Chapter XXIV: Section 2: of Chapter IX. Chief among these were the secret expansion of (1)

the German Navy in violation of treaty limitations, under the guidance of Raeder; the secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, adopted the same day that Germany unilaterally renounced the armament provision of the Versailles Treaty (_2261-PS_); von Blomberg’s plan, 2 May 1935, for the reoccupation of the Rhineland (_C-139_); and von Blomberg’s orders of 2 March 1936 under which the reoccupation was actually carried out (_C-159_). All these events clearly required the closest collaboration between the military leaders and the Nazis.

The state of mind and objectives of the German military leaders during this early period are significant. The viewpoint of the German Navy on the opportunities which Naziism offered for rearmament so that Germany could achieve its objectives by force or threat of force, is reflected in a memorandum published by the High Command of the German Navy in 1937 entitled “The Fight of the Navy against Versailles, 1919-35” (_C-156_). This memorandum was compiled by a naval captain named Schuessler in the German Admiralty. The preface contains the following statements:

“The object and aim of this memorandum is to draw a technically
reliable picture based on documentary records and the evidence
of those who took part, of the fight of the Navy against the
unbearable regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles.”

* * * * * *

“This compilation makes it clearer however, that even such ideal
and ambitious plans can be realized only to a small degree if
the concentrated and united strength of the whole people is not
behind the courageous activity of the soldier. Only when the
Fuehrer had created the second and even more important condition
for an effective rearmament, in the coordination of the whole
nation and in the fusion of the political, financial and
spiritual powers, could the work of the soldier find its
fulfilment.

“The framework of this Peace Treaty, the most shameful known in
world history, collapsed under the driving power of this united
will.” (_C-156_)

Thus, the German Navy and the Nazis were in comradely agreement and full collaboration. Hitler was giving the military leaders the chance they wanted. Jodl stated the situation clearly in his speech to the Gauleiters on 7 November 1943 (_L-172_):

“1. The fact that the National-Socialist movement and its
struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the
outer liberation from the bonds of the Dictate of Versailles is
not one on which I need enlarge in this circle. I should like
however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful
regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played
by the National-Socialist movement in re-awakening the will to
fight [_Wehrwillen_] in nurturing fighting strength
[_Wehrkraft_] and in rearming the German people. In spite of all
the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small _Reichswehr_
would never have been able to cope with this task, if only
because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the
Fuehrer aimed at—and has so happily been successful in bringing
about—was the fusion of these two forces.

“2. The seizure of power in its turn has meant in the first
place restoration of fighting sovereignty [_Wehrhoheit_]
(conscription, occupation of the Rhineland) and rearmament with
special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armoured
and air arm.” (_L-172_)

Nor were the high-ranking German officers unaware that the policies and objectives of the Nazis were leading Germany in the direction of war. Notes made by Admiral Carls of the German Navy in September 1938 by way of comment on a “Draft study of Naval Warfare against England,” read as follows:

“A. There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.

“1. If according to the Fuehrer’s decision Germany is to acquire
a position as a world power she needs not only sufficient
colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and
secure access to the ocean.

“2. Both requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to
Anglo-French interests and would limit their position as world
powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful
means. The decision to make Germany a world power therefore
forces upon us the necessity of making the corresponding
preparations for war.

“3. War against England means at the same time war against the
Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well and a
large number of countries overseas, in fact against one-half to
one-third of the whole world.

“It can only be justified and have a chance of success if it is
prepared _economically_ as well as _politically_ and
_militarily_ and waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an
outlet to the ocean.” (_C-23_)

The German Air Force, during this prewar period, was developing even more radically aggressive plans for the aggrandizement of the Reich. A study prepared by the chief, Kammhuber, of a branch of the General Staff of the Air Force called the “Organization Staff”, contained recommendations for the organization of the German Air Force in future years up to 1950 (_L-43_). The recommendations are based on certain assumptions, one of which was that by 1950 the frontiers of Germany would be as shown on the map which is attached as an inclosure to this study (_Chart Number 10_). On this map Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the Baltic coast up to the Gulf of Finland are all included within the borders of the Reich. Kammhuber also envisaged the future peacetime organization of the German Air Force as comprising seven “Group Commands.” Four of these were to lie within the borders of Germany proper, at Berlin, Brunswick, Munich, and Koenigsberg, but the three others are proposed to be at Vienna, Budapest, and Warsaw. (_L-43_)

The basic agreement and harmony between the Nazis and the German military leaders cannot be overemphasized. Without this agreement on objectives there might never have been a war. In this connection, an affidavit (_3704-PS_) by von Blomberg, formerly Field Marshall, Reich War Minister, and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces until February 1938, is significant:

“From 1919, and particularly from 1924, three critical
territorial questions occupied attention in Germany. These were
the questions of the Polish Corridor, the Ruhr and Memel.

“I myself, as well as the whole group of German staff officers,
believed that these three questions, outstanding among which was
the question of the Polish Corridor, would have to be settled
some day, if necessary by force of arms. About ninety percent of
the German people were of the same mind as the officers on the
Polish question. A war to wipe out the desecration involved in
the creation of the Polish Corridor and to lessen the threat to
separated East Prussia surrounded by Poland and Lithuania was
regarded as a sacred duty though a sad necessity. This was one
of the chief reasons behind the partially secret rearmament
which began about ten years before Hitler came to power and was
accentuated under Nazi rule.

“Before 1938-1939 the German generals were not opposed to
Hitler. There was no reason to oppose Hitler since he produced
the results which they desired. After this time some generals
began to condemn his methods and lost confidence in the power of
his judgment. However they failed as a group to take any
definite stand against him, although a few of them tried to do
so and as a result had to pay for this with their lives or their
positions.

“Shortly before my removal from the post of Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces in January 1938, Hitler asked me to
recommend a successor. I suggested Goering, who was the ranking
officer, but Hitler objected because of his lack of patience and
diligence. I was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces by no officer, but Hitler personally took over my
function as Commander. Keitel was recommended by me as a Chef de
bureau. As far as I know he was never named Commander of the
Armed Forces but was always merely a ‘Chief of Staff’ under
Hitler and in effect conducted the administrative functions of
the Ministry of War. At my time Keitel was not opposed to Hitler
and therefore was qualified to bring about a good understanding
between Hitler and the Armed Forces, a thing which I myself
desired and had furthered as _Reichswehrminister_ and
_Reichskriegsminister_. To do the opposite would have led to a
civil war, for at that time the mass of the German people
supported Hitler. Many are no longer willing to admit this. But
it is the truth.

“As I heard, Keitel did not oppose any of Hitler’s measures. He
became a willing tool in Hitler’s hands for every one of his
decisions.

“He did not measure up to what might have been expected of him.”
(_3704-PS_)

This statement by von Blomberg is paralleled closely in some respects by an affidavit by Colonel General Blaskowitz (_3706-PS_). Blaskowitz commanded an army in the campaign against Poland and the campaign against France. He subsequently took command of Army Group G in southern France, and held command of Army Group H, which retreated beyond the Rhine at the end of the war. His statement is as follows:

“* * * After the annexation of Czechoslovakia we hoped that the
Polish question would be settled in a peaceful fashion through
diplomatic means, since we believed that this time France and
England would come to the assistance of their ally. As a matter
of fact we felt that, if political negotiations came to naught,
the Polish question would unavoidably lead to war, that is, not
only with Poland herself, but also with the Western Powers.

“When in the middle of June I received an order from the OKH to
prepare myself for an attack on Poland, I knew that this war
came even closer to the realm of possibility. This conclusion
was only strengthened by the Fuehrer’s speech on 22 August 1939
on the Obersalzberg when it clearly seemed to be an actuality.
Between the middle of June 1939 and 1 September 1939 the members
of my staff who were engaged in preparations, participated in
various discussions which went on between the OKH and the army
group. During these discussions such matters of a tactical,
strategic and general nature were discussed as had to do with my
future position as Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Army during
the planned Polish campaign.

“During the Polish campaign, particularly during the Kutno
operations, I was repeatedly in communication with the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and he, as well as the Fuehrer,
visited my headquarters. In fact it was common practice for
commanders-in-chief of army groups and of armies to be asked
from time to time for estimates of the situation and for their
recommendations by telephone, teletype or wireless, as well as
by personal calls. These front commanders-in-chief thus actually
became advisers to the OKH in their own field so that the
positions shown in the attached chart embrace that group which
was the actual advisory council of the High Command of the
German Armed Forces.” (_3706-PS_)

It should be noted that General Blaskowitz, like Colonel General Halder and Field Marshall von Brauchitsch, vouches for the accuracy of the structure and organization of the General Staff and High Command group as described by the prosecution.

It is, accordingly, clear beyond dispute that the military leaders of Germany knew of, approved, supported, and executed plans for the expansion of the Armed Forces beyond the limits set by treaties. The objectives they had in mind are obvious from the affidavits and documents to which reference has been made. In these documents and affidavits we see the Nazis and the Generals in agreement upon the basic objective of aggrandizing Germany by force or threat of force, and collaborating to build up the armed might of Germany in order to make possible the subsequent acts of aggression.

(_a_) _Austria._ Notes taken by Colonel Hossbach of a conference held in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin on 5 November 1937 show that this conference, at which Hitler presided, was small and highly secret (_386-PS_). The only other participants were the four principal military leaders, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (von Neurath), and Hossbach acting as Secretary. The four chief leaders of the Armed Forces—Blomberg, who was then Reich Minister for War, and the Commanders-in-Chief of the three branches of the Armed Forces, von Fritsch for the Army, Raeder for the Navy, and Goering for the Air Force—were present. Hitler embarked on a general discussion of Germany’s diplomatic and military policy, and stated that the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia was an essential preliminary “for the improvement of our military position” and “in order to remove any threat from the flanks”. (_386-PS_)

The military and political advantages envisaged included the acquisition of a new source of food, shorter and better frontiers, the release of troops for other tasks, and the possibility of forming new divisions from the population of the conquered territories. Von Blomberg and von Fritsch joined in the discussion and von Fritsch stated:

“That it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for
this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out
operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of
the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications”
(_386-PS_).

In the following Spring, March 1938, the German plans with respect to Austria came to fruition. Entries in the diary kept by Jodl show the participation of the German military leaders in the absorption of Austria (_1780-PS_). As is shown by Jodl’s diary entry for 11 February 1938, Keitel and other generals were present at the Obersalzberg meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler:

“_11 February_

“In the evening and on 12 February General K. with General V.
Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together
with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and
military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol”.
(_1780-PS_)

Two days later Keitel and others were preparing proposals to be submitted to Hitler which would give the Austrian government the impression that Germany would resort to force unless the Schuschnigg agreement was ratified in Vienna:

“_13 February_

“In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come
to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer order is to the
effect that military pressure by shamming military action should
be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive
maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone
for approval”. (_1780-PS_)

These proposals are embodied in a document 14 February 1938 and signed by Keitel (_1775-PS_). Portions of Keitel’s proposals to the Fuehrer are as follows:

“1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or
Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.

“2. Spread false, but quite credible news, which may lead to the
conclusion of military preparations against Austria,

“_a._ through V-men (_V-Maenner_) in Austria,
“_b._ through our customs personnel (staff) at the frontier,
“_c._ through travelling agents.”

* * * * * *

“4. Order a very active make-believe wireless exchange in
_Wehrkreis VII_ and between Berlin and Munich.

“5. Real maneuvers, training flights, and winter maneuvers of
the Mountain Troops near the frontier.

“6. Admiral Canaris has to be ready beginning on February 14th
in the Service Command Headquarters in order to carry out
measures given by order of the Chief of the OKW.” (_1775-PS_)

As Jodl’s diary entry for 14 February shows, these deceptive maneuvers and threats of force were very effective in Austria:

“The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is
created that Germany is undertaking serious military
preparations.” (_1780-PS_)

About a month later armed intervention was precipitated by Schuschnigg’s decision to hold a plebiscite in Austria. Hitler ordered mobilization in accordance with the preexisting plans for the invasion of Austria (these plans were known as “Case Otto”) in order to absorb Austria and stop the plebiscite. Jodl’s diary entry for 10 March 1938 states:

“By surprise and without consulting the ministers, Schuschnigg
ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring
strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or
preparation.

“Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March
9 to 10, he calls for Goering, General V. Reichenau is called
back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General V. Schobert is
ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is
with the District Leader [_Gauleiter_] Burckel in the
Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He
drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I follow at 10:15,
according to the wish of General V. Viebahn, to give him the old
draft.

‘Prepare case Otto’.” (_1780-PS_)

In an order 11 March, initialed by Keitel and Jodl, Hitler laid down the general instructions for the invasion, and directed that the Army and Air Force be ready for action by 12 March (_C-102_). On the same evening Hitler ordered the invasion of Austria to commence at daybreak on 12 March. The order was initialed by Jodl. (_C-182_)

The invasion of Austria differs from the other German acts of aggression in that the invasion was not closely scheduled and timed in advance. This was so simple because the invasion was precipitated by an outside event, Schuschnigg’s order for the plebiscite. But although for this reason the element of deliberately timed planning was lacking, the foregoing documents make abundantly clear the participation of the military leaders at all stages. At the small policy meeting in November 1937, when Hitler’s general program for Austria and Czechoslovakia was outlined, the only others present were the four principal military leaders and the Foreign Secretary (_386-PS_). In February, Keitel, Reichenau, and Sperrle were present at Obersalzberg to help subject Schuschnigg to “the heaviest military pressure” (_1780-PS_). Keitel and others immediately thereafter worked out and executed a program of military threat and deception for frightening the Austrian Government into acceptance of the Schuschnigg protocol (_1775-PS_). When the actual invasion took place it was, of course, directed by the military leaders and executed by the German Armed Forces. Jodl has given a clear statement of why the German military leaders were delighted to join with the Nazis in bringing about the end of Austrian independence. In his lecture to the Gauleiters in November 1943 (_L-172_) Jodl explained:

“The Austrian ‘Anschluss’, in its turn, brought with it not only
fulfilment of an old national aim but also had the effect both
of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving
our strategic position. Whereas up till then the territory of
Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into
Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base
for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself
was now enclosed by pincers. Its own strategic position had now
become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any
attack pressed home with vigour before effective aid from the
West could be expected to arrive”. (_L-172_)

(_b_) _Czechoslovakia._

The steps in the planning for the invasion of Czechoslovakia (“Case Green” or Fall Gruen) bear the evidence of knowing and wilful participation by Keitel, Jodl, and other members of the General Staff and High Command Group.

The Hossbach minutes of the conference between Hitler and the four principal German military leaders on 5 November 1937 show, that Austria and Czechoslovakia were then listed as the first intended victims of German aggression (_386-PS_). After the absorption of Austria in March 1938, Hitler as head of the State and Keitel as Chief of all the armed forces lost no time in turning their attention to Czechoslovakia. In the Hitler-Keitel discussions on 21 April 1938 a nice balance of political and military factors was worked out (_388-PS_):

“A. _Political Aspect_

1. Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any cause or possibility of justification has been turned down. As result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the elimination of the last opponent on the mainland.

2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a crisis and lead to war.

3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (e.g. assassination of German ambassador in connection with an anti-German demonstration).

B. _Military Conclusions_

1. The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities 2 and 3. Case 2 is the undesired one since “Gruen” will have taken security measures.

* * * * * *

4. Politically, the first 4 days of military action are the decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished facts must prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of spoils!) and demoralize “Gruen”.

Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless thrust by a motorized army. (e.g. via Pi past Pr) [Pilsen, Prague]. (_388-PS_)

From this point on, nearly the whole story is contained in the Schmundt file (_388-PS_) and in Jodl’s diary (_1780-PS_). These two sources of information demolish in advance what will, no doubt, be urged in defense of the military defendants and the General Staff and High Command Group. They will seek to create the impression that the German generals were pure military technicians; that they were uninterested and uninformed about political and diplomatic considerations and events; that they passed their days mounting mock battles at the _Kriegsakadamie_; that they prepared plans for military attack or defense, on a purely hypothetical basis. They will say all this in order to suggest that they did not share and could not estimate Hitler’s aggressive intentions, and that they carried out politically conceived orders like military automatons, with no idea whether the wars they launched and waged were aggressive or not.

If these arguments are made, the Schmundt file (_388-PS_) and Jodl’s diary (_1780-PS_) make it abundantly apparent that aggressive designs were conceived jointly between the Nazis and the generals; that the military leaders were fully posted on the aggressive intentions of the Nazis; that they were fully informed of political and diplomatic developments; that indeed German generals had a habit of turning up at diplomatic gatherings.

If the documents did not show these things so clearly, a moment’s thought must show them to be true. A highly successful program of conquest depends on armed might, and cannot be executed with an unprepared, weak, or recalcitrant military leadership. It has, of course, been said that war is too important a business to be left to soldiers alone. It is equally true that aggressive diplomacy is far too dangerous a business to be conducted without military advice and military support.

No doubt some of the German generals had qualms about Hitler’s timing and the boldness of some of his moves. Some of these doubts are rather amusingly reflected in an entry in Jodl’s diary for 10 August 1938:

“The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Force groups, Lt.
Col. Jeschonnek and myself are ordered to the Berghof. After
dinner the Fuehrer makes a speech lasting for almost three
hours, in which he develops his political thoughts. The
subsequent attempts to draw the Fuehrer’s attention to the
defects of our preparation, which are undertaken by a few
generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This applies
especially to the remark of General Wietersheim, in which to top
it off he claims to quote from General Adams [_die er noch dazu
dem General Adams in den Mund legt_] that the western
fortifications can only be held for three weeks. The Fuehrer
becomes very indignant and flames up, bursting into the remark
that in such a case the whole Army would not be good for
anything. ‘I assure you, General, the position will not only be
held for three weeks, but for three years.’ The cause of this
despondent opinion, which unfortunately enough is held very
widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various
reasons. First of all, it [the General Staff] is restrained by
old memories; political considerations play a part as well,
instead of obeying and executing its military mission. That is
certainly done with traditional devotion, but the vigor of the
soul is lacking because in the end they do not believe in the
genius of the Fuehrer. And one does perhaps compare him with
Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this defeatism may
not only possibly cause immense political damage, for the
opposition between the General’s opinion and that of the Fuehrer
is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale
of the troops. But I have no doubt that [?] the Fuehrer will be
able to boost the morale of the people in an unexpected way when
the right moment comes.” (_1780-PS_)

But if this entry shows that some of the German generals at that time were cautious with respect to Germany’s ability to take on Poland and the Western Powers simultaneously, nonetheless the entry shows no lack of sympathy with the Nazi aims for conquest. And there is no evidence in Jodl’s diary or elsewhere that any substantial number of German generals lacked sympathy with Hitler’s objectives. Furthermore, the top military leaders always joined with and supported his decisions, with formidable success in the years from 1938 to 1942.

If it is said that German military leaders did not know that German general policy toward Czechoslovakia was aggressive, or based on force and threat of force, it may be noted that on 30 May 1938 Hitler signed a Most Secret directive to Keitel (_388-PS Item 11_) in which he said:

“It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by
military action in the near future. It is the job of the
political leaders to await or bring about the politically and
militarily suitable moment.

“An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia
or other political events in Europe creating a surprisingly
favorable opportunity and one which may never come again may
cause me to take early action.

“The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a
favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly
the preparations are to be made at once.” (_388-PS Item 11_)

Jodl was in no doubt what this meant. He noted in his diary that same day:

“The Fuehrer signs directive ‘Green’, where he states his final
decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates
military preparation all along the line”. (_1780-PS_)

The succeeding evidence in the Schmundt file (_388-PS Items 14, 16, 17_) and in the Jodl diary (_1780-PS_) shows how those military preparations went forward “all along the line.” Numerous examples of discussions, planning, and preparation during the last few weeks before the Munich Pact, including discussions with Hungary and the Hungarian General Staff in which General Halder participated, are contained in the Jodl diary (_1780-PS_) and the later items in the Schmundt file (_388-PS Items 18 to 22, 24, 26 to 28, 31 to 34, 36 to 54_). The day the Munich Pact was signed, Jodl noted in his diary:

“The Munich Pact is signed. Czechoslovakia as a power is out.
Four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2nd and 7th
of October. The remaining part of mainly German character will
be occupied by the 10th of October. The genius of the Fuehrer
and his determination not to shun even a World War have again
won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that
the incredulous, the weak and the doubtful people have been
converted and will remain that way.” (_1780-PS_)

Plans for the “liquidation” of the remainder of Czechoslovakia were made soon after Munich (_388-PS Item 40_; _C-136_; _C-138_). Ultimately the absorption was accomplished by diplomatic bullying in which Keitel participated for the usual purposes of demonstrating that German armed might was ready to enforce the threats (_2802-PS_). Once again, Jodl in his 1943 lecture (_L-172_) explained clearly why the objective of eliminating Czechoslovakia lay as close to the hearts of the German military leaders as to the hearts of the Nazis:

“The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of
1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded
off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it then
became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of
more or less favorable strategic premises.” (_L-172_)

This serves to recall the affidavits by Blomberg (_3704-PS_) and Blaskowitz (_3706-PS_) already quoted:

“The whole group of German staff and front officers believed
that the question of the Polish Corridor would have to be
settled some day, if necessary by force of arms.”

“A war to wipe out the political and economic losses resulting
from the creation of the Polish Corridor was regarded as a
sacred duty though a sad necessity.”

“Before 1938-39, the German generals were not opposed to
Hitler.”

“Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired.”

(_c_) _Poland._ The story of the German attack on Poland furnishes an excellent case study of the functioning of the General Staff and High Command Group.

Reference is made to the series of directives from Hitler and Keitel involving “Fall Weiss” (_C-120_). The series starts with a re-issuance of the “Directive for the Uniform Preparation for War by the Armed Forces”. This periodically re-issued directive was encountered previously in the case of Czechoslovakia.

In essence these directives are (_a_) statements of what the Armed Forces must be prepared to accomplish in view of political and diplomatic policies and developments, and (_b_) indications of what should be accomplished diplomatically in order to make the military tasks easier and the chances of success greater. They constitute, in fact, a fusion of diplomatic and military thought and strongly demonstrate the mutual inter-dependence of aggressive diplomacy and military planning. The distribution of these documents early in April 1939, in which the preparations of plans for the Polish war is ordered, was limited. Five copies only are distributed by Keitel: one to Brauchitsch (OKH), one to Raeder (OKM), one to Goering (OKL), and two to Warlimont in the Planning Branch of OKW. Hitler lays down that the plan must be susceptible of execution by 1 September 1939, and that target date was adhered to. The fusion of military and diplomatic thought is clearly brought out by the following part of one of those documents:

“1. _Political Requirements and Aims._ German relations with
Poland continue to be based on the principle of avoiding any
quarrels. Should Poland, however, change her policy towards
Germany, based up to now on the same principles as our own, and
adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a final settlement
might become necessary, notwithstanding the pact in effect with
Poland.

“The aim then will be to destroy Polish military strength, and
create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements
of national defense. The Free State of Danzig will be proclaimed
a part of the Reich-territory at the outbreak of the conflict,
at the latest.

“The political leadership considers it its task in this case to
isolate Poland if possible, that is to say, to limit the war to
Poland only.

“The development of increasing internal crises in France and the
resulting British cautiousness might produce such a situation in
the not too distant future.

“Intervention by Russia so far as she would be able to do this
cannot be expected to be of any use for Poland, because this
would imply Poland’s destruction by Bolshevism.

“The attitudes of the _Baltic States_ will be determined wholly
by German military exigencies.

“On the German side, Hungary cannot be considered a certain
German ally. Italy’s attitude is determined by the Berlin-Rome
Axis.

“2. _Military Conclusions._ The great objectives in the building
up of the German Armed Forces will continue to be determined by
the antagonism of the ‘Western Democracies’. ‘Fall Weiss’
constitutes only a precautionary complement to these
preparations. It is not to be looked upon in any way, however,
as the necessary prerequisite for a military settlement with the
Western opponents.

“The isolation of Poland will be more easily maintained, even
after the beginning of operations, if we succeed in starting the
war with heavy, sudden blows and in gaining rapid successes.

“The entire situation will require, however, that precautions be
taken to safeguard the western boundary and the German North Sea
coast, as well as the air over them.” (_C-120_)

It cannot be suggested that these are hypothetical plans, or that the General Staff and High Command Group did not know what was in prospect. The plans show on their face that they are in earnest and no war game. The point is reinforced by Schmundt’s notes on the conference in Hitler’s study at the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, on 23 May 1939 (_L-79_). At this conference Hitler announced:

“There is, therefore, no question of sparing Poland, and we are
left with the decision: _to attack Poland at the first suitable
opportunity_”. (_L-79_)

Besides Hitler and a few military aides and adjutants, the following were present: Goering (C-in-C _Luftwaffe_); Raeder (C-in-C Navy); Keitel (Chief, OKW); von Brauchitsch (C-in-C Army); Col. General Milch (Inspector General of the _Luftwaffe_); Gen. Bodenschatz (Goering’s personal assistant); Rear Admiral Schnievindt (Chief of the Naval War Staff); Col. Jeschonnek (Chief of the Air Staff); Col. Warlimont (Planning Staff of OKW). All except Milch, Bodenschatz, and the adjutants are members of the Group as defined in the Indictment.

The initial and general planning of the attack on Poland, however, had to be examined, checked, corrected, and perfected by the field commanders who were to carry out the attack. In a document issued in the middle of June 1939 (_C-142_), von Brauchitsch as C-in-C of the Army passed on the general outlines of the plan to the field commanders-in-chief (the _Oberbefehlshaber_ of Army Groups and Armies) so that they could work out the actual preparation and deployments in accordance with the general plan:

“The object of the operation is to _destroy the Polish Armed
Forces_. High policy demands that the war should be begun by
heavy surprise blows in order to achieve quick results. _The
intention of the Army High Command_ is to prevent a regular
mobilization and concentration of the Polish Army by a surprise
invasion of Polish territory and to destroy the mass of the
Polish Army which is to be expected to be west of the
Vistula-Narve line. This is to be achieved by a concentric
attack from Silesia on one side and Pomerania-East Prussia on
the other side. The possible influence from Galicia against this
operation must be eliminated. The main idea of the destruction
of the Polish Army west of the Vistula-Narve Line with the
elimination of the possible influence from Galicia remains
unchanged even if advanced preparedness for defense on the part
of the Polish Army, caused by previous political tension, should
have to be taken into consideration. In such a case it may be a
question of not making the first attack mainly with mechanized
and motorized forces but of waiting for the arrival of stronger,
non-motorized units. The Army High Command will then give the
correspondingly later time for the crossing of the frontier. The
endeavour to obtain a quick success will be maintained.

“The Army Group Commands and the Army Commands (A.O.K.) will
make their preparations on the basis of surprise of the enemy.
There will be alterations necessary if surprise should have to
be abandoned: these will have to be developed simply and quickly
on the same basis: they are to be prepared mentally to such an
extent, that in case of an order from the Army High Command they
can be carried out quickly.” (_C-142_)

A document of approximately the same date reveals an _Oberbefehlshaber_ at work in the field planning the attack (_2327-PS_). This document, signed by Blaskowitz, at the time the commander-in-chief of the Third Army Area Command and commander-in-chief of the 8th Army during the Polish campaign, states in part:

“The commander-in-chief of the army has ordered the working out
of a _plan of deployment against Poland_ which takes in account
the demands of the political leadership for the opening of war
by surprise and for quick success.

“The order of deployment by the High Command, ‘_Fall Weiss_’
authorizes the Third Army Group [in _Fall Weiss_, 8th Army
Headquarters] to give necessary directions and orders to all
commands subordinated to it for ‘_Fall Weiss_’.”

* * * * * *

“The whole correspondence on ‘_Fall Weiss_’ has to be conducted
under the classification Top Secret [_Chefsache_]. This is to be
disregarded only if the content of a document, in the judgment
of the chief of the responsible command is harmless in every
way—even in connection with other documents.

“For the middle of July a conference is planned where details on
the execution will be discussed. Time and place will be ordered
later on. Special requests are to be communicated to Third Army
Group before 10 July.

“I declare it the duty of the Commanding Generals, the
divisional commanders and the commandants to limit as much as
possible the number of persons who will be informed, and to
limit the extent of the information and ask that all suitable
measures be taken to prevent persons not concerned from getting
information.

“The Commander-in-Chief of Army Area Command

“(signed) F. Blaskowitz.”

“_Aims of Operation ‘Fall Weiss’_

“1. a. The operation, in order to forestall an orderly Polish
mobilization and concentration, is to be opened by surprise with
forces which are for the most part armored and motorized, placed
on alert in the neighborhood of the border. The initial
superiority over the Polish frontier-guards and surprise that
can be expected with certainty are to be maintained by quickly
bringing up other parts of the army as well to counteract the
marching up of the Polish Army.

“Accordingly all units have to keep the initiative against the
foe by quick action and ruthless attacks.” (_2327-PS_)

Finally, a week before the actual onslaught, when all the military plans have been laid, The General Staff and High Command Group all gathered in one place, in fact all in one room. On 23 August 1939 the _Oberbefehlshaber_ assembled at Obersalzberg to hear Hitler’s explanation of the timing of the attack, and to receive political and diplomatic orientation from the head of the State (_798-PS_). This speech, the second of the two examples referred to in the initial affidavits by Halder (_3702-PS_) and Brauchitsch (_3703-PS_), was addressed to the very group defined in the indictment as the General Staff and High Command Group.

(_d_) _The War Period, September 1939-June 1941: Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece._ On 1 September 1939 Germany launched the war. Within a few weeks, and before any important action on the western front, Poland was overrun and conquered. German losses were insignificant.

The “three principal territorial questions” mentioned in the Blomberg (_3704-PS_) and Blaskowitz (_3706-PS_) affidavits had all been solved. The Rhineland had been reoccupied and fortified, Memel annexed, and the Polish Corridor annexed. And much more too. Austria had become a part of the Reich, and Czechoslovakia was occupied and a Protectorate of Germany. All of western Poland was in German hands. Germany was superior in arms, and in experience in their use, to her western enemies, France and England.

Then came the three years of the war—1939, 1940, 1941—when German armed might swung like a great scythe from north to south to east. Italy, Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria had become German allies. Norway and Denmark; the Low Countries; France; Tripoli and Egypt; Yugoslavia and Greece; the western part of the Soviet Union—all this territory was invaded and overrun.

In the period from the fall of Poland in October 1939 to the attack against the Soviet Union in June 1941, occurred the aggressive wars, in violation of treaties, against Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and Greece. But one thing is certain: neither the Nazis nor the generals thought during this period in terms of a series of violations of neutrality and treaties. They thought in terms of a war, a war for the conquest of Europe.

Six weeks after the outbreak of war, and upon the successful termination of the Polish campaign, on 9 October 1939, there was issued a “Memorandum and Directive for the Conduct of the War in the West.” (_L-52_). It is unsigned, was distributed only to the four service chiefs (Keitel, Brauchitsch, Goering, and Raeder) and gives every indication of having been issued by Hitler. The following are pertinent extracts:

“The aim of the Anglo-French conduct of war is to dissolve or
disintegrate the 80 million state again so that in this manner
the European equilibrium, in other words the balance of power,
which serves their ends, may be restored. This battle therefore
will have to be fought out by the German people one way or
another. Nevertheless, the very great successes of the first
month of war could serve, in the event of an immediate signing
of peace to strengthen the Reich psychologically and materially
to such an extent that from the German viewpoint there would be
no objection to ending the war immediately, insofar as the
present achievement with arms is not jeopardized by the
peace-treaty.

“It is not the object of this memorandum to study the
possibilities in this direction or even to take them into
consideration. In this paper I shall confine myself exclusively
to the other case; the necessity to continue the fight, the
object of which, as already stressed, consists so far as the
enemy is concerned in the dissolution or destruction of the
German Reich. In opposition to this, the German war aim is the
final military dispatch of the West, i.e. destruction of the
power and ability of the Western Powers ever again to be able to
oppose the state consolidation and further development of the
German people in Europe.

“As far as the outside world is concerned, however, this
internal aim will have to undergo various propaganda
adjustments, necessary from a psychological point of view. This
does not alter the war aim. It is and remains the destruction of
our Western enemies.”

* * * * * *

“The successes of the Polish campaign have made possible first
of all a war on a single front, awaited for past decades without
any hope of realization, that is to say, Germany is able to
enter the fight in the West with all her might, leaving only a
few covering troops.

“The remaining European states are neutral either because they
fear for their own fates, or lack interest in the conflict as
such, or are interested in a certain outcome of the war, which
prevents them from taking part at all or at any rate too soon.

“The following is to be firmly borne in mind * * *”

* * * * * *

“_Belgium and Holland_—Both countries are interested in
preserving their neutrality but incapable of withstanding
prolonged pressure from England and France. The preservation of
their colonies, the maintenance of their trade, and thus the
securing of their interior economy, even of their very life,
depend wholly upon the will of England and France. Therefore, in
their decisions, in their attitude, and in their actions, both
countries are dependent upon the West, in the highest degree. If
England and France promise themselves a successful result at the
price of Belgian neutrality, they are at any time in a position
to apply the necessary pressure. That is to say, without
covering themselves with the odium of a breach of neutrality,
they can compel Belgium and Holland to give up their neutrality.
Therefore, in the matter of the preservation of Belgo-Dutch
neutrality time is not a factor which might promise a favorable
development for Germany.

“_The Nordic States_—Provided no completely unforeseen factors
appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be assumed.
The continuation of German trade with these countries appears
possible even in a war of long duration.” (_L-52_)

Six weeks later, on 23 November 1939, the group of _Oberbefehlshaber_ again assembled and heard from Hitler much of what he had said previously to the four service chiefs (_789-PS_):

“For the first time in history we have to fight on only one
front, the other front is at present free. But no one can know
how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long time
whether I should strike in the east and then in the west.
Basically I did not organize the armed forces in order not to
strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or
later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it was
decided that the east was to be attacked first. If the Polish
war was won so quickly, it was due to the superiority of our
armed forces. The most glorious appearance in history.
Unexpectedly small expenditures of men and material. Now the
eastern front is held by only a few divisions. It is a situation
which we viewed previously as unachievable. Now the situation is
as follows: The opponent in the west lies behind his
fortifications. There is no possibility of coming to grips with
him. The decisive question is: how long can we endure this
situation.”

* * * * * *

“Everything is determined by the fact that the moment is
favorable now; in 6 months it might not be so anymore.”

* * * * * *

“England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves.
The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring
England to her knees. However, this can only occur if we have
occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me.
None has ever achieved what I have achieved. My life is of no
importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great
height, even if the world does hate us now. I am setting this
work on a gamble. I have to choose between victory or
destruction. I choose victory. Greatest historical choice, to be
compared with the decision of Friedrich the Great before the
first Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one
man. Even there the closest advisers were disposed to
capitulation. Everything depended on Friedrich the Great. Even
the decisions of Bismarck in 1866 and 1870 were no less great.
My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England
at the most favorable and quickest moment. Breach of the
neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will
question that when we have won. We shall not bring about the
breach of neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do
not break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without
attack the war is not to be ended victoriously. I consider it as
possible to end the war only by means of an attack. The question
as to whether the attack will be successful no one can answer.
Everything depends upon the favorable instant”. (_789-PS_)

Thereafter the winter of 1939-40 passed quietly—the winter of “phony war”. The General Staff and High Command Group all knew what the plan was; they had all been told. It was to attack ruthlessly at the first opportunity, to smash the French and English forces, to pay no heed to treaties with, or the neutrality of, the Low Countries.

“Breaking of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is
meaningless. No one will question that when we have won.”
(_789-PS_)

That is what Hitler told the _Oberbefehlshaber_. The generals and admirals agreed and went forward with their plans.

The military leaders may contend that all the steps in this march of conquest were conceived by Hitler, and that the military leaders embarked on them with reluctance and misgivings. Or they may be restrained by pride from taking so undignified and degrading a position as to suggest that German military leadership, the bearers of the tradition of Schlieffen, Moltke, Spee and Hindenburg, was cowed and coerced into war and plans of which they did not approve by a gang of political adventurers. But whether they make the argument or not, it is utterly without foundation.

Hitler’s utterances in October (_L-79_) and November (_789-PS_) 1939 are full of plans against France, England, and the Low Countries but contain no suggestion of an attack on Scandinavia. Indeed, Hitler’s memorandum of 9 October 1939 (_L-52_) to the four service chiefs affirmatively indicates that he saw no reason to disturb the situation to the North:

“_The Northern States_—Providing no completely unforeseen
factors appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be
assumed. The continuance of trade with these countries appears
possible even in a war of long duration.” (_L-52_)

But a week previous, on 3 October 1939, Raeder had caused a questionnaire to be circulated within the Naval War Staff, seeking comments on the advantages which might be gained from a naval standpoint by securing bases in Norway and Denmark (_C-122_). Raeder was stimulated to circulate this questionnaire by a letter from another Admiral named Carls, who pointed out the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany (_C-66_). (Rolf Carls later attained the rank of Admiral of the Fleet, and commanded Naval Group North from January 1940 to February 1943. In that capacity he is a member of the General Staff and High Command Group as defined in the Indictment.)

Doenitz, at that time Flag Officer Submarines, on 9 October 1939, replied to the questionnaire that from his standpoint Trondheim and Narvik met his requirements, that Trondheim was preferable, and proposed the establishment of a U-boat base there (_C-5_). Raeder’s visit to Hitler the next day and certain subsequent events are described as follows (_L-323_):

“_Entry in the War Diary of the C-in-C of the Navy (Naval War
Staff) on ‘Weseruebung’._ 1. 10 October 1939. First reference of
the C-in-C of the Navy (Naval War Staff), when visiting the
Fuehrer, to the significance of Norway for sea and air warfare.
The Fuehrer intends to give the matter consideration.

“12 December 1939. Fuehrer received Q & H.

“Subsequent instructions to the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces to make mental preparations. The C-in-C of the Navy is
having an essay prepared, which will be ready in January. With
reference to this essay, _Kapitan zur see_ Krancke is working on
‘_Weseruebung_’, and OKW.

“During the time which followed, H maintained contact with the
Chief of Staff of the C-in-C of the Navy. His aim was to develop
the Party Q with a view to making it capable of making a coup,
and to give the Supreme Command of the Navy information on
political developments in Norway and military questions. In
general he pressed for a speeding-up of preparations, but
considered that it was first necessary to expand the
organization. The support which had been promised him in the
form of money and coal was set in motion only very slowly and
came in small quantities, and he repeatedly complained about
this. It was not until the end of March that Q considered the
coup [_Aktion_] so urgent that the expansion of his organization
could not wait. The military advice of H was passed on to the
OKW.” (_L-323_)

On 12 December the Naval War Staff discussed the Norwegian project with Hitler at a meeting which Keitel and Jodl also attended (_C-64_). In the meantime, illustrating the close link between the service chiefs and the Nazi politicians, Raeder was in touch with Rosenberg on the possibilities of using Quisling (_C-65_). As result of all this, on Hitler’s instructions Keitel issued an OKW directive on 27 January 1940. The directive related that Hitler had commissioned Keitel to take charge of preparation for the Norway operation, to which he then gave the code name “_Weseruebung_.” On 1 March 1940 Hitler issued the directive setting forth the general plan for the invasion of Norway and Denmark (_C-174_). The invasion itself took place on 9 April 1940. The directive was initialled by Admiral Kurt Fricke who at that time was head of the Operations Division of the Naval War Staff, and who at the end of 1941 became Chief of the Naval War Staff. In that capacity he too is a member of the Group as defined in the Indictment.

So, as these documents make clear, the plan to invade Norway and Denmark was not conceived in Nazi Party circles or forced on the military leaders. On the contrary it was conceived in the naval part of the General Staff and High Command Group, and Hitler was persuaded to take up the idea. Treaties and neutrality meant just as little to the General Staff and High Command Group as to the Nazis. Launching aggressive war against inoffensive neighboring states gave the generals and admirals no qualms.

As for the Low Countries, neither Hitler nor the military leaders were disturbed about Treaty considerations. At the conferences between Hitler and the principal military leaders in May 1939 (_L-79_), when the intention to attack Poland was announced, Hitler in discussing the possibility of war with England said:

“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed
force. Declarations of neutrality will be ignored”. (_L-79_)

And in the speech to the _Oberbefehlshaber_ in November 1939 (_789-PS_), after the Polish victory, Hitler made clear his intention to attack France and England by first invading the Low Countries. “No one will question that when we have won,” he said.