Chapter XXXII: Part I: , p. 2125 (2)

Of all the members of the Nazi conspiracy, Hess was closest to Hitler from the first. As Hitler’s secretary and A. d. C., as his Deputy, and finally as his Second Successor Designate, Hess was at all times his direct representative in all Party matters. Thus, the conspiracy’s most powerful instrument of political action rested in his hands.

Hess used this power to penetrate and dominate the German government administration with National Socialist functionaries; to control legislation and education; and to persecute all independent groups, especially the churches and the Jews.

Being responsible for the political direction and control of the German people, through the Party, Hess played a decisive role in preparing the nation for war. He furthered the secret rearmament of the Party’s military formations; he signed the Conscription Law of 1935; he sat on the Reichs Defense Council, the inner Cabinet in which the heads of the conspiracy blue-printed the administrative, economic, and political preparation of their aggressive wars.

Hess, above, all, was responsible for the creation and direction of the Nazi fifth-column, in which foreign citizens of German extraction joined under the Nazi banner to weaken and undermine those countries which the Nazi conspirators had determined to subjugate.

All through the years from 1920 to 1941 Hess remained the most faithful and relentless executor of Hitler’s aims and designs. This complete devotion to the success of the conspiracy was climaxed by his flight to Scotland in an attempt to end the war with England and to receive English support for Germany’s demands against Russia, which he had helped to prepare.

The share of Hess’ participation in the Nazi conspiracy is as great as that of the Party which he directed. The Party’s crimes are his.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO RUDOLF HESS

│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 58
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*062-PS │Top secret Hess directive of 13 March │ │
│1940, concerning behavior in case of │ │
│landings of enemy planes or │ │
│parachutists. (USA 696) │ III │ 107
│ │ │
070-PS │Letter of Deputy Fuehrer to Rosenberg,│ │
│25 April 1941, on substitution of │ │
│National Socialist mottos for morning │ │
│prayers in schools. (USA 349) │ III │ 118
│ │ │
*089-PS │Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 8 │ │
│March 1940, instructing Amann not to │ │
│issue further newsprint to │ │
│confessional newspapers. (USA 360) │ III │ 147
│ │ │
*098-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 22 │ │
│February 1940, urging creation of │ │
│National Socialist Catechism, etc. to │ │
│provide moral foundation for NS │ │
│religion. (USA 350) │ III │ 152
│ │ │
*101-PS │Letter from Hess’ office signed │ │
│Bormann to Rosenberg, 17 January 1940,│ │
│concerning undesirability of religious│ │
│literature for members of the │ │
│Wehrmacht. (USA 361) │ III │ 160
│ │ │
*107-PS │Circular letter signed Bormann, 17 │ │
│June 1938, enclosing directions │ │
│prohibiting participation of │ │
│Reichsarbeitsdienst in religious │ │
│celebrations. (USA 351) │ III │ 162
│ │ │
*113-PS │Secret Order issued by Hess’ Office │ │
│signed Bormann, 27 July 1938, making │ │
│clergymen ineligible for Party │ │
│offices. (USA 683) │ III │ 164
│ │ │
*388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan│ │
│for the attack on Czechoslovakia), │ │
│kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │
│April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305
│ │ │
675-PS │Letter from Hess’ office to Minister │ │
│of Interior, signed Bormann, 25 August│ │
│1938, agreeing to invalidation of │ │
│Concordat between Austria and Holy │ │
│See. │ III │ 482
│ │ │
784-PS │Letters from Minister of Justice to │ │
│Hess and SA Chief of Staff, 5 June │ │
│1935, concerning penal proceedings │ │
│against merchant and SA leader and 22 │ │
│companions because of inflicting │ │
│bodily injury on duty. (USA 732) │ III │ 559
│ │ │
*812-PS │Letter from Rainer to Seyss-Inquart, │ │
│22 August 1939 and report from │ │
│Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar │ │
│Gauleiter Buerckel, 6 July 1939 on │ │
│events in the NSDAP of Austria from │ │
│1933 to 11 March 1938. (USA 61) │ III │ 586
│ │ │
*837-PS │Secret circular by Hess, 3 February │ │
│1939, concerning National League of │ │
│Germans abroad and the German Eastern │ │
│League. (GB 265) │ III │ 603
│ │ │
*838-PS │Letter from Hess’ office signed │ │
│Bormann, 3 June 1939, referring to │ │
│Hitler’s Decree of 6 March 1939 which │ │
│precluded Christian Scientists from │ │
│joining the Party. (USA 684) │ III │ 605
│ │ │
*840-PS │Party Directive, 14 July 1939, making │ │
│clergy and theology students │ │
│ineligible for Party membership. (USA │ │
│355) │ III │ 606
│ │ │
842-PS │Correspondence between Party │ │
│officials, 30 December 1940, │ │
│concerning killing of the insane. │ III │ 609
│ │ │
*1143-PS │Letter from Schickendanz to Rosenberg,│ │
│20 October 1932, for personal │ │
│transmission to Hess concerning │ │
│organization of Air Force. (USA 40) │ III │ 806
│ │ │
1377-PS │Decree establishing a Secret Cabinet │ │
│Council, 4 February 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 111. │ III │ 931
│ │ │
1392-PS │Law on the Hitler Youth, 1 December │ │
│1936. 1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 993. │ III │ 972
│ │ │
1393-PS │Law on treacherous attacks against │ │
│State and Party, and for the │ │
│Protection of Party Uniforms, 20 │ │
│December 1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│Part I, p. 1269. │ III │ 973
│ │ │
*1395-PS │Law to insure the unity of Party and │ │
│State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. │ │
│(GB 252) │ III │ 978
│ │ │
1416-PS │Reich Citizen Law of 15 September │ │
│1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 1146. │ IV │ 7
│ │ │
*1417-PS │First regulation to the Reichs │ │
│Citizenship Law, 14 November 1935. │ │
│1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│1333. (GB 258) │ IV │ 8
│ │ │
**1654-PS │Law of 16 March 1935 reintroducing │ │
│universal military conscription. 1935 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 369. │ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ IV │ 163
│ │ │
*1774-PS │Extracts from Organizational Law of │ │
│the Greater German Reich by Ernst │ │
│Rudolf Huber. (GB 246) │ IV │ 349
│ │ │
*1866-PS │Record of conversation between Reich │ │
│Foreign Minister and the Duce, 13 May │ │
│1941. (GB 273) │ IV │ 499
│ │ │
1942-PS │Hess’ participation in legislative │ │
│process, published in Legal │ │
│Regulations and Legal Problems of the │ │
│Movement, by Dr. O. Gauweiler, p. 20. │ IV │ 584
│ │ │
1969-PS │Correspondence of party officials, │ │
│concerning killing of insane. │ IV │ 602
│ │ │
2001-PS │Law to Remove the Distress of People │ │
│and State, 24 March 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 141. │ IV │ 638
│ │ │
2003-PS │Law concerning the Sovereign Head of │ │
│the German Reich, 1 August 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 747. │ IV │ 639
│ │ │
2008-PS │German Communal Ordinance, 30 January │ │
│1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 49. │ IV │ 643
│ │ │
*2018-PS │Fuehrer’s decree establishing a │ │
│Ministerial Council for Reich Defense,│ │
│30 August 1939. 1939 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1539. │ │
│(GB 250) │ IV │ 650
│ │ │
*2124-PS │Decree introducing the Nurnberg Racial│ │
│Laws into Austria, 20 May 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 594. (GB│ │
│259) │ IV │ 755
│ │ │
*2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │
│Commanders of Army, Navy and Air │ │
│Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by │ │
│copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May │ │
│1935 and copy of Decision of Reich │ │
│Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council │ │
│for defense of the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934
│ │ │
*2307-PS │Law concerning reunion of Austria with│ │
│German Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 237. (GB│ │
│133) │ IV │ 997
│ │ │
*2385-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 30│ │
│August 1945. (USA 68) │ V │ 23
│ │ │
*2426-PS │Extracts from Speeches, by Hess. (GB │ │
│253) │ V │ 90
│ │ │
*2608-PS │Frick’s lecture, 7 March 1940, on “The│ │
│Administration in Wartime”. (USA 714) │ V │ 327
│ │ │
2715-PS │Speech by Hitler to the Reichstag on │ │
│20 February 1938, published in The │ │
│Archive, February 1938, Vol. 47, pp. │ │
│1441-1442. (USA 331) │ V │ 376
│ │ │
*2788-PS │Notes of conference in the Foreign │ │
│Office between Ribbentrop, Konrad │ │
│Henlein, K. H. Frank and others on │ │
│program for Sudeten agitation, 29 │ │
│March 1938. (USA 95) │ V │ 422
│ │ │
2917-PS │Decree concerning German people’s list│ │
│and German nationality in the │ │
│incorporated Eastern Territories of 4 │ │
│March 1941. 1941 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 118. │ V │ 587
│ │ │
*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │
│picture composed of captured German │ │
│film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801
│ │ │
*3061-PS │Supplement No. 2 to the Official │ │
│Czechoslovak Report entitled “German │ │
│Crimes Against Czechoslovakia” │ │
│(document 998-PS). (USA 126) │ V │ 857
│ │ │
3067-PS │Law for the prevention of offspring │ │
│with Hereditary diseases, 14 July │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 529. │ V │ 880
│ │ │
3075-PS │Law for the building up of │ │
│administration in Ostmark, 14 April │ │
│1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 777. │ V │ 884
│ │ │
3076-PS │Law for building up of administrations│ │
│in Reich Gau Sudetenland, 14 April │ │
│1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 780. │ V │ 889
│ │ │
3077-PS │Law regarding reunion of Free City of │ │
│Danzig with German Reich of 1 │ │
│September 1939. 1939 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1547. │ V │ 891
│ │ │
3124-PS │Extracts from Rudolf Hess—Speeches. │ │
│(GB 253) │ V │ 902
│ │ │
3132-PS │Extracts from Dates of the History of │ │
│the NSDAP, 1939. │ V │ 906
│ │ │
3163-PS │The Deputy of the Fuehrer—Rudolf Hess,│ │
│published in National Socialist │ │
│Yearbook, 1941, pp. 219-22. │ V │ 914
│ │ │
*3178-PS │Law to Secure the Unity of Party and │ │
│State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. │ │
│(GB 248) │ V │ 916
│ │ │
3179-PS │Law for the Protection of German Blood│ │
│and Honor of 15 September 1935. 1935 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1146. │ V │ 916
│ │ │
3180-PS │Decree providing for the participation│ │
│of the Fuehrer’s Deputy in appointment│ │
│of officials, 24 September 1935. 1935 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1203. │ V │ 918
│ │ │
3182-PS │Decree concerning participation of │ │
│Deputy Fuehrer in the appointment of │ │
│Labor Service Leaders and Heads of │ │
│departments of Reich, 3 April 1936. │ │
│1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│373. │ V │ 918
│ │ │
3183-PS │Reich Regulations for enlistment, │ │
│employment and promotion of Reich and │ │
│Provincial officials, 14 October 1936.│ │
│1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, p. 893. │ V │ 919
│ │ │
3184-PS │Order of Fuehrer and Reichchancellor │ │
│concerning appointment of Civil │ │
│Servants and termination of employment│ │
│as Civil Servants of 10 July 1937. │ │
│1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│769. │ V │ 921
│ │ │
3189-PS │Greater Germany, published in │ │
│Documents of German Politics, Vol. VI,│ │
│Part 1, pp. 4-5. (GB 249) │ V │ 922
│ │ │
3190-PS │The Development of the Reich, │ │
│published in Documents of German │ │
│Politics, Vol. VII, Part 1, p. 264. │ V │ 923
│ │ │
3191-PS │Extracts from German Fuehrer │ │
│Dictionary, 1934-1935, p. 25, │ │
│concerning Hess. │ V │ 923
│ │ │
3192-PS │Extract concerning Hess from The │ │
│German Reichstag, p. 180. │ V │ 924
│ │ │
3196-PS │Hitler decree of 21 April 1933, │ │
│published in National Socialist Party │ │
│Correspondence, 27 April 1933, p. 1. │ V │ 924
│ │ │
3197-PS │First decree for execution of Sudeten │ │
│Gau Law of 10 June 1939. 1939 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 997. │ V │ 924
│ │ │
3198-PS │Official Party News, 26 September │ │
│1933, published in National Socialist │ │
│Party Correspondence. │ V │ 927
│ │ │
3200-PS │Extract concerning Hess as Deputy │ │
│Fuehrer from National Socialist │ │
│Yearbook, 1939, pp. 188-189. │ V │ 927
│ │ │
3203-PS │Hess decree of 3 June 1936 │ │
│establishing the NS Aid Fund for the │ │
│Struggle in the Universities, reported│ │
│in The Third Reich, 1937, Vol. IV, p. │ │
│360. │ V │ 927
│ │ │
3204-PS │Ceremonial Initiation of Sudeten │ │
│German Party into NSDAP by Rudolf │ │
│Hess, published in Voelkischer │ │
│Beobachter, 7 November 1938, p. 5. │ V │ 928
│ │ │
*3245-PS │Order of 21 February 1940, concerning │ │
│recruiting for Waffen SS, published in│ │
│Decrees, Regulations, Announcements, │ │
│Vol. III, p. 354. (GB 267) │ V │ 946
│ │ │
3254-PS │The Austrian Question, 1934-1938, by │ │
│Seyss-Inquart, 9 September 1945. (USA │ │
│704) │ V │ 961
│ │ │
*3258-PS │Extracts from National Socialism Basic│ │
│Principles, Their Application by the │ │
│Nazi Party’s Foreign Organization, and│ │
│the Use of Germans Abroad for Nazi │ │
│Aims, by U. S. Government Printing │ │
│Office, Washington, 1943. (GB 262) │ V │ 997
│ │ │
3322-PS │Office for Racial Policies of NSDAP, │ │
│from Organization Book of NSDAP, 1940,│ │
│p. 330. │ VI │ 38
│ │ │
3347-PS │Seniority List of the SS, of NSDAP, as│ │
│of 1 December 1936. │ VI │ 78
│ │ │
*3385-PS │Hess Order of 14 December 1938 │ │
│concerning position of the SD within │ │
│the Party, from Decrees, Regulations, │ │
│Announcements, Vol. IV, Part I, p. │ │
│231. (GB 257) │ VI │ 104
│ │ │
*3401-PS │National Socialism and German │ │
│Nationalism Abroad, from Voelkischer │ │
│Beobachter, 24 May 1934, p. 2. (GB │ │
│263) │ VI │ 120
│ │ │
3418-PS │Destruction of the Jewish race, from │ │
│The Archive, January 1939, p. 1605. │ VI │ 121
│ │ │
3419-PS │Extract from The Party Congress of │ │
│Freedom, 1936, pp. 258-259. │ VI │ 122
│ │ │
*3425-PS │Voluntary statement made by │ │
│Seyss-Inquart with advice of counsel, │ │
│10 December 1945. (USA 701) │ VI │ 124
│ │ │
*3796-PS │Letter of Canaris enclosing a report, │ │
│25 October 1939, concerning the │ │
│activities of Auslands organization. │ │
│(GB 286) │ VI │ 732
│ │ │
3817-PS │File of correspondence and reports by │ │
│Dr. Haushofer on Asiatic situation. │ │
│(USA 790) │ VI │ 752
│ │ │
*D-138 │Decree of 27 July 1934, providing for │ │
│participation of Fuehrer’s deputy in │ │
│the drafting of all legislation. (USA │ │
│403) │ VI │ 1055
│ │ │
*D-139 │Letter from Hess to Goebbels, 9 │ │
│October 1934, concerning participation│ │
│in legislation of the Reich. (USA 404)│ VI │ 1056
│ │ │
*D-140 │Letter from Lammers to Reich │ │
│Ministers, 12 April 1938. (USA 405) │ VI │ 1057
│ │ │
*D-151 │Krupp, Schacht and Hess correspondence│ │
│in 1933 regarding the Hitler Fund. (GB│ │
│256; USA 831) │ VI │ 1060
│ │ │
*D-181 │Circular from Gauleiter of South │ │
│Westphalia, 21 January 1937, │ │
│concerning Hereditary Health Law. (GB │ │
│528) │ VI │ 1073
│ │ │
D-614 │Statement of British Secretary of │ │
│State for Foreign Affairs in │ │
│Parliament on 22 September 1943. │ VII │ 94
│ │ │
*EC-411 │Order by Hess concerning the │ │
│reconstruction of certain industrial │ │
│enterprises in Poland, 20 November │ │
│1939. (USA 299) │ VII │ 469
│ │ │
*L-273 │Report of American Consul General in │ │
│Vienna to Secretary of State, 26 July │ │
│1938, concerning anniversary of │ │
│assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss. │ │
│(USA 59) │ VII │ 1094
│ │ │
*L-292 │Telegram of American Consul General in│ │
│Vienna to Secretary of State, 12 March│ │
│1938, concerning propaganda dropped │ │
│over Vienna. (USA 78) │ VII │ 1098
│ │ │
M-102 │Extract from National Zeitung, 27 │ │
│April 1942, concerning Hess. (GB 254) │ VIII │ 32
│ │ │
M-103 │Speech by Hess to representatives of │ │
│Foreign Chamber of Commerce, from │ │
│Voelkischer Beobachter, 30 June 1934. │ VIII │ 33
│ │ │
*M-104 │Speech by Hess at inauguration of new │ │
│Adolf Hitler Hall at Hof, from │ │
│Frankfurter Zeitung, 13 October 1936. │ │
│(GB 260) │ VIII │ 33
│ │ │
*M-105 │Speech by Hess at meeting of Reich │ │
│Chamber of Labour at Messerschmitt │ │
│Works, from Voelkischer Beobachter, 2 │ │
│May 1941. (GB 261) │ VIII │ 34
│ │ │
*M-107 │Speech by Hess at 7th Annual Meeting │ │
│of Foreign Organization of NSDAP, from│ │
│Voelkischer Beobachter, 28 August │ │
│1939. (GB 266) │ VIII │ 35
│ │ │
M-108 │Speech by Hess broadcast on Fuehrer’s │ │
│birthday, 20 April 1941. │ VIII │ 37
│ │ │
*M-116 │Report of interview with Hess by Wing │ │
│Commander the Duke of Hamilton, 11 May│ │
│1941. (GB 269) │ VIII │ 37
│ │ │
*M-117 │Record of interview with Hess, 13 May │ │
│1941. (GB 270) │ VIII │ 40
│ │ │
*M-118 │Record of interview with Hess, 14 May │ │
│1941. (GB 271) │ VIII │ 43
│ │ │
*M-119 │Record of conversation with Hess, 15 │ │
│May 1941. (GB 272) │ VIII │ 45
│ │ │
M-120 │“The VDA and the Nazi Party”, │ │
│extracted from German Basic Handbook, │ │
│Part III, Chap. IV. │ VIII │ 46
│ │ │
M-121 │“German Foreign Institute”, extracted │ │
│from German Basic Handbook, Part III, │ │
│Chap. IV. │ VIII │ 47
│ │ │
*M-122 │“The Problem of German Minorities”, │ │
│from German Basic Handbook, Part III, │ │
│Chap. IV. (GB 264) │ VIII │ 48
│ │ │
R-96 │Correspondence of Minister of Justice │ │
│in preparation of the discriminatory │ │
│decree of 4 December 1941 regarding │ │
│criminal justice against Poles and │ │
│Jews in annexed Eastern Territories. │ │
│(GB 268) │ VIII │ 72
│ │ │
R-139 │Correspondence between Hess’ office │ │
│and the Ministry of Justice concerning│ │
│civil law in Eastern Territories. │ VIII │ 209
│ │ │
R-141 │Minutes of conference directed by │ │
│Hess’ assistants, 20 February 1941, │ │
│concerning racial problems in Armed │ │
│Forces. │ VIII │ 236
│ │ │
Affidavit F │Affidavit of Josef Dietrich, 20-21 │ │
│November 1945. │ VIII │ 631
│ │ │
*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770
│ │ │
*Chart No. 15 │Staff of the Fuehrer’s Deputy. │
│(3201-PS; GB 251) │ End of VIII

3. JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP

A. _POSITIONS HELD BY RIBBENTROP._

According to Ribbentrop’s own certified statement (_2829-PS_), he became a member of the Nazi Party in 1932, but according to the semi-official statement in “_Das Archiv_,” he had gone to work for the Party before that time by extending his business connections to political circles. Having joined the service of the Party in 1930 at the time of the final struggle for power in the Reich, “Ribbentrop played an important if not strikingly obvious part in the bringing about of the decisive meetings between the representatives of the President of the Reich and the heads of the NSDAP, who had prepared the entry of Nazis into power on 30-1-1933. Those meetings as well as those between Hitler and von Papen took place in Ribbentrop’s house in Berlin Dahlen.” (_D-472_).

Ribbentrop was therefore present and active at the inception of the Nazi seizure of power. In that first period he was advisor to the Party on questions of foreign affairs. His title was first, “Collaborator to the Fuehrer on matters of Foreign Policy.” He later became Representative in Matters of Foreign Policy on the Staff of the Deputy.

This was followed by membership in the Nazi Reichstag in November 1933.

On 24 April 1934 after Germany had left the disarmament conference, he was appointed Delegate of the Reich Government in matters of Disarmament. In this capacity he visited London and other foreign capitals. He was then given a more important and imposing title, the German Minister Plenipotentiary at Large, and it was in that capacity that he negotiated the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935.

In March 1936, after the Nazi Government had reoccupied the Rhineland zone, which had been demilitarized in accordance with the terms of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties, and the matter was brought before the Council of the League of Nations, Ribbentrop addressed the Council in defense of Germany’s action.

On 11 August 1936 he was appointed Ambassador in London, and occupied that position for a period of some eighteen months. His activities while holding that position are not highly relevant to the issues, but during that period, in his capacity which he still had as German Minister Plenipotentiary at Large, he signed the original Anticomintern Pact with Japan in November 1936, and also the additional pact by which Italy joined it in 1937.

Finally, on 24 February 1938, Ribbentrop was appointed Foreign Minister in place of von Neurath, and simultaneously was made a member of the Secret Cabinet Council (_Geheimer Kabinettsrat_) established by decree of Hitler of the same date (_1337-PS_).

Ribbentrop became an _Oberfuehrer_ in the SS, was subsequently promoted to SS _Gruppenfuehrer_ in 1938, and later became _Obergruppenfuehrer_. There is no question of any honorary rank. The SS went into his ancestry in detail in order to deal with the law relating to that subject. Ribbentrop was also permitted to adopt “von” as a prefix before his last name (_D-636_).

These activities of Ribbentrop in the earlier part of his career show in themselves that he assisted willing and deliberately in bringing the Nazis into power, and in the earlier stage of their obtaining control of the German State.

B. _RIBBENTROP’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO LAUNCH AND WAGE WARS OF
AGGRESSION._

(1) _The Austrian Anschluss._ Ribbentrop was present at a meeting at Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938, at which Hitler and von Papen met the Austrian Chancellor von Schuschnigg and his foreign minister, Guido Schmidt. The official German account of that interview is contained in _2461-PS_. What appears to be the truthful account of that interview is contained in Jodl’s diary, the entries for 11 and 12 February 1938 (_1780-PS_).

On 11 February Jodl wrote:

“In the evening, and on 12 February, General Keitel with General
von Reichenau and Sperrle at Obersalzburg. Schuschnigg, together
with R. G. Schmidt, are again being put under the heaviest
political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs
protocol.” (_1780-PS_)

The 13 February entry reads:

“In the afternoon, General Keitel asks Admiral Canaris and
myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer’s
order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming
military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for
these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the
Fuehrer by telephone for approval.

“14 February:

“At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrived. Canaris
went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence Office VII and
initiates the different measures.

“The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is
created that Germany is undertaking serious military
preparations.” (_1780-PS_)

The next step was the telephone conversation which took place between Goering and Ribbentrop on 13 March 1938, when Ribbentrop was still in London. Goering was passing on the false statement that there was no ultimatum to Austria. The facts of the ultimatum were explained by the earlier telephone conversations between Goering and Vienna. But Goering then passed the falsehood on to Ribbentrop in London in order that he might placate and reassure political circles in London (_2949-PS_).

The third step was taken by Ribbentrop after his return from London. Although he had been appointed Foreign Minister in February, he had gone back to London to clear up his business at the embassy. Although he was still in London until after the Anschluss had actually occurred, his name appears as a signatory of the law making Austria a province of the German Reich (_2307-PS_).

(2) _Czechoslovakia._ Czechoslovakia furnishes a typical example of aggression in its various aspects. To summarize the outstanding features briefly: First, there was the necessity of stirring up trouble inside the country against which aggression was planned.

Ribbentrop, as Foreign Minister, helped in the stirring up of the Sudeten Germans under Henlein, who was in frequent contact with the German Foreign Office (_3060-PS_; _2789-PS_; _3059-PS_). These documents demonstrate how the Foreign Office stirred up the Sudeten-German movement so that it would act in accordance with the Government of the Reich.

Later on, Ribbentrop was present on 28 May 1938 at the conference at which Hitler gave instructions to prepare the attack on Czechoslovakia (_388-PS_; _2360-PS_). In a speech in January 1939 Hitler proclaimed that aggression was to take place against Czechoslovakia (_2360-PS_):

“On the basis of this unbearable provocation, which was still
further emphasized by a truly infamous persecution and
terrorizing of our Germans there, I have now decided to solve
the Sudeten-German question in a final and radical manner.”

* * * * * *

“On 28 May I gave the order for the preparation of military
steps against this state, to be concluded by 2 October.”
(_2360-PS_)

The important point is that 28 May was the date when the _Fall Gruen_ for Czechoslovakia was the subject of orders, and that it was thereafter put into effect, to come to fruition at the beginning of October.

That was the second stage: To lay well in advance the plans of aggression.

The third stage was to see that neighboring states were not likely to cause trouble. Hence, on 18 July 1938, Ribbentrop had a conversation with the Italian Ambassador, Attolico, at which the attack on Czechoslovakia was discussed (_2800-PS_). Further discussions along the same lines followed (_2791-PS_; _2792-PS_). The effect of these documents is, that it was made clear to the Italian Government that the German Government was going to move against Czechoslovakia.

The other interested country was Hungary, for Hungary had certain territorial desires with regard to parts of the Czechoslovakian Republic. Accordingly on 23 and 25 August Ribbentrop was present at the discussions and had discussions himself with the Hungarian politicians Imredi and Kanya (_2796-PS_; _2797-PS_). These documents indicate that Ribbentrop endeavored to get assurances of Hungarian help, and that the Hungarian Government at the time was not too ready to commit itself to action, although it was ready enough with sympathy.

Contacts had been established with the Sudeten Germans, for theirs was the long-term grievance that had to be exploited. But the next stage was to have a short-term grievance and to stir up trouble, preferably at the fountainhead. Therefore, between 16 and 24 September, the German Foreign Office, of which Ribbentrop was the head, was engaged in stirring up trouble in Prague (_2858-PS_; _2855-PS_; _2854-PS_; _2853-PS_; and _2856-PS_). An example of the type of these activities is the communication of 19 September from the Foreign Office to the German Embassy in Prague (_2858-PS_):

“Please inform Deputy Kundt at Konrad Henlein’s request, to get
in touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start
_their_ demands _for_ autonomy tomorrow.” (_2858-PS_)

Another of these documents deals with questions of arrest and the action to be taken against any Czechs in Germany in order to make the position more difficult (_2855-PS_).

That was the contribution which Ribbentrop made to the pre-Munich crisis, which culminated in the Munich agreement of 29 September 1938 (_TC-23_).

A significant aspect of Nazi plotting with regard to Czechoslovakia, which shows the sort of action and advice which the _Wehrmacht_ expected from the Foreign Office, is contained in a long document putting forward an almost infinite variety of breaches of International Law, which were likely to arise or might have arisen from the action in regard to Czechoslovakia (_C-2_). On all these points the opinion of the Foreign Office was sought, with a view to explanation and justification. That, of course, remained a hypothetical question because at that time no war resulted.

The second stage of the acquisition of Czechoslovakia occurred when, having obtained the Sudetenland, the Nazis arranged a crisis in Czechoslovakia which would be an excuse for taking the rest. This action is important as constituting the first time that the German Government disregarded its own commitment that its desires did not go beyond the return of German blood to the Reich. On that point, again, Ribbentrop was active. On 13 March, as events were moving to a climax, he sent a telegram to the German Minister in Prague, his subordinate, telling him to

“make a point of not being available if the Czech Government
wants to get in touch with you in the next few days.”
(_2815-PS_).

At the same time Ribbentrop attended a conference in Berlin with Hitler and a delegation of pro-Nazi Slovaks. Tiso, one of the heads of the pro-Nazi Slovaks, was directed to declare an independent Slovak State in order to assist in the disintegration of Czechoslovakia (_2802-PS_). A previous meeting along the same lines had been held a month before (_2790-PS_). Thus, Ribbentrop was assisting in the task, again, of fomenting internal trouble.

On 14 March 1939, the following day, Hacha, the President of Czechoslovakia, was called to Berlin. Ribbentrop was at this meeting, at which pressure and threats were used to obtain the aged President’s consent to hand over the Czechoslovak State to Hitler (_2798-PS_; _3061-PS_).

That was the end of the Czech part of Czechoslovakia. The following week Ribbentrop signed a treaty with Slovakia, Article II of which granted the German Government the right to construct military posts and installations, and to keep them garrisoned within Slovakia (_1439-PS_). Thus, after swallowing Bohemia and Moravia as an independent state, Ribbentrop obtained military control over Slovakia.

(3) _Lithuania._ An interesting point concerning the Northern Baltic shows how difficult it was for Ribbentrop to keep his hands out of the internal affairs of other countries, even when it did not seem a very important matter. On 3 April 1939 Germany had occupied the Memeland (_TC-53-A_). It would have appeared, as far as the Baltic States were concerned, that the position was satisfactory to the Nazis but in fact Ribbentrop was acting in close concert with Heydrich, in stirring up trouble in Lithuania with a group of pro-Nazi people called the Woldemaras Supporters (_2953-PS_; _2952-PS_). Heydrich was passing to Ribbentrop a request for financial support for this group:

“Dear Party Comrade v. Ribbentrop,

“Enclosed please find a further report about the ‘Woldemaras
Supporters.’ As already mentioned in the previous report, the
‘_Woldemaras Supporters’ are still asking for help from the
Reich._ I therefore ask you to examine the question of financial
support, brought up again by the ‘Woldemaras Supporters’ set
forth on page 4, para 2 of the enclosed report and to make a
definite decision.

“_The request of the ‘Woldemaras Supporters’ for financial
support could, in my opinion, be granted. Deliveries of arms
should not, however, be made, under any circumstances._”
(_2953-PS_)

At the end of a fuller report on the same matter (2952-PS) there is added in handwriting,

“I support small regular payments, e.g. 2,000 to 3,000 marks
quarterly.” (_2952-PS_).

It is signed “W”, who was the Secretary of State. Such was the extraordinary interference, even with comparatively unimportant countries.

(4) _Poland._ In the aggression against Poland, there were several periods. The first was what might be called the Munich period, up to the end of September 1938, and at that time no language the Nazis could use was too good for Poland. Examples of German assurances and reassurances to Poland during this period are Hitler’s Reichstag speech on 20 February 1938 (_2357-PS_), the secret Foreign Office memorandum of 26 August 1938 (_TC-76_), and the conversation between M. Lipski, the Polish ambassador, and Ribbentrop (_TC-73, No. 40_). A final illustration of this technique is Hitler’s speech at the Sportzpalast on 26 September 1938, in which he said that this was the end of his territorial problems in Europe and expressed an almost violent affection for the Poles (_TC-73, No. 42_).

The next stage occupied the period between Munich and the rape of Prague. With part of the German plan for Czechoslovakia having been accomplished and parts still remaining to be done, there was a slight change towards Poland but still a friendly atmosphere. In a conversation with M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador to Berlin, on 24 October 1938, Ribbentrop put forward very peaceful suggestions for the settlement of the Danzig issue (_TC-73, No. 44_). The Polish reply, of 31 October 1938, stated that it was unacceptable that Danzig should return to the Reich, but made suggestions of a bilateral agreement (_TC-73, No. 45_). Between these dates the German Government had made its preparations to occupy Danzig by surprise (_C-137_).

But although these preparations were made, still some two months later, on 5 January 1939, Hitler was suggesting to M. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, a new solution (_TC-73, No. 48_).

Ribbentrop saw M. Beck on the next day and said that there was to be no violent solution of the Danzig issue, but a further building up of friendly relations (_TC-73, No. 49_). Not content with that, Ribbentrop went to Warsaw on 25 January to talk of the continued progress and consolidation of friendly relations (_2530-PS_). That was capped by Hitler’s Reichstag speech on 30 January 1939, in the same tone (_TC-73, No. 57_). That was the second stage—the mention of Danzig in honeyed words, because the rape of Prague had not yet been attained.

Then, in the meeting at the Reichschancellery on 23 May 1939, Hitler made it quite clear, and so stated, that Danzig had nothing to do with the real Polish question (_L-79_). “I have to deal with Poland because I want _lebensraum_ in the East”—that is the effect of Hitler’s words at that time: that Danzig was merely an excuse.

The extent to which Ribbentrop had adopted this attitude of mind of Hitler at this time is shown in the introduction to Count Ciano’s Diary (_2987-PS_):

“In the Summer of 1939 Germany advanced her claim against
Poland, naturally without our knowledge; indeed, Ribbentrop had
several times denied to our Ambassador that Germany had any
intentions of carrying the controversy to extremes. Despite
these denials I remained in doubt; I wanted to make sure for
myself, and on August 11th I went to Salzburg. It was in his
residence at Fuschl that Ribbentrop informed me, while we were
waiting to sit down at the table, of the decision to start the
fireworks, just as he might have told me about the most
unimportant and commonplace administrative matter. ‘Well,
Ribbentrop,’ I asked him, while we were walking in the garden,
‘What do you want? The Corridor, or Danzig?’ ‘Not any more’, and
he stared at me through those cold Musee Grevin eyes, ‘We want
war.’” (_2987-PS_).

That extraordinary declaration closely corroborates Hitler’s statement at his Chancellery conference on 23 May—that it was no longer a question of Danzig or the Corridor, but a question of war to achieve _lebensraum_ in the East (_L-79_).

It should be recalled in this connection that “_Fall Weiss_”, the plan for operations against Poland, is dated 3 and 11 April 1939, thus showing that preparations were already in hand (_C-120_). Another entry in Count Ciano’s Diary during the summer of 1939 makes this point quite clear:

“I have collected in the conference records verbal transcripts
of my conversations with Ribbentrop and Hitler. I shall only
note some impressions of a general nature. Ribbentrop is evasive
every time I ask him for particulars of the forthcoming German
action. He has a guilty conscience. He has lied too many times
about German intentions toward Poland not to feel embarrassment
now over what he must tell me and what he is preparing to do.

“The will to fight is unalterable. He rejects any solution which
might satisfy Germany and prevent the struggle. I am certain
that even if the Germans were given everything they demanded,
they would attack just the same, because they are possessed by
the demon of destruction.

“Our conversation sometimes takes a dramatic turn. I do not
hesitate to speak my mind in the most brutal manner. But this
doesn’t shake him in the least. I realize how little weight this
view carries in German opinion.

“The atmosphere is icy. And the cold feeling between us is
reflected in our followers. During dinner we do not exchange a
word. We distrust each other. But I at least have a clear
conscience. He has not.” (_2987-PS_)

The next stage in the German plan consisted of sharp pressure over the claim for Danzig, commencing immediately after Czechoslovakia had been formally dealt with on 15 March 1939. The first sharp raising of the claim was on 21 March (_TC-73, No. 61_).

An interesting sidelight during the last days before the war concerns the return of Herr von Dirksen, the German Ambassador at the Court of St. James, to Berlin on 18 August 1939. When interrogated (after capture) regarding the significance of this event, Ribbentrop expressed a complete absence of recollection of ever having seen the German Ambassador to England after his return. Ribbentrop thought he would have remembered him if he had seen him, and therefore he accepted the probability that he did not see him (_D-490_). Thus when it was well known that war with Poland would involve England and France, either Ribbentrop was not sufficiently interested in opinion in London to take the trouble to see his ambassador, or else, as he rather suggests, he had appointed so weak and ordinary a career diplomat to London that his opinion was not taken into account, either by himself or by Hitler. In either case, Ribbentrop was completely uninterested in anything which his Ambassador might have to tell him as to opinion in London or the possibility of war. It is putting the matter with great moderation to say that in the last days before 1 September 1939, Ribbentrop did whatever he could to avoid peace with Poland and to avoid anything which might hinder the encouraging of the war which he and the Nazis wanted. He did that, well knowing that war with Poland would involve Great Britain and France. (See also Section 8 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against Poland.)

M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador at Berlin, summarized all these events leading up to the war in his report of 10 October 1939 (_TC-73, No. 147_).

(5) _Norway and Denmark._ On 31 May 1939, Ribbentrop, on behalf of Germany, signed a non-aggression pact with Denmark which provided that:

“The German Reich and the Kingdom of Denmark will under no
circumstances go to war or employ force of any other kind
against one another.” (_TC-24_)

And on 7 April 1940 the German armed forces invaded Denmark at the same time they invaded Norway.

Ribbentrop was fully involved in the earlier preparations for the aggression against Norway. Along with Rosenberg, Ribbentrop assisted Quisling in his early activities. A letter from Rosenberg to Ribbentrop on 24 February states:

“Dear Party Comrade von Ribbentrop:

“Party Comrade Scheidt has returned and has made a detailed
report to Privy Councillor von Gruendherr who will address you
on this subject. We agreed the other day that 2-300,000 RM would
be made immediately available for the said purpose. Now it turns
out that Privy Councillor Gruendherr states that the second
instalment can be made available only after eight days. But as
it is necessary for Scheidt to go back immediately, I request
you to make it possible that this second instalment is given to
him at once. With a longer absence of _Reichsamtsleiter_ P. M.
Scheidt also the connection with your representatives would be
broken up, which just now, under certain circumstances, could be
very unfavorable.

“Therefore I trust that it is in everybody’s interest, if P. M.
Scheidt goes back immediately.” (_957-PS_)

In a report to Hitler on the Quisling activities, Rosenberg outlined Ribbentrop’s part in the preparation of the Norwegian operation:

“* * * Apart from financial support which was forthcoming from
the Reich in currency, Quisling had also been promised a
shipment of material for immediate use in Norway, such as coal
and sugar. Additional help was promised. These shipments were to
be conducted under cover of a new trade company, to be
established in Germany or through especially selected existing
firms, while Hagelin was to act as consignee in Norway. Hagelin
had already conferred with the respective Ministers of the
Nygaardsvold Government, as for instance, the Minister of Supply
and Commerce, and had been assured permission for the import of
coal. At the same time, the coal transports were to serve
possibly to supply the technical means necessary to launch
Quisling’s political action in Oslo with German help. It was
Quisling’s plan to send a number of selected, particularly
reliable men to Germany for a brief military training course in
a completely isolated camp. They were then to be detailed as
area and language specialists to German Special Troops, who were
to be taken to Oslo on the coal barges to accomplish a political
action. Thus Quisling planned to get hold of his leading
opponents in Norway, including the King, and to prevent all
military resistance from the very beginning. Immediately
following this political action and upon official request of
Quisling to the Government of the German Reich, the military
occupation of Norway was to take place. All military
preparations were to be completed previously. Though this plan
contained the great advantage of surprise, it also contained a
great number of dangers which could possibly cause its failure.
For this reason it received a quite dilatory treatment, while at
the same time, it was not disapproved as far as the Norwegians
were concerned.

“In February, after a conference with General Field Marshal
Goering, Reichsleiter Rosenberg informed the Secretary in the
Office of the Four Year Plan, only of the intention to prepare
coal shipments to Norway to the named confidant Hagelin. Further
details were discussed in a conference between Secretary
Wohlthat, Staff Director Schickedanz, and Hagelin. Since
Wohlthat received no further instructions from the General Field
Marshal, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop—after a consultation
with Reichsleiter Rosenberg—consented to expedite these
shipments through his office. Based on a report of Reichsleiter
Rosenberg to the Fuehrer it was also arranged to pay Quisling
ten thousand English pounds per month for three months,
commencing on the 15 of March, to support his work”. (_004-PS_)

This sum was paid through Scheidt.

In a letter to Ribbentrop dated 3 April 1940, Keitel wrote:

“Dear Herr von Ribbentrop:

“The military occupation of Denmark and Norway has been, by
command of the Fuehrer, long in preparation by the High Command
of the _Wehrmacht_. The High Command of the _Wehrmacht_ has
therefore had ample time to occupy itself with all the questions
connected with the carrying out of this operation. The time at
your disposal for the political preparation of this operation,
is on the contrary, very much shorter. I believe myself
therefore to be acting in accordance with your own ideas in
transmitting to you herewith, not only these wishes of the
_Wehrmacht_ which would have to be fulfilled by the Governments
in Oslo, Copenhagen and Stockholm for purely military reasons,
but also if I include a series of requests which certainly
concern the _Wehrmacht_ only indirectly but which are, however,
of the greatest importance for the fulfillment of its task * *
*.” (_D-629_)

Keitel then proceeds to ask that the Foreign Office get in touch with certain commanders. The important point is Keitel’s clear admission to Ribbentrop that the military occupation of Denmark and Norway had been long in preparation. It is interesting to connect this letter with the official Biography of Ribbentrop, in the Archives, which makes a point of mentioning the invasion of Norway and Denmark (_D-472_):

“With the occupation of Denmark and Norway on the 9 of April
1940, only a few hours before the landing of British troops in
these territories, the battle began against the Western Powers.”
(_D-472_)

It is clear that whoever else had knowledge or whoever else was ignorant, Ribbentrop had been thoroughly involved in the Quisling plottings and knew at least a week before the invasion started that the _Wehrmacht_ and Keitel had been long in preparation for this act of aggression. (See also Section 9 of Chapter IX on Aggression against Norway and Denmark.)

(6) _The Low Countries: Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg._ The facts as to the aggression against these countries, during the period when Ribbentrop was Foreign Minister, are discussed in Section 10 of Chapter IX. Special attention should be called, however, to the statement made by Ribbentrop 10 May 1940 to representatives of the foreign press with regard to the reasons for the German invasion of the Low Countries. These reasons demonstrated to be false in Section 10 of