Chapter VII: on the Acquisition of Totalitarian Political Control.) (1)

As if to indorse the methods by which this legislation was enacted, von Papen personally signed the Amnesty Decree of 21 March 1933, liberating all persons who had committed murder between 30 January and 21 March 1933 against anti-Nazi politicians, writers, and Reichstag Deputies (_2059-PS_).

Von Papen participated in this program notwithstanding the fact that he foresaw at that time the implications of granting to Hitler the complete powers conferred by the Enabling Act. He has so testified (in an interrogation at Nurnberg, 3 September 1945):

“Q. After Hitler became Chancellor, when for the first time did
you have any doubts about the wisdom of having allowed him to
become Chancellor?

“A. Well, that’s difficult to say. I mean the first doubt
certainly I had when the Reichstag gave in to his request for
the law, to enable him to rule the country without parliament.”

(4) _Von Papen not only participated in the seizure by the cabinet of supreme power for the Nazis, but as a member of the cabinet participated in the systematic elimination of all potential enemies of the Nazi conspiracy._ The Reichstag fire and the ensuing suppression of civil liberties marked the beginning of the destruction of all rival political parties. The immediate elimination of the legally elected Communist members from the Reichstag was merely the forerunner of the rapid and complete liquidation of all political parties other than the National Socialists (_2403-PS_; _1396-PS_; _2058-PS_; _1388-PS_). By these measures the suppression of all democratic opposition became complete, within one year of the time when von Papen was warning his countrymen of the dangers of authoritarianism.

Having substituted the autocracy of the Hitler cabinet for the democratic force of the Reichstag, the cabinet proceeded immediately to enact a series of laws abolishing the states and coordinating them with the Reich (_2004-PS_; _2005-PS_; _2006-PS_). The enactment of these laws, which had been clearly indicated by point 25 of the Party program, removed all possible retarding influences which the German federal States might have exerted against the overwhelming centralization of power in Hitler’s Reich Cabinet.

The importance of this step, as well as the role played by Papen, is reflected in an exchange of letters between Reichs President Hindenburg, von Papen in his capacity as Reichskommissar for Prussia, and Reichs Minister Goering. The exchange occurred in connection with the recall of the Reichskommissar and the appointment of Goering to the post of Minister President of Prussia. In tendering his resignation, on 7 April 1933, von Papen wrote to Hitler:

“With the draft of the law for the coordination of the states
with the Reich, passed today by the Reich Chancellor,
legislative work has begun which will be of historical
significance for the political development of the German state.
The step taken by the Reich Government, which I headed at the
time, is now crowned by this new inter-locking of the Reich.
You, Herr Reich Chancellor, will now, as once Bismarck, be able
to coordinate in all points the policy of the greatest of German
states with that of the Reich. Now that the new law enables you
to appoint a Prussian Prime Minister I ask you to inform the
Reich President that I return to his hands my post of Reichs
Commissar for Prussia.” (_3357-PS_)

In transmitting this resignation request to President Hindenburg, Hitler stated:

“Vice-Chancellor von Papen has sent a letter to me which I
enclose for your information. Herr von Papen already informed me
within the last few days that he agreed with Minister Goering to
resign on his own volition, as soon as the unified conduct of
the governmental affairs in the Reich and in Prussia would be
assured by the new law on coordination of policy in the Reich
and the states [_Laender_].

“On the eve of the day when the new law on the institution of
Reich governors [_Reichs-Statthalter_] was adopted, Herr von
Papen considered this aim as having been attained and he
requested of me to undertake the appointment of the Prussian
Prime Minister, when at the same time he would offer his full
time services in the Reich Government.

“Herr von Papen, in accepting the commission for the Government
of Prussia in these difficult times since 30 January, has
rendered a very meritorious service to the realization of the
idea of coordinating the policy in the Reich and the States. His
collaboration in the Reich cabinet, for which he now offers all
his strength, is infinitely valuable; my relationship to him is
such a heartily friendly one, that I sincerely rejoice at the
great help I shall thus receive.

“For profound reverence,
“A.H.” (_3357-PS_)

The enactment of this legislation followed repeated declarations in which Papen had warned his countrymen of the dangers of the exaggerated degree of centralized authority which would result from abolition of the federal system. These warnings began before Hitler’s accession to power and continued by implication in the reassurances which Papen gave in February 1933 to Bavarian political leaders who expressed their fears of Nazi centralized authority (_Cuno Horkenbach, Das Deutsche Reich von 1918 bis Heute._ (The German Reich from 1918 until today) (Berlin 1933), p. 44). As late as 3 March 1933, in an election speech at Stuttgart, von Papen warned that:

“Federalism saves us from centralism, that organizational form
which concentrically draws all the vital forces of a people to
one point, as a mirror will do with the rays of the sun. No
people is less suited for being governed centralistically than
the German people.” (_3313-PS_)

Less than one month after its seizure of the legislative power, the cabinet of which von Papen was a member enacted the first of a series of laws aimed at establishing firm Nazi control over the entire civil service and judiciary (_2012-PS_; _1400-PS_; _1398-PS_). Having been a public servant himself, von Papen was aware of the far-reaching effect of these first legislative and administrative steps in attaining full totalitarian control over the entire governmental machinery of Germany.

The cabinet of which von Papen was a member embarked upon a state policy of persecution of the Jews. The first organized act in this program was the boycott of Jewish enterprises on 1 April 1933, which was approved by the entire cabinet. This was followed by a series of laws beginning the systematic elimination of the Jews from public and professional life in Germany. (See Section 7 of Chapter VII on the Program for Persecution of Jews.)

All these suppressive measures were in line with long-standing basic objectives of the NSDAP to which von Papen had agreed in his January conference with Hitler and von Schroeder.

(5) _To complete its suppression of all rival influences, the Cabinet of which von Papen was a member enacted a series of decrees which strengthened the Nazi movement by conferring upon it a para-governmental status._ Followers of the Party, through a decree signed personally by von Papen, were granted amnesty “for penal acts committed in the material revolution of the German People, in its preparation of the fight for the German soil” (_2059-PS_). The perpetrators of Nazi terrorism were thereby placed above the law, and a pattern was established for the subsequent handling of Nazi excesses.

This cabinet enacted measures which gave legal protection to the status and symbols of the Party and its formations (_1652-PS_; _2759-PS_).

This cabinet enacted a series of measures to assure the Nazi movement’s spiritual control over Germany (_2029-PS_; _2030-PS_; _2415-PS_; _2083-PS_; _2078-PS_; _2088-PS_).

Having first outlawed all political parties other than the NSDAP, the cabinet of which von Papen was a member formally decreed that:

“1. After the victory of the National Socialistic Revolution,
the National Socialistic German Labor Party is the bearer of the
concept of the German State and is inseparably the state.

“2. It will be a part of the public law. Its organization will
be determined by the Fuehrer.” (_1395-PS_).

Having granted para-governmental status to the Nazi party, and having assured legal unity of the Party’s Fuehrer and the Reich’s Chancellor, the Nazis next step was to combine in the same person the Presidency of the German Reich. This was accomplished by merging the offices of President and Chancellor, by means of a decree signed by von Papen (_2003-PS_). An important consequence of this law was to give to Hitler the supreme command of the German armed forces, always a perquisite of the Presidency (_2050-PS_).

(6) _Despite disagreements as to detail, von Papen fundamentally agreed with basic Nazi objectives and publicly endorsed the regime for which he shared responsibility as Vice Chancellor._ Von Papen’s basic political philosophy was not so divergent from Nazism as to preclude an easy bridging of the gap. In 1932, while still Chancellor, von Papen had been willing to head a government in which Nazism would be strongly represented. By January 1933 he found it possible—as a price for his restoration to a position of public prominence—to submerge his differences with Hitler and to direct his energies to the installation of a Nazi regime (see B above).

In addition to his participation as a cabinet member in the process of Nazifying Germany, von Papen’s devotion to the Nazi cause was repeatedly demonstrated throughout this period by public statements and acts both by himself and by Hitler. Thus, as noted above in connection with his role in the elimination of the _Laender_ as a political force, von Papen wrote Hitler in April 1933, that

“You, Herr Reich Chancellor, will now, as once Bismarck, be able
to coordinate in all points the policy of the greatest of German
states with that of the Reich,”

And Hitler on that occasion took notice of Papen’s services by declaring that

“His collaboration in the Reich cabinet, for which he now offers
all his strength, is infinitely valuable; my relationship to him
is such a heartily friendly one, that I sincerely rejoice at the
great help I shall thus receive.” (_3357-PS_).

And again on 2 November 1933, speaking from the same platform with Hitler and Gauleiter Terboven, in the course of the campaign for Reichstag election and the referendum on Germany’s withdrawal from the League of Nations, von Papen declared:

“Ever since Providence called upon me to become the pioneer of
national resurrection and the rebirth of our homeland, I have
tried to support with all my strength the work of the national
socialist movement and its leader; and just as I at the time of
taking over the chancellorship have advocated to pave the way to
power for the young fighting liberation movement, just as I on
January 30 was selected by a gracious fate to put the hands of
our chancellor and Fuehrer into the hand of our beloved field
marshal, so do I today again feel the obligation to say to the
German people and all those who have kept confidence in me:

“The kind Lord has blessed Germany by giving it in times of deep
distress a leader who will lead it, through all distresses and
weaknesses, through all crisis and moments of danger, with the
sure instinct of the statesman into a happy future.”

* * * * * *

“Let us in this hour say to the Fuehrer of the new Germany that
we believe in him and his work.” (_3375-PS_).

By this time as noted above, the cabinet of which Papen was a member had abolished the civil liberties which were a condition to any effective protest against Nazism, had sanctioned political murder committed in aid of Nazism’s seizure of power, had substituted itself for the Reichstag as Germany’s supreme law-making authority, had destroyed all rival political parties, had enacted the basic laws for abolition of the political influence of the _Laender_, had provided the legislative basis for purging the civil service and judiciary of anti-Nazi elements, had embarked upon a state policy of persecution of the Jews, had legislated Nazi influence into the cultural life of the German nation, and had taken its first steps toward conferring a para-governmental status upon the Nazi party and its principal formations.

Even after von Papen’s Marburg speech of June 1934, in which he again showed some understanding of the dangers of Nazism, he remained a pillar of Nazi policy and influence. Thus Hitler himself, in attempting to justify the Blood Purge of 30 June 1934, tacitly admitted that Papen was still considered a loyal member of the regime:

“The allegations [of foreign newspapers] that Vice-Chancellor
von Papen, Reichsminister Seldte, or other gentlemen of the
Reich Cabinet had entertained connections with the rebels is
refuted by the fact that one of the first intentions of the
rebels was to assassinate these men.” (_Hitler Reichstag_
address, 18 July 1934, as quoted in _Das Archiv_, Vol. IV, pp.
495, 507.)

The Fuehrer thus made a tacit bid for the continuing loyalty of von Papen. Von Papen’s subsequent career demonstrated that this was not a vain expectation. He left the vice-chancellorship only to assume the new task of special emissary of the Fuehrer to Austria. But before leaving, while still Vice Chancellor, von Papen signed the decree combining the positions of President and Reichs Chancellor on 1 August 1934, and on 5 August 1934 he delivered the document—the so-called Hindenburg Testament—which purported to confer the revered president’s dying blessing upon Hitler and the Nazi regime (_Notice concerning delivery of Hindenburg’s testament by Vice Chancellor von Papen, Das Archiv_, Vol. V, page 648).

D. _AS GERMANY’S MOST FAMOUS CATHOLIC LAYMAN AND AS NEGOTIATOR OF THE
VATICAN CONCORDAT, VON PAPEN USED HIS POSITION AND PERSONAL INFLUENCE TO
PARTICIPATE IN THE CONSOLIDATION OF NAZI CONTROL OVER GERMANY AND IN
NAZI PREPARATION FOR AGGRESSION._

(1) _Immediately upon Nazi seizure of power within Germany, von Papen endeavored to weld German Catholicism into a powerful body of support for the Nazi state._ When Naziism seized control of Germany in January 1933, its relations with the church were at a low ebb. The period of the Reichstag elections of July and November 1932 was marked by certain widely circulated anti-Nazi pronouncements of the German bishops, especially in such Catholic papers as _Germania_, _Koelnische Volkszeitung_, and the _Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung_. These bishops discerned the fundamental incompatibility between the Church and the Nazis’ own declarations of State policy. They accordingly publicly stigmatized the Nazi movement as anti-Christian, forbade the Catholic clergy to participate in any ceremonies (such as funerals) in which the Nazi Party was officially represented, refused the sacraments to Party officials, and in several pastorals expressly warned the faithful against the danger to German Catholicism created by the Party (_3389-PS_).

Immediately upon seizure of power, the main concern of the new regime was to liquidate political opposition. Achievement of this objective was predicated upon the strategy of “divide and rule”. A first step in this strategy was to convince conservatives that the efforts of the government were being directed primarily against the Communists and other forces of the extreme Left, and that their own interests would remain safe in Nazi hands as long as they would consent to refrain from political activity. The result was a brief but active period of rapprochement between Church and Party. Von Papen was a leader in this strategy. The minutes of the Reich cabinet meeting of 15 March 1933 contain the following notation in connection with discussions on the Enabling Act:

“The Vice Chancellor and Reich Commissar for the State of
Prussia said it is of decisive importance to integrate into the
new State the masses standing behind the Parties. He said that
the question of coordination of political Catholicism into the
new State is of special importance.” (_2962-PS_)

Eight days later, speaking at the second meeting of the Reichstag of 1933, on 23 March 1933, Hitler asked for adoption of the Enabling Act. In this speech he declared:

“While the government is determined to carry through the
political and moral purging of our public life, it is creating
and insuring prerequisites for a truly religious life. The
government sees in both Christian confessions the factors most
important for the maintenance of our Folkdom. It will respect
agreements concluded between them and the states. However, it
expects that its work will meet with a similar appreciation. The
government will treat all other denominations with equal
objective justice. However, it can never condone that belonging
to a certain denomination or to a certain race might be regarded
as license to commit or tolerate crimes. The Government will
devote its care to the sincere living together of Church and
State.” (_3387-PS_).

The immediate effect of this assurance was action by the conference of German bishops, meeting in Fulda on 28 March 1933. This conference lifted restrictions imposed on members of the church adhering to the Nazi movement. In a cautious statement which placed full faith and credit in the Papen-inspired Hitler assurances, the bishops declared:

“The high shepherds of the dioceses of Germany in their dutiful
anxiety to keep the Catholic faith pure and protect the
untouchable aims and rights of the Catholic Church have adopted,
for profound reasons, during the last years, an oppositional
attitude toward the National Socialist movement, through
prohibitions and warnings, which was to be in effect as long and
as far as those reasons remained valid.

“It must now be recognized that there are official and solemn
declarations issued by the highest representative of the Reich
Government—who at the same time is the authoritarian leader of
that movement—which acknowledge the inviolability of the
teachings of Catholic faith and the unchangeable tasks and
rights of the church, and which expressly assure the full value
of the legal pacts concluded between the various German States
and the Church.

“Without lifting the condemnation of certain religious and
ethical errors implied in our previous measures, the Episcopate
now believes it can entertain the confidence that those
prescribed general prohibitions and warnings may not be regarded
as necessary any more.” (_3389-PS_)

This action opened the door for mass Party adherence by practicing Catholics. All those German Catholics who were inclined to adopt Nazi political views and had hesitated only because of the anti-Nazi attitude of the hierarchy hastened now to join the victorious party of the “National Revolution”. This tendency was marked by a tremendous and sudden burst of activity by the so-called “bridge-builders,” who rushed to close the gap between the Church and the Nazi State. Von Papen, who only a short time before had been willing to use armed force to suppress the Nazis, was foremost among these “bridge-builders”, who not only claimed an ideological affinity between the Nazi system and the alleged anti-liberal character of Catholic politics, but affirmatively apologized for excesses of the State which even then had begun to shock the world.

Existing agencies were used for this purpose. Thus, the Union of Catholic Germans (_Arbeitsgemeinschaft Katholischer Deutscher_), of which von Papen was president, insisted in its program that the church, like the Nazi movement itself, was guided by the leadership principle (Cuno Horkenbach, _Das Deutsche Reich von 1918 bis Heute_ (The German Reich from 1918 Until Today) (Berlin 1935), pp. 436, 504). The same organization, in the course of the election campaign which preceded adoption of the Enabling Act, had bitterly criticized the Catholic political opposition to Marxism and urged that Catholics “by all means vote unanimously the National Socialist ticket”, because “We Catholics do not wish to be denied to march in the lead in this election campaign” (Election Appeal, _Voelkischer Beobachter_, 23 February 1933, p. 2). Later, on the eve of the Nazis’ first anti-Jewish boycott, this same organization played its part in the extensive campaign replying to foreign newspaper reports concerning atrocities committed against German Jews. On 1 April 1933 it published through the Prussian News Service, an “Appeal to all Christians”, viewing “with great indignation” this “irresponsible campaign against Germany” which “continues in spite of official German declarations and corrections”. This “Appeal” characterized the foreign reports as “intentional lies and falsifications” and “a reckless, crafty campaign of destruction conducted by the Jewish world alliance and moneyed powers against the right of self-determination of all peoples and against the entire Christian civilization”. It called upon “the Christians of all countries, irrespective of denominations, to form a world-wide front of defense against that Jewish conspiracy disturbing the true peace” (“_Appeal to All Christians_”, _Voelkischer Beobachter_ (People’s Observer), 30 March 1933, p. 2).

Notwithstanding the force of these activities, this Nazification by existing agencies was not deemed adequate to the task of organizing Catholic lay support. The result was the creation, in early April 1933, under the sponsorship of von Papen, of a new “Bund” of Catholic Germans called “Cross and Eagle” (“_Kreuz und Adler_”) which made it its task “to contribute enthusiastic devotion to the upbuilding of the future Reich” (Gerd Ruehle, _Das Dritte Reich_ (The Third Reich), p. 250).

This whole program of rapprochement between Church and Party manifests the Papen “touch”—the same quality of handiwork which had manifested itself in Hitler’s accession to power and which later was to reappear in Austria: First, gentle hints by Papen as to strategy, followed within eight days by reassurances in Hitler’s Reichstag speech. Next, again following merely by days, the formal lifting of the restrictions on Nazi membership by the leaders of the Church of which von Papen was the most famous lay member. Finally, again within a few days, the open campaign by which Papen-sponsored organizations endeavoured to align Church and Party. The close timing of these events was not a coincidence.

(2) _Having achieved initial successes in consolidating Catholic support within Germany, von Papen undertook international consolidation of Nazi-Church relationships by negotiation of a Concordat with the Vatican._ The program of rapprochement and the public declarations bridging the gap between the Church and the Nazi movement were merely advertising media by which Nazi-minded Catholics were herded into the movement, and slogans by which the conspirators might placate the Catholic hierarchy. Throughout this period there continued an undercurrent of anti-Catholic activity. A thorough job was done in purging Reich, state, and municipal administrations of officials appointed for their adherence to the Centre or Bavarian People’s parties. Former leaders of those parties, including priests, joined Communists and Social Democrats in the concentration camps, and the campaign of hatred against the “black” was resumed. By April 1933 the bishops were making appeals for clemency toward former civil servants, who, they pointed out, were not able to join the celebration of national awakening because they had been dismissed from positions in which they had given their best to the community of the German people. And on 31 May 1933, a meeting of the Bavarian bishops adopted a solemn statement directed against the tendency of attributing to the State alone the right of educating, organizing, and leading ideologically the German youth (_Dismissal of Catholics_, Excerpts from _Voelkischer Beobachter_, February-March 1933; _Excerpt, Voelkischer Beobachter_, 19 April 1933 (Munich ed.), p. 2).

By this maintenance of a certain amount of pressure against Catholic interests, the hierarchy was reminded of the dangers of not coming to a definite agreement with the Nazi State. The stage was thus set for von Papen’s negotiation of a Concordat with the Vatican.

At the time of these activities, the government of which von Papen was Vice Chancellor had already launched its program to mold the state machinery into the Nazi image. The Enabling Act had become law, and the general outlines of the Nazi State were already manifest. Notwithstanding the doubts created in his mind by Hitler’s insistence upon the Enabling Act, von Papen undertook negotiations with the Vatican. In fact, he since has claimed that these fears gave rise to the negotiation of the Concordat (Interrogation at Nurnberg, 3 Sept. 1945):

“I became alarmed, you remember, somewhere in June when I went
to Rome to negotiate a concordat because I certainly feared that
the particular powers of the Hitler Party would create
difficulties on the religious side. So that with the consent of
Hitler I went to Rome to make that concordat.”

It is clear, however, that these alleged fears of the Enabling Act were not fears at all. They were merely an understanding of the threat they carried to all persons and instrumentalities antagonistic to the Nazi system. Von Papen understood the significance of these developments. What he actually feared was that the rest of the world would also understand Nazi methods and would erect barriers to the consummation of the plans of the conspirators. The situation plainly called for a neutralizing of these potential barriers to Nazi plans. One method of achieving this result at that time was the negotiation of solemn agreements whereby other powers would commit themselves to a policy of non-intervention by either armed or moral force.

When von Papen concluded the Concordat with the Vatican, the political objectives of furthering the purposes of the Nazi conspiracy were thus foremost in his mind. Even at that time, in the first half of 1933, von Papen had in mind, in concluding this Concordat, not only the consolidation of Catholicism behind the Nazi regime within Germany, but also the psychological build-up of the Austrians in preparation for Anschluss. Von Papen’s own words eloquently characterize these manoeuvres (monograph entitled “Austria” written at Nurnberg, 1945):

“Although the ‘_Heimwehr_’ movement [in Austria] had brought
these patriotic elements together before this, and had fought
with them to free the country from strong Socialistic pressure,
yet they were armed only from the standpoint of domestic
politics and remained aloof from all ambitions for a greater
Germany. The cause lay mostly in the Catholic nature of the
country, and in the strong influence of the clergy in political
leadership. The Reich was considered a bulwark of Protestantism,
despite its twenty million Catholics. The anti-clerical wave,
which was dominant in the Reich under the leadership of Prussia,
itself led by Socialists, appeared to have verified the fears of
the Austrian clergy. For in spite of Catholics at the head of
the Reich—Wirth, Marx, Bruening—the Centre Party had always
put through its cultural demands by logrolling with the
Socialists. There were at least two Socialist officials,
university professors or teachers for every Catholic appointee.
In contrast to the obviously badly functioning Weimar
Constitution, there was an effort in Austria, under clerical
leadership and with the strong support of the Vatican, to
develop into a corporate state.

“Those were serious obstacles on both sides. When, after the
seizure of power of the NSDAP in 1933, as the first remedy
against a new ‘_Kulturkampf_’, I safely concluded the Concordat
of the New Reich with the Holy See, my thoughts at the time were
not focused only on the Reich. For a peaceful evolution of the
German-Austrian question it was of the greatest importance that
the doubts of the clergy on the Austrian side be completely
eliminated.”

* * * * * *

“It was my first purpose in the diplomatic field to deprive the
Austrian problem of its European character, and to develop it
gradually into an exclusively internal problem between the Reich
and Austria.

“It therefore had to be my primary aim to convince the Vatican
that a union could not endanger the Vatican’s interests. A
Concordat of the Reich with the Vatican had been my first
attempt to prevent religious difficulties arising from Nazism’s
revolutionary doctrine; the attempt had obviously failed. Under
the growing influence of his Party, Hitler sabotaged the
Concordat. Rome was deeply disappointed and in the greatest
excitement.”

On 20 July 1933 the Reich Concordat with the Vatican was signed by von Papen as representative of the Nazi Government of Germany. This instrument was an international treaty which purported to give the church an official guarantee of all the church rights it had sought. In addition it purported to confer freedom for Catholic organizations, maintenance of parochial schools, and preservation of the general influence of the church on the education of the German Catholic youth. Among the 33 articles of the Concordat, 21 treated exclusively the rights and prerogatives accorded to the church. Reciprocation consisted only in a pledge of loyalty by the clergy to the Reich Government and a promise that Catholic religious instruction would emphasize the patriotic duties of the Christian citizen and insist on a loyal attitude toward the Fatherland. Since it had always been the practice of the Catholic church to abide by established governments and to promote patriotic convictions among the faithful, these stipulations of the Concordat were no more than legalizations of an existing custom. They were no more than a guarantee of goodwill betokening harmonious Church-State relations (_2655-PS_).

(3) _The signing of the Concordat was only an interlude in the church policy of the Nazi Conspirators, which was a policy of reassurances and repression._ The signing of the Concordat merely marked the beginning of evasions and violations of both its spirit and letter. The ink was hardly dry before it became necessary for the Vatican to complain about a false interpretation of the text, made by the Nazi government in its own favour. (See Section 6 of Chapter VII on Suppression of the Christian Churches.)

By action taken only ten days after the signing of the Concordat, and despite its provision for the continuance of the Catholic Youth Association, simultaneous membership in the Hitler Jugend and the Catholic Youth Association was forbidden, and the campaign to smash the latter organization thereby commenced (_2456-PS_).

These first steps were merely a foretaste of a long series of violations which were to commence almost immediately and eventually to result in papal denunciation and serious excesses committed against the clergy (_3280-PS_).

The continuing character of the conspirators’ church policy—and of von Papen’s participation in it—is further revealed by von Papen’s action of 19 September 1934, when, as president of the Union of Catholic Germans (_Arbeitsgemeinschaft Katholischer Deutscher_), he ordered dissolution of this organization. By this time the Nazis were dropping all pretext that rival organizations might be permitted to exist, and were well along in their plans for the integration of all German institutions into the Nazi system. The official published announcement of dissolution is a revealing document:

“Since the Reich Party Leadership through its department for
spiritual peace increasingly and immediately administers all
cultural problems and those concerning the relationship of State
and Churches, the tasks at first delegated to the Union of
Catholic Germans are now included in those of the Reich Party
Leadership in the interest of a stronger coordination.

“Vice-Chancellor von Papen, up to now the Leader of the Union of
Catholic Germans, declared about the Dissolution of this
organization that it was done upon his suggestion, since the
attitude of the national socialist State toward the Christian
and Catholic Church had been explained often and inequivocally
through the leader and chancellor himself.” (_3376-PS_).

E. _AS ENVOY AT VIENNA, VON PAPEN USED HIS POSITION AND INFLUENCE
DELIBERATELY TO WEAKEN THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT, AND PARTICIPATED IN THE
POLITICAL PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR MILITARY AGGRESSION AGAINST
AUSTRIA._

(1) _Von Papen accepted appointment as envoy at Vienna knowing he would “front” for a Nazi fifth column in Austria._ In July 1934, the Austrian policy of the Nazi government of Germany was in bad odor throughout the civilized world. The historical record of this period was written in the newspaper headlines of the day. A period of Nazi pressure and terror culminated on 25 July 1934 in an attempted revolutionary putsch, the murder of the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss, in which the German Minister, Reith, was implicated. (See Section 3 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against Austria.) The situation was such as to call for removal of the German Minister, Reith, and for the prompt substitution of a man who was an enthusiast for Anschluss with Germany, who could be tolerant of Nazi objectives and methods, but who could lend an aura of respectability to official German representation in Vienna. Hitler’s reaction was immediate. He chose von Papen as quickly as he heard the news of the Dollfuss murder. Writing of this event in 1945 after his arrest by Allied authorities, von Papen dramatically describes the Fuehrer’s response to the situation (monograph on “Austria” referred to above):

“Suddenly, at three o’clock in the morning, there was a loud
ringing of my doorbell. SS men demanded admission. My son and I
were of the opinion that I was going to be imprisoned. We went
to the front door armed with pistols. Our suspicions were
unfounded. The SS men declared that they had come from the
Chancellery with the order to put through a telephone connection
between Hitler and myself.

“Hitler was in Bayreuth and had been trying for hours without
success to get in touch with me. The connection was made.

“Hitler started, ‘You know of course what has happened in
Vienna. You must go there immediately and try to set things in
order.’

“I replied, ‘I have no idea what has happened in Vienna. I have
just returned from the country and I don’t understand what you
want with me in Vienna. I am in the act of packing my trunk to
leave Berlin once and for all.’

“Hitler, highly excited, gave thereupon a short description of
the dramatic events in Vienna which led to the murder of
Dollfuss, and continued, ‘You are the only person who can save
the situation. I implore you to carry out my request.’”

As a result of this telephone call, von Papen flew immediately to join Hitler at Bayreuth. There it was clear that the Nazi leadership feared international repercussions from their Austrian policy and felt themselves in dire need of a respectable “front” man. Von Papen has described this meeting:

“There I found Hitler and his entire entourage, excited as an
ant-hill. It was difficult to get anything approaching an exact
picture of the Vienna ‘_Putsch_’ and the role of Hitler’s
promoters. Even if one had come into this gathering in complete
ignorance of the different circumstances involved, one could
have gathered with one look that they had a very bad conscience
and now were fearing the consequences. From the very first
moment I was certain that the immoderate policy of the Austrian
NSDAP under the leadership of Hitler’s condottiere, Habig, had
led to this coup d’etat.

“This was, then, a few days after the 30 June, the second bloody
excess of the Party which had promised to bring Germany by
peaceful means to social tranquility, welfare, and respect. It
was obvious that both events had made a deep impression on the
entire world, and that the governmental methods of the Party
must damage most seriously the political credit of the Reich”.

At this meeting it was Papen himself who drafted the letter of appointment. This letter was a masterpiece of deceit, calculated to conceal completely Hitler and Papen’s goal of annexation. It stated:

“As a result of the events in Vienna I am compelled to suggest
to the Reichs-President the removal of the German Minister to
Vienna, Dr. Reith, from his post, because he, at the suggestion
of Austrian Federal Ministers and the Austrian rebels
respectively consented to an agreement made by both these
parties concerning the safe conduct and retreat of the rebels to
Germany without making inquiry of the German Reich Government.
Thus the Minister has dragged the German Reich into an internal
Austrian affair without any reason.

“The assassination of the Austrian Federal Chancellor which was
strictly condemned and regretted by the German Government has
made the situation in Europe, already fluid, more acute, without
any fault of ours. Therefore, it is my desire to bring about if
possible an easing of the general situation, and especially to
direct the relations with the German Austrian State, which have
been so strained for a long time, again into normal and friendly
channels.

“For this reason, I request you, dear Mr. von Papen, to take
over this important task, just because you have possessed and
continue to possess my most complete and unlimited confidence
ever since we have worked together in the Cabinet.

“Therefore, I have suggested to the Reichs-President that you,
upon leaving the Reich-Cabinet and upon release from the office
of Commissioner for the Saar, be called on special mission to
the post of the German Minister in Vienna for a limited period
of time. In this position you will be directly subordinated to
me.

“Thanking once more for all that you have at a time done for the
coordination of the Government of the National Revolution and
since then together with us for Germany, I remain.” (_2799-PS_).

The actual mission of von Papen was stated more frankly, shortly after his arrival in Vienna, in the course of a private conversation with the American Minister, George S. Messersmith. Mr. Messersmith has described this meeting:

“When I did call on von Papen in the German Legation, he greeted
me with ‘Now you are in my Legation and I can control the
conversation’. In the baldest and most cynical manner he then
proceeded to tell me that all of Southeastern Europe, to the
borders of Turkey, was Germany’s natural hinterland, and that he
had been charged with the mission of facilitating German
economic and political control over all this region for Germany.
He blandly and directly said that getting control of Austria was
to be the first step. He definitely stated that he was in
Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and from
Vienna to work towards the weakening of the Governments in the
other states to the South and South East. He said that he
intended to use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain
influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer,
towards that end. He said that he was telling me this because
the German Government was bound on this objective of getting
this control of Southeastern Europe and there was nothing which
could stop it and that our own policy and that of France and
England was not realistic.

“The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him in the
German Legation, that I had to listen to what he had to say and
of course I was prepared to hear what he had to say although I
already knew what his instructions were. I was nevertheless
shocked to have him speak so baldly to me and when he finished I
got up and told him how shocked I was to hear the accredited
representative of a supposedly friendly state to Austria admit
that he was proposing to engage in activities to undermine and
destroy that Government to which he was accredited. He merely
smiled and said, of course this conversation was between us and
that he would, of course, not be talking to others so clearly
about his objectives. I have gone into this detail with regard
to this conversation as it is characteristic of the absolute
frankness and directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of
their objectives.” (_1760-PS_)

(2) _Von Papen proceeded forthwith to accomplish his mission—the maintenance of an outward appearance of non-intervention while keeping appropriate contacts useful in the eventual overthrow of the Austrian government._ Throughout the earlier period of his mission to Austria, von Papen’s activity was characterized by the assiduous avoidance of any appearance of intervention. His true mission was reaffirmed with clarity, several months after its commencement, when he was instructed by Berlin that “during the next two years nothing can be undertaken which will give Germany external political difficulties”. Every “appearance” of German interference in Austrian affairs “must be avoided” (_1760-PS_). As von Papen himself stated to Berger-Waldenegg, the Austrian Foreign Minister:

“Yes, you have your French and English friends now and you can
have your independence a little longer.” (_1760-PS_).

Throughout this period, the Nazi movement was gaining strength in Austria without openly-admitted German intervention, and Germany needed more time to consolidate its diplomatic position. These reasons for German policy were frankly expressed by the German Foreign Minister von Neurath in conversation with the American Ambassador to France (_L-150_).

Von Papen accordingly restricted his public activity to the normal ambassadorial function of cultivating all respectable elements in Austria and ingratiating himself in these circles—particularly if they were well-disposed (but not too obviously) to notions of Pan-Germanism. In these efforts he was particularly careful to exploit his background as a former professional officer and a Catholic (_1760-PS_).

Meanwhile, however, the Austrian Nazis continued illegal organization in anticipation of the possibility of securing their objectives by force if necessary. In these efforts they were aided by Germany, which permitted the outlawed Austrian Nazis to meet and perfect their plots within Germany and with German Nazi assistance; which harbored the Austrian Legion; which made funds available to National Socialists in Austria; and which established appropriate contact with them through the Reich Propaganda Ministry and through “respectable” Austrian “front” personalities (_1760-PS_; _812-PS_). (See also Section 3 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against Austria.)

Von Papen was fully aware of the existence and activities of these groups, and of their potentialities in effecting an Anschluss. Thus, in a report to Hitler dated 27 July 1935, entitled “Reflections on the Anniversary of Dollfuss’ Death”, he reviewed the activities of these illegal groups and concluded that National Socialism could “certainly become the rallying point of all racially German units beyond the borders”. In this report he declared:

“The Third Reich will be with Austria, or it will not be at all.
National Socialism must win it or it will perish, if it is
unable to solve this task.” (_2248-PS_).

These sentiments concerning the role of National Socialism were something more than idle speculation. Von Papen knew that the presence of the Austrian Legion in Germany in itself produced incidents, and that the Austrian Nazi movement was dependent on German support. He has so testified (at an interrogation in Nurnberg, 13 October 1945). In fact, despite his facade of strict non-intervention, he remained in contact with subversive and potentially subversive elements within Austria. Thus, in a report to Hitler dated 17 May 1935 he advised concerning the Austrian Nazi strategy as proposed by Captain Leopold, leader of the illegal Austrian Nazis (_2247-PS_). In subsequent statements he has revealed his _modus operandi_ in the use of his embassy staff. This method provided him with an opportunity to disclaim responsibility if these activities should be questioned. Thus, his military attache, Mutz, “maintained good relations with the Army circles which were inclined towards National Socialism”. Von Papen’s all-around contact man with the Austrian Nazis was a member of his staff, Baron von Kettler, who “had always maintained intimate contact with a group of young Austrian National Socialists who, as we both agreed, had a conservative coating and fought for a healthy development within the Party”. The practical effect of these contacts has been clarified in questioning of von Papen (at Nurnberg, 8 October 1945):

“* * * A. As I told you, I charged one of my younger people of
the Embassy, von Kettler—he was made the go-between with these
Nazi people, to smooth them down and talk with them. Personally
I had not very much to do with them.

“Q. Well, I know that. That is what you always said. But the
result of your time in Austria was that their interests were
furthered through your office. Whether you did it personally or
somebody working for you did it, I don’t think it is too
important for what we have in mind here tonight; do you?

“A. No.

“Q. Now, isn’t it a fact that their interests were furthered
through your office, if not through you as an individual during
those years that you were there?

“A. Yes, I wanted to know about their doings, you see. I must
have been informed what was going on.”

(3) _Conclusion of the Agreement of 11 July 1936 merely constituted another step towards Anschluss._ Prior to 1936, sponsorship of political subversion was not the only pressure applied by Germany in its efforts to gain control of Austria. The German Government in addition had placed certain economic barriers against trade between German and Austrian subjects, the most serious of which was the 1000 mark law, which crippled the Austrian tourist traffic by levying a 1000 RM tax on any German citizen crossing the border into Austria. The effect of these pressures was to induce the Austrian Chancellor, Kurt von Schuschnigg, to seek from Hitler an agreement to “lift the 1000 Mark barrier he had levied against Austria and reassure Austria that he had no political designs concerning our state, Austria” (_2994-PS_).

The result was the agreement of 11 July 1936 between Germany and Austria, which was negotiated by von Papen as Hitler’s representative. The published form of this agreement provided:

“Being convinced that they are making a valuable contribution
towards the whole European development in the direction of
maintaining peace, and in the belief that they are thereby best
serving the manifold mutual interests of both German States, the
Governments of the Federal State of Austria and of Germany have
resolved to return to relations of a normal and friendly
character. In this connection it is declared—

“(1) The German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of
the Federal State of Austria in the spirit of the pronouncements
of the German Fuehrer and Chancellor of May 21, 1935.

“(2) Each of the two Governments regards the inner political
order (including the question of Austrian National-Socialism)
obtaining in the other country as an internal concern of that
country, upon which it will exercise neither direct nor indirect
influence.

“(3) The Austrian Federal Government will constantly follow in
its policy in general, and in particular towards Germany, a line
in conformity with leading principles corresponding to the fact
that Austria regards herself as a German State.

“By such a decision neither the Rome Protocols of 1934 and their
additions of 1936, nor the relationships of Austria to Italy and
Hungary as partners in these protocols, are affected.
Considering that the detente desired by both sides cannot become
a reality unless certain preliminary conditions are fulfilled by
the Governments of both countries, the Austrian Federal
Government and the German Government will pass a number of
special measures to bring about the requisite preliminary state
of affairs.” (_TC-22_).

More interesting was the secret part of this agreement, the most important provisions of which have been summarized by Mr. Messersmith:

“Austria would (1) appoint a number of individuals enjoying the
Chancellor’s confidence but friendly to Germany to positions in
the Cabinet; (2) would devise means to give the ‘National
opposition’ a role in the political life of Austria and within
the framework of the Patriotic Front, and (3) would amnesty all
Nazis save those convicted of the most serious offenses.”
(_1760-PS_)

Especially interesting was the manner in which this agreement contained German economic concessions and further solemn assurances regarding Austrian independence and integrity, on the one hand, alongside far-reaching political concessions to the Nazi movement (_2994-PS_). The effect was to place Austria completely at the mercy of German good faith. Von Papen has correctly described it (in an interrogation at Nurnberg, 8 October 1945) as “the first step” toward preparation for Anschluss, notwithstanding his clear understanding at the time that the Austrian government desired and intended to retain its independence.

The Germans lost no time in making the most of their new opportunities, solemn assurances notwithstanding. The agreement merely heralded a new era in “legitimizing” the German fifth column in Austria. Thus, the immediate amnesty to political prisoners in itself presented serious police problems. The freedom granted to political demonstrations and organization by German Nazis made it difficult to police the propagandizing of Austrians. And the agreement specifically gave the German Nazis an opening wedge to representation in the Austrian government. The terroristic activities and pressure of the illegal Nazis continued without interruption under German sponsorship, until their hand was strengthened to the point of openly asking for official recognition (_812-PS_; _1760-PS_; _2994-PS_).

The importance of this agreement to the Germans was underscored by the promotion of its negotiator from _Gesandter_ to _Botschafter_, at the time of its signing (Announcement, _Das Archiv_, XXVIII, p. 571).

Von Papen himself participated in this pressure game by maintaining contact with the illegal Nazis, by trying to influence appointments to strategic cabinet positions, and by attempting to secure official recognition of Nazi “front” organizations. Reporting to Hitler shortly after conclusion of the 11 July 1936 agreement, he succinctly summarized his program for “normalizing” Austro-German relations under the regime of the new agreement:

“The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at the
present time is obstructed by the continued persistence of the
Ministry of Security, occupied by the old anti-National
Socialistic officials. Changes in personnel are therefore of
utmost importance. But they are definitely not to be expected
prior to the conference on the abolishing of the Control of
Finances [_Finanzkontrolle_] at Geneva. The Chancellor of the
League has informed Minister de Glaise-Horstenau, of his
intention, to offer him the portfolio of the Ministry of the
Interior. As a guiding principle [_Marschroute_] I recommend on
the tactical side, continued, patient psychological
manipulations, with slowly intensified pressure directed at
changing the regime. The proposed conference on economic
relations, taking place at the end of October will be a very
useful tool for the realization of some of our projects. In
discussion with government officials as well as with leaders of
the illegal party (Leopold and Schattenfreh) who conform
completely with the concordat of July 11, I am trying to direct
the next developments in such a manner to aim at corporative
representation of the movement in the fatherland front
[_Vaterlaendischen Front_] but nevertheless refraining from
putting National-Socialists in important positions for the time
being. However such positions are to be occupied only by
personalities, having the support and the confidence of the
movement. I have a willing collaborator in this respect in
Minister Glaise-Horstenau.” (_2246-PS_).

This activity continued through 1937. In fact, by 14 January 1937 the negotiations with the Austrian Minister of Security and the development of “front” organizations had proceeded so far that “a very intensive crisis has arisen for the illegal party” with respect to its future program. In urging a patient attitude toward these problems, von Papen appeared less concerned with the legitimacy of their position under the 11 July 1936 agreement than with his fear that

“a too strong and far-reaching connection (with a proposed
conservative ‘German Action’ front organization) would be
understood neither in our own ranks nor could it be of use to
the action itself.” (_2831-PS_)

On the other hand when an Austrian cabinet minister failed to show sufficient energy to suit von Papen’s purpose, he showed no hesitancy, under the terms of his 11 July 1936 agreement, to urge replacement by a more cooperative individual. Thus, von Papen has summarized his efforts to remove the Austrian Minister of the Interior (monograph “Austria”):

“I had tried to persuade Schuschnigg to appoint another minister
to his cabinet beside Herr von Glaise, who was not very active.
The new minister was to act as trusted liaison man between the
two governments, able to work on innumerable problems directly
without diplomatic intervention. This simplification would also
bring the men on both sides of the fence closer together.”

By the beginning of 1938, the Nazi hand had been so strengthened in Austria, and the differences and misunderstandings regarding the agreement of 11 July had become so serious and frequent, that Chancellor Schuschnigg found it expedient to accept von Papen’s invitation to meet Hitler at Berchtesgaden, notwithstanding serious misgivings on the part of Schuschnigg (_2995-PS_). Von Papen showed no hesitancy in extending this invitation despite the fact that he knew Hitler’s “idea to swallow Austria”, despite his knowledge of Schuschnigg’s distrust of Hitler, and despite his own doubts concerning the value of Hitler’s word. Notwithstanding the situation, he found it possible even to urge Schuschnigg that Hitler was a man upon whom Schuschnigg could rely. And in making these representations, he was fully aware of the extent of German rearmament and of its possible use as a diplomatic pressure device (according to interrogations, Nurnberg, 19 September and 8 October 1945).

On 11 February 1938, Schuschnigg left for Berchtesgaden to meet Hitler. At this meeting the severest pressure was exerted to extort far-reaching concessions from Austria, including reorganization of the cabinet, appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister of Security and the Interior, and a general amnesty to Nazis convicted of crimes (_2995-PS_; _2461-PS_; _1544-PS_; _1780-PS_).

It was at this meeting that Papen urged upon Hitler the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister of Security and the Interior (according to monograph “Austria”).

Thoroughly entrenched in the government, the Nazis were now able to seize upon Schuschnigg’s plebiscite as an excuse to seize power, and to call for military intervention by Germany (_812-PS_; _2996-PS_). (See also Section 3 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against Austria.)

Thereafter it was only a matter of hours before Austria became a province of the Reich—by a law signed by von Papen’s man, Seyss-Inquart (_2307-PS_).

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO FRANZ VON PAPEN