Chapter LVIII: Section 8: of Chapter IX on Aggression Against Poland

Finally, when the Nazis decided to take action for the conquest of Poland in the next year, assurance had to be given to Russia. Hence, a non-aggression pact was entered into with the U.S.S.R. on 23 August 1939. (_TC-25_)

With regard to the foregoing summary, the Latin tag, _res ipsa loquitur_ is apposite. But a frank statement from von Neurath with regard to the earlier part of it is found in the account of his conversation with the United States Ambassador, Mr. Bullitt, on 18 May 1936 (_L-150_):

“Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German
Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until ‘the
Rhineland had been digested.’ He explained that he meant that,
until the German fortifications had been constructed on the
French and Belgian frontiers, the German Government would do
everything possible to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak
by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue a quiet line with
regard to Czechoslovakia. ‘As soon as our fortifications are
constructed and the countries of Central Europe realize that
France cannot enter German territory at will, all those
countries will begin to feel very differently about their
foreign policies and a new constellation will develop,’ he
said.” (_L-150_)

The conversation between von Papen as Ambassador and Mr. Messersmith is much to the same effect. (_1760-PS_)

(2) _Austria._ At the time of the aggression against Austria von Neurath was Foreign Minister. This included the preliminary stages, during the early Nazi plottings against Austria in 1934. In this period occurred the Nazi murder of Chancellor Dolfuss and the ancillary acts which were afterwards so strongly approved by the German Government. (See Section 3 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against Austria.) Von Neurath was also Foreign Minister when the false assurance was given to Austria on 21 May 1935 (_TC-26_) and the fraudulent treaty was made on 11 July 1936 (_TC-22_). And von Neurath was Foreign Minister when his ambassador to Austria, von Papen, was carrying on his subterranean intrigue in the period from 1935 to 1937. (_2247-PS_; _2246-PS_)

Von Neurath was present when Hitler declared, in a highly confidential circle, on 5 November 1937, that the German question could only be solved by force, and that his plans were to conquer Austria and Czechoslovakia (_386-PS_). Hitler expressed his designs on Austria as follows:

“* * * For the improvement of our military political position,
it must be our first aim in every case of entanglement by war to
conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously, in order to
remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance
westwards.” (_386-PS_)

It is impossible for von Neurath, after that meeting, to say that he was not acting except with his eyes completely open and with complete comprehension as to what was intended.

During the _Anschluss_ von Neurath received a note from the British Ambassador dated 11 March 1938 (_3045-PS_). In reply von Neurath uttered two obvious untruths. The first:

“* * * It is untrue that the Reich used forceful pressure to
bring about this development, especially the assertion, which
was spread later by the former Chancellor Schuschnigg, that the
German Government had presented the Federal President with a
conditional ultimatum. It is a pure invention.” (_3287-PS_)

According to the German ultimatum, Schuschnigg had to appoint a proposed candidate as Chancellor and form a Cabinet conforming to the proposals of the German Government. Otherwise the invasion of Austria by German troops was held in prospect. (See Section 3 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against Austria.) The second untruth:

“The truth of the matter is that the question of sending
military or police forces from the Reich was only brought up
when the newly formed Austrian Cabinet addressed a telegram,
already published by the press, to the German Government,
urgently asking for the dispatch of German troops as soon as
possible, in order to restore peace and order and to avoid
bloodshed. Faced with the immediately threatening danger of a
bloody civil war in Austria the German Government then decided
to comply with the appeal addressed to it.” (_3287-PS_)

(As to the inspired nature of the Austrian telegram, see Section 3 of