Chapter XII: on Persecution of the Jews.) (5)

“I have reported the contents of your letters of the 11/11 to
the Fuehrer today. He instructed me to inform you that he would
be readily prepared to arrange for any possible safeguarding for
the continued existence of the works as a family enterprise; it
would be the simplest to issue a ‘_Lex Krupp_’ to start with.”
(_D-101_).

(_c_) Krupp’s recognition of the unusual character of his proposal is indicated in his letter of 24 February 1943 to Lammers, wherein he said:

“Without doubt, the matter, which is without precedent in
economic life, will have to be discussed with the Reichs
Minister of Justice and the Reichs Minister of Finance also. * *
*” (_D-106_).

(_d_) On 12 November 1943 Hitler signed the decree making possible the preservation of the Krupp firm as a family enterprise in recognition of the fact that

“for 132 years the firm of Fried. Krupp, as a family enterprise
has achieved outstanding and unique merits for the armed
strength of the German people.” (_D-120_)

In a letter dated 16 November 1943, Lammers wrote to Krupp:

“On 12 November the Fuehrer signed the decree regarding the
family enterprise of the firm Fried. Krupp. * * * May I express
my heartiest congratulations to you, your wife and the firm
Fried. Krupp on the great honor which has been conferred on the
merits of the firm Fried. Krupp with this recognition by the
Fuehrer.” (_D-124_).

(_e_) As the final step in the proceeding, Hitler approved “the statute of the family enterprise Fried. Krupp” which gave effect to his decree of 12 November 1943 (_D-131_).

(_f_) In a letter of gratitude to Hitler dated 29 December 1943, Krupp stated:

“* * * By this, you have made a wish come true, which my wife
and I had had for years, and thus relieved our hearts of great
worry over the future of the Krupp works.”

* * * * * *

“My wife and I, as well as the whole family, are deeply grateful
to you for this proof of your confidence. * * *”

“Our special thanks go to you, Mein Fuehrer, also for the great
honour and recognition which you have awarded, in the
introduction to your decree, to 130 years of the work of Krupps,
the work of Krupps done by many generations of faithful
followers, and steered and directed by 4 generations of the
family Krupp.” (_D-135_)

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO GUSTAV KRUPP VON
BOHLEN UND HALBACH

│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 64
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │
│picture composed of captured German │ │
│film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801
│ │ │
D-62 │Letter from Inspector of War │ │
│Production to Krupp, 21 January 1937. │ VI │ 1028
│ │ │
D-63 │Declaration of political attitude by │ │
│Krupp, 6 February 1937. │ VI │ 1029
│ │ │
D-64 │Letter to Krupp, 3 December 1941, │ │
│enclosing extracts from draft of │ │
│article entitled “Works Leader and │ │
│Armaments Works”, 5 April 1941. │ VI │ 1030
│ │ │
D-66 │Presentation certificate, 7 August │ │
│1940, concerning granting to Krupp of │ │
│Shield of the Eagle of German Reich. │ VI │ 1034
│ │ │
D-88 │Correspondence between Krupp and │ │
│Raeder, 7 and 10 August 1935. │ VI │ 1042
│ │ │
D-94 │Article by Krupp, Manager and Armament│ │
│Worker, from 1 March 1942 issue of │ │
│Krupp magazine. │ VI │ 1043
│ │ │
D-96 │Memorandum on establishment of an │ │
│experimental Tank Factory by the │ │
│Grusonwerk, 21 February 1944. │ VI │ 1047
│ │ │
D-99 │Letter from Krupp to Bormann, 11 │ │
│November 1942. │ VI │ 1048
│ │ │
D-101 │Letter from Bormann to Krupp, 21 │ │
│November 1942. │ VI │ 1050
│ │ │
D-106 │Letter from Krupp to Lammers, 24 │ │
│February 1943. │ VI │ 1050
│ │ │
D-120 │Fuehrer decree on family enterprise of│ │
│the firm Friedrich Krupp. │ VI │ 1051
│ │ │
D-124 │Letter from Lammers to Krupp, 16 │ │
│November 1943. │ VI │ 1053
│ │ │
D-131 │Hitler decree of 21 December 1943, │ │
│approving family enterprise of Krupp. │ VI │ 1054
│ │ │
D-135 │Letter from Krupp to Hitler, 29 │ │
│December 1943. │ VI │ 1054
│ │ │
D-143 │List of barracks and beds in workers │ │
│Hostels and PW camps of Friedrich │ │
│Krupp A.G., and covering letter of 30 │ │
│June 1942. │ VI │ 1058
│ │ │
*D-151 │Krupp, Schacht and Hess correspondence│ │
│in 1933 regarding the Hitler Fund. (GB│ │
│256; USA 831) │ VI │ 1060
│ │ │
D-152 │Memorandum by Pfirsrch on the │ │
│conference at Federal Ministry for │ │
│National Defense in Vienna, 28 │ │
│September 1936. │ VI │ 1062
│ │ │
D-154 │Memorandum, 23 June 1937, in files of │ │
│Friedrich Krupp A.G. concerning order │ │
│for armor plating from Bulgaria. │ VI │ 1062
│ │ │
*D-157 │Letter from Krupp to Hitler, 25 April │ │
│1933, with enclosure. (USA 765) │ VI │ 1063
│ │ │
D-158 │Letter from Rosenberg to Krupp, 26 │ │
│April 1933. │ VI │ 1066
│ │ │
*D-167 │Memoranda by Sonnenberg and Dr. Conn │ │
│concerning exchange of intelligence │ │
│involving Krupp works. (USA 766) │ VI │ 1069
│ │ │
D-170 │Notes of 8 May 1939 by Sonnenberg on │ │
│conference in Berlin concerning │ │
│foreign anti-aircraft guns. │ VI │ 1072
│ │ │
D-191 │Memorandum on reconstruction of │ │
│Krupp’s after war 1914-1918 with │ │
│special reference to armaments │ │
│exports, 25 March 1941. │ VI │ 1076
│ │ │
D-196 │Memoranda by Dr. Lehman concerning │ │
│recruiting of French workers. │ VI │ 1078
│ │ │
D-201 │Telegram from Goering to Krupp. │ VI │ 1080
│ │ │
*D-203 │Speech of Hitler to leading members of│ │
│industry before the election of March │ │
│1933. (USA 767) │ VI │ 1080
│ │ │
*D-204 │Statement of Krupp concerning │ │
│political organization of state and │ │
│economy, 22 February 1933. (USA 768) │ VI │ 1085
│ │ │
*D-206 │Memorandum, 12 October 1939, on │ │
│distribution of propaganda abroad │ │
│through foreign connections of Krupp │ │
│firm. (USA 769) │ VI │ 1085
│ │ │
D-208 │Letter from Krupp to Springorum, 26 │ │
│April 1933. │ VI │ 1087
│ │ │
*D-230 │Instruction for issuing steel switches│ │
│to Krupp camps, 3 January 1945. (USA │ │
│898) │ VI │ 1094
│ │ │
D-233 │Memorandum, 17 October 1944, │ │
│concerning working hours for foreign │ │
│workers. │ VI │ 1095
│ │ │
D-238 │Memorandum by Trockel, 28 July 1944, │ │
│concerning assignation of detainees. │ VI │ 1095
│ │ │
D-242 │Letter from Springorum to Krupp │ │
│concerning contribution of 20,000 │ │
│marks to Rosenberg. │ VI │ 1097
│ │ │
D-249 │Von Bulow memorandum on notes of │ │
│conference with Grassmann, Fuss and │ │
│Kraft, held 9 December 1942, │ │
│concerning History of War Economy. │ VI │ 1098
│ │ │
D-253 │Affidavit of Peter Gutersohn, 3 │ │
│October 1945. │ VI │ 1105
│ │ │
D-256 │Affidavit of Rene Koenigsberg and │ │
│Agnes Koenigsberg, 20 September 1945. │ VI │ 1107
│ │ │
D-265 │Affidavit of Heinrich Ruhnau, 3 │ │
│October 1945. │ VI │ 1108
│ │ │
D-267 │Affidavit of Heinrich Tiedtke, Karl │ │
│Hanke, Johann Berek, 27 September │ │
│1945. │ VI │ 1109
│ │ │
D-270 │Memorandum, 7 April 1942, concerning │ │
│employment of foreign workers. │ VI │ 1110
│ │ │
D-271 │Memorandum from Wiele to Ihn, 20 │ │
│October 1942. │ VI │ 1110
│ │ │
D-272 │Affidavit of Elizabeth and Ernestin │ │
│Roth, 21 September 1945. │ VI │ 1111
│ │ │
D-274 │Statement by Ihn, 1 October 1945. │ VI │ 1112
│ │ │
D-277 │Affidavit of Rosa Katz, 21 September │ │
│1945. │ VI │ 1115
│ │ │
D-278 │Memorandum from Works Catering │ │
│Department to Dr. Lehmann, Employment │ │
│Office, 19 March 1942. │ VI │ 1116
│ │ │
D-279 │Affidavit of Alexander Haverkarte, 1 │ │
│October 1945. │ VI │ 1116
│ │ │
D-280 │Secret memorandum, 17 June 1942, │ │
│concerning need for and obtaining of │ │
│workers for cast steel works. │ VI │ 1117
│ │ │
D-281 │Memorandum by Winhold, 13 July 1942, │ │
│concerning urgent production A.Z. 23 │ │
│(Pr). │ VI │ 1119
│ │ │
*D-283 │Report by Krupp hospitals, 7 May 1943,│ │
│concerning deaths of Eastern Workers. │ │
│(USA 899) │ VII │ 1
│ │ │
D-287 │Letter from Krupp to Raeder, 30 │ │
│October 1942. │ VII │ 1
│ │ │
*D-288 │Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Jaeger, 15 │ │
│October 1945. (USA 202) │ VII │ 2
│ │ │
D-291 │Speech by Krupp, 1 May 1936. │ VII │ 7
│ │ │
D-297 │Memorandum from Theile to Hupe, 26 │ │
│March 1942, concerning employment of │ │
│Russian PWs and civilians. │ VII │ 9
│ │ │
D-298 │Affidavit by Dr. Georg Wolff and │ │
│chart, “Fried. Krupp Berthawerk, │ │
│Markstaedt Breslau, Number of Occupied│ │
│Foreigners, Prisoners of War and │ │
│Concentration Camp Inmates”. │ VII │ 10
│ │ │
D-304 │Krupp speech, 13 October 1938. │ VII │ 12
│ │ │
D-305 │Affidavit of Heinrich Buschhauer, 5 │ │
│October 1945. │ VII │ 13
│ │ │
D-306 │Affidavit of August Kleinschmidt, 11 │ │
│October 1945. │ VII │ 14
│ │ │
D-310 │Memorandum from Grollius to Kolsch, 18│ │
│March 1942. │ VII │ 15
│ │ │
D-312 │Affidavit of Karl Sehnbruch, 11 │ │
│October 1945. │ VII │ 16
│ │ │
*D-313 │Affidavit by Dr. Apolinary Gotowicki, │ │
│October 1945. (USA 901) │ VII │ 18
│ │ │
D-316 │Memorandum to Mr. Hupe, 14 March 1942,│ │
│concerning employment of Russians. │ │
│(USA 201) │ VII │ 20
│ │ │
*D-317 │Krupp speech, “Thoughts about the │ │
│Industrial Enterpriser”, January 1944.│ │
│(USA 770) │ VII │ 21
│ │ │
D-318 │Memorandum from Diwkelaker to Ihn, 20 │ │
│March 1942. │ VII │ 24
│ │ │
*D-321 │Affidavit of Adam Schmidt, 12 October │ │
│1945. (USA 895) │ VII │ 25
│ │ │
D-325 │Affidavit of 17 October 1945 │ │
│concerning payments of Fried. Krupp │ │
│Cast Steel Works to Party and Party │ │
│Organizations. │ VII │ 26
│ │ │
D-332 │Letter from Janssen to NSDAP, 27 June │ │
│1935. │ VII │ 26
│ │ │
*D-335 │Memorandum from Stinnesbeck to Jaeger,│ │
│12 June 1944. (USA 900) │ VII │ 27
│ │ │
D-338 │Special medical report by Dr. Jaeger, │ │
│28 July 1944. │ VII │ 27
│ │ │
D-339 │Special medical report by Dr. Jaeger, │ │
│2 September 1944. │ VII │ 28
│ │ │
D-341 │Affidavit of Johannes Schroeder │ │
│concerning Fried. Krupp │ │
│Participations. │ VII │ 29
│ │ │
D-345 │Letter from Col. Zimmermann to Krupp │ │
│firm, 27 August 1942. │ VII │ 30
│ │ │
D-348 │Secret memo by Reiff concerning │ │
│conference in Berlin, 14 August 1942. │ VII │ 31
│ │ │
D-353 │Speech by Krupp, 18 October 1933, at │ │
│first meeting of Committee for │ │
│Industrial and Social Policy of Reich │ │
│Association of German Industry. │ VII │ 32
│ │ │
D-354 │Affidavit of Paul Lenz, Wilhelm Sill, │ │
│Hermann Rosskothen, Fritz Schink, Karl│ │
│Fortkamp, Wilhelm Piegeler, 5 October │ │
│1945. │ VII │ 34
│ │ │
D-355 │Affidavit of Walter Thoene, 8 October │ │
│1945. │ VII │ 36
│ │ │
D-363 │Krupp speech, 4 September 1939. │ VII │ 37
│ │ │
D-366 │Memorandum from Haller to Schuermeyer,│ │
│8 December 1942. │ VII │ 37
│ │ │
D-367 │Affidavit of Heinrich Frauenrath, 12 │ │
│October 1945. │ VII │ 38
│ │ │
D-368 │Letter from Lutze, 15 August 1934, │ │
│concerning use of Hitler Fund. │ VII │ 39
│ │ │
D-373 │Letter from Terboven to Krupp, 24 June│ │
│1935, thanking Krupp for │ │
│contributions. │ VII │ 40
│ │ │
D-375 │Letter from Krupp to Hitler, 24 July │ │
│1942. │ VII │ 40
│ │ │
*D-382 │Affidavit of Raimund Becker, Aloys │ │
│Hoefer, Josef Dahm, 4 October 1945. │ │
│(USA 897) │ VII │ 41
│ │ │
D-385 │Speech by Krupp at first showing of │ │
│Krupp film on 27 October 1935. │ VII │ 42
│ │ │
D-386 │Speech by Krupp on election after │ │
│death of Hindenburg, on 10 August │ │
│1934. │ VII │ 43
│ │ │
D-387 │Speech by Krupp, 7 April 1938. │ VII │ 43
│ │ │
D-390 │Krupp speech to jubilees of plant on 6│ │
│May 1941. │ VII │ 43
│ │ │
D-391 │Speech by Krupp, 6 April 1938. │ VII │ 44
│ │ │
D-392 │Speech by Krupp, 26 January 1934. │ VII │ 45
│ │ │
D-393 │Speech by Krupp, “The Day of Fate of │ │
│the German People”. │ VII │ 47
│ │ │
D-526 │File memorandum, 29 July 1942, │ │
│concerning acquisition of Liancourt │ │
│lease. │ VII │ 71

14. KARL DOENITZ

A. _NAVAL AND POLITICAL CAREER._

After his appointment in 1935 as commander of the Weddigen U-boat flotilla—the first flotilla to be formed after the World War in 1918—Doenitz, who thus became in effect commander of U-boats, rose steadily in rank as the U-boat arm expanded until he became an admiral. On 30 January 1943 he was appointed Grand Admiral and succeeded Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, retaining his command of the U-boat arm. Then, on 1 May 1945, he succeeded Hitler as leader of Germany (_2887-PS_).

Doenitz was awarded the following decorations: On 18 September 1939 he received the Cluster of the Iron Cross, first class, for the U-boat successes in the Baltic during the Polish campaign. This award was followed on 21 April 1940 by the high award of the Knight’s Cross to the Iron Cross, while on 7 April 1943 he received personally from Hitler the Oak Leaf to the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross, as the 223rd recipient.

Doenitz’s services in building up the German Navy, and in particular the offensive U-boat arm for the coming war, were outstanding. An extract from the official publication “_Das Archiv_” on the occasion of Doenitz’s promotion to vice-admiral, dated 27 September 1940, reads as follows:

“* * * In four years of untiring and in the fullest sense of the
word uninterrupted work of training, he [Doenitz] succeeds in
developing the young U-boat arm, personnel, and material till it
is a weapon of a striking power unexpected even by the experts.
More than three million gross tons of sunken enemy shipping in
only one year achieved with only few boats speak better than
words of the services of this man.” (_D-436_)

An extract from the diary for the German Navy, 1944 edition (_1463-PS_) emphasizes Doenitz’s contribution. It describes in detail Doenitz’s work in building up the U-boat arm; his ceaseless work in training night and day to close the gap of seventeen years, during which no training had taken place; his responsibility for new improvements and for devising the “pack” tactics which were later to become famous. His position is summarized further as follows:

“* * * In spite of the fact that his duties took on unmeasurable
proportions since the beginning of the huge U-boat construction
program, the chief was what he always was and always will be,
leader and inspiration to all the forces under him. * * * In
spite of all his duties, he never lost touch with his men and he
showed a masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the
changing fortunes of war.” (_1463-PS_)

It was not only, however, his ability as a naval officer which won Doenitz these high honors: his promotion to succeed Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; the personal position he acquired as one of Hitler’s principal advisers; and finally, earlier candidates such as Goering having betrayed Hitler’s trust or finding the position less attractive than they had anticipated, the doubtful honour of becoming Hitler’s successor. These he owed, to his fanatical adherence to Hitler and to the Party, to his belief in the Nazi ideology with which he sought to indoctrinate the Navy and the German people, and to his “masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of war” (_1463-PS_), which may be regarded as synonymous with a capacity for utter ruthlessness.

B. _INDOCTRINATION OF NAVAL PERSONNEL WITH NAZI POLITICAL IDEOLOGY._

Doenitz’s attitude to the Nazi Party and its creed is shown by his public utterances. In a speech—subsequently circulated by Doenitz as a Top Secret document for senior officers only and by the hand of officers only—at a meeting of commanders of the Navy in Weimar on 17 December 1943, Doenitz stated (_D-443_):

“* * * I am a firm adherent of the idea of ideological
education. For what is it in the main? Doing his duty is a
matter of course for the soldier. But the whole importance, the
whole weight of duty done, are only present when the heart and
spiritual conviction have a voice in the matter. The result of
duty done is then quite different to what it would be if I only
carried out my task literally, obediently, and faithfully. It is
therefore necessary for the soldier to support the execution of
his duty with all his mental, all his spiritual energy, and for
this his conviction, his ideology are indispensable. It is
therefore necessary for us to train the soldier uniformly,
comprehensively, that he may be adjusted ideologically to our
Germany. Every dualism, every dissension in this connection, or
every divergence, or unpreparedness, imply a weakness in all
circumstances. He in whom this grows and thrives in unison is
superior to the other. Then indeed the whole importance, the
whole weight of his conviction comes into play. It is also
nonsense to say that the soldier or the officer must have no
politics. The soldier embodies the state in which he lives; he
is the representative, the articulate exponent of this state. He
must therefore stand with his whole weight behind this state.

“We must travel this road from our deepest conviction. The
Russian travels along it. We can only maintain ourselves in this
war if we take part in it with holy zeal, with all our
fanaticism.

“Not I alone can do this, but it can only be done with the aid
of the man who holds the production of Europe in his hand, with
Minister Speer. My ambition is to have as many warships for the
Navy as possible so as to be able to fight and to strike. It
does not matter to me who builds them.” (_D-443_)

In a speech on the same subject by Doenitz as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to the Commanders in Chief on 15 February 1944, he had this to say:

“From the very start the whole of the officer corps must be so
indoctrinated that it feels itself co-responsible for the
National Socialist State in its entirety. The officer is the
exponent of the state; the idle chatter that the officer is
non-political is sheer nonsense.” (_D-640_)

Doenitz’s position was made unmistakably clear in a speech which he made to the German Navy and the German people on Heroes’ Day, 12 March 1944:

“German men and women!

“* * * What would have become of our country today, if the
Fuehrer had not united us under National-Socialism! Split into
parties, beset with the spreading poison of Jewry and vulnerable
to it, and lacking, as a defense, our present uncompromising
world outlook, we would long since have succumbed to the burdens
of this war and been subject to the merciless destruction of our
adversaries. * * *” (_2878-PS_) A speech by Doenitz to the Navy
on 21 July 1944 shows his fanaticism:

“Men of the Navy! Holy wrath and unlimited anger fill our hearts
because of the criminal attempt which was intended to have cost
the life of our beloved Fuehrer. Providence wished it
otherwise—watched over and protected our Fuehrer, and did not
abandon our German fatherland in the fight for its destiny.”
(_2878-PS_)

And then he goes on to deal with the fate which should be meted out to the traitors.

The abolition of the German military salute and the adoption of the Nazi salute in the German forces was due to Doenitz along with Goering and Keitel (_2878-PS_).

When Adolf Hitler was reported dead, Doenitz spoke over the German radio announcing the Fuehrer’s death and his own succession. The German announcer made this statement:

“It has been reported from the Fuehrer’s Headquarters that our
Fuehrer Adolf Hitler has died this afternoon in his battle
headquarters at the Reichschancellery fighting to the last
breath for Germany against Bolshevism.

“On the 30th April the Fuehrer nominated Grand Admiral Doenitz
to be his successor. The Grand Admiral and Fuehrer’s successor
will speak to the German nation.” (_D-444_)

Whereupon Doenitz spoke as follows:

“German men and women, soldiers of the German Armed Forces. Our
Fuehrer Adolf Hitler is dead. The German people bow in deepest
sorrow and respect. Early he had recognized the terrible danger
of Bolshevism and had dedicated his life to the fight against
it. His fight having ended, he died a hero’s death in the
capital of the German Reich, after having led an unmistakably
straight and steady life.” (_D-444_)

Doenitz proceeded to issue an order of the day, to the same effect (_D-444_).

C. _PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF AGGRESSIVE WARS._

Apart from his services in building up the U-boat arm, there is ample evidence that Doenitz, as Officer Commanding U-boats, took part in the planning and execution of the aggressive wars against Poland, Norway, and Denmark.

(1) _Poland._ The distribution list on a memorandum by Raeder, dated 16 May 1939, shows that the sixth copy went to the _Fuehrer der Unterseeboote_, who was Doenitz. This document was a directive for the invasion of Poland (_Fall Weiss_) (_C-126_). Another memorandum from Raeder’s headquarters, dated 2 August 1939, is addressed to the fleet, and The Flag Officer, U-boats—this is, Doenitz (_C-126_). This was merely a covering letter on operational directions for the precautionary employment of U-boats in the Atlantic in the event that the intention to carry out _Fall Weiss_ remained unchanged. The second sentence is significant:

“Flag Officer, U-boats, is handing in his operational orders to
SKL [_Seekriegsleitung_, the German Admiralty] by 12 August. A
decision on the sailings of U-boats for the Atlantic will
probably be made at the middle of August.” (_C-126_)

Doenitz proceeded to give operational instructions to his U-boats for the operation _Fall Weiss_. These instructions, signed by him, are not dated, but it is clear from the subject matter that the date must have been before 16 July 1939 (_C-172_). These operational instructions gave effect to Raeder’s directive (_C-126_).

(2) _Norway and Denmark._ An extract from the War Diary of the Naval War Staff of the German Admiralty, dated 3 October 1939, records the fact that the Chief of the Naval War Staff has called for views on the possibility of taking operational bases in Norway (_C-122_). It states Doenitz’s views as follows:

“* * * Flag Officer U-boats already considers such harbors
extremely useful as equipment—and supply—bases for Atlantic
U-boats to call at temporarily.” (_C-122_)

A communication from Doenitz as Flag Officer U-boats, addressed to the Supreme Command of the Navy (the Naval War Staff) dated 9 October 1939, sets out Doenitz’s views on the advantages of Trondheim and Narvik as bases. Doenitz proposes the establishment of a base at Trondheim with Narvik as an alternative (_C-5_).

Doenitz then gave operation orders to his U-boats for the occupation of Denmark and Norway. This Top Secret order, dated 30 March 1940, under the code name “_Hartmut_,” provided:

“The naval force will, as they enter the harbor, fly the British
flag until the troops have landed, except presumably at Narvik.”
(_C-151_)

(3) _England._ The preparations for war against England are perhaps best shown by the disposition of the U-boats under Doenitz’s command on 3 September 1939, when war broke out between Germany and the Western Allies. The locations of the sinkings in the following week, including that of the _Athenia_, provide corroboration. These matters are contained in two charts prepared by the British Admiralty. The first chart sets out the disposition of German submarines on 3 September 1939. The certificate attached to this chart reads:

“This chart has been constructed from a study of the orders
issued by Doenitz between 21 August 1939 and 3 September 1939,
and subsequently captured. The chart shows the approximate
disposition of submarines ordered for the 3rd of September 1939,
and cannot be guaranteed accurate in every detail, as the file
of captured orders are clearly not complete and some of the
submarines shown apparently had received orders at sea on or
about September 3 to move to new operational areas. The
documents from which this chart was constructed are held by the
British Admiralty in London.”

It will be apparent that U-boats which were in the positions indicated on this chart on 3 September 1939 had left Kiel a considerable time before. The location of the U-boat U-30 is particularly significant.

The second chart sets out the sinkings during the first week of the war. The attached certificate reads:

“This chart has been constructed from the official records of
the British Admiralty in London. It shows the position and
sinkings of the British merchant vessels lost by enemy action in
the seven days subsequent to 3 September 1939.”

The location of the sinking of the _Athenia_ is significant.

D. _PARTICIPATION IN CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT VIOLATIONS OF RULES OF
WARFARE._

The course of the war waged against neutral and allied merchant shipping by German U-boats followed, under Doenitz’s direction, a course of consistently increasing ruthlessness.

(1) _Attacks on Merchant Shipping._ Doenitz displayed “his masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of war” (_1463-PS_). From the very early days, merchant ships, both allied and neutral, were sunk without warning, and when operational danger zones had been announced by the German Admiralty, these sinkings continued to take place both within and without those zones. With some exceptions in the early days of the war, no regard was taken for the safety of the crews or passengers of sunken merchant ships, and the announcement claiming a total blockade of the British Isles merely served to confirm the established situation under which U-boat warfare was being conducted without regard to the established rules of international warfare or the requirements of humanity.

The course of the war at sea during the first eighteen months is summarized by two official British reports made at a time when those who compiled them were ignorant of some of the actual orders issued which have since come to hand. An official report of the British Foreign Office summarizes German attacks on merchant shipping during the period 3 September 1939 to September 1940, that is to say, the first year of the war (_D-641-A_). This report, made shortly after September 1940, states in part as follows:

“* * * During the first twelve months of the war, 2,081,062 tons
of Allied shipping, comprising 508 ships, have been lost by
enemy action. In addition, 769,213 tons of neutral shipping
comprising 253 ships, have also been lost. Nearly all these
merchant ships have been sunk by submarine, mine, aircraft or
surface craft, and the great majority of them sunk while engaged
on their lawful trading occasions. 2,836 Allied merchant seamen
have lost their lives in these ships.

“In the last war the practice of the Central Powers was so
remote from the recognized procedure that it was thought
necessary to set forth once again the rules of warfare in
particular as applied to submarines. This was done in the Treaty
of London 1930, and in 1936 Germany acceded to these rules. The
rules laid down:

“(1) In action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must
conform to the rules of International Law to which surface
vessels are subjected.

“(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to
stop on being summoned, or of active resistance to visit and
search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not
sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without
having first placed passengers, crew, and ship’s papers in a
place of safety. For this purpose, the ship’s boats are not
regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the
passengers and crew is assured in the existing sea and weather
conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another
vessel which is in a position to take them on board.

“At the beginning of the present war, Germany issued a Prize
Ordinance for the regulation of sea warfare and the guidance of
her naval officers. Article 74 of this ordinance embodies the
submarine rules of the London Treaty. Article 72, however,
provides that captured enemy vessels may be destroyed if it
seems inexpedient or unsafe to bring them into port, and Article
73 (i) (ii) makes the same provision with regard to neutral
vessels which are captured for sailing under enemy convoy, for
forcible resistance, or for giving assistance to the enemy.
These provisions are certainly not in accordance with the
traditional British view but the important point is that, even
in these cases, the Prize Ordinance envisages the capture of the
merchantman before its destruction. In other words, if the
Germans adhered to the rules set out in their own Prize
Ordinance, we might have argued the rather fine legal point with
them, but we should have no quarrel with them, either on the
broader legal issue or on the humanitarian one. In the event,
however, it is only too clear that almost from the beginning of
the war the Germans abandoned their own principles and waged war
with steadily increasing disregard for International Law, and
for what is, after all, the ultimate sanction of all law, the
protection of human life and property from arbitrary and
ruthless attacks.” (_D-641-A_)

Two instances are then set out:

“On the 30th of September, 1939, came the first sinking of a
neutral ship by a submarine without warning and with loss of
life. This was the Danish ship ‘_Vendia_’ bound for the Clyde in
ballast. The submarine fired two shots and shortly after
torpedoed the ship. The torpedo was fired when the master had
already signalled that he would submit to the submarine’s orders
and before there had been an opportunity to abandon ship. By
November submarines were beginning to sink neutral vessels
without warning as a regular thing. On the 12th November the
Norwegian ‘_Arne Kjode_’ was torpedoed in the North Sea without
any warning at all. This was a tanker bound from one neutral
port to another. The master and four of the crew lost their
lives and the remainder were picked up after many hours in open
boats. Henceforward, in addition to the failure to establish the
nature of the cargo, another element is noticeable, namely an
increasing recklessness as to the fate of the crew.” (_D-641-A_)

And then, dealing with attacks on allied merchant vessels, certain figures are given:

“Ships sunk 241
“Recorded attacks 221
“Illegal attacks 112

“At least 79 of these 112 ships were torpedoed without warning.”
(_D-641-A_)

The report continues:

“By the middle of October submarines were sinking merchant
vessels without any regard to the safety of the crews. Yet four
months later the Germans were still officially claiming that
they were acting in accordance with the Prize Ordinance. Their
own semi-official commentators however, had made the position
clearer. As regards neutrals, Berlin officials had early in
February stated that any neutral ship that is either voluntarily
or under compulsion bound for an enemy port—including
contraband control harbours—thereby loses its neutrality and
must be considered hostile. At the end of February the cat was
let out of the bag by a statement that a neutral ship which
obtained a navicert from a British Consul in order to avoid
putting into a British contraband control base was liable to be
sunk by German submarines, even if it was bound from one neutral
port to another. As regards Allied ships, in the middle of
November 1939 a Berlin warning was issued against the arming of
British vessels. By that date a score of British merchantmen had
been illegally attacked by gunfire or torpedo from submarines,
and after that date some fifteen more unarmed Allied vessels
were torpedoed without warning. It is clear, therefore, that not
only was the arming fully justified as a defensive measure, but
also that neither before nor after this German threat did the
German submarines discriminate between armed and unarmed
vessels.” (_D-641-A_)

A similar report covering the next six months (_D-641-B_) makes these statements:

“On the 30th January 1941, Hitler proclaimed that ‘every ship,
with or without convoy, which appears before our torpedo tubes
is going to be torpedoed.’ On the face of it, this announcement
appears to be uncompromising; and the only qualification
provided by the context is that the threats immediately
preceding it are specifically addressed to the peoples of the
American Continent. German commentators, however, subsequently
tried to water it down by contending that Hitler was referring
only to ships which attempted to enter the area within which the
German ‘total blockade’ is alleged to be in force.

“From one point of view it probably matters little what exactly
was Hitler’s meaning, since the only conclusion that can be
reached after a study of the facts of enemy warfare on merchant
shipping is that enemy action in this field is never limited by
the principles which are proclaimed by enemy spokesmen, but
solely by the opportunities or lack of them which exist at any
given time.”

* * * * * *

“The effect of the German total blockade is to prohibit neutral
ships from entering an enormous stretch of sea round Britain
(the area extends to about 500 miles west of Ireland, and from
the latitude of Bordeaux to that of the Faroe Islands), upon
pain of having their ships sunk without warning and their crews
killed. As a matter of fact, at least thirty-two neutral ships,
exclusive of those sailing in British convoys, have been sunk by
enemy action since the declaration of the ‘total blockade’.”

* * * * * *

“Yet, though information is lacking in very many cases, details
are available to prove that, during the period under review, at
least thirty-eight Allied merchant ships, exclusive of those in
convoys, have been torpedoed without warning in or near the
‘total blockade’ area.

“That the Germans themselves have no exaggerated regard for the
area is proved by the fact that of the thirty-eight ships
referred to at least sixteen were torpedoed outside the limits
of the war-zone.”

* * * * * *

“The sinking of the ‘_City of Benares_’ on the 17th September
1940 is a good example of this. The ‘_City of Benares_’ was an
11,000-ton liner with 191 passengers on board, including nearly
100 children. She was torpedoed without warning just outside the
‘war zone,’ with the loss of 258 lives, including 77 children.
It was blowing a gale, with hail and rain squalls and a very
rough sea when the torpedo struck her at about 10 p. m. In the
darkness and owing to the prevailing weather conditions, at
least four of the twelve boats lowered were capsized. Others
were swamped and many people were washed right out of them. In
one boat alone sixteen people, including 11 children, died from
exposure; in another 22 died, including 15 children; in a third
21 died. The point to be emphasized is not the unusual brutality
of this attack but rather that such results are inevitable when
a belligerent disregards the rules of sea warfare as the Germans
have done and are doing.”

“There are hundreds of similar stories, stories of voyages for
days in open boats in Atlantic gales, of men in the water
clinging for hours to a raft and gradually dropping off one by
one, of crews being machine-gunned as they tried to lower their
boats or as they drifted away in them, of seamen being blown to
pieces by shells and torpedoes and bombs. The enemy must know
that such things are the inevitable result of the type of
warfare he has chosen to employ.” (_D-641-B_)

The total sinkings by U-boats during the war (1939 to 1945) amounted to 2,775 British, Allied, and Neutral ships totalling 14,572,435 gross tons (_D-641-C_).

Another example of the ruthless nature of the actions conducted by Doenitz’s U-boat commanders, particularly as both British and German versions of the sinking are available, is the sinking of “_S. S. Sheaf Mead_.” The British report, which includes the German account in the shape of a complete extract from the U-boat’s log, states:

“The British ‘_S. S. Sheaf Mead_’ was torpedoed without warning
on 27 May 1940 with the loss of 31 of the crew. The commander of
the U-boat responsible is reported to have behaved in an
exceptionally callous manner towards the men clinging to
upturned boats and pieces of wood. It was thought that this man
was Kapitaenleutnant Oehrn of U-37. The following extract from
his diary for 27 May 1940 leaves no doubt on the matter and
speaks for itself as to his behaviour.” (_D-644_)

The relevant extract from the log, at 1554 hours, reads:

“Surface. Stern [referring to the ship which has been torpedoed]
is underwater. Bows rise higher. The boats are now on the water.
Lucky for them. A picture of complete order. They lie at some
distance. The bows rear up quite high. Two men appear from
somewhere in the forward part of the ship. They leap and rush
with great bounds along the deck down to the stern. The stern
disappears. A boat capsizes. Then a boiler explosion. Two men
fly through the air, limbs outstretched. Bursting and crashing.
Then all is over. A large heap of wreckage floats up. We
approach it to identify the name. The crew have saved themselves
on wreckage. We fish out a buoy. No name on it. I ask a man on
the raft. He says, hardly turning his head—‘Nix Name.’ A young
boy in the water calls ‘Help, help, please.’ The others are very
composed. They look damp and somewhat tired. An expression of
cold hatred is on their faces. On to the old course. After
washing the paint off the buoy, the name comes to light:
Greatafield, Glasgow. 5006 gross registered tons.” (_D-644_)

“On to the old course” means merely that the U-boat makes off.

The report of the Chief Engineer of the “_S. S. Sheaf Mead_” contains this description of the situation:

“When I came to the surface I found myself on the port side,
that is, nearest to the submarine, which was only about five
yards away. The submarine Captain asked the steward the name of
the ship, which he told him, and the enemy picked up one of our
lifebuoys, but this had the name ‘_Gretaston_’ on it, as this
was the name of our ship before it was changed to ‘_Sheaf Mead_’
last January.”

* * * * * *

“She had cutaway bows, but I did not notice a net cutter. Two
men stood at the side with boat hooks to keep us off.

“They cruised around for half an hour, taking photographs of us
in the water. Otherwise they just watched us, but said nothing.
Then she submerged and went off, without offering us any
assistance whatever.” (_D-644_)

The U-boats log at 1444 hours contains a description of the sighting of the ship, the difficulty in identification, and then the sinking:

“The distance apart is narrowing. The steamship draws in
quickly, but the position is still 40-50. I cannot see the stern
yet. Tube ready. Shall I or not? The gunnery crews are also
prepared. On the ship’s side a yellow cross in a small, square,
dark blue ground. Swedish? Presumably not. I raise the periscope
a little. Hurrah, a gun at the stern, an ack-ack gun or
something similar. Fire! I cannot miss.” (_D-644_)

The actual documents by which Doenitz and his fellow conspirators issued their orders in disregard of International Law indicate that the compiler of the above reports understated the case. These orders cover not only the period referred to in the above reports, but also the subsequent course of the war. It is interesting to note in them the steps by which the conspirators progressed. At first they were content with breaching the rules of International Law to the extent of sinking merchant ships, including neutral ships, without warning where there was a reasonable prospect of being able to do so without discovery. The facts already quoted show that the question of whether ships were defensively armed or outside the declared operational areas was in practice immaterial.

A memorandum by the German Naval War Staff, dated 22 September 1939, (_C-191_) provides:

“Flag Officer U-boats intends to give permission to U-boats to
sink without warning any vessels sailing without lights. * * *
In practice there is no opportunity for attacking at night, as
the U-boat cannot identify a target which is a shadow in a way
that entirely obviates mistakes being made. If the political
situation is such that even possible mistakes must be ruled out,
U-boats must be forbidden to make any attacks at night in waters
where French and English Naval forces or merchant ships may be
situated. On the other hand, in sea areas where only English
units are to be expected, the measures desired by F. O. U-boats
can be carried out; permission to take this step is not to be
given in writing, but need merely be based on the unspoken
approval of the Naval War Staff. U-boat commanders would be
informed by word of mouth and the sinking of a merchant ship
must be justified in the War Diary as due to possible confusion
with a warship or an auxiliary cruiser. In the meanwhile,
U-boats in the English Channel have received instructions to
attack all vessels sailing without lights.” (_C-191_)

The War Diary of the Naval War Staff of the German Admiralty contains the following report by Ia (Staff Operations Officer on the Naval War Staff) on directive of the Armed Forces High Command of 30 December 1939:

“According to this the Fuehrer, on report of the Commander in
Chief, Navy, has decided:

“(_a_) Greek merchant vessels are to be treated as enemy vessels
in the zone blockaded by U.S.A. and Britain.

“(_b_) In the Bristol Channel all ships may be attacked without
warning. For external consumption these attacks should be given
out as hits by mines.

“Both measures may be taken with immediate effect.” (_C-21_)

Another report by Ia, refers to intensified measures in naval and air warfare in connection with “_Fall Gelb_”.

“In consequence of this Directive, the Navy will authorize,
simultaneously with the general intensification of the war, the
sinking by U-boats, without any warning, of all ships in those
waters near the enemy coasts in which _mines can be employed_.
In this case, for external consumption, pretence should be made
that mines are being used. The behaviour of, and use of weapons
by, U-boats should be adapted to this purpose.” (_C-21_)

A third extract from the Naval War Diary, dated 6 January 1940, states:

“* * * the Fuehrer has in principle agreed (see minutes of
report of C. in C. Navy of 30 December) to authorize firing
without warning whilst maintaining the pretence of mine hits in
certain parts of the American blockaded zone.” (_C-21_)

Whereupon, the order is given to Flag Officer, Submarines, carrying out that decision (_C-21_).

The report for 18 January 1940 states:

“The High Command of the Armed Forces has issued the following
Directive dated 17th of January, cancelling the previous order
concerning intensified measures of warfare against merchantmen.

“The Navy will authorize, with immediate effect, the sinking
without warning by U-Boats of all ships in those waters near the
enemy coasts in which the use of mines can be pretended. U-Boats
must adapt their behavior and employment of weapons to the
pretence, which is to be maintained in these cases, that the
hits were caused by mines. Ships of the United States, Italy,
Japan and Russia are exempted from these attacks.” (_C-21_)

An extract from the BDU War Diary (Doenitz’s War Diary) dated 18 July 1941, reveals a further extension of the above order so as to cut down the protected categories:

“Supplementary to the order forbidding, for the time being,
attacks on U. S. warships and merchant vessels in the
operational area of the North Atlantic, the Fuehrer has ordered
the following:

“1. Attack on U. S. merchant vessels sailing in British or U. S.
convoys or independently is authorized in the original
operational area which corresponds in its dimensions to the U.
S. blockade zone and which does not include the sea-route U. S.
to Iceland.” (_C-118_)

As these orders show, at one date the ships of a particular neutral under certain conditions could be sunk, while those of another could not. The attitude to be adopted toward ships of particular neutrals changed at various times, for Doenitz conducted the U-Boat war against neutrals with cynical opportunism. It all depended on the political relationship of Germany toward a particular country at a particular time whether her ships were sunk or not.

(2) _The Orders Concerning Treatment of Survivors._ A series of orders led up to the issue of an order which enjoined U-Boat commanders not merely to abstain from rescuing crews and give them no assistance, but deliberately to annihilate them.

Among these preliminary standing orders of the U-Boat Command is Order Number 154, signed by Doenitz:

“Paragraph (_e_). Do not pick up survivors and take them with
you. Do not worry about the merchant-ship’s boats. Weather
conditions and distance from land play no part. Have a care only
for your own ship and strive only to attain your next success as
soon as possible. We must be harsh in this war. The enemy began
the war in order to destroy us, so nothing else matters.”
(_D-642_)

In 1942, when the United States entered the war with its enormous ship-building capacity, the change thus brought about necessitated a further adjustment in the methods adopted by the U-Boats. Doenitz accordingly issued an order, which intended not merely the sinking of merchant ships, not merely the abstention from rescue of the crews, but their deliberate extermination.

The course of events is shown by the record of a conversation between Hitler and the Japanese Ambassador, Oshima, (_D-423_) in the presence of Ribbentrop, on 3 January 1942:

“The Fuehrer, using a map, explains to the Japanese Ambassador
the present position of marine warfare in the Atlantic,
emphasizing that he considers his most important task is to get
the U-Boat warfare going in full swing. The U-Boats are being
reorganized. Firstly, he had recalled all U-Boats operating in
the Atlantic. As mentioned before, they would now be posted
outside United States ports. Later, they would be off Freetown
and the larger boats even as far down as Capetown.”

* * * * * *

“After having given further explanations on the map, the Fuehrer
pointed out that, however many ships the United States built,
one of their main problems would be the lack of personnel. For
that reason, even merchant ships would be sunk without warning
with the intention of killing as many of the crew as possible.
Once it gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the
sinkings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in
enlisting new people. The training of sea-going personnel takes
a very long time. We are fighting for our existence and our
attitude cannot be ruled by any humane feelings. For this reason
he must give the order that in case foreign seamen could not be
taken prisoner, which is not always possible on the sea, U-boats
were to surface after torpedoing and shoot up the lifeboats.

“Ambassador Oshima heartily agreed with the Fuehrer’s comments,
and said that the Japanese too are forced to follow these
methods.” (_D-423_)

An extract from the BDU War Diary of 16 September 1942 is part of the story in the sense that it was on the following day that the annihilation order was issued. It records an attack on a U-boat, which was rescuing survivors, chiefly the Italian survivors of the Allied liner “_Laconia_,” when it was attacked by an Allied aircraft (_D-446_).

A Top Secret order, sent to all commanding officers of U-boats from Doenitz’s headquarters, dated 17 September 1942, provided:

“1. No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of
ships sunk, and this includes picking up persons in the water
and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats, and
handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the
rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy
ships and crews.

“2. Orders for bringing in Captains and Chief Engineers still
apply.

“3. Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements will be of
importance for your boat.

“4. Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy takes no regard of
women and children in his bombing attacks on German cities.”
(_D-630_)

The intentions of this carefully worded order are made clear by an extract from Doenitz’s War Diary which is personally signed by Doenitz. The War Diary entry for 17 September 1942 reads:

“The attention of all commanding officers is again drawn to the
fact that all efforts to rescue members of the crews of ships
which have been sunk contradict the most primitive demands for
the conduct of warfare by annihilating enemy ships and their
crews. Orders concerning the bringing in of the Captains and
Chief Engineers still stand.” (_D-630_).

In this connection, a telegram from the Commander of the U-boat “_Schacht_” to Doenitz’s headquarters, and the reply, are significant. “_Schacht_” had been taking part in the rescue of survivors from the “_Laconia_.” The telegram from “_Schacht_,” dated 18 September 1942, reads:

“163 Italians handed over to ‘_Annamite_.’ Navigating Officer of
‘_Laconia_’ and another English Officer on board.” (_D-630_)

The telegram goes on to set out the position of English and Polish survivors in boats.

The reply from Doenitz’s headquarters was sent on the 20th:

“Action as in wireless telegram message of 17th of September was
wrong. Boat was detailed to rescue Italian allies and not for
the rescue of English and Poles.” (_D-630_)

Such were Doenitz’s plans before the bombing incident ever occurred.

“Operation Order Atlantic No. 56,” dated 7 October 1943, contains the sailing orders of a U-boat (_D-663_). Although the date of this order is 7 October 1943, in fact it is only a reproduction of an order issued earlier, in the autumn of 1942. The following is an extract from this order:

“Rescue ships: A so-called rescue ship is generally attached to
every convoy, a special ship of up to 3000 gross registered
tons, which is intended for the picking up of survivors after
U-boat attacks. These ships are, for the most part, equipped
with a shipborne aircraft and large motor-boats, are strongly
armed with depth-charge throwers, and very manoeuverable, so
that they are often called U-Boat Traps by the commander. In
view of the desired destruction of ships’ crews, their sinking
is of great value.” (_D-663_)