preferred to say [Greek: to\ ei)=dos tê=s grammê=s].) These reasonings have already misled the Pythagoreans, and are likely to mislead others also: they would conduct us to the recognition of one and the same Form in many cases where the Form is manifestly different: they lead us even to assume one single Form universally, reducing every thing besides to be no Form, but merely Matter to that one single real Form. By such reasoning, we should be forced to consider all things as One (b. 20), which would be obviously absurd.

We see from hence that there are real difficulties respecting the theory of Definition, and how such difficulties arise. It is because some persons are forward overmuch in trying to analyse every thing and in abstracting altogether from Matter; for some things include Matter along with the Form, or determined in a certain way, _i.e._, this along with that, or these things in this condition (p, 1036, b. 22). The comparison which the younger Sokrates was accustomed to make about the animal is a mistaken one (b. 24): it implies that man may be without his material parts, as the circle may exist without brass. But this analogy will not hold; animal is something perceivable by sense and cannot be defined without motion; of course, therefore, not without bodily members organized in a certain way (b. 30). The hand is not a part of man, when it is in any supposable condition, but only when it can perform its functions, that is, when it is animated; when not animated, it is not a part (b. 32). Clearly the soul is the first Essence or Form, the body is Matter, and man or animal is the compound of both as an Universal; while Sokrates, Koriskus &c., are as particulars to this Universal, whether you choose to take Sokrates as soul without body, or as soul with body (p. 1037, a. 5-10: these words are very obscure).

Respecting Mathematical Entia, why are not the notions of the **parts parts of the notion of the whole? _e.g._, why is not the notion of a semi-circle part of the notion of a circle? Perhaps it will be replied that this circle and semi-circle are not perceivable by sense: but this after all makes no difference; for some things even not perceivable by sense involve Matter along with them, and indeed Matter is involved in every thing which is not [Greek: t.ê.e.] and Form [Greek: au)to\ kath' au(to/]. The semi-circles are not included as parts of the notion of the universal circle; but they are parts of each particular circle: for there is one Matter perceivable and another cogitable (p. 1036, a. 34.--Bonitz remarks that these words from p. 1036, a. 22 to p. 1037, a. 5, are out of their proper place). Whether there be any other Matter, besides the Matter of these Mathematical Entia, and whether we are to seek a distinct Form and Essence for them--such as numbers, must be reserved for future enquiry. This has been one of our reasons for the preceding chapters about perceivable Essences; for these last properly belong to the province of Second Philosophy--of the physical theorist ([Greek: tê=s phusikê=s kai\ deute/ras philosophi/as e)/rgon]--p. 1037, a. 15). The physical philosopher studies not merely the Matter, but the Form or notional Essence even more (a. 17).