Chapter XXII: Section IV: , he was responsible for the carrying out of these (2)

│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 9. │ I │ 6
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │ 29, 70,
│ Appendix B. │ I │ 71
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
071-PS │Rosenberg letter to Bormann, 23 April │ │
│1941, replying to Bormann’s letter of │ │
│19 April 1941 (Document 072-PS). (USA │ │
│371) │ III │ 119
│ │ │
*498-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing │ │
│of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA │ │
│501) │ III │ 416
│ │ │
*501-PS │Collection of four documents on │ │
│execution by gas, June 1942, one │ │
│signed by Dr. Becker, SS │ │
│Untersturmfuehrer at Kiev, 16 May │ │
│1942. (USA 288) │ III │ 418
│ │ │
*502-PS │Order, 17 July 1941, entitled │ │
│“Regulations for the Commandos of the │ │
│Chief of the SIPO and SD which are to │ │
│be activated in Stalags”. (USA 486) │ III │ 422
│ │ │
*526-PS │Top secret notice, 10 May 1943, │ │
│concerning saboteurs captured and shot│ │
│in Norway. (USA 502) │ III │ 434
│ │ │
532-PS │Telegram of WFSt, 24 June 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of Commandos. │ III │ 437
│ │ │
*553-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 4 August 1942,│ │
│regulating treatment of paratroops. │ │
│(USA 500) │ III │ 441
│ │ │
654-PS │Thierack’s notes, 18 September 1942, │ │
│on discussion with Himmler concerning │ │
│delivery of Jews to Himmler for │ │
│extermination through work. (USA 218) │ III │ 467
│ │ │
*668-PS │Letter from Chief of the SIPO and SD │ │
│and OKW letter, 24 June 1942, │ │
│concerning prosecution of punishable │ │
│offenses against the Reich or │ │
│occupation forces in occupied │ │
│territories. (USA 504) │ III │ 476
│ │ │
*674-PS │Secret letter from President of High │ │
│District Court of Kattowitz re │ │
│executions being carried out by │ │
│Gestapo without judicial processes, 3 │ │
│December 1941. (USA 505) │ III │ 478
│ │ │
*701-PS │Letter from Minister of Justice to │ │
│Prosecutors, 1 April 1943, concerning │ │
│Poles and Jews who are released from │ │
│Penal institutions of Department of │ │
│Justice. (USA 497) │ III │ 510
│ │ │
*710-PS │Letter from Goering to Heydrich, 31 │ │
│July 1941, concerning solution of │ │
│Jewish question. (USA 509) │ III │ 525
│ │ │
745-PS │Letter from Chief of SD, Koblenz, 12 │ │
│June 1944, concerning enemy aviators │ │
│who have been shot down. │ III │ 543
│ │ │
775-PS │Memorandum of Minister of the Interior│ │
│concerning clarification of police │ │
│matters, 1935. │ III │ 547
│ │ │
779-PS │Directive by Frick, regulating │ │
│“protective custody”, 12 April 1934. │ III │ 555
│ │ │
833-PS │Instructions by Admiral Canaris, Head │ │
│of the Abwehr, 2 February 1942, │ │
│concerning prosecution of crimes │ │
│against the Reich or occupying forces │ │
│in the occupied territories. │ III │ 600
│ │ │
1061-PS │Official report of Stroop, SS and │ │
│Police Leader of Warsaw, on │ │
│destruction of Warsaw Ghetto, 1943. │ │
│(USA 275) │ III │ 718
│ │ │
*1063-A-PS │Order of Chief of SIPO and SD, 2 │ │
│January 1941, concerning │ │
│classification of concentration camps.│ │
│(USA 492) │ III │ 775
│ │ │
*1063-B-PS │Letter signed by Kaltenbrunner, 26 │ │
│July 1943, concerning establishment of│ │
│Labor Reformatory camps. (USA 492) │ III │ 777
│ │ │
*1063-D-PS │Mueller’s order, 17 December 1942, │ │
│concerning prisoners qualified for │ │
│work to be sent to concentration │ │
│camps. (USA 219) │ III │ 778
│ │ │
1063-E-PS │Copy of Mueller’s order, 25 June 1942,│ │
│concerning increased shipments to │ │
│concentration camps. │ III │ 780
│ │ │
*1104-PS │Memorandum, 21 November 1941, │ │
│enclosing copies of report concerning │ │
│anti-Jewish action in Minsk. (USA 483)│ III │ 783
│ │ │
1113-PS │Report of 6 November 1942 concerning │ │
│action “Marshfever”. │ III │ 792
│ │ │
*1165-PS │Letter from Commandant of │ │
│concentration Camp Gross Rosen, 23 │ │
│October 1941, and letter of Mueller to│ │
│all Gestapo offices, 9 November 1941, │ │
│concerning execution of Russian PW’s. │ │
│(USA 244) │ III │ 821
│ │ │
*1276-PS │Top secret letter from Chief of SIPO │ │
│and SD to OKW/WFSt, 17 June 1944, │ │
│concerning Commando operations. (USA │ │
│525). │ III │ 855
│ │ │
1285-PS │Extract from The German Police, 1943, │ │
│pp. 81-82. │ III │ 863
│ │ │
1437-PS │Law concerning reuniting of Austria │ │
│with German Reich, 18 March 1938. 1938│ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 262. │ IV │ 17
│ │ │
1438-PS │Fuehrer concerning administration of │ │
│Sudeten-German territory, 22 October │ │
│1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 1453. │ IV │ 17
│ │ │
*1472-PS │Copy of telegram from Mueller to │ │
│Himmler, 16 December 1942, concerning │ │
│recruiting Jewish labor. (USA 279) │ IV │ 49
│ │ │
*1481-PS │Gestapo order, 20 January 1938, │ │
│dissolving and confiscating property │ │
│of Catholic Youth Womens Organization │ │
│in Bavaria. (USA 737). │ IV │ 50
│ │ │
*1514-PS │Order, 27 July 1944, from 6th Corps │ │
│Area Command concerning delivery of │ │
│prisoners of war to secret state │ │
│police. (USA 491) │ IV │ 53
│ │ │
*1521-PS │Report from the Bavarian Political │ │
│Police to the Gestapo, Berlin, 24 │ │
│August 1934, concerning National │ │
│mourning on occasion of death of von │ │
│Hindenburg. (USA 740) │ IV │ 75
│ │ │
*1531-PS │Directive from RSHA, 26 October 1939, │ │
│concerning execution of protective │ │
│custody, and directive, 12 June 1942, │ │
│concerning third degree. (USA 248) │ IV │ 93
│ │ │
1551-PS │Decree assigning functions in Office │ │
│of Chief of German Police, 26 June │ │
│1936. 1936 Reichs Ministerialblatt, │ │
│pp. 946-948. │ IV │ 106
│ │ │
*1573-PS │Order signed Mueller, 18 June 1941, │ │
│concerning measures to be taken │ │
│against Emigrants and civilian workers│ │
│from Russian areas and against Foreign│ │
│workers. (USA 498) │ IV │ 112
│ │ │
1638-PS │Circular of Minister of Interior, 11 │ │
│November 1938, on cooperation of SD │ │
│and other authorities. 1938 Reichs │ │
│Ministerialblatt, p. 1906. │ IV │ 142
│ │ │
*1650-PS │Directive to State Police Directorates│ │
│from Chief of SIPO and SD by Mueller, │ │
│4 March 1944, concerning captured │ │
│escaped PWs except British and │ │
│American PWs. (USA 246) │ IV │ 158
│ │ │
*1680-PS │“Ten Years Security Police and SD” │ │
│published in The German Police, 1 │ │
│February 1943. (USA 477) │ IV │ 191
│ │ │
*1723-PS │Order concerning cooperation of Party │ │
│offices with the Secret State Police, │ │
│25 January 1938, published in Decrees,│ │
│Regulations, Announcements, 1937, Vol.│ │
│II, pp. 430-439. (USA 206) │ IV │ 219
│ │ │
*1815-PS │Documents on RSHA meeting concerning │ │
│the study and treatment of church │ │
│politics. (USA 510) │ IV │ 415
│ │ │
*1852-PS │“Law” from The German Police, 1941, by│ │
│Dr. Werner Best. (USA 449) (See Chart │ │
│No. 16.) │ IV │ 490
│ │ │
1956-PS │Meaning and Tasks of the Secret State │ │
│Police, published in The Archives, │ │
│January 1936, Vol. 22-24, p. 1342. │ IV │ 598
│ │ │
2073-PS │Decree concerning the appointment of a│ │
│Chief of German Police in the Ministry│ │
│of the Interior, 17 June 1936. 1936 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 487. │ IV │ 703
│ │ │
2104-PS │Law on organization of Secret State │ │
│Police office, 26 April 1933. 1933 │ │
│Preussische Gesetzsammlung, p. 122. │ IV │ 730
│ │ │
2105-PS │Law on Secret State Police of 30 │ │
│November 1933. 1933 Preussische │ │
│Gesetzsammlung, p. 413. │ IV │ 731
│ │ │
2107-PS │Law on Secret State Police of 10 │ │
│February 1936. 1936 Preussische │ │
│Gesetzsammlung, pp. 21-22. │ IV │ 732
│ │ │
2108-PS │Decree for execution of Law on Secret │ │
│State Police of 10 February 1936. 1936│ │
│Preussische Gesetzsammlung, pp. 22-24.│ IV │ 732
│ │ │
2113-PS │Decree for application of law of 30 │ │
│November 1933, concerning Secret State│ │
│Police of 8 March 1934. 1934 │ │
│Preussische Gesetzsammlung, p. 143. │ IV │ 743
│ │ │
2232-PS │Tasks and Means of a Political Police,│ │
│from German Administrative Law by Hans│ │
│Frank, pp. 420-430. │ IV │ 881
│ │ │
2243-PS │Law relating to finance measures in │ │
│connection with the police, 19 March │ │
│1937. 1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 325. │ IV │ 924
│ │ │
2245-PS │Frick decree of 20 September 1936 │ │
│concerning employment of Security │ │
│Police Inspectors. 1936 Reichs │ │
│Ministerialblatt, pp. 1343-1344. │ IV │ 928
│ │ │
*2273-PS │Extract from a top secret report of │ │
│Einsatz Group A. (USA 487) (See Chart │ │
│No. 4.) │ IV │ 944
│ │ │
*2285-PS │Affidavit, 13 May 1945, by two French │ │
│officers, about shooting of prisoners │ │
│at Mauthausen. (USA 490) │ IV │ 991
│ │ │
2344-PS │Reconstruction of a Nation by Goering,│ │
│1934, p. 89. │ IV │ 1065
│ │ │
2347-PS │Court decisions from 1935 │ │
│Reichsverwaltungsblatt, Vol. 56, pp. │ │
│577-578, 20 July 1935. │ IV │ 1066
│ │ │
2348-PS │Affidavit of Rauff, Head of Amt II D, │ │
│RSHA, 19 October 1945. (USA 485) │ IV │ 1068
│ │ │
2371-PS │Execution of ordinance for Security of│ │
│people and state, 28 February 1933. │ │
│1933 Reichs Ministerialblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 543. │ IV │ 1102
│ │ │
2372-PS │Unified Designation of offices of │ │
│Secret State Police in Reich. 1936 │ │
│Reichs Ministerial Gazette, Part V, │ │
│pp. 1344-5. │ IV │ 1105
│ │ │
2374-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Mildner, 27 June │ │
│1945, concerning treatment of │ │
│English-American commando groups. │ V │ 1
│ │ │
2375-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Mildner, 16 │ │
│November 1945, concerning activities │ │
│of SIPO and SD. │ V │ 2
│ │ │
2376-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Mildner, 16 │ │
│November 1945, concerning treatment of│ │
│Jews. │ V │ 3
│ │ │
*2460-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Diels. (USA 751) │ V │ 205
│ │ │
*2477-PS │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 4 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 518) │ V │ 229
│ │ │
2478-PS │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 4 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 230
│ │ │
2479-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Rudolf Mildner, 4 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 230
│ │ │
*2499-PS │Original Protective Custody Order │ │
│served on Dr. R. Kempner, 15 March │ │
│1935. (USA 232) │ V │ 236
│ │ │
*2542-PS │Affidavit of Kurt Lindow, 30 September│ │
│1945. (USA 489) │ V │ 286
│ │ │
*2605-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Rudolf Kastner, │ │
│former President of the Hungarian │ │
│Zionist Organization, 13 September │ │
│1945. (USA 242) │ V │ 313
│ │ │
2614-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, 5 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 918) │ V │ 337
│ │ │
2615-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, 5 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 338
│ │ │
*2620-PS │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 919) │ V │ 341
│ │ │
2622-PS │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 343
│ │ │
2644-PS │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 357
│ │ │
2645-PS │Affidavit of Gottfried Boley, 14 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 357
│ │ │
*2751-PS │Affidavit of Alfred Naujocks, 20 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 482) │ V │ 390
│ │ │
2752-PS │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 8 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 392
│ │ │
2846-PS │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 13 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 507
│ │ │
2884-PS │Affidavit of Walter Warlimont, 14 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 550
│ │ │
2890-PS │Extracts from Befehlsblatt of the SIPO│ │
│and SD. │ V │ 557
│ │ │
*2990-PS │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 18 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 526) │ V │ 694
│ │ │
*2992-PS │Affidavits of Hermann Graebe. (USA │ │
│494) │ V │ 696
│ │ │
*3012-PS │Order signed Christiansen, 19 March │ │
│1943, to all group leaders of Security│ │
│Service, and record of telephone │ │
│conversation signed by Stapj, 11 March│ │
│1943. (USA 190) │ V │ 731
│ │ │
*3033-PS │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 21 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 488) │ V │ 741
│ │ │
*3051-PS │Three teletype orders from Heydrich to│ │
│all stations of State Police, 10 │ │
│November 1938, on measures against │ │
│Jews, and one order from Heydrich on │ │
│termination of protest actions. (USA │ │
│240) │ V │ 797
│ │ │
3058-PS │Letter from Heydrich to Goering, 11 │ │
│November 1938, reporting action │ │
│against the Jews. (USA 508) │ V │ 854
│ │ │
3343-PS │Speech delivered at labor-meeting of │ │
│Prussian State Council on 18 June │ │
│1934, from Speeches and Essays of │ │
│Hermann Goering. │ VI │ 78
│ │ │
3344-PS │Extract from Befehlsblatt of the Chief│ │
│of Security Police and SD, Berlin, 7 │ │
│September 1942, No. 39, p. 249. │ VI │ 78
│ │ │
*3360-PS │Teletype, 12 February 1944, relating │ │
│to recaptured escaped Eastern │ │
│laborers. (USA 499) │ VI │ 95
│ │ │
3363-PS │Special delivery letter, 21 September │ │
│1939, from Chief of Security Police to│ │
│Chiefs of all detail groups concerning│ │
│Jewish problem in Occupied zone. │ VI │ 97
│ │ │
*3840-PS │Statement of Karl Kaleske, 24 February│ │
│1946, concerning the elimination of │ │
│the Warsaw Ghetto. (USA 803) │ VI │ 775
│ │ │
*3841-PS │Statement of SS and Polizeifuehrer │ │
│Juergen Stroop, 24 February 1946, │ │
│concerning elimination of the Warsaw │ │
│Ghetto. (USA 804) │ VI │ 776
│ │ │
*3868-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand │ │
│Hoess, 5 April 1946, concerning │ │
│execution of 3,000,000 people at │ │
│Auschwitz Extermination Center. (USA │ │
│819) │ VI │ 787
│ │ │
D-46 │Order designating Herzogenbosch as │ │
│concentration camp, 18 January 1943. │ VI │ 1025
│ │ │
D-50 │Order establishing concentration camps│ │
│at Lublin, 9 April 1943. │ VI │ 1027
│ │ │
D-183 │Order of Gestapo Office, Darmstadt, 7 │ │
│December 1938, concerning treatment of│ │
│articles secured during protest action│ │
│against Jews. │ VI │ 1075
│ │ │
*D-569 │File of circulars from Reichsfuehrer │ │
│SS, the OKW, Inspector of │ │
│Concentration Camps, Chief of Security│ │
│Police and SD, dating from 29 October │ │
│1941 through 22 February 1944, │ │
│relative to procedure in cases of │ │
│unnatural death of Soviet PW, │ │
│execution of Soviet PW, etc. (GB 277) │ VII │ 74
│ │ │
*D-762 │Order of Hitler, 30 July 1944, │ │
│concerning combatting of “terrorists” │ │
│and “saboteurs” in Occupied │ │
│Territories. (GB 298) │ VII │ 221
│ │ │
*D-763 │Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, │ │
│regarding penal jurisdiction of │ │
│non-German civilians in Occupied │ │
│Territories. (GB 300) │ VII │ 222
│ │ │
*L-18 │Official report, Katzmann to General │ │
│of Police Krueger, 30 June 1943, │ │
│concerning “Solution of Jewish │ │
│Question in Galicia”. (USA 277) │ VII │ 755
│ │ │
*L-37 │Letter from Illmer, Chief of the SIPO │ │
│and SD of Radom, to subordinates, 19 │ │
│July 1944, concerning collective │ │
│responsibility of members of families │ │
│of assassins and saboteurs. (USA 506) │ VII │ 782
│ │ │
*L-41 │Orders of Mueller, Chief of the │ │
│Gestapo, 17 December 1942 and 23 March│ │
│1943, concerning transfer of workers │ │
│to concentration camps. (USA 496) │ VII │ 784
│ │ │
*L-51 │Affidavit of Adolf Zutter, 2 August │ │
│1945. (USA 521) │ VII │ 798
│ │ │
L-53 │Order from Commandant of the SIPO and │ │
│SD for the Radom District to Branch │ │
│Office in Tomaschow, 21 July 1944, on │ │
│clearance of prisons. (USA 291) │ VII │ 814
│ │ │
*L-61 │Express letter from Sauckel to │ │
│Presidents of Landes Employment │ │
│Office, 26 November 1942, concerning │ │
│employment of Jews and exchange of │ │
│Jews in essential employment against │ │
│Polish labor. (USA 177) │ VII │ 816
│ │ │
*L-89 │Top secret letter issued by the │ │
│Commandant of the SIPO and SD, │ │
│District Radom, 24 February 1944, │ │
│concerning intensified interrogations.│ │
│(USA 507) │ VII │ 868
│ │ │
*L-90 │Fuehrer decree, February 1942, │ │
│concerning prosecution of offenses in │ │
│Occupied Territory; “First Ordinance” │ │
│signed by Keitel for execution of the │ │
│directive; memorandum of 12 December │ │
│1941, signed by Keitel. (USA 503) │ VII │ 871
│ │ │
L-152 │RSHA Order concerning fraternization │ │
│of Jews and Aryans, 3 November 1941. │ VII │ 903
│ │ │
L-167 │Orders of the Reichsminister of the │ │
│Interior, 24 March 1942, concerning │ │
│use of public transportation by Jews, │ │
│and covering letters. │ VII │ 917
│ │ │
*L-180 │Report by SS Brigade Commander │ │
│Stahlecker to Himmler, “Action Group │ │
│A”, 15 October 1941. (USA 276) │ VII │ 978
│ │ │
*L-185 │Organization plan of the RSHA, 1 │ │
│January 1941. (USA 484) │ VII │ 996
│ │ │
*L-215 │File of orders and dossiers of 25 │ │
│Luxembourgers committed to │ │
│concentration camps at various times │ │
│in 1944. (USA 243) │ VII │ 1045
│ │ │
L-217 │Order of Secret State Police │ │
│concerning camouflage of Jewish │ │
│businesses, 20 November 1936. │ VII │ 1052
│ │ │
*L-219 │Organization plan of the RSHA as of 1 │ │
│October 1943. (USA 479) │ VII │ 1053
│ │ │
L-297 │Law commissioning Secret State Police │ │
│Bureau with supervision of duties of │ │
│Political Police commanders in │ │
│provinces, 20 September 1936. 1936 │ │
│Reichs Ministerialblatt, p. 1343. │ VII │ 1099
│ │ │
L-301 │New ruling on protective custody, from│ │
│The Archive, April 1934, p. 31. │ VII │ 1099
│ │ │
*L-316 │RSHA Order of 5 November 1942, signed │ │
│by Streckenbach, concerning │ │
│jurisdiction over Poles and Eastern │ │
│Nationals. (USA 346) │ VII │ 1104
│ │ │
*L-358 │Extract from register of arrests by │ │
│Gestapo in Poland, 1943. (USA 495) │ VII │ 1107
│ │ │
*L-361 │Three documents concerning the │ │
│formation of the RSHA, Himmler, 27 │ │
│September 1939; Heydrich, 23 and 27 │ │
│September 1939. (USA 478) │ VII │ 1109
│ │ │
*R-102 │Report on activities of The Task │ │
│Forces of SIPO and SD in USSR, 1-31 │ │
│October 1941. (USA 470) │ VIII │ 96
│ │ │
*R-110 │Himmler order of 10 August 1943 to all│ │
│Senior Executive SS and Police │ │
│officers. (USA 333) │ VIII │ 107
│ │ │
*R-135 │Letter to Rosenberg enclosing secret │ │
│reports from Kube on German atrocities│ │
│in the East, 18 June 1943, found in │ │
│Himmler’s personal files. (USA 289) │ VIII │ 205
│ │ │
*R-142 │Memoranda to Koblenz District │ │
│Headquarters, 22 April 1938 and 7 May │ │
│1938, relating to the plebiscite of 10│ │
│April 1938. (USA 481) │ VIII │ 243
│ │ │
R-145 │State Police Order, 28 May 1934, at │ │
│Duesseldorf, signed Schmid, concerning│ │
│sanction of denominational youth and │ │
│professional associations and │ │
│distribution of publications in │ │
│churches. (USA 745) │ VIII │ 248
│ │ │
Affidavit A │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 │ │
│January 1946, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg 30 November and 1│ │
│December 1945. │ VIII │ 587
│ │ │
Affidavit B │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 20 │ │
│November 1945, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg 3 January 1946. │ VIII │ 596
│ │ │
Affidavit C │Affidavit of Dieter Wisliceny, 29 │ │
│November 1945, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg, 3 January 1946. │ VIII │ 606
│ │ │
Affidavit D │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 23 │ │
│January 1946, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg, 4 January 1946. │ VIII │ 622
│ │ │
Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │
│the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │
│fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707
│ │ │
*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770
│ │ │
Chart No. 3 │Organization of the SS. (USA 445) │ VIII │ 772
│ │ │
*Chart No. 4 │Report of Special Purpose Group “A” │ │
│regarding Jews killed in the Baltic │ │
│Countries, White Russia and Lithuania.│ │
│(2273-PS; USA 487) │ VIII │ 773
│ │ │
*Chart No. 5 │Position of Kaltenbrunner and the │ │
│Gestapo and SD in the German Police │ │
│System. (USA 493) │ VIII │ 774
│ │ │
*Chart No. 16 │The Structure of the German Police. │
│(1852-PS; USA 449) │ End of VIII
│ │ │
*Chart No. 19 │Organization of the Security Police │
│(Gestapo and Kripo) and the SD │
│1943-1945. (USA 480) │ End of VIII

7. THE GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES

In one respect the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces is to be distinguished from the other groups and organizations against which the prosecution seeks declaration of criminality. The Leadership Corps of the NSDAP, for example, was the instrument by which Hitlerism rose to full power in Germany. The SA and the SS were branches—large branches to be sure—of the Nazi Party. The German police had certain roots and antecedents which antedated Hitlerism, but was almost entirely a creature of the party and the SS. The Reichs Cabinet was, in essence, merely a committee or set of committees of Reichs Ministers, and when the Nazis came to power these ministerial positions were filled for the most part by Nazis. All those groups and organizations, accordingly, either owe their origin and development to Naziism, or automatically became nazified when Hitler came to full power.

That is not true of this group, the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces. It is common knowledge that German armed might and the German military tradition antedate Hitlerism by many decades. The war of 1914-18, the Kaiser, and the “scrap of paper” are modern witnesses to this fact.

As a result of the German defeat in 1918 and the Treaty of Versailles, the size and activities of the German armed forces were severely restricted. The last few years have made it abundantly apparent that these restrictions did not destroy or even seriously undermine German militarism. The full flowering of German military strength came about through collaboration between the Nazis and the career leaders of the German Armed Forces—the professional soldiers, sailors, and airmen. When Hitler came to power in 1933, he did not find a vacuum in the field of military affairs; he found a small _Reichswehr_ and a body of professional officers with a morale and outlook nourished by German military history.

The leaders of these professional officers constitute the group named in the Indictment—the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces. This part of the case concerns that group of men. Needless to say, it is not the prosecution’s position that it is a crime to be a soldier or sailor, or to serve one’s country as a soldier or sailor in time of war. The profession of arms is an honorable one, and can be honorably practiced. But it is too clear for argument that a man who commits crimes cannot plead as a defense that he committed them in uniform.

It is not in the nature of things, and it is not the prosecution’s position, that all members of this group were wicked men, or that they were all equally culpable. But this group not only collaborated with Hitler and supported many Nazi objectives. They furnished one thing which was essential and basic to the success of the Nazi program for Germany—skill and experience in the development and use of armed might.

Why did this group support Hitler and the Nazis? The answer is simple. The answer is that they agreed with the basic objectives of Naziism, and that Hitler gave the generals the opportunity to play a major part in achieving those objectives. The generals, like Hitler, wanted Germany to aggrandize at the expense of neighboring countries, and to do so if necessary by force or threat of force. Force—armed might—was the keystone of the arch, the thing without which nothing else would have been possible.

As they came to power and when they had attained power, the Nazis had two alternatives: to collaborate with and expand the _Reichswehr_, or to ignore the Reichswehr and build up a separate army of their own. The generals feared that the Nazis might do the latter. So they were the more ready to play along with the Nazis. Moreover, the Nazis offered the generals the chance of achieving much that the generals wished to achieve in the expansion of German armies and frontiers. And so the generals climbed onto the Nazi bandwagon. They saw it was going in their direction for the present. No doubt they hoped later to take over the direction themselves. In fact, it was ultimately they who were taken over by the Nazis. Hitler attracted the generals to him with the glitter of conquest and then succeeded in submerging them politically. As the war proceeded they became his tools.

But if the leaders of the Armed Forces became the tools of Naziism, it is not to be supposed that they were unwitting, or that they did not participate fully in many of the actions which are charged as criminal. The willingness, indeed eagerness, of German officers to become partners of the Nazis will be fully developed.

A. _Composition and Functions of The General Staff and High Command
Group._

During the first World War there was an organization in the German Armed Forces known as the Great General Staff. This name persists in the public mind, but the _Grosse Generalstab_ no longer exists in fact. There has been no such single organization, no single German General Staff, since 1918. But there has of course been a group of men responsible for the policy and acts of the Armed Forces. The fact that these men have no collective name does not prevent us from collecting them together. Men cannot escape the consequences of their collective acts by combining informally instead of formally. The essence of a general staff or a high command lies not in name but in function. And the men comprised within this group do constitute a functional group, welded together by common responsibility, of those officers who had the principal authority and responsibility under Hitler, for the plans and operations of the German armed forces.

(1) _Structure and Organization of the German Armed Forces._ When the Nazis came to power in 1933 the German Armed Forces were controlled by a Reich Defense Minister, at that time Field Marshall von Blomberg. Subordinate to von Blomberg were the chiefs of the army staff (at that time von Fritsch), and of the naval staff, the defendant Raeder. Owing to the limitations imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, the German Air Force at that time had no official existence whatsoever.

In May 1935, at the time that military conscription was introduced in Germany, there was a change in the titles of these offices but the structure remained basically the same. Field Marshall von Blomberg remained in supreme command of the armed forces, with the title of Reich Minister for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Von Fritsch became Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and Raeder Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The army and naval staffs were renamed “High Commands”—_Oberkommando des Heeres and Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine_, from which are derived the initials by which they are usually known (OKH and OKM).

The German Air Force came into official and open existence at about this same time, but it was not put under von Blomberg. It was an independent institution under the personal command of Goering, who had the double title of Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

In February 1938 a rather fundamental reorganization took place, both in terms of personnel and organizational structure. Although Raeder survived the reshuffle, von Blomberg and von Fritsch were both retired from their positions, and Blomberg’s ministry, the War Ministry, was wound up. This ministry had contained a division or department called the _Wehrmachtamt_ or “Armed Forces Department,” the function of which was to coordinate the plans and operations of the Army and Navy. From this Armed Forces Department was formed a new over-all Armed Forces authority, known as the High Command of the Armed Forces—_Oberkommando der Wehrmacht_—usually known by the initials OKW. As the Air Force as well as the Army and the Navy was subordinated to OKW, coordination of all Armed Forces matters was vested in the OKW, which was in effect Hitler’s personal staff for these matters. It combined staff and ministerial functions. Keitel was appointed chief of the OKW. The most important department of OKW was the operations staff, of which Jodl became the chief. Jodl’s immediate subordinate was Warlimont, with the title of Deputy Chief of The Armed Forces Operations Staff from 1941. (The genesis of this department is explained in _L-79_.)

This reorganization and establishment of OKW were embodied in a decree issued by Hitler on 4 February 1938 (1938 RGBl., Part I, page 111):

“DECREE ON THE COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES

“Command authority over the entire Armed Forces is from now on
exercised directly by me personally.

“The Armed Forces Department in the Reich War Ministry with its
functions becomes ‘The High Command of the Armed Forces’ and
comes directly under my command as my military staff.

“The head of the Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces
is the Chief of the former Armed Forces Department, with the
title of Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. His
status is equal to that of Reich Minister.

“The High Command of the Armed Forces also takes over the
affairs of the Reich War Ministry. The Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces as my representative exercises the functions
hitherto exercised by the Reich War Minister.

“The High Command of the Armed Forces is responsible in peace
time for the unified preparation of the defense of the Reich in
all areas according to my directives.

“Berlin, 4 February 1938.

“The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
“(S) Adolf Hitler
“The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
“(S) Dr. Lammers
“Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
“(S) Keitel”

Under OKW were the supreme commands of the three branches of the Armed Forces: OKH, OKM, and the Air Force, which did not receive the official designation of _Oberkommando der Luftwaffe_ (OKL) until 1944. Raeder remained after 1938 as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and von Fritsch was replaced by von Brauchitsch as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Goering continued as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. In 1941 von Brauchitsch was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Army by Hitler himself, and Raeder was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy by Doenitz early in 1943. Goering continued as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force until the last month of the war, when he was replaced by von Greim.

OKW, OKH, OKM and the Air Force each had its own staff. These four staffs did not have uniform designations; in the case of OKH, the staff was known as the _Generalstab_ (General Staff); in the case of OKW, it was known as the _Fuehrungstab_ (Operations Staff); but in all cases the functions were those of a General Staff in military parlance. It will be seen, therefore, that there was in this war no single German General Staff, but rather four, one for each branch of the service plus one for the OKW as the over-all interservice supreme command.

Under OKH, OKL, and OKM were the various fighting formations of the Army, Air Force and Navy respectively. The largest army field formation was known to the Germans, as it is among the nations generally, as an “army group”. An Army group was a headquarters controlling two or more “armies.” In some cases, e.g. in the campaigns in Norway and Greece where only one army was used, “armies” were directly subordinated to OKH, rather than to an “army group.” Under the armies come the lower field formations such as corps, divisions, regiments, etc.

In the case of the German Air Force (OKL), the largest formation was known as an “air fleet” (_Luftflotte_) and the lower units under the air fleet were called “corps” (_Fliegerkorps_ or _Jagdkorps_) or “divisions” (_Fliegerdivisionen_ or _Jagddivisionen_).

Under OKM were the various “naval group commands,” which controlled all naval operations in a given area, with the exception of the operation of the high seas fleet and the submarines, which by their nature, were too mobile to be restricted to an area command. The Commanders of the fleet and submarines, and certain other specialized units, were directly subordinate to the German Admiralty.

(2) _Composition of the Group Charged as Criminal._ The group charged in the Indictment (Appendix B) as criminal comprises, first, German officers who held the top positions in the four supreme commands described above; and second, the officers who held the top field commands.

The holders of nine of the principal positions in the supreme commands are included in the group. Four of these are positions of supreme authority: the chief of the OKW, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. Four other positions are those of the Chiefs of Staff to the four Commanders-in-Chief: the Chief of the Operations Staff of OKW, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief of the Naval War Staff. The ninth position is that of Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff of OKW. The particular responsibility of the holder of this office was planning, and for this reason his office has been included in the group.

The group named in the Indictment comprises all individuals who held any of these nine staff positions between February 1938 and the end of the war in May 1945. February 1938 was selected as the opening date because it was in that month that the top organization of the German Armed Forces was reorganized and assumed substantially the form in which it persisted up to the end of the war. Twenty-two different individuals occupied these nine positions during that period, of whom eighteen are still living.

With regard to the officers who held the principal field commands, the Indictment includes as members of the group all Commanders-in-Chief in the field who had the status of _Oberbefehlshaber_ in the Army, Navy, or Air Force. The term _Oberbefehlshaber_ defies literal translation into English: literally the components of the word mean “over-command-holder,” and it is perhaps best translated as Commander-in-Chief. In the case of the Army, commanders of army groups and armies always had the status and title of _Oberbefehlshaber_. In the Air Force, the Commander-in-Chief of air fleets always had the status of _Oberbefehlshaber_, although they were not formally so designated until 1944. In the Navy, officers holding the senior regional commands, and therefore in control of all naval operations (other than of the high seas fleet itself) in a given sector, had the status of _Oberbefehlshaber_. Roughly 110 individual officers had the status of _Oberbefehlshaber_ in the Army, Navy, or Air Force during the period in question, and all but approximately a dozen of them are still alive.

The entire General Staff and High Command group as defined in the Indictment comprises about 130 officers, of whom 114 are believed still to be living. These figures are the cumulative total of all officers who at any time belonged to the group during the seven years and three months from February 1938 to May 1945. The number of active members of the group at any one time is, of course, much smaller; it rose from about 20 at the outbreak of the war to 50 in 1944 and 1945.

The structure and functioning of the German General Staff and High Command group have been described in a series of affidavits by some of the principal German field marshalls and generals. A brief description of how these statements were obtained may be helpful. In the first place two American officers, selected for ability and experience in interrogating high-ranking German prisoners of war, were briefed by an Intelligence officer and a trial counsel on the particular problems presented by this part of the case. These interrogators were already well versed in military intelligence and were able to converse fluently in German. The officer who briefed these interrogators emphasized that their function was objectively to inquire into and to establish facts on which the prosecution wishes to be accurately and surely informed; the interrogators were not to regard themselves as cross-examiners. The German officers to be interrogated were selected on the basis of the special knowledge which they could be presumed to possess by reason of positions held by them during the past generation. After each interview the interrogator prepared a report. From this report such facts as appeared relevant to the issues now before the Tribunal were extracted and a statement embodying these facts was prepared. This statement was then presented to the officer at a later interview. It was presented in the form of a draft and the officer was asked whether it truly reproduced what he said at the previous interview. He was also invited to alter it in any way he thought fit. This careful and laborious, but necessary, process had as its object the procuring of the best possible testimony in the form of carefully considered statements.

These affidavits fully support the prosecution’s description of the group, and conclusively establish that this group of officers was in fact the group which had the major responsibility for planning and directing the operations of the German Armed Forces.

The first of these affidavits is that of Franz Halder (_3702-PS_), who held the rank of _Generaloberst_ (Colonel General), the equivalent of a four-star general in the American Army. Halder was chief of the General Staff of OKH from September 1938 to September 1942 and is, accordingly, a member of the group. His statement reads:

“Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in
Germany was vested in the Head of State who prior to 2 August
1934 was Field Marshall von Hindenburg and thereafter until 1945
was Adolf Hitler.

“Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the
three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of
State), that is to say the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. In
practice, supervision within this field was exercised by a
relatively small group of high-ranking officers. These officers
exercised such supervision in their official capacity and by
virtue of their training, their positions and their mutual
contacts. Plans for military operations of the German Armed
Forces were prepared by members of this group according to the
instructions of the OKW in the name of their respective
Commanding Officers and were presented by them to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of
State).

“The members of this group were charged with the responsibility
of preparing for military operations within their competent
fields and they actually did prepare for any such operations as
were to be undertaken by troops in the field.

“Prior to any operation, members of this group were assembled
and given appropriate directions by the Head of State. Examples
of such meetings are the speech by Hitler to the
Commanders-in-Chief on 22 August 1939 prior to the Polish
campaign and the consultation at the Reich Chancellery on 14
June 1941 prior to the first Russian campaign. The composition
of this group and the relationship of its members to each other
were as shown in the attached chart. This was in effect the
General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces.”

“(S) Halder” (_3702-PS_)

A substantially identical statement (_3703-PS_) was made by von Brauchitsch, who held the rank of Field Marshall, and who was Commander-in-Chief of the Army from 1938 to 1941. Von Brauchitsch was also, therefore, a member of the group. The only difference between the two statements is worth noting occurs in the last sentence of each. Halder states that the group described in the Indictment “was in effect the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces,” (_3702-PS_), whereas von Brauchitsch puts it a little differently, saying “in the hands of those who filled the positions shown in the chart lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces.” (_3703-PS_)

Both von Brauchitsch and Halder have stated under oath that the General Staff chart (_Chart Number 7_) accurately portrays the top organization of the German Armed Forces. The statements by von Brauchitsch and Halder also fully support the prosecution’s statement that the holders of the positions shown on this chart constitute the group in whom lay the major responsibility for the planning and execution of all Armed Forces matters.

Another affidavit by Halder (_3707-PS_) sets forth certain less important matters of detail:

“The most important department in the OKW was the Operations
Staff—in much the same way as the General Staff was in the Army
and Air Force and the Naval War Staff in the Navy. Under Keitel
there were a number of departmental chiefs who were equal in
status with Jodl, but in the planning and conduct of military
affairs they and their departments were less important and less
influential than Jodl and Jodl’s staff.

“The OKW Operations Staff was also divided into sections. Of
these the most important was the section of which Warlimont was
chief. It was called the ‘National Defense’ Section and was
primarily concerned with the development of strategic questions.
From 1941 onwards Warlimont, though charged with the same
duties, was known as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff.

“There was during World War II no unified General Staff such as
the Great General Staff which operated in World War I.

“Operational matters for the Army and Air Force were worked out
by the group of high-ranking officers described in my Statement
of 7 November (in the Army: ‘General Staff of the Army’; in the
Air Force ‘General Staff of the Air Force’).

“Operational matters in the Navy were even in World War I not
worked out by the ‘Great General Staff’ but by the Naval Staff.”

“(Signed) Franz Halder” (_3707-PS_)

This affidavit is primarily concerned with the functions of the General Staffs of the four Commanders of OKW, OKL, OKM, and OKH and fully supports the inclusion of the Chiefs of Staff of the four services in the indicted group, as well as the inclusion of Warlimont as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff, with his strategic planning responsibilities.

An affidavit (_3708-PS_) by the son of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, who had the rank of _Oberst_ (Colonel) in the German Air Force, and who was personal aide to Goering as Commander-in-Chief of the German Air Force, furnishes a few details on the _Luftwaffe_:

“_Luftflottenchefs_ have the same status as the
_Oberbefehlshaber_ of an army. During the war they had no
territorial authority and accordingly exercised no territorial
jurisdiction.

“They were the highest troop commanders of the air force units
subordinate to them and were directly under the command of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

“Until the summer of 1944 they bore the designation
‘_Befehlshaber_’ and from then on that of ‘_Oberbefehlshaber_.’
This change of designation carried with it no change in the
functions and responsibilities which they previously had.”

“(Signed) Brauchitsch” (_3708-PS_)

(3) _Functioning of the General Staff and High Command Group._ In many respects, the German military leaders functioned in the same general manner as obtains in the military establishments of other large nations. General plans were made by the top staff officers and their assistants at OKW, OKH, OKL, and OKM, in collaboration with the field generals or admirals who were entrusted with the execution of the plans. A decision to wage a particular campaign would be made, needless to say, at the highest level, and the making of such a decision would involve political and diplomatic questions as well as purely military considerations. When the decision was made, to attack Poland, for example, the top staff officers in Berlin and their assistants would work out general military plans for the campaign. These general plans would be transmitted to the Commanders of the Army groups and Armies who were to be in charge of the campaign. Consultation would follow between the top field commanders and the top staff officers at OKW and OKH, and the plans would be revised, perfected, and refined in detail.

The manner in which the group worked, involving as it did the interchange of ideas and recommendations between the top staff officers at OKW and OKH and the principal field commanders, is graphically described in two affidavits by Field Marshall von Brauchitsch (_3705-PS_):

“STATEMENT OF 7 NOVEMBER 1945

“In April 1939 I was instructed by Hitler to start military
preparations for a possible campaign against Poland. Work was
immediately begun to prepare an operational and deployment plan.
This was then presented to Hitler and approved by him as amended
by a change which he desired.

“After the operational and deployment orders had been given to
the two Commanders of the army groups and the five Commanders of
the armies, conferences took place with them about details in
order to hear their desires and recommendations.

“After the outbreak of the war I continued this policy of
keeping in close and constant touch with the Commanders-in-Chief
of army groups and of armies by personal visits to their
headquarters as well as by telephone, teletype or wireless. In
this way I was able to obtain their advice and their
recommendations during the conduct of military operations. In
fact it was the accepted policy and common practice for the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army to consult his subordinate
Commanders-in-Chief and to maintain a constant exchange of ideas
with them. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army and his Chief of
Staff communicated with army groups and, thru them as well as
directly, with armies; thru army groups on strategical and
tactical matters; directly on questions affecting supply and the
administration of conquered territory occupied by these armies.
An army group had no territorial jurisdiction. It had a
relatively small staff which was concerned only with military
operations. In all territorial matters it was the
Commander-in-Chief of the army and not of the army group who
exercised jurisdiction.

“(Signed) von Brauchitsch” (_3705-PS_)

* * * * *

“SUPPLEMENT TO MY STATEMENT OF 7 NOVEMBER 1945

“When Hitler had made a decision to support the realization of
his political objectives through military pressure or through
the application of military force, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army, if he was at all involved, ordinarily first received an
appropriate oral briefing or an appropriate oral command.

“Operational and deployment plans were next worked out in the
OKM. After these plans had been presented to Hitler, generally
by word of mouth, and had been approved by him, there followed a
written order from the OKW to the three branches of the Armed
Forces. In the meanwhile the OKH began to transmit the
operational and deployment plans to the army groups and armies
involved. Details of the operational and deployment plans were
discussed by the OKH with the Commanders of the army groups and
armies and with the Chiefs of Staff of these Commanders.

“During the operations the OKH maintained a constant exchange of
ideas with the army groups by means of telephone, radio and
courier. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army used every
opportunity to maintain a personal exchange of ideas with the
Commanders of army groups, armies and lower echelons by means of
personal visits to them. In the war against Russia the
Commanders of army groups and of armies were individually and
repeatedly called in by Hitler for consultation.

“Orders for all operational matters went from the OKH to army
groups and for all matters concerning supply and territorial
jurisdiction from the OKH directly to the armies.”

“(Signed) von Brauchitsch” (_3705-PS_)

The _Oberbefehlshaber_ in the field, therefore—and in the case of the army that means the Commander-in-Chief of army groups and armies—participated in planning, and directed the execution of the plans. The _Oberbefehlshaber_ were also the repositories of general executive power in the areas in which their army groups and armies were operating. This fact appears from a directive of 13 March 1941 signed by Keitel and issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (_447-PS_). This directive sets out various regulations for the impending operations against the Soviet Union (which were actually begun on 22 June 1941). Under paragraph I, is entitled “Area of operations and executive power (_Vollziehende Gewalt_)”, subparagraph 1 and 2(a) provide:

“It is not contemplated to declare East Prussia and the
General-Gouvernement an area of operations. However, in
accordance with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19 and 21
October 1939, the Commander in Chief of the Army shall be
authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution of
his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may
transfer his authority onto the Commanders in Chief
[_Oberbefehlshaber_] of the Army Groups and Armies. Orders of
that kind have priority over all orders issued by civilian
agencies.”

* * * * * *

“The area of operations created through the advance of the Army
beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries
is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The
Commander-in-Chief of the Army has the right to exercise the
executive power [_Vollziehende Gewalt_] in this area, and may
transfer his authority onto the Commanders in Chief
[_Oberbefehlshaber_] of the Army Groups and Armies.” (_447-PS_)