Chapter III: Categoriæ (2)

[Footnote 49: Ibid. a. 36, seq.]

_Relata_ ([Greek: ta\ pro/s ti]--_ad Aliquid_) are things such, that what they are, they are said to be _of other things_, or are said to in some other manner _towards something else_ ([Greek: o(/sa au)ta\ a(/per e)sti\n **e(te/rôn ei)=nai le/getai, ê)\ o(pôstou=n a)/llôs pro\s e(/teron]). Thus, that which is greater, is said to be greater _than another_; that which is called double is called also double _of another_. Habit, disposition, perception, cognition, position, &c., are all _Relata_. Habit, is habit _of something_; perception and cognition, are always _of something_; position, is position _of something_. The Category of Relation admits contrariety in some cases, but not always; it also admits, in some cases, graduation, or the more or less in degree; things are more like or less like to each other.[50] All _Relata_ are so designated in virtue of their relation to other _Correlata_; the master is master _of a servant_--the servant is servant _of a master_. Sometimes the _Correlatum_ is mentioned not in the genitive case but in some other case; thus cognition is cognition _of_ the _cognitum_, but _cognitum_ is _cognitum by_ cognition; perception is perception _of_ the _perceptum_, but the _perceptum_ is _perceptum by_ perception.[51] The correlation indeed will not manifestly appear, unless the Correlate be designated by its appropriate term: thus, if the wing be declared to be wing _of a bird_, there is no apparent correlation; we ought to say, the wing is wing _of the winged_, and the winged is winged _through_ or _by_ the wing; for the wing belongs to the bird, not _quâ bird_, but _quâ winged_,[52] since there are many things winged, which are not birds. Sometimes there is no current term appropriate to the Correlate, so that we are under the necessity of coining one for the occasion: we must say, to speak with strict accuracy, [Greek: ê( kephalê/, tou= kephalôtou= kephalê/] not [Greek: ê( kephalê/, tou= zô=|ou kephalê/]; [Greek: to\ pêda/lion, tou= pêdaliôtou= pêda/lion], not [Greek: to\ pêda/lion, ploi/ou pêda/lion].[53]

[Footnote 50: Aristot. Categ. p. 6, b. 20.]

[Footnote 51: Ibid. b. 28-37.]

[Footnote 52: Ibid. b. 36; p. 7, a. 5. [Greek: ou) mê\n a)ll' e)ni/ote ou) do/xei a)ntistre/phein, e)a\n mê\ oi)kei/ôs pro\s o(\ le/getai a)podothê=|, a)lla\ diama/rtê| o( a)podidou/s, oi(=on to\ ptero\n e)a\n a)podothê=| o)/rnithos, ou)k a)ntistre/phei o)/rnis pterou=; ou) ga\r oi)kei/ôs to\ prô=ton a)pode/dotai ptero\n o)/rnithos; ou) ga\r ê(=| o)/rnis, tau/tê| to\ ptero\n au)tou= le/getai, a)ll' ê(=| pterôto/n e)sti; pollô=n ga\r kai\ a)/llôn ptera/ e)stin, a(\ ou)k ei)si\n o)/rnithes.]]

[Footnote 53: Ibid. p. 7, a. 6-25. [Greek: e)ni/ote de\ kai\ o)nomatopoiei=n I)/sôs a)nagkai=on, e)a\n mê\ kei/menon ê)=| o)/noma pro\s o(\ oi)kei/ôs a)\n a)podothei/ê], &c.]

The _Relatum_ and its Correlate seem to be _simul naturâ_. If you suppress either one of the pair, the other vanishes along with it. Aristotle appears to think, however, that there are many cases in which this is not true. He says that there can be no _cognoscens_ without a _cognoscibile_, nor any _percipiens_ without a _percipibile_; but that there may be _cognoscibile_ without any _cognoscens_, and _percipibile_ without any _percipiens_. He says that [Greek: to\ ai)sthêto\n] exists [Greek: pro\ tou= ai)/sthêsin ei)=nai].[54] Whether any Essence or Substance can be a _Relatum_ or not, he is puzzled to say; he seems to think that the Second Essence may be, but that the First Essence cannot be so. He concludes, however, by admitting that the question is one of doubt and difficulty.[55]

[Footnote 54: Ibid. b. 15; p. 8, a. 12. The Scholion of Simplikius on this point (p. 65, a. 16, b. 18, Br.) is instructive. He gives his own opinion, and that of some preceding commentators, adverse to Aristotle. He says that [Greek: e)pistê/mê] and [Greek: to\ e)pistêto/n, ai)sthêsis] and [Greek: to\ ai)sthêto/n], are not properly correlates. The actual correlates with the actual, the potential with the potential. Now, in the above pairs, [Greek: to\ e)pistêto\n] and [Greek: to\ ai)sthêto\n] are potentials, while [Greek: **e)pistê/mê] and [Greek: ai)/sthêsis] are actuals; therefore it is correct to say that [Greek: to\ e)pistêto\n] and [Greek: to\ ai)sthêto\n] will not cease to exist if you take away [Greek: e)pistê/mê] and [Greek: ai)/sthêsis]. But the real and proper correlate to [Greek: to\ e)pistêto\n] would be [Greek: to\ e)pistêmoniko/n]: the proper correlate to [Greek: to\ ai)sthêto\n] would be [Greek: to\ ai)sthêtiko\n]. And when we take these two latter pairs, it is perfectly correct to say, [Greek: sunanairei= tau=ta a)/llêla].

In the treatise, De Partibus Animalium, i. p. 641, b. 2, where Aristotle makes [Greek: nou=s] correlate with [Greek: ta\ noêta/], we must understand [Greek: nou=s] as equivalent to [Greek: to\ noêtiko/n], and as different from [Greek: ê( no/êsis].]

[Footnote 55: Aristot. Categ. p. 8, b. 22.]

Quality is that according to which Subjects are called Such and Such ([Greek: poioi/ tines]). It is, however, not a true genus, but a vague word, of many distinct, though analogous, meanings including an assemblage of particulars not bound together by any generic tie.[56] The more familiar varieties are--1. Habits or endowments ([Greek: e(/xeis]) of a durable character, such as, wise, just, virtuous; 2. Conditions more or less transitory, such as, hot, cold, sick, healthy, &c. ([Greek: diathe/seis]); 3. Natural powers or incapacities, such as hard, soft, fit for boxing, fit for running, &c. 4. Capacities of causing sensation, such as sweet of honey, hot and cold of fire and ice. But a person who occasionally blushes with shame, or occasionally becomes pale with fear, does not receive the designation of _such or such_ from this fact; the occasional emotion is a passion, not a quality.[57]

[Footnote 56: See the first note on p. 66. Aristot. Categ. p. 8, b. 26: [Greek: e)/sti de\ ê( poio/tês tô=n pleonachô=s legome/nôn], &c. Compare Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, a. 33, and the Scholion of Alexander, p. 715, a. 5, Br.

The abstract term [Greek: Poio/tês] was a new coinage in Plato's time; he introduces it with an apology (Theætet. p. 182 A.).]

[Footnote 57: Aristot. Categ. p. 9, b. 20-33.]

A fifth variety of Quality is figure or circumscribing form, straightness or crookedness. But dense, rare, rough, smooth, are not properly varieties of Quality; objects are not denominated _such and such_ from these circumstances. They rather declare position of the particles of an object in reference to each other, near or distant, evenly or unevenly arranged.[58]

[Footnote 58: Ibid. p. 10, a. 11-24.]

Quality admits, in some cases but not in all, both contrariety and graduation. Just is contrary to unjust, black to white; but there is no contrary to red or pale. If one of two contraries belongs to Quality, the other of the two will also belong to Quality. In regard to graduation, we can hardly say that Quality in the abstract is capable of more and less; but it is indisputable that different objects have more or less of the same quality. One man is more just, healthy, wise, than another; though justice or health in itself cannot be called more or less. One thing cannot be more a triangle, square, or circle than another; the square is not more a circle than the oblong.[59]

[Footnote 59: Aristot. Categ. p. 10, b. 12; p. 11, a. 10, 11-24.]

What has just been said is not peculiar to Quality; but one peculiarity there is requiring to be mentioned. Quality is the foundation of Similarity and Dissimilarity. Objects are called _like_ or _unlike_ in reference to qualities.[60]

[Footnote 60: Ibid. p. 11, a. 15.]

In speaking about Quality, Aristotle has cited many illustrations from _Relata_. Habits and dispositions, described by their generic names, are _Relata_; in their specific varieties they are Qualities. Thus cognition is always cognition _of something_, and is therefore a _Relatum_; but _grammatiké_ (grammatical cognition) is not _grammatiké of any thing_, and is therefore a Quality. It has been already intimated[61] that the same variety may well belong to two distinct Categories.

[Footnote 61: Ibid. a. 20-38. [Greek: e)/ti ei) tu/gchanoi to\ au)to\ pro/s ti kai\ poio\n o)/n, ou)de\n a)/topon e)n a)mphote/rois toi=s ge/nesin au)to\ katarithmei=sthai.]]

After having thus dwelt at some length on each of the first four Categories, Aristotle passes lightly over the remaining six. Respecting _Agere_ and _Pati_, he observes that they admit (like Quality) both of graduation and contrariety. Respecting _Jac[=e]re_ he tells us that the predicates included in it are derived from the fact of positions, which positions he had before ranked among the _Relata_. Respecting _Ubi_, _Quando_, and _Habere_, he considers them all so manifest and intelligible, that he will say nothing about them; he repeats the illustrations before given--_Habere_, as, to be shod, or to be armed (to have shoes or arms); _Ubi_, as, in the Lykeium; _Quando_, as, yesterday, last year.[62]

[Footnote 62: Ibid. b. 8-15. [Greek: dia\ to\ prophanê= ei)=nai, ou)de\n u(pe\r au)tô=n a)/llo le/getai ê)\ o(/sa e)n a)rchê=| e)rre/thê], &c.]

. . . . . .

No part of the Aristotelian doctrine has become more incorporated with logical tradition, or elicited a greater amount of comment and discussion,[63] than these Ten Categories or Predicaments. I have endeavoured to give the exposition as near as may be in the words and with the illustrations of Aristotle; because in many of the comments new points of view are introduced, sometimes more just than those of Aristotle, but not present to his mind. Modern logicians join the Categories side by side with the five Predicables, which are explained in the Eisagoge of Porphyry, more than five centuries after Aristotle's death. As expositors of Logic they are right in doing this; but my purpose is to illustrate rather the views of Aristotle. The mind of Aristotle was not altogether exempt from that fascination[64] which particular numbers exercised upon the Pythagoreans and after them upon Plato. To the number Ten the Pythagoreans ascribed peculiar virtue and perfection. The fundamental Contraries, which they laid down as the Principles of the Universe, were ten in number.[65] After them, also, Plato carried his ideal numbers as far as the Dekad, but no farther. That Aristotle considered Ten to be the suitable number for a complete list of general heads--that he was satisfied with making up the list of ten, and looked for nothing beyond--may be inferred from the different manner in which he deals with the different items. At least, such was his point of view when he composed this treatise. Though he recognizes all the ten Categories as co-ordinate in so far that (except _Quale_) each is a distinct Genus, not reducible under either of the others, yet he devotes all his attention to the first four, and gives explanations (copious for him) in regard to these. About the fifth and sixth (_Agere_ and _Pati_)[66] he says a little, though much less than we should expect, considering their extent and importance. About the last four, next to nothing appears. There are even passages in his writings where he seems to drop all mention of the two last (_Jacere_ and _Habere_), and to recognize no more than eight Predicaments. In the treatise Categoriæ where his attention is fastened on Terms and their signification, and on the appropriate way of combining these terms into propositions, he recites the ten _seriatim_; but in other treatises, where his remarks bear more upon the matter and less upon the terms by which it is signified, he thinks himself warranted in leaving out the two or three whose applications are most confined to special subjects. If he had thought fit to carry the total number of Predicaments to twelve or fifteen instead of ten,[67] he would probably have had little difficulty in finding some other general heads not less entitled to admission than _Jacere_ and _Habere_; the rather, as he himself allows, even in regard to the principal Categories, that particulars comprised under one of them may also be comprised under another, and that there is no necessity for supposing each particular to be restricted to one Category exclusively.

[Footnote 63: About the prodigious number of these comments, see the Scholion of Dexippus, p. 39, a. 34, Br.; p. 5, ed. Spengel.]

[Footnote 64: See Simpl. in Categ. Schol. p. 78, b. 14, Br.; also the two first chapters of the Aristotelian treatise De Coelo; compare also, about the perfection of the [Greek: tri/tê su/stasis], De Partibus Animalium, ii. p. 646, b. 9; De Generat. Animal. iii. p. 760, a. 34.]

[Footnote 65: Aristot. Metaph. A. p. 986, a. 8. There existed, in the time of the later Peripatetics, a treatise in the Doric dialect by Archytas--[Greek: Peri\ tou= Panto/s]--discriminating Ten Categories, and apparently the same ten Categories as Aristotle. By several Aristotelian critics this treatise was believed to have been composed by Archytas the Tarentine, eminent both as a Pythagorean philosopher and as the leading citizen of Tarentum--the contemporary and friend of Plato, and, therefore, of course, earlier than Aristotle. Several critics believed that Aristotle had borrowed his Ten Categories from this work of Archytas; and we know that the latter preserved the total number of Ten. See Schol. ad Categor. p. 79, b. 3, Br.

But other critics affirmed, apparently with better reason, that the Archytas, author of this treatise, was a Peripatetic philosopher later than Aristotle; and that the doctrine of Archytas on the Categories was copied from Aristotle in the same manner as the Doric treatise on the Kosmos, ascribed to the Lokrian Timæus, was copied from the Timæus of Plato, being translated into a Doric dialect.

See Scholia of Simplikius and Boëthius, p. 33, a. 1, n.; p. 40, a. 43, Brandis. The fact that this treatise was ascribed to the Tarentine Archytas, indicates how much the number Ten was consecrated in men's minds as a Pythagorean canon.]

[Footnote 66: Trendelenburg thinks (Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, p. 131) that Aristotle must have handled the Categories _Agere_, and _Pati_ more copiously in other treatises; and there are some passages in his works which render this probable. See De Animâ, ii. p. 416, b. 35; De Generat. Animal. iv. p. 768, b. 15. Moreover, in the list of Aristotle's works given by Diogenes Laertius, one title appears-- [Greek: Peri\ tou= poiei=n kai\ peponthe/nai] (Diog. L. v. 22).]

[Footnote 67: Prantl expresses this view in his Geschichte der Logik (p. 206), and I think it just.]

These remarks serve partly to meet the difficulties pointed out by commentators in regard to the Ten Categories. From the century immediately succeeding Aristotle, down to recent times, the question has always been asked, why did Aristotle fix upon Ten Categories rather than any other number? and why upon these Ten rather than others? And ancient commentators[68] as well as modern have insisted, that the classification is at once defective and redundant; leaving out altogether some particulars, while it enumerates others twice over or more than twice. (This last charge is, however, admitted by Aristotle himself, who considers it no ground of objection that the same particular may sometimes be ranked under two distinct heads.) The replies made to the questions, and the attempts to shew cause for the selection of these Ten classes, have not been satisfactory; though it is certain that Aristotle himself treats the classification as if it were real and exhaustive,[69] obtained by comparing many propositions and drawing from them an induction. He tries to determine, in regard to some particular enquiries, under which of the Ten _Summa Genera_ the subject of the enquiry is to be ranged; he indicates some predicate of extreme generality (_Unum_, _Bonum_, &c.), which extend over all or several Categories, as equivocal or analogous, representing no true _Genera_. But though Aristotle takes this view of the completeness of his own classification, he never assigns the grounds of it, and we are left to make them out in the best way we can.

[Footnote 68: Schol. p. 47, b. 14, seq., 49, a. 10, seq. Br.; also Simplikius ad Categor. fol. 15, 31 A, 33 E. ed. Basil., 1551.]

[Footnote 69 Scholia ad Analyt. Poster. (I. xxiii. p. 83, a. 21) p. 227, b. 40, Br. [Greek: O(/ti de\ tosau=tai mo/nai ai( katêgori/ai ai( kata\ tô=n ou)siô=n lego/menai, e)k tê=s e)pagôgê=s lamba/nei.]

Brentano (in his treatise, Ueber die Bedeutung des Seienden in Aristoteles, Sects. 12 and 13, pp. 148-177) attempts to draw out a scheme of systematic deduction for the Categories. He quotes (pp. 181, 182) a passage from Thomas Aquinas, in which such a scheme is set forth acutely and plausibly. But if Aristotle had had any such system present to his mind, he would hardly have left it to be divined by commentators.

Simplikius observes (Schol. ad Categ. p. 44, a. 30) that the last nine Categories coincide in the main (excepting such portion of _Quale_ as belongs to the Essence) with [Greek: to\ o)/n kata\ sumbebêko/s]: which latter, according to Aristotle's repeated declarations, can never be the matter of any theorizing or scientific treatment--[Greek: ou)demi/a e)sti\ peri\ au)to\ theôri/a], Metaphys. E. p. 1026, b. 4; K. p. 1064, b. 17. This view of Aristotle respecting [Greek: to\ sumbebêko/s], is hardly consistent with a scheme of intentional deduction for the accidental predicates.]

We cannot safely presume, I think, that he followed out any deductive principle or system; if he had done so, he would probably have indicated it. The decuple indication of general heads arose rather from comparison of propositions and induction therefrom. Under each of these ten heads, some predicate or other may always be applied to every concrete individual object, such as a man or animal. Aristotle proceeded by comparing a variety of propositions, such as were employed in common discourse or dialectic, and throwing the different predicates into _genera_, according as they stood in different logical relation to the Subject. The analysis applied is not metaphysical but logical; it does not resolve the real individual into metaphysical [Greek: a)rchai\] or Principles, such as Form and Matter; it accepts the individual as he stands, with his full complex array of predicates embodied in a proposition, and analyses that proposition into its logical constituents.[70] The predicates derive their existence from being attached to the First Subject, and have a different manner of existence according as they are differently related to the First Subject.[71] What is this individual, Sokrates? He is an _animal_. What is his Species? _Man_. What is the Differentia, limiting the Genus and constituting the Species? _Rationality_, _two-footedness_. What is his height and bulk? He is _six feet_ high, and is of _twelve stone_ weight. What manner of man is he? He is _flat-nosed_, _virtuous_, _patient_, _brave_. In what relation does he stand to others? He is a _father_, a _proprietor_, a _citizen_, a _general_. What is he doing? He is _digging his garden_, _ploughing his field_. What is being done to him? He is _being rubbed with oil_, he is _having his hair cut_. Where is he? _In the city_, _at home_, _in bed_. When do you speak of him? _As he is, at this moment_, _as he was, yesterday_, _last year_. In what posture is he? He is _lying down_, _sitting_, _standing up_, _kneeling_, _balancing on one leg_. What is he wearing? He _has a tunic_, _armour_, _shoes_, _gloves_.

[Footnote 70: Aristot. Metaphys. Z. p. 1038, b. 15. [Greek: dichô=s u(pokei=tai, ê)\ to/de ti o)/n, ô(/sper to\ zô=|on toi=s pa/thesin, ê)\ ô(s ê( u(/lê tê=| e)ntelechei/a|.] The first mode of [Greek: u(pokei/menon] is what is in the Categories. For the second, which is the metaphysical analysis, see Aristot. Metaph. Z. p. 1029, a. 23: [Greek: ta\ me\n ga\r a)/lla tê=s ou)si/as katêgorei=tai, au(/tê de\ tê=s u(/lês. ô(/ste to\ e)/schaton kath' au(to\ ou)/te ti\ ou)/te poso\n ou)/te a)/llo ou)the/n e)sti.]

Porphyry and Dexippus tell us (Schol. ad Categ. p. 45, a. 6-30) that both Aristotle and the Stoics distinguished [Greek: prô=ton u(pokei/menon] and [Greek: deu/teron u(pokei/menon]. The [Greek: prô=ton u(pokei/menon] is [Greek: ê( a)/poios u(/lê--to\ duna/mei sô=ma], which Aristotle insists upon in the Physica and Metaphysica, the [Greek: deu/teron u(pokei/menon, o(\ koinô=s poio\n ê)\ i)di/ôs u(phi/statai], coincides with the [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a] of the Categories, already implicated with [Greek: ei)=dos] and stopping short of metaphysical analysis.

The remarks of Boêthus and Simplikius upon this point deserve attention. Schol. pp. 50-54, Br.; p. 54, a. 2: [Greek: ou) peri\ tê=s a)sche/tou u(/lês e)sti\n o( parô\n lo/gos, a)lla\ tê=s ê)/dê sche/sin e)chou/sês pro\s to\ ei)=dos. to\ de\ su/ntheton dêlo/noti, o(/per e)sti\ to\ a)/tomon, e)pide/chetai to\ to/de.] They point out that the terms Form and Matter are not mentioned in the Categories, nor do they serve to illustrate the Categories, which do not carry analysis so far back, take their initial start from [Greek: to/de ti], the [Greek: su/ntheton] of Form and Matter,--[Greek: ou)si/a kuriô/tata kai\ prô/tôs kai\ ma/lista legome/nê].

Simplikius says (p. 50, a. 17):--[Greek: dunato\n de\ tou= mê\ mnêmoneu=sai tou= ei)/dous kai\ tê=s u(/lês ai)/tion le/gein, kai\ to\ tê\n tô=n Katêgoriô=n pragmatei/an _kata\ tê\n pro/cheiron kai\ koinê\n tou= lo/gou chrê=sin_ poiei=sthai; to\ de\ tê=s u(/lês kai\ tou= ei)/dous o)/noma kai\ ta\ u(po\ tou/tôn sêmaino/mena ou)k ê)=n toi=s polloi=s sunê/thê], &c. Compare p. 47, a. 27. This what Dexippus says also, that the Categories bear only upon [Greek: tê\n prô/tên chrei/an tou= lo/gou kath' ê(\n ta\ pra/gmata dêlou=n a)llêlois e)phie/metha] (p. 13, ed. Spengel; also p. 49).

Waitz, ad Categor. p. 284. "In Categoriis, non de ipsâ rerum naturâ et veritate exponit, sed res tales capit, quales apparent in communi vitâ homini philosophiâ non imbuto."

We may add, that Aristotle applies the metaphysical analysis--Form and Matter--not only to the Category [Greek: ou)si/a] but also to that of [Greek: poio\n] and [Greek: poso/n] (De Coelo, iv. 312, a. 14.)]

[Footnote 71: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: D]. 1017, a. 23. [Greek: o(sachô=s ga\r le/getai, tosautachô=s to\ ei)=nai sêmai/nei].]

Confining ourselves (as I have already observed that Aristotle does in the Categories) to those perceptible or physical subjects which every one admits,[72] and keeping clear of metaphysical entities, we shall see that respecting any one of these subjects the nine questions here put may all be put and answered; that the two last are most likely to be put in regard to some living being; and that the last can seldom be put in regard to any other subject except a person (including man, woman, or child). Every individual person falls necessarily under each of the ten Categories; belongs to the Genus animal, Species man; he is of a certain height and bulk; has certain qualities; stands in certain relations to other persons or things; is doing something and suffering something; is in a certain place; must be described with reference to a certain moment of time; is in a certain attitude or posture; is clothed or equipped in a certain manner. Information of some kind may always be given respecting him under each of these heads; he is always by necessity _quantus_, but not always of any particular quantity. Until such information is given, the concrete individual is not known under conditions thoroughly determined.[73] Moreover each head is separate and independent, not resolvable into any of the rest, with a reservation, presently to be noticed, of Relation in its most comprehensive meaning. When I say of a man, that he is at home, lying down, clothed with a tunic, &c., I do not predicate of him any quality, action, or passion. The information which I give belongs to three other heads distinct from these last, and distinct also from each other. If you suppress the two last of the ten Categories and leave only the preceding eight, under which of these eight are you to rank the predicates, Sokrates is _lying down_, Sokrates is _clothed with a tunic_, &c.? The necessity for admitting the ninth and tenth Categories (_Jacere_ and _Habere_) as separate general heads in the list, is as great as the necessity for admitting most of the Categories which precede. The ninth and tenth are of narrower comprehension,[74] and include a smaller number of distinguishable varieties, than the preceding; but they are not the less separate heads of information. So, among the chemical elements enumerated by modern science, some are very rarely found; yet they are not for that reason the less entitled to a place in the list.

[Footnote 72: Ibid. Z. p. 1028, b. 8, seq.: p. 1042, a. 25. [Greek: ai( ai)sthêtai\ ou)si/ai--ai( o(mologou/menai ou)si/ai].]

[Footnote 73: Prantl observes, Geschichte der Logik, p. 208:--"Fragen wir, wie Aristoteles überhaupt dazu gekommen sei, von Kategorien zu sprechen, und welche Geltung dieselben bei ihm haben, so ist unsere Antwort hierauf folgende: Aristoteles geht, im Gegensatze gegen Platon, davon aus, dass die Allgemeinheit in der Concretion des Seienden sich verwirkliche und in dieser Realität von dem menschlichen Denken und Sprechen ergriffen werde; der Verwirklichungsprocess des concret Seienden ist der Uebergang vom Unbestimmten, jeder Bestimmung aber fähigen, zum allseitig Bestimmten, welchem demnach die Bestimmtheit überhaupt als eine selbst concret gewordene einwohnt und ebenso in des Menschen Rede von ihm ausgesagt wird. Das grundwesentliche Ergebniss der Verwirklichung ist sonach: die zeitlich-räumlich concret auftretende und hiemit individuell gewordene Substanzialität, in einer dem Zustande der Concretion entsprechenden Erscheinungsweise; diese letztere umfasst das ganze habituelle Dasein und Wirken der concreten Substanz, welche in der Welt der räumlichen Ausdehnung numerären Vielheit erscheint. Die ontologische Basis demnach der Kategorien ist der in die Concretion führende Verwirklichungsprocess der Bestimmtheit überhaupt."]

[Footnote 74: Plotinus, among his various grounds of exception to the ten Aristotelian Categories, objects to the ninth and tenth on the ground of their narrow comprehension (Ennead. vi. 1, 23, 24).

Boêthus expressly vindicated the title of [Greek: e)/chein] to be recognized as a separate Category, against the Stoic objectors.--Schol. ad Categ. p. 81, a. 5.]

If we seek not to appreciate the value of the Ten Categories as a philosophical classification, but to understand what was in the mind of Aristotle when he framed it, we shall attend, not much to the greater features, which it presents in common with every other scheme of classification, as to the minor features which constitute its peculiarity. In this point of view the two last Categories are more significant than the first four, and the tenth is the most significant of all; for every one is astonished when he finds _Habere_ enrolled as a tenth _Summum Genus_, co-ordinate with _Quantum_ and _Quale_. Now what is remarkable about the ninth and tenth Categories is, that individual persons or animals are the only Subjects respecting whom they are ever predicated, and are at the same time Subjects respecting whom they are constantly (or at least frequently) predicated. An individual person is habitually clothed in some particular way in all or part of his body; he (and perhaps his horse also) are the only Subjects that are ever so clothed. Moreover animals are the only Subjects, and among them man is the principal Subject, whose changes of posture are frequent, various, determined by internal impulses, and at the same time interesting to others to know. Hence we may infer that when Aristotle lays down the Ten Categories, as _Summa Genera_ for all predications which can be made about any given Subject, the Subject which he has wholly, or at least principally, in his mind is an individual Man. We understand, then, how it is that he declares _Habere_ and _Jacere_ to be so plain as to need no farther explanation. What is a man's posture? What is his clothing or equipment? are questions understood by every one.[75] But when Aristotle treats of _Habere_ elsewhere, he is far from recognizing it as narrow and plain _per se_. Even in the Post-Predicamenta (an appendix tacked on to the Categoriæ, either by himself afterwards, or by some follower) he declares _Habere_ to be a predicate of vague and equivocal signification; including portions of _Quale_, _Quantum_, and _Relata_. And he specifies the personal equipment of an individual as only one among these many varieties of signification. He takes the same view in the fourth book ([Greek: D].) of the Metaphysica, which book is a sort of lexicon of philosophical terms.[76] This enlargement of the meaning of the word _Habere_ seems to indicate an alteration of Aristotle's point of view, dropping that special reference to an individual man as Subject, which was present to him when he drew up the list of Ten Categories. The like alteration carried him still farther, so as to omit the ninth and tenth almost entirely, when he discusses the more extensive topics of philosophy. Some of his followers, on the contrary, instead of omitting _Habere_ out of the list of Categories, tried to procure recognition for it in the larger sense which it bears in the Metaphysica. Archytas ranked it fifth in the series, immediately after _Relata_.[77]

[Footnote 75: In the thirteenth and fourteenth chapters of Mr. James Harris's Philosophical Arrangements, there is a learned and valuable illustration of these two last Aristotelian Categories. I think, however, that he gives to the Predicament [Greek: Kei=sthai] (_Jacere_) a larger and more comprehensive meaning than it bears in the treatise Categoriæ; and that neither he, nor the commentators whom he cites (p. 317), take sufficient notice of the marked distinction drawn in that treatise between [Greek: kei=sthai] and [Greek: the/sis] (Cat. p. 6, b. 12). Mr. Harris ranks the arrangement of words in an orderly discourse, and of propositions in a valid syllogism, as cases coming under the Predicament [Greek Kei=sthai]; which is travelling far beyond the meaning of that word in the Aristotelian Categories. At the same time he brings out strongly the fact, that living beings, and especially _men_, are the true and special subjects of predicates belonging to [Greek: Kei=sthai] and [Greek: E)/chein]. The more we attend to this, the nearer approach shall we make to the state of Aristotle's mind when he drew up the list of Categories; as indeed Harris himself seems to recognize (chap. ii. p. 29).]

[Footnote 76: Aristot. Categor. p. 15, b. 17; Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1023, a. 8.]

[Footnote 77: See the Scholia of Simplikius, p. 80, b. 7, seq.; p. 92, b. 41, Brand.; where the different views of Archytas, Plotinus, and Boêthus, are given; also p. 59, b. 43: [Greek: proêgei=tai ga\r ê( sumphuê\s tô=n pro/s ti sche/sis tô=n e)piktê/tôn sche/seôn, ô(s kai\ tô\| A)rchu/ta| dokei=.] In the language of Archytas, [Greek: ai( e)pi/ktêtoi sche/seis] were the equivalent of the Aristotelian [Greek: e)/chein].]

The narrow manner in which Aristotle conceives the Predicament _Habere_ in the treatise Categoriæ, and the enlarged sense given to that term both in the Post-Predicaments and in the Metaphysica, lead to a suspicion that the Categoriæ is comparatively early, in point of date, among his compositions. It seems more likely that he should begin with the narrower view, and pass from thence to the larger, rather than _vice versâ_. Probably the predicates specially applicable to Man would be among his early conceptions, but would by later thought be tacitly dropped,[78] so as to retain those only which had a wider philosophical application.

[Footnote 78: Respecting the paragraph (at the close of the Categoriæ) about [Greek: to\ e)/chein], see the Scholion in Waitz's ed. of the Organon, p. 38.

The fact that Archytas in his treatise presented the Aristotelian Category [Greek: e)/chein] under the more general phrase of [Greek: ai( e)pi/ktêtoi sche/seis] (see the preceding note), is among the reasons for believing that treatise to be later than Aristotle.]

I have already remarked that Aristotle, while enrolling all the Ten Predicaments as independent heads, each the _Generalissimum_ of a separate descending line of predicates, admitted at the same time that various predicates did not of necessity belong to one of these lines exclusively, but might take rank in more than one line. There are some which he enumerates under all the different heads of Quality, Relation, Action, Passion. The classification is evidently recognized as one to which we may apply a remark which he makes especially in regard to Quality and Relation, under both of which heads (he says) the same predicates may sometimes be counted.[79] And the observation is much more extensively true than he was aware; for he both conceives and defines the Category of Relation or Relativity (_Ad Aliquid_) in a way much narrower than really belongs to it. If he had assigned to this Category its full and true comprehension, he would have found it implicated with all the other nine. None of them can be isolated from it in predication.

[Footnote 79: Aristot. Categ. p. 11, a. 37.

Simplikius says that what Aristotle admits about [Greek: poio/tês], is true about all the other Categories also, viz.: that it is not a strict and proper [Greek: ge/nos]. Each of the ten Categories is (what Aristotle says about [Greek: to\ o(\n]) [Greek: me/son tô=n te sunôno/môn kai\ o(mônu/môn.--ou)de\ ga\r e)kei=na kuri/ôs e)sti\ ge/nê, ou)de\ ô(s ge/nê tô=n u(p' au)ta\ katêgorei=tai, _ta/xeôs ou)/sês pantachou= prô/tôn kai\ deute/rôn_.] (Scholia ad Categor. p. 69, b. 30, Br.) This is a remarkable observation, which has been sufficiently adverted to, I think, by Brentano in his treatise on Aristotle's Ontology.]

That _Agere_ and _Pati_ (with the illustrations which he himself gives thereof--_urit_, _uritur_) may be ranked as varieties under the generic Category of Relation or Relativity, can hardly be overlooked. The like is seen to be true about _Ubi_ and _Quando_, when we advert to any one of the predicates belonging to either; such as, _in the market-place_, _yesterday_.[80] Moreover, not merely the last six of the ten Categories, but also the second and fourth (_Quantum_ and _Quale_) are implicated with and subordinated to Relation. If we look at _Quantum_, we shall find that the example which Aristotle gives of it is [Greek: tripê=chus], tricubital, or three cubits long; a term quite as clearly relative as the term [Greek: dipla/sios] or double, which he afterwards produces as instance of the Category _Ad Aliquid_.[81] When we are asked the questions, How much is the height? How large is the field? we cannot give the information required except by a relative predicate--_it is three feet_--_it is four acres_; we thereby carry back the mind of the questioner to some unit of length or superficies already known to him, and we convey our meaning by comparison with such unit. Again, if we turn from _Quantum_ to _Quale_, we find the like Relativity implied in all the predicates whereby answer is made to the question [Greek: Poio\s ti/s e)sti?] _Qualis est_? What manner of man is he? _He is such as A, B, C_--persons whom we have previously seen, or heard, or read of.[82]

[Footnote 80: The remarks of Plotinus upon these four last-mentioned Categories are prolix and vague, but many of them go to shew how much [Greek: to\ pro/s ti] is involved in all of the four (Ennead. vi. 1, 14-18).]

[Footnote 81: Trendelenburg (Kategorienlehre, p. 184) admits a certain degree of interference and confusion between the Categories of _Quantum_ and _Ad Aliquid_; but in very scanty measure, and much beneath the reality.]

[Footnote 82: The following passages from Mr. James Mill (Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, vol. ii. ch. xiv. sect. ii. pp. 48, 49, 56, 1st ed.) state very clearly the Relativity of the predicates of Quantity and Quality:--

"It seems necessary that I should say something of the word _Quantus_, from which the word Quantity is derived. _Quantus_ is the correlate of _Tantus_. _Tantus_, _Quantus_, are relative terms, applicable to all the objects to which we apply the terms Great, Little."--"Of two lines, we call the one _tantus_, the other _quantus_. The occasions on which we do so, are when the one is as long as the other."--"When we say that one thing is _tantus_, _quantus_ another, or one so great, as the other is great; the first is referred to the last, the _tantus_ to the _quantus_. The first is distinguished and named by the last. The _Quantus_ is the standard."--"On what account, then, is it that we give to any thing the name _Quantus_? As a standard by which to name another thing, _Tantus_. The thing called _Quantus_ is the previously known thing, the ascertained amount, by which we can mark and define the other amount."

"_Talis_, _Qualis_, are applied to objects in the same way, on one account, as _Tantus_, _Quantus_, on another; and the explanation we gave of _Tantus_, _Quantus_, may be applied, _mutatis mutandis_, to the pair of relatives which we have now named. _Tantus_, _Quantus_, are names applied to objects on account of dimension. _Talis_, _Qualis_, are names applied to objects on account of all other sensations. We apply _Tantus_, _Quantus_, to a pair of objects when they are equal; we apply _Talis_, _Qualis_, to a pair of objects when they are alike. One of the objects is then the standard. The object _Qualis_ is that to which the reference is made."

Compare the same work, vol. i. ch. ix. p. 225:--"The word _Such_ is a relative term, and always connotes so much of the meaning of some other term. When we call a thing _such_, it is always understood that it is such _as_ some other thing. Corresponding with our words _such as_, the Latins had _Talis_, _Qualis_."]

We thus see that all the predicates, not only under the Category which Aristotle terms _Ad Aliquid_, but also under all the last nine Categories, are relative. Indeed the work of predication is always relative. The express purpose, as well as the practical usefulness, of a significant predicate is, to carry the mind of the hearer either to a comparison or to a general notion which is the result of past comparisons. But though each predicate connotes Relation, each connotes a certain _fundamentum_ besides, which gives to the Relation its peculiar character. Relations of Quantity are not the same as relations of Quality; the predicates of the former connote a _fundamentum_ different from the predicates of the latter, though in both the meaning conveyed is relative. In fact, every predicate or concrete general name is relative, or connotes a Relation to something else, actual or potential, beyond the thing named. The only name not relative is the Proper name, which connotes no attributes, and cannot properly be used as a predicate (so Aristotle remarks), but only as a Subject.[83] Sokrates, Kallias, Bukephalus &c., denotes the _Hoc Aliquid_ or _Unum Numero_, which, when pronounced alone, indicates some concrete aggregate (as yet unknown) which may manifest itself to my senses, but does not, so far as the name is concerned, involve necessary reference to anything besides; though even these names, when one and the same name continues to be applied to the same object, may be held to connote a real or supposed continuity of past or future existence, and become thus to a certain extent relative.

[Footnote 83: You may make Sokrates a predicate, in the proposition, [Greek: to\ leuko\n e)kei=no Sôkra/tês e)sti/n], but Aristotle dismisses this as an irregular or perverse manner of speaking (see Analytic. Priora, i. p. 43, a. 35; Analyt. Poster. i. p. 83, a. 2-16).

Alexander calls these propositions [Greek: ai( para\ phu/sin prota/seis] (see Schol. ad Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1017, a. 23).

Mr. James Harris observes (Philosophical Arrangements, ch. x. p. 214; also 317, 348):--"Hence too we may see why Relation stands next to Quantity; for in strictness the Predicaments which follow are but different modes of Relation, marked by some peculiar character over their own, over and above the relative character, which is common to them all." To which I would add, that the first two Categories, Substance and Quantity, are no less relative or correlative than the eight later Categories; as indeed Harris himself thinks; see the same work, pp. 90, 473: "Matter and Attribute are essentially distinct, yet, like _convex_ and _concave_, they are by nature inseparable. We have already spoken as to the inseparability of attributes; we now speak as to that of matter. [Greek: Ê(mei=s de\ phame\n me\n ei)=nai/ tina u(/lên tô=n sôma/tôn tô=n ai)sthêtô=n, a)lla\ tau/tên ou) chôristê\n a)ll' a)ei\ met' e)nantiô/seôs--u(/lên tê\n a)chô/riston me\n, u(pokeime/nên de\ toi=s e)nanti/ois (Aristot. De Gen. et Corr. p. 329, a. 24). By contraries, Aristotle means here the several attributes of matter, hot, cold, &c.; from some one or other of which matter is always inseparable."]

We must observe that what the proper name denotes is any certain concrete One and individual,[84] with his attributes essential and non-essential, whatever they may be, though as yet undeclared, and with his capacity of receiving other attributes different and even opposite. This is what Aristotle indicates as the most special characteristic of Substance or Essence, that while it is _Unum et Idem Numero_, it is capable of receiving contraries. This potentiality of contraries, described as characterizing the _Unum et Idem Numero_,[85] is relative to something about to come; the First Essence is doubtless logically First, but it is just as much relative to the Second, as the Second to the First. We know it only by two negations and one affirmation, all of which are relative to predications _in futuro_. It is neither in a Subject, nor predicable of a Subject. It is itself the ultimate Subject of all predications and all inherencies. Plainly, therefore, we know it only relatively to these predications and inherencies. Aristotle says truly, that if you take; away the First Essences, everything else, Second Essences as well as Accidents, disappears along with them. But he might have added with equal truth, that if you take away all Second Essences and all Accidents, the First Essences will disappear equally. The correlation and interdependence is reciprocal.[86] It may be suitable, with a view to clear and retainable philosophical explanation, to state the Subject first and the predicates afterwards; so that the Subject may thus be considered as logically _prius_. But in truth the Subject is only a _substratum_ for predicates,[87] as much as the predicates are _superstrata_ upon the Subject. The term _substratum_ designates not an absolute or a _per se_, but a _Correlatum_ to certain _superstrata_, determined or undetermined: now the _Correlatum_ is one of the pair implicated directly or indirectly in all Relation; and it is in fact specified by Aristotle as one variety of the Category _Ad Aliquid_.[88] We see therefore that the idea of Relativity attaches to the first of the ten Categories, as well as to the nine others. The inference from these observations is, that Relation or Relativity, understood in the large sense which really belongs to it, ought to be considered rather as an Universal, comprehending and pervading all the Categories, than as a separate Category in itself, co-ordinate with the other nine. It is the condition and characteristic of the work of predication generally; the last analysis of which is into Subject and Predicate, in reciprocal implication with each other. I remark that this was the view taken of it by some well-known Peripatetic commentators of antiquity;[89] by Andronikus, for example, and by Ammonius after him. Plato, though he makes no attempt to draw up a list of Categories, has an incidental passage respecting Relativity;[90] conceiving it in a very extended sense, apparently as belonging more or less to all predicates. Aristotle, though in the Categoriæ he gives a narrower explanation of it, founded upon grammatical rather than real considerations, yet intimates in other places that predicates ranked under the heads of _Quale_, _Actio_, _Passio_, _Jacere_, &c., may also be looked at as belonging to the head of _Ad Aliquid_.[91] This latter, moreover, he himself declares elsewhere to be _Ens_ in the lowest degree, farther removed from the _Prima Essentia_ than any of the other Categories; to be more in the nature of an appendage to some of them, especially to _Quantum_ and _Quale_;[92] and to presuppose, not only the _Prima Essentia_ (which all the nine later Categories presuppose), but also one or more of the others, indicating the particular mode of comparison or Relativity in each case affirmed. Thus, under one aspect, Relation or Relativity may be said to stand _prius naturâ_, and to come first in order before all the Categories, inasmuch as it is implicated with the whole business of predication (which those Categories are intended to resolve into its elements), and belongs not less to the mode of conceiving what we call the Subject, than to the mode of conceiving what we call its Predicates, each and all. Under another aspect, Relativity may be said to stand last in order among the Categories--even to come after the adverbial Categories _Ubi et Quando_; because its _locus standi_ is dim and doubtful, and because every one of the subordinate predicates belonging to it may be seen to belong to one or other of the remaining Categories also. Aristotle remarks that the Category _Ad Aliquid_ has no peculiar and definite mode of generation corresponding to it, in the manner that Increase and Diminution belong to _Quantum_, Change to _Quale_, Generation, simple and absolute, to Essence or Substance.[93] New relations may become predicable of a thing, without any change in the thing itself, but simply by changes in other things.[94]

[Footnote 84: Simplikius ap. Schol. p. 52, a. 42: [Greek: pro\s o(/ phasin oi( spoudaio/teroi tô=n e)xêgêtô=n, o(/ti ê( ai)sthêtê\ ou)si/a sumpho/rêsi/s ti/s e)sti poiotê/tôn kai\ u(/lês, kai\ o(mou= me\n pa/nta sumpage/nta mi/an poiei= tê\n ai)sthêtê\n ousi/an, chôri\s de\ e(/kaston lambano/menon to\ me\n poio\n to\ de\ poso/n e)sti lambano/menon, ê)/ ti a)/llo.]]

[Footnote 85: Aristot. Categ. p. 4, a. 10: [Greek: Ma/lista de\ I)/dion tou=to tê=s ou)si/as dokei= ei)=nai, to\ tau)to\n kai\ e(\n a)rithmô=| o)\n tô=n e)nanti/ôn ei)=nai dektiko/n.] See Waitz, note, p. 290: [Greek: dektiko\n] dicitur [Greek: to\ e)n ô(=| pe/phuken u(pa/rchein ti].

Dexippus, and after him Simplikius, observe justly, that the characteristic mark of [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a] is this very circumstance of being _unum numero_, which belongs in common to all [Greek: prô=|tai ou)si/ai], and is indicated by the Proper name: [Greek: lu/sis de\ touo/tou, o(/ti au)to\ to\ mi/an ei)=nai a)rithmô=|, koino/s e)sti lo/gos]. (Simpl. in Categor., fol. 22 [Greek: D]].; Dexippus, book ii. sect. 18, p. 57, ed. Spengel.)]

[Footnote 86: Aristot. Categ. p. 2, b. 5. [Greek: mê\ ou)sô=n ou)=n tô=n prô/tôn ou)siô=n a)du/naton tô=n a)/llôn ti ei)=nai.]

Mr. John Stuart Mill observes: "As to the self-existence of Substance, it is very true that a substance may be conceived to exist without any other substance; but so also may an attribute without any other attributes. And we can no more imagine a substance without attributes, than we can imagine attributes without a substance." (System of Logic, bk. i. ch. iii. p. 61, 6th ed.)]

[Footnote 87: Aristot. Physic. ii. p. 194, b. 8. [Greek: e)/ti tô=n pro/s ti ê( u(/lê; a)/llô| ga\r ei)/dei a)/llê u(/lê.]

Plotinus puts this correctly, in his criticisms on the Stoic Categories; criticisms which on this point equally apply to the Aristotelian: [Greek: pro/s ti ga\r to\ u(pokei/menon, ou) pro\s to\ e)n au)tô=|, a)lla\ pro\s to\ poiou=n ei)s au)to/, kei/menon. Kai\ to\ u(pokei/menon u(pokei=tai pro\s to\ ou)ch u(pokei/menon; ei) tou=to, pro\s ta\ to\ e)/xô], &c. Also Dexippus in the Scholia ad Categor. p. 45, a. 26: [Greek: to\ ga\r u(pokei/menon kata\ pro/s ti le/gesthai e)do/kei, tini\ ga\r u(pokei/menon.]]

[Footnote 88: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, b. 31, p. 1021, a. 27, seq.]

[Footnote 89: Schol. p. 60, a. 38, Br.; p. 47, b. 26. Xenokrates and Andronikus included all things under the two heads [Greek: to\ kath' au(to\] and [Greek: to\ pro/s ti]. [Greek: A)ndro/nikos me\n ga\r o( R(o/dios teleutai/an a)pone/mei toi=s pros ti ta/xin, le/gôn ai)ti/an toiau/tên. ta\ pro/s ti oi)kei/an u(/lê ou)k e)/chei; _paraphua/di ga\r e)/oiken oi)kei/an phu/sin mê\ e)chou/sê| a)lla\ periplekome/nê| toi=s e)/chousin oi)kei/an r(i/zan; ai( de\ e)/nnea katêgori/ai oi)kei/an u(/lên e)/chousin_; ei)ko/tôs ou)=n teleutai/an ô)/pheilon e)/chein ta/xin.] Again, Schol. p. 60, a. 24 (Ammonius): [Greek: kalô=s de/ tines a)peika/zousi ta\ pro/s ti paraphua/sin], &c. Also p. 59, b. 41; p. 49, a. 47; p. 61, b. 29: [Greek: i)/sôs de\ kai\ o(/ti ta\ pro/s ti e)n toi=s a)/llois ge/nesin u(phe/stêke, dia\ tou=to su\n au)toi=s theôrei=tai, ka)\n mê\ proêgoume/nês e)/tuche mnê/mês (and the Scholia ad p. 6, a. 36, prefixed to Waitz's edition, p. 33). Also p. 62, a. 37: [Greek: dia\ tau=ta de\ ô(s paraphuome/nên tai=s a)/llais katêgori/ais tê\n tou= pro/s ti e)peisodiô/dê nomi/zousi, kai/toi proêgoume/nên ou)=san kai\ kata\ diaphora\n oi)kei/an theôroume/nên.] Boêthus had written an entire book upon [Greek: ta\ pro/s ti], Schol. p. 61, b. 9.]

[Footnote 90: Plato, Republic, iv. 437 C. to 439 B. (compare also Sophistes, p. 255 C., and Politicus, p. 285). [Greek: Kai\ ta\ plei/ô dê\ pro\s ta\ e)la/ttô kai\ ta\ dipla/sia pro\s ta\ ê(mi/sea kai\ pa/nta ta\ toiau=ta, kai\ au)= baru/tera pro\s koupho/tera kai\ tha/ttô pro\s bradu/tera, _kai\ e)/ti ge ta\ therma\ pro\s ta\ psuchra\_ kai\ pa/nta ta\ tou/tois o(/moia, a)=r' ou)ch ou(/tôs e)/chei?] (438 C.)]

[Footnote 91: See Metaphysic. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, b. 26, p. 1021, b. 10. Trendelenburg observes (Gesch. der Kategorienlehre, pp. 118-122, seq.) how much more the description given of [Greek: pro/s ti] in the Categoriæ is determined by verbal or grammatical considerations, than in the Metaphysica and other treatises of Aristotle.]

[Footnote 92: See Ethic. Nikomach. i. p. 1096, a. 20: [Greek: to\ de\ kath' au(to\ kai\ ê( ou)si/a pro/teron tê=| phu/sei tou= pro/s ti; paraphua/di ga\r tou=t' e)/oike kai\ sumbebêko/ti tou= o)/ntos, ô(/ste ou)k a)\n ei)/ê koinê/ tis e)pi\ tou/tôn i)de/a.] (The expression [Greek: paraphua/di] was copied by Andronikus; see a note on the preceding page.) Metaphys. N. p. 1088, a. 22-26: [Greek: to\ de\ pro/s ti pa/ntôn ê(/kista phu/sis tis ê)\ ou)si/a tô=n katêgoriôn e)sti/, kai\ u(ste/ra tou= poiou= kai\ posou=; kai\ _pa/thos ti tou= posou= to\ pro/s ti_, ô(/sper e)le/chthê, a)ll' ou)ch u(/lê, ei)/ ti e(/teron kai\ tô=| o(/lôs koinô=| pro/s ti kai\ toi=s me/resin au)tou= kai\ ei)/desin.] Compare Bonitz in his note on p. 1070, a. 33.

The general doctrine laid down by Aristotle, Metaphys. N. p. 1087, b. 34, seq., about the universality of [Greek: me/tron] as pervading all the Categories, is analogous to the passage above referred to in the Politicus of Plato, and implies the Relativity involved more or less in all predicates.]

[Footnote 93: Aristot. Metaph. N. p. 1088, a. 29: [Greek: sêmei=on de\ o(/ti ê(/kista ou)si/a tis kai\ o)/n ti _to\ pro\/s ti_ to\ mo/non mê\ ei)=nai ge/nesin au)tou= mêde\ phthora\n mêde\ ki/nêsin, ô(/sper kata\ to\ poso\n au)/xêsis kai\ phthi/sis, kata\ to\ poio\n a)lloi/ôsis, kata\ to/pon phora/, kata\ tê\n ou)si/an ê( a(plê= ge/nesis kai\ phthora/.] Compare K. p. 1068, a. 9: [Greek: a)na/gkê trei=s ei)=nai kinê/seis, poiou=, posou=, to/pou. kat' ou)si/an d' ou)/, dia\ to\ mêthe\n ei)=nai ou)si/a| e)nanti/on, ou)de\ tou= pro/s ti.] Also Physica, v. p. 225, b. 11: [Greek: e)nde/chetai ga\r thate/rou metaba/llontos a)lêtheu/esthai tha/teron mêde\n meta/ballon.] See about this passage Bonitz and Schwegler's notes on Metaphys. p. 1068.]

[Footnote 94: Hobbes observes (First Philosophy, part ii. ch. xi. 6): "But we must not so think of Relation as if it were an accident differing from all the other accidents of the relative; but one of them, namely, that by which the comparison is made. For example, the likeness of one white to another white, or its unlikeness to black, is the same accident with its whiteness." This may be true about the relations Like and Unlike (see Mr. John Stuart Mill, Logic, ch. iii. p. 80, 6th ed.) But, in Relations generally, the _fundamentum_ may be logically distinguished from the Relation itself.

Aristotle makes the same remarks upon [Greek: to\ sumbebêko\s] as upon [Greek: to\ pro/s ti]:--That it verges upon Non-ens; and that it has no special mode of being generated or destroyed. [Greek: phai/netai ga\r to\ sumbebêko\s e)ggu/s ti tou= mê\ o)/ntos; tô=n me\n ga\r a)/llon tro/pon o)/ntôn e)/sti ge/nesis kai\ phthora/, tô=n de\ kata\ sumbebêko\s ou)k e)/stin.] (Metaphys. E. p. 1026, b. 21.)]