Chapter XXV: Section 2: of Chapter IX. Chief among these were the secret expansion of (2)

Accordingly, the winter of 1939-40 and the early spring of 1940 was a period of intensive planning in German military circles. The major attack in the West through the Low Countries, and the attack on Norway and Denmark had to be planned. Jodl’s diary for the period 1 February to 26 May 1940 (_1809-PS_) contains many entries reflecting the course of this planning. These entries show that during February and early March there was considerable doubt in German military circles as to whether the attack on Norway and Denmark should precede or follow the attack on the Low Countries; and that at some points there even was doubt as to whether all these attacks were necessary from a military standpoint. But there is not a single entry which reflects any hesitancy, from a moral angle, on the part of Jodl or any of the people he mentions to overrun these neutral countries.

On 1 February 1940, General Jeschonnek (Chief of the Air Staff and a member of the Group as defined in the Indictment) visited Jodl and suggested that it might be wise to attack only Holland, on the ground that Holland alone would “be a tremendous improvement in conducting aerial warfare”. On 6 February, Jodl conferred with Jeschonnek, Warlimont, and Col. von Waldau, and what Jodl calls a “new idea” was proposed at this meeting: that the Germans should “carry out actions H (Holland) and Weser exercise (Norway and Denmark) only and guarantee Belgium’s neutrality for the duration of the war” (_1809-PS_). The German Air Force may have felt that occupation of Holland alone would give them sufficient scope for air bases for attacks on England, and that if Belgium’s neutrality were preserved the bases in Holland would be immune from attack by the French and the British armies in France. If, to meet this situation, the French and British attacked through Belgium, the violation of neutrality would be on the other foot. But whether or not the “new idea” made sense from a military angle, it appears to be a most extraordinary notion from a diplomatic angle. It was a proposal to violate, without any substantial excuse, the neutrality of three neighboring small countries, and simultaneously to guarantee the neutrality of a fourth. What value the Belgians might have attributed to a guarantee of neutrality offered under such circumstances it is difficult to imagine and in fact the “new idea” projected at this meeting of military leaders is an extraordinary combination of cynicism and naivete.

In the meantime, as Jodl’s diary shows, on 5 February 1940 the “special staff” for the Norway invasion met for the first time and got its instructions from Keitel (_1809-PS_). On 21 February Hitler put General von Falkenhorst (who subsequently became an _Oberbefehlshaber_ and a member of the Group) in command of the Norway undertaking; and Jodl’s diary records that “Falkenhorst accepts gladly” (_1809-PS_). On 26 February Hitler was still in doubt whether to go first into Norway or the Low Countries, but on 3 March, he decided to do Norway first and the Low Countries a short time thereafter. This decision proved final. Norway and Denmark were invaded on 9 April and the success of the venture was certain by the first of May; the invasion of the Low Countries took place 10 days thereafter.

France and the Low Countries fell, Italy joined the war on the side of Germany, and the African campaign began. In the meantime, Goering’s Air Force hammered at England unsuccessfully, and the planned invasion of Britain (“Operation _Seeloewe_”) never came to pass. In October 1940 Italy attacked Greece and was fought to better than a standstill. The Italo-Greek stalemate and the uncertain attitude of Yugoslavia were embarrassing to Germany, particularly because the attack on the Soviet Union was being planned in the winter of 1940-41, and Germany felt she could not risk an uncertain situation at her rear in the Balkans.

Accordingly, it was decided to end the Greek situation by coming to Italy’s aid, and the Yugoslavian coup d’etat of 26 March 1940 brought about the final German decision to crush Yugoslavia also. The aggressive nature of the German attacks on Greece and Yugoslavia are demonstrated in _444-PS_; _1541-PS_; _C-167_; _1746-PS_. The decisions were made, and the Armed Forces drew up the plans and executed the attacks. The onslaught was particularly ruthless against Yugoslavia for the special purpose of frightening Turkey and Greece. The final deployment instructions were issued by Brauchitsch (_R-95_):

“1. The political situation in the Balkans having changed by
reason of the Yugoslav military revolt, Yugoslavia has to be
considered as an enemy even should it make declarations of
loyalty at first.

“_The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided therefore to
destroy Yugoslavia as quickly as possible_ * * *”

* * * * * *

“5. _Timetable for the operations._ a. On 5th April as soon as
sufficient forces of the Air Forces are available and weather
permitting, the Air Forces shall attack continuously by day and
night the Yugoslav ground organization and Belgrade.” (_R-95_)

(_e_) _The Soviet Union._ It is quite possible that some members of the General Staff and High Command Group opposed “Barbarossa,” the German attack on the Soviet Union, as unnecessary and unwise from a military standpoint. Raeder so indicated in a memorandum he wrote on 10 January 1944 (_C-66_):

“1. At this time the Fuehrer had made known his ‘unalterable
decision’ to conduct the Eastern campaign in spite of all
remonstrances. After that, further warnings, if no new situation
had arisen, were found to be completely useless. As Chief of
Naval War Staff, I was never convinced of the ‘compelling
necessity’ for Barbarossa.”

* * * * * *

“The Fuehrer very early had the idea of one day settling
accounts with Russia, doubtless his general ideological attitude
played an essential part in this. In 1937-38 he once stated that
he intended to eliminate the Russians as a Baltic power; they
would then have to be diverted in the direction of the Persian
Gulf. The advance of the Russians against Finland and the Baltic
States in 1939-40 probably further strengthened him in this
idea.

“The fear that control of the air over the Channel in the autumn
of 1940 could no longer be attained—a realization which the
Fuehrer, no doubt, gained earlier than the Naval War Staff, who
were not so fully informed of the true results of air raids on
England (our own losses)—surely caused the Fuehrer, as far back
as August and September, to consider whether—even prior to
victory in the West—an Eastern campaign would be feasible with
the object of first eliminating our last serious opponent on the
Continent. The Fuehrer did not openly express this fear,
however, until well into September.”

* * * * * *

“7. As no other course is possible, I have submitted to
compulsion. If, in doing so, a difference of opinion arises
between 1 SKL and myself, it is perhaps because the arguments
the Fuehrer used on such occasion (dinner speech in the middle
of July to the Officers in Command) to justify a step he had
planned, usually had a greater effect on people not belonging to
the ‘inner circle,’ than on those who often heard this type of
reasoning.

“Many remarks and plans indicate that the Fuehrer calculated on
the final ending of the Eastern campaign in the autumn of 1941,
whereas the Supreme Command of the Army (General Staff) was very
skeptical.” (_C-66_)

But the passage last quoted indicates that the other members of the General Staff favored “Barbarossa”. Raeder’s memorandum actually says substantially what Blomberg’s affidavit (_3704-PS_) says; that some of the generals lost confidence in the power of Hitler’s judgment, but that the generals failed as a group to take any definite stand against him although a few tried and suffered thereby. Certainly the High Command Group took no stand against Hitler on “Barbarossa” and the events of 1941 and 1942 do not suggest that the High Command embarked on the Soviet war tentatively or with reservations, but rather with ruthless determination backed by careful planning. The plans themselves have already been cited. (_446-PS_; _C-35_; _872-PS_; _C-78_; _447-PS_)

(_f_) _Nature of the General Staff and High Command Group Responsibility for Aggression._ The nature of the accusation against this Group for plotting and launching wars of aggression must be clearly understood. They are not accused on the ground that they are soldiers. They are not accused because they did the usual things a soldier is expected to do, such as make military plans and command troops.

It is among the normal duties of a diplomat to engage in negotiations and conferences; to write notes and side memoires to the government to which he is accredited; and to cultivate good will toward the country he represents. Ribbentrop is not indicted for doing these things. It is the usual function of a politician to weigh and determine matters of national policy and to draft regulations and decrees and make speeches. Hess, Frick, and the other politician-defendants are not indicted for doing these things. It is an innocent and respectable business to be a locksmith but it is none the less a crime if the locksmith turns his talents to picking the locks of neighbors and looting their homes. And that is the nature of the charge against all the defendants, and against the General Staff and High Command Group as well. The charge is that in performing the functions of diplomats, politicians, soldiers, sailors, or whatever they happened to be, they conspired to and did plan, prepare, initiate, and wage wars of aggression and in violation of Treaties.

The Charter (Article 6(a)) declares that wars of aggression and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances are crimes against peace. It is no defense for those who commit such crimes to plead that they practice a particular profession, whether it is arms or the law. It is perfectly legal for military men to prepare military plans to meet national contingencies, to carry out such plans and engage in war if in so doing they do not knowingly plan and wage illegal wars.

There might well be individual cases where drawing the line between legal and illegal conduct would involve some difficulties. That is not an uncommon situation in the legal field. But there can be no doubt as to the criminality of the General Staff and High Command Group, nor as to the guilt of the five defendants who are members of the Group. The evidence is clear that these defendants, and the leaders of the Group, and most of the members of the Group, were fully advised in advance of the aggressive and illegal war plans, and carried them out with full knowledge that the wars were aggressive and in violation of treaties.

In the case of defendants Goering, Keitel, and Jodl, the evidence is voluminous and their participation in aggressive plans and wars is constant. The same is true of the defendant Raeder, and his individual responsibility for the aggressive and savage attack on Norway and Denmark is especially clear. The evidence so far offered against Doenitz is less voluminous, for the reason that he was younger and not one of the top group until later in the war, but his knowing participation in and advocacy of the Norwegian venture is clear.

Numerous other members of the General Staff and High Command Group, including its other leaders, participated knowingly and willfully in these illegal plans and wars. Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and his Chief of Staff, Halder; Warlimont the deputy to Jodl and chief repository of plans—in the nature of things these men knew all that was going on, and participated fully, as the evidence has shown. Reichenau and Sperrle helped to bully Schuschnigg; Reichenau and von Schobert, together with Goering, were immediately sent for by Hitler when Schuschnigg ordered the plebiscite. At later date, Blaskowitz as an _Oberbefehlshaber_ in the field knowingly prepared for the attack on Poland; Field Marshal List educated the Bulgarians for their role during the attacks on Yugoslavia and Greece; von Falkenhorst “gladly” accepted the assignment to command the invasion of Norway and Denmark. On the air side, Jeschonnek had proposed that Germany attack Norway, Denmark, and Holland, and simultaneously assured Belgium that there was nothing to fear. On the naval side, Admiral Carls foresaw at an early date that German policy was leading to a general European war, and at a later date the attack on Norway and Denmark was his brainchild; Krancke was one of the chief planners of this attack; Schniewindt was in the inner circle for the attack on Poland; Fricke certified the final orders for “_Weseruebung_” and a few months later proposed that Germany annex Belgium and northern France and reduce the Netherlands and Scandinavia to vassalage. Most of these 19 officers were at the time members of the Group, and the few who were not subsequently became members. At the final planning and reporting conference for “_Barbarossa_,” 17 additional members were present. At the two meetings with Hitler, at which the aggressive plans and the contempt for treaties were fully disclosed, the entire group was present.

The military defendants may perhaps argue that military men are pure technicians, bound to do whatever the political leaders order them to do. Such a suggestion must fail, on any test of reason or logic. It amounts to saying that military men are a race apart from and different from the ordinary run of human beings—men above and beyond the moral and legal requirements that apply to others; men incapable of exercising moral judgment on their own behalf.

It stands to reason that the crime of planning and waging aggressive warfare is committed most consciously, deliberately, and culpably by a nation’s leaders—the leaders in all the major fields of activity necessary to and closely involved in the waging of war. It is committed by the principal propagandists and publicists who whip up the necessary beliefs and enthusiasms among the people as a whole, so that the people will acquiesce and join in attacking and slaughtering the peoples of other nations. It is committed by the political leaders who purport to represent and execute the national will. It is committed by the diplomats who handle the nation’s foreign policy and endeavor to create a favorable diplomatic setting for successful warfare, and by the chief ministers who adapt the machinery of government to the needs of a nation at war. It is committed by the principal industrial and financial leaders who shape the national economy and marshall the productive resources for the needs of an aggressive war program. It is no less committed by the military leaders who knowingly plan aggressive war, mobilize the men and equipment of the attacking forces, and execute the actual onslaught.

In the nature of things, planning and executing aggressive war is accomplished by agreement and consultation among all these types of leaders. If the leaders in any notably important field of activity stand aside, resist, or fail to cooperate in launching and executing an aggressive war program, the program will at the very least be seriously obstructed, and probably its successful accomplishment will be impossible. That is why the principal leaders in all these fields of activity share responsibility for the crime, and the military leaders no less than the others. Leadership in the military field, as in any other field, calls for moral wisdom as well as technical astuteness.

The responsible military leaders of any nation can hardly be heard to say that their role is that of a mere janitor, custodian, or pilot of the war machine which is under their command, and that they bear no responsibility whatsoever for the use to which that machine is put. Such a view would degrade and render ignoble the profession of arms. The prevalence of such a view would be particularly unfortunate today, when the military leaders control forces infinitely more powerful and destructive than ever before. Should the military leaders be declared exempt from the declaration in the Charter that planning and waging aggressive war is a crime, it would be a crippling if not fatal blow to the efficacy of that declaration.

The American prosecution here representing the United Nations believes that the profession of arms is a distinguished and noble profession. It believes that the practice of that profession by its leaders calls for the highest degree of integrity and moral wisdom no less than for technical skill. It believes that in consulting and planning with leaders in other national fields of activity, the military leaders will act and counsel in accordance with International Law and the dictates of the public conscience. Otherwise, the military resources of the nation will be used, not in accordance with the laws of modern civilization, but with the law of the jungle. The military leaders share responsibility with other leaders of a nation.

Obviously the military leaders are not the final and exclusive arbiters, and the German military leaders do not bear exclusive responsibility for the aggressive wars which were waged. If the leading German diplomats and industrialists and other leaders had not been infected with similar criminal purposes, the German military leaders might not have had their way. But the German military leaders conspired with others to undermine and destroy the conscience of the German nation. The German military leaders wanted to aggrandize Germany and if necessary to resort to war for that purpose. As the Chief Prosecutor for the United States said in his opening statement, “the German military leaders are here before you because they, along with others, mastered Germany and drove it to war.”

(2) _War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity._ It is proposed to show that members of the General Staff and High Command Group, including the five defendants who are members of the Group, ordered and directed the commission of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, as defined in the Indictment. It is also proposed to show, in certain instances, the actual commission of war crimes by members of the German Armed Forces, as a result of these orders, or as a result of other orders or arrangements made by members of the General Staff and High Command Group, which controlled the German Armed Forces and bears responsibility for war crimes committed by them.

It is not proposed, however, to make a full showing of war crimes committed by the German Armed Forces. The full presentation of this evidence is to be made, pursuant to agreement among the Chief Prosecutors, by the French and Soviet delegations.

It will be shown that the General Staff and High Command became wedded to a policy of terror. In some cases, where the evidence of this policy is in documentary form, the activating papers which were signed by, initialed by, and circulated among the members of the Group will be presented. In other instances, where the actual crimes were committed by others than members of the German Armed Forces (where, for example prisoners of war or civilians were handed over to and mistreated or murdered by the SS or SD), it will be shown that members of the Group were well aware that they were assisting in the commission of war crimes. It will be shown that many crimes committed by the SS or SD were committed with the knowledge and necessary support of the General Staff and High Command, and that frequently members of the German Armed Forces acted in conjunction with the SS and SD in carrying out tasks then known by such respectable-sounding terms as “pacification,” “cleansing,” and “elimination of insecure elements.”

(_a_) _Murder of Commandos, Paratroopers, and Members of Military Missions._ This story starts with an order issued by Hitler on 18 October 1942 (_498-PS_). The order began with a recital that allied commandos were using methods of warfare alleged to be outside the scope of the Geneva Conventions, and thereafter proceeded to specify the methods of warfare which German troops should use against allied commandos, and the disposition which should be made of captured commandos. This order reads as follows:

“1. For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare
methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions.
Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the
so-called commandos, who, as is established, are partially
recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries. From
captured orders it is divulged that they are directed not only
to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on
the spot at the moment in which they believe that the latter as
prisoners represent a burden in the further pursuit of their
purposes or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have
been found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded
in principle.

“2. For this reason it was already announced in an addendum to
the Armed Forces report of 7 October 1942, that in the future,
Germany, in the face of these sabotage troops of the British and
their accomplices, will resort to the same procedure, i.e., that
they will be ruthlessly mowed down by the German troops in
combat, wherever they may appear.

“3. I therefore order:
From now on all enemies on so-called Commando missions in Europe
or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are to all
appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether
armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered
to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they
are landed from ships and aeroplanes for their actions, or
whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these
individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give
themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In
each individual case full information is to be sent to the OKW
for publication in the Report of the Military Forces.

“4. If individual members of such commandos, such as agents,
saboteurs, etc. fall into the hands of the military forces by
some other means, through the police in occupied territories for
instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD. Any
imprisonment under military guard, in PW stockades for instance,
etc., is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for
a short time.

“5. This order does not apply to the treatment of any enemy
soldiers who in the course of normal hostilities (large-scale
offensive actions, landing operations and airborne operations),
are captured in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this
order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after
battles at sea, or enemy soldiers trying to save their lives by
parachute after battles.

“6. I will hold responsible under Military Law, for failing to
carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either
have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this
order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed.

“(S) Adolf Hitler” (_498-PS_).

This order was issued by the OKW in twelve copies, and the distribution included the three supreme commands and the principal field commands. (_498-PS_)

On the same day Hitler issued a supplementary order (_503-PS_) for the purpose of explaining the reasons for the issuance of the basic order. In this explanation, Hitler pointed out that allied commando operations had been extraordinarily successful in the destruction of rear communications, intimidation of laborers, and destruction of important war plants in occupied areas. Among other things Hitler stated in this explanation:

“Added to the decree concerning the destruction of terror and
sabotage troops (_OKW/WFst No. 003830/42 Top Secret of 18
October 1942_) a supplementary order of the Fuehrer is enclosed.

“_This order is intended for commanders only and must not under
any circumstances fall into enemy hands._

“_The further distribution is to be limited accordingly by the
receiving bureaus._

“The bureaus named in the distribution list are held
responsible, for the return and destruction of all distributed
pieces of the order and copies made thereof.

“The Chief of the High Command of
the Armed Forces

“By order of
“Jodl”

* * * * * *

“I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the
destruction of enemy sabotage troops and to declare
noncompliance with these orders severely punishable. I deem it
necessary to announce to the competent commanding officers and
commanders the reasons for this decree.

“As in no previous war, a method of destruction of
communications behind the front, intimidation of the populace
working for Germany, as well as the destruction of war-important
industrial plants in territories occupied by us has been
developed in this war.”

* * * * * *

“The consequences of these activities are of extraordinary
weight. I do not know whether each commander and officer is
cognizant of the fact that the destruction of one single
electric power plant, for instance, can deprive the _Luftwaffe_
of many thousand tons of aluminum, thereby eliminating the
construction of countless aircraft that will be missed in the
fight at the front and so contribute to serious damage of the
Homeland as well as bloody losses of the fighting soldiers.

“Yet this form of war is completely without danger for the
adversary. Since he lands his sabotage troops in uniform but at
the same time supplies them with civilian clothes, they can,
according to need, appear as soldiers or civilians. While they
themselves have orders to ruthlessly remove any German soldiers
or even natives who get in their way, they run no danger of
suffering really serious losses in their operations, since at
the worst, if they are caught, they can immediately surrender
and thus believe that they will theoretically fall under the
provisions of the Geneva Convention. There is no doubt, however,
that this is a misuse in the worst form of the Geneva
agreements, especially since part of these elements are even
criminals, liberated from prisons, who can rehabilitate
themselves through these activities.

“England and America will therefore always be able to find
volunteers for this kind of warfare as long as they can
truthfully assure them that there is no danger of loss of life
for them. At worse, all they have to do is to successfully
commit their attack on people, traffic installations, or other
installations, and upon being encountered by the enemy, to
capitulate.

“If the German conduct of war is not to suffer grievous damage
through these incidents, it must be made clear to the adversary
that all sabotage troops will be exterminated, without
exception, to the last man.

“This means that their chance of escaping with their lives is
nil. Under no circumstances can it be permitted, therefore, that
a dynamite, sabotage, or terrorist unit simply allows itself to
be captured, expecting to be treated according to rules of the
Geneva Convention. It must under all circumstances be ruthlessly
exterminated.

“The report on this subject appearing in the Armed Forces
communique will briefly and laconically state that a sabotage,
terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and
exterminated to the last man.

“I therefore expect the commanding officers of armies
subordinated to them as well as individual commanders not only
to realize the necessity of taking such measures, but to carry
out this order with all energy. Officers and noncommissioned
officers who fail through some weakness are to be reported
without fail, or under circumstances when there is danger in
delay to be at once made strictly accountable. The Homeland as
well as the fighting soldier at the front has the right to
expect that behind their back the essentials of nourishment as
well as the supply of war-important weapons and ammunition
remains secure.

“These are the reasons for the issuance of this decree.

“If it should become necessary, for reasons of interrogation, to
initially spare one man or two, then they are to be shot
immediately after interrogation.

“(signed) A. Hitler” (_503-PS_).

Ten days later, on 28 October 1942, while Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the Germany Navy, the Naval War Staff in Berlin transmitted its copy of the basic order of 18 October to the lower Naval commands. The copy distributed by the Navy and the covering memorandum from the Naval War Staff (_C-179_) shows clearly the secrecy which surrounded the dissemination of this order:

“Enclosed pleased find a Fuehrer Order regarding annihilation of
terror and sabotage units.

“This order must not be distributed in writing by Flotilla
leaders, Section Commanders or officers of this rank.

“After verbal distribution to subordinate sections the above
authorities must hand this order over to the next highest
section which is responsible for its confiscation and
destruction.

“(s) Wagner” (_C-179_).

* * * * *

“_Note for Distribution_:

“These instructions are not to be distributed over and above the
battalions and corresponding staffs of the other services. After
notification, those copies distributed over and above the
Regimental and corresponding staffs of the other services must
be withdrawn and destroyed.” (_C-179_)

On 11 February 1943, just twelve days after Doenitz had become Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, the Naval War Staff promulgated a further memorandum on this subject in order to clear up certain misunderstandings as to the scope of the basic order of 18 October 1942 (_C-178_). It was stated in this subsequent memorandum that all commanders and officers who neglected their duty in failing to instruct their units concerning the order would run the risk of serious court martial penalties:

“From the notice given by 3/SKL [Naval War Staff] on February
1st 43, it has been discovered that the competent departments of
the General Staff of the Army, as well as those of the Air Force
Operations Staff have a wrong conception regarding the treatment
of saboteurs. A telephone inquiry at 3/SKL proved that this
Naval authority was not correctly informed either. In view of
this situation, reference is made to figure _6_ of the Fuehrer
order of October 18, 42 (Appendix to Volume No. 1 SKL 1 Ops 26
367/42 Top Secret of October 28, 42) according to which all
commanders and officers, who have neglected their duty in
instructing their units about the order referring to treatment
of saboteurs, are threatened with punishment by court martial.

“The first Fuehrer order concerning this matter of October 18,
42 (Appendix to Volume No. 1 SKL 1 Ops 2108/42 Top Secret of
October 27, 42) was given the protection of Top Secret merely
because it is stated therein:

“1. That, according to the Fuehrer’s views the spreading of
military sabotage organizations in the East _and_ West may have
portentous consequences for our whole conduct of the war and

“2. That the shooting of uniformed prisoners acting on military
orders must be carried out even _after_ they have surrendered
voluntarily and asked for pardon.

“On the other hand, the annihilation of sabotage units in battle
is not at all to be kept secret but on the contrary to be
currently published in the OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces) reports. The purpose of these measures to act as a
deterrent, will not be achieved, if those taking part in enemy
‘Commando Operations’ would not learn that certain death and not
safe imprisonment awaits them. As the saboteurs are to be
annihilated immediately, unless their statements are first
needed for military reasons, it is necessary that not only all
members of the Armed Forces must receive instructions that these
types of saboteurs, even if they are in uniform, are to be
annihilated, but also all departments of the home staff, dealing
with this kind of question, must be informed of the course of
action which has been ordered.” (_C-178_)

The Hitler order of October 1942 was actually carried out in a number of instances. During the night of the 19-20 November 1942, a British freight glider crashed near Egersund in Norway. The glider carried a British commando unit of 17 men, of whom 3 were apparently killed in the crash. All were in English uniform. The 14 survivors were executed in accordance with the Hitler order in the evening of 20 November 1942. The proof is contained in the following document (_508-PS_):

“1. Following supplementary report is made about landing of a
British freight glider at Hegers and in the night of November
20:

“a. No firing on the part of German defense.

“b. The towing plane (Wellington) has crashed the ground, 7 man
crew dead. The attached freight glider also crashed, of the
17-man crew 14 alive. Indisputably a sabotage force. Fuehrer
order has been carried out.”

* * * * * *

“On November 20, 1942 at 5:50 an enemy plane was found 15 Km NE
of Egersund. It is a British aircraft (towed glider) made of
wood without engine. Of the 17 member crew 3 are dead, 6 are
severely, the others slightly wounded.

“All wore English khaki uniforms without sleeve-insignia.
Furthermore following items were found: 8 knapsacks, tents, skis
and radio sender, exact number is unknown. The glider carried
rifles, light machine guns and machine pistols, number unknown.
At present the prisoners are with the Bn. in Egersund.”

* * * * * *

“Beside the 17 member crew extensive sabotage material and work
equipment were found. Therefore the sabotage purpose was
absolutely proved. The 280th Inf. Div. (J.D.) ordered the
execution of the action according to the Fuehrer’s order. The
execution was carried out toward the evening of Nov. 20. Some of
the prisoners wore blue ski-suits under their khaki uniforms
which had no insignia on the sleeves. During a short
interrogation the survivors have revealed nothing but their
names, ranks and serial numbers.”

* * * * * *

“In connection with the shooting of the 17 members of the crew,
the Armed Forces Commander of Norway (WBN) has issued an order
to the district commanders, according to which the interrogation
by G-2 (Ic) and by BDS are important before the execution of the
Fuehrer order; in case of No. 4 of the Fuehrer order the
prisoners are to be handed over to the BDS.” (_508-PS_)

In three specific instances the Hitler order was carried out in Norway (_512-PS_). The procedure was to take individual commandos prisoner and interrogate them to extract military intelligence before executing them. This procedure was in accordance with the last sentence of Hitler’s supplementary order (_503-PS_), and is obviously in flat contradiction of the requirements of the Hague and Geneva Conventions. The reason for this procedure is explained as follows:

“_TOP SECRET_—According to the last sentence of the Fuehrer
order of 18th October (_CHEFS_), individual saboteurs can be
spared for the time being in order to keep them for
interrogation. The importance of this measure was proven in the
cases of Glomfjord, Twoman torpedo Drontheim, and glider plane
Stavanger, where interrogations resulted in valuable knowledge
of enemy intentions. Since in the case of Egersund the saboteur
was liquidated immediately and no clues were won; therefore,
Armed Forces Commander (WB) referred to above mentioned (OA)
last sentence of the Fuehrer order (Liquidation only after short
interrogation).” (_512-PS_)

Another instance from the Norwegian theater of war (_526-PS_): On 30 March 1943, 10 Norwegian navy personnel were taken prisoner from a Norwegian cutter at Toftefjord. The 10 prisoners were executed by the SD in accordance with the Hitler order, but the published report announced only that the unit was destroyed:

“On the 30.3 1943 in Toftefjord (70° Lat.) an enemy cutter was
sighted, cutter was blown up by the enemy. Crew: 2 dead men, 10
prisoners.

“Cutter was sent from Scalloway (Shetland Is.) by the Norwegian
Navy.”

* * * * * *

“_Purpose_: Construction of an organization for sabotaging of
strong-points, battery positions, staff and troop billets and
bridges.

“_Assigner of Mission in London_: Norwegian, Maj. Munthe.

“Fuehrer order executed by S.D. (security service).

“_Wehrmacht Report_ of 6.4 announces the following about it:

“In Northern Norway an enemy sabotage unit was engaged and
destroyed on approaching the coast.” (_526-PS_)

Similar action took place in the Italian theater. A telegram (_509-PS_) from the Supreme Commander in Italy to OKW, dated 7 November 1943, shows that on 2 November 1943 three British commandos captured at Pascara, Italy, were given “special treatment” (_Sonderbehandelt_), which, as previous evidence has shown, (_3040-PS_) means death. What happened to the remaining nine prisoners of war who were wounded and in the hospital is not known. (_509-PS_)

An affidavit (_2610-PS_) dated 7 November 1945, by Frederick W. Roche, a Major in the Army of the United States, furnishes other evidence of the carrying out of the Hitler order. Major Roche was the Judge Advocate of an American Military Commission which tried General Anton Dostler, formerly Commander of the 75th German Army Corps, for the unlawful execution of 15 members of the United States Armed Forces. His affidavit states:

“FREDERICK W. ROCHE being duly sworn deposes and says:

“I am a Major in the Army of the United States.

“I was the Judge Advocate of the Military Commission which tried
Anton Dostler for ordering the execution of the group of fifteen
United States Army personnel who comprised the ‘Ginny Mission.’
This Military Commission consisting of five officers was
appointed by command of General McNarney, by Special Orders No.
269, dated 26 September 1945, Headquarters, Mediterranean
Theater of Operations, United States Army, APO 512.

“The Military Commission met at Rome, Italy, on 8 October 1945
and proceeded with the trial of the case of the United States v.
Anton Dostler. The trial of this case consumed four days and the
findings and sentence were announced on the morning of 12
October 1945. The charge and specification in this case are as
follows:

“‘Charge: Violation of the law of war.’

“‘Specification: In that Anton Dostler, then General, commanding
military forces of the German Reich, a belligerent enemy nation,
to wit the 75th Army Corps, did, on or about 24 March 1944, in
the vicinity of La Spezia, Italy, contrary to the law of war,
order to be shot summarily, a group of United States Army
personnel, consisting of two officers and thirteen enlisted men
who had then recently been captured by forces under General
Dostler, which order was carried into execution on or about 26
March 1944, resulting in the death of the said fifteen members
of the Army of the United States identified as follows * * *’.”

* * * * * *

“I was present throughout the entire proceeding. I heard all the
testimony, and I am familiar with the record in this case. The
facts developed in this proceeding are as follows: On the night
of 22 March 1944, two officers and thirteen enlisted men of the
2677th Special Reconnaissance Battalion of the Army of the
United States disembarked from some United States Navy boats and
landed on the Italian coast near Stazione di Framura. All
fifteen men were members of the Army of the United States and
were in the military service of the United States. When they
landed on the Italian coast they were all properly dressed in
the field uniform of the United States Army and they carried no
civilian clothes. Their mission was to demolish a railroad
tunnel on the main line between La Spezia and Genoa. That rail
line was being used by the German Forces to supply their
fighting forces on the Cassino and Anzio Beachhead fronts. The
entire group was captured on the morning of 24 March 1944 by a
patrol consisting of Fascist soldiers and a group of members of
the German Army. All fifteen men were placed under interrogation
in La Spezia and they were held in custody until the morning of
26 March 1944 when they were all executed by a firing squad.
These men were never tried nor were they brought before any
court or given any hearing; they were shot by order of Anton
Dostler, then General Commanding the 75th German Army Corps.

“Anton Dostler took the stand in this case and testified by way
of defense that he ordered the fifteen American soldiers to be
shot pursuant to the Hitler order of 18 October 1942 on commando
operations, which provided that commandos were to be shot and
not taken prisoners of war, even after they had been
interrogated. He also testified that he would have been subject
to court martial proceedings if he did not obey the Hitler
order.

“The following is a true copy of the findings and sentence in
the case of the United States v. Anton Dostler, as these
findings and sentence appear in the original record of the trial
and as they were announced in open court at Rome, Italy on 12
October 1945:

“‘_FINDINGS_: General Dostler, as president of this commission it is
my duty to inform you that the commission in closed
session and upon secret written ballot, at least
two-thirds of all the members of the commission
concurring in each finding of guilty, finds you of the
specification and of the charge:
“‘GUILTY’.
“‘SENTENCE: And again in closed session and upon secret written
ballot, at least two-thirds of all of the members of
the commission concurring, sentences you:
“‘TO BE SHOT TO DEATH BY MUSKETRY’.” (_2610-PS_)

The order of 18 October 1942 remained in force, so far as the evidence shows, until the end of the war. On 22 June 1944 in a document initialed by Warlimont (_506-PS_) the OKW made it clear that the Hitler order was to be applied even in cases where the commando operation was undertaken by only one person:

“WFSt agrees with the view taken in the letter of the army group
judge [_Heeresgruppenrichter_] with the Supreme Commander
Southwest of 20 May 44 (Br. B. Nr 68/44 g.K.). The Fuehrer order
is to be applied even if the enemy employs only _one_ person for
a task. Therefore, it does not make any difference if several
persons or a single person take part in a commando operation.
The reason for the special treatment of participants in a
commando operation is that such operations do not correspond to
the German concept of usage and customs of (land) warfare.”
(_506-PS_)

The allied landing in Normandy early in June 1944, in the course of which large scale air-borne operations took place, raised among the Germans the question as to how far the Hitler order would be applied to Normandy, and in France behind the German lines. A memorandum (_531-PS_) dated 23 June 1944 and signed by Warlimont, starts by quoting a teletype from the Supreme Command in the West inquiring what should be done about applying the Hitler order to air-borne troops and commandos:

“Supreme Command West reports by teletype message No. 1750/44
Top Secret of 23 June 44:

“The treatment of enemy commando groups has so far been carried
out according to the order referred to. With the large-scale
landing achieved, a new situation has arisen. The order referred
to directs in number 5 that enemy soldiers who are taken
prisoner in open combat or surrender within the limits of normal
combat operations (large-scale landing operations and
undertakings) are not to be treated according to numbers 3 and
4. It must be established in a form easily understood by the
troops how far the concept ‘within the limits of normal combat
operations, etc.’ is to be extended.

“The application of number 5 for all enemy _soldiers in uniform_
penetrating from the outside into the occupied western areas is
held by Supreme Command West to be the most correct and clearest
solution.” (_531-PS_)

Warlimont’s memorandum (_531-PS_) continues by reciting the position taken with reference to the request by the OKW Operations Staff, of which Warlimont was the Deputy Chief:

“_Position taken by Armed Forces Operational Staff_:

“1. The Commando order remains basically in effect even after
the enemy landing in the west.

“2. Number 5 of the order is to be clarified to the effect, that
the order is not valid for _those_ enemy soldiers in uniform,
who are captured in open combat in the immediate combat area of
the beachhead by our troops committed there, or who surrender.
Our troops committed in the immediate combat area means the
divisions fighting on the front line as well as reserves up to
and including corps headquarters.

“3. Furthermore, in doubtful cases enemy personnel who have
fallen into our hands alive are to be turned over to the SD,
upon whom it is encumbent to determine whether the Commando
order is to be applied or not.

“4. Supreme Command West is to see to it that all units
committed in its zone are orally acquainted in a suitable manner
with the order concerning the treatment of members of commando
undertakings of 18 Oct. 42 along with the above explanation.”
(_531-PS_)

On 25 June 1944 the OKW replied to this inquiry in a teletype message (_551-PS_) signed by Keitel and initialed by Warlimont and Jodl:

“_Subject_: Treatment of Commando Participants.

“1. Even after the landing of Anglo-Americans in France, the
order of the Fuehrer on the destruction of terror and sabotage
units of 18 Oct. 1942 remains fully in force.

“Enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate combat area of the
bridgehead, that is, in the area of the divisions fighting in
the most forward lines as well as of the reserves up to the
Corps Commands, according to No. 5 of the basic order of 18 Oct.
1942, remain exempted.

“2. All members of terror and sabotage units, found outside the
immediate combat area, who include fundamentally all
parachutists, are to be killed in combat. In special cases, they
are to be turned over to the SD.

“3. All troops, committed outside the combat area of Normandy,
are to be informed about the duty to destroy enemy terror and
sabotage units briefly and succinctly according to the
directives, issued for it.

“4. Supreme Commander West will report immediately daily, how
many saboteurs have been liquidated in this manner. This applies
especially also to undertakings by the military commanders. The
number is to be published daily in the Armed Forces Communique
to exercise a frightening effect, as has already been done
toward previous commando undertakings in the same manners.”

“[Initial] W [Warlimont]
“[signature] Keitel (_551-PS_).

In July 1944, the question was raised within the German High Command as to whether the order of October 1942 should be applied to members of foreign military missions, with special regard to the British, American, and Soviet military missions which were cooperating with allied forces in Southeastern Europe, notably in Yugoslavia. A long document signed by Warlimont (_1279-PS_) embodies the discussions which were had at that time at OKW. It discloses that the Armed Forces Operational Staff recommended that the order should be applied to these military missions and drew up a draft order to this effect. The order which actually resulted from these discussions (_537-PS_), dated 30 July 1944 and signed by Keitel, provides:

“_Re: Treatment of members of foreign ‘Military Missions,’
captured together with partisans._

“In the areas of the High Command Southeast and Southwest
members of foreign so-called ‘Military Missions’ (Anglo-American
as well as Soviet-Russian) captured in the course of the
struggle against partisans shall not receive the treatment as
speculated in the Special Orders regarding the treatment of
captured partisans. Therefore they are not to be treated as PWs
but in conformity with the Fuehrer’s order re the elimination of
terror and sabotage troops of 18 October 1942 (OKW/WFSt.
003830/42 g. Kdos).

“This order shall not be transmitted to other units of the Armed
forces via the High Commands and equivalent staffs and is to be
destroyed after being made record.

“The Chief of the High Command of the _Wehrmacht_

“Keitel” (_537-PS_)

Pursuant to this order, approximately 15 members of an allied military mission to Slovakia were executed in January 1945. An affidavit (_L-51_) signed by one Adolf Zutter, who was the adjutant at the camp where the executions took place, reads in part:

“Concerning the American Military Mission which had landed
behind the German main line of resistance in Slovakian or
Hungarian territory in January 1945, I remember when in January
1945 it was brought to the concentration camp at Mauthausen. I
suppose there were about 12 to 15 newcomers. They wore an
American or Canadian uniform, of brown-green color, blouse, and
cap made of cloth. Eight or ten days after their arrival the
order for execution came in by radiogram or teletype. Colonel
Ziereis came to me in the office and said: now Kaltenbrunner has
authorized the execution. The letter was secret and had the
signature: signed Kaltenbrunner. These people were then shot
according to martial law and T/Sgt [_Oberscharfuehrer_]
Niedermeyer handed their belongings over to me. In spring 1945,
a written order based on an Army manual to destroy all files was
received by the security officer in Mauthausen, 1st Lt.
[_Obersturmfuehrer_] Reimer; this order had been sent by Lt.
[_Untersturmfuehrer_] Meinhardt, security officer of Section D
in Oranienburg. Reimer forwarded this order personally in
written form to the various sections and supervised the
compliance with it. Among the files were also all the execution
orders.” (_L-51_)

The foregoing documents with respect to the order of 18 October 1942, and its subsequent enforcement and application, clearly demonstrate that members of the General Staff and High Command Group, including the defendants Keitel, Jodl, Doenitz, and Raeder, ordered and directed the commission of war crimes by members of the German Armed Forces, and that these orders were carried out in numerous instances.

(_b_) _War Crimes on the Eastern Front._ The order of October 1942 with respect to the murdering of captured commandos operated chiefly in the Western theater of war, against British and American commando troops. This was natural since Germany occupied almost the entire Western coast of Europe from 1940 until the last year of the war, and during that period land fighting in Western Europe was largely limited to commando operations. The Mediterranean Theater likewise lent itself to this type of warfare.

On the Eastern Front, where there was large-scale land fighting in Poland and the Soviet Union from 1941 on, the German forces were fighting amongst a hostile population and had to face extensive partisan activities behind their lines. It will be shown that the activities of the German Armed Forces against partisans and other elements of the population became a vehicle for carrying out Nazi political and racial policies, and a cloak for the ruthless and barbaric massacre of Jews and of numerous segments of the Slavic population which were regarded by the Nazis as undesirable. It was the policy of the German Armed Forces to behave with the utmost severity to the civilian population of the occupied territories, and to conduct its military operations, particularly against partisans, so as to further these Nazi policies. It will be shown that the German Armed Forces supported, assisted, and acted in cooperation with the SS Groups which were especially charged with anti-partisan activities. Members of the General Staff and High Command Group ordered, directed, encouraged, and were fully aware of these criminal policies and activities.

It is not proposed to make a full or even partial showing of war crimes committed by the Nazis on the Eastern Front; evidence of those crimes are to be presented by the Soviet delegation. Evidence concerning the activities of the SS, SD, and Gestapo will be discussed only to the extent necessary to clarify the relations between these organizations and the German Armed Forces and to demonstrate their close collaboration in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe.

These policies of ruthless severity to the civilian population of the occupied Eastern territories were determined upon and made official for the German Armed Forces even before the invasion of the Soviet Union took place. An order by Hitler, dated 13 May 1941, and signed by Keitel as Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (_C-50_) provided:

“_Order_

“_Concerning the exercise of martial jurisdiction and PROCEDURE
IN THE AREA ‘Barbarossa’ and special military measures._

“The application of martial law aims in the first place at
_maintaining discipline_.

“The fact that the operational areas in the East are so
farflung, the battle strategy which this necessitates, and the
peculiar qualities of the enemy, confront the courts-martial
with problems which, being short-staffed, they cannot solve
while hostilities are in progress, and until some degree of
pacification has been achieved in the conquered areas, unless
jurisdiction is confined, in the first instance, to its main
task.

“This is possible only if _the troops_ take ruthless action
themselves against any threat from the enemy population.

“For these reasons I herewith issue the following order
effective for the area ‘Barbarossa’ (area of operations, army
rear area, and area of political administration).

“I. _Treatment of offences committed by Enemy Civilians._

“1. Until further notice the military courts and the
courts-martial will not be competent for _crimes committed by
enemy civilians_.

“2. Guerillas should be disposed of ruthlessly by the military,
whether they are fighting or in flight.

“3. Likewise all other attacks by enemy civilians on the Armed
Forces, its members and employees, are to be suppressed at once
by the military, using the most extreme methods, until the
assailants are destroyed.

“4. Where such measures have been neglected or were not at first
possible, _persons suspected of criminal action will be brought
at once before an officer_. _This officer will decide whether
they are to be shot._

“On the orders of an officer with the powers of at least a
Battalion Commander, _collective despotic measures_ will be
taken without delay against _localities_ from which cunning or
malicious attacks are made on the Armed Forces, if circumstances
do not permit of a quick identification of individual offenders.

“5. It is _expressly forbidden_ to _keep_ suspects _in custody_
in order to hand them over to the courts after the reinstatement
of civil courts.