Chapter XII: on Persecution of the Jews.) (7)

On 23 October 1939, the Nazi Party paper, the “_Voelkischer Beobachter_,” published in screaming headlines the story, “Churchill sank the Athenia” (_3260-PS_). The scale on which this deliberate lie was perpetrated is indicated by the rest of the “_Voelkischer Beobachter_” for that day; on the front page, with large red underlining, were the words: “Now we indict Churchill” (_3260-PS_). An extract from the third page of this issue of the “_Voelkischer Beobachter_” refers to photograph of the ship and reads as follows:

“Churchill sank the ‘_Athenia_’. The above picture shows the
proud ‘_Athenia_’, the ocean giant, which was sunk by
Churchill’s crime. One can clearly see the big radio equipment
on board the ship. But nowhere was an SOS heard from the ship.
Why was the ‘_Athenia_’ silent? Because her captain was not
allowed to tell the world anything. He very prudently refrained
from telling the world that Winston Churchill attempted to sink
the ship, through the explosion of an infernal machine. He knew
it well, but he had to keep silent. Nearly fifteen hundred
people would have lost their lives if Churchill’s original plan
had resulted as the criminal wanted. Yes, he longingly hoped
that the one hundred Americans on board the ship would find
death in the waves so that the anger of the American people, who
were deceived by him, should be directed against Germany as the
presumed author of the deed. It was fortunate that the majority
escaped the fate intended for them by Churchill. Our picture on
the right shows two wounded passengers. They were rescued by the
freighter, ‘_City of Flint_’, and as can be seen here, turned
over to the American coast guard boat ‘_Gibb_’ for further
medical treatment. They are an unspoken accusation against the
criminal Churchill. Both they and the shades of those who lost
their lives call him before the Tribunal of the world and ask
the British people, ‘How long will the office, one of the
richest in tradition known to Britain’s history, be held by a
murderer?’” (_3260-PS_)

Contrary to these Nazi allegations, the “_Athenia_” made repeated wireless distress signals, which were in fact intercepted and answered by His Majesty’s ships “_Electra_” and “_Escort_,” as well as by the Norwegian steamship “_Knute Nelson_” and the Swedish yacht “_Southern Cross_.” In fact, the “_Athenia_” was sunk by the German U-boat U-30. So unjustifiable was the torpedoing of the “_Athenia_,” however, that the German Navy embarked on a course of falsification of their records and on other dishonest measures, in the hope of hiding the guilty secret. Meanwhile, the Nazi propagandists sought to shift the responsibility to the British. The Captain of U-boat 30, _Oberleutnant_ Lemp, was later killed in action, but some of the original crew of the U-30 have survived to tell the tale as prisoners of war. An affidavit by a member of the crew of the U-30 establishes the truth of this episode and reveals the Nazis’ attempt to conceal the true facts (_D-654_). The affidavit reads:

“I, Adolf Schmidt, Official Number N 1043-33T,

“Do solemnly declare that:

“I am now confined to Camp No. 133, Lethbridge, Alberta.

“That on the first day of war, 3 September 1939, a ship of
approximately 10,000 tons was torpedoed in the late hours of the
evening by the U-30.

“That after the ship was torpedoed and we surfaced again,
approximately half an hour after the explosion, the Commandant
called me to the tower in order to show me the torpedoed ship.

“That I have seen the ship with my very eyes, but that I do not
think that the ship could see our U-boat at that time on account
of the position of the moon.

“That only a few members of the crew had an opportunity to go to
the tower in order to see the torpedoed ship.

“That apart from myself, _Oberleutnant_ Hinsch was in the tower
when I saw the steamer after the attack.

“That I observed that the ship was listing.

“That no warning shot was fired before the torpedo was launched.

“That I myself observed much commotion on board of the torpedoed
ship.

“That I believe that the ship had only one smoke stack.

“That in the attack on this steamer one or two torpedoes were
fired which did not explode but that I myself heard the
explosion of the torpedo which hit the steamer.

“That _Oberleutnant_ Lemp waited until darkness before
surfacing.

“That I was severely wounded by aircraft 14 September 1939.

“That _Oberleutnant_ Lemp, shortly before my disembarkation in
Reykjavik 19 September 1939, visited me in the forenoon in the
Petty Officers quarters where I was lying severely wounded.

“That _Oberleutnant_ Lemp then had the Petty Officers’ quarters
cleared in order to be alone with me.

“That _Oberleutnant_ Lemp then showed me a declaration under
oath according to which I had to bind myself to mention nothing
concerning the incidents of 3 September 1939 on board the U-30.

“That this declaration under oath had approximately the
following wording: ‘I, the undersigned, swear hereby that I
shall shroud in secrecy all happenings of 3 September 1939 on
board the U-30, regardless whether foe or friend, and that I
shall erase from my memory all happenings of this day.’

“That I have signed this declaration under oath, which was drawn
up by the Commandant in his own handwriting, with my left hand
very illegibly.

“That later on in Iceland when I heard about the sinking of the
‘_Athenia_,’ the idea came into my mind that the U-30 on the 3
September 1939 might have sunk the ‘_Athenia_,’ especially since
the Captain caused me to sign the above-mentioned declaration.

“That up to today I have never spoken to anyone concerning these
events.

“That due to the termination of the war I consider myself freed
from my oaths.” (_D-654_)

Doenitz’s part in the “_Athenia_” episode is described in an affidavit which he has sworn, in English (_D-638_). At the end of the affidavit four words are added in Doenitz’s handwriting, the significance of which will be adverted to shortly. Doenitz states:

“U-30 returned to harbor about Mid-September. I met the captain,
_Oberleutnant_ Lemp, on the lockside at Wilhelmshaven, as the
boat was entering harbor, and he asked permission to speak to me
in private. I noticed immediately that he was looking very
unhappy and he told me at once that he thought he was
responsible for the sinking of the ‘_Athenia_’ in the North
Channel area. In accordance with my previous instructions, he
had been keeping a sharp lookout for possible armed merchant
cruisers in the approaches to the British Isles, and had
torpedoed a ship he afterwards identified as the ‘_Athenia_’
from wireless broadcasts, under the impression that she was an
armed merchant cruiser on patrol. I had never specified in my
instructions any particular type of ship as armed merchant
cruiser nor mentioned any names of ships. I despatched Lemp at
once by air to report to the SKL at Berlin; in the meantime, I
ordered complete secrecy as a provisional measure. Later the
same day or early on the following day, I received a verbal
order from _Kapitaen zur See_ Fricke [head of the Operations
Division of the Naval War Staff] that:

“1. The affair was to be kept a total secret.

“2. The OKM considered that a court martial was not necessary as
they were satisfied that the captain had acted in good faith.

“3. Political explanations would be handled by the OKM.

“I had had no part whatsoever in the political events in which
the Fuehrer claimed that no U-boat had sunk the ‘_Athenia_.’

“After Lemp returned to Wilhelmshaven from Berlin, I
interrogated him thoroughly on the sinking and formed the
impression that although he had taken reasonable care, he had
still not taken sufficient precautions to establish fully the
identity of the ship before attacking. I had previously given
very strict orders that all merchant vessels and neutrals were
to be treated according to naval prize law, before the
occurrence of this incident. I accordingly placed him under
cabin arrest, as I felt certain that a court-martial could only
acquit him and would entail unnecessary publicity” [whereat
Doenitz has added the words, “and too much time”]. (_D-638_)

Doenitz’s suggestion that the captain of the U-30 sank the “_Athenia_” in mistake for a merchant cruiser must be considered in the light of Doenitz’s order of 22 September 1939, that

“the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War
Diary as due to possible confusion with a warship or an
auxiliary cruiser.” (_C-191_)

The U-30 returned to Wilhelmshaven on 27 September 1939. On that date another fraudulent entry was made in the War Diary of the Chief of U-boats:

“U-30 comes in. She had sunk: ‘S.S. _Blairlogie_’; ‘S.S. _Fanad
Head_’.” (_D-659_)

There is no reference at all to the sinking of the “_Athenia_.”

Perhaps the most elaborate forgery in connection with this episode was made on the log book of the U-30, which was responsible for sinking the “_Athenia_” (_D-662_). The Prosecution submits that the first page of that log book is a forgery which shows a curiously un-German carelessness about detail. It is clear on the original document that the first page of the text is a substitute for pages that have been removed: The dates in the first column of that page are in Arabic numerals. On the second and more authentic-looking page, and throughout the other pages of the log book, they are in Roman numerals. (_D-662_)

Furthermore, all reference to the sinking of the “_Athenia_” on 3 September is omitted. The log book shows that at 1400 hours on 3 September 1939 the position of the U-30 is given as AL 0278, which is one of the few positions quoted at all upon that page, and which was some 200 miles west of the position where the “_Athenia_” was sunk. The recorded course (due south) and the recorded speed (10 knots)—those entries are obviously designed to suggest that the U-30 was well clear of the “_Athenia’s_” position on 3 September. (_D-662_)

Finally, the original shows Lemp’s own signature upon the page dealing with 3 September differs from his other signature in the text. The difference appears in the final letter of his name. The signature in question shows a Roman “p”, whereas on the other signatures there is a script “p.” The inference is that either the signature is a forgery or it was made by Lemp at some other, and probably considerably later, date. (_D-662_)

The story of the “_Athenia_” establishes that the German Navy under Raeder embarked upon deliberate fraud. Even before receiving Lemp’s reports, the German Admiralty had repeatedly denied the possibility that a German U-boat could be in the area concerned. The charts which showed the disposition of U-boats and the position of sinking of the “_Athenia_” (discussed in Section 14 on Doenitz) have shown the dishonesty of these announcements. The conclusion to be drawn is this: Raeder, as head of the German Navy, knew all the facts. Censorship and information control in Nazi Germany were so complete that Raeder, as head of the Navy, must have been party to the falsification published in the “_Voelkischer Beobachter_,” which was an attempt by the Nazi conspirators to save face with their own people and to uphold the myth of an infallible Fuehrer backed by an impeccable war machine.

(5) _The Attack on Norway and Denmark._ Truth mattered little in Nazi propaganda, and Raeder’s camouflage was not confined to painting his ships or sailing them under the British flag, as he did in attacking Norway or Denmark. Raeder’s proud comment upon the invasions of Denmark and Norway, in which he played a leading part, (see Section 9 of Chapter IX on aggression against Norway and Denmark), is contained in a letter of Raeder’s to the Navy, which stated in part:

“The operations of the Navy in the occupation of Norway will for
all time remain the great contribution of the Navy to this war.”
(_C-155_)

(6) _The Attack on the U.S.S.R._ With the occupation of Norway and much of Western Europe safely completed, Hitler turned his eyes towards Russia. Raeder was against the attack on Russia and tried his best to dissuade Hitler from embarking upon it. Raeder approached the problem with cynicism. He did not object to the aggressive war on Russia because of its illegality, its immorality, its inhumanity. His only objection to it was its untimeliness. He wanted to finish England first before going further afield.

The story of Raeder’s part in the deliberations upon the war against Russia is told in extracts from a German compilation of official naval notes by the German Naval War Staff (_C-170_). The first entry, dated 26 September 1940, shows that Raeder was advocating to Hitler an aggressive Mediterranean policy, in which the Navy would play a paramount role, as opposed to a continental land policy. The entry reads:

“Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme
Commander presents his opinion about the situation: the Suez
Canal must be captured with German assistance. From Suez advance
through Palestine and Syria; then Turkey in our power. The
Russian problem will then assume a different appearance. Russia
is fundamentally frightened of Germany. It is questionable
whether action against Russia from the North will then be still
necessary.” (_C-170_)

The entry for 14 November reads:

“Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer is still
inclined to instigate the conflict with Russia. Naval Supreme
Commander recommends putting it off until the time after the
victory over England since there is heavy strain on German
forces and the end of warfare is not in sight. According to the
opinion of the Naval Supreme Commander, Russia will not press
for a conflict within the next year, since she is in the process
of building up her Navy with Germany’s help—38 cm. turrets for
battleships, etc.:—thus, during these years she continues to be
dependent upon German assistance.” (_C-170_)

And again, the entry for 27 December states:

“Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme
Commander emphasizes again that strict concentration of our
entire war effort against England as our main enemy is the most
urgent need of the hour. On the one side England has gained
strength by the unfortunate Italian conduct of the war in the
eastern Mediterranean and by the increasing American support. On
the other hand, however, she can be hit mortally by a
strangulation of her ocean traffic which is already taking
effect. What is being done for submarine and naval air force
construction is much too little. Our entire war potential must
work for the conduct of the war against England; thus for Navy
and air force every fissure of strength prolongs the war and
endangers the final success. Naval Supreme Commander voices
serious objections against Russia campaign before the defeat of
England.” (_C-170_)

The entry for 18 February 1941 reads as follows:

“Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) insists on the occupation of
Malta even before ‘_Barbarossa_’.” (_C-170_)

The 23 February entry reads:

“Instruction from Supreme Command, Armed Forces (OKW) that
seizure of Malta is contemplated for the fall of 1941 after the
execution of ‘_Barbarossa_’.” (_C-170_)

The entry for 19 March 1941 shows that by March 1941 Raeder had begun to consider what prospects of naval action the Russian aggression had to offer. The entry states:

“In case of ‘_Barbarossa_’, Supreme Naval Commander describes
the occupation of Murmansk as an absolute necessity for the
Navy. Chief of the Supreme Command, Armed Forces, considers
compliance very difficult.” (_C-170_).

In the meantime, the entries show that Mussolini was crying out for a more active Nazi Mediterranean policy. The entry for 30 May reads:

“[Duce] demands urgently decisive offensive Egypt-Suez for fall
1941; 12 divisions are needed for that; ‘This stroke would be
more deadly to the British Empire than the capture of London’;
Chief Naval Operations agrees completely.” (_C-170_)

Finally, the entry for 6 June indicates the strategic views of Raeder and the German Navy at that stage:

“Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Memorandum of the
Chief, Naval Operations. Observation on the strategic situation
in the Eastern Mediterranean after the Balkan campaign and the
occupation of Crete and further conduct of the war.”

* * * * * *

“The memorandum points with impressive clarity to the decisive
aims of the war in the Near East. Their advancement has moved
into grasping distance by the successes in the Aegean area, and
the memorandum emphasizes that the offensive utilization of the
present favorable situation must take place with the greatest
acceleration and energy, before England has again strengthened
her position in the Near East with help from the United States
of America. The memorandum realizes the unalterable fact that
the campaign against Russia would be opened very shortly;
demands, however, that the undertaking ‘_Barbarossa_’, which
because of the magnitude of its aims naturally stands in the
foreground of the operational plans of the armed forces
leadership, must under no circumstances lead to an abandonment,
diminishing delay of the conduct of the war in the Eastern
Mediterranean.” (_C-170_)

Thus Raeder, throughout, was seeking an active role for his Navy in the Nazi war plans.

Once Hitler had decided to attack Russia, Raeder sought a role for the Navy in the Russian campaign. The first naval operational plan against Russia was characteristically Nazi. The entry for 15 June 1941 in the notes of the German Naval War Staff reads:

“On the proposal of Chief Naval Operations, use of arms against
Russian submarines, south of the northern boundary of the Poland
warning area is permitted immediately; ruthless destruction is
to be aimed at.” (_C-170_)

Keitel provides a typically fraudulent pretext for this action in his letter dated 15 June 1941 (_C-38_):

“Subject: Offensive action against enemy submarines in the
Baltic Sea.

“To:

“High Command of the Navy—OKM (SKL)

“Offensive action against submarine south of the line
Memel—southern tip of Oeland is authorized if the boats cannot
be definitely identified as Swedish during the approach by
German naval forces.

“The reason to be given up to B-day is that our naval forces
believed to be dealing with penetrating British submarines.”
(_C-38_).

This order was given on 15 June 1941, although the Nazi attack on Russia did not take place until 22 June 1941.

(7) _Instigation of Japanese aggression._ In the meantime, Raeder was urging Hitler, as early as 18 March 1941, to enlarge the scope of the world war by inducing Japan to seize Singapore. Raeder’s views at his audience with Hitler on 18 March were as follows:

“Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible,
since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (whole
English Fleet contained; unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war
against Japan; inferiority of U. S. Fleet vis-a-vis the
Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action,
but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she
will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England.
Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring
Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East
Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby
solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

“Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U.S.A. She can do
so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.”
(_C-152_)

By 20 April 1941 Hitler had agreed with Raeder’s proposition to induce the Japanese to take offensive action against Singapore. The entry in the notes of the German Naval War Staff, for 20 April 1941, reads:

“Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Navy Supreme
Commander asks about result of Matsuoka’s visit, and evaluation
of Japanese-Russian pact. Fuehrer has informed Matsuoka, ‘that
Russia will not be touched if she behaves friendly according to
the treaty. Otherwise, he reserves action for himself.’
Japan-Russia pact has been concluded in agreement with Germany,
and is to prevent Japan from advancing against Vladisvostok, and
to cause her to attack Singapore.” (_C-170_).

The real purpose of Hitler’s words to Matsuoka is revealed in another description of their conversation:

“* * * At that time the Fuehrer was firmly resolved on a
surprise attack on Russia, regardless of what was the Russian
attitude to Germany. This, according to reports coming in, was
frequently changing. The communication to Matsuoka was designed
entirely as a camouflage measure and to ensure surprise.”
(_C-66_)

The Axis partners were not even honest with each other. This is typical of the jungle diplomacy with which Raeder associated himself.

C. _RAEDER’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES._

(1) _Instigation of the Navy to Violate the Rules of Warfare._ Raeder throughout his career showed a complete disregard for any international rule or usage of war which conflicted with his intention of carrying through the Nazi program of conquest. Raeder has himself summarized his attitude in a long memorandum compiled by Raeder and the German Naval War Staff and dated 15 October 1939, only a few weeks after the war started (_UK-65_). The memorandum, which concerns the intensification of the war at sea, reads in part as follows:

“I. Military requirements for the decisive struggle against
Great Britain.

“Our naval strategy will have to employ all the military means
at our disposal as expeditiously as possible. Military success
can be most confidently expected if we attack British
sea-communications wherever they are accessible to us with the
greatest ruthlessness; the final aim of such attacks is to cut
off all imports into and exports from Britain. We should try to
consider the requirements. It is desirable to base all military
measures taken on existing International Law; however measures
which are considered necessary from a military point of view,
provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have
to be carried out, even if they are not covered by existing
International Law. In principle therefore, any means of warfare
which is effective in breaking enemy resistance should be used
on some legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a
new code of naval warfare.

“The supreme War Council will have to decide what measures of
military and legal nature are to be taken. Once it has been
decided to conduct economic warfare in its most ruthless form,
in fulfilment of military requirements, this decision is to be
adhered to under all circumstances and under no circumstances
may such a decision for the most ruthless form of economic
warfare, once it has been made, be dropped or released under
political pressure from neutral powers; that is what happened in
the World War to our own detriment. Every protest by neutral
powers must be turned down. Even threats of further countries,
including the U. S. coming into the war, which can be expected
with certainty should the war last a long time, must not lead to
a relaxation in the form of economic warfare once embarked upon.
The more ruthlessly economic warfare is waged, the earlier will
it show results and the sooner will the war come to an end. The
economic effect of such military measures on our own war economy
must be fully recognized and compensated through immediate
re-orientation of German war economy and the re-drafting of the
respective agreements with neutral states; for this, strong
political and economic pressure must be employed if necessary.”
(_UK-65_)

Those comments of Raeder are revealing and show that as an active member of the inner councils of the Nazi state up to 1943, Raeder must share responsibility for the many war crimes committed by his confederates and underlings in the course of their wars.

(2) _The Navy’s Crimes at Sea._ Apart from this over-all responsibility of Raeder, certain war crimes were essentially initiated or ordered through the naval chain of command by Raeder himself.

(_a_) _Attacks on neutral shipping._ The minutes of a meeting between Hitler and Raeder on 30 December 1939 read in part as follows:

“The Chief of Naval War Staff requests that full power be given
to the Naval War Staff in making any intensification suited to
the situation and to the means of war. The Fuehrer fundamentally
agrees to the sinking without warning of Greek ships in the
American prohibited area in which the fiction of mine danger can
be upheld, e.g., the Bristol Channel.” (_C-27_)

At this time Greek ships also were neutral. This is another demonstration that Raeder was a man without principle.

This incitement to crime was a typical group effort, since a directive effectuating those naval views was issued on 30 December 1939 by the OKW, and signed by Jodl (_C-12_). This directive reads:

“On the 30th of December 1939, according to a report of Ob.d.M.,
the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces decided
that:

“(1) Greek merchant ships in the area around England declared by
U.S.A. to be a barred zone are to be treated as enemy vessels.

“(2) In the Bristol Channel, all shipping may be attacked
without warning—where the impression of a mining incident can
be created.

“Both measures are authorized to come into effect immediately.”
(_C-12_)

A pencilled note at the foot of this directive reads:

“Add to (1) Attack must be carried out without being seen. The
denial of the sinking of these steamships in case the expected
protests are made must be possible.” (_C-12_)

Another example of the callous attitude of Raeder’s Navy towards neutral shipping is found in an entry in Jodl’s diary for 16 June 1942 (_1807-PS_). This extract reads as follows:

“The operational staff of the Navy (SKL) applied on the 29th May
for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. The
SKL considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and
merchant ships is expedient at this juncture (a) because defense
measures are still incomplete; (b) because there is the
possibility of achieving surprise; and (c) because Brazil is to
all intents and purposes fighting Germany at sea.” (_1807-PS_).

This was a plan for a kind of Brazilian “Pearl Harbor,” although war did not in fact break out between Germany and Brazil until the 22 August 1942.

Raeder also caused the Navy to participate in war crimes ordered by other conspirators. A single example will suffice.

(b) _The order to shoot commandos._ On 28 October 1942 the head of the Operations Division of the Naval War Staff promulgated to naval commands Hitler’s order of 18 October 1942 requiring the shooting of commandos. The effect of this order was to deny the protection of the Geneva Convention to captured commandos. The document dated 28 October 1942 reads:

“Enclosed please find a Fuehrer Order regarding annihilation of
terror and sabotage units.

“This order must not be distributed in writing by Flotilla
leaders, Section Commanders or officers of this rank.

“After verbal distribution to subordinate sections the above
authorities must hand this order over to the next highest
section which is responsible for its confiscation and
destruction.” (_C-179_).

It will be difficult to conceive of clearer evidence than this, that Raeder appreciated the wrongfulness of Hitler’s commando order.

One example will show that this order was executed by the German Navy during the period when Raeder was its Commander.

A certain commando operation of December 1942 had as its objective an attack on shipping in Bordeaux harbor. The _Wehrmacht_ account of this incident states that six of the ten participants in that commando raid were arrested, and that all were shot on 23 March 1943 (_UK-57_). On this particular occasion the Navy under Raeder had implemented Hitler’s order much more expeditiously. This fact appears in extracts from the war diary of Admiral Bachmann, who was the German Flag Officer in charge of Western France (_C-176_). The entry for 10 December 1942 reads:

“About 1015. Telephone call from personal representative of the
Officer-in-charge of the Security Service in Paris, SS
Obersturmfuehrer Dr. Schmidt to Flag Officer-in-charge’s Flag
Lieutenant, requesting postponement of the shooting, as
interrogation had not been concluded. After consultation with
the Chief of Operations Staff the Security Service had been
directed to get approval direct from Headquarters.

“1820. Security Service, Bordeaux, requested Security Service
authorities at Fuehrer’s headquarters to postpone the shooting
for three days. Interrogations continued for the time being.”
(_C-176_)

The entry for the next day, 11 December 1942, reads:

“Shooting of the two prisoners was carried out by a unit
(strength 1/16) belonging to the naval officer in charge
Bordeaux, in the presence of an officer of the Security Service,
Bordeaux, on order of the Fuehrer.” (_C-176_)

A note in green pencil in the margin opposite this entry reads:

“Security Service should have done this. Phone Flag Officer in
Charge in future cases.” (_C-176_)

This provision for “future cases” was in fact an order that commandos should be handed over to the Security Service to be shot.

It is therefore evident from Admiral Bachmann’s war diary (_C-176_) that the first two men to be shot from the Bordeaux operation were actually put to death by a naval firing party on 11 December 1942.

The Naval War Staff had this comment to make upon that shooting:

“The Naval Commander, West France, reports that during the
course of the day explosives with magnets to stick on, mapping
material dealing with the mouth of the Gironde, aerial
photographs of the port installations at Bordeaux, camouflage
material and food and water for several days were found.
Attempts to salvage the canoe were unsuccessful. The Naval
Commander, West France, has ordered that both soldiers be shot
immediately for attempted sabotage, if their interrogation,
which has begun, confirms what has so far been discovered. Their
execution has, however, been postponed in order to obtain more
information.

“According to a _Wehrmacht_ report, both soldiers have meanwhile
been shot. The measure would be in accordance with the Fuehrer’s
special order, but is nevertheless something new in
international law, since the soldiers were in uniform.”
(_D-658_)

That last sentence shows clearly that the Naval High Command under Raeder accepted allegiance to the Nazi conspiracy as of greater importance than any question of moral principle or professional honor. The shooting of commandos was not an act of war, but simple murder.

D. _RAEDER’S ASSISTANCE TO THE CONSPIRACY THROUGH HIS POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES._

Raeder was not just a military puppet carrying out political orders. Before the Nazis came to power he had worked actively to rebuild the German Navy behind the back of the Reichstag. When the Nazis seized power, he unreservedly joined forces with them. He was the prime mover in transferring the loyalty of the German Navy to the Nazi Party. He himself was as much a member of the inner councils of the Nazis as any other defendant. He accepted membership in their main political advisory bodies.

He was well aware of the designs of the Nazis and assisted in their realization not only as a military technician, but also as a mendacious politician. And he furthered brutal methods of warfare. And yet of all the conspirators Raeder was one of the first to fall from his high position. It is true that the extension of the war beyond the boundaries of Poland came as a disappointment to him. His vision of a Nazi Armada mastering the Atlantic reckoned without Ribbentrop’s diplomacy and Hitler’s ideas of strategy.

In a memorandum dated 10 January 1943, just before his retirement, entitled, “The Importance of German Surface Forces for the War by powers signatory to the Three Power Pact,” Raeder stated:

“It was planned by the leaders of the National Socialist Reich
to give the German Navy by 1944/45 such a strength that it would
be possible to strike at the British vital arteries in the
Atlantic with sufficient ships, fighting power and range.

“In 1939, the war having begun five years earlier, the
construction of these forces was still in its initial stages.”
(_C-161_).

This memorandum shows how completely Raeder was cheated in his ambitious plans by miscalculation as to when his high seas fleet would be required. Raeder made a great effort to recover some of his lost glory with his attack on Norway. He made many efforts to liven up the war at sea, both at the expense of neutrals and also of the customs and laws of the sea. His further schemes, however, were disregarded by his fellow conspirators, and in January 1943 he retired, and thereafter was a leader in name only.

The record, in Raeder’s handwriting, of his interview with Hitler on 6 January 1943, which led to Raeder’s retirement, states in part:

“If the Fuehrer was anxious to demonstrate that the parting was
of the friendliest and wished that the name Raeder should
continue to be associated with the Navy, particularly abroad, it
would perhaps be possible to make an appointment to General
Inspector, giving appropriate publicity in the press, etc. But a
new C. in C. Navy with full responsibility for this office must
be appointed. The position of General Inspector, or whatever it
was decided to call it, must be purely nominal.

“Hitler accepted this suggestion with alacrity. The General
Inspector could perhaps carry out special tasks for him, make
tours of inspection, etc. The name of Raeder was still to be
associated with the Navy. After C. in C. Navy had repeated his
request, the Fuehrer definitely agreed to 30th January as his
release date. He would like to think over the details.”
(_D-655_)

This was Raeder’s twilight, different from the period of his ascendancy in 1939, when on 12 March he spoke on the occasion of the German Heroes’ Day (_D-653_). In that speech, during the celebration of “freedom to rearm,” Raeder stated, in the presence of Hitler and representatives of the Party and Armed Forces:

“* * * National Socialism, which originates from the spirit of
the German fighting soldier, has been chosen by the German
people as its ideology. The German people follow the symbols of
its regeneration with the same great love and fanatical passion.
The German people has had practical experience of National
Socialism and it has not been imposed, as so many outside
critics believe. The Fuehrer has shown his people that in the
National Socialist racial community lies the greatest and
invincible sources of strength, whose dynamic power ensures not
only peace at home, but also enables to make use of all the
Nation’s creative powers.” (_D-653_).

After eulogies of Hitler, Raeder continued as follows:

“This is the reason for the clear and unsparing summons to fight
Bolshevism and international Jewry, whose race-destroying
activities we have sufficiently experienced on our own people.
Therefore, the alliance with all similar-minded Nations who,
like Germany, are not willing to allow their strength, dedicated
to construction and peaceful work at home, to be disrupted by
alien ideologies as by parasites of a foreign race. * * * If
later on we instruct in the technical handling of weapons, this
task demands that the young soldier should also be taught
National Socialist ideology and the problems of life. This part
of the task, which becomes for us both a duty of honor and a
demand which cannot be refused, can and will be carried out if
we stand shoulder to shoulder and in sincere comradeship to the
Party and its organization. The armed forces and the Party thus
became more and more united in attitude and spirit.”

* * * * * *

“Germany is the protector of all Germans within and beyond our
frontiers. The shots fired at Almeria are proof of that.”
(_D-653_)

(The reference is to the bombardment of the Spanish town of Almeria, carried out by a German naval squadron on 31 May 1937 during the course of the Spanish Civil War.) After further panegyries on the Fuehrer and his leadership, Raeder hinted of what was to come:

“They all planted into a younger generation the great tradition
of death for a holy cause, knowing that their blood will lead
the way towards the freedom of their dreams.” (_D-653_)

That speech of Raeder’s illustrates his deep personal involvement in the Nazi conspiracy. There is the mixture of heroics and fatalism that led millions of Germans to slaughter. There are boasts of the violence used on the people of Almeria. There is the lip service to peace by a man who planned conquest. “Armed forces and party have become more and more united in attitude and spirit”—there is the authentic Nazi voice. There is the assertion of racialism. Finally, there is the anti-Semitic gesture, Raeder’s contribution to the outlook that produced Belsen. Imbued with these ideas, he became an active participant on both the political and military level in the Nazi conspiracy to wage wars of aggression and to wage them ruthlessly.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ERICH RAEDER

│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 67
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in │ │
│the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 │ │
│November 1937, signed by Hitler’s │ │
│adjutant, Hossbach, and dated 10 │ │
│November 1937. (USA 25) │ III │ 295
│ │ │
*498-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing │ │
│of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA │ │
│501) │ III │ 416
│ │ │
*503-PS │Letter signed by Jodl, 19 October │ │
│1942, concerning Hitler’s explanation │ │
│of his commando order of the day │ │
│before (Document 498-PS). (USA 542) │ III │ 426
│ │ │
*798-PS │Hitler’s speech to │ │
│Commanders-in-Chief, at Obersalzberg, │ │
│22 August 1939. (USA 29) │ III │ 581
│ │ │
*1807-PS │Extract from Jodl Diary, 16 June 1942,│ │
│concerning attack on Brazilian sea and│ │
│air forces. (GB 227) │ IV │ 377
│ │ │
*2031-PS │Decree establishing a Secret Cabinet │ │
│Council, 4 February 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 112. (GB│ │
│217) │ IV │ 654
│ │ │
2098-PS │Decree relating to Status of Supreme │ │
│Commanders of Army and Navy, 25 │ │
│February 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│Part I, p. 215. (GB 206) │ IV │ 725
│ │ │
*2194-PS │Top secret letter from Ministry for │ │
│Economy and Labor, Saxony, to Reich │ │
│Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, │ │
│enclosing copy of 1938 Secret Defense │ │
│Law of 4 September 1938. (USA 36) │ IV │ 843
│ │ │
2879-PS │Extracts from The Archives. │ V │ 542
│ │ │
*2888-PS │Certificate of positions held by │ │
│Raeder, 14 November 1945. (USA 13) │ V │ 553
│ │ │
*3260-PS │“Churchill Sank the Athenia”, │ │
│published in Voelkischer Beobachter, │ │
│23 October 1939. (GB 218) │ V │ 1008
│ │ │
*C-12 │OKW directive, signed Jodl, 20 │ │
│December 1939, concerning conduct of │ │
│U-Boat warfare on Merchant shipping │ │
│against England. (GB 226) │ VI │ 818
│ │ │
*C-21 │Extracts from file on Intensification │ │
│of U-boat warfare. (GB 194) │ VI │ 825
│ │ │
*C-23 │Unsigned documents found in official │ │
│Navy files containing notes year by │ │
│year from 1927 to 1940 on │ │
│reconstruction of the German Navy, and│ │
│dated 18 February 1938, 8 March 1938, │ │
│September 1938. (USA 49) │ VI │ 827
│ │ │
*C-27 │Minutes of Meeting between C-in-C Navy│ │
│and the Fuehrer. (GB 225) │ VI │ 829
│ │ │
*C-29 │Directive of 31 January 1933 by Raeder│ │
│for German Navy to support the │ │
│armament industry. (USA 46) │ VI │ 830
│ │ │
C-32 │Survey report of German Naval Armament│ │
│after conference with Chief of “A” │ │
│Section, 9 September 1933. (USA 50) │ VI │ 833
│ │ │
*C-38 │Letter, 13 June 1941, requesting │ │
│decision on action against enemy │ │
│submarines and Order to attack Soviet │ │
│submarines, 15 June 1941. (GB 223) │ VI │ 855
│ │ │
*C-64 │Raeder’s report, 12 December 1939, on │ │
│meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. │ │
│(GB 86) │ VI │ 884
│ │ │
*C-66 │Memorandum from Raeder to Assman, 10 │ │
│January 1944, concerning “Barbarossa” │ │
│and “Weseruebung”. (GB 81) │ VI │ 887
│ │ │
*C-105 │Extract from German Naval War Diary, │ │
│21 December 1940, p. 252. (GB 455) │ VI │ 913
│ │ │
*C-115 │Naval deception and camouflage in │ │
│invasion of Norway taken from file of │ │
│naval operation orders for operation │ │
│“Weseruebung”. (GB 90) │ VI │ 914
│ │ │
C-116 │Extract from German Naval file, 9 │ │
│August 1941, concerning Order to │ │
│blockade Norwegian ships. │ VI │ 915
│ │ │
C-117 │Extract from German Naval file, 13 │ │
│July 1941, concerning preparations for│ │
│laying of minefield near the │ │
│Bosphorus. │ VI │ 915
│ │ │
*C-120 │Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 │ │
│for “Fall Weiss”, operation against │ │
│Poland. (GB 41) │ VI │ 916
│ │ │
*C-122 │Extract from Naval War Diary. │ │
│Questionnaire on Norway bases, 3 │ │
│October 1939. (GB 82) │ VI │ 928
│ │ │
C-124 │Secret letter, 29 September 1941, │ │
│concerning future of St. Petersburg. │ VI │ 931
│ │ │
*C-126 │Preliminary Time Table for “Fall │ │
│Weiss” and directions for secret │ │
│mobilization. (GB 45) │ VI │ 932
│ │ │
*C-135 │Extract from history of war │ │
│organization and of the scheme for │ │
│mobilization. (GB 213) │ VI │ 946
│ │ │
*C-141 │Order for concealed armament of │ │
│E-boats, 10 February 1932, signed by │ │
│Raeder. (USA 47) │ VI │ 955
│ │ │
*C-152 │Extract from Naval War Staff files, 18│ │
│March 1941, concerning audience of │ │
│C-in-C of Navy with Hitler on 18 March│ │
│1941. (GB 122) │ VI │ 966
│ │ │
*C-155 │Memorandum, 11 June 1940, signed by │ │
│Raeder. (GB 214) │ VI │ 969
│ │ │
*C-156 │Concealed Rearmament under Leadership │ │
│of Government of Reich, from “Fight of│ │
│the Navy against Versailles │ │
│1919-1935”. (USA 41) │ VI │ 970
│ │ │
*C-161 │Memo by Raeder, 10 January 1943, │ │
│entitled: Importance of German Surface│ │
│forces for conducting of war by powers│ │
│signatory to Three Power Pact. (GB │ │
│230) │ VI │ 976
│ │ │
*C-166 │Order from Command Office of Navy, 12 │ │
│March 1934, signed in draft by Groos, │ │
│concerning preparation of auxiliary │ │
│cruisers. (USA 48) │ VI │ 977
│ │ │
*C-170 │File of Russo-German relations found │ │
│in OKM files covering period 25 August│ │
│1939 to 22 June 1941. (USA 136) │ VI │ 977
│ │ │
*C-176 │Extracts from War Diary of Admiral │ │
│Bachmann, concerning shooting of │ │
│commandos in Bordeaux. (GB 228) │ VI │ 1011
│ │ │
C-179 │Hitler’s second decree, 18 October │ │
│1942, regarding annihilation of terror│ │
│and sabotage units. (USA 543) │ VI │ 1014
│ │ │
*C-189 │Conversation with the Fuehrer in June │ │
│1934 on occasion of resignation of │ │
│Commanding Officer of “Karlsruhe”. │ │
│(USA 44) │ VI │ 1017
│ │ │
*C-190 │Memorandum of conversation with Hitler│ │
│on financing Naval rearmament and │ │
│assembling six submarines, 2 November │ │
│1934. (USA 45) │ VI │ 1018
│ │ │
*C-191 │Demands by defendant Doenitz on │ │
│sinking of merchant ships, 22 │ │
│September 1939. (GB 193) │ VI │ 1018
│ │ │
*D-448 │Announcement of birthday celebration │ │
│of Doenitz in Voelkischer Beobachter, │ │
│25 April 1942. (GB 216) │ VII │ 58
│ │ │
*D-481 │Law regarding the swearing in of │ │
│officials and soldiers of Armed │ │
│Forces, 20 August 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 785. (GB│ │
│215) │ VII │ 66
│ │ │
*D-638 │Affidavit of Doenitz concerning │ │
│sinking of Athenia, 17 November 1945. │ │
│(GB 220) │ VII │ 114
│ │ │
*D-653 │Raeder speech, 12 March 1939, │ │
│published in The Archive, March 1939, │ │
│pp. 1841-1846. (GB 232) │ VII │ 153
│ │ │
*D-654 │Affidavit of Adolf Schmidt, 9 August │ │
│1945. (GB 219) │ VII │ 156
│ │ │
*D-655 │Raeder interview with Hitler on 6 │ │
│January 1943. (GB 231) │ VII │ 158
│ │ │
*D-658 │Extract from SKL War Diary, 9 December│ │
│1942. (GB 229) │ VII │ 164
│ │ │
D-659 │Extract from War Diary of Chief of │ │
│U-boats, 27 September 1939. (GB 221) │ VII │ 164
│ │ │
*D-662 │War Diary of Commanding Officer of │ │
│U-boat U-30. (GB 222) │ VII │ 169
│ │ │
*D-663 │Operation Order “Atlantic” No. 56 for │ │
│U-boats in Atlantic, 7 October 1943. │ │
│(GB 200) │ VII │ 170
│ │ │
*EC-177 │Minutes of second session of Working │ │
│Committee of the Reich Defense held on│ │
│26 April 1933. (USA 390) │ VII │ 328
│ │ │
*L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │
│“Indoctrination on the political │ │
│situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847
│ │ │
*UK-57 │Keitel directives, 4 January 1944 and │ │
│21 April 1944, concerning │ │
│counteraction to Kharkov show trial. │ │
│(GB 164) │ VIII │ 539
│ │ │
*UK-65 │Report by Raeder to Hitler, 16 October│ │
│1939, and memorandum regarding │ │
│intensified naval war against England,│ │
│15 October 1939. (GB 224) │ VIII │ 545
│ │ │
Statement I │The Laconia Case and German Submarine │ │
│Warfare, by Karl Doenitz, Nurnberg, 7 │ │
│and 19 October 1945. │ VIII │ 657
│ │ │
Statement VII │The Development of German Naval │ │
│Policy—1933-1939, by Erich Raeder, │ │
│Moscow, fall 1945. │ VIII │ 684
│ │ │
Statement VIII │The Breakthrough in the Channel Early │ │
│in 1942, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, 30 │ │
│August 1945. │ VIII │ 701
│ │ │
Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │
│the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │
│fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707

16. BALDUR VON SCHIRACH

A. _SCHIRACH’S NSDAP MEMBERSHIP, NSDAP POSITIONS, AND GOVERNMENT
POSITIONS._

In an affidavit (_3302-PS_), Schirach has declared that he held the following positions:

_Positions in the Nazi Party_

(1) NSDAP member, 1925 to 1945.

(2) Leader of the National Socialist Students League, 1929-1931.

(3) Leader of the Hitler Youth organization, 1931-1940.

(4) Reich Youth Leader (_Reichsjugendfuehrer_) on the Staff of
the SA Supreme Command under Ernst Roehm, 1931-1932.

(5) Reich Youth Leader (_Reichsjugendfuehrer_) of the NSDAP,
1931-1940; in 1932 Schirach became an independent Reich Leader
(_Reichsleiter_), and no longer remained on the Staff of the SA
Supreme Command.

(6) Gruppenfuehrer (Lt. General) of the SA, 1931-1941.

(7) Reich Leader (_Reichsleiter_) for Youth Education in the
NSDAP, 1932-1945.

(8) Gau Leader (Gauleiter) of the Reichsgau Vienna, 1940-1945.

(9) Obergruppenfuehrer (General) of the SA, 1941-1945.

_Governmental Positions_

(1) Reich Youth Leader, 1933-1940.

(2) Reich Governor (_Reichsstatthalter_) of the Reichsgau
Vienna, 1940-1945.

(3) Reich Defense Commission of Vienna, 1940-1945.

(4) Deputy to the Fuehrer for the Inspection of the Hitler Youth
(_Beauftragter der Fuehrer fuer die Inspektion der Gesamten
Hitler Jugend_), 1940-1945.

Schirach was also a member of the Reichstag from 1932 to 1945 (_2973-PS_).

B. _SCHIRACH WAS AN INTIMATE AND SLAVISH FOLLOWER OF HITLER SINCE 1925._

As early as 1925 Baldur von Schirach, then 18 years old, joined the Nazi conspirators. Upon special request of Hitler, he went to Munich in order to study Party affairs. After having joined the NSDAP in 1925, he became active in converting students to National Socialism (_3302-PS_). This was the start of Schirach’s conspiratorial activities, which he continued for two decades in the spirit of unbending loyalty to Hitler and to the principles of National Socialism. Schirach shows his slavish loyalty to Hitler in his principal book, “The Hitler Youth,” published in 1934:

“We were not yet able to account for our conception in detail,
we simply believed. And when Hitler’s book, _Mein Kampf_, was
published it was our bible which we almost learned by heart in
order to answer the questions of the doubters and superior
critics. Almost everyone today who is leading youth in a
responsible position joined us in those years.”

* * * * * *

“In my apartment on _Koenigin Strasse_, I was lucky enough to be
able to express my apprehensions about Strasser to the Fuehrer,
otherwise I never discussed these things with anybody with the
exception of Julius Streicher.” (_1458-PS_).

C. _SCHIRACH WAS THE LEADING NAZI CONSPIRATOR IN DESTROYING INDEPENDENT
YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS AND IN BUILDING THE NAZI YOUTH MOVEMENT._

(Reference is made at this point to section 8 of Chapter VII on “Reshaping of Education and Training of Youth”. See also _3054-PS_.)

It was Schirach’s task to perpetuate the Nazi regime through generations by poisoning the mind of youth, and thereby the mind of the German people, and to prepare the German nation for aggressive wars.

The basic law concerning the Hitler Youth, which under Schirach’s tutelage became an instrument of the Nazi State, declares:

“The future of the German Nation depends on its youth, and the
German youth shall have to be prepared for its future duties. *
* *

“All German youth in the Reich is organized within the Hitler
Youth.

“The German youth besides being reared within the family and
school, shall be educated physically, intellectually, and
morally in the spirit of National Socialism to serve the people
and the community, through the Hitler Youth.

“The task of educating the German Youth through the Hitler Youth
is being entrusted to the Reich Leader of German Youth in the
NSDAP. * * *” (_1392-PS_).

For the five years preceding the promulgation of this law Schirach had been leader of the Hitler Youth and Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP. He continued in these positions until the Nazis launched their aggressive wars. As late as 4 December 1945, Schirach declared his own feeling of responsibility for Nazi policies concerning youth:

“I feel myself responsible for the policy of the youth movement
in the Party and later within the Reich.” (_3302-PS_).

(1) _Schirach actively promoted the NSDAP and its affiliated youth organizations before the Nazis seized power._ In 1929 Hitler appointed Schirach leader of the National Socialist German Students League and in 1931 leader of the Hitler Jugend. After 1931, Schirach devoted his full time to Party work (_3302-PS_). Before 1933, Schirach moved throughout Germany, leading demonstrations and summoning German youth to the Hitler Youth. When this organization and the wearing of its uniform were forbidden by law, Schirach continued by illegal means. Of this period he writes:

“Whoever came to us during this illegal time, boy or girl,
risked everything. * * * With pistols in our belts we drove
through the Ruhr district while stones came flying after us.”
(_1458-PS_)

Schirach admits that Rosenberg and he were not successful before 1933 in efforts to reach “an understanding” with other youth organizations. Schirach states that he thereupon arrived at a conclusion which later was to spell the doom of independent youth groups:

“I realized at that time that an understanding with the leaders
of the League would never be possible and devoted myself to the
principle of the totality [_Totalitaet_] of the Hitler Youth
which in the year 1933 cost all those leagues their independent
existence.” (_1458-PS_).

(2) _Schirach, on behalf of the Nazi conspirators, destroyed all independent youth organizations or caused them to be absorbed within the Hitler Youth (Hitler Jugend)._ After the Nazi conspirators seized political control of Germany, Schirach was aggressive in bringing the entire German youth within the Nazi orbit of control and domination. Referring to the period immediately following 30 January 1933, Schirach declared: