Chapter XII: on Persecution of the Jews.) (9)

A secret conference on 12 January 1943 discussed Bormann’s order of 12 August 1942 under which all Party agencies were placed at Himmler’s disposal for the latter’s program of forced resettlement and denationalization of occupied populations (_705-PS_). Correspondence from the Office of the Fuehrer’s Deputy reveals Bormann’s demands that non-German populations of occupied territories be subjected to a special discriminatory legal regime (_R-139_). An agreement between Thierack and Himmler was made at Bormann’s suggestion, under which all Eastern populations are subjected to brutal police regime, and under which all disputes between the parties to the agreement are to be settled by Bormann. (_654-PS_)

In issuing these orders Bormann took a large part in the conspiracy to exterminate millions of people in the Eastern occupied areas.

F. _CONCLUSION._

Martin Bormann, only 45 years old at the time of Germany’s defeat, devoted his entire adult life to the Nazi conspiracy. When he joined the Nazi Party at the age of 25 he had already been active for several years in conspiratorial and terroristic organizations working secretly to prepare Germany for war, and had spent one year in jail for his participation in a political murder.

Bormann’s important contribution to the conspiracy remained throughout in the sphere of the Nazi Party. First, as Chief of Staff to Hess, the Fuehrer’s Deputy, then as Head of the Party Chancery, he managed the entire organization of the Party in the service of the conspiracy. He was responsible for channelling the Party’s demands concerning legislation, education, civil service, and all other fields of public and private life to Hess, who was a member of the Reich Cabinet, which was then Germany’s legislative, administrative, and judicial organ. Thus, Bormann advanced the Party’s conspiratorial program through the control of his co-conspirators over the German government machinery. He used this power for various criminal purposes, among them the persecution of the independent churches, demanding their complete elimination from German life on the ground that Christianity and National Socialism were irreconcilable.

After having acceded in 1941 to the highest position in the Nazi Party, directly under Hitler, Bormann exercised the broadest influence in the direction of Germany’s aggressive wars. Here he acted in two capacities:

(1) As executive head of the Party he commanded the Party Gauleaders who, as District Defense Commissioners, controlled all civilian and political war activities in German and the annexed territories. In that position he became responsible for the multiple war crimes committed by the German civilian population, especially the lynching of allied flying personnel, and the cruel mistreatment of forced laborers.

(2) As Secretary to the Fuehrer, Bormann took an active part in the policy-making conferences and discussions of Hitler and his political and military staffs. Here, Bormann became jointly responsible for the illegal annexation of Allied territories, the enslavement and spoliation of the civilian population in occupied countries, and the planned persecution and extermination of the populations in Eastern territories especially the Jews.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO MARTIN BORMANN

│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 60
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*025-PS │Conference report of 4 September 1942 │ │
│concerning the importation of domestic│ │
│workers from the East into the Reich. │ │
│(USA 698) │ III │ 67
│ │ │
057-PS │Circular letter from Bormann to │ │
│Political Leaders, 30 May 1944, │ │
│concerning justice exercised by people│ │
│against Anglo-American murderers. (USA│ │
│329) │ III │ 102
│ │ │
*058-PS │Hitler Order of 30 September 1944 │ │
│concerning reorganization of the │ │
│concerns of prisoners of war. (USA │ │
│456) │ III │ 103
│ │ │
*061-PS │Secret Bormann letter, 11 January │ │
│1944, concerning large-scale │ │
│organization for withdrawal of │ │
│commodities from occupied territories │ │
│for use of bombed-out population in │ │
│Germany. (USA 692) │ III │ 105
│ │ │
*062-PS │Top secret Hess directive of 13 March │ │
│1940, concerning behavior in case of │ │
│landings of enemy planes or │ │
│parachutists. (USA 696) │ III │ 107
│ │ │
*066-PS │Bormann letter to Rosenberg, 24 June │ │
│1940, submitting draft for │ │
│discriminatory church law for Danzig │ │
│and West Prussia. (USA 689) │ III │ 112
│ │ │
*069-PS │Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 17 │ │
│January 1939, enclosing order of 28 │ │
│December 1938, concerning decisions on│ │
│Jewish question. (USA 589) │ III │ 116
│ │ │
*070-PS │Letter of Deputy Fuehrer to Rosenberg,│ │
│25 April 1941, on substitution of │ │
│National Socialist mottos for morning │ │
│prayers in schools. (USA 349) │ III │ 118
│ │ │
*071-PS │Rosenberg letter to Bormann, 23 April │ │
│1941, replying to Bormann’s letter of │ │
│19 April 1941 (Document 072-PS). (USA │ │
│371) │ III │ 119
│ │ │
*072-PS │Bormann letter to Rosenberg, 19 April │ │
│1941, concerning confiscation of │ │
│property, especially of art treasures │ │
│in the East. (USA 357) │ III │ 122
│ │ │
089-PS │Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 8 │ │
│March 1940, instructing Amann not to │ │
│issue further newsprint to │ │
│confessional newspapers. (USA 360) │ III │ 147
│ │ │
*098-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 22 │ │
│February 1940, urging creation of │ │
│National Socialist Catechism, etc. to │ │
│provide moral foundation for NS │ │
│religion. (USA 350) │ III │ 152
│ │ │
*099-PS │Bormann letter to Reich Minister of │ │
│Finance, January 1940, demanding that │ │
│church assessments for the special war│ │
│tax be greatly increased. (USA 688) │ III │ 158
│ │ │
*100-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 18 │ │
│January 1940, urging preparation of │ │
│National Socialist reading material to│ │
│replace Christian literature for │ │
│soldiers. (USA 691) │ III │ 160
│ │ │
*101-PS │Letter from Hess’ office signed │ │
│Bormann to Rosenberg, 17 January 1940,│ │
│concerning undesirability of religious│ │
│literature for members of the │ │
│Wehrmacht. (USA 361) │ III │ 160
│ │ │
*107-PS │Circular letter signed Bormann, 17 │ │
│June 1938, enclosing directions │ │
│prohibiting participation of │ │
│Reichsarbeitsdienst in religious │ │
│celebrations. (USA 351) │ III │ 162
│ │ │
*113-PS │Secret Order issued by Hess’ Office │ │
│signed Bormann, 27 July 1938, making │ │
│clergymen ineligible for Party │ │
│offices. (USA 683) │ III │ 164
│ │ │
*116-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, │ │
│enclosing copy of letter, 24 January │ │
│1939, to Minister of Education │ │
│requesting restriction or elimination │ │
│of theological faculties. (USA 685) │ III │ 165
│ │ │
117-PS │Bormann letter to Army High Command, │ │
│28 January 1939, opposing the │ │
│establishment of an Army Corps of │ │
│Chaplains. │ III │ 167
│ │ │
*122-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 17 │ │
│April 1939, enclosing copy of Minister│ │
│of Education letter, 6 April 1939, on │ │
│elimination of theological faculties │ │
│in various universities. (USA 362) │ III │ 173
│ │ │
*123-PS │Confidential letter from Bormann to │ │
│Minister of Education, 23 June 1939, │ │
│in reply to memorandum of 6 April 1939│ │
│(122-PS) reporting the Party’s │ │
│decision to order the suppression of │ │
│numerous Divinity Schools. (USA 686) │ III │ 175
│ │ │
*131-PS │Bormann letter to Rosenberg, 12 │ │
│December 1939, agreeing with │ │
│suggestion that the University Chairs │ │
│belonging to the Divinity School in │ │
│the University of Munich be used for │ │
│instructors at the Nazi Academy (Hohe │ │
│Schule). (USA 687) │ III │ 184
│ │ │
205-PS │Bormann Circular, 5 May 1943, │ │
│containing detailed directions as to │ │
│the treatment of foreign workers │ │
│employed within the Reich. │ III │ 218
│ │ │
*228-PS │Bormann Circular, 25 November 1943, │ │
│demanding harsher treatment of │ │
│Prisoners of War and the fuller │ │
│utilization of their manpower. (USA │ │
│695) │ III │ 225
│ │ │
*232-PS │Bormann Order of 13 September 1944 │ │
│establishing Party jurisdiction over │ │
│the use of Prisoners of War for forced│ │
│labor. (USA 693) │ III │ 229
│ │ │
327-PS │Letter of Rosenberg to Bormann, 17 │ │
│October 1944, concerning liquidation │ │
│of property in Eastern Occupied │ │
│Territories. (USA 338) │ III │ 257
│ │ │
*654-PS │Thierack’s notes, 18 September 1942, │ │
│on discussion with Himmler concerning │ │
│delivery of Jews to Himmler for │ │
│extermination through work. (USA 218) │ III │ 467
│ │ │
*656-PS │Letter, undated, from Bormann to │ │
│Political leaders, enclosing Order of │ │
│Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, 29 │ │
│January 1943, relating to self-defense│ │
│against prisoners of war. (USA 339) │ III │ 470
│ │ │
705-PS │Secret conference, 12 January 1943, of│ │
│the SS-Committee for General Labor in │ │
│the German Zone. │ III │ 511
│ │ │
*735-PS │Minutes of meeting, 6 June 1944, to │ │
│fix the cases in which the application│ │
│of Lynch Law against Allied airmen │ │
│would be justified. (GB 151) │ III │ 533
│ │ │
*838-PS │Letter from Hess’ office signed │ │
│Bormann, 3 June 1939, referring to │ │
│Hitler’s Decree of 6 March 1939 which │ │
│precluded Christian Scientists from │ │
│joining the Party. (USA 684) │ III │ 605
│ │ │
*840-PS │Party Directive, 14 July 1939, making │ │
│clergy and theology students │ │
│ineligible for Party membership. (USA │ │
│355) │ III │ 606
│ │ │
841-PS │Secret Order of Goering, 28 December │ │
│1938, concerning Jewish problem. │ III │ 606
│ │ │
1395-PS │Law to insure the unity of Party and │ │
│State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. │ │
│(GB 252) │ III │ 978
│ │ │
1409-PS │Order concerning utilization of Jewish│ │
│property, 3 December 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1709. │ IV │ 1
│ │ │
1422-PS │Thirteenth regulation under Reich │ │
│Citizenship Law, 1 July 1943. 1943 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 372. │ IV │ 14
│ │ │
*1520-PS │Memorandum of conference, 8 May 1942 │ │
│between Hitler, Rosenberg, Lammers, │ │
│Bormann. (GB 156) │ IV │ 65
│ │ │
*1600-PS │Bormann correspondence, 1940-1941, │ │
│concerning confiscation of religious │ │
│art treasures. (USA 690) │ IV │ 128
│ │ │
*1723-PS │Order concerning cooperation of Party │ │
│offices with the Secret State Police, │ │
│25 January 1938, published in Decrees,│ │
│Regulations, Announcements, 1937, Vol.│ │
│II, pp. 430-439. (USA 206) │ IV │ 219
│ │ │
*1815-PS │Documents on RSHA meeting concerning │ │
│the study and treatment of church │ │
│politics. (USA 510) │ IV │ 415
│ │ │
*1816-PS │Stenographic report of the meeting on │ │
│The Jewish Question, under the │ │
│Chairmanship of Fieldmarshal Goering, │ │
│12 November 1938. (USA 261) │ IV │ 425
│ │ │
*1950-PS │Secret letter from Lammers to │ │
│defendant von Schirach, 3 December │ │
│1940, concerning deportation of Jews. │ │
│(USA 681) │ IV │ 592
│ │ │
2001-PS │Law to Remove the Distress of People │ │
│and State, 24 March 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 141. │ IV │ 638
│ │ │
2099-PS │Fuehrer decree relating to Chief of │ │
│Party Chancellery of 29 May 1941. 1941│ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 295. │ IV │ 725
│ │ │
2100-PS │Decree on position of leader of Party │ │
│Chancellery, 24 January 1942. 1942 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 35. │ IV │ 726
│ │ │
2559-PS │Military Commission Order No. 2, │ │
│Headquarters Fifteenth U. S. Army, 25 │ │
│June 1945, concerning trial of German │ │
│civilian by U. S. Military Commission.│ V │ 294
│ │ │
2560-PS │Military Commission Order No. 5, │ │
│Headquarters Third U. S. Army and │ │
│Eastern Military District, 18 October │ │
│1945, concerning trial of German │ │
│national by U. S. Military Commission.│ V │ 296
│ │ │
2561-PS │Military Commission Order No. 3, │ │
│Headquarters Third U. S. Army, 4 │ │
│October 1945, concerning trial of four│ │
│German nationals by U. S. Military │ │
│Commission. │ V │ 298
│ │ │
2981-PS │Biographical information on Martin │ │
│Bormann, published in The Greater │ │
│German Reichstag, 1943, p. 167. │ V │ 686
│ │ │
3018-PS │Hitler decree of 18 October 1944 in │ │
│Voelkischer Beobachter, South German │ │
│Edition, 20 October 1944, p. 1. │ V │ 736
│ │ │
3085-PS │Himmler’s ordinance of 3 July 1943 │ │
│charging Gestapo with execution of │ │
│Thirteenth Ordinance under Reich │ │
│Citizen Law. 1943 Ministerial Gazette │ │
│of Reich and Prussian Ministry of │ │
│Interior, p. 1085. │ V │ 892
│ │ │
3180-PS │Decree providing for the participation│ │
│of the Fuehrer’s Deputy in appointment│ │
│of officials, 24 September 1935. 1935 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1203. │ V │ 918
│ │ │
3234-PS │Promotions in the SS, published in The│ │
│Archive, July 1940, p. 399. │ V │ 938
│ │ │
3235-PS │Every Party Region Becomes a Reich │ │
│Defense District, from The Archive, │ │
│December 1942, p. 805. │ V │ 938
│ │ │
3236-PS │Biographical material on Martin │ │
│Bormann, published in The German │ │
│Reichstag, 1936, p. 113. │ V │ 939
│ │ │
3237-PS │Bormann Order of 14 February 1935, │ │
│demanding that all Party officers │ │
│assist the SD in its work, published │ │
│in Decrees of the Deputy of the │ │
│Fuehrer. │ V │ 939
│ │ │
3239-PS │Bormann Order of 3 September 1935 │ │
│calling on Party agencies to hand │ │
│persons who criticize the Nazi Party │ │
│or institutions over to Gestapo, │ │
│published in Decrees of the Deputy of │ │
│the Fuehrer. │ V │ 940
│ │ │
3240-PS │Bormann Order of 8 January 1937 │ │
│concerning refusal of financial │ │
│assistance to patients who consult │ │
│Jewish Doctors, published in Decrees │ │
│of the Fuehrer’s Deputy. │ V │ 941
│ │ │
3242-PS │The Reich Offices of the NSDAP, │ │
│published in National Socialist │ │
│Yearbook, 1944, pp. 181-182. │ V │ 941
│ │ │
3243-PS │Food Supply of the Jews, published in │ │
│Decrees, Orders, Announcements, Vol. │ │
│II, pp. 147-150. │ V │ 944
│ │ │
3244-PS │Preparatory Measures for the Solution │ │
│of the Jewish Problem in Europe, │ │
│published in Decrees, Regulations, │ │
│Announcements, Vol. 2, pp. 131-132. │ V │ 945
│ │ │
3246-PS │Bormann Order of 7 January 1936, │ │
│published in Decrees of the Deputy of │ │
│the Fuehrer. │ V │ 948
│ │ │
*3249-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Franz Blaha, 24 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 663) │ V │ 949
│ │ │
*3355-PS │Affidavit of Robert M. W. Kempner, 8 │ │
│December 1945. (USA 682) │ VI │ 85
│ │ │
3569-PS │Private will and testament and │ │
│political will of Adolf Hitler, 29 │ │
│April 1945. │ VI │ 258
│ │ │
3734-PS │Summary of Interrogation of Hanna │ │
│Reitsch, 8 October 1945. │ VI │ 551
│ │ │
3735-PS │Testimony of Erich Kempka on the last │ │
│days of Hitler. │ VI │ 571
│ │ │
*D-75 │SD Inspector Bierkamp’s letter, 12 │ │
│December 1941, to RSHA enclosing copy │ │
│of secret decree signed by Bormann, │ │
│entitled Relationship of National │ │
│Socialism and Christianity. (USA 348) │ VI │ 1035
│ │ │
*D-138 │Decree of 27 July 1934, providing for │ │
│participation of Fuehrer’s deputy in │ │
│the drafting of all legislation. (USA │ │
│403) │ VI │ 1055
│ │ │
*D-163 │Bormann instructions, 5 November 1941,│ │
│prohibiting burials with religious │ │
│ceremonies for Russian Prisoners of │ │
│War. (USA 694) │ VI │ 1067
│ │ │
*D-226 │Speer circular of 10 November 1944, │ │
│distributing Himmler’s decree for │ │
│ensuring the discipline and output of │ │
│foreign workers. (USA 697) │ VI │ 1088
│ │ │
*D-753-A │Letter from Lammers to Bormann, 1 │ │
│January 1945. (GB 323) │ VII │ 214
│ │ │
D-753-B │Letter from Bormann to Lammers, 5 │ │
│January 1945. (GB 323) │ VII │ 219
│ │ │
*L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the │ │
│Beginning of the 5th Year of War”, a │ │
│lecture delivered by Jodl on 7 │ │
│November 1943 at Munich to Reich and │ │
│Gauleiters. (USA 34) │ VII │ 920
│ │ │
*L-221 │Bormann report on conference of 16 │ │
│July 1941, concerning treatment of │ │
│Eastern populations and territories. │ │
│(USA 317) │ VII │ 1086
│ │ │
*R-36 │Memorandum to Rosenberg, 19 August │ │
│1942, concerning Bormann letter of 23 │ │
│July 1942, prepared by an official in │ │
│the Rosenberg Ministry. (USA 699) │ VIII │ 52
│ │ │
R-139 │Correspondence between Hess’ office │ │
│and the Ministry of Justice concerning│ │
│civil law in Eastern Territories. │ VIII │ 209
│ │ │
*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770

18. FRANZ VON PAPEN

A. _POSITIONS HELD BY VON PAPEN._

(1) _Awarded the Golden Party Badge by Hitler, thereby becoming member of NSDAP_ (_2902-PS_; _Das Archiv_ vol. 48, p. 1614).

(2) _Member of Reichstag_, 1933-1945 (_2902-PS_).

(3) _Reich Chancellor, 1 June 1932 to 2 December 1932, acting pro-tem between 17 November and 2 December_ (_2902-PS_).

(4) _Vice Chancellor, 30 January 1933 to August 1934_ (?) (Papen admits holding office only to 30 June 1934; he also admits that decrees published on 1 and 2 August 1934 carry his signature as Vice-Chancellor, but claims this was either mistake or forgery) (_2902-PS_).

(5) _Special Plenipotentiary for the Saar_ (13 November 1933 to 30 June 1934) (_2902-PS_).

(6) _Negotiator of Concordat with Vatican_ (concluded 20 July 1933) (_2655-PS_).

(7) _German Ambassador at Vienna (26 July 1934 to 4 February 1938), continuing thereafter to arrange Berchtesgaden meeting between Hitler and Schuschnigg and to participate in meeting itself_ (_2902-PS_).

B. _AS EX-REICH CHANCELLOR AND PROMINENT POLITICAL LEADER, VON PAPEN
USED HIS PERSONAL INFLUENCE TO PROMOTE THE ACCESSION OF THE NAZIS TO
POWER._

(1) _When von Papen began these efforts he was well aware of the Nazi program and Nazi methods._ The official NSDAP program was open and notorious. For many years it had been published and republished in the Yearbook of the NSDAP and elsewhere. The Nazis made no secret of their intention to make it the fundamental law of the State. The first three points of this program forecast a foreign policy predicated upon the absorption of “Germanic” populations outside the boundaries of the Reich, the abrogation of Versailles treaty limitations, and the acquisition of “_Lebensraum_.” Points 4 to 8 foretold the ruthless elimination of the Jews, and the 25th point demanded “unlimited authority” of the central regime over the entire Reich as a means “for the execution of all this” (_1708-PS_).

Hitler and the other leaders of the Party repeatedly reiterated these views before 1933. Hitler himself subsequently pointed out that there was no excuse for misinterpreting Nazi intentions:

“When I came to power in 1933, our path lay unmistakably before
us. Our internal policy had been, exactly defined by our
fifteen-year-old struggle. Our program, repeated a thousand
times, obligated us to the German people. I should be a man
without honor, worthy of being stoned, had I retracted a single
step of the program I then enunciated * * *”

* * * * * *

“My foreign policy had identical aims. My program was to abolish
the Treaty of Versailles. It is futile nonsense for the rest of
the world to pretend today that I did not reveal this program
until 1933 or 1935 or 1937. Instead of listening to the foolish
chatter of emigres, these gentlemen would have been wiser to
read what I have written thousands of times.” (_2541-PS_)

Hitler and other Nazi leaders repeatedly made clear their willingness to use force if necessary to achieve their purposes. They glorified war. _Mein Kampf_ is replete with early evidence of such intentions, which subsequently were reaffirmed from time to time in the years preceding 1933 (_D-660_; _2771-PS_; _2512-PS_).

The Nazi leaders prior to 1933 had openly declared their intentions to subvert democratic processes as a means to achieve their purposes, and to this end to harass and embarrass democratic forces at every turn. Thus Hitler himself had declared that,

“We shall become members of all constitutional bodies, and in
this manner make the Party the decisive factor. Of course, when
we possess all constitutional rights we shall then mould the
State into the form we consider to be the right one.”
(_2512-PS_)

Frick, writing in the National Socialist Yearbook, declared:

“Our participation in the parliament does not indicate a
support, but rather an undermining of the parliamentarian
system. It does not indicate that we renounce our
anti-parliamentarian attitude, but that we are fighting the
enemy with his own weapons and that we are fighting for our
National Socialist goal from the parliamentary platform.”
(_2742-PS_)

The practical application of these purposes was thus subsequently described by a leading Nazi constitutional authority, Ernst Rudolf Huber:

“It was necessary above all to make formal use of the
possibilities of the party-state system but to refuse real
cooperation and thereby to render the parliamentary system,
which is by nature dependent upon the responsible cooperation of
the opposition, incapable of action.” (_2633-PS_).

This practical application of Nazi purposes and methods was manifest at the time von Papen was a member of the Reichstag and Vice Chancellor. By this time the Nazi members of the Reichstag were engaging in tactics of disturbance which finally culminated in physical attacks upon members of the Reichstag and upon visitors, and were using terroristic measures to assure their election (_L-83_).

Von Papen not only had the opportunity to observe early manifestations of Nazi violence and irresponsibility. He fully understood the true character of the Nazi menace before 1933 and publicly condemned it.

At the time of the German elections in the summer of 1932, von Papen, President Hindenburg, and certain other German leaders were hoping that the rising Nazi menace would be dissipated by providing for National Socialist participation in a rightist-centrist government. Hitler refused all overtures inviting such participation, even when suggested by President Hindenburg himself, insisting upon assuming the chancellorship without obligation to other parties. Hitler’s refusal at this time to collaborate with Hindenburg and Papen marked the beginning of a series of public declarations in which von Papen revealed a clear understanding of Nazi methods and objections. Thus, on the occasion of his Munster speech of 28 August 1932 von Papen declared:

“The licentiousness emanating from the appeal of the leader of
the National Socialist Movement does not comply very well with
his claims to governmental power.”

* * * * * *

“I do not concede him the right to regard the mere minority
following his banner solely as the German nation, and to treat
all our fellow countrymen as ‘free game’.”

* * * * * *

“I am advocating the constitutional state, the community of the
people, law and order in government. In doing so, it is I, and
not he, who is carrying on the struggle against the domination
of parties, against arbitrarianism and injustice, a struggle
which millions of his supporters had been wholeheartedly longing
for years to fight.”

* * * * * *

“I am firmly determined to stamp out the smouldering flame of
civil war, to put an end to political unrest and political
violence, which today is still such a great obstacle to the
positive work representing the sole task of the State.”
(_3314-PS_)

Writing in the September 1932 issue of the periodical “_Volk und Reich_,” von Papen declared:

“The present situation clearly shows that party domination and
State leadership are concepts incompatible with one another. It
is conceivable theoretically that a party might gain the
majority in parliament and claims the government (State
leadership) for itself. The NSDAP has proclaimed this
theoretical possibility as its practical goal and has come very
close to attaining it. It is to be hoped that the leaders of
this movement will place the nation above the party and will
thus lend a visible expression to the faith of millions looking
for a way out of the spiritual and material distress of the
nation provided also by the leadership of the State.”

* * * * * *

“* * * The hope in the hearts of millions of national socialists
can be fulfilled only by an authoritarian government. The
problem of forming a cabinet on the basis of a parliamentary
coalition has again been brought into the field of public
political discussion. If such negotiations, in the face of
growing distress, are conducted with the motif of destroying the
political opponent by the failure of his governmental activity,
this is a dangerous game against which one cannot warn enough.
In the last analysis such plans can mean nothing else but a
tactics which counts on the possibility that matters get worse
for the people and that the faith of millions will turn into the
bitterest disappointment, if these tactics only result in the
destruction of the political adversary. It is within the nature
of such party-tactical maneuvers that they are veiled and will
be disclaimed in public. That, however, cannot prevent me from
warning publicly against such plans, about which it may be
undecided who is the betrayer and who the betrayed one; plans,
though, which will certainly cheat the German people out of
their hope for improvement of their situation. Nothing can prove
more urgently the necessity for an authoritarian government than
such a prospect of maneuvers of a tactical game by the parties.”
(Papen article quoted in “Frankfurter Zeitung”, 2 Sept. 1932, p.
2).

In his Munich speech on 13 October 1932 von Papen was especially clear:

“The essence of conservative ideology is its being anchored in
the divine order of things. That too is its fundamental
difference compared with the doctrine advocated by the NSDAP.
The principle of ‘exclusiveness’ of a political ‘everything or
nothing’ which the latter adheres to, its mythical
Messiah-belief in the bombastic Fuehrer who alone is destined to
direct fate, gives it the character of a political sect. And
therein I see the unbridgeable cleavage between a conservative
policy born of faith and a national-socialist creed as a matter
of politics. It seems to me that today names and individuals are
unimportant when Germany’s final fate is at stake. What the
nation demands is this: it expects of a movement which has
written upon its banner the internal and external national
freedom that it will act, at all times and under all
circumstances, as if it were the spiritual, social and political
conscience of the nation. If it does not act that way; if this
movement follows merely tactical points of view,
democratic-parliamentarian points of view, if it engages in the
soliciting of mass support using demagogic agitation and means
of proletarian class struggle—then it is not a movement any
more, it has become a political party.

“And, indeed, the Reich was almost destroyed by the political
parties. One simply cannot, on one side, despise mercilessly
masses and majorities, as Herr Hitler is doing, and on the other
hand surrender to parliamentarian democracy; surrender to the
extent of adopting resolutions against one’s own government
together with Bolshevists.”

* * * * * *

“In the interest of the entire nation we decline the claim to
power by parties which want to own their followers body and
soul, and which want to put themselves, as a party or a
movement, over and above the whole nation.” (_3317-PS_)

In a series of interviews and speeches in the fall of 1932 von Papen castigated the Nazi party for its ambitions to achieve a total and centralized control of Germany. He contrasted its objectives and methods to his own “conservatism” and emphasized its incompatibility with the preservation of the “federalistic” type of government to which he was committed. His public pronouncements in this connection were clearly reflected in the contemporary press:

“Von Papen claimed that it had been his aim from the very
beginning of his tenure in office to build a new Reich for and
with the various states [_Laender_]. The Reich government is
taking a definite federalist attitude. Its slogan is not a
dreary centralism or unitarianism.”

* * * * * *

“Wherever one did hear von Papen express himself in public, one
did hear a chancellor who took special care to be regarded as an
unconditional federalist.” (_3318-PS_)

The Vice Chancellor’s campaign against the Nazis culminated finally in a radio speech to the German public on 4 November 1932, in which he severely criticized Nazi political methods. He damned the Nazis’ “pure party egoism” which resulted in methods described by him as “sabotage” and as “a crime against the nation.” He accused the Nazis of wanting complete and permanent power in Germany (_Deutsche Reichsgeshichte in Dokumenten IV_, p. 523 (Rundfunkrede des Reichkanzlers von Papen)).

Nor was von Papen content merely to make speeches against the Nazis. As late as November 1932, Papen was prepared to use all the forces at the command of the state in a supreme effort to suppress the rising Nazi menace. He was deterred from this purpose only by a failure to secure the support of his cabinet. The inner struggles of the German cabinet at this time are recounted by Otto Meissner (in a statement made at Nurnberg, 28 November 1945), Chief of the Chancery of Reichspresident Hindenburg.

“Papen’s reappointment as Chancellor by President Hindenburg
would have been probable if he had been prepared to take up an
open fight against the National Socialists, which would have
involved the threat or use of force. Almost up to the time of
his resignation, Papen and some of the other ministers agreed on
the necessity for pressing the fight against the Nazis by
employing all the resources of the State and relying on Article
48 of the Constitution, even if this might lead to armed
conflict. Other ministers, however, believed that such a course
would lead to civil war.

“The decision was provided by Schleicher, who in earlier times
had recommended energetic action against the National
Socialists—even if this meant the use of police and army. Now,
in the decisive cabinet meeting, he abandoned this idea and
declared himself for an understanding with Hitler.

“The gist of Schleicher’s report—which was given partly by
himself, partly by Major Ott, who adduced detailed statistical
material—was that the weakened Reichswehr, which was dispersed
over the whole Reich, even if supported by civilian volunteer
formations, would not be equal to military operations on a large
scale, and was not suited and trained for civil war. The police,
in particular the Prussian police, had been undermined by
propaganda and could not be considered as absolutely reliable.
If the Nazis began an armed revolt, one must anticipate a revolt
of the Communists and a general strike at the same time. The
forces of these two adversaries were very strong. If such a ‘war
against two fronts’ should take place, the forces of the State
would undoubtedly be disrupted. The outcome of a civil war would
be at the least most uncertain.

“In his, Schleicher’s view, it was impossible to take the risks
implied in such a policy. In case of failure, which he believed
likely, the consequences for Germany would be terrible. All
present in the cabinet meeting were deeply impressed by
Schleicher’s statement, and even those who had been in favor of
energetic action against the National Socialists now changed
their mind, so that Papen was isolated and felt himself to be
isolated.

“In the interview which Papen had with Hindenburg after this
meeting, on November 17th 1932 Papen did not conceal his deep
disappointment over Schleicher’s altered position. Although
Hindenburg asked him to make a new attempt to form a government,
Papen stood on his decision to resign and Hindenburg gave in.”

(2) _Despite his appreciation of the Nazi menace, von Papen rigorously proceeded to conduct negotiations which resulted in placing Hitler and the Nazi regime in power._ Following his resignation as Chancellor on 17 November 1932 von Papen continued as Chancellor pro-tem until 2 December 1932, when General Schleicher was appointed to replace him (_2902-PS_).

Almost as soon as he vacated the Chancery, von Papen began plotting to unseat his arch-rival Schleicher. On about 10 December 1932—less than a month after he was willing to use force to suppress the Nazis—von Papen requested Kurt von Schroeder, the Cologne banker, to arrange a meeting between Hitler and von Papen (according to the statement of Schroeder, made at Nurnberg, 5 December 1945). Schroeder was one of a group of rightist industrial and financial leaders who had previously been organized by Hitler’s man, Wilhelm Keppler, to provide means of bolstering Nazi economic power.

Hitler himself at this time understood von Papen. He knew that Papen’s ideas were not too different from his own to preclude agreement. He knew that Papen’s personal rivalry with Schleicher would make Papen amenable to some agreement whereby Schleicher might be unhorsed and Papen restored to a position of public prominence. He accordingly asked Keppler to arrange for a meeting with Papen (reported in an affidavit of Wilhelm Keppler, executed at Nurnberg, 26 November 1945).

The result of these maneuvers was the now-famous meeting between Hitler and Papen at banker Schroeder’s Cologne home in January 1933. It was at this meeting that Hitler and Papen reached an understanding, subject only to the ironing out of minor details. It was at this meeting that Papen completely committed himself to go along with Nazi policy.

The events of this day have been described by Kurt von Schroeder (in a statement referred to above):

“On January 4, 1933, Hitler, von Papen, Hess, Himmler and
Keppler came to my house in Cologne. Hitler, von Papen and I
went to my den where we were closeted in a discussion lasting
about two hours. Hess, Himmler and Keppler did not participate
in this discussion but were in the next room. Keppler, who had
helped arrange this meeting, came from Berlin; von Papen came
alone from his home in the Saar; and Hitler brought Hess and
Himmler with him, as they were traveling with him to Lippe in
connection with the election campaign. The discussion was only
between Hitler and Papen; I personally had nothing to say in the
discussion. The meeting started about 11:30 A.M. and the first
question was raised by Hitler as to why it was necessary to
punish the two Nazis who had killed the Communist in Silesia.
Von Papen explained to Hitler that it had been necessary to
punish these two Nazis, although they had not been put to death,
because the law was on the books and all political offenders
under the law must have some punishment. He further explained to
Hitler that it might be possible to get a pardon from President
Hindenburg to give serious consideration to making Hitler the
Chancellor at the time that Hindenburg met with Hitler and von
Papen and that he had understood that Hindenburg was perfectly
willing to discuss this matter with Hitler at that time. He said
that it came as a great surprise and shock to him when
Hindenburg was unwilling to do so and he felt that someone,
probably von Schleicher, was responsible for the change in
Hindenburg’s point of view. Next, von Papen told Hitler that it
seemed to him the best thing to have the conservatives and
nationalists who had supported him join with the Nazis to form a
government. He proposed that this new government should, if
possible, be headed by Hitler and von Papen on the same level.
Then Hitler made a long speech in which he said if he were made
Chancellor, it would be necessary for him to be head of the
government but that supporters of Papen could go into his
(Hitler’s) government as ministers when they were willing to go
along with him in his policy of changing many things. These
changes he outlined at this time included elimination of Social
Democrats, Communists and Jews from leading positions in Germany
and the restoration of order in public life. Von Papen and
Hitler reached an agreement in principle so that many of the
points which had brought them in conflict could be eliminated
and they could find a way to get together. They agreed that
further details would have to be worked out and that this could
be done in Berlin or some other convenient place.

“I understand they met later with von Ribbentrop and worked out
further details.

“The meeting broke up about 1:30 and the three of us joined
Hess, Himmler and Keppler at lunch, during which there was
general conversation which lasted until about four o’clock when
they, all the guests, departed.”

Having reached an understanding with Hitler, von Papen directed his energy toward convincing President Hindenburg to allow Hitler to form a new government. In this task he had to overcome Hindenburg’s fears that this appointment would lead to domestic oppressions and risk of war (according to a statement of Otto Meissner, Nurnberg, 28 November 1945).

Von Papen himself subsequently admitted the important role he played in bringing Hitler to power. At Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938, immediately after Hitler had forced Schuschnigg to sign the document which led to the Austrian Anschluss, Hitler turned to Papen and remarked:

“Herr von Papen, through your assistance I was appointed
Chancellor of Germany and thus the Reich was saved from the
abyss of communism. I will never forget that.”

Papen replied:

“_Ja, wohl, Mein Fuehrer._” (_2995-PS_)

C. _AS VICE-CHANCELLOR, VON PAPEN USED HIS POSITION AND PERSONAL
INFLUENCE TO FACILITATE THE CONSOLIDATION OF NAZI CONTROL OVER GERMANY._

(1) _In the first critical year and a half of Nazi consolidation of control over Germany, von Papen was second only to Hitler in the Cabinet which established the legal basis for furtherance of the Nazi program._ As Vice-Chancellor, van Papen was the only member of the government empowered to act for the Fuehrer in his absence.

(2) _Von Papen actively participated in the general abolition of civil liberties by promoting legislation which paved the way for the Nazi police state._ At the first meeting of Hitler’s Cabinet, there was intensive discussion concerning the possibility of securing passage of an Enabling Law which in practical effect would liquidate the Reichstag and make the Nazi Cabinet the supreme law-making power of the Reich. The conspirators, including von Papen, at this meeting clearly indicated that they did not at the time hold sufficient power to achieve this measure by normal constitutional methods (_351-PS_).

Seizing the Reichstag fire as a pretext, the Cabinet forthwith arranged for the suspension of those fundamental civil liberties (including freedom of speech, press, assembly and association) which would protect citizens who dared to oppose the plans of the conspirators. The suspension of civil liberties was accomplished by issuance of a Presidential decree, which presumably, according to German usage, was proposed to the Reich President by the Cabinet and countersigned by those Ministers whose departments were involved (_1390-PS_; _2050-PS_).

This basic law was only the first of a series which placed the individual dissenter at the mercy of the Nazi state. As if to underscore explicitly the basic policy behind this legislation, von Papen personally signed the decree which implemented this legislation by creating Special Courts to enforce its provisions. This decree abolished rights, including the right of appeal, which had previously characterized the administration of justice by the German judicial system. It thus constituted also the first legislative measure for the Nazification of the German judiciary (_2076-PS_).

The subsequent creation of the dreaded _Volksgericht_ and the wholesale Nazification of the German system of criminal law was merely the logical development of these earlier steps. This too was achieved by decree of the Cabinet in which von Papen was Vice-Chancellor (_2014-PS_).

(3) _Von Papen actively participated in substitution of the Nazi Cabinet for the Reichstag as Germany’s supreme law-giving authority, notwithstanding his doubts as to the advisability of giving Hitler such extensive power._ Von Papen actively participated in the Cabinet deliberations concerning the proposed so-called Enabling Act, and concerning the means by which it might be made law (_351-PS_; _2962-PS_; _2963-PS_).

The enactment of this law deprived the Reichstag of its legislative functions, so that legislative as well as executive powers were concentrated in Hitler and his Cabinet (_2001-PS_).

Enactment of the law was made possible only by the application of Nazi pressure and terror against the potential opponents of this legislation, and by taking advantage of the Presidential decree of 28 February 1933, suspending constitutional guarantees of freedom. (See section 2 of