Chapter XII: on Persecution of the Jews.) (3)

There was no room for surmise in these utterances; Hitler was definitely and irrevocably committed to waging aggressive war. If Schacht ever had any doubts concerning Hitler’s firm resolve to carry out the program of aggressive war outlined in _Mein Kampf_; if, contrary to his statements to Mr. Messersmith and Ambassador Dodd, Schacht actually doubted in 1934 that the Nazis, whom he was faithfully serving, would inevitably plunge Europe into war; and if, despite the pressing sense of immediacy that had pervaded the Nazi war economy from the very outset, he had entertained lingering doubts concerning Hitler’s plans for armed aggression, all such doubts must have been removed by the clear and unequivocal pronouncements in the above-mentioned eventful meetings of 1936 in which he participated.

Yet, despite his knowledge of Hitler’s plans to wage aggressive war, despite the fact that he had grave technical doubts about the ability of the Reichsbank to finance further armaments through additional short term credits, and despite the fact that some directors of the Reichsbank had opposed further “mefo” financing, Schacht pledged another 3 billion Reichsmarks by the “mefo” bill method for further financing of armaments in March 1937 (_EC-438_).

The Hossbach notes, dated 10 November 1937, on the important conference of 5 November 1937 in the _Reichskanzlei_, reveal a further crystallization of Hitler’s program of absorption and conquest in Europe (_386-PS_). Definite plans were laid for the early acquisition of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and for their exploitation in preparation for further military operations. So far as appears, Schacht was not present at this particular meeting. But his awareness of what occurred at the meeting is shown by the fact that he told Ambassador Bullitt on 23 November 1937, that

“Hitler was determined to have Austria eventually attached to
Germany and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of
Bohemia. At the present moment he was not vitally concerned
about the Polish Corridor, and in his [Schacht’s] opinion it
might be possible to maintain the Corridor provided Danzig were
permitted to join East Prussia, and provided some sort of a
bridge could be built across the Corridor uniting Danzig and
East Prussia with Germany.” (_L-151_).

Although Schacht apparently sought to convey the impression to Ambassador Bullitt that he desired to stay Hitler’s hand but was powerless to do so, it is clear that he was actually in complete sympathy with Hitler’s objectives. Despite the mounting tension which followed his conversation with Ambassador Bullitt, Schacht remained as President of the Reichsbank, and in that capacity established, in advance of the invasion of Austria, the rate of exchange between Marks and Austrian Schillings which was to prevail after the absorption of Austria (_EC-421_).

Moreover, under his direction, the Austrian National Bank was merged into the Reichsbank (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1938, I, 254). His speech of 21 March 1938, to the employees of the former Austrian National Bank on the occasion of its obliteration as an independent institution, betrayed his true feelings. After inveighing against “the dictates of Versailles and St. Germain”, Schacht stated:

“Thank God, these things could after all not hinder the great
German people on their way, for Adolf Hitler has created a
communion of German will and German thought, he bolstered it up
with the newly strengthened Wehrmacht and he then finally gave
the external form to the inner union between Germany and
Austria.”

* * * * * *

“One person says he would have done it maybe in one way, but the
remarkable thing is that they did not do it (hilarity), that IT
WAS ONLY DONE BY OUR ADOLF HITLER (Long continued applause) and
if there is still something left to be improved, then those
grumblers should try to bring about those improvements from the
German Reich and within the German community, but not to disturb
it from without. (Lively agreement)”.

* * * * * *

“I ask you to raise your hands and to repeat after me:

I swear that: I will be faithful, and obedient to the Fuehrer of
the German Reich and the German people, Adolf Hitler, and will
perform my duties conscientiously and selflessly. (The audience
takes the pledge with uplifted hands).

You have taken this pledge. A scoundrel he who breaks it. To our
Fuehrer a triple ‘Sieg heil’.” (_EC-297-A_)

Schacht was likewise enthusiastic about the acquisition of the Sudetenland, and filled with pride over the contribution his credit policy as head of the Reichsbank had made thereto (_EC-611_).

In January 1939, when Hitler was ruthlessly exploiting his successes in Austria and the Sudetenland in preparation for his next aggressive move, Schacht again referred, with pride, to the fact that the _Wehrmacht_ which he had helped create by his ingenious and risky methods had made possible Hitler’s successes. Thus, he said:

“From the beginning the Reichsbank has been aware of the fact
that a successful foreign policy can be attained only by the
reconstruction of the German armed forces. It [the Reichsbank]
therefore assumed to a very great extent the responsibility to
_finance_ the rearmament in spite of the inherent dangers to the
currency. The justification thereof was the necessity—which
pushed all other considerations into the background—to carry
through the armament at once, out of nothing and furthermore
under camouflage, which made a respect-commanding foreign policy
possible.” (_EC-369_)

The foregoing proof establishes, it seems clear, that Schacht knew of Hitler’s plans for aggressive war, and wilfully created the means whereby those plans could be executed. But apart from this direct proof, it is submitted that to a man in Schacht’s position, the events of the period clearly bespoke Hitler’s intentions. Schacht was a key figure in the Nazi Government during the period of the Nazi agitation in Austria, the introduction of conscription, the march into the Rhineland, the conquest of Austria, and the acquisition of the Sudetenland by a show of force.

During this period, the Reich debt trebled under the stress of mounting armaments (_EC-419_), and all the resources of Germany were being strained to the very limit for armament. It was a period in which the burning European foreign policy issue was the satisfaction of Germany’s repeated demands for additional territory. Hitler, committed to a policy of expansion, was laying the greatest stress upon utmost speed in preparation for war.

Certainly in this setting, Schacht did not proceed in ignorance of the fact that he was assisting Hitler and Nazi Germany along the road towards armed aggression.

E. _SCHACHT’S LOSS OF POWER DID NOT IMPLY DISAGREEMENT WITH THE
CONSPIRATORS’ PROGRAM OF AGGRESSIVE WAR._

(1) _His resignation as Minister of Economics and General Plenipotentiary for War Economy._ In November 1937, Schacht resigned his offices as Minister of Economics and General Plenipotentiary for War Economy. At the same time, he accepted appointment as Minister without Portfolio, and continued as President of the Reichsbank. It is submitted that the evidence shows that Schacht’s resignations were merely the outgrowth of a clash between two power-seeking individuals, Goering and Schacht, over _methods_ of creating a war economy and over who should have final authority to direct the completion of the task. So far as appears, Schacht was in full accord with the other conspirators upon the _desirability_ of providing Hitler with the means by which he eventually could carry out his planned aggressions.

The basic differences between Schacht and Goering date from a period shortly after Goering became head of the Four-Year Plan Office. The latter office was created by Hitler in September 1936, and in connection therewith, Goering was “given far reaching powers to issue directives to all the highest offices of the State and Party”. Goering conceived of his function as head of the Four-Year Plan Office “within four years to put the entire economy in a state of readiness for war” (_EC-408_).

Schacht was in agreement with the “aim and idea” of the Four-Year Plan. He promised Goering his complete support and cooperation, and urged that Goering draw upon Schacht’s long experience in economic affairs. Thus, in Schacht’s letter of 5 August 1937, to Goering, he said:

“The aim and the idea of the Four Year Plan were and remain
entirely correct and necessary! It stands, essentially, for the
application of increased energy to the efforts already
undertaken by my ministry since 1934 with the results shown in
the above statistics. As you will remember, I welcomed it when
your energy, my dear Prime Minister, was recruited by the
Fuehrer for these tasks, and from the very beginning I gave you
my most loyal support and cooperation, with the particular plea
that I be given a hearing from time to time, since I believed
that my more than thirty years of experience in economic life,
half of them in public service, could be of value to you.”
(_EC-497_)

Goering, however, failed to avail himself of Schacht’s offer of his services. “I can only regret,” said Schacht in the aforementioned letter, “that you have made so little use of my offer” (_EC-497_). Instead, Goering began to encroach upon powers which had been delegated to Schacht, and they became embroiled in a bitter jurisdictional conflict. On 26 November 1936, Goering issued a directive regarding raw and synthetic material production, whereby he undertook to assume control over large economic areas previously within Schacht’s province (_EC-243_).

Schacht did not supinely accept Goering’s intrusions upon his powers. Goering’s directive was countered by an abrupt order from Schacht to all supervisory offices to accept orders from him alone (_EC-376_).

The conflict reached such dimensions that it threatened to retard the pace of the conspirators’ armament program. The military sided with Schacht, who had provided the means for their rapid rearmament. They submitted proposals which would have assured to Schacht as Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy the responsibility for “unified preparation of the war economy as heretofore” (_EC-408_; _EC-420_).

In January 1937, the German Military Weekly Gazette published an article warmly praising Schacht’s achievements in rearmament. The timing of the article indicates that it was a further attempt by the military to tip the scales in Schacht’s favor. The article stated:

“The German Defense Force commemorates Dr. Schacht today as one
of the men who have done imperishable things for it and its
development in accordance with directions from the Fuehrer and
Reich Chancellor. The Defense Force owes it to Schacht’s skill
and great ability that, in defiance of all currency
difficulties, it, according to plan, has been able to grow up to
its present strength from an army of 100,000 men.” (_EC-383_)

Shortly thereafter, Schacht attempted to force a showdown with Goering by temporarily refusing to act in his capacity as Plenipotentiary. Schacht plainly was using his prime importance in the conspirators’ program of economic planning and preparation for war as a lever. In a letter to Hitler dated 22 February 1937, General von Blomberg, the Minister of War, suggested a settlement of the jurisdictional fight under which Schacht would fully retain his powers as General Plenipotentiary of War Economy, and concluded by stating:

“If you, my Fuehrer, agree with my view regarding these
jurisdictional questions, it may be possible to induce
Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht, whose cooperation as
Plenipotentiary for preparation of war is of great significance,
to resume his former activity.” (_EC-244_)

As a further demonstration of the community of interest between Schacht and the top German military authorities, Schacht attended the secret “War Economy” games at Godesberg in the latter part of May 1937. The purpose of the games was to demonstrate “how the action of the soldiers in total war is influenced by economy and how on the other hand, economy is completely dependent on military operations”. Schacht’s attendance was acclaimed at the games as

“renewed proof that you are willing to facilitate for us
soldiers the difficult war-economic preparations and to
strengthen the harmonious cooperation with your offices.”
(_EC-174_).

In June 1937, Keitel implored Hitler to accelerate a final agreement between Schacht and Goering. Speaking of arrangements concerning cooperation of these two key figures, Keitel said:

“I know that a necessary practical basis for it [the arrangement
for cooperation between Schacht and Goering] has already been
found, and only a formal agreement is needed in order to carry
on the common work.”

* * * * * *

“* * * to waste time in our situation would be the greatest
reproach that history could make upon us.

“May I beg, therefore, once more that the arrangement mentioned
be expedited, and that I be notified accordingly.” (_EC-248_)

Finally, on 7 July 1937, Schacht and Goering signed an agreement of reconciliation in Berlin, wherein it was said that the tasks of Goering and Schacht “are being solved in closest mutual cooperation,” and that “no doubt exists about the fact that the Commissioner General for War Economy has the position of a supreme authority of the Reich” (_EC-384_).

Schacht resumed his duties as General Plenipotentiary with renewed vigor. On the day following his formal agreement with Goering, he wrote to General von Blomberg on “Measures for the preparation of the conduct of war,” pledging continued cooperation in their mutual endeavors:

“* * * by the direction of the supreme authority for the conduct
of war, the coordination of the conduct of war will be assured
in its execution through mutual agreement between you and me,
which I look upon as a matter of course in the Central Authority
and without which I cannot envisage any conduct of war. The
direction of the economy by the plenipotentiary would in that
event never ‘take place entirely independent from the rest of
the war mechanism’ but would be aimed at the accomplishment of
the political war purpose with the mustering of all economic
forces. I am entirely willing, therefore, to participate in this
way in the preparation of the forthcoming order giving effect to
the Reich Defense Act [_Reichsverteidigungsgesetz_].” (_EC-252_)

However, Schacht and Goering were soon again in disagreement. After a sharp exchange of letters in which each sought to justify his particular economic program as the best means of making possible the attainment of Hitler’s objectives (_EC-497_; _EC-493_), Schacht suggested to Goering in a curt letter dated 26 August 1937, that he (Goering) assume sole charge of economic policies. In this letter, Schacht rationalized his precipitate action as follows:

“To me it does not seem to be of decisive importance to raise
questions of competence and initiative, but it is of decisive
importance that the Fuehrer’s economic policy should be carried
out in a coherent manner, and with the least amount of
friction.” (_EC-283_)

Despite the uncompromising tenor of the latter communication, Schacht was still amenable to an arrangement with Goering which would have permitted him a measure of autonomy in economic planning and preparation for war. On 1 November 1937, he attended a conference with Goering

“* * * which led in an entirely friendly manner to the working
out of a series of proposals, which * * * Goering promised to
have presented to me [Schacht] in writing on the following day *
* * so that, after having reached an agreement we could present
a mutually approved text to you, my Fuehrer.” (_EC-495_)

But the written agreement was not forthcoming as Goering had promised, and Schacht repeated his request to be relieved from the Ministry of Economics, “in the interest of a uniform government management” (_EC-495_). Hitler finally accepted Schacht’s resignation as Minister of Economics on 26 November 1937, simultaneously appointing him Minister Without Portfolio. Schacht’s resignation was also extended to his position as Plenipotentiary for War Economy (_EC-494_).

In subsequent interrogations, both Schacht and Goering have confirmed the fact that Schacht’s withdrawal was simply the result of a losing struggle with Goering to retain personal power (_3730-PS_; _3728-PS_).

There is nothing to indicate that Schacht’s withdrawal from the Ministry of Economics and the Office of Plenipotentiary for War Economy in any sense represented a break with Hitler on the ground of contemplated military aggression. He consented to retain his position as President of the Reichsbank, where he remained undisputed master, and accepted the post of Minister of[without] Portfolio, in order to be Hitler’s “personal adviser.” In the letter accepting Schacht’s resignation as Minister of Economics, Hitler said:

“If I accede to your wish it is with the expression of deepest
gratitude for your so excellent achievements and in the happy
consciousness that, as President of the Reichsbank Directorium,
you will make available for the German people and me for many
years more your outstanding knowledge and ability and your
untiring working strength. Delighted at the fact that in the
future, also, you are willing to be my personal adviser, I
appoint you as of today a Reich Minister.” (_L-104_).

As President of the Reichsbank, Schacht continued to carry out Hitler’s policies. As previously shown, he participated in the planning of the invasion of Austria by fixing the conversion rate of the Austrian Schilling in advance of the invasion; and under his direction, the Austrian National Bank was merged into the Reichsbank. He publicly approved the absorption of Austria and the acquisition of the Sudetenland. He continued to finance armaments by “mefo” bill credits until April 1938, and thereafter, until his resignation in January 1939, authorized an increase of approximately 2.6 billion Reichsmarks in bank notes in order to discount commercial paper which was used in connection with the armament program. (_EC-438_)

(2) _Schacht’s dismissal from the Presidency of the Reichsbank._ Schacht was dismissed from the Presidency of the Reichsbank in January 1939. The evidence indicates that Schacht engineered his dismissal in order to escape personal responsibility for what he believed to be an impending financial crisis; he was not dismissed because of disagreement with the ultimate objectives of the conspiracy or common plan.

Schacht had always feared an inflation in Germany. As early as May 1936, he emphatically stated that he would “never be party to an inflation” (_1301-PS_). In January 1939, Schacht was convinced that ruinous inflation was, in fact, imminent (_EC-369_). There was, it appears, ample basis for his fear. The Finance Minister, von Krosigk, had already recognized the situation in September 1938, and had written to Hitler warning that

“* * * we are steering towards a serious financial crisis, the
forebodings of which have led already abroad to detailed
discussions of this weak side in our economic preparations and
to an apprehensive loss of confidence domestically.” (_EC-419_)

Schacht was not only afraid of a financial crisis; he was even more fearful that he personally would be held responsible for it and his prestige would suffer a crushing blow. One of his associates at the Reichsbank has stated:

“When Schacht saw that the risky situation which he had
sponsored was becoming insoluble, he was more and more anxious
to get out. This desire to get out of a bad situation was for a
long time the ‘leitmotif’ of Schacht’s conversations with the
directors of the bank.” (_EC-438_)

In the end, Schacht deliberately stimulated his dismissal from the Presidency of the Reichsbank by arbitrarily refusing an end-of-the-month loan in a relatively small amount to the Reich, contrary to well established practice (_3730-PS_; _3731-PS_).

Despite differences of opinion concerning the limits to which the German economy might be pushed without plunging the country into inflation, Schacht continued to enjoy Hitler’s confidence. In his letter to Schacht dated 19 January 1939, Hitler stated:

“On the occasion of your recall from Office as President of the
Reichsbank Directory, I take the opportunity to express to you
my most sincere and warmest gratitude for the services which you
rendered repeatedly to Germany and to me personally in this
capacity during long and difficult years. Your name, above all,
will always be connected with the first epoch of the national
rearmament. I am happy to be able to avail myself of your
services for the solution of new tasks in your position as Reich
Minister.” (_EC-397_).

On his side, Schacht evidenced his abiding faith in Hitler and his continued agreement with his aggressive policies, by remaining as Minister without Portfolio until January 1943. As such he received a large salary from the Nazi Government and enjoyed the emoluments of public office (_3724-PS_).

(3) _Conclusion._ Schacht’s assistance in the earlier phase of the conspiracy was an important factor in enabling the conspirators to seize the German state and thus pave the way for their later crimes. His work was indispensable to the rearmament of Germany and to the economic planning and preparation required to launch the German wars of aggression. As long as he remained in power, he worked as eagerly for the preparation of aggressive war as any of his co-conspirators. He personally was favorably disposed towards aggression, if “Lebensraum” for Germany could not otherwise be attained. He knew that Hitler intended to and would break the peace, and with this knowledge, he willingly and purposely contributed his efforts. His withdrawal from three of his four posts reflected no moral feeling against the use of aggressive warfare as an instrument of national policy; he withdrew for reasons wholly unrelated to Hitler’s program of illegal aggression. By the time of his withdrawal from these three positions, he had already provided his co-conspirators with the physical means and economic planning necessary to launch and maintain their wars of aggression; and he continued in his lucrative fourth position (Minister without Portfolio) until January 1943—until, in short, it became doubtful whether the conspirators could maintain the successes which they had gained in the wars they had illegally launched and were waging.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO HJALMAR SCHACHT

│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 63
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in │ │
│the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 │ │
│November 1937, signed by Hitler’s │ │
│adjutant, Hossbach, and dated 10 │ │
│November 1937. (USA 25) │ III │ 295
│ │ │
*1168-PS │Unsigned Schacht memorandum to Hitler,│ │
│3 May 1935, concerning the financing │ │
│of the armament program. (USA 37) │ III │ 827
│ │ │
*1301-PS │File relating to financing of │ │
│armament, including minutes of │ │
│conference with Goering at the Air │ │
│Ministry, 14 October 1938, concerning │ │
│acceleration of rearmament. (USA 123) │ III │ 868
│ │ │
*2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │
│Commanders of Army, Navy and Air │ │
│Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by │ │
│copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May │ │
│1935 and copy of Decision of Reich │ │
│Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council │ │
│for defense of the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934
│ │ │
*2409-PS │Extracts from The Imperial House to │ │
│the Reich Chancellery by Dr. Joseph │ │
│Goebbels. (USA 262) │ V │ 83
│ │ │
*3021-PS │Statement of governmental positions │ │
│held by Dr. Hjalmar Schacht. (USA 11) │ V │ 737
│ │ │
3700-PS │Letter from Schacht to Reich Marshal, │ │
│11 March, concerning conscription of │ │
│15-year-olds. (USA 780) │ VI │ 404
│ │ │
*3724-PS │Testimony of Hjalmar Schacht, 11 July │ │
│1945. (USA 776) │ VI │ 463
│ │ │
*3725-PS │Testimony of Hjalmar Schacht, 20 July │ │
│1945. (USA 615) │ VI │ 464
│ │ │
*3726-PS │Testimony of Hjalmar Schacht, 24 │ │
│August 1945. (USA 628) │ VI │ 465
│ │ │
*3727-PS │Testimony of Hjalmar Schacht, 13 │ │
│October 1945. (USA 633) │ VI │ 478
│ │ │
*3728-PS │Testimony of Hjalmar Schacht, 16 │ │
│October 1945. (USA 636) │ VI │ 485
│ │ │
*3729-PS │Testimony of Hjalmar Schacht, 17 │ │
│October 1945. (USA 616) │ VI │ 501
│ │ │
*3730-PS │Testimony of Hermann Goering, 17 │ │
│October 1945. (USA 648) │ VI │ 530
│ │ │
*3731-PS │Testimony of von Krosigk, 24 September│ │
│1945. (USA 647) │ VI │ 535
│ │ │
*3901-PS │Letter written November 1932 by │ │
│Schacht, Krupp and others to the Reich│ │
│President. (USA 837) │ VI │ 796
│ │ │
*D-203 │Speech of Hitler to leading members of│ │
│industry before the election of March │ │
│1933. (USA 767) │ VI │ 1080
│ │ │
*EC-128 │Report on state of preparations for │ │
│war economic mobilization as of 30 │ │
│September 1934. (USA 623) │ VII │ 306
│ │ │
*EC-174 │Summary “war economy” trip to │ │
│Godesberg undertaken by General Staff │ │
│between 25 May and 2 June 1937. (USA │ │
│761) │ VII │ 326
│ │ │
*EC-177 │Minutes of second session of Working │ │
│Committee of the Reich Defense held on│ │
│26 April 1933. (USA 390) │ VII │ 328
│ │ │
EC-243 │Memorandum, 26 November 1936, │ │
│containing Goering’s Order regarding │ │
│jurisdiction and development of raw │ │
│and synthetic materials. (USA 637) │ VII │ 338
│ │ │
*EC-244 │Letter from Blomberg to Hitler, 22 │ │
│February 1937. (USA 641) │ VII │ 342
│ │ │
EC-248 │Letter from Keitel to Koerner, 14 June│ │
│1937, concerning cooperation of │ │
│Plenipotentiary General and Four Year │ │
│Plan for War Economy. │ VII │ 343
│ │ │
EC-251 │Letter from Wohlthat to various │ │
│officials, 21 July 1937. │ VII │ 344
│ │ │
*EC-252 │Letter from Schacht to Blomberg, 8 │ │
│July 1937. (USA 762) │ VII │ 346
│ │ │
*EC-257 │Personal letter from Schacht to │ │
│Thomas, 29 December 1937. (USA 763) │ VII │ 347
│ │ │
*EC-258 │Report on Preparation of the Economic │ │
│Mobilization by the Plenipotentiary │ │
│for War Economy as of 31 December │ │
│1937. (USA 625) │ VII │ 347
│ │ │
EC-283 │Letter from Schacht to Goering, 26 │ │
│August 1937. │ VII │ 379
│ │ │
*EC-297-A │Address in Vienna of the Reichsbank │ │
│President, Dr. Schacht, 21 March 1938.│ │
│(USA 632) │ VII │ 394
│ │ │
*EC-369 │Correspondence between Schacht and │ │
│Hitler, January 1939. (USA 631) │ VII │ 426
│ │ │
*EC-376 │Letter from Schacht to supervisory │ │
│officers, 11 December 1936. (USA 638) │ VII │ 436
│ │ │
*EC-383 │Letter 16 January 1937 with │ │
│enclosure—article about Schacht │ │
│appearing in the Military weekly │ │
│Gazette. (USA 640) │ VII │ 436
│ │ │
EC-384 │Agreement between Schacht and Goering,│ │
│7 July 1937. (USA 771) │ VII │ 438
│ │ │
*EC-397 │Letter from Hitler to Schacht, 19 │ │
│January 1939. (USA 650) │ VII │ 438
│ │ │
*EC-398 │Dismissal of Schacht as President of │ │
│the Reichsbank, 20 January 1939. (USA │ │
│649) │ VII │ 438
│ │ │
*EC-405 │Minutes of Tenth Meeting of Working │ │
│Committee of Reichs Defense Council, │ │
│26 June 1935. (GB 160) │ VII │ 450
│ │ │
*EC-406 │Minutes of Eleventh Meeting of Reichs │ │
│Defense Council, 6 December 1935. (USA│ │
│772) │ VII │ 455
│ │ │
*EC-408 │Memorandum report about the Four Year │ │
│Plan and preparation of the war │ │
│economy, 30 December 1936. (USA 579) │ VII │ 465
│ │ │
*EC-415 │Extracts from “Schacht in His │ │
│Statements”, Berlin, 1937. (USA 627) │ VII │ 469
│ │ │
*EC-416 │Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 4 │ │
│September 1936. (USA 635) │ VII │ 471
│ │ │
*EC-419 │Letter from Schwerin-Krosigk to │ │
│Hitler, 1 September 1938. (USA 621) │ VII │ 474
│ │ │
*EC-420 │Draft of letter prepared by Military │ │
│Economic Staff, 19 December 1936. (USA│ │
│639) │ VII │ 479
│ │ │
*EC-421 │Minutes taken by member of General │ │
│Thomas’ staff of meeting held on 11 │ │
│March 1938. (USA 645) │ VII │ 481
│ │ │
EC-432 │Extracts from Annual Economic Review │ │
│for Germany, 1935, prepared by Douglas│ │
│Miller. │ VII │ 484
│ │ │
*EC-433 │Koenigsberg speech of Schacht at │ │
│German Eastern Fair. (USA 832) │ VII │ 486
│ │ │
*EC-436 │Affidavit of Puhl, 2 November 1945. │ │
│(USA 620) │ VII │ 494
│ │ │
EC-437 │Affidavit of Puhl, 7 November 1945. │ │
│(USA 624) │ VII │ 495
│ │ │
*EC-438 │Affidavit of Puhl, 8 November 1945. │ │
│(USA 646) │ VII │ 499
│ │ │
*EC-439 │Affidavit of Schnitzler, 10 November │ │
│1945. (USA 618) │ VII │ 501
│ │ │
*EC-450 │Affidavit of S. R. Fuller, 18 October │ │
│1945. (USA 629) │ VII │ 502
│ │ │
*EC-451 │Affidavit of Messersmith, 15 November │ │
│1945. (USA 626) │ VII │ 509
│ │ │
*EC-456 │Letter from Schacht to Hitler, 12 │ │
│November 1932. (USA 773) │ VII │ 512
│ │ │
*EC-457 │Letter from Schacht to Hitler, 29 │ │
│August 1932. (USA 619) │ VII │ 513
│ │ │
*EC-458 │Affidavit of Major Tilley, 21 November│ │
│1945. (USA 634) │ VII │ 514
│ │ │
*EC-460 │Franz Reuter “Schacht”, from German │ │
│Publishing Establishment, 1937, pp. │ │
│113-114. (USA 617) │ VII │ 515
│ │ │
*EC-461 │Extracts from Ambassador Dodd’s Diary,│ │
│1933-38. (USA 58) │ VII │ 515
│ │ │
EC-492 │Letter from Schacht to Goering, 17 │ │
│April 1937. │ VII │ 550
│ │ │
*EC-493 │Letter from Goering to Schacht, 22 │ │
│August 1937. (USA 642) │ VII │ 552
│ │ │
*EC-494 │Letter from Lammers to Goering, │ │
│presenting copy of letter from Lammers│ │
│to Schacht, 8 December 1937. (USA 643)│ VII │ 565
│ │ │
*EC-495 │Letter from Schacht to Hitler, 16 │ │
│November 1937, requesting release. │ │
│(USA 774) │ VII │ 566
│ │ │
*EC-497 │Letter from Schacht to Goering, 5 │ │
│August 1937. (USA 775) │ VII │ 567
│ │ │
EC-498 │“Schacht in Danzig”, excerpt of 16 │ │
│June 1935 from Frankfurter Zeitung. │ VII │ 576
│ │ │
EC-499 │Dr. Schacht 60 Years Old, from │ │
│Voelkischer Beobachter, 21 January │ │
│1937. │ VII │ 576
│ │ │
EC-500 │A Proclamation by Dr. Schacht on │ │
│occasion of presentation of Golden │ │
│Party Badge, from Frankfurter Zeitung,│ │
│9 February 1937. │ VII │ 578
│ │ │
EC-501 │The Economic Development, and │ │
│Inaugural speech by Dr. Schacht, from │ │
│Berliner Tageblatt, 21 April 1937. │ VII │ 579
│ │ │
EC-502 │“In Germany There is only One Economic│ │
│Policy”, from Frankfurter Zeitung, 19 │ │
│January 1936. │ VII │ 583
│ │ │
EC-503 │Schacht Speech at Leipzig Fair, from │ │
│Frankfurter Zeitung, 5 March 1935. │ VII │ 583
│ │ │
*EC-611 │Speech by Schacht, 29 November 1938, │ │
│entitled “Miracle of Finance” and “The│ │
│New Plan”. (USA 622) │ VII │ 589
│ │ │
*L-104 │Report Ambassador Dodd to State │ │
│Department, 29 November 1937, │ │
│concerning Hitler’s letter to Schacht │ │
│accepting resignation as Minister of │ │
│Economics and Schacht’s circular │ │
│communication to officials of │ │
│Ministry. (USA 644) │ VII │ 879
│ │ │
*L-111 │Telegraphic report from Ambassador │ │
│Davies to State Department, 20 January│ │
│1937. (USA 630) │ VII │ 881
│ │ │
*L-151 │Report from Ambassador Bullitt to │ │
│State Department, 23 November 1937, │ │
│regarding his visit to Warsaw. (USA │ │
│70) │ VII │ 894
│ │ │
*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770

13. GUSTAV KRUPP von BOHLEN und HALBACH[1]

A. _IN FURTHERANCE OF THE NAZI CONSPIRACY, KRUPP CIRCUMVENTED THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES ON THE REARMAMENT OF GERMANY. AS THE RESPONSIBLE HEAD OF THE HUGE ARMAMENTS CONCERN, FRIED. KRUPP A.G., HE CONCEALED ITS ARMAMENT ACTIVITY IN ORDER TO DECEIVE THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS. HE WAS, THEREFORE, IN A POSITION TO PROMOTE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CONSPIRACY BY THE RAPID PRODUCTION OF MUNITIONS OF WAR ON A HUGE SCALE AFTER THE CONSPIRATORS’ ACCESSION TO POWER._

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[1] Since the name of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach was severed from the Nurnberg trial which commenced on 20 November 1945, the trial brief outlining the case against Krupp, which was prepared before his severance, was not presented to the Tribunal. Despite his personal absence from the prisoners’ dock, however, Krupp remained technically still under indictment and liable to prosecution in subsequent proceedings. Moreover, Krupp was still regarded by the prosecution as a member of the Nazi conspiracy. The following summary of evidence, adapted from the trial brief, is included here in order to show the role played by Krupp as co-conspirator.

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In an article entitled “Manager and Armament Worker” written for the 1 March 1942 issue of the Krupp magazine, Krupp stated:

“* * * I knew German history well, and out of my experiences in
the rest of the world I believed to know the German kind;
therefore I never doubted that, although for the time being all
indications were against it, one day a change would come. How, I
never knew or asked, but I believed in it. But with this
knowledge—and today I may speak about these things and for the
first time I am doing this extensively and publicly—with this,
as responsible head of the Krupp works, consequences of the
greatest importance had to be taken. If Germany should ever be
reborn, if it should shake off the chains of Versailles one day,
the Krupp concern had to be prepared again. * * *”

“* * * I wanted and had to maintain Krupp, in spite of all
opposition, as an armament plant for the later future, even if
in camouflaged form. I could only speak in the smallest, most
intimate circles about the real reasons which made me undertake
the changeover of the plants for certain lines of production for
I had to expect that many people would not understand me. * * *”

“Without arousing any commotion, the necessary measures and
preparations were undertaken. Thus to the surprise of many
people Krupp began to manufacture goods which really appeared to
be far distant from the former work of an armament plant. Even
the Allied snooping commissions were duped. Padlocks, milk cans,
cash registers, track repair machines, trash carts and similar
‘small junk’ appeared really unsuspicious and even locomotives
and automobiles made an entirely ‘civilian’ impression.

“After the accession to power of Adolf Hitler I had the
satisfaction of being able to report to the Fuehrer that Krupps
stood ready, after a short warming-up period, to begin the
rearmament of the German people without any gaps of
experience,—the blood of the comrades of KAR. Saturday 1923 had
not been shed in vain. Since that time I was often permitted to
accompany the Fuehrer through the old and new workshops and to
experience how the workers of Krupp cheered him in gratitude. In
the years after 1933 we worked with an incredible intensity and
when the war did break out the speed and results were again
increased. We are all proud of having thus contributed to the
heretofore magnificent successes of our army.”

* * * * * *

“I have always considered it to be an honour as well as an
obligation to be the head of an arms factory and I know that the
employees of Krupp share these feelings. Thanks to the
educational work of the National Socialist Government this is
the case all over Germany. I know that the things I have said
here about the armament worker in particular hold true for every
German worker. With these men and women who work for the cause
with all their hearts, with cool heads and skilled hands we will
master every fate.” (_D-94_; see _D-64_).

In a memorandum of a conference held on 9 December 1942, concerning the proposed publication of a book dealing with Krupp’s armament activities, Von Bulow, confidential secretary to Krupp, wrote:

“For the period of transition from 1919 up to rearmament, A. K.
[Krupp] had undertaken various tasks in order to keep up the
Company’s activity in the field of artillery, in the sense of
observing activities in that field in the rest of the world
(relation: BOFORS) and then also for the production of artillery
material, within and to a certain extent also beyond, the
limitation established by the peace dictate.” (_D-249_).

B. _AFTER THE CONSPIRATORS’ ACCESSION TO POWER, KRUPP LENT HIS
INFLUENCE, PRESTIGE, AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE CONSOLIDATION OF THEIR
CONTROL OVER THE GERMAN STATE._

(1) With knowledge of the aims and purposes of the Nazi conspiracy, he sought to reorganize the Reich Association of German Industry, of which he was Chairman, so as to bring it into line with the aims of the conspirators and to make it an effective instrument for the execution of their policies.

(_a_) Upon the invitation of Goering (_D-201_), Krupp attended a meeting in Berlin on 20 February 1933, during which Hitler, in a speech to a select group of industrialists, announced the conspirators’ aims to seize totalitarian control over Germany, to destroy the parliamentary system, to crush all opposition by force, and to restore the power of the _Wehrmacht_. In the course of this speech, Hitler stated:

“Private enterprise cannot be maintained in the age of
Democracy; it is conceivable only if the people have a sound
idea of authority and personality. * * * Life always tears up
humanity. It is therefore the noblest task of a Leader to find
ideals that are stronger than the factors that pull the people
apart. I recognized even while in the hospital that one had to
search for new ideas conducive to reconstruction. I found them
in Nationalism, in the value of personality, in the denial of
reconciliation between nations, in the strength and power of
individual personality. * * * If one rejects pacifism, one must
put a new idea in its place immediately. Everything must be
pushed aside, must be replaced by something better.”

“* * * We must not forget that all the benefits of culture must
be introduced more or less with an iron fist, just as once upon
a time the farmers were forced to plant potatoes. For all this,
however, courage, and iron will and perseverance are essential.”

“* * * With the very same courage with which we go to work to
make up for what had been sinned during the last 14 years, we
have withstood all attempts to move us off the right way. We
have turned down the favour (benevolence) of the Catholic Centre
Party [_Zentrum_] to tolerate us. Hugemberg has too small a
movement. He has only considerably slowed down our development.
We must first gain complete power if we want to crush the other
side completely. While still gaining power one should not start
the struggle against the opponent. Only when one knows that one
has reached the pinnacle of power, that there is no further
possible upward development, shall one strike. * * *”

“Now we stand before the last election. Regardless of the
outcome there will be no retreat, even if the coming election
does not bring about a decision. One way or another, if the
election does not decide, the decision must be brought about
even by other means. I have intervened in order to give the
people once more the chance to decide their fate by themselves.
This determination is a strong asset for whatever must possibly
happen later. Does the election bring no result, well, Germany
won’t go to ruin. Today, as never before, everyone is under the
obligation to pledge himself to success. The necessity to make
sacrifices has never been greater than now. For Economy I have
the one wish that it go parallel with the internal structure to
meet a calm future. The question of restoration of the Wehrmacht
will not be decided at Geneva, but in Germany, when we have
gained internal strength through internal peace. * * * There are
only two possibilities, either to crowd back the opponent on
constitutional grounds, and for this purpose once more this
election or a struggle will be conducted with other weapons,
which may demand greater sacrifices. I would like to see them
avoided. I hope the German people thus recognize the greatness
of the hour. It shall decide over the next 10 or probably even
100 years. It will become a turning point in German history, to
which I pledge myself with glowing energy.” (_D-203_).

At this same meeting, Goering declared that the impending election of 5 March 1933 would certainly be the last one for the next 10 years, and probably even for the next 100 years (_D-203_).

In a memorandum dated 22 February 1933 describing this meeting, Krupp wrote that he had expressed to Hitler the gratitude of approximately 25 industrialists present for the clear expression of his views and emphasized, on behalf of all present, that it was time to clarify the political situation in Germany (_D-204_).

(_b_) On 25 April 1933, Krupp, as Chairman of the Reich Association of German Industry (_Reichsverbandes der Deutschen Industrie_) submitted to Hitler his plan for the reorganization of German industry and in connection therewith, undertook to bring the Association into line with the aims of the conspirators and to make it an effective instrument for the execution of their policies.

_1._ In the letter of transmittal, Krupp stated that his plan of
reorganization was characterized by the desire to coordinate
“economic measures and political necessity, adopting the
Fuehrer’s conception of the New German State” (_D-157_).

_2._ In the plan of reorganization itself Krupp stated:

“The turn of political events is in line with the wishes
which I myself and the Board of Directors have cherished
for a long time. I am convinced that, under the threat
of the impoverishment of our people, the machinery of
government must be simplified to the utmost. For the
same reason I did not fail to recognize a long time ago
the necessity of rationalizing our economic system.

“Convinced that the opportunity of the hour must not be
missed to obtain the best for our economic system, I am
employing the authority bestowed upon me by the
Presiding Council to carry out a double task:—

1. In the negotiations with the Reichschancellor and his
representatives I shall make it my goal to coordinate,
in the field of organization of industrial associations,
the economically reasonable with the politically
necessary.

2. In reorganizing the Reich Association of German
Industry I shall be guided by the idea of bringing the
new organization into agreement with the political aims
of the Reich Government and at the same time to make it
so rational and forceful that it can be an effective
instrument of industrial enterprise, according to the
relative importance of the industry.” (_D-157_)

(_c_) In a speech delivered on 18 October 1933, on the occasion of the first meeting of the Committee for Industrial and Social policy of the Reich Association of German Industry, Krupp reaffirmed his aim to bring the Association into complete accord with the political goals of the Nazi government and stated, _inter alia_:

“* * * To have united the purposes of an entire Nation, is the
great historical achievement of the man in whose strong hands
our President has placed the fate of our people. When
Reichschancellor and Fuehrer Adolf Hitler called the General
Council of Economy together for the first time on the 20th of
September, I had the honor to thank him for the confidence which
he had put in the men of the practical business world by calling
them to the General Council. I pledged to him unrestrained
support in his Government in its exceedingly difficult task from
all branches and organizations of Economy.

“I may repeat now what I said then: ‘The unshakable faith of our
Reichschancellor and Fuehrer in the future of our people gives
also to the men of business the courage and the strength to put
everything in the reconstruction of a healthy National Economy
in a strong National State under National Socialist leadership’.

“You, too, gentlemen, if I am certain of your confidence, are
bound to this pledge. It holds in itself, for all of us, the
deeply felt obligation to be the guarantors for the
unconditional execution of the Fuehrer’s will in all links and
branches of Industry. May the spirit of devotion to duty which
inspires us always dominate this Committee’s conferences!

“I ask you, gentlemen, to rise and to join me in the toast: To
the venerable President of the German Reich, General
Fieldmarshal Von Hindenburg and the German People’s Chancellor
and Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler: ‘_Sieg Heil_’.” (_D-353_).

(2) Krupp organized, sponsored, and made substantial financial contributions to the Hitler Fund (_Hitler Spende_), with knowledge that the funds were to be used to further the objectives of the SA and SS.

(_a_) In a letter to Schacht dated 30 May 1933, Krupp wrote:

“As Dr. Hoettgen and I had the opportunity of mentioning to you
yesterday, it is proposed to initiate a collection in the most
far-reaching circles of German industry, including agriculture
and the banking world, which is to be put at the disposal of the
Fuehrer of the NSDAP in the name of ‘The Hitler Fund’, which
would replace collections in many cases separately organized of
the various NSDAP organizations and the Stahlhelm. It has been
decided to appoint a management council for this central
collection; I have accepted the chairmanship of the management
council at the unanimous request of the principal federations,
inspired by the wish to collaborate with my full strength in
this task which is to be a symbol of gratitude to the Fuehrer of
the nation.” (_D-151_)

(_b_) A circular written by Hess in August 1933, which was found among Krupp’s files, specifically states that one of the purposes of the Hitler Fund is “to put at the disposal of the Reich leadership the funds required for the unified execution of the tasks which fall to the lot of the SA, SS, ST, HJ, political organizations etc.” (_D-151_).

In a letter dated 15 August 1934, from Lutze, Chief of Staff of the SA, which was found among Krupp’s papers, authority was granted, with the approval of the Deputy Fuehrer, to Gauleiter Terboven to use a special part of the year’s Hitler Fund in the interest of the SA in the Ruhr district (_D-368_).

(_c_) From the inception of the Hitler Fund until the collapse of Germany, the Fried. Krupp Cast Steel Works in Essen (main company in the Krupp organization) alone contributed 4,738,446 marks to that fund (_D-325_; the above figure is the total amount shown on the chart, not here reproduced[2]). This assistance to the Hitler Fund was supplemented by large contributions made by the other Krupp companies.

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[2] This and subsequent similar charts have been omitted from this publication because of their length and complexity, and the relative unimportance of the issue for which they have been cited.

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(3) Krupp, both privately and through the Krupp firm, made substantial contributions to the Nazi Party and affiliated organizations.

(_a_) For contributions by Fried. Krupp Cast Steel Works in Essen, see _D-325_.

(_b_) In June 1935, Krupp contributed 100,000 marks to the Nazi Party out of his personal account (_D-332_; _D-373_).

(4) In numerous public addresses, Krupp supported the measures adopted by the conspirators in the execution of their program.

(_a_) In a speech urging every German to approve Germany’s withdrawal from the disarmament conference and the League of Nations, Krupp said:

“* * * Just as the 5th of March brought about the change from
chaos to order, from disgrace to honor in domestic policy so, on
November 12, the unanimous “Yes” of the German people concerning
the foreign policy of the Reich Government, shall and must give
ample proof to the entire world that every citizen who is worthy
of the German name, stands unconditionally behind the Reich
Government as led by the Reich Chancellor, and its foreign
policy which is dictated by the commandment of self-respect.”

* * * * * *

“* * * When the radio broadcasts the results of the People’s
Election on the evening of November 12, the entire world must
know that: Germany stands in the camp of Adolf Hitler.”
(_D-393_).

(_b_) In a speech delivered on 26 January 1934, Krupp expressed approval of the leadership principle in industrial relations, under which the entrepreneur became the leader and the workers became his followers. In the course of this speech he said:

“National-Socialism has liberated the German worker from the
clutches of a doctrine which was basically hostile both for
employer and employee. Adolf Hitler has returned the worker to
his nation; he has made of him a disciplined soldier of labor
and therefore our comrade. When, on the other hand, the new
State awards to the enterpriser the role of leader in economy
and labor, then we know that: Leadership has obligation!

“The enterpriser and his leading officers are the trustees for
the material welfare of our people.” (_D-392_).

(_c_) In a speech delivered on 10 August 1934, in connection with the plebiscite to approve Hitler’s dual appointment as president and chancellor after Hindenburg’s death, Krupp said:

“Let us all follow him now also, our Leader, our Reich—and
People’s Chancellor.

“In an exceptionally short time he has eliminated the quarrel
between parties, has guaranteed unity to the Reich and has
assured to every German pride to work, has brought the
opportunity for work to the near future. On 19 August all our
votes borne of deep trust and proven confidence shall go to the
man acclaimed by those hearts of many thousands and millions who
cannot, because of their age, go to the polls but who daily join
us, who are permitted to vote, in the Cry:

Heil Hitler!” (_D-386_).

(_d_) In a speech dated 27 October 1935, Krupp stated:

“* * * Our thoughts fly therefore by themselves in this festive
hour of our plant community, to the man whom we thank for the
resurrection of our Nation: Adolf Hitler, the patron of German
labour and German art. Unanimously we will confess and pledge
ourselves to stand behind the Fuehrer and his movement today and
forever and thereby to be of service to the idea of eternal
Germany.” (_D-385_)

(_e_) In a speech dated 1 May 1936, after the Nazis had reoccupied and fortified the Rhineland, Krupp stated:

“No greater recognition, no greater incentive to further common
work accomplishment could have been given us than was done
through the visit of our Fuehrer on March 27th of this year to
our works and through his addresses from here. * * *”

“Never has a statesman fought for the soul of his people and for
its well-being with such faith, such ardor, such endurance. We
shall never forget how deeply we are indebted to him. * * * I
only mention here the abolition of the parties and the
unification of the people, the regaining of the sovereignty in
the Rhineland, the extensive abolition of unemployment, the
accomplishments of the labour service, the magnificent public
buildings, the roads, bridges and canals. * * *”

* * * * * *

“The world will have to get used to the fact that the voice of
the Fuehrer is the voice of the whole German people. * * *”

“Jubileers and co-workers! We shall be thankful to fate that we
were and are permitted to be eye and action witnesses of the
great turning point in our German history, and we shall thank
especially the divine destiny that it has presented us with a
man like Adolf Hitler. Let us then combine all that which moves
our hearts upon mention of this name into the cry: Our people
and fatherland and its great Fuehrer Adolf Hitler

_Sieg Heil!_” (_D-291_).

C. _UNDER KRUPP’S DIRECTION, THE KRUPP FIRM, BY DEVELOPING NEW
INSTRUMENTS OF WAR AND PRODUCING HUGE QUANTITIES OF WAR MATERIALS,
FURTHERED THE CONSPIRATORS’ PROGRAM TO CREATE A POWERFUL MILITARY
POTENTIAL._

(1) In a speech prepared in January 1944, for delivery at the University of Berlin, Krupp stated: