Chapter XX: Section D: dealt with economics, and was subdivided as follows

D a Reading office, economics, press, magazines, literature. D b Colonial economics. D S Special questions and review of material. D West Western occupied regions. D Ost Eastern occupied regions. D 1 Food economy. D 2 Commerce, handcraft, and transport. D 3 Finance, currency, banks and exchanges, insurance. D 4 Industry and Power. D 5 Labor and Social Questions. (_L-219_)

Within Germany the original regional offices of the SD were called _SD-Oberabschnitte_ and _SD-Unterabschnitte_. In 1939 these designations were changed to _SD-Abschnitte_ and _SD-Leitabschnitte_. Offices of the _SD-Abschnitte_ were located in the same place as the _Staatspolizeistellen_. _SD-Abschnitte_ located where there were _Staats Polizeileitstellen_ were called “_SD Leitabschnitte_.” Direct orders came from the Chief of the Security Police and SD in Berlin (RSHA) to these regional offices, but they were also subject to the supervision of the _Inspekteurs_ of the SIPO and SD. In the occupied territories the regional offices of the SD were coordinated with the GESTAPO and Criminal Police under _Kommandeurs_ of the SIPO and SD who were subject to _Befehlshabers_ of the Security Police and SD who reported to the Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) in Berlin. (_1680-PS_, _L-361_)

(3) _Combined Organization of the GESTAPO and SD._ The central offices of the GESTAPO and SD were coordinated in 1936 with the appointment of Heydrich, the head of the SD, as chief of the Security Police. The office of Heydrich was called “Chief of the Security Police and SD.” (_1551-PS_)

When the central offices of the GESTAPO and SD, together with the Criminal Police, were centralized in one main office (RSHA) in 1939, the functions were somewhat redistributed.

_Amt_ I of the RSHA handled personnel for the three agencies. Subsection A 2 handled personnel matters of the GESTAPO, A 3 handled personnel matters of the KRIPO, and A 4 handled personnel matters of the SD.

_Amt_ II handled organization, administration, and law for the three agencies. Subsection C handled domestic arrangements and pay accounts, and was divided into two sections, one to take care of pay accounts of the Security Police and the other to take care of pay accounts of the SD, since personnel of the former were paid by the State and personnel of the latter were paid by the Party. Subsection D, under SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Rauff handled technical matters, including the motor vehicles of the SIPO and SD.

_Amt_ III was the SD and was charged with investigation into spheres of German life. Its subdivisions have heretofore been considered.

_Amt_ IV was the GESTAPO and was charged with combatting political opposition. Its subdivisions have heretofore been considered.

_Amt_ V was the KRIPO and was charged with combatting criminals. Subsection V D was the criminalogical institute for the SIPO handling matters of identification, chemical and biological investigations, and technical research.

_Amt_ VI was concerned with foreign political intelligence and contained subsections dealing with western Europe, Russia and Japan, Anglo-American sphere, and central Europe. It contained a special section dealing with sabotage.

_Amt_ VII handled ideological research against enemies, such as Freemasonry, Judaism, political churches, Marxism, and liberalism. (_L-185_; _L-219_)

The centralization of the main offices of the GESTAPO and SD was not fully carried out in the regional organization. Within Germany the regional offices of the GESTAPO and SD maintained their separate identity and reported directly to the section of the RSHA which had the jurisdiction of the subject matter. They were, however, coordinated by the _Inspekteurs_ of the Security Police and SD. The _Inspekteurs_ were also under the supervision of the Higher SS and Police leaders appointed for each _Wehrkreis_.

The Higher SS and Police leaders reported to the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in each _Wehrkreis_ and supervised not only the _Inspekteurs_ of the Security Police and SD but also the _Inspekteurs_ of the Order Police and various subdivisions of the SS. (_1285-PS_)

In the occupied territories the organization developed as the German armies advanced. Combined operational units of the Security Police and SD, known as _Einsatz_ Groups, operated with and in the rear of the Army. These groups were officered by personnel of the GESTAPO, the KRIPO, and the SD, and the enlisted men were composed of Order Police and Waffen SS. They functioned with various army groups. The _Einsatz_ Groups were subdivided into _Einsatzkommandos_, _Sonderkommandos_, and _Teilkommandos_, all of which performed the functions of the Security Police and SD with or closely behind the army. After the occupied territories had been consolidated, the _Einsatz_ Groups and their subordinate parts were formed into permanent combined offices of the Security Police and SD within prescribed geographical locations. These combined forces were placed under the _Kommandeurs_ of the Security Police and SD, and the offices were organized in sections similar to the RSHA headquarters. The _Kommandeurs_ of the Security Police and SD reported directly to _Befehlshabers_ of the Security Police and SD, who in turn reported directly to the Chief of the Security Police and SD. In the occupied territories, the Higher SS and Police leaders exercised more direct control over the _Befehlshabers_ and the _Kommandeurs_ of the Security Police and SD than within the Reich. They had authority to issue direct orders so long as they did not conflict with the Chief of the Security Police and SD who exercised controlling authority. (_1285-PS, Chart Number 19._)

C. _Place of the GESTAPO and SD in the Conspiracy._

(1) _Tasks and Methods of the GESTAPO._ In the basic law of 10 February 1936, the GESTAPO was declared to have “the duty to investigate and to combat in the entire territory of the State, all tendencies dangerous to the State.” The decree issued for the execution of said law gave the GESTAPO the authority to make police investigations in treason, espionage, and sabotage cases, “and in other cases of criminal attacks on Party and State.” (_2107-PS_; _2108-PS_)

In referring to the above law, the Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best, commented as follows:

“Not the State in its outward organic appearance but the tasks
of the leadership in the sense of the National-Socialist idea is
the object of protection.” (_2232-PS_)

The duties of the GESTAPO were described in 1938 as follows, in an order published by the Party Chancery:

“To the GESTAPO has been entrusted the mission by the Fuehrer to
watch over and to eliminate all enemies of the Party and the
National Socialist State as well as all disintegrating forces of
all kinds directed against both.” (_1723-PS_)

In _Das Archiv_, January 1936, the duties of the GESTAPO were described in part as follows:

“Since the National Socialist revolution, all open struggle and
all open opposition to the State and to the leadership of the
State is forbidden, and a Secret State Police as a preventive
instrument in the struggle against all dangers threatening the
State is indissolubly bound up with the National Socialist
Fuehrer-State.” (_1956-PS_)

The successful accomplishment of this mission to strike down the political and ideological opponents of the Nazi conspiracy was stated in the official magazine of the SIPO and SD on 1 February 1943 in the following words:

“The Secret State Police by carrying out these tasks,
contributed decisively to the fact that the National Socialist
constructive work could be executed in the past ten years
without any serious attempts of interference by the political
enemies of the nation.” (_1680-PS_)

The methods used by the GESTAPO were limited only by the results to be obtained.

“The duties of the political police and the necessary means for
their performance are not chosen freely but are prescribed by
the foe. Just like the operations of an army against the outward
enemy and the means to fight this enemy cannot be prescribed, so
the political police also must have a free hand in the choice of
the means necessary at times to fight the attempts dangerous to
the State.” (_2232-PS_)

The GESTAPO was not restricted to the limitations of written law. The Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best, states:

“As long as the ‘police’ carries out the will of the leadership,
it is acting legally.” (_1852-PS_)

The GESTAPO was given the express power to take action outside the law in the occupied territories. The laws pertaining to the administration of Austria and the Sudetenland provided that the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police will take measures for the maintenance of security and order “even beyond the legal limitation otherwise laid down for this purpose.” (_1437-PS_; _1438-PS_)

The actions and orders of the GESTAPO were not subject to judicial review. The decision of the Prussian High Court of Administration on 2 May 1935 held that the status of the GESTAPO as a special police authority removed its orders from the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunals. The court said that under the law of 30 November 1933 the only redress available was by appeal to the next higher authority within the GESTAPO itself. (_2347-PS_)

The basic law of 10 February 1936 on the powers of the GESTAPO provided specifically in Section VII:

“Orders in matters of the Secret State Police are not subject to
the review of the administrative courts.” (_2107-PS_)

Concerning the power of the GESTAPO to act outside the law, the Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best, states:

“It is no longer a question of law but a question of fate
whether the will of the leadership lays down the ‘right’ rules,
i.e., rules feasible and necessary for police action—the
‘police’ law suitable for and beneficial to the people. Actual
misuse of the legislative power by a people’s leadership—be it
a harmful severity or weakness—will, because of the violations
of the ‘laws of life,’ be punished in history more surely by
fate itself through misfortune, overthrow and ruin, than by a
State Court of Justice.” (_1852-PS_)

The great power of the GESTAPO was “_Schutzhaft_”—the power to imprison people without judicial proceedings on the theory of “protective custody.” This power was based upon the law of 28 February 1933 which suspended the clauses of the Weimar Constitution guaranteeing civil liberties to the German people, including Article 114 thereof, which provided that an abridgement of personal liberty was permissible only by authority of law. (_2499-PS_)

In April 1934 the Reich Minister of the Interior issued a decree (which was not made public) stating that in view of the stabilizing of the national situation it had become feasible to place restrictions upon the exercise of protective custody and providing for limitations upon its exercise. (_L-301_; _779-PS_)

The GESTAPO did not observe such limitations, and the practice of taking people into protective custody increased greatly in 1934. The GESTAPO did not permit lawyers to represent persons taken into protective custody and, in one instance, counsel were themselves placed in protective custody for trying to represent clients. Civil employees were investigated and taken into protective custody by the GESTAPO without knowledge of their superiors. (_775-PS_)

As of 1 February 1938, the Reich Minister of the Interior rescinded previous decrees relating to protective custody, including the decree of 12 April 1934, and issued new regulations. These regulations provided that protective custody could be ordered:

“* * * as a coercive measure of the Secret State Police against
persons who endangered the security of the people and the State
through their attitude, in order to counter all aspirations of
enemies of the people and State”;

that the GESTAPO had the exclusive right to order protective custody; that protective custody was to be executed in the State concentration camps; and that the GESTAPO, which authorized release from protective custody, would review individual cases once every three months. The Chief of the Secret Police was given authority to issue the necessary regulations. (_1723-PS_)

The importance of this power of protective custody was set forth in _Das Archiv_, 1936, in the following language:

“The most effective preventive measure is without doubt the
withdrawal of freedom, which is covered in the form of
protective custody, if it is to be feared that the free activity
of the persons in question might endanger the security of the
State in any way. While protective arrest of short duration is
carried out in police and court prisons, the concentration camps
under the Secret State Police admit those taken into protective
custody who have to be withdrawn from public life for a longer
time.” (_1956-PS_)

The authority of the GESTAPO to administer the concentration camps was set forth in the decree to the basic law of 10 February 1936. (_2108-PS_)

Other methods used by the GESTAPO consisted of the dissolution of associations, prohibition and dissolution of assemblies and congregations, prohibition of publications of various kinds and so forth. (_1956-PS_)

(2) _Tasks and Methods of the SD._ The task of the SD, after it became the intelligence service for State and Party, was to obtain secret information concerning the actual and potential enemies of the Nazi leadership so that appropriate action could be taken to destroy or neutralize opposition. (_1956-PS_)

The duties of the SD were stated by the Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best, as follows:

“As the intelligence service of the German National Socialist
Labor Party, the Security Service has first of all the task of
investigating and keeping a watch over all forces, events and
facts which are of importance for the domination of the National
Socialist idea and movement in German territory. With this task
follows that duty laid down by the Reich Minister of the
Interior—the duty of supporting the Security Police—which is
fulfilled, so far as it goes, under State orders. In support of
the tasks of the Security Police in securing the ranks of the
German people against interference and destruction of any kind,
the Security Service has to watch over every sphere of life of
the German people with regard to the activities of inimical
forces and the result of state and political measures, and to
inform continually the competent State authorities and offices
about the facts which have come to light. Finally, it has to
investigate politically and explore fundamentally the activities
and connections of the great, ideological, arch-enemy of
National Socialism and the German people, in order thereby to
render possible a purposeful and effective fight against it.”
(_1852-PS_)

To accomplish this task, the SD created an organization of agents and informants operating out of various SD regional offices established throughout the Reich, and later in conjunction with the GESTAPO and Criminal Police throughout the occupied territories. The organization consisted of several hundred full-time agents whose work was supplemented by several thousand part-time informants. Informants were located in schools, shops, churches, and all other spheres of German life, operating under cover, and reporting any utterances or actions against the Nazi Party, State or leadership. (_2614-PS_)

The SD had direct and powerful influence in the selection of Nazi leaders. It investigated the loyalty and reliability of State officials, evaluating them by their complete devotion to Nazi ideology and the Hitler leadership. It secretly marked ballots and thereby discovered the identity of persons who cast “No” votes and “invalid” votes in the referenda. (_2614-PS_; _R-142_)

The SD worked closely with the GESTAPO. An article in the “_Voelkischer Beobachter_” published in _Das Archiv_, January 1936, stated:

“As the Secret State Police can not carry out, in addition to
its primary executive tasks, this observation of the enemies of
the state, to the extent necessary, there steps alongside to
supplement it the Security Service of the Reichsleader of the
SS, set up by the Deputy Fuehrer as the political intelligence
service of the movement, which puts a large part of the forces
of the movement mobilized by it into the service of the security
of the state.” (_1956-PS_)

(3) _The Place of the GESTAPO and the SD in the Conspiracy._ The GESTAPO was founded in April 1933 by Goering to serve as a political police force in Prussia. Goering instructed Diels, the first Deputy Chief of the GESTAPO, that his main task would be the elimination of political opponents of National Socialism and the fight against Communism. (_2460-PS_)

In “_Aufbau Einer Nation_,” published in 1934, Goering said:

“For weeks I had been working personally on the reorganization
and at last I alone and upon my own decision and my own
reflection created the office of the Secret State Police. This
instrument which is so feared by the enemies of the State, has
contributed most to the fact that today there can no longer be
talk of a Communist and Marxist danger in Germany and Prussia.”
(_2344-PS_)

So effective had the GESTAPO proven itself in combatting the political opposition to National Socialism by the fall of 1933 that Goering took over direct control of the GESTAPO (_2105-PS_). Goering’s position as Chief of the GESTAPO in Prussia was recognized by Himmler even after he became Chief of the German Police in 1936 (_2372-PS_). Even as late as December 1938 Goering continued to exercise his direct control over the Prussian GESTAPO. (_D-183_)

Himmler was named Deputy Chief of the GESTAPO in Prussia in 1934. He used the GESTAPO, infused with new personnel recruited in large part from the SS, to carry out the Roehm purge of 30 June 1934. (_2460-PS_)

The GESTAPO, through its great power of arrest and confinement to concentration camps without recourse to law, was the principal means for eliminating enemies of the Nazi regime. Diels, the former Deputy Chief of the GESTAPO under Goering, declared:

“* * * From (1934) on the GESTAPO is responsible for all
deprivations of freedom and breaches of law and killings in the
political field which took place without court verdict. Of
primary importance among these was the shooting of numerous
persons who had been committed to jails by the courts and then
shot supposedly because of resistance. Many such cases were at
that time published in the papers. For people guilty of
immorality such illegal shootings became the rule. As for
deprivation of freedom, there was no legal reason any more for
protective custody orders after 1934, which had still been the
case before that date, since from 1934 on the power of the
totalitarian state was so stabilized that the arrest of a person
for his own protection was only an excuse for arbitrary
arrest—without court verdict and without legal measures for
him. The terroristic measures, which led to the development of
the pure force system and punished to an increasing degree each
critical remark and each impulse of freedom with the
concentration camp, took on more and more arbitrary and cruel
forms. The GESTAPO became the symbol of the regime of force.”
(_2460-PS_)

D. _Criminal Responsibility of the Gestapo and SD._

In the remainder of this section the criminal responsibility of the GESTAPO and the SD will be considered with respect to certain crimes against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity which were in principal part committed by the centralized political police system the development and organization of which has previously been considered. In some instances the crimes were committed in cooperation or conjunction with other groups and organizations.

Frequent reference will be made to the phrase, “SIPO and SD.” The SIPO and SD was composed of the following organizations,—the GESTAPO, the KRIPO and the SD.

The GESTAPO was the largest of these, having a membership of about 40,000 or 50,000 in 1943-45. It was the political police force of the Reich. Much of its personnel consisted of transferees from former political police forces of the States. Membership in the GESTAPO was voluntary.

The KRIPO was second largest, having a membership of about 15,000 in 1943-45. It was the criminal police force of the Reich.

The SD was the smallest, having a membership of about 3,000 in 1943-45. It was the intelligence service of the SS. Membership in the SD was voluntary. (_3033-PS_)

In common usage, and even in orders and decrees, the term “SD” was used as an abbreviation in the term “SIPO and SD.” Since the GESTAPO was the primary executive agency of the SIPO and SD, and by far the largest, in most such cases the actual executive action was carried out by personnel of the GESTAPO rather than of the SD or of the KRIPO. In occupied territories members of the GESTAPO frequently wore SS uniforms. (_3033-PS_)

The term “Chief of the Security Police and SD” describes the person who is the head of the GESTAPO, KRIPO and the SD, and of their headquarters office called the RSHA. The “Chief of the Security Police and SD” and the “head of the RSHA” are always one and the same person. The RSHA was a department in the Reich Ministry of the Interior and in the SS. Sometimes organizational responsibility can be established by the fact that the orders in question were issued by or submitted to _Amt_ III of the RSHA (in which case the action concerned the SD), to _Amt_ IV of the RSHA (in which case the action concerned the GESTAPO), or to _Amt_ V of the RSHA (in which case the action concerned the KRIPO).

Although the GESTAPO was the chief executive agency in the political police system, all three organizations contributed to the accomplishment of most of the criminal activities discussed hereinafter.

E. _Crimes of the GESTAPO and SD against the Peace._

Prior to the invasion of Poland by Germany, “border incidents” were fabricated by the GESTAPO and SD for the purpose of furnishing Hitler with an excuse to wage war. (_2751-PS_)

Early in August, 1939, the plan was conceived by the Chief of the Security Police and SD, Heydrich, to stage simulated border raids by personnel of the GESTAPO and SD dressed as Poles. To add authenticity, it was planned to take certain prisoners from concentration camps, kill them by use of hypodermic injections, and leave their bodies, clad in Polish uniforms, at the various places where the incidents were planned to occur. The Chief of the GESTAPO, Mueller, took a directing hand in these actions, which were staged on 31 August 1939 in Beuthen, Hindenburg, Gleiwitz, and elsewhere.

The leader of the SD agents who made the pretended attack on the Gleiwitz radio station on 31 August, said:

“* * * In my presence, Mueller discussed with a man named
Mehlhorn plans for another border incident, in which it should
be made to appear that Polish soldiers were attacking German
troops. Germans in the approximate strength of a company were to
be used. Mueller stated that he had 12 or 13 condemned criminals
who were to be dressed in Polish uniforms and left dead on the
ground of the scene of the incident, to show that they had been
killed while attacking. For this purpose they were to be given
fatal injections by a doctor employed by Heydrich. Then they
were also to be given gunshot wounds. After the incident members
of the press and other persons were to be taken to the spot of
the incident. A police report was subsequently to be prepared.

“4. Mueller told me that he had an order from Heydrich to make
one of those criminals available to me for the action at
Gleiwitz. The code name by which he referred to these criminals
was ‘Canned Goods.’

“5. The incident at Gleiwitz in which I participated was carried
out on the evening preceding the German attack on Poland. As I
recall, war broke out on the 1st of September 1939. At noon of
the 31st August I received by telephone from Heydrich the code
word for the attack which was to take place at 8 o’clock that
evening. Heydrich said, ‘In order to carry out this attack
report to Mueller for Canned Goods.’ I did this and gave Mueller
instructions to deliver the man near the radio station. I
received this man and had him laid down at the entrance to the
station. He was alive but he was completely unconscious. I tried
to open his eyes. I could not recognize by his eyes that he was
alive, only by his breathing. I did not see the shot wounds but
a lot of blood was smeared across his face. He was in civilian
clothes.

“6. We seized the radio station as ordered, broadcast a speech
of three to four minutes over an emergency transmitter, fired
some pistol shots and left.” (_2751-PS_; _2479-PS_)

These were the “frontier incidents” to which Hitler referred in his speech to the Reichstag on 1 September 1939. (Adolf Hitler, “My New Order,” Reynal and Hitchcock, Inc., 1941, p. 687.)

F. _War Crimes of the GESTAPO and SD._

(1) _The GESTAPO and SD carried out mass murders of hundreds of thousands of civilians of occupied countries as a part of the Nazi program to exterminate political and racial undesirables (“Einsatz Groups”)._ About four weeks before the attack on Russia, special task forces of the SIPO and SD, called _Einsatzgruppen_ or Special Task Groups, were formed on order of Himmler for the purpose of following the German armies into Russia, combatting partisans and members of resistance groups and exterminating the Jews and Communist leaders. In the beginning four _Einsatz_ Groups were formed. _Einsatz_ Group A, operating in the Baltic States, was placed under the command of Stahlecker, former Inspector of the SIPO and SD. _Einsatz_ Group B, operating toward Moscow, was placed under the command of Nebe, the Chief of _Amt_ V (KRIPO) of the RSHA. _Einsatz_ Group C, operating toward Kiev, was placed under the command of Rasch and later of Thomas, former Chief of the SIPO and SD in Paris. _Einsatz_ Group D, operating in the south of Russia, was placed under the command of Ohlendorf, the Chief of _Amt_ III (SD) of the RSHA.

The _Einsatz_ Groups were officered by personnel of the GESTAPO, the SD and the KRIPO. The men were drawn from the Order Police and the Waffen SS. The groups had complements of 400 to 500 men, and had their own vehicles and equipment. By agreement with the OKW and OKH, the _Einsatzkommandos_ were attached to certain Army corps or divisions. The Army assigned the area in which the _Einsatzkommandos_ were to operate, but all operational directives and orders for the carrying out of executions were given through the RSHA in Berlin. Regular courier service and radio communications existed between the _Einsatz_ Groups and the RSHA.

The affidavit of Ohlendorf, Chief of the SD, who led _Einsatz_ Group D, reads in part as follows:

“When the German Army invaded Russia, I was leader of
_Einsatzgruppe_ D in the southern sector, and in the course of
the year during which I was leader of the _Einsatzgruppe_ D, it
liquidated approximately 90,000 men, women and children. The
majority of those liquidated were Jews, but there were also
among them some Communist functionaries.

“In the execution of this extermination program the
_Einsatzgruppen_ were subdivided into _Einsatzkommandos_, and
the _Einsatzkommandos_ into still smaller units, the so-called
_Sonderkommando_ and _Teilkommandos_. Usually the smaller units
were led by a member of the SD, the GESTAPO or the KRIPO. The
unit selected for this task would enter a village or city and
order the prominent Jewish citizens to call together all Jews
for the purpose of resettlement. They were asked to hand over
their personal belongings to the leaders of the unit, and
shortly before the execution, to surrender their outer clothing.
The men, women and children were led to a place of execution
which usually was located beside a deepened antitank ditch. Then
they were shot, kneeling or standing, and the corpses were
thrown into the ditch. I never permitted the shooting by
individuals in Group D, but ordered that several of the men
should shoot at the same time in order to avoid direct personal
responsibility. The leaders of the unit, or especially
designated persons, however, had to fire the last shot against
those victims who were not dead immediately. I learned from
conversations with other group leaders that some of them asked
the victims to lie down flat on the ground to be shot through
the neck. I did not approve of these methods.” (_2620-PS_)

The contention that these murders were carried out by subterfuge and without force and terror is belied by the eyewitness account of two such mass murders witnessed by Hermann Graebe, who was manager and engineer in charge of the branch office of the Solingen firm of Josef Jung in Sdolbunow, Ukraine, from September 1941 until January 1944. Graebe’s interest in the mass executions derived from the fact that in addition to Poles, Germans, and Ukrainians, he employed Jews on the various construction projects under his supervision. He was personally acquainted with the leader of the SIPO and SD who carried out the actions hereinafter described with the aid of SS-men (most of whom wore the SD arm-band) and Ukrainian militia. Graebe negotiated with SS-major Putz, the leader of the SIPO and SD, for the release of about 100 Jewish workers from the action which took place in Rowno on 13 July 1942. The original letter which exempted these Jewish workers from the action is attached to Graebe’s affidavit, which states in part as follows:

“In the evening of this day I drove to Rowno and posted myself
with Fritz Einsporn in front of the house in the Bahnhofstrasse
in which the Jewish workers of my firm slept. Shortly after
22.00 the ghetto was encircled by a large SS detachment and
again about three times as many members of the Ukrainian
militia. Then the electric floodlights which had been erected
all around the ghetto were switched on. SS and militia details
of 4 to 6 members entered or at least tried to enter the houses.
Where the doors and windows were closed and the inhabitants did
not open upon the knocking, the SS men and militia broke the
windows, forced the doors and beams with crowbars and entered
the dwellings. The owners were driven onto the street just as
they were, regardless of whether they were dressed or whether
they had been in bed. Since the Jews in most cases refused to
leave their dwellings and resisted, the SS and militia both
applied force. With the help of whippings, kicks and hits with
the rifle butts they finally succeeded in having the dwellings
evacuated. The people were chased out of their houses in such
haste that the small children who had been in bed had been left
behind in several instances. In the street women cried out for
their children and children for their parents. That did not
prevent the SS from chasing the people along the road, at double
time, and hitting them until they reached a waiting freight
train. Car after car was filled, over it hung the screaming of
women and children, the cracking of whips and rifle shots. Since
several families and groups had barricaded themselves in
especially strong buildings, and the doors could not be forced
with crowbars or beams, these houses were now blown open with
hand grenades. Since the ghetto was near the railroad tracks in
Rowno, the younger people tried to get across the tracks and to
a small river to be outside of the ghetto. This sector being
outside of the floodlights was lighted by signal ammunition. All
through the night these beaten, chased and wounded people
dragged themselves across the lighted streets. Women carried
their dead children in their arms, children hugged and dragged
by their arms and feet their dead parents down the road toward
the train. Again and again the calls ‘Open the door,’ ‘Open the
door’ echoed through the ghetto.” (_2992-PS_)

The leader of _Einsatz_ Group D, Ohlendorf, stated in his affidavit that other _Einsatz_ Group leaders required the victims to lie down flat on the ground to be shot through the neck. Graebe describes a mass execution of this kind which he observed carried out under the direction of a man in SD uniform on 5 October 1943 at Dubno, Ukraine, as follows:

“Thereupon in the company of Moennikes I drove to the
construction area and saw in its vicinity a heap of earth, about
30 meters long and 2 meters high. Several trucks stood in front
of the heap. Armed Ukrainian militia chased the people off the
trucks under the supervision of an SS man. The militia men were
guards on the trucks and drove them to and from the excavation.
All these people had the prescribed yellow badges on the front
and back of their clothes, and thus were recognized as Jews.

“Moennikes and I went directly to the excavation. Nobody
bothered us. Now we heard shots in quick succession from behind
one of the earth mounds. The people who had gotten off the
trucks—men, women, and children of all ages—had to undress
upon the orders of an SS man who carried a riding or dog whip.
They had to put down their clothes in fixed places, sorted
according to shoes, over and underclothing, I saw a pile of
shoes of about 800 to 1,000 pairs, great piles of laundry and
clothing. Without screaming or crying these people undressed,
stood around by families, kissed each other, said farewells and
waited for the nod of another SS man, who stood near the
excavation, also with a whip in his hand. During the 15 minutes
that I stood near the excavation I have heard no complaint and
no request for mercy. I watched a family of about 8 persons, a
man and a woman, both about 50 with their children of about 1, 8
and 10, and two grown-up daughters of about 20 to 24. An old
woman with snow-white hair held the one-year-old child in her
arms and sang for it, and tickled it. The child was squeaking
from joy. The couple looked on with tears in their eyes. The
father held the hand of a boy about 10 years old and spoke to
him softly; the boy was fighting his tears. The father pointed
toward the sky, fondled his hand, and seemed to explain
something to him. At that moment the SS-man at the excavation
called something to his comrades. The latter counted off about
20 persons and instructed them to walk behind the earth mound.
Among them was the family which I had mentioned. I remember very
well a girl, blackhaired and slender, passing near me; she
pointed at herself and said, ‘23 years.’ I walked around the
mound, and stood in front of a tremendous grave. Closely pressed
together the people were lying on top of each other so that only
their heads were visible. Several of the people shot still
moved. Some lifted their arms and turned their heads to show
that they were still alive. The excavation was already
two-thirds full. I estimated that it contained about 1,000
people. I looked for the man who did the shooting. I saw an
SS-man who sat at the rim of the narrow end of the excavation,
his feet dangling into the excavation. On his knees he had a
machine pistol and he was smoking a cigarette. The completely
naked people descended a stairway which was dug into the clay of
the excavation and slipped over the heads of the people lying
there already to the place to which the SS-man directed them.
They laid themselves in front of the dead or injured people,
some touched tenderly those who were still alive and spoke to
them in a low voice. Then I heard a number of shots. I looked
into the excavation and saw how the bodies jerked or the heads
rested already motionless on top of the bodies that lay before
them. Blood was running from their necks. I was surprised that I
was not chased away, but I saw there were two or three postal
officers in uniform nearby. Now already the next group
approached, descended into the excavation, lined themselves up
against the previous victims and was shot. When I walked back,
around the mound, I noticed again a transport which had just
arrived. This time it included sick and frail persons. An old,
very thin woman with terribly thin legs was undressed by others
who were already naked, while two persons held her up.
Apparently the woman was paralyzed. The naked people carried the
woman around the mound. I left with Moennikes and drove with my
car back to Dubno.” (_2992-PS_)

There are two reports by Stahlecker, the Chief of _Einsatz_ Group B, available. The first report, found in Himmler’s personal files, states that during the first four months of the Russian campaign _Einsatz_ Group A murdered 135,000 Communists and Jews, and carried out widespread destruction of homes and villages and other vast crimes. Enclosure 8 to this Stahlecker report is a careful survey of the number of persons murdered, classified as to country, and whether Jew or Communist, with totals given in each instance. This report discloses that the _Einsatz_ Groups frequently enlisted the aid of the local populations in the extermination program. It states:

“In view of the extension of the area of operations and the
great number of duties which had to be performed by the Security
Police, it was intended from the very beginning to obtain the
cooperation of the reliable population for the fight against
vermin—that is, mainly the Jews and Communists.” (_L-180_)

With respect to extermination of Jews the report stated:

“From the beginning it was to be expected that the Jewish
problem could not be solved by pogroms alone. In accordance with
the basic orders received, however, the cleansing activities of
the Security Police had to aim at a complete annihilation of the
Jews. Special detachments reinforced by selected units—in
Lithuania partisan detachments, in Latvia units of the Latvian
auxiliary police—therefore performed extensive executions both
in towns and in rural areas. The actions of the execution
detachments were performed smoothly. * * *”

Enclosure 8, “Survey of the number of executed persons” is quoted directly from the report:

“_Enclosure 8—Survey of the number of executed persons_

Area │ Jews │Communists│ Total
“Lithuania: │ │ │
Kowono town and surroundings │ │ │
(land) │ 31,914│ 80│ 31,994
Schaulen │ 41,382│ 763│ 42,145
Wilna │ 7,015│ 17│ 7,032
│ —————│ —————│ —————
│ 80,311│ 860│ 81,171
│==========│==========│==========
“Latvia: │ │ │
Riga town and surroundings │ │ │
(land) │ │ │ 6,378
Mitau │ │ │ 3,576
Libau │ │ │ 11,860
Wolmar │ │ │ 209
Dueanaburg │ 9,256│ 589│ 9,845
│ —————│ —————│ —————
│ 30,025│ 1,843│ 31,868
│==========│==========│==========
“Esthonia │ 474│ 684│ 1,158
│==========│==========│==========
“White Ruthenia │ 7,620│ │ 7,620
│==========│==========│==========
“Total: │ │ │
Lithuania │ 80,311│ 860│ 81,171
Latvia │ 30,025│ 1,843│ 31,868
Esthonia │ 474│ 684│ 1,158
White Ruthenia │ 7,620│ │ 7,620
│ —————│ —————│ —————
│ 118,430│ 3,387│ 121,817

“to be added to these figures: In Lithuania and Latvia Jews annihilated by pogroms 5,500 Jews, Communists and partisans executed in old-Russian area 2,000 Lunatics executed 748 ———— 122,455 Communists and Jews liquidated by State Police and Security Service Tilsit during search actions 5,502 ———— 135,567” (_L-180_)

The second report from _Einsatz_ Group A (_L-180_) reports the extermination of nearly 230,000 persons. With respect to Esthonia, it states in part:

“Only by the SIPO and SD were the Jews gradually executed as
they became no longer required for work. Today there are no
longer any Jews in Esthonia.”

With respect to Latvia, the report states in part:

“Up to October 1941 approximately 30,000 Jews had been executed
by these _Sonderkommandos_. The remaining Jews who were still
indispensable from the economic point of view were collected in
Ghettos, which were established in Riga, Duenaburg and Libau.”

With respect to Lithuania, the report states in part:

“Therefore by means of selected units—mostly in the proportion
of 1:8—first of all the prisons, and then systematically,
district by district, the Lithuanian sector was cleansed of Jews
of both sexes. Altogether 136,421 people were liquidated in a
great number of single actions. As the complete liquidation of
the Jews was not feasible, as they were needed for labor,
Ghettos were formed which at the moment are occupied as follows:
Kauen approximately 15,000 Jews; Wilna approximately 15,000
Jews; Schaulen approximately 4,500 Jews. These Jews are used
primarily for work of military importance. For example, up to
5,000 Jews are employed in 3 shifts on the aerodrome near Kauen
on earthworks and work of that sort.”

With respect to White Russia, the report states in part:

“In view of the enormous distances, the bad condition of the
roads, the shortage of vehicles and petrol, and the small forces
of Security Police and SD, it needs the utmost effort to be able
to carry out shootings in the country. Nevertheless 41,000 Jews
have been shot up to now.”

With respect to Jews from the Reich, the report states in part

“Since December 1940 transports containing Jews have arrived at
short intervals from the Reich. Of these, 20,000 Jews were
directed to Riga and 7,000 Jews to Minsk. Only a small section
of the Jews from the Reich is capable of working. About 70-80
percent are women and children or old people unfit for work. The
death rate is rising continually also as a result of the
extraordinarily bad winter. In isolated instances sick Jews with
contagious disease were selected under the pretext of putting
them into a home for the aged or a hospital, and executed.”

Attached as an enclosure to this report is a map entitled “Jewish Executions Carried out by _Einsatzgruppe_ A,” on which, by the use of coffins as symbols, the number of Jews murdered in each area covered by _Einsatz_ Group A is shown (_Chart Number 4_). The map shows thousands of Jews in ghettos, and an estimated 128,000 Jews “still on hand” in the Minsk area. Number of murdered, according to figures beside the coffins, during the period covered by this report, was 228,050.

On 30 October 1941 the Commissioner of the territory of Sluzk wrote a report to the Commissioner General, Minsk, in which he severely criticized the actions of the _Einsatzkommandos_ operating in his area for the murder of all the Jews of Sluzk:

“On 27 October in the morning at about 8 o’clock a first
lieutenant of the police battalion No. 11 from Kauen (Lithuania)
appeared and introduced himself as the adjutant of the battalion
commander of the security police. The first lieutenant explained
that the police battalion had received the assignment to effect
the liquidation of all Jews here in the town of Sluzk, within
two days. The battalion commander with his battalion in strength
of four companies, two of which were made up of Lithuanian
partisans, was on the march here and the action would have to
begin instantly. I replied to the first lieutenant that I had to
discuss the action in any case first with the commander. About
half an hour later the police battalion arrived in Sluzk.
Immediately after the arrival the conference with the battalion
commander took place according to my request. I first explained
to the commander that it would not very well be possible to
effect the action without previous preparation, because
everybody had been sent to work and that it would lead to
terrible confusion. At least it would have been his duty to
inform me a day ahead of time. Then I requested him to postpone
the action one day. However, he rejected this with the remark
that he had to carry out this action everywhere and in all towns
and that only two days were allotted for Sluzk. Within these two
days, the town of Sluzk had to be cleared of Jews by all means.
For the rest, as regards the execution of the action, I must
point out to my deepest regret that the latter bordered already
on sadism. The town itself offered a picture of horror during
the action. With indescribable brutality on the part of both the
German police officers and particularly the Lithuanian
partisans, the Jewish people, but also among them White
Ruthenians, were taken out of their dwellings and herded
together. Everywhere in the town shots were to be heard and in
different streets the corpses of shot Jews accumulated. The
White Ruthenians were in greatest distress to free themselves
from the encirclement. Regardless of the fact that the Jewish
people, among whom were also tradesmen, were mistreated in a
terribly barbarous way in the face of the White Ruthenian
people, the White Ruthenians themselves were also worked over
with rubber clubs and rifle butts. There was no question of an
action against the Jews any more. It rather looked like a
revolution. In conclusion I find myself obliged to point out
that the police battalion has looted in an unheard of manner
during the action, and that not only in Jewish houses but just
the same in those of the White Ruthenians. Anything of use such
as boots, leather, cloth, gold and other valuables, has been
taken away. On the basis of statements of members of the armed
forces, watches were torn off the arms of Jews in public, on the
streets, and rings were pulled off the fingers in the most
brutal manner. A major of the finance department reported that a
Jewish girl was asked by the police to obtain immediately 5,000
rubles to have her father released. This girl is said to have
actually gone everywhere in order to obtain the money.”
(_1104-PS_)

This report was submitted by the Commissioner General of White Ruthenia to the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories on 1 November 1941 with the following comment:

“I am submitting this report in duplicate so that one copy may
be forwarded to the Reich Minister. Peace and order cannot be
maintained in White Ruthenia with methods of that sort. To bury
seriously wounded people alive who worked their way out of their
graves again is such a base and filthy act that the incidents as
such should be reported to the Fuehrer and Reichs Marshal.”
(_1104-PS_)

On the same date by separate letter the Commissioner General of White Ruthenia reported to the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories that he had received money, valuables, and other objects taken by the police in the action at Sluzk and other regions, all of which had been deposited with the Reich Credit institute for the disposal of the Reich Commissioner. (_1104-PS_)

On 21 November 1941 a report on the Sluzk incident was sent to the personal reviewer of the permanent deputy of the Minister of the Reich with a copy to Heydrich, the Chief of the Security Police and SD. (_1104-PS_)

On 6 November 1942 a secret report submitted to the Reich Commissar for the East concerning the struggle against partisans in the East discloses that destruction of villages continued, and reports the execution of 1,274 partisan suspects and 8,350 Jews, and the deportation of 1,217 people. This report was forwarded on 10 December 1942 to the Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern territories. (_1113-PS_)

The report from the prison administrator at Minsk as of 31 May 1943 to the General Commissioner for White Ruthenia states:

“The German, former dentist Ernst Israel Tichauer and his wife
Elisa Sara Tichauer, born Rosenthal, were delivered to the
Court-Prison by the SD (_Hauptscharfuehrer_ Rube) on 13 April
1943. Since that date, the golden bridgework, crowns and
fillings of the received German and Russian Jews were pulled
out, respectively broken out by force. This always happened 1-2
hours before the actions in question.

“Since 13 April 1943, 516 German and Russian Jews were
liquidated. After careful investigation it was ascertained that
gold objects were only taken away during 2 actions, namely on 14
April 43 from 172 and on 27 April 43 from 164 Jews. About 50
percent of the Jews had gold teeth, bridges or fillings.
_Hauptscharfuehrer_ Rube of the SD was always present in person,
and also took the gold objects with him.

“This has not been done before 13 April 1943.”

This report was forwarded to the Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern territories on 1 June 1943. (_R-135_)

Death vans were used by the _Einsatz_ Groups to murder victims by gas. These vans were built by the Saurer Works in Berlin and other firms. The vans were built for the technical section of _Amt_ II of the RSHA, which sent them to the _Einsatz_ Groups in the field. They were first used in the spring of 1942 and continued to be used throughout the war (_2348-PS_). The method of using the vans is described by Ohlendorf in the following words:

“We received orders to use the car for the killing of women and
children. Whenever a unit had collected a sufficient number of
victims, a car was sent for their liquidation. We also stationed
these cars in the neighborhood of the transit camps to which the
victims had been brought. They were told that they would be
resettled and had to climb into the cars for that purpose. Then
the doors were closed and as soon as the cars started moving the
gas would enter. The victims died within ten to fifteen minutes.
The cars were driven to the burial place where the corpses were
taken out and buried.” (_2620-PS_)

A letter from Becker, the operator of several death vans, written to Rauff, the head of the technical section of _Amt_ II of the RSHA, on 16 May 1942, states:

“The overhauling of vans by groups D and C is finished. While
the vans of the first series can also be put into action if the
weather is not too bad the vans of the second series (Saurer)
stop completely in rainy weather. If it has rained for instance
for only one-half hour, the van cannot be used because it simply
skids away. It can only be used in absolutely dry weather. It is
only a question now whether the van can only be used standing at
the place of execution. First the van has to be brought to that
place, which is possible only in good weather. The place of
execution is usually 10-15 km away from the highways and is
difficult of access because of its location; in damp or wet
weather it is not accessible at all. If the persons to be
executed are driven or led to that place, then they realize
immediately what is going on and get restless, which is to be
avoided as far as possible. There is only one way left; to load
them at the collecting point and to drive them to the spot.

“I ordered the vans of group D to be camouflaged as
house-trailers by putting one set of window shutters on each
side of the small van and two on each side of the larger vans,
such as one often sees on farm-houses in the country. The vans
became so well-known, that not only the authorities but also the
civilian population called the van “death van”, as soon as one
of these vehicles appeared. It is my opinion that the van cannot
be kept secret for any length of time, not even camouflaged.

“* * * I should like to take this opportunity to bring the
following to your attention: several commands have had the
unloading after the application of gas done by their own men. I
brought to the attention of the commanders of those SK concerned
the immense psychological injuries and damages to their health
which that work can have for those men, even if not immediately,
at least later on. The men complained to me about headaches
which appeared after each unloading.

“* * * The application of gas usually is not undertaken
correctly. In order to come to an end as fast as possible, the
driver presses the accelerator to the fullest extent. By doing
that the persons to be executed suffer death from suffocation
and not death by dozing off as was planned. My directions now
have proved that by correct adjustment of the levers death comes
faster and the prisoners fall asleep peacefully. Distorted faces
and excretions, such as could be seen before, are no longer
noticed.” (_501-PS_)

The death vans were not always satisfactory. A telegram from the commandant of the SIPO and SD “Ostland” to the RSHA, _Amt_ II D, on 15 June 1942, states:

“A transport of Jews, which has to be treated in a special way,
arrives weekly at the office of the commandant of the Security
Police and the Security Service of White Ruthenia.

“The three S-vans, which are there, are not sufficient for that
purpose. I request assignment of another S-van (5-tons). At the
same time I request the shipment of 20 gas-hoses for the three
S-vans on hand (2 Diamond, 1 Saurer), since the ones on hand are
leaky already.” (_501-PS_)

The reports of the various _Einsatz_ Groups were summarized at RSHA, and the summaries were then distributed to the various sections interested, particularly _Amt_ III (the SD), _Amt_ IV (the GESTAPO), and _Amt_ V (the KRIPO) (_2752-PS_). One such report covering the period 1-31 October 1941 is entitled “Activity and Situation Report No. 6 of the _Einsatz_ Groups of the Security Police and the SD in the USSR” (_R-102_). This report describes in summary form the activities of the various _Einsatz_ Groups during the month of October 1941. The report first discusses the stations and in that regard states:

“During the period covered by this report the stations of the
Task Forces of the Security Police and the SD have changed only
in the Northern Sector.

“The present stations are:

“Task Force A: since 7 October 1941 Krasnowardeisk.

“Task Force B: continues in Smolensk.

“Task Force C: since 27 September 1941 in Kiew.

“Task Force D: since 27 September 1941 in Nikolajew.

“The Action and Special Commandos (_Einsatz und Sonder_
Commandos) which are attached to the Task Force continue on the
march with the advancing troops into the sectors which have been
assigned to them.” (_R-102_)

The report next discusses the activities of each _Einsatz_ Group. There is included first a discussion of the Baltic area, next of White Ruthenia, and last of the Ukraine. Under each section the work of the _Einsatz_ Groups in connection with the action taken against partisans, Jews, and communist officials is considered. With respect to the treatment of Jews in the Baltic area the report states in part:

“* * * However, the Estonian Protective Corps (_Selbstschutz_),
formed at the time of the entry of the _Wehrmacht_, immediately
started a comprehensive arrest action of all Jews. This action
was under the direction of the task force of the Security Police
and the SD.

“The measures taken were:

1. Arrest of all male Jews over 16.

2. Arrest of all Jewesses from 16-20 years, who lived in
Reval and environs and were fit for work; these were
employed in peat cutting.

3. Comprehensive detention in the synagogue of all
Jewesses living in Dorport and its environs.

4. Arrest of the Jews and Jewesses fit for work in
Pernau and environs.

5. Registration of all Jews according to age, sex, and
capacity for work for the purpose of their detention in
a camp that is being prepared.

“The male Jews over 16 were executed with the exception of
doctors and the elders. At the present time this action is still
in progress. After completion of this action there will remain
only 500 Jewesses and children in the Eastern territory. * * *”
(_R-102_)

With respect to partisan activity in White Ruthenia, the report states in part:

“* * * In the village Michalowo, after careful reconnaissance
through civilian agents, 8 partisans were surprised in a house
by the same Commando of the Security Police and the SD, they
were arrested and hanged the next day in this particularly
partisan infested village.

“The president of the District Region Soviets in Tarenitsch and
his secretary were shot because of their connections with
partisans.

“During an action approximately 70 kilometers south of Mogilow,
25 Armenians, Kirghize and Mongols were apprehended with false
identification papers with which they tried to conceal the fact
that they belong to a partisan group. They were liquidated. * *
*” (_R-102_)

With respect to arrests and executions of communists in White Ruthenia, the report states in part:

“A further large part of the activity of the Security Police was
devoted to the combating of Communists and criminals. A special
Commando in the period covered by this report executed 63
officials, NKVD agents and agitators. * * *” (_R-102_)

With respect to the action taken against the Jews in White Ruthenia the report states in part:

“* * * All the more vigorous are the actions of the task forces
of the Security Police and the SD against the Jews who make it
necessary that steps be taken against them in different spheres.

“In Gorodnia 165 Jewish terrorists and in Tschernigow 19 Jewish
Communists were liquidated. 8 more Jewish communists were shot
at Beresna.

“It was experienced repeatedly that the Jewish women showed an
especially obstinate behaviour. For this reason 28 Jewesses had
to be shot in Krugoje and 337 at Mogilev.

“In Borissov 321 Jewish saboteurs and 118 Jewish looters were
executed.

“In Bobruisk 380 Jews were shot who had engaged to the last in
incitement and horror propaganda [_Hetz-und Greuelpropaganda_]
against the German army of occupation.

“In Tatarsk the Jews had left the Ghetto of their own accord and
returned to their old home quarters, attempting to expel the
Russians who had been quartered there in the meantime. All male
Jews as well as 3 Jewesses were shot.

“In Sadrudubs the Jews offered some resistance against the
establishment of a Ghetto so that 272 Jews and Jewesses had to
be shot. Among them was a political Commissar.

“_MOGILEV_

“In Mogilev too, the Jews attempted to sabotage their removal to
the Ghetto; 113 Jews were liquidated.

“_Wit_

“Moreover four Jews were shot on account of refusal to work and
2 Jews were shot because they had sabotaged orders issued by the
German occupation authorities.

“In Talka 222 Jews were shot for anti-German propaganda and in
Marina Gorka 996 Jews were shot because they had sabotaged
orders issued by the German occupation authorities.

“At Schklow 627 more Jews were shot because they had
participated in acts of sabotage.

“_Witebsk_

“On account of the extreme danger of an epidemic, a beginning
was made to liquidate the Jews in the ghetto at Witebsk. This
involved approximately 3000 Jews. * * *” (_R-102_)

With respect to partisan activity in the Ukraine the report states in part:

“Although partisan activity in the south sector is very strong
too, there is nevertheless the impression that spreading and
effective partisan activity are strongly affected by the flight
of higher partisan leaders and by the lack of initiative of the
subordinate leaders who have remained behind. Only in one case a
commando of the Security Police and the SD succeeded in a fight
with partisans in shooting the Secretary of the Communist Party
for the administration district of Nikolajew-Cherson, who was at
the time Commissar of a partisan group for the district
Nikolajew-Cherson-Krim. * * *” (_R-102_)

With respect to treatment of Jews in the Ukraine the report states in part:

“The embitterment of the Ukrainian population against the Jews
is extremely great because they are thought responsible for the
explosions in Kiew. They are also regarded as informers and
agents of the NKVD who started the terror against the Ukrainian
people. As a measure of retaliation for the arson at Kiew, all
Jews were arrested and altogether 33,771 Jews were executed on
the 29th and 30th September. Money, valuables and clothing were
secured and put at the disposal of the National-Socialist League
for Public Welfare (NSV) for the equipment of the National
Germans [_Volksdeutschen_] and partly put at the disposal of the
provisional city administration for distribution to the needy
population.

“_Shitomir_

“In Shitomir 3,145 Jews had to be shot, because from experience
they have to be regarded as bearers of Bolshevik propaganda and
saboteurs.

“_Cherson_

“In Cherson 410 Jews were executed as a measure of retaliation
for acts of sabotage. Especially in the area east of the Dnjepr
the solution of the Jewish question has been taken up
energetically by the task forces of the Security Police and the
SD. The areas newly occupied by the Commandos were purged of
Jews. In the course of this action 4,891 Jews were liquidated.
At other places the Jews were marked and registered. This
rendered it possible to put at the disposal of the _Wehrmacht_
for urgent labor, Jewish worker groups up to 1,000 persons.”
(_R-102_)

These reports, circulated among the various offices of the RSHA, brought general knowledge to the entire organization of the program of mass murder conducted by these special task forces of the SIPO and SD. (_R-102_)

The activities of the _Einsatz_ Groups continued throughout 1943 and 1944 under Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the SIPO and SD. New groups were formed and sent into action in the West (_2890-PS_). Under adverse war conditions, however, the program of extermination was to a large extent changed to one of rounding up slave labor for Germany. A letter written on 19 March 1943 from the headquarters of a _Sonderkommando_ (section of _Einsatz_ Group C) states as follows:

“It is the task of the Security Police and of the Security
Service (SD) to discover all enemies of the Reich and fight
against them in the interest of security, and in the zone of
operations especially to guarantee the security of the army.
Besides the annihilation of active opponents all other elements
who, by virtue of their opinions or their past, may appear
active as enemies under favorable conditions, are to be
eliminated [_sind * * * auszumerzen_] through preventive
measures. The Security Police carries out this task according to
the general directives of the Fuehrer with all the required
toughness. Energetic measures are especially necessary in
territories endangered by the activity of hostile gangs. The
competence of the Security Police within the zone of operations
is based on the Barbarossa decrees. I deem the measures of the
Security Police, carried out on a considerable scale during
recent times, necessary for the two following reasons:

“1. The situation at the front in my sector had become so
serious that the population, partly influenced by Hungarians and
Italians, who streamed back in chaotic condition, took openly
position against us.

“2. The strong expeditions of hostile gangs, who came especially
from the forest of Bryansk, were another reason. Besides that,
other revolutionary groups, formed by the population, appeared
suddenly in all districts. The providing of arms evidently
provided no difficulties at all. It would have been
irresponsible, if we had observed this whole activity without
acting against it. It is obvious that all such measures bring
about some harshness. I want to take up the significant points
of harsh measures:

“1. The shooting of Hungarian Jews.

“2. The shooting of directors of collective farms.

“3. The shooting of children.

“4. The total burning down of villages.

“5. The “shooting, while trying to escape” of Security
Service (SD) prisoners.

“Chief of _Einsatz_ Group C confirmed once more the correctness
of the measures taken, and expressed his recognition for the
energetic actions.

“With regard to the current political situation, especially in
the armament industry in the fatherland, the measures of the
Security Police have to be subordinated to the greatest extent
to the recruiting of labor for Germany. In the shortest possible
time, the Ukraine has to put at the disposal of the armament
industry 1 million workers, 500 of whom have to be sent from our
territory daily.

“The work of the field groups has therefore to be changed as of
now. The following orders are given:

“1. Special treatment is to be limited to a minimum.

“2. The listing of communist functionaries, activists and so on,
is to take place by roster only for the time being, without
arresting anybody. It is, for instance, no longer feasible to
arrest all the close relatives of a member of the communist
party. Although, members of the Komsomolz are to be arrested
only if they were active in a leading position.

“3. The activity of the labor offices, respective of recruiting
commissions, is to be supported to the greatest extent possible.
It will not be possible always to refrain from using force.
During a conference with the Chief of the Labor Commitment
Staffs, an agreement was reached stating that wherever prisoners
can be released, they should be put at the disposal of the
Commissioner of the Labor Office. When searching [_Uberholung_]
villages, resp., when it has become necessary to burn down a
village, the whole population will be put at the disposal of the
Commissioner by force.

“4. As a rule, no more children will be shot.

“5. The reporting of hostile gangs as well as drives against
them is not affected hereby. All drives against these hostile
gangs can only take place after my approval has been obtained.

“6. The prisons have to be kept empty, as a rule. We have to be
aware of the fact that the Slavs will interpret all soft
treatment on our part as weakness and that they will act
accordingly right away. If we limit our harsh measures of
security police through above orders for the time being, that is
only done for the following reason. The most important thing is
the recruiting of workers. No check of persons to be sent into
the Reich will be made. No written certificates of political
reliability check or similar things will be issued.

“(signed) Christiansen.”
(_3012-PS_)

The head of the Jewish section in the GESTAPO, and the man directly responsible for carrying out the mass extermination program against the Jews by the GESTAPO, _Obersturmbannfuehrer_ Eichmann, estimated in his report to Himmler on the matter, that 2,000,000 Jews had been killed by shootings, mainly by the _Einsatz_ Groups of the SIPO and SD during the campaign in the East. This did not include the estimated 4,000,000 sent by the GESTAPO for extermination in annihilation camps. (_2615-PS_)

(2) _The GESTAPO and SD stationed special units in prisoner of war camps for the purpose of screening out racial and political undesirables and executing them._ The program of mass murder of political and racial undesirables carried on against civilians was also applied to prisoners of war captured on the Eastern front. Warlimont, Deputy Chief of Staff of the _Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab_, states:

“* * * Shortly before the beginning of this campaign [with
U.S.S.R.] I was present in a group composed of the Commanders in
Chief (with their Chiefs of Staff) of the three Armed Forces, of
the Army groups, of Armies, and of the corresponding groups in
the Air Forces and Navy. Hitler made an announcement to this
group that special measures would have to be taken against
political functionaries and commissars of the Soviet army. He
said that this would not be an ordinary campaign but would be
the clash of conflicting ideologies. He further said that the
political functionaries and commissars were not to be considered
as prisoners of war but were to be segregated from other
prisoners immediately after their capture and were to be turned
over to special detachments of the SD which were to accompany
the German troops to Russia. He further said that when it was
not possible to turn over the political functionaries and
commissars to the SD, they were to be eliminated by the German
troops.” (_2884-PS_)

The Chief of the SD, Otto Ohlendorf, describes this action in the following words:

“In 1941, shortly after the start of the campaign against
Russia, an agreement was entered into between the Chief of the
Security Police and SD and the OKW and OKH to the effect that
the prisoner of war camps on the Eastern front should be opened
to _Einsatzkommandos_ of the SIPO and SD so that the prisoners
could be screened. All Jews and Communist functionaries were to
be taken from the prisoner of war camps by the
_Einsatzkommandos_ and executed outside the camps. To my
knowledge, this action was carried on throughout the entire
Russian campaign. In the other occupied territories and within
the Reich—to my knowledge—the GESTAPO had been made
responsible for this program in the Russian prisoner of war
camps. It was, to my knowledge, carried on throughout the
greater part of the war.” (_2622-PS_)

Lahousen, chief of a division in the office of foreign intelligence in the _Wehrmacht_, states:

“* * * From the start of the campaign against the U.S.S.R. the
higher German political and military leadership followed the
policy of eliminating Russian commissars and various other types
of Russian prisoners of war captured by the _Wehrmacht_. In June
and July 1941 I participated in a conference which concerned
itself with the treatment of Russian commissars. * * *
Obergruppenfuehrer Mueller was present as representative of the
RSHA, and he participated in this matter because, as Chief of