Chapter X: Sophistici Elenchi (1)

The Sophist (according to Aristotle) is one whose professional occupation it is to make money by a delusive show of wisdom without the reality--by contriving to make others believe falsely that he possesses wisdom and knowledge. The abstract substantive noun _Sophistic_, with the verb _to practice as a Sophist_ ([Greek: sophisteu/ein]), expresses such profession and purpose.[1] This application of the term is derived from Plato, who has in various dialogues (Protagoras, Hippias, Euthydêmus, &c.) introduced Sokrates conversing with different professional Sophists, and who has, in a longer dialogue called Sophistes, attempted an elaborate definition of the intellectual peculiarities of the person so named. It is the actual argumentative procedure of the Sophist that Aristotle proposes to himself as the theme of this little treatise, appended to his general theory of the Syllogism; a treatise which, though forming properly the Ninth and concluding Book of the Topica, is commonly known as a separate appendix thereto, under the title of Sophistici Elenchi, or Sophistical Refutations.

[Footnote 1: Soph. El. i. p. 165, a. 21, 28, 32: [Greek: e)/sti ga\r ê( sophistikê\ phainome/nê sophi/a ou)=sa d' ou)/, kai\ o( sophistê\s chrêmatistê\s a)po\ phainome/nês sophi/as a)ll' ou)k ou)/sês;--a)na/gkê ou)=n _tou\s boulome/nous sophisteu/ein to\_ tô=n ei)rême/nôn lo/gôn ge/nos zêtei=n;--o(/ti me\n ou)=n e)/sti ti toiou=ton lo/gôn ge/nos, kai\ o(/ti toiau/tês e)phi/entai duna/meôs _ou(\s kalou=men sophista/s_, dê=lon.] Also xi. p. 171, b. 27.]

The Sophistical Elenchus or Refutation, being a delusive semblance of refutation which imposes on ordinary men and induces them to accept it as real, cannot be properly understood without the theory of Elenchus in general; nor can this last be understood without the entire theory of the Syllogism, since the Elenchus is only one variety of Syllogism.[2] The Elenchus is a syllogism with a conclusion contradictory to or refutative of some enunciated thesis or proposition. Accordingly we must first understand the conditions of a good and valid Syllogism, before we study those of a valid Elenchus; these last, again, must be understood, before we enter on the distinctive attributes of the Pseudo-elenchus--the sophistical, invalid, or sham, refutation. In other words, an enumeration and classification of Fallacies forms the closing section of a treatise on Logic--according to the philosophical arrangement originating with Aristotle, and copied by most logicians after him.

[Footnote 2: Ibid. x. p. 171, a. 1-5.]

Aristotle begins by distinguishing reality and mere deceptive appearance; and by stating that this distinction is found to prevail not less in syllogisms than in other matters. Next he designates a notorious class of persons, called Sophists, who made it their profession to study and practise the deceptive appearance of syllogizing; and he then proceeds to distinguish four species of debate:--(1) Didactic; (2) Dialectic; (3) Peirastic; (4) Eristic or Sophistic.[3] In this quadruple arrangement, however, he is not consistent with his own definitions, when he ranks the four as distinct and co-ordinate species. The marked and special antithesis is between Didactic and Dialectic. Both Peirastic and Eristic fall as varieties or sub-species under the species Dialectic; and there is under the species Didactic a variety called Pseudo-graphic or Pseudo-didactic, which stands to Didactic in the same relation in which Eristic stands to Dialectic.[4]

[Footnote 3: Soph. El. ii. p. 165, a. 38: [Greek: e)/sti dê\ tô=n e)n tô=| diale/gesthai lo/gôn te/ttara ge/nê, didaskalikou\ kai\ dialektikoi\ kai\ peirastikoi\ kai\ e)ristikoi/.]]

[Footnote 4: Ibid. xi. p. 171, b. 34.]

Didactic discourse is not applicable to all matters indiscriminately, but only to certain special sciences; each of which has its own separate, undemonstrable _principia_, from which its conclusions, so far as true and valid, must be deduced. It supposes a teacher acquainted with these _principia_ and deductions, talking with some one who being ignorant of them wishes to learn. The teacher puts questions, to which the learner makes the best answers that he can; and, if the answers are wrong, corrects them and proceeds to draw, according to syllogistic canons, conclusions from premisses which he himself knows to be the truth. These premisses the learner must believe upon the teacher's authority. Properly speaking, indeed, the didactic process is not interrogative (in the same sense that Dialectic is): the teacher does not accept the learner's answer and reason from it, if he thinks it wrong.[5]

[Footnote 5: Ibid. xi. p. 172, a. 11: [Greek: nu=n d' ou)k e)/stin o( dialektio\s peri\ ge/nos ti ô(risme/non, ou)de\ deiktiko\s ou)deno/s, ou)de\ toiou=tos oi(=os o( katho/lou. ou)/te ga/r e)stin a(/panta e)n e(ni/ tini ge/nei, ou)/te ei) ei)/ê, oi(=o/n te u(po\ ta\s au)ta\s a)rcha\s ei)=nai ta\ o)/nta. ô(/st' ou)demi/a te/chnê tô=n deiknuousô=n tina\ phu/sin e)rôtêtikê/ e)stin; ou) ga\r e)/xestin o(poteronou=n tô=n mori/ôn dou=nai; sullogismo\s ga\r ou) gi/netai e)x a)mphoi=n. ê( de\ dialektikê\ e)rôtêrikê/ e)stin; ei) d' e)dei/knuen, ei) kai\ mê\ pa/nta, a)lla\ ta/ ge prô=ta kai\ ta\s oi)kei/as a)rcha/s, ou)k a)\n ê)rô/ta. mê\ dido/ntos ga\r ou)k a)\n e)/ti ei)=chen e)x ô(=n e)/ti diale/xetai pro\s tê\n e)/nstasin.]

When Aristotle, therefore, reckons [Greek: lo/gous didaskalikou/s] as one of the four species [Greek: tô=n e)n tô=| diale/gesthai lo/gôn] (Soph. El. ii. p. 165, a. 38), we must understand [Greek: to\ diale/gesthai] in a very wide and vague sense, going much beyond the derivative noun [Greek: dialektikê/].]

Dialectic, on the contrary, is applicable to all matters universally and indiscriminately, including even the undemonstrable _principia_ which the teacher assumes as the highest premisses of his didactic syllogisms. It supposes, in place of teacher and learner, an interrogator (or opponent) and a respondent. The respondent declares a problem or thesis, which he undertakes to defend; while the other puts questions to him respecting it, with the purpose of compelling him either to contradict the thesis, or to contradict himself on some other point. The interrogator is allowed only to ask questions, and to deduce legitimate conclusions from the premisses granted by the respondent in answer: he is not permitted to introduce any other premisses. The premisses upon which the debate turns are understood all to be probable--opinions accredited either among an ordinary multitude or among a few wise men, but to have no higher authority. Accordingly there is often a conflict of arguments _pro_ and _con_, much diversified. The process is essentially controversial; and, if the questioner does not succeed in exposing a contradiction, the respondent is victorious, and remains in possession of the field.

Such is the capital antithesis, much dwelt upon by Aristotle, between Didactic and Dialectic. But that which he calls Peirastic, and that which he calls Eristic, are not species co-ordinate with and distinguished from Dialectic: they are peculiar aspects, subordinate varieties or modes, of Dialectic itself. Aristotle himself, indeed, admits Peirastic to be a mode or variety of Dialectic;[6] and the like is equally true respecting what he terms Eristic or Sophistic.

[Footnote 6: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 4-9: [Greek: ê( ga\r peirastikê/ e)sti dialektikê/ tis], &c.--p. 172, a. 35: [Greek: o( te/chnê| sullogistikê=| peirastiko/s, dialektiko/s].--viii. p. 169, b. 25: [Greek: e)/sti d' ê( peirastikê\ me/ros tê=s dialektikê=s.]]

These subordinate distinctions turn upon the manner, the limitations, and the purpose, for and under which the dialectical process is conducted. Dialectic is essentially gymnastic and peirastic:[7] it may be looked at either as gymnastic, in reference to the two debaters, or as peirastic, in reference to the arguments and doctrines brought forward; intellectual exercise and stimulation of the two speakers and the auditors around being effected by testing and confronting various probable doctrines. It is the common purpose ([Greek: koino\n e)/rgon])[8] of the two champions, to improve and enlarge this exercise for the instruction of all, by following out a variety of logical consequences and logical repugnancies, bearing more or less directly on the thesis which the respondent chooses and undertakes to defend against a testing cross-examination. Certain rules and limitations are prescribed both for questioner and respondent; but, subject to these rules, each of them is bound to exert all his acuteness for the purpose of gaining victory; and, though one only can gain it, the debate may be well and creditably conducted on both sides. If the rules are not observed, if the assailing champion, bent upon victory at all cost, has recourse to dishonest interrogative tricks, or the defensive champion to perverse and obstructive negations, beyond the prescribed boundary, in that case the debate is called by Aristotle _eristic_ or _contentious_, from the undue **predominance of the controversial spirit and purpose; also _sophistic_, from the fact that there existed (as he asserts) a class or profession of persons called Sophists, who regularly studied and practised these culpable manoeuvres, first with a view to reputation, and ultimately with a view to pecuniary profit, being pretenders to knowledge and wisdom without any reality to justify them.[9]

[Footnote 7: Topic. I. ii. p. 101, a. 26, b. 2: [Greek: pro\s gumnasi/an--e)xetastikê\ ga\r ou)=sa], &c. Compare also Topica, VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 25; xiv. p. 163, a. 29, p. 164, b. 1: [Greek: to\ de\ gumna/zesthai duna/meôs cha/rin, kai\ ma/lista peri\ ta\s prota/seis kai\ e)nsta/seis; e)/sti ga\r ô(s a(plô=s ei)pei=n dialektiko\s o( protatiko\s kai\ e)nstatiko/s.]]

[Footnote 8: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 20, 37.]

[Footnote 9: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 25-35: [Greek: oi( me\n ou)=n tê=s ni/kês au)tê=s cha/rin toiou=toi e)ristikoi\ a)/nthrôpoi kai\ phile/rides dokou=sin ei)=nai, oi( de\ do/xês cha/rin tê=s ei)s chrêmatismo\n sophistikoi/;--kai\ tô=n lo/gôn tô=n au)tô=n me/n ei)sin oi( phile/rides kai\ sophistai/, a)ll' ou) tô=n au)tô=n e(/neken. kai\ lo/gos o( au)to\s me\n e)/stai sophistiko\s kai\ e)ristiko/s, a)ll' ou) kata\ tauto/n, a)ll' ê(=| me\n ni/kês phainome/nês, e)ristiko/s, ê(=| de\ sophi/as, sophistiko/s.] &c.]

We thus see plainly that Peirastic and Eristic are not to be ranked as two distinct species of discourse, co-ordinate with Didactic and Dialectic; but that _peirastic_ is in fact an epithet applicable generally to Dialectic, bringing to view one of its useful and appropriate functions; while _eristic_ designates only a peculiar mode of conducting the process, the essential feature of which is that it is abusive or that it transgresses the rules and regulations. Still less ought Sophistic to be ranked as a distinct species; since it involves no intrinsic or intellectual _differentia_, but connotes only ethical and personal peculiarities ascribed to the Sophist, who is treated as an impostor practising dishonest tricks for the sake of pecuniary profit.[10]

[Footnote 10: Aristot. Rhetoric. I. i. p. 1355, b. 17: [Greek: o( ga\r sophistiko\s ou)k e)n tê=| duna/mei, a)ll' e)n tê=| proaire/sei;--sophistê\s me\n kata\ tê\n proai/resin, dialektiko\s d' ou) kata\ tê\n proai/resin a)lla\ kata\ tê\n du/namin.] To the same purpose he speaks in Metaphys. [Greek: G]. ii. p. 1004, b. 25, distinguishing the Sophist by his [Greek: proai/resis] from the Dialectician, but recognizing that in point of [Greek: du/namis] both are alike. Mr. Poste observes justly (in Transl. of the Soph. El., notes, p. 99):--"[Greek: du/namis], capacity, is in the intellect; [Greek: proai/resis], purpose, in the will. The antithesis between these terms may throw light on what Aristotle conceived to be the relation between Sophistic and Dialectic. . . The power _plus_ the will to deceive is called Sophistic; the power without the will, Dialectic (p. 100)."]

While, however, we recognize as main logical distinctions only the two heads Didactic and Dialectic, we note another way that Aristotle has of bringing in what he calls Sophistic as a variety of the latter. Both in Didactic and Dialectic (he tells us) the speakers enunciate and prove their propositions by Syllogism; the didactic syllogism is derived from the _principia_ belonging specially to one particular science, and proceeds from premisses that are true to conclusions that are true; while the dialectic syllogism starts from probable premisses (_i.e._, accredited by the ordinary public or by a few wise men), and marches in correct form to conclusions that are probable. Now, corresponding to each of these two, Aristotle recognizes farther a sort of degenerate counterpart. To the didactic syllogism there corresponds the _pseudographic_ syllogism or the _paralogism_: which draws its premisses (as the didactic syllogism does) from the special matters of some given science,[11] yet which nevertheless has only the appearance of truth without the reality; either because it is incorrect in syllogistic form, or because the matter of the premisses (the major, the minor, or both) is untrue. To the dialectic syllogism in like manner, there corresponds the _eristic_ or _sophistic_ syllogism: which is a good syllogism in appearance, but not in reality; either because it is incorrect in form, or because its premisses, in respect of their matter, appear to be probable without being really probable.[12]

[Footnote 11: Topic. I. i. p. 101, a. 5-15. [Greek: oi( e)k tô=n peri/ tinas e)pistê/mas oi)kei/ôn gino/menoi paralogismoi/, katha/per e)pi\ tê=s geômetri/as kai\ tô=n tau/tê| suggenô=n sumbe/bêken e)/chein;--e)k tô=n oi)kei/ôn me\n tê=| e)pistê/mê| lêmma/tôn, ou)k a)lêthô=n de/, to\n sullogismo\n poiei=tai.]]

[Footnote 12: Ibid. p. 100, a. 31-p. 101, a. 16; Soph. El. i. p. 164, a. 20-b. 21.]

One would suppose that the relation between the pseudo-didactic and the didactic syllogism, was the same as that between the pseudo-dialectic and the dialectic; so that, if the pseudo-dialectic deserved to be called sophistic or eristic, the pseudo-didactic would deserve these appellations also; especially, since the formal conditions of the syllogism are alike for both. This Aristotle does not admit, but draws instead a remarkable distinction. The Sophist (he says) is a dishonest man, making it his professional purpose to deceive; the pseudo-graphic man of science is honest always, though sometimes mistaken. So long as the pseudo-graphic syllogism keeps within the limits belonging to its own special science, it may be false, since the geometer may be deceived even in his own science geometry,[13] but it cannot be sophistic or eristic; yet, whenever it transgresses those limits, even though it be true and though it solves the problem proposed, it deserves to be called by those two epithets. Thus, there were two distinct methods proposed for the quadrature of the circle--one by Hippokrates, on geometrical principles, the other by Bryson, upon principles extra-geometrical. Both demonstrations were false and unsuccessful; yet that of Hippokrates was not sophistic or eristic, because he kept within the sphere of geometry; while that of Bryson was so, because it travelled out of geometry. Nay more, this last would have been equally sophistic and eristic, and on the same ground, even if it had succeeded in solving the problem.[14] If indeed the pseudo-graphic syllogism be invalid in form, it must be considered as sophistic, even though within the proper scientific limits as to matter; but, if it be correct in form and within these same limits, then, however untrue its premisses may be, it is to be regarded as not sophistic or eristic.[15]

[Footnote 13: Topic. V. iv. p. 132, a. 32.]

[Footnote 14: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 12-20: [Greek: ta\ ga\r pseudographê/mata ou)k e)ristika/ (kata\ ga\r ta\ u(po\ tê\n te/chnên oi( paralogismoi/), ou)de/ g' ei)/ ti/ e)sti pseudogra/phêma peri\ a)lêthe/s, oi(=on to\ I(ppokra/tous ê)\ o( tetragônismo\s o( dia\ tô=n mêni/skôn. a)ll' ô(s Bru/sôn e)tetragô/nize to\n ku/klon, _ei) kai\ tetragôni/zetai o( ku/klos, a)ll' o(/ti ou) kata\ to\ pra=gma, dia\ tou=to sophistiko/s_.] Also p. 172, a. 1-8.]

[Footnote 15: Ibid. xi. p. 171, b. 19-20. Compare Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 33: [Greek: dei= de\ to\n kalô=s metabiba/zonta dialektikô=s kai\ mê\ e)ristikô=s metabiba/zein, katha/per to\n geôme/trên geômetrikô=s, a)/n te pseu=dos a)/n t' a)lêthe\s ê)=| to\ sumperaino/menon.] Also Topic. VIII. xii. p. 162, b. 10.]

Such is the test whereby Aristotle distinguishes the sophistication of the didactic process from the legitimate working of that process. Now this same test cannot be applied to Dialectic, which has no appropriate or exclusive specialty of matters, but deals with _Omne Scibile_, universally and indiscriminately. Aristotle therefore puts the analogy in another way. Both in Didactic and in Dialectic the Sophist is one who sins against the fundamental conditions of the task which he undertakes; these conditions being, that in Didactic he shall confine himself to the matters and premisses of a given science,--in Dialectic, to matters probable of whatever kind they may be. Transgression of these conditions constitutes unfair and dishonest manoeuvre, whether of teacher or questioner; like breach of the regulations on the part of competitors, bent on victory at all price, in the Olympic games. Aristotle ranks this dishonesty as a species, under the name of Sophistic or Eristic, admitting of being analysed and defined;[16] and his treatise on Sophistical Refutations is intended to describe and illustrate the _Loci_ belonging to it, and contributing to its purpose.[17]

[Footnote 16: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 22: [Greek: ô(/sper ga\r ê( e)n a)gô=ni a)diki/a ei)=do/s ti e)/chei kai\ e)/stin a)dikomachi/a tis, ou(/tôs e)n a)ntilogi/a| a)dikomachi/a ê( e)ristikê/ e)stin; e)kei= te ga\r oi( pa/ntôs nika=n proairou/menoi pa/ntôn a(/ptontai, kai\ e)ntau=tha oi( e)ristikoi/.]]

[Footnote 17: Soph. El. ix. p. 170, a. 34: [Greek: dê=lon ou)=n o(/ti ou) pa/ntôn tô=n e)/legchôn a)lla\ tô=n para\ tê\n dialektikê\n lêpte/on tou\s to/pous.]]

Fallacious dialectical refutation being thus referred altogether to dishonesty of purpose (either contentious or profit-seeking) and being assumed as unknown in fair dialectical debate, we have to see by what characteristic Aristotle discriminates fallacious premisses from fair and admissible premisses. Dialectic (he tells us) has for its appropriate matter probable premisses--beliefs accredited either by the multitude or by a wise few. But (he goes on to say) not everything which appears probable is really probable. Nothing that is really probable is a mere superficial fancy; wherever this last is the case, the _probabilia_ are apparent only and not real; they have the character of falsehood stamped upon them, so as to be immediately manifest and obvious, even to persons of very narrow intelligence. It is such apparent _probabilia_ as these, which make up the premisses of eristic or sophistic discourse, and upon which the sophistical or fallacious refutations turn.[18]

[Footnote 18: Topic. I. i. p. 100, b. 23: [Greek: e)ristiko\s d' e)/sti sullogismo\s o( e)k phainome/nôn e)ndo/xôn mê\ o)/ntôn de/, kai\ o( e)x e)ndo/xôn ê)\ phainome/nôn e)ndo/xôn phaino/menos. ou) ga\r pa=n to\ phaino/menon e)/ndoxon, kai\ e)/stin e)/ndoxon. ou)the\n ga\r tô=n legome/nôn e)ndo/xôn e)pipo/laion e)/chei pantelô=s tê\n phantasi/an, katha/per peri\ ta\s tô=n e)ristikô=n lo/gôn a)rcha\s sumbe/bêken e)/chein; parachrê=ma ga\r kai\ ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu/ toi=s kai\ mikra\ sunora=n duname/nois kata/dêlos e)n au)toi=s ê( tou= pseu/dous e)sti\ phu/sis.] Compare Soph. El. ii. p. 165, b. 7.]

Aristotle thus draws a broad and marked line between Dialectic on the one hand, and Eristic or Sophistic on the other; and he treats the whole important doctrine of Logical Fallacies as coming under this latter department. The distinction that he draws between them is two-fold: first as to purpose, next as to subject-matter. On the part of the litigious or sophistical debater there is the illicit purpose of victory at all cost, or for profit; and probabilities merely apparent--such as any one may see not to be real probabilities--constitute the matter of his syllogisms.

Now, as to the distinction of purpose, we may put aside the idea of profit as having no essential connection with the question. It is quite possible to suppose the fair Dialectician, not less than the Sophist, as exhibiting his skill for pecuniary reward; while the eagerness for victory on both sides is absolutely indispensable even in well-conducted debate, in order that the appropriate stimulus and benefit of dialectical exercise may be realized. But, if the distinction of purpose and procedure, between the Dialectician and the Sophist, is thus undefined and unsatisfactory, still more unsatisfactory is the distinction of subject-matter. To discriminate between what is really probable (_i.e._, accredited either by the multitude or by a wise few), and what is only probable in appearance and not in reality--is a task of extreme difficulty. The explanation given by Aristotle himself[19]--when he describes the apparently probable as that which has only superficial show, and which the most ordinary intelligence discerns at once to be false--includes only the more gross and obvious fallacies, but leaves out all the rest. Nothing can be more incorrect than the assumption, in regard to fallacies generally, that the appearance of probability is too faint to impose upon any ordinary man. If all fallacies could be supposed to come under this definition, the theory of Fallacies would undoubtedly be worthless (as Mr. Poste suggests that it is, in the Preface to his translation of the Sophistici Elenchi); and the most dishonest Sophist would at any rate be harmless. But, in fact, Aristotle himself departs from this definition even in the beginning of the Sophistici Elenchi; for he there treats the sophistic syllogism and refutation as having a semblance of validity plausible enough to impose upon many persons, and to be difficult of detection; like base metals having the exterior appearance of gold and silver, and like men got up for the purpose of looking finer and stronger than they really are.[20] Here we have the eristic or sophistic syllogism presented as fallacious, yet as very likely to be mistaken for truth, by unprepared auditors, unless warning and precaution be applied; not (as it was set forth in the definition above cited) as bearing the plain and obvious stamp of falsehood, recognizable even by the vulgar. At the time when Aristotle constructed that definition, he probably had present to his mind such caricatures of dialectical questions as Plato (in the dialogue Euthydêmus) puts into the mouth of the Sophists Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus. And, since Aristotle chose to connect fallacious reasoning with dishonest purposes, and to announce it as employed exclusively by dishonest debaters, he seems to have found satisfaction in describing it as something which no honest man of ordinary understanding could accept as true: the Sophist being thus presented not merely as a knave but as a fool.

[Footnote 19: Topic. I. i. p. 100, b. 24, seq.]

[Footnote 20: Soph. El. i. p. 164, a. 23-b. 27. [Greek: to\n au)to\n de\ tro/pon kai\ sullogismo\s kai\ e)/legchos o( me\n e)/stin, o( d' ou)k e)/sti me/n, phai/netai de\ dia\ tê\n a)peiri/an; oi( ga\r a)/peiroi ô(/sper a)\n a)pe/chontes po/r)r(ôthen theôrou=sin.]]

I think it a mistake on the part of Aristotle to treat the fallacies incidental to the human intellect as if they were mere traps laid by Sophists and litigants; and as if they would never show themselves, assuming dialectical debate to be conducted entirely with a view to its legitimate purposes of testing a thesis and following out argumentative consequences. It is true that, if there are infirmities incident to the human intellect, a dishonest disputant will be likely to take advantage of them. So far it may be well to note his presence. But the dishonest disputant does not originate these infirmities: he finds them already existing, and manifested undesignedly not merely in dialectical debate, but even in ordinary discourse. It is the business of those who theorize on the intellectual processes to specify and discriminate the Fallacies as liabilities to intellectual error among mankind in general, honest or dishonest, with a view to precaution against their occurrence, or correction if they do occur; not to present them as inventions of a class of professional cheats,[21] or as tares sown by the enemy in a field where the natural growth would be nothing but pure wheat.

[Footnote 21: Soph. El. i. p. 165, a. 19, seq.]

In point of fact the actual classification of Fallacies given by Aristotle is far sounder than his announcement would lead us to expect. Though he entitles them Sophistical Refutations, describing them as intentionally cultivated and exclusively practised by professional Sophists for gain, or by unprincipled litigants for victory, yet he recognises them as often very difficult of detection, and as an essential portion of the theory of Dialectic generally.[22] The various general heads under which he distributes them are each characterized by intellectual or logical marks.

[Footnote 22: Ibid. xi. p. 172, b. 7.]

His first and most general observation is, that language is the usual medium and instrument through which fallacies are operated.[23] Names and propositions are of necessity limited in number; but things named or nameable are innumerable; hence it happens inevitably that the same name or the same proposition must have several different meanings. Since we cannot talk of things except by means of their names, the equivocation inseparable from these names is a constant source of false conclusions.[24]

[Footnote 23: Ibid. i. p. 165, a. 5.]

[Footnote 24: Ibid. a. 10: [Greek: ta\ me\n ga\r o)no/mata pepe/rantai kai\ to\ tô=n lo/gôn plê=thos, ta\ de\ pra/gmata to\n a)rithmo\n a)/peira/ e)stin. a)nagkai=on ou)=n plei/ô to\n au)to\n lo/gon kai\ tou)/noma to\ e(\n sêmai/nein.]]

In dialectical procedure, the Sophist and the litigious debater aim at the accomplishment of five distinguishable ends:--(1) To refute, or obtain the false appearance of refuting, the thesis; (2) To catch, or appear to catch, the opponent in affirming something false or contradictory; (3) Or in affirming something paradoxical; (4) Or in uttering incorrect and ungrammatical speech; (5) Or in tautological repetition. The first of these five ends is what the Sophist most desires; where that cannot be had, then, as secondary purposes, the succeeding four, in the order in which they are enumerated.[25]

[Footnote 25: Soph. El. iii. p. 165, b. 12-22.]

The syllogism whereby the Sophist appears to refute without really refuting, is either faulty in form, or untrue in matter, or irrelevant to the purpose. The Fallacies that he employs to bring about this deceitful appearance of refutation are various, and may be distributed first under two great divisions:--

I. _Fallaciæ Dictionis_. II. _Fallaciæ Extra Dictionem_.

I. The first division--_Fallaciæ Dictionis_--includes all those cases wherein, under the same terms or propositions, more than one meaning is expressed. Six heads may be distinguished:--

1. Homonymy (Equivocation): where the double meaning resides in one single term--noun or verb. 2. Amphiboly: where the double meaning resides, not in a single word but, in a combination of words--proposition, phrase, or sentence. 3. Conjunction (hardly distinguishable from that immediately preceding--Amphiboly). 4. Disjunction: where what is affirmed conjunctively is not true disjunctively, or the reverse. (_E.g._, Five are two and three; but you cannot say, Five are even and odd. The greater is equal and something besides; but you cannot say, The greater is equal.) 5. Accentuation: where the same word differently accentuated has a different meaning. 6. _Figura Dictionis_: where two words, from being analogous in form, structure, or conjugation, are erroneously supposed to be analogous in meaning also.[26]

[Footnote 26: Ibid. iv. p. 165, b. 23-p. 166, b. 19.]

Such are the six heads of _Fallaciæ Dictionis_--Fallacies or Paralogisms arising from words as such, or something directly appertaining to them.

II. Under the second division--Fallacies or Paralogisms _Extra Dictionem_--there are seven heads:

1. _Fallacia Accidentis_. 2. _Fallacia a dicto Secundum Quid ad dictum Simpliciter_. 3. _Ignoratio Elenchi_. 4. _Fallacia Consequentis_ 5. _Petitio Principii_. 6. _Non Causa pro Causâ_. 7. _Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum_.[27]

[Footnote 27: Soph. El. v. p. 166, b. 20-27.]

1. The first of these varieties, called _Fallacia Accidentis_, arises when a syllogism is made to conclude that, because a given predicate may be truly affirmed of a given subject, the same predicate may also be truly affirmed respecting all the accidents of that subject: as when Koriskus is denied to be a man, because he is not Sokrates, who is a man; or is denied to be Koriskus, because he is a man, while a man is not Koriskus.

In the title given to this general head of Fallacy,[28] we must understand Accident, not in its special logical sense as opposed to Essence, but in a far larger sense, including both Genus when predicated separately from Differentia, and Differentia when predicated separately from Genus; including, in fact, every thing which is distinguishable from the subject in any way, and at the same time predicable of it--every thing except the Definition, which conjoins Genus and Differentia together, and is thus identical and convertible with the _definitum_.

[Footnote 28: Ibid. b. 29: [Greek: oi( para\ to\ sumbebêko\s paralogismoi/]. Every man is an animal; but, because a predicate is true of the subject man, you cannot infer that the same predicate is true of the subject animal. This title comprehends within its range another, which is presently announced as distinct and separate--_Fallacia Consequentis_.]

2. The second general variety arises when a proposition is affirmed with qualification or limitation in the premisses, but is affirmed without qualification, simply and absolutely, in the conclusion. The Ethiopian is white in his teeth and black in his skin; therefore, he is both white and not white--both white and black. In this example the fallacy is obvious, and can hardly escape any one; but there are many other cases in which the distinction is not so conspicuous, and in which the respondent will hesitate whether he ought to grant or refuse a question simply and absolutely.[29] One example given by Aristotle deserves notice on its own account: _Non-Ens est opinabile_, therefore _Non-Ens est_; or, again, _Ens non est homo_, therefore, _Ens non est_. This is one among Aristotle's ways of bringing to view what modern logicians describe as the double function of the substantive verb--to serve as copula in predication, and to predicate existence.[30] He regards the confusion between these two functions as an example of the Fallacy now before us--of passing _a dicto Secundum Quid ad dictum Simpliciter_.[31]

[Footnote 29: Ibid. b. 37, seq. [Greek: o(/tan to\ e)n me/rei lego/menon ô(s a(plô=s ei)rême/non lêphthê=|--to\ de\ toiou=ton e)p' e)ni/ôn me\n panti\ theôrê=sai r(a/|dion--e)p' e)ni/ôn de\ lantha/nei polla/kis.]]

[Footnote 30: The same double or multiple meaning of _Est_ is discriminated by Aristotle in the Metaphysica, but in a different way--[Greek: to\ o)\n ô(s a)lêthe/s, kai\ to\ mê\ o)\n ô(s pseu=dos]--[Greek: D].] vii. p. 1017, a. 31; E. iv. p. 1027, b. 18-36. Bonitz (ad. Metaphys. Z. iv. p. 310) says:--"Quid quod etiam illud _esse_ huc refert, quo non existentiam significamus, sed predicati cum subjecto conjunctionem." Aristotle is even more precise than modern logicians in analysing the different meanings of [Greek: to\ o)/n]: he distinguishes _four_ of them.]

[Footnote 31: Soph. El. v. p. 167, a. 1: [Greek: oi(=on ei) to\ mê\ o)/n e)sti doxasto/n, o(/ti to\ mê\ o)\n e)/stin; ou) ga\r tau)to\n ei)=nai te/ ti kai\ ei)=nai a(plô=s.]

Compare Metaphys. Z. iv. p. 1030, a. 25, and De Interpretatione, p. 21, a. 25-34: [Greek: ô(/sper O(/mêro/s e)sti/ ti, oi(=on poiêtê/s; a)=r' ou)=n kai\ e)/stin, ê) ou)/? kata\ sumbebêko\s ga\r katêgorei=tai tou= O(mê/rou to\ e)/stin; o(/ti ga\r poiêtê/s e)stin, a)ll' ou) kath' au(to/, katêgorei=tai kata\ tou= O(mê/rou to\ e)/stin.]

It is clear from the above passages that Aristotle was thoroughly aware of the logical fact which Hobbes, James Mill, and Mr. John Stuart Mill, have more fully brought out and illustrated, as the confusion between the two distinct functions of the substantive verb. Many excellent remarks on the subject will be found in the 'System of Logic,' by Mr. J. S. Mill (Bk. I. ch. iv. s. 1); also in the 'Analysis of the Human Mind,' by James Mill, especially in the recent edition of that work, containing the explanatory notes by Mr. J. S. Mill and Dr. Findlater (Vol. I. ch. iv. p. 174, seq.). Mr. J. S. Mill, however, speaks too unreservedly of this confusion as having escaped the notice of Aristotle, and as having been brought to light only by or since Hobbes. He says (in a note on the 'Analysis,' p. 183):--"As in the case of many other luminous thoughts, an approach is found to have been made to it by previous thinkers. Hobbes, though he did not reach it, came very close to it; and it was still more distinctly anticipated by Laromiguière, though without any sufficient perception of its value . . . in the following words:--'Quand on dit, l'être est, &c., le mot _est_, ou le verbe, n'exprime pas la même chose que le mot _être_, sujet de la définition. Si j'énonce la proposition suivante: Dieu est existant, je ne voudrais pas dire assurément, Dieu existe existant: cela ne ferait pas un sens: de même, si je dis que Virgile est poète, je ne veux pas donner à entendre que Virgile existe. Le verbe _est_ dans la proposition n'exprime dont pas l'existence réelle; il n'exprime qu'un rapport spécial entre le sujet et l'attribut, &c.'" The passages above cited from Aristotle show that he had not only enunciated the same truth as Laromiguière, but even illustrated it by the same example (Homer instead of Virgil). I shall in another place state more fully the views of Aristotle respecting _Existence_.]

3. The third of these heads of Fallacy--_Ignoratio Elenchi_--is, when the speaker, professing to contradict the thesis, advances another proposition which contradicts it in appearance only but not in reality, because he does not know what are the true and sufficient conditions of a valid Elenchus. In order to be valid, it must be real, not merely verbal; it must be proved by good syllogistic premisses, without any _Petitio Principii_; and it must deny the same matter, in the same relations, and at the same time, as that which the thesis affirmed. Thus, it is no contradiction to affirm and deny doubleness of the same body; both affirmation and denial may be true, if you take the comparison against different numbers or different bodies, or at different times. Sometimes persons neglect some of these conditions, and fancy that they have contradicted the thesis, when they have not: this is _Ignoratio Elenchi_.[32] (If the thesis be an affirmative universal, it _is_ sufficient contradiction if you prove a negative particular against it.)

[Footnote 32: Soph. El. v. p. 167, a. 21-35: [Greek: oi( de\ para\ to\ mê\ diôri/sthai ti/ e)sti sullogismo\s ê)\ ti/ e)/legchos, a)lla\ para\ tê\n e)/lleipsin gi/nontai tou= lo/gou.]

We may remark, by the way, that it is not very consistent in Aristotle to recognize one general head of Sophistical Refutation called _Ignoratio Elenchi_, after the definition that he has given of the Sophist at the beginning of this treatise. He had told us that the Sophist was a dishonest man, who made it his profession to study and practise these tricks, for the purpose of making himself pass for a clever man, and of getting money. According to this definition, there is no _Ignoratio Elenchi_ in the Sophist, though there may be in the person who supposes himself refuted. The Sophist is assumed to know what he is about, and to be aware that his argument is a fallacious one.]

4. The fourth head includes what are called _Fallaciæ Consequentis_: when a man inverts the relation between predicate and subject in a categorical proposition affirmative and universal, thinking that it may be simply converted or that the subject may be truly affirmed of the predicate; or when, in an hypothetical proposition, he inverts the relation between antecedent and consequent, arguing that, because the consequent is true, the antecedent must for that reason be true also. Honey is of yellow colour; you see a yellow substance, and you infer for that reason that it must be honey. Thieves generally walk out by night; you find a man walking out by night, and you infer that he must be a thief. These are inferences from Signs, opinions founded on facts of sense, such as are usually employed in Rhetoric; often or usually true, but not necessarily or universally true, and therefore fallacious when used as premisses in a syllogism.[33]

[Footnote 33: Soph. El. v. p. 167, b. 1-18. This head (_Fallacia Consequentis_) is not essentially distinguishable from the first (_Fallacia Accidentis_), being nothing more than a peculiar species or variety thereof, as Aristotle himself admits a little farther on--vi. p. 168, a. 26; vii. p. 169, b. 7; viii. p. 170, a. 3. Compare also xxviii. p. 181, a. 25.]

5. The fifth head is that of _Petitio Principii_: a man sometimes assumes for his premiss what is identical with the conclusion to be proved, without being aware of the identity.[34]

[Footnote 34: Ibid. v. p. 167, a. 38: [Greek: dia\ to\ mê\ du/nasthai sunora=n to\ tau)to\n kai\ to\ e(/teron].]

6. The sixth head of Fallacy--_Non Causa pro Causâ_--is, when we mistake for a cause that which is not really a cause; or, to drop the misleading word _cause_, and to adopt the clearer terms in which this same fallacy is announced in the Analytica Priora[35]--_Non per Hoc_--_Non propter Hoc_, it arises when we put forward, as an essential premiss of a given conclusion, something that is not really an essential premiss thereof. When you intend to refute a given thesis by showing, that, if admitted, it leads to impossible or absurd conclusions, you must enunciate that thesis itself among the premisses that lead to such absurdities.[36] But, though enunciated in this place, it may often happen that the thesis may be an unnecessary adjunct--not among the premisses really pertinent and essential: and that the impossible conclusion may be sufficiently proved, even though the thesis were omitted. Still, since the thesis is declared along with the rest, it will appear falsely to be a part of the real proof. It will often appear so even to yourself the questioner; you not detecting the fallacy.[37] Under such circumstances the respondent meets you by _Non propter Hoc_. He admits your conclusion to be impossible, and at the same time to be duly proved, but he shows you that it is proved by evidence independent of his thesis, and not by reason or means of his thesis. Accordingly you have advanced a syllogism good in itself, but not good for the purpose which you aimed at;[38] viz., to refute the thesis by establishing that it led to impossible consequences. You will fail, even if the impossible consequence which you advance is a proposition conjoined with the thesis through a continuous series of intermediate propositions, each of them having one common term with the next. Much more will you fail, if your impossible consequence is quite foreign and unconnected with the thesis; as we sometimes find in Dialectic.

[Footnote 35: Ibid. b. 21; vii. p. 169, b. 13. Compare Analyt. Prior. II. xvii. p. 65.

In commenting on the above chapter of the Analytica Priora, I have already remarked (Vol. I. p. 258, note) how much better is the designation there given of the present fallacy--_Non per Hoc_ ([Greek: ou) para\ tê\n the/sin to\ pseu=dos])--than the designation here given of the same fallacy--_Non Causa pro Causâ_. Aristotle is speaking of a syllogistic process, consisting of premisses and a conclusion; the premisses being the _reasons_ or grounds of the conclusion, not the _cause_ thereof, as that term is commonly understood. The term _cause_ is one used in so many different senses that we cannot be too careful in reasoning upon it. See Whately's remarks on this subject, Bk. iii. Sect. 14, of his Logic: also his Appendix I. to that work, under article _Reason_.]

[Footnote 36: Soph. El. v. p. 167, b. 24: [Greek: e)a\n ou)=n e)gkatarithmê/thê| e)n toi=s a)nagkai/ois e)rôtê/masi pro\s to\ sumbai=non a)du/naton, do/xei para\ tou=to gi/nesthai polla/kis o( e)/legchos.]]

[Footnote 37: Ibid. b. 35: [Greek: kai\ lantha/nei polla/kis ou)ch ê(=tton au)tou\s tou\s e)rôtô=ntas to\ toiou=ton.]]

[Footnote 38: Ibid. b. 34: [Greek: a)sullo/gistoi me\n ou)=n a(plô=s ou)k ei)si\n oi( toiou=toi lo/goi, pro\s de\ to\ prokei/menon a)sullo/gistoi.]]

7. The seventh and last of these heads of Fallacy is, when the questioner puts two distinct questions in the same form of words, as if they were one--_Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum ut Unius_. In well-conducted Dialectic the respondent was assumed to reply either Yes or No to the question put; or, if it was put in the form of an alternative, he accepted distinctly one term of the alternative. Under such conditions he could not reply to one of these double-termed questions without speaking falsely or committing himself. Are the earth and the sea liquid? Is the heaven or the earth sea? The questions are improperly put, and neither admits of any one correct answer. You ought to confine yourself to one question at a time, with one subject and one predicate, making what is properly understood by one single proposition. The two questions here stated as examples ought properly to be put as four.[39]

[Footnote 39: Ibid. b. 38-p. 168, a. 16; vi. p. 169, a. 6-12. [Greek: ê( ga\r pro/tasi/s e)stin e(\n kath' e(no/s.--ei) ou)=n mi/a pro/tasis ê( e(\n kath' e(no\s a)xiou=sa, kai\ a(plô=s e)/stai pro/tasis ê( toiau/tê e)rô/têsis.]

The examples given of this fallacy by Aristotle are so palpable--the expounder of every fallacy _must_ make it clear by giving examples that every one sees through at once--that we are tempted to imagine that no one can be imposed on by it. But Aristotle himself remarks, very justly, that there occur many cases in which we do not readily see whether one question only, or more than one, is involved; and in which one answer is made, though two questions are concerned. To set out distinctly all the separate debateable points is one of the most essential precautions for ensuring correct decision. The importance of such discriminating separation is one of the four rules prescribed by Descartes in his Discours de la Méthode. The present case comes under Mr. Mill's Fallacies of Confusion.]

Aristotle has thus distinguished and classified Fallacies under thirteen distinct heads in all--six _In Dictione_, and seven _Extra Dictionem_; among which last one is _Ignoratio Elenchi_. He now proceeds to show that, in another way of looking at the matter, all the Fallacies ranged under the thirteen heads, may be shown to be reducible to this single one--_Ignoratio Elenchi_. Every Fallacy, whatever it be, transgresses or fails to satisfy, in some way or other, the canons or conditions which go to constitute a valid Elenchus,[40] or a valid Syllogism. For a true Elenchus is only one mode of a true Syllogism; namely, that of which the conclusion is contradictory to some given thesis or proposition.[41] With this particular added, the definition of a valid Syllogism will also be the definition of a good Elenchus. And thus _Ignoratio Elenchi_--misconception or neglect of the conditions of a good Elenchus--understood in its largest meaning, is rather a characteristic common to all varieties of Fallacy, than one variety among others.[42]

[Footnote 40: Soph. El. vi. p. 168, a. 19: [Greek: e)/sti ga\r a(/pantas a)nalu=sai tou\s lechthe/ntas tro/pous ei)s to\n tou= e)le/gchou diorismo/n.]]

[Footnote 41: Ibid. a. 35.]

[Footnote 42: Ibid. p. 169, b. 15.]

In regard to two among the thirteen heads--_Fallacia Accidentis_ and _Fallacia Consequentis_ (which however ought properly to rank as only one head, since the second is merely a particular variety of the first)--Aristotle's observations are remarkable. After having pointed out that a Syllogism embodying this fallacy will not be valid or conclusive (thus showing that it involves _Ignoratio Elenchi_), he affirms that even scientific men were often not aware of it, and conceived themselves to be really refuted by an unscientific opponent urging against them such an inconclusive syllogism. To take an example:--Every triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles; every triangle is a figure; therefore, every figure has its three angles equal to two right angles.[43] Here we have an invalid syllogism; for it is in the Third figure, and sins against the conditions of that figure, by exhibiting an universal affirmative conclusion: it is a syllogism properly concluding in _Darapti_, but with conclusion improperly generalized. Yet Aristotle intimates that a scientific geometer of his day, in argument with an unscientific opponent, would admit the conclusion to be well proved, not knowing how to point out where the fallacy lay: he would, if asked, grant the premisses necessary for constructing such a syllogism; and, even if not asked, would suppose that he had already granted them, or that they ought to be granted.[44]

[Footnote 43: Ibid. p. 168, a. 40: [Greek: ou)d' ei) to\ tri/gônon duoi=n o)rthai=n i)/sas e)/chei, _sumbe/bêke d' au)tô=| schê/mati ei)=nai_ ê)\ prô/tô| ê)\ a)rchê=|, o(/ti _schê=ma_ ê)\ a)rchê\ ê)\ prô=ton tou=to.]

Here we have Figure reckoned as an _accident_ of Triangle. This is a specimen of Aristotle's occasional laxity in employing the word [Greek: sumbebêko/s]. He commonly uses it as contrasted with _essential_, of which last term Mr. Poste says very justly (notes, p. 129):--"To complete the statement of Aristotle's view, it should be added, that essential propositions are those whose predicate cannot be defined without naming the subject, or whose subject cannot be defined without naming the predicate." Now figure is the genus to which triangle belongs, and triangle cannot be defined without naming its genus figure. But to include Genus as a predicable under the head of [Greek: sumbebêko/s]or Accident, is in marked opposition to Aristotle's own doctrine elsewhere: see Topic. I. v. p. 102, b. 4; iv. p. 101, b. 17; Analyt. Post. I. ii. p. 71, b. 9; Metaphys. E. p. 1026, b. 32. It is a misfortune that Aristotle gave to this general head of Fallacy the misleading title of _Fallacia Accidentia_--[Greek: para\ to\ sumbebêko/s]. When he gave this title, he probably had present to his mind only such examples as he indicates in Soph. El. v. p. 166, b. 32. Throughout the Topica and elsewhere, Genus is distinguished pointedly from [Greek: sumbebêko/s], though examples occur occasionally in which the distinction is neglected. The two Fallacies called _Accidentis_ and _Consequentis_, would both be more properly ranked under one common logical title--_Supposed convertibility or interchangeableness between Subject and Predicate_--[Greek: ei) to/de a)po\ tou=de mê\ chôri/zetai, mêd' a)po\ thate/rou chôri/zesthai tha/teron] (vii. p. 169, b. 8).]

[Footnote 44: Soph. El. vi. p. 168, b. 6: [Greek: a)lla\ para\ tou=to kai\ oi( techni=tai kai\ o(/lôs oi( e)pistê/mones u(po\ tô=n a)nepistêmo/nôn e)le/gchontai; kata\ sumbebêko\s ga\r poiou=ntai tou\s sullogismou\s pro\s tou\s ei)do/tas; oi( d' ou) duna/menoi diairei=n ê)\ e)rôtô/menoi dido/asin ê)\ ou) do/ntes oi)/ontai dedôke/nai.]]

The passage affords us a curious insight into the intellectual grasp of the scientific men contemporary with Aristotle. Most of them were prepared to admit fallacious inferences (such as the above) which assumed the interchangeability of subject and predicate. They had paid little or no attention to the logical relations between one proposition and another, and between the two different terms of the same proposition. The differences of essential from accidental predication, and of each among the five Predicables from the others, must have been practically familiar to them, as to others, from the habit of correct speaking in detail; but they had not been called upon to consider correct speaking and reasoning in theory, nor to understand upon what conditions it depended whether the march of their argumentative discourse landed them in true or false results. And, if even the scientific men were thus unaware of logical fallacies, we may be sure that this must have been still more the case with unscientific men, of ordinary intelligence and education. Aristotle tells us here, in more than one passage, how widespread such illogical tendencies were: to fancy that two subjects which had one predicate the same must be the same with each other in all respects;[45] to understand each predicate applied to a subject as being itself an independent subject, implying a new _Hoc Aliquid_ or _Unum_;[46] to treat the universal, not as a common epithet but, as a substantive and singular apart;[47] to use equivocal words or phrases, even the most wide and vague, without any attempt to discriminate their various meanings.[48] Such insensibility to the conditions of accurate reasoning prevailed alike among ordinary men and among the men of special science. A geometer would be imposed upon by the inconclusive syllogism stated in the last paragraph, which, as being founded on the _Fallacia Accidentia_ (or interchangeability of subject and predicate), Aristotle numbers among Sophistical Refutations. Such a refutation, however, even when successful, would not at all prove that the geometer was deficient in knowledge of his own science;[49] for it would puzzle the really scientific man as well as the pretender.

[Footnote 45: Soph. El. vi. p. 168, b. 31: [Greek: ta\ ga\r e(ni\ tau)ta/, kai\ a)llê/lois a)xiou=men ei)=nai tau)ta/.]--vii. p. 169, b. 7: [Greek: e)/ti kai\ e)pi\ pollô=n phai/netai _kai\ a)xiou=tai ou(/tôs_, ei) to/de a)po\ tou=de mê\ chôri/zetai, mêd' a)po\ thate/rou chôri/zesthai tha/teron.]]

[Footnote 46: Ibid. vii. p. 169, a. 33: [Greek: o(/ti _pa=n to\ katêgorou/meno/n tinos u(polamba/nomen to/de ti kai\ ô(s e(\n u(pakou/omen_; tô=| ga\r e(ni\ kai\ tê=| ou)si/a| ma/lista dokei= pare/pesthai to\ to/de ti kai\ to\ o)/n.]]

[Footnote 47: Ibid. xxii. p. 178, b. 37-p. 179, a. 10.]

[Footnote 48: Ibid. vii. p. 169, a. 22.]

[Footnote 49: Ibid. viii. p. 169, b. 27: [Greek: oi( de\ sophistikoi\ e)/legchoi, a)\n kai\ sullogi/zôntai tê\n a)nti/phasin, ou) poiou=si dê=lon ei) a)gnoei=; kai\ ga\r to\n ei)do/ta e)mpodi/zousi tou/tois toi=s lo/gois.] Compare vi. p. 168, b. 6.]

We must always recollect that Aristotle was the first author who studied the logical relations between Terms and Propositions, with a view to theory and to general rules founded thereupon. The distinctions which he brought to view were in his time novelties; even the simplest rules, such as those relating to the Conversion of propositions, or to Contraries and Contradictories, had never been stated in general terms before. Up to a certain point, indeed, acquired habit, even without these generalities, would doubtless lead to correct speech and reasoning; yet liable to be perverted in many cases by erroneous tendencies, requiring to be indicated and guarded against by a logician. When we are told that even a professed geometer was imposed upon by these fallacies, we learn at once how deep-seated were such illogical deficiencies, how useful was Aristotle's theoretical study in marking them out, and how insufficient was his classification when he described the Fallacies as obvious frauds, broached only by dishonest professional Sophists. As he himself states, the cause of deceit turns upon a quite trifling difference; having its root in the imperfection of language and in our frequent habit of using words without much attention to logical distinctions.[50]

[Footnote 50: Soph. El. vii. p. 169, b. 14: [Greek: e)n a(/pasi ga\r ê( a)pa/tê dia\ to\ para\ mikro/n; ou) ga\r diakribou=men ou)/te tê=s prota/seôs ou)/te tou= sullogismou= to\n o(/ron dia\ tê\n ei)rême/nên ai)ti/an.] Compare v. p. 167, a. 5-14; i. p. 165, a. 6-19.]

Under one or other, then, of the thirteen general heads above enumerated, all Paralogisms must be included--merely apparent syllogisms, or refutations, which are not real and valid;[51] and all of them designated by Aristotle as sophistic or eristic. Besides these, moreover, he includes, as we saw, under the same designation, syllogisms or refutations valid in form, and true as to conclusion, yet founded on premisses not suited to the matter in debate; _i.e._, not suited to Dialectic. Now, here it is that difficulty arises. Dialectic and Rhetoric are carefully distinguished by Aristotle from all the special sciences (such as Geometry, Astronomy, Medicine, &c.); and are construed as embracing every variety of authoritative _dicta_, current beliefs, and matters of opinion, together with all the most general maxims and hypotheses of Ontology and Metaphysics, of Physics and Ethics, and the common Axioms assumed in all the sciences, as discriminated from what is special and peculiar to each. Construed in this way, we might imagine that the subject-matter of Dialectic was all-comprehensive, and that every thing without exception belonged to it, except the specialties of Geometry and of the other sciences; and such is the usual language of Aristotle. Yet in the treatise before us we find him exerting himself to establish another classification, and to part off Dialectic from a certain other science or art which he acknowledges under the title of Sophistic or Eristic.[52] Elsewhere he describes Sophistic as occupied in the study of accidents or occasional conjunctions; and this characteristic feature parts it off from Demonstration and Science. But there is greater difficulty when he tries to part it off from Dialectic. Where are we to find a clear line of distinction between the matter of dialectic debate (gymnastic or testing) on the one hand, and the matter of debate sophistic or litigious, on the other? At the beginning of the Topica Aristotle assigned, as the distinction, that the Dialectician argues upon premisses _really_ probable, while the litigious Sophist takes up premisses which are probable _in appearance only_, and not in reality; such apparent _probabilia_ (he goes on to say) having only the most superficial semblance of truth, and being seen immediately to be manifest falsehoods by persons of very ordinary intelligence.[53] But I have already pointed out that this description of apparent _probabilia_, if considered as applying to fallacious reasoning generally, is both untenable in itself, and contradicted by Aristotle himself elsewhere. The truth is, that there is no clear distinction between the matter of Dialectic and the matter of Sophistic. And so, indeed, Aristotle must be understood to admit, when he falls back upon an alleged distinction of aim and purpose between the practitioners of one and the other. The litigious man (he tells us) is bent upon nothing but victory in debate, _per fas et nefas_: the Sophist aims at passing himself off falsely for a wise or clever man, and making money thereby.[54]

[Footnote 51: Ibid. viii. p. 170, a. 10.]

[Footnote 52: Metaphys. K. viii. p. 1064, b. 26: [Greek: tou=to de\ (to\ sumbebêko/s) ou)demi/a zêtei= tô=n o(mologoume/nôs ou)sô=n e)pistêmô=n, _plê\n ê( sophistikê/_; peri\ to\ sumbebêko\s ga\r au(/tê mo/nê pragmateu/etai.] Compare Analyt. Poster. I. ii. p. 71, b. 10.]