Chapter VII: on the Acquisition of Totalitarian Political Control.) (3)

“Gruppenfuehrer Keppler explained that the Fuehrer did not yet
have an urgent reason for the invasion. This reason must first
be created. The situation in Vienna and in the country is most
dangerous. It is feared that street fighting will break out any
moment because Rainer ordered the entire party to demonstrate at
3 o’clock. Rainer proposed storming and seizing the government
palace in order to force the reconstruction of the government.
The proposal was rejected by Keppler but was carried out by
Rainer after he discussed it with Globocnik. After 8:00 p. m.
the SA and SS marched in and occupied the government buildings
and all important positions in the city of Vienna. At 8:30 p. m.
Rainer, with the approval of Klausner, ordered all Gauleiters of
Austria to take over power in all eight ‘gaus’ of Austria, with
the help of the SS and SA and with instructions that all
government representatives who try to resist should be told that
this action was taken on order of Chancellor Seyss-Inquart.

“With this, the revolution broke out, and this resulted in the
complete occupation of Austria within three hours and the taking
over of all important posts by the party * * *.

“The seizure of power was the work of the party supported by the
Fuehrer’s threat of invasion and the legal standing of
Seyss-Inquart in the government. The national result in the form
of the taking over of the government by Seyss-Inquart was due to
the actual seizure of power by the party on one hand, and the
political efficiency of Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his territory on
the other; but both factors may be considered only in the
relation to the Fuehrer’s decision on 9 March 1938 to solve the
Austrian problem under any circumstances and the orders
consequently issued by the Fuehrer.” (_812-PS_)

Seyss-Inquart’s own story of the events on 11 March 1938 is not fundamentally different, although he does show a marked tendency to minimize his role in the planning, precipitating, and accomplishment of the annexation of Austria by Germany, in a statement signed by him after his arrest and indictment:

“At 10 o’clock in the morning Glaise-Horstenau and I went to the
Bundes Chancellery and conferred for about two hours with Dr.
Schuschnigg. We told him of all that we knew, particularly about
the possibility of disturbances and preparations by the Reich.
The Chancellor said that he would give his decision by 1400
hours. While I was with Glaise-Horstenau and Dr. Schuschnigg, I
was repeatedly called to the telephone to speak to Goering. He
informed me, (the demands of the Reich steadily increasing) that
the agreement of 12-2 had been cancelled, and demanded Dr.
Schuschnigg’s resignation and my appointment as Chancellor. I
delivered this information verbally to Dr. Schuschnigg and
withdrew from the conference.

“In the meantime Keppler arrived from Berlin and had a
conference in the Bundes Chancellery, I believe also with
President Miklas. The latter refused to concede to the demands
and sought to find various other solutions. When Keppler arrived
from Berlin he showed me the contents of a telegram which I, as
leader of the provisional Austrian Government, was to send to
Hitler and in which I was to request sending of German troops to
Austria to put down disorders. I refused as I did not want to
establish myself as head of a provisional government, and there
were no disorders in Austria. Keppler repeatedly urged me about
the telegram. Around 6 p. m. I told him that he knew my
standpoint and should do what he wished with Berlin. Keppler, as
I have been able to confirm from records available, understood
my answer and did not send off the telegram at that time. Around
7:30 p. m. a frontier police post announced that German troops
were crossing the frontier. Thereupon Dr. Schuschnigg gave his
well known farewell speech over the radio. Upon requests from
various sides I followed with a speech over the radio, stating
that I was still functioning as Minister of Interior and
Security, requesting preservation of peace and order, and gave
directions that no resistance should be offered the German
troops.

“As I am able to gather from the records available, I was again
requested about 10 p. m. to give my sanction to another somewhat
altered telegram, about which I informed President Miklas and
Dr. Schuschnigg. Finally President Miklas appointed me
Chancellor and a little while later he approved of my proposed
ministers.” (_3425-PS_)

However, Seyss-Inquart displayed undue modesty in this statement. His letter to Himmler indicates how active he was on 11 March 1938, and reveals that he was not satisfied with making demands upon Chancellor Schuschnigg, but also handed an ultimatum to President Miklas:

“It is only possible that Buerckel made a statement that in the
critical hours it was hard to find me. After I had handed an
ultimatum to Miklas which was respited until 5:45 p. m. I took a
recess of about a half hour to catch some fresh air. I conceded
that I was, in a way, exhausted from the things which happened
just a few hours before that and I tried to find recreation in
the fresh air. Besides that I planned to take a look at the
situation on the streets. Furthermore, I wanted to make a phone
call to Berlin, not from the Chancellery, but from some other
place. Phone calls from the Chancellery were always tapped
whereas they were only sometimes tapped from other places. I was
sure they didn’t need me until 5:30 p. m., because the men of
the old system would not make a decision a second earlier than
they had to.” (_3271-PS_)

A stenographic transcript of Goering’s telephone conversation with Seyss-Inquart confirms the fact that Seyss-Inquart was ordered to demand Chancellor Schuschnigg’s resignation and the appointment of himself as Chancellor. (_2949-PS_)

This stenographic record of Goering’s conversations also reveals that Seyss-Inquart had an agent keep in contact with Goering during the negotiations with Chancellor Schuschnigg. Seyss-Inquart was given an order by Goering through this agent to report by 7:30 p. m., 11 March 1938, that he had formed a new government. He was informed that the foreign political aspect would be handled exclusively by Germany and that Hitler would talk with him about this matter at a future date. (_2949-PS_)

In addition the stenographic transcript of these telephone conversations show that the selection of individual members of the cabinet of the new government to be established by Seyss-Inquart was to be made by the Nazi conspirators in Berlin. (_2949-PS_)

At 1726 hours on the night of 11 March 1938, Seyss-Inquart reported to Goering by telephone as ordered. He reported that President Miklas had accepted the resignation of Chancellor Schuschnigg but wanted to appoint a man like Ender to the Chancellorship. He further reported his suggestion to the President that the Chancellorship be entrusted to him—Seyss-Inquart—and also reported that “We have ordered the SA and the SS to take over police duties.” Thereupon Goering ordered Seyss-Inquart to go with Lt. Gen. Muff to President Miklas and inform him that if the demands were not met immediately German troops, already advancing to the frontier, would invade Austria that night and Austria would cease to exist. An audience with the President was to be demanded. The invasion would be stopped only if President Miklas entrusted Seyss-Inquart with the Chancellorship. Seyss-Inquart was also instructed to call out the National Socialists of Austria all over the country, because Austrian Nazis should even then be in the streets. Seyss-Inquart was to report again at 7:30 p. m. (_2949-PS_)

The telegram, already prepared, asking Hitler to send German troops into Austria, over the defendant Seyss-Inquart’s signature, was transmitted as ordered and agreed upon. (_2463-PS_)

Even before Seyss-Inquart received his appointment as Chancellor of Austria he dispatched a telegram using that title. An affidavit of August Eigruber states as follows:

“On the evening of 11 March 1938 at between 8 and 9 o’clock p.
m. he received two telegrams; one of which came from Dr.
Seyss-Inquart, as Bundes Chancellor of Austria, and the other
from one Dr. Rainer; that the telegram from Dr. Seyss-Inquart
appointed the affiant as temporary _Landeshauptmann_ in Upper
Austria; and that the telegram from Dr. Rainer appointed the
affiant temporary leader of the National Socialist Party in
Upper Austria.” (_2909-PS_)

Schuschnigg presented his resignation, which was accepted by President Miklas. The appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor came late on the evening of 11 March 1938. (_2465-PS_)

(9) _Having infiltrated into the Austrian Government of Chancellor Schuschnigg according to plan, Seyss-Inquart exploited his opportunities to carry out the plan to its ultimate conclusion, i.e. German annexation of Austria._ The first act of Seyss-Inquart as the new Chancellor of Austria was to hold a telephone conversation with Hitler early in the morning of 12 March 1938. He has described the substance of this telephone conversation as follows:

“During the morning of 12 March I held a telephone conversation
with Hitler in which I suggested that while German troops were
entering Austria, Austrian troops as a symbol should march into
the Reich. Hitler agreed to this suggestion and we agreed to
meet in Linz, Upper Austria, later on that same day.”
(_3425-PS_)

Thereafter, on 12 March 1938, Seyss-Inquart greeted Hitler on the balcony of the City Hall of Linz, Upper Austria. In his ensuing speech, Seyss-Inquart announced that Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain, which provided that “the independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations,” was no longer operative.

“I then flew to Linz with Himmler, who had arrived in Vienna
from Berlin. I greeted Hitler on the balcony of the City Hall,
and said that Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain was now
inoperative.” (_3425-PS_; _L-231_)

In his memorandum entitled “The Austrian Question” Seyss-Inquart describes his meeting with Hitler as follows:

“In the afternoon, I flew with Himmler to Linz and drove then to
meet Hitler. Hitler entered Linz in the evening. I never saw
such an enthusiasm. The welcome was spontaneous and of no
precedence. In my (welcome) speech I declared that Article 88 of
the St. Germain Treaty was no longer binding.” (_3254-PS_;
_2485-PS_)

Seyss-Inquart then drove back to Vienna on the morning of 13 March 1938. His Secretary of State for Security begged that he be allowed to resign, a decision he reached as a result of a conversation with Himmler, which had caused him to fear for his own personal welfare. Seyss-Inquart then nominated Kaltenbrunner for State Secretary for Security, and the nomination was accepted by President Miklas. About noon State Under Secretary Stuckart of the German Reich Ministry of the Interior brought a proposal for a reannexation act uniting Austria to Germany, and announced Hitler’s wish for prompt execution of it. Seyss-Inquart then called a meeting of his Council of Ministers, and on his proposal the council adopted the act. (_3254-PS_)

Seyss-Inquart, realizing that if the President of Austria resigned his office, then he, Seyss-Inquart, would be the successor, went to President Miklas with the information about the action of the Council of Ministers. Seyss-Inquart describes this meeting with President Miklas as follows:

“In the case where the Bund President would, for any reason,
either have resigned his functions or be, for some time, impeded
in fulfilling them, his prerogatives were to go over to the Bund
Chancellor, I went to the Bund President with Dr. Wolff. The
President told me that he did not know whether this development
would be of welfare to the Austrian Nation, but that he did not
wish to interfere and preferred to resign his functions, so that
all rights would come into my hands, according to the
Constitution. The possibility of my dismissal or resignation
were only slightly mentioned and recognized as inopportune in
the prevailing situation.” (_3254-PS_)

President Miklas then resigned and Seyss-Inquart succeeded to his office. (_2466-PS_)

Thereafter Seyss-Inquart signed the Act uniting Austria with Germany and hurried back to Linz to report this news to Hitler:

“Then there were some letters exchanged between the Bund
President and myself, confirming our conversation and his
retirement. Thereafter I drove to Linz, where I arrived around
mid-night and reported to the Fuehrer the accomplishment of the
Anschluss Law. Hitler was very much impressed by it; for a while
he remained quiet, then tears dropped from his eyes down his
cheeks. He said then that he was especially happy because his
Motherland had achieved her annexation to the Reich without any
shedding of blood.” (_3254-PS_)

On 14 March 1938 Hitler entered Vienna. On 15 March 1938 there was a public demonstration in Vienna and Hitler introduced Seyss-Inquart as “Reich _Statthalter_ for Austria.” Hitler then put him in charge of the Civil Administration of Austria, while political matters were assigned to Gauleiter Josef Buerckel, who shortly thereafter was made Reich Commissar for the Anschluss. (_3425-PS_)

(10) _Despite Seyss-Inquart’s modesty since arrest and indictment, his fellow Nazi conspirators recognized the importance of his part in the Austrian Anschluss._

Goering made a speech in Vienna on 26 March 1938 in which he said:

“At this moment [announcement of the plebiscite in Austria] it
has been established that now the decision really came. A
complete unanimity between the Fuehrer and the N. S. confidants
inside of Austria existed. According to their opinion also the
hour of action had come, but they thought they could not use any
more democratic methods in negotiations and they took the law of
action in their own strong hands and forced the others to
retreat. If the N. S. rising succeeded so quickly and thoroughly
without bloodshed, it is first of all due to the intelligent and
decisive firmness of the present Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart
and his confidants. But this too proved the correctness of the
previous continued politics because if our confidants had not
been in the government, this whole course of events would not
have been possible.” (_3270-PS_)

According to Dr. Rainer, Hitler and the general public gave Seyss-Inquart credit for playing the leading role in the annexation of Austria by Germany. This is evidenced by the covering letter written by Dr. Rainer, dated 6 July 1939, to Reich Commissar Gauleiter Josef Buerckel:

“We had the impression that the general opinion, perhaps also
Hitler’s own, was that the liberation depended more upon
Austrian matters of state rather than the Party. To be more
exact, Hitler especially mentioned Seyss-Inquart alone; and
public opinion gave him alone credit for the change and thus
believed him to have played the sole leading role.” (_812-PS_)

In his report to Reich Commissar Buerckel, Dr. Rainer said:

“But as a result of the agreement at Berchtesgaden and the
statement of the Fuehrer made to him during his state visit to
Berlin, Seyss-Inquart was the personal trustee of the Fuehrer
and directly responsible to him for the illegal NSDAP in Austria
within the confines of his political sphere. * * * The seizure
of power was the work of the party supported by the Fuehrer’s
threat of invasion and the legal standing of Seyss-Inquart in
the government.

“The national result in the form of the taking over of the
government by Seyss-Inquart was due to the actual seizure of
power by the Party on one hand and the political efficiency of
Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his territory on the other.” (_812-PS_)

Hans Frank recognized the importance of the services rendered by Seyss-Inquart to the Nazi cause in Austria. When Seyss-Inquart was about to leave Poland to become Reich commissar of the Occupied Netherlands Territories, Frank extolled him as follows:

“But your name without that is shining like a light through the
history of the Third Reich, since you are the creator of the
National Socialist Austria.” (_3465-PS_)

(11) _The Nazi conspirators within the German Reich evidenced their intentions of annexing Austria in many ways._ Hitler, on the first page of Chapter 1 of _Mein Kampf_, said:

“Today it seems to me providential that Fate should have chosen
Braunau on the Inn as my birthplace. For this little town lies
on the boundary between two German states which we of the
younger generation at least have made it our life work to
reunite by every means at our disposal.

“German-Austria must return to the great German Mother Country,
and not because of any economic considerations. No, and again
no: even if such a union were unimportant from an economic point
of view; yes, even if it were harmful, it must nevertheless take
place. One blood demands one Reich. Never will the German Nation
possess the moral right to engage in Colonial politics until, at
least, it embraces its own sons within a single state. Only when
the Reich borders include the very last German, but can no
longer guarantee his daily bread, will the moral right to
acquire foreign soil arise from the distress of our own people.
Their sword will become our plow, and from the tears of war the
daily bread of future generations will grow.”

Seyss-Inquart devoted his efforts to legalize the sale and circulation of _Mein Kampf_ in Austria. His letter to Keppler, German Secretary of State for Austrian Affairs, contained the following passage.

“The _Teinfaltstrasse_ is very well informed even if not in
detail about my efforts regarding the re-permission of the book
‘Mein Kampf’.” (_3392-PS_)

Goering and Schacht both told an American diplomat that it was Germany’s determination to annex Austria and Sudetenland to the Reich. (_L-151)_

One of the missions of von Papen, as German Ambassador to Austria, was to effect a change in the personnel of the Austrian Cabinet headed by Chancellor von Schuschnigg and to eliminate anti-Nazi opposition, particularly in the Ministry of Interior and Security. (_2246-PS_)

The German Reich applied economic pressure upon Austria. One of the means adopted was the law of 24 March 1933, which required payment of 1,000 Reichs Marks by every German crossing the border into Austria (_3467-PS_). Kurt von Schuschnigg, former Chancellor of Austria, in his affidavit of 19 November 1945, described this economic pressure upon Austria by Germany in the following words:

“* * * During my tenure of office as Federal Chancellor of
Austria, more particularly on the 11th day of July, 1936, I
negotiated with the then existing government of the German
Reich, and with Adolf Hitler, an Agreement more particularly
known as the Agreement of 11 July 1936.

“I further depose and say that prior to the consummation of the
aforesaid Agreement, the German Government had placed certain
economic barriers against trade between Germany and Austria such
as—to-wit—the 1,000 mark barrier which said barrier provided
that any German citizen who crosses the border of Germany into
Austria is obliged to pay to the German Government the sum of
1,000 German Reichs Marks for the privilege thereof—Austria had
been accustomed before this edict of the German Government to
receive into Austria some one hundred thousand visitors from
Germany annually.

“I further state that the aforesaid barrier placed against
Austria was extremely injurious to Austrian agriculture and
industrial interests.” (_2994-PS_)

Jodl stated in his diary that in 1938 the aim of German policy was the elimination of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The will of resistance in both countries was undermined by pressure on the government as well as by propaganda and the fifth column. At the same time German military preparations for attack were worked out (_1780-PS_). (“Case Otto” was the code name for the Austrian campaign, and “Case Green” was the code name for the battle plans against Czechoslovakia.)

Jodl also stated in his diary that when Chancellor von Schuschnigg announced the proposed plebiscite for 13 March 1938, Hitler was determined to intervene. Goering, General Reichenau, and Minister Glaise-Horstenau were called before Hitler. “Case Otto” was to be prepared, and the mobilization of army units and air forces was ordered on 10 March 1938. The march into Austria took place on 11 March 1938. (_1780-PS_).

(12) _Hitler and the Nazi conspirators completed the annexation of Austria by decree._ On 11 March 1938 Hitler issued a directive regarding “Case Otto” addressed to the German armed forces, classified Top Secret, in which he stated that, if other measures proved useless, his intentions were to invade Austria with armed force. The directive prescribed operational duties and assigned objectives. It further provided that resistance was to be broken up ruthlessly with armed force. (_C-102_)

Later on that same day, at 8:45 p. m., Hitler issued a second directive, which stated in substance, that the demands of the German ultimatum to Austria had not been fulfilled, and for that reason the entry of German armed forces into Austria would commence at daybreak on 12 March 1938. He directed that all objectives were to be reached by exerting all forces to the full as quickly as possible. (_C-182_)

On 13 March 1938 Germany in violation of Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, formally incorporated Austria into the Reich by decree and declared it to be a province of the German Reich. (_2307-PS_)

Officials of the Province of Austria were then required by decree to take an oath of personal obedience to Hitler. Jews were barred from taking this oath, and thus could not retain offices and positions previously held. (_2311-PS_)

Members of the Austrian Army were required to take an oath of personal allegiance to Hitler as their Supreme Commander. (_2936-PS_)

Compulsory military service was instituted in Austria by law, which provided the Greater German Reich with additional manpower for its armed forces. (_1660-PS_)

(13) _Seyss-Inquart participated in the execution of the plans for aggression against Czechoslovakia._ In an official report to Viscount Halifax, Basil Newton, an official of the British Government, related some of the “gangster methods employed by the Reich to obtain its ends in Czecho-Slovakia.” The part played by Seyss-Inquart was described in this report in the following words:

“On M. Sidor’s return to Bratislava, after he had been entrusted
with the Government in place of Mgr. Tiso, Herr Buerckel, Herr
Seyss-Inquart and five German generals came at about 10 pm on
the evening of Saturday, the 11th March, into a Cabinet meeting
in progress at Bratislava, and told the Slovak Government that
they should proclaim the independence of Slovakia. When M. Sidor
showed hesitation, Herr Buerckel took him on one side and
explained that Herr Hitler had decided to settle the question of
Czecho-Slovakia definitely. Slovakia ought, therefore, to
proclaim her independence because Herr Hitler would otherwise
disinterest himself in her fate. M. Sidor thanked Herr Buerckel
for this information, but said that he must discuss the
situation with the Government at Prague.” (_D-571_)

Hitler expressed his intention to crush Czechoslovakia in the following language:

“‘At Munich I did not take Bohemia and Moravia into the German
territorial sphere [“_Lebensraum_”]. I left the Czechs only
another five months, but for the Slovaks I have some sympathy. I
approved the Award of Vienna in the conviction that the Slovaks
would separate themselves from the Czechs and declare their
independence, which would be under German protection. That is
why I have refused Hungarian demands in respect of Slovakia. As
the Slovaks appear to be agreeing with the Czechs it looks as
though they have not respected the spirit of the Vienna Award.
This I cannot tolerate. To-morrow at mid-day I shall begin
military action against the Czechs, which will be carried out by
General Brauchitsch’ (who was present and to whom he pointed).
‘Germany,’ he said, ‘does not intend to take Slovakia into her
“_Lebensraum_,” and that is why you must either immediately
proclaim the independence of Slovakia or I will disinterest
myself in her fate. To make your choice I give you until
to-morrow mid-day, when the Czechs will be crushed by the German
steam-roller.’” (_D-571_)

Ribbentrop and von Neurath also participated in the execution of the Nazi plot to obliterate Czechoslovakia as a nation. (_D-571_)

The use of pressure, fifth columnists, and propaganda to undermine resistance in Czechoslovakia, and the preparation of military plans for the attack upon that country were all noted by Jodl in his diary. (_1780-PS_)

Before the annexation of Austria by Germany Seyss-Inquart was in communication and contact with Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten German Nazis in Czechoslovakia. On 29 December 1937 Seyss-Inquart wrote a letter to Henlein in encouraging terms and extended his warmest sympathy and hope for the success of the Sudeten Germans (_3523-PS_). Henlein thereafter replied in a letter to Seyss-Inquart dated a few days after the German annexation of Austria had been accomplished. In this letter Henlein expressed his pride in the fact that Seyss-Inquart, born a Sudeten German, had fulfilled the task determined by the Fuehrer in the most decisive hour of German history. He also thanked Seyss-Inquart for the effect and influence the developments in Austria would have in the Sudetenland. (_3522-PS_)

C. _SEYSS-INQUART PARTICIPATED IN THE POLITICAL PLANNING AND PREPARATION OF THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS FOR WARS OF AGGRESSION AND WARS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND ASSURANCES SET FORTH IN COUNTS ONE AND TWO OF THE INDICTMENT._

The German Reichstag came under the control of the Nazi conspirators with the advent of Hitler into the German Government and became a willing tool in the hands of Hitler and the conspirators. (See Sections 2, 3, and 4 of chapter VII on the acquisition and consolidation of totalitarian political control, and terrorization of political opponents.)

The members of the Reich Cabinet were the accomplices, aiders and abettors of Hitler and his closest Nazi lieutenants in the political planning and preparation for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances. (See section 3 of chapter XV on the Reich Cabinet.)

Seyss-Inquart was a member of the Reichstag and of the Reich Cabinet before the invasion of Poland, and occupied those positions until the unconditional surrender of Germany. Thus he is equally responsible for the acts and decisions of the members of those governmental bodies concerning the political planning and preparation of the Nazi Conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment. (_2910-PS_)

D. _SEYSS-INQUART AUTHORIZED, DIRECTED, AND PARTICIPATED IN THE
CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AS SET FORTH IN THE INDICTMENT._

(1) _Austria._

(_a_) _Position and authority of Seyss-Inquart._ Seyss-Inquart was appointed Reich Governor of Austria by Hitler on 15 March 1938, and was put in charge of the Civil Administration. Austria had then ceased to exist as an independent nation and was a province of the German Reich. (_2910-PS_; _3425-PS_)

Goering, as Delegate for the Four-Year Plan, commissioned Seyss-Inquart, who was then _Reichsstatthalter_ in Austria, jointly with the Plenipotentiary of the Reich, to consider and take any steps necessary for the “Aryanization of business and economic life, and to execute this process in accordance with our laws” (Laws of the Reich). (_3460-PS_)

Seyss-Inquart participated in the drafting of laws for the sequestration and confiscation of property of the so-called “enemies of the people and State.” Evidence of this fact is found in the correspondence between Seyss-Inquart and Dr. Lammers, Chief of the Reichs Chancellery. On 24 October 1938 Seyss-Inquart wrote a letter to Dr. Lammers stating in substance that the law providing for the sequestration and confiscation of the property of enemies of the State was almost completed and ready for the signature of the Fuehrer, and expressing hope that the signature would be obtained soon. Dr. Lammers replied to Seyss-Inquart that the decree would be issued by the Reichsministerof the Interior, a copy of which had been submitted to Hitler, who had expressed no objections. (_3448-PS_; _3447-PS_)

The power and authority of Seyss-Inquart with respect to the sequestration and confiscation of the property of “enemies of the State” stemmed from a decree empowering the _Reichsstatthalter_ in Vienna, or the office designated by him, to confiscate property of persons or societies which had promoted efforts inimical to the people of the State. This decree also attempted to legalize the confiscation of property ordered by the Secret State Police prior to the issuance of the decree. (_3450-PS_) This decree appeared to be a secret law, because it was not published. Yet its existence as law is evidenced by a letter written to the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, Himmler, in January 1939, which shows that the decree was in fact issued on 18 November 1938. (_3449-PS_)

(_b_) _Murder and illtreatment of civilians._ Seyss-Inquart was aware that so-called enemies of the State were imprisoned in concentration camps. His knowledge of this matter is evidenced by his claim of credit for the transfer of his predecessor—Chancellor of Austria, von Schuschnigg—from one concentration camp to another in south Germany which was in the path of the armed forces of the United States. (_3254-PS_)

One of the most notorious concentration camps was Mauthausen, located in Austria and in existence while Seyss-Inquart was the Reich Governor of the Province of Austria. As has already been shown, this camp became noted as an extermination center. (_2176-PS_)

(_c_) _Plunder of public and private property._ Even before the issuance of the above decree for the sequestration and confiscation of the property of the so-called enemies of the State, Seyss-Inquart wrote a letter to Hitler indicating that he had come into possession of from 700 to 900 valuable tapestries. Seyss-Inquart offered to display the most beautiful pieces so that the Fuehrer might make a selection. In this same letter Seyss-Inquart expressed his pride and wonder over the manner in which Hitler had “solved the Sudeten problem.” (_3391-PS_)

While Seyss-Inquart was Reich Governor of the Province of Austria a large quantity of valuable property, including works of art, belonging to the so-called enemies of the State, was seized, sequestered, and confiscated. A partial list of such property is found in a memorandum which referred to a report of the Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police submitted with a letter dated 10 August 1938 and received in Berlin 26 September 1938. This inventory listed a total of 162 cases of confiscation, of which 113 cases had a value of some 93,366,358.24 marks. It is significant that the former owners of this property were Jews and political opponents of the Nazis. (_3446-PS_)

(2) _Poland._

(_a_) _Position and authority._ Seyss-Inquart was appointed Deputy Governor General of the Polish Occupied Territory by Hitler’s decree of 12 October 1939, which also appointed Hans Frank Governor General of the Polish Occupied Territory. The official title of the government of Poland under the Nazi conspirators was the “General Government” (_3147-PS_). Prior to his appointment as Deputy Governor General of the Polish Occupied Territory from the early part of September 1939 to 12 October 1939, Seyss-Inquart was Chief of the Civil Administration of South Poland (_2910-PS_). Seyss-Inquart as Deputy Governor General of the Polish Occupied Territory was second only to the Governor General, Frank. (_2233-CC-PS_)

The Chief of the Office of the Governor General of the Polish Occupied Territory and the Higher SS and Police Leaders were directly subordinate to the Governor General and his representative. In turn the leaders of the General and Security Police were subordinated to the Higher SS and Police Leaders. (_3468-PS_)

According to Hans Frank, Seyss-Inquart organized the General Government of Poland. When Seyss-Inquart was about to depart to assume his new duties as Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands, Frank eulogized Seyss-Inquart as follows:

“In the construction of the General-Government, your name will
forever take a place of honor as originator of this organization
and State system. I express our thanks, Mr. Reichsminister, for
your collaboration and for your creative energy in the name of
all officers, employees, and laborers, of all SS organizations
and the whole police force of the General-Government, and in the
name of the District Chiefs, the Gau and city leaders, in the
name of all otherwise on the order of the Reich and the Fuehrer
her active persons. * * *” (_3465-PS_)

During November 1939 Seyss-Inquart made a tour of inspection in Poland. While on this tour he gave lectures to the German officials of the General Government of Poland concerning their duties and German administrative policy in that country. He told these officials that the only principal aim of that policy was to satisfy the interests of the Reich and that they should promote everything of use to the Reich and hamper all that might damage the Reich. He instructed the officials that the German Government must utilize the General Government of Poland for German economic purposes. (_2278-PS_)

(_b_) _Murder and illtreatment of the civilian population of occupied territories._ While Seyss-Inquart was on the aforesaid tour of inspection, a Dr. Lasch, who was a District Governor, reported to Seyss-Inquart that all criminals found in the penitentiaries were shot. The executions, however, were conducted in closed-off wooded areas and not in public. (_2278-PS_)

In his report concerning his tour of inspection Seyss-Inquart stated that the intellectuals of Poland were to a greater part locked up. He also passed on the suggestion made by District Governor Schmidt to use the “moorish” country around Cychov, Poland, as a reservoir for Jews because this measure might have a decimating effect upon the Jewish population of Poland. (_2278-PS_)

Hans Frank, in his capacity as Governor General of the Polish Occupied Territory, made an official report to Hitler in which he stated that, in the course of time, the German rule had led to a substantial deterioration in the “attitude” of the entire Polish people due to malnutrition, mass arrests, mass shootings, and rigorous methods used to obtain forced labor. In this report it was admitted that before 1939 the food supply of the Polish people was quite adequate to sustain them. (_437-PS_)

(_c_) _Plunder of public and private property._ During the aforesaid tour of inspection Seyss-Inquart ordered the seizure of all soap stocks, and informed the German officials that the seizure of soap and tea was to be regarded as most important. In addition he ordered a marshalling of goods such as oil, salt, manures, etc., in monopolies such as cooperative societies. He also directed that the Polish unemployment fund in a considerable amount be diverted to the repair of damaged buildings. (_2278-PS_)

Frank in his report to Hitler stated that there had been a confiscation of a great part of Polish estates, together with encroachments upon and confiscation of the assets of industries, trades, professions, and other private property. (_437-PS_)

(_d_) _Conscription of civilian labor._ Seyss-Inquart, as Deputy Governor General of the Polish Occupied Territory, attended most staff meetings held by Frank, the Governor General. Among the subjects discussed and decided upon at those meetings was the conscription and deportation of vast numbers of Polish nationals to the Reich for forced labor. Some of these deportees were employed in instruments of war production in violation of Articles 6, 23h, 46, and 52 of the Hague Regulations 1907, as well as the Prisoner of War Convention (Geneva 1929). On 11 January 1940 one Frauendorfer reported in the presence of Seyss-Inquart that daily transports, each carrying 1,000 workers, were going to the Reich. Thus Seyss-Inquart aided and abetted in these violations. (_2233-B-PS_)

According to Frank approximately 160,000 agricultural workers and 50,000 industrial workers were conscripted and deported from Poland to the Reich up to and including 21 April 1940. Because the total quota had been fixed at 500,000 and because there were not enough “voluntary enlistments”, solution to the problem was sought in the use of coercive measures. Seyss-Inquart participated actively in the discussions on this matter, and thus aided materially in the solution of the problem. (_2233-N-PS_)

(_e_) _Germanization of occupied territories._ The Nazi government of the Polish Occupied Territory was determined to make Poland entirely German. (Evidence of this intention is discussed in Chapter XIII.) In addition, Frank in his report to Hitler reported that there had been an expropriation of property and expulsion of Polish nationals therefrom for German settlements in Poland. (_437-PS_)

(3) _The Netherlands._

(_a_) _Position and authority of Seyss-Inquart._ Seyss-Inquart was appointed Reich Commissar for the occupied Netherlands territories by decree of Hitler dated 18 May 1940. This decree made Seyss-Inquart “guardian of the interests of the Reich” and invested him with “supreme civil authority.” Seyss-Inquart was made responsible only to Hitler, and empowered to promulgate laws by decree for the occupied Netherlands territories. (_1376-PS_; _2910-PS_)

(_b_) _Abrogation and modification of Netherlands legislation not justified by military necessity._ In his capacity as Reich Commissar of the occupied Netherlands territories Seyss-Inquart authorized and directed the abrogation or modification of Netherlands legislation not demanded or justified by military exigency. This action was in violation of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, 1907.

The acts abolished included Provincial and Municipal Laws. (_3340-PS_; _3342-PS_)

Ordinary criminal laws not in conflict with the permissible objectives of the occupying power were abrogated, suspended, or radically changed. Administrative courts martial were established by decree of Seyss-Inquart as Reich Commissar which empowered the Leader of the Superior SS and the Police and Special Agents appointed by the Reich Commissar to deviate from existing law. This decree also prescribed harsh penalties for misdemeanors, extending from 10 years to life imprisonment, and include the death penalty (i) for participation in “activities likely to disturb or endanger public order and security” and (ii) for intentional violation of the orders of the Reich Commissar. (_2111-PS_)

Existing marriage laws were amended by Seyss-Inquart so as to require approval of the Reich Commissar instead of the consent of parent or guardian in the case of Dutch girls. The statutory waiting period was also abolished. Thus, intermarriage of Germans with female persons of Netherlands nationality were facilitated and promoted. (_3339-PS_)

Existing legislation concerning Netherlands nationality was modified by Seyss-Inquart so as to favor Germany. (_3341-PS_)

Additional decrees not justified or demanded by the military interests of the occupant were issued by Seyss-Inquart as Reich Commissar. These decrees amended or superseded and distorted existing laws concerning press, education, social services, corporate life, trade unionism, medical care, art, science, and divers phases of the political, social, economic, and industrial life of the Netherlands. Some of these enactments, including the discriminatory decrees against the Jews, are considered in greater detail hereafter. (_1726-PS_)

(_c_) _Germanization of Netherlands Territory._ Seyss-Inquart in his capacity as Reich Commissar for the occupied Dutch Territory, took affirmative steps to assimilate the territory under his jurisdiction politically, culturally, socially, and economically into the German Reich. This action violated Articles 43, 46, 55, and 56 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed, and Article 6 (b) of the Charter.

The more offensive crimes in the above category, such as economic exploitation and enforced conscription are considered in detail elsewhere in this section. Other “Germanization” measures, such as the decrees promoting marriage between German males and female Netherlanders, and altering citizenship laws in favor of Germany, have been previously adverted to.

When he assumed office on 29 May 1940, Seyss-Inquart said in a speech at The Hague:

“We neither will oppress this land and its people
imperialistically nor will we impose on them our political
convictions. We will bring this about in no other way—only
through our deportment and our example.” (_3430-PS_)

The _bona fides_ of the above statement is belied by a public statement made by Seyss-Inquart two years later. In a speech at Hengelo on 19 May 1943 he revealed his true purpose:

“Several times it has been held against me that I have let
national socialism come to the fore in all phases in public
life. As far as I am concerned that is no reproach, it is a
historical mission, which I have to fulfill here.” (_3430-PS_)

Full disclosure of Seyss-Inquart’s intentions and actions with respect to nazification and exploitation of Holland was made in a Top Secret report prepared by him and sent to Berlin covering the situation in the Netherlands during the period 29 May to 19 July 1940. This report was forwarded by Lammers of the Reich Chancellery to Rosenberg. Seyss-Inquart prefaces the report by describing his mission as not merely the guarding of Reich interests and maintaining order, but also the building of close economic ties between the Netherlands and the Reich. The report catalogues in considerable detail the measures initiated by Seyss-Inquart, discusses the building up of the NSDAP in the Netherlands, and adverts to the proposed creation of Nazi para-military and corresponding organizations. It also mentions the efforts made to bring about an assimilation of interests between Holland and Germany in the fields of economics and agriculture, culture, art, and science. The report points out that the allocation of supplies made, and financial and currency arrangements prescribed, were favorable to the Reich; that such transactions were signed by Dutch officials so that the “appearance of being voluntary” was preserved. (_997-PS_)

(_d_) _Spoliation of property._ In his capacity as Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands territory Seyss-Inquart authorized, directed, and participated in the exploitation of the material resources of the Occupied Netherlands territory for purposes unrelated to the needs of the Army of Occupation. These acts were all in violation of Article 6 (b) of the Charter and Articles 43, 46-49, 52 of the Hague Regulations, 1907.

These crimes, for which Seyss-Inquart is responsible not only by virtue of his position as the dominant civil representative of the Reich Government in the Occupied Netherlands territory but also because of his direct participation in the initiation and execution of such criminal policies, took the following form:

Control and exploitation of the Netherlands economy in the interest of the German total war effort.

Levy of excessive occupation charges on the Netherlands.

Exaction of large sums of money and gold as “external occupation costs,” or “contributions to the war against Bolshevism.”

Requisitioning of gold and foreign exchange of Dutch nationals for purposes unrelated to the needs of the occupation army.

Use of German reichsmarks as currency in the Netherlands for purposes unrelated to the needs of the occupation army, with compulsory free exchange of such Reichsmarks for gulden by the Netherlands Bank.

(Evidence of the foregoing methods of exploitation of the occupied Netherlands and correlative enrichment of the Reich is discussed in