Chapter IX: on Aggression Against The Low Countries

(7) _Greece and Yugoslavia._ At a meeting in Salzburg in August 1939, at which von Ribbentrop participated, Hitler announced that the Axis had decided to liquidate certain neutrals (_1871-PS_):

“* * * Generally speaking, it would be best to liquidate the
pseudo-neutrals one after the other. This is fairly easily done,
if one Axis partner protects the rear of the other, who is just
finishing off one of the uncertain neutrals, and vice versa.
Italy may consider Yugoslavia such an uncertain neutral. At the
visit of Prince Regent Paul he [the Fuehrer] suggested,
particularly in consideration of Italy, that Prince Paul clarify
his political attitude towards the Axis by a gesture. He had
thought of a closer connection with the Axis and Yugoslavia’s
leaving the League of Nations. Prince Paul agreed to the latter.
Recently the Prince Regent was in London and sought reassurance
from the Western Powers. The same thing was repeated that
happened in the case of Gafencu, who was also very reasonable
during his visit to Germany and who denied any interest in the
aims of the western democracies. Afterwards it was learned that
he had later assumed a contrary standpoint in England. Among the
Balkan countries the Axis can completely rely only on Bulgaria,
which is in a sense a natural ally of Italy and Germany. * * *
At the moment when there would be a turn to the worse for
Germany and Italy, however, Yugoslavia would join the other side
openly, hoping thereby to give matters a final turn to the
disadvantage of the Axis.” (_1871-PS_)

That demonstrates the policy with regard to uncertain neutrals.

Then, as early as September 1940 Ribbentrop reviewed the war situation with Mussolini. Ribbentrop emphasized the heavy revenge bombing raids in England and the fact that London would soon be in ruins. It was agreed between the parties that only Italian interests were involved in Greece and Yugoslavia, and that Italy could count on German support. Ribbentrop went on further to explain to Mussolini the Spanish plan for the attack on Gibraltar and Germany’s participation therein. He added that he was expecting to sign the Protocol with Spain, bringing the latter country into the war, on his return to Berlin (_1842-PS_). Ribbentrop then gave Mussolini a free hand with Greece and Yugoslavia:

“With regard to Greece and Yugoslavia, the Foreign Minister
stressed that it was exclusively a question of Italian
interests, the settling of which was a matter for Italy alone,
and in which Italy could be certain of Germany’s sympathetic
assistance.

“But it seemed to us to be better not to touch on these problems
for the time being, but to concentrate on the destruction of
England with all our forces instead. Where Germany was
concerned, she was interested in the northern German districts
(Norway, etc.), and this was acknowledged by the Duce.”
(_1842-PS_)

Several months later, in January 1941, at the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini in which Ribbentrop participated, the Greek operation was discussed. Hitler stated that the German troops in Rumania were for use in the planned campaign against Greece (_C-134_). Count Ciano, who attended that meeting as Italian Foreign Minister, recalls his impression of that meeting in his diary entry for 20/21 January:

“The Duce is pleased with the conversation on the whole. I am
less pleased, particularly as Ribbentrop, who had always been so
boastful in the past, told me, when I asked him outright how
long the war would last, that he saw no possibility of its
ending before 1942.” (_2987-PS_)

Despite that somewhat pessimistic statement to Count Ciano, three weeks later, when it was a question of encouraging the Japanese to enter the war, Ribbentrop took a more optimistic line. On 13 February 1941 he saw Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador. In the course of their conversation Ribbentrop gave an optimistic account of the military situation and the position of Bulgaria and Turkey (_1834-PS_).

In the course of his efforts to get Yugoslavia to join the Axis, Ribbentrop addressed a note, (_2450-PS_) on 25 March 1941, to Prime Minister Cvetkovitch, which contained this assurance:

“The Axis-Power Governments during this war will not direct a
demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of
troops through the Yugoslav state or territory.” (_2450-PS_)

Shortly thereafter, there occurred the coup d’etat in Yugoslavia, when General Simovitch took over the Government. Two days after Ribbentrop’s assurance (_2450-PS_), at a meeting on 27 March 1941 at which Ribbentrop was present, Hitler outlined the military campaign against Yugoslavia and promised the destruction of Yugoslavia and the demolition of Belgrade by the German Air Force (_1746-PS_).

After the invasion of Yugoslavia Ribbentrop was one of the persons directed by Hitler with the drawing of the boundaries for the partition and division of Yugoslavia. The preliminary directive for that action provided:

“* * * If the drawing up of boundaries has not been laid down in
the above Part I, it will be carried out by the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces in agreement with the Foreign Office
[Ribbentrop], the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
[Goering], and the Reich Minister of the Interior [Frick].”
(_1195-PS_)

(8) _The U.S.S.R._ On 23 August 1939 Ribbentrop signed the German-Soviet non-aggression Pact (_TC-25_). The first point at which Ribbentrop seems to have considered special problems of aggression against the Soviet Union was just after 20 April 1941, when Rosenberg and Ribbentrop met or communicated to consider problems expected to arise in the Eastern occupied territory. Ribbentrop appointed his Counsellor, Grosskopf, to be his liaison man with Rosenberg and also assigned a Consul General, Braeutigam, who had many years experience in the USSR, as a collaborator with Rosenberg (_1039-PS_).

The following month, on 18 May 1941, the German Foreign Office prepared a declaration setting forth operational zones in the Arctic Ocean and the Baltic and Black Seas to be used by the German Navy and Air Force in the coming invasion of the Soviet Union:

“The Foreign Office has prepared for use in _Barbarossa_ the
attached draft of a declaration of operational zones. The
Foreign Office has, however, reserved its decision as to the
date when the declaration will be issued, as well as discussion
of particulars.” (_C-77_)

Thus, it is clear that Ribbentrop was again fully involved in the preparation for this act of aggression. Finally, on 22 June 1941, Ribbentrop announced to the world that the German armies were invading the USSR (_3054-PS_).

How untrue were the reasons given by Ribbentrop is shown by the report of his own Ambassador in Moscow on 7 June 1941, who said that everything was being done by the Russians to avoid a conflict.

(9) _Instigation of Japanese Aggression._ On 25 November 1936, as a result of negotiations of Ribbentrop as Ambassador at Large, Germany and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact (_2508-PS_). The recital states the purpose of the agreement as follows:

“The Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese
Government, recognizing that the aim of the Communist
Internationale known as the Comintern is to disintegrate and
subdue existing States by all the means at its command;
convinced that the toleration of interference by the Communist
Internationale in the internal affairs of the nations not only
endangers their internal peace and social well-being, but is
also a menace to the peace of the world; desirous of cooperating
in the defense against Communist subversive activities; having
agreed as follows * * *.” (_2508-PS_)

There then follow the effective terms of the agreement under which Germany and Japan are to act together for five years. It is signed on behalf of Germany by Ribbentrop (_2508-PS_).

On 27 September 1940 Ribbentrop, as Foreign Minister, signed the Tripartite Pact with Japan and Italy, thereby bringing about a full-scale military and economic alliance for the creation of a new order in Europe and East Asia (_2643-PS_).

On 13 February 1941—some four months later—Ribbentrop was urging the Japanese to attack British possessions in the Far East (_1834-PS_).

Then, in April 1941, at a meeting between Hitler and Matsuoka, representing Japan, at which Ribbentrop was present, Hitler promised that Germany would declare war on the United States in the event of war occurring between Japan and the United States as a result of Japanese aggression in the Pacific (_1881-PS_).

The development of Ribbentrop’s views is indicated by the minutes of another conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister (_1882-PS_):

“* * * Matsuoka then spoke of the general high morale in
Germany, referring to the happy faces he had seen everywhere
among the workers during his recent visit to the Borsig Works.
He expressed his regret that developments in Japan had not as
yet advanced as far as in Germany and that in his country the
intellectuals still exercised considerable influence.

“The Reich Foreign Minister replied that at best a nation which
had realized its every ambition could afford the luxury of
intellectuals, most of whom are parasites, anyway. A nation,
however, which has to fight for a place in the sun must give
them up. The intellectuals ruined France; in Germany they had
already started their pernicious activities when National
Socialism put a stop to these doings; they will surely be the
cause of the downfall of Britain, which is to be expected with
certainty * * *.” (_1882-PS_)

That was on 5 April 1941.

Within a month after the German armies invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, Ribbentrop was urging Ott, his ambassador in Tokyo, to do his utmost to cause the Japanese Government to attack the Soviet in Siberia (_2896-PS_; _2897-PS_).

A message, intercepted, which was sent by the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin on 29 November 1941, a week before the attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor, reports the coaxings of Ribbentrop:

“Ribbentrop opened our meeting by again inquiring whether I had
received any reports regarding the Japanese-United States
negotiations. I replied that I had received no official word.

“Ribbentrop: ‘It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in
East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been
and probably never will be a time when closer cooperation under
the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this
time, and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New
Order, all the military might of Britain and the United States
will be concentrated against Japan.

“‘As Fuehrer Hitler said today, there are fundamental
differences in the very right to exist between Germany and
Japan, and the United States. We have received advice to the
effect that there is practically no hope of the Japanese-United
States negotiations being concluded successfully because of the
fact that the United States is putting up a stiff front.

“‘If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a
decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident
that that will not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan
jointly, but would bring about favorable results for Japan and
herself.’” (_D-656_).

Then the Japanese Ambassador replied:

“‘I can make no definite statement as I am not aware of any
concrete intentions of Japan. Is Your Excellency indicating that
a state of actual war is to be established between Germany and
the United States?’

“Ribbentrop: ‘Roosevelt’s a fanatic, so it is impossible to tell
what he would do.’” (_D-656_).

The Japanese Ambassador thereupon concludes:

“Concerning this point, in view of the fact that Ribbentrop has
said in the past that the United States would undoubtedly try to
avoid meeting German troops, and from the tone of Hitler’s
recent speech, as well as that of Ribbentrop’s, I feel that
German attitude toward the United States is being considerably
stiffened. There are indications at present that Germany would
not refuse to fight the United States if necessary.” (_D-656_).