Chapter VII: on the Acquisition of Totalitarian Political Control.) (2)

│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 63
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*351-PS │Minutes of First Meeting of Cabinet of│ │
│Hitler, 30 January 1933. (USA 389) │ III │ 270
│ │ │
*812-PS │Letter from Rainer to Seyss-Inquart, │ │
│22 August 1939 and report from │ │
│Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar │ │
│Gauleiter Buerckel, 6 July 1939 on │ │
│events in the NSDAP of Austria from │ │
│1933 to 11 March 1938. (USA 61) │ III │ 586
│ │ │
1388-PS │Law concerning confiscation of │ │
│Property subversive to People and │ │
│State, 14 July 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 479. │ III │ 962
│ │ │
1390-PS │Decree of the Reich President for the │ │
│Protection of the People and State, 28│ │
│February 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│Part I, p. 83. │ III │ 968
│ │ │
*1395-PS │Law to insure the unity of Party and │ │
│State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. │ │
│(GB 252) │ III │ 978
│ │ │
1396-PS │Law concerning the confiscation of │ │
│Communist property, 26 May 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 293. │ III │ 979
│ │ │
1398-PS │Law to supplement the Law for the │ │
│restoration of the Professional Civil │ │
│Service, 20 July 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 518. │ III │ 986
│ │ │
1400-PS │Law changing the regulations in regard│ │
│to public officer, 30 June 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 433. │ III │ 987
│ │ │
*1544-PS │Von Papen’s notes, 26 February 1938, │ │
│on his parting visit with Chancellor │ │
│Schuschnigg. (USA 71) │ IV │ 103
│ │ │
1652-PS │Decree of the Reich President for │ │
│protection against treacherous attacks│ │
│on the government of the Nationalist │ │
│movement, 21 March 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 135. │ IV │ 160
│ │ │
*1708-PS │The Program of the NSDAP. National │ │
│Socialistic Yearbook, 1941, p. 153. │ │
│(USA 255, USA 324) │ IV │ 208
│ │ │
*1760-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 28│ │
│August 1945. (USA 57) │ IV │ 305
│ │ │
*1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │
│Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. │ │
│(USA 72) │ IV │ 360
│ │ │
2001-PS │Law to Remove the Distress of People │ │
│and State, 24 March 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 141. │ IV │ 638
│ │ │
2003-PS │Law concerning the Sovereign Head of │ │
│the German Reich, 1 August 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 747. │ IV │ 639
│ │ │
2004-PS │Preliminary law for the coordination │ │
│of Federal States under the Reich, 31 │ │
│March 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 153. │ IV │ 640
│ │ │
2005-PS │Second law integrating the “Laender” │ │
│with the Reich, 7 April 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 173. │ IV │ 641
│ │ │
2006-PS │Law for the reconstruction of the │ │
│Reich, 30 January 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 75. │ IV │ 642
│ │ │
2012-PS │First regulation for administration of│ │
│the law for the restoration of │ │
│professional Civil Service, 11 April │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 195. │ IV │ 647
│ │ │
2014-PS │Law amending regulations of criminal │ │
│law and criminal procedure, 24 April │ │
│1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 341. │ IV │ 648
│ │ │
2029-PS │Decree establishing the Reich Ministry│ │
│of Public Enlightenment and │ │
│Propaganda, 13 March 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 104. │ IV │ 652
│ │ │
2030-PS │Decree concerning the Duties of the │ │
│Reich Ministry for Public │ │
│Enlightenment and Propaganda, 30 June │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 449. │ IV │ 653
│ │ │
2050-PS │The Constitution of the German Reich, │ │
│11 August 1919. 1919 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1383. │ IV │ 662
│ │ │
2058-PS │Decree for the securing of the State │ │
│Leadership, 7 July 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 462. │ IV │ 699
│ │ │
2059-PS │Decree of the Reich President relating│ │
│to the granting of Amnesty, 21 March │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 134. │ IV │ 701
│ │ │
2076-PS │Decree of the Government concerning │ │
│formation of Special Courts, 21 March │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│pp. 136-137. │ IV │ 705
│ │ │
2078-PS │Decree concerning establishment of │ │
│Ministry for Science, Education and │ │
│Popular Culture, 1 May 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 365. │ IV │ 706
│ │ │
2083-PS │Editorial control law, 4 October 1933.│ │
│1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│713. │ IV │ 709
│ │ │
2088-PS │Decree relating to tasks of Reichs │ │
│Ministry for Education, 11 May 1934. │ │
│1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│375. │ IV │ 718
│ │ │
*2246-PS │Report of von Papen to Hitler, 1 │ │
│September 1936, concerning Danube │ │
│situation. (USA 67) │ IV │ 930
│ │ │
*2247-PS │Letter from von Papen to Hitler, 17 │ │
│May 1935, concerning intention of │ │
│Austrian government to arm. (USA 64) │ IV │ 930
│ │ │
*2248-PS │Report of von Papen to Hitler, 27 July│ │
│1935, concerning National Socialism in│ │
│Austria. (USA 63) │ IV │ 932
│ │ │
*2307-PS │Law concerning reunion of Austria with│ │
│German Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 237. (GB│ │
│133) │ IV │ 997
│ │ │
2403-PS │The End of the Party State, from │ │
│Documents of German Politics, Vol. I, │ │
│pp. 55-56. │ V │ 71
│ │ │
2415-PS │First decree for the implementation of│ │
│law relating to The Reich Chamber of │ │
│Culture, 1 November 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 797. │ V │ 89
│ │ │
2456-PS │Youth and the Church, from Complete │ │
│Handbook of Youth Laws. │ V │ 198
│ │ │
*2461-PS │Official German communique of meeting │ │
│of Hitler and Schuschnigg, 12 February│ │
│1938, published in Documents of German│ │
│Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part I. (GB │ │
│132) │ V │ 206
│ │ │
2512-PS │Hitler’s Testimony Before the Court │ │
│for High Treason, published in │ │
│Frankfurter Zeitung, 26 September │ │
│1931. │ V │ 246
│ │ │
2541-PS │Extracts from German Publications. │ V │ 285
│ │ │
2633-PS │Extracts from Constitutional Law of │ │
│the Greater German Reich, 1939. │ V │ 344
│ │ │
2655-PS │Concordat between the Holy See and the│ │
│German Reich, Article 31. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, pp. 679, │ │
│687-8. │ V │ 364
│ │ │
2742-PS │Passage written by Frick in National │ │
│Socialist Yearbook, 1927, p. 124. │ V │ 383
│ │ │
2759-PS │Law for the protection of Nationalist │ │
│Symbols, 19 May 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 285. │ V │ 394
│ │ │
2771-PS │U. S. State Department, National │ │
│Socialism, published by U. S. │ │
│Government Printing Office, 1943. │ V │ 417
│ │ │
**2799-PS │Letter from Hitler to von Papen, 26 │ │
│July 1934, published in Documents of │ │
│German Politics, Vol. II, p. 83, No. │ │
│38. (Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ V │ 441
│ │ │
*2830-PS │Letter from von Papen to Hitler, 12 │ │
│May 1936, concerning May Rally of │ │
│Freedom Union. (GB 243) │ V │ 496
│ │ │
2831-PS │Letter from Office of Extraordinary │ │
│and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of │ │
│German Government to Reich │ │
│Chancellery, inclosing report on │ │
│Political situation in Austria, 14 │ │
│January 1937. │ V │ 498
│ │ │
2902-PS │Statement of von Papen, 13 November │ │
│1945, prepared by his defense lawyer. │ │
│(GB 233) │ V │ 569
│ │ │
*2962-PS │Minutes of meeting of Reich Cabinet, │ │
│15 March 1933. (USA 578) │ V │ 669
│ │ │
*2963-PS │Minutes of meeting of Reich Cabinet, │ │
│20 March 1933. (USA 656) │ V │ 670
│ │ │
**2994-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │
│former Chancellor of Austria, │ │
│concerning Austrian-German Treaty of │ │
│11 July 1936. (USA 66) (Objection to │ │
│admission in evidence upheld.) │ V │ 703
│ │ │
2995-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │
│former Chancellor of Austria, │ │
│concerning his visit to Berchtesgaden │ │
│on 12 February 1938. │ V │ 709
│ │ │
2996-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │
│former Chancellor of Austria, │ │
│concerning events of 11 March 1938. │ V │ 713
│ │ │
*3280-PS │Extract from Papal Encyclical “Mit │ │
│Brennender Sorge”, set forth in │ │
│Appendix II, p. 524, of “The │ │
│Persecution of the Catholic Church in │ │
│the Third Reich”. (USA 567) │ V │ 1079
│ │ │
*3313-PS │Von Papen, Appeal to the German │ │
│Conscience, Stuttgart speech of 3 │ │
│March 1933. (GB 240) │ VI │ 1
│ │ │
*3314-PS │Von Papen’s address as Chancellor, 28 │ │
│August 1932, published in Frankfurter │ │
│Zeitung, 29 August 1932. (GB 234) │ VI │ 2
│ │ │
*3317-PS │Von Papen’s address as Chancellor, 12 │ │
│October 1932, published in Frankfurter│ │
│Zeitung, 13 October 1932. (GB 235) │ VI │ 3
│ │ │
*3318-PS │Visit of von Papen as Chancellor in │ │
│Munich, 11 October 1932, published in │ │
│Frankfurter Zeitung, 12 October 1932. │ │
│(GB 241) │ VI │ 4
│ │ │
3357-PS │Exchange of letters, │ │
│Papen-Hitler-Hindenburg, from │ │
│Documents of German Politics, Vol. I, │ │
│p. 158. (GB 239) │ VI │ 85
│ │ │
*3375-PS │Von Papen’s speech at Essen, 2 │ │
│November 1933, published in │ │
│Voelkischer Beobachter, Southern │ │
│German Edition, 4 November 1933. (GB │ │
│245) │ VI │ 101
│ │ │
*3376-PS │Dissolution of Union of Catholic │ │
│Germans, published in The Archives, │ │
│September 1934, Vol. VI, pp. 767-768. │ │
│(GB 244) │ VI │ 103
│ │ │
*3387-PS │Hitler Reichstag speech, 23 March │ │
│1933, asking for adoption of Enabling │ │
│Act, from Voelkischer Beobachter, 24 │ │
│March 1933, p. 1. (USA 566) │ VI │ 104
│ │ │
*3389-PS │Fulda Declaration of 28 March 1933, │ │
│from Voelkischer Beobachter, 29 March │ │
│1933, p. 2. (USA 566) │ VI │ 105
│ │ │
3463-PS │Extracts from Dates from the History │ │
│of the NSDAP by Dr. Hans Volz. │ VI │ 165
│ │ │
*D-472 │Ribbentrop’s actions as Foreign │ │
│Minister, from International │ │
│Biographical Archives, 22 April 1943. │ │
│(GB 130) │ VII │ 59
│ │ │
*D-631 │Decree of Reichs president against │ │
│political excesses, 14 June 1932. 1932│ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, pp. │ │
│297-300. (GB 236) │ VII │ 101
│ │ │
*D-632 │Biography of Papen, from International│ │
│Biographical Archives, 26 October │ │
│1944. (GB 237) │ VII │ 102
│ │ │
D-633 │Letter from von Papen to Hitler, 13 │ │
│November 1932. (GB 238) │ VII │ 106
│ │ │
*D-634 │Letter from Hitler to von Papen, 16 │ │
│November 1932. (GB 238) │ VII │ 107
│ │ │
*D-635 │Radiogram from von Papen to Board of │ │
│Trade for German-American Commerce, 27│ │
│March 1933. (Translation published in │ │
│New York Times.) (GB 242) │ VII │ 111
│ │ │
*D-660 │Extracts from Hutchinson’s Illustrated│ │
│edition of Mein Kampf. (GB 128) │ VII │ 164
│ │ │
*L-83 │Affidavit of Gerhart H. Seger, 21 July│ │
│1945. (USA 234) │ VII │ 859
│ │ │
*L-150 │Memorandum of conversation between │ │
│Ambassador Bullitt and von Neurath, │ │
│German Minister for Foreign Affairs, │ │
│18 May 1936. (USA 65) │ VII │ 890
│ │ │
*TC-22 │Agreement between Austria and German │ │
│Government and Government of Federal │ │
│State of Austria, 11 July 1936. (GB │ │
│20) │ VIII │ 369

19. ARTUR SEYSS-INQUART

Within the Nazi conspiracy Seyss-Inquart became the expert manipulator and subjugator of countries to be invaded or already invaded by the Nazi conspirators, first of Austria, later of Poland and The Netherlands. For the benefit of the Nazi conspirators he enslaved these countries, making them vassals of the Nazi regime.

A. _POSITIONS HELD BY SEYSS-INQUART._

(1) _Positions Held by Artur Seyss-Inquart in the Order Set Forth
in the Indictment._
(_a_) Member of the NSDAP (Nazi Party), 13 March 1938 to 8 May
1945.
(_b_) General in the SS, 15 March 1938 to 8 May 1945.
(_c_) State Councillor of Austria, May 1937 to 12 February 1938.
(_d_) Minister of Interior and Security of Austria, 16 February
1938 to 11 March 1938.
(_e_) Chancellor of Austria, 11 March 1938 to 15 March 1938.
(_f_) Member of the Reichstag, April 1938 to 8 May 1945.
(_g_) Member of the Reich Cabinet, 1 May 1939 to 1945.
(_h_) Reich Minister without Portfolio, 1 May 1939 to September
1939.
(_i_) Chief of the Civil Administration of South Poland, early
September 1939.
(_j_) Deputy Governor-General of the Polish Occupied Territory, 12
October 1939 to 18 May 1940.
(_k_) Reich Commissar for Occupied Netherlands 18 May 1940 to 8
May 1945. (_2910-PS_)

(2) _Positions Held in Addition to Those Set Forth in the
Indictment._
(_a_) Reich Governor of Austria, 15 March 1938 to 1 May 1939.
(_2910-PS_)
(_b_) President of the German Academy, Munich, 1943. (_3457-PS_)

(3) _Previous Occupations of Seyss-Inquart._
(_a_) Commissioned officer in a Tyrol-Kaiserjaeger Regiment of the
Austrian Army in World War I, 1914-1918.
(_b_) Lawyer in Vienna, Austria. (_3425-PS_)

B. _SEYSS-INQUART USED HIS POSITIONS AND INFLUENCE SO AS TO PROMOTE THE
NAZI SEIZURE AND CONSOLIDATION OF CONTROL OVER AUSTRIA._

(1) _Seyss-Inquart was a member of the Nazi Party and held the rank of General in the SS._ Seyss-Inquart has admitted that he became a member of the Nazi Party on 13 March 1938; that he was made a General in the SS on 15 March 1938, and held both membership and rank until 8 May 1945. (_2910-PS_)

Seyss-Inquart, in a letter to Goering, on 14 July 1939, asserted that he had been a member of the Nazi Party since 1931. The following is an excerpt from that letter:

“Until July 1934, I conducted myself as a regular member of the
Party. And if I had quietly in whatever form paid my membership
dues, the first one according to a receipt, I paid in December
1931.” (_2219-PS_)

In a voluntary statement signed by Seyss-Inquart, with the advice of his counsel, he discussed his affiliation with the Nazi Party as follows:

“I supported also the National Socialist Party as long as it was
legal, because it declared itself with particular determination
in favor of the Anschluss. From 1932 onward I made financial
contributions to this Party, but I discontinued financial
support when it was declared illegal in 1934.” (_3425-PS_)

In contrast with the foregoing assertions of the defendant, Seyss-Inquart wrote a letter to Heinrich Himmler on 19 August 1939 in which he confirmed the fact that he became a member of the Nazi Party in 1931 and also stated that he continued his membership in the Nazi Party even after it was declared illegal in Austria. The following is an excerpt from that letter:

“Concerning my membership in the Nazi Party, I want to state
that I never was asked to enter the Nazi Party but I asked Dr.
Kier in December 1931 to take care of my relation to the Party.
At that time I saw the basis of the solution of the Austrian
question only in the Party. I wrote this already in the year
1929 to Dr. Neubacher to adjust his hopes which he had put in
the Austria-German Volksbund. After that, I paid my membership
fees and, as I remember, direct to the Gau Wien. The payments
were made even after the party was forbidden. Some time later, I
got in direct touch with the _Ortsgruppe_ in Dornbach. The
membership fees were paid by my wife but the Blockwart couldn’t
possibly have any doubt that those payments were for my wife and
myself since the amount of the fees, S 40 [40 Schillings] a
month, was a sure indication of this fact and I was treated in
every respect as a Party member. Besides that, I was, since
1932, a member of the _Steirischen Heimatschutzes Kammerhofer_.
In this organization I made every effort to absorb the
_Steirische Heimatschutz_ in the Party and mainly on account of
my efforts, von Habicht declared that the members of the
_Steirische Heimatschutz_ were members of the Party. That proves
that I felt myself, in every respect, as a member of the Party
and I was regarded as belonging to the Party and as I said
before, already in December 1931.” (_3271-PS_)

(2) _Seyss-Inquart, even before he became a member of the Nazi Party, belonged to an organization conceived and founded upon principles which later became those of the Nazi Party._ Seyss-Inquart has stated in writing that he had been a member of a secret organization known as the “German Brotherhood” (_Deutsche Gemeinschaft_). This is evidenced by the following excerpts from his letter to Himmler of 19 August 1939:

“It must be known to you that at the time of the Black-Red
Coalition, there existed an extremely secret organization under
the name of ‘German Community.’ Here met all sorts of
Nationalists and Catholic elements who, at least at that time,
were anti-Semitic and anti-Marxists. Dr. Doelter, who was my
office chief, was one of the leaders of this association and
through him I came into this movement. Dolfuss was also active
here. He was of my age and was a very active anti-Semitic. It is
through success of the activities of this organization that the
Black-Red Coalition was broken and the Marxists never came back
in the government. After the establishment of National
Socialism, this organization was dissolved.” (_3271-PS_)

The secret organization, “German Brotherhood”, (_Deutsche Gemeinschaft_), was organized to promote the anti-Semitic and anti-Free Mason doctrines later adopted by the Nazi Party. This fact is evidenced by Seyss-Inquart’s copy of the minutes of a meeting of this organization on 28 December 1918 and by its constitution and by-laws, a portion of which appear in the following quotation:

“The purpose of this organization is the liberation of the
German people from Jewish influences, and combat against Jewry
with all available means. The organization is secret. Since a
contact of the organization with the public can’t be avoided it
has to be done under pretense of unsuspicious purposes and
without showing the actual set-up.” (_3400-PS_)

New members of this organization were required to make a sworn statement, i.e.:

“As a German man, I assure with my honor, as far as I know,
there is no Jewish blood in my descendency. Furthermore, I am
not connected by marriage with a wife or other companion of
Jewish descendency, and I never will have relation with one of
those. I am not a Free Mason, I assure to be forever a good
member of the Deutsche Gemeinschaft and I will always represent
the interest of the German people against the Jewish people and
I am willing to fight the Jewish people with all my power, any
place and at any time. I promise to obey all orders and decrees
of the leadership of the organization and to preserve complete
secrecy about their institution, about the persons of the
organization, and the events within it, as long as I live.”
(_3400-PS_)

New members were also asked the question: “In case you will be accepted, are you willing to employ only Aryan physicians, attorneys, and businessmen?” (_3400-PS_)

(3) _Seyss-Inquart, after the Austrian Nazi Party was declared illegal in July 1934, posed as a non-member of the Nazi Party but continued to support it in its activities, principles, and objectives in a subversive manner._

Seyss-Inquart has stated that:

“Before the Anschluss, I worked for the legal, political
activities of the Austrian Socialists under the conditions laid
down in the Austrian Constitution. * * * From 1932 onwards I
made financial contributions to this party but I discontinued
financial support when it was declared illegal in 1934. From
July 1934 until the year 1936 I supported individual National
Socialists as lawyer and in collaboration with the welfare work
Langoth in Linz. From July 1936 onwards, I endeavored to help
the National Socialists to regain their legal status and finally
to participate in the Austrian Government. * * * I was
sympathetic towards the efforts of the Austrian Nazi Party to
gain political power and corresponding influence because they
were in favor of the Anschluss. * * * On 10 March 1938 I
suggested to Chancellor Schuschnigg, as a solution to the
difficulties resulting from his plebiscite plan, that the
National Socialists be appointed to the Cabinet, after I became
in May 1937 State Councillor and then on 16-2-1938 Minister of
Interior and Security.” (_3425-PS_)

Seyss-Inquart was an official in the Austrian Government, yet he rendered services, and physical and moral support to the illegal Austrian Nazi Party during those years, knowing that the radical elements engaged in terroristic acts.

“During this time, particularly after the Party was forbidden in
July 1934, I knew that the radical element of the Party was
engaged in terroristic activities, such as the attacks on
railroads, bridges, telephone communications, etc. I knew that
the governments of both Chancellors Dolfuss and Schuschnigg,
although they held the same total German viewpoint in principle,
were opposed to the Anschluss then because of the National
Socialist regime in the Reich. I was sympathetic towards the
efforts of the Austrian Nazi Party to gain political power and
corresponding influence, because they were in favor of the
Anschluss. On the day of the unsuccessful ‘putsch,’ 25 July
1934, I was at my home in Stannern near Iglau, Czechoslovakia. I
learned later that the murder of Chancellor Dolfuss on that day
was the outcome of a ‘putsch’ plan, in which SS circles were
mainly involved, to arrest the Chancellor and put in an Austrian
government with National Socialist participation. Eight or ten
days before this unsuccessful ‘putsch’ Chancellor Dolfuss sent
for me. We discussed the disturbances and troubled state of
affairs created in Austria by the radical element of the
Austrian National Socialists. I advised Chancellor Dolfuss to
make an arrangement with Hitler because the Austrian National
Socialists and even this radical element would obey Hitler’s
orders. I conjectured—later I found confirmation—that these
terroristic activities had a certain support from the Reich.
Chancellor Dolfuss told me he would think the matter over and
made a tentative future appointment for a further discussion. I
informed among others, also acquaintances, of this conversation
whom I knew had influence among the Austrian National
Socialists. About one week later Chancellor Dolfuss informed me
that at the moment he had no time for further discussion.”
(_3425-PS_)

(4) _Seyss-Inquart derived personal benefits and political power as the result of the subversive manipulations and terroristic activities of his fellow Nazi collaborators._ He was appointed State Councillor of Austria in May 1937, and Minister of the Interior and Security of that country as the direct result of Nazi manipulation. These facts he has admitted:

“My appointment as State Councillor was the result of an
agreement between Austria and Germany on 11-7-1936. My
appointment as Minister of the Interior and Security was one of
the results of the conference between Chancellor Schuschnigg and
Hitler at Berchtesgaden on 12-2-1938.” (_3425-PS_)

Another result of the Berchtesgaden conference was that Austrian Nazis were thereafter allowed openly to demonstrate their conviction, an advantage which they exploited to the full.

“The Austrian National Socialists must certainly have taken my
appointment as Minister of Interior and Security as an
indication of their right to activity. Still more, however, the
outcome of the agreement of 12-2-1938 allowed them to
demonstrate their convictions. This right they utilized in more
and more widespread demonstrations.” (_3425-PS_)

(5) _Seyss-Inquart used his affiliation with the Nazis to promote the absorption of Austria into the Greater German Reich, according to plan as conceived by his fellow Nazi conspirators._ Seyss-Inquart had had a continuous and constant interest in the union of Austria and Germany for twenty years, and during all that time worked, planned, and collaborated with others until the union became an accomplished fact.

“In 1918 I became interested in the Anschluss of Austria with
Germany. From that year on I worked, planned, and collaborated
with others of a like mind to bring about a union. * * * It was
my desire to effect this union of the two countries—in an
evolutionary manner and by legal means. Among my Austrian
collaborators were Dr. Neubacher, City Councillor Speiser, the
University Professor Hugelmann, and Dr. Wilhelm Bauer, Professor
Wettstein and others. Later, during the rise of National
Socialism, Dr. Friedrich Rainer, Dr. Jury, Glaise-Horstenau,
Major Klausner, Dr. Muehlmann, Globotschnigg, and others. * * *
After I became State Councillor, I discussed several times with
von Papen, the German Ambassador, the possibilities of an
understanding between the Austrian government and the Austrian
National Socialists, respectively the Reich. We did not talk of
the Anschluss as an actual program. However, we were both of the
opinion that a successful understanding would bring about in the
course of time the Anschluss by evolutionary means in some form.
The last time I spoke to von Papen was in January 1938 in
Garmisch where I met him by chance.” (_3425-PS_)

Seyss-Inquart contributed his efforts to revive the Austrian Nazi Party after the unsuccessful “putsch” of July 25, 1934, and to provide relief for the families of arrested and condemned Nazis. He has described these activities in the following words:

“The effect of the ‘Putsch’ was a complete catastrophe to the
National Socialist Camp. Not merely the leaders, but party
members were arrested in so far as they did not escape; the
confiscation of their fortunes was announced; the revolt which
led to military actions in Steiriermark, Karnten and
Oberoesterreich did cost victims; the political management was
seriously compromised by the Nazis and above all, a most
sinister looking situation was created in regard to foreign
politics. In any case, the idea of a union had suffered a severe
setback. I was in agreement about the effect with Dr. Neubacher,
and it was our desire to assist easing the tension. Following
this situation I felt urged to take up politics beyond the
question of the ‘Anschluss.’ * * * The former National delegate
to the ‘Langoth’ in Linz was working with Rheintaller. Dr.
Neubacher and myself contacted this circle and met there some
other men whose names I have forgotten, but who later did not
play a particular role. After some time, the lawyer applicant
from Linz, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, joined this circle. He was said to
be an SS man. The main activities consisted in organizing an
institution to succor the needy families of those arrested and
condemned Nazis. * * * As matters calmed down, the Austrian
National Socialists collected themselves again into an illegal
party, the organization was built up for better or worse
according to the old schedule, those who returned from the Reich
were considered to be more ‘in the know’ and authoritative. The
institution of succor, ‘Langoth,’ remained outside the party
organization. But here were also men in the Nazi circles who
considered an absolute dependence on the Reich as politically
wrong and endeavored for an independent Austrian National
Socialist Party. In effect, Dr. Rainer from Karnten belonged to
those, and by his influence the future Gauleiter Klausner who is
now dead; also Globotschnigg was in it, though I doubt he was
sincerely convinced, and also others. Dr. Neubacher took a
keener interest in political affairs and entered into
relationship with the proper Party circles.” (_3254-PS_)

The defendant submitted his plans to Hitler, Hess, and Goering for their approval, and contacted other German Nazis.

“After my appointment as State Councillor, Wilhelm Keppler, the
German Secretary of State for Austrian affairs, arranged a visit
for me with Hess and Goering. I explained my intentions and
plans to them, namely, the attainment of the legal activity for
the Austrian National Socialist, independent of the Reich Party.
Hess expressed his interest and said to me among other things:
he regretted that I was not one of the original ‘old fighters.’
I believe that at that time Goering had already established
direct connections with the Austrian State Secretary, Guido
Schmid. After my appointment as Minister of Interior and
Security of Austria, I went to Berlin to visit Hitler. I arrived
in Berlin on 17-2-1938 where I was met by Keppler who took me to
Himmler. This visit was not anticipated in my program. Himmler
wanted to talk over police matters, I informed him, however,
that I was not conversant to speak about them. I did not follow
the suggestions which he made. I greeted Hitler with raised
hand—permissible after the agreement of 12-2—advised him,
however, immediately that as Austrian Minister, my
responsibility lay with Austria. I explained to Hitler my plans,
namely: I was to be the living guaranty for Dr. Schuschnigg of
the evolutionary way. The Austria National Socialists must only
conduct their activities according to the Austrian Constitution
and on those lines find their way to the Reich; they must not
make any totalitarian claim nor conduct a cultural struggle. The
leadership of the Austrian National Socialists must be
independent of the Reich and remain responsible to Austria. I
would have, as Minister of Security, to oppose any kind of
illegal activity. Against this the Austrian National Socialist
would be permitted full freedom of activity to work for the
closest cooperation of Austria and Germany. Hitler agreed to my
plans but expressed certain doubts whether Dr. Schuschnigg would
be willing to go so far. During my conference with Hitler,
Keppler and Ribbentrop waited in the ante-room of Hitler’s
office.” (_3425-PS_)

Seyss-Inquart’s fellow Nazi conspirators regarded his position as Councillor of State in the Austrian Government as most important to them, because he had a mandate from the German Nazis in power, which he was attempting to carry out. Because his negotiations with Chancellor Schuschnigg seemed to be running aground, Seyss-Inquart sent a report of that fact to Keppler by courier, stating that he felt compelled to return his mandate, and expressing a desire to discuss the matter before acting accordingly. Keppler immediately sought advice from Goering in a letter dated 6 January 1938. On that same day Goering’s secretary was instructed to telephone instructions to Keppler to do anything to avoid the resignations of Councillor of State Dr. Seyss-Inquart and State Minister Glaise von Horstenau. Keppler received this telephone message on 7 January 1938, and on 8 January 1938 wrote a letter to Seyss-Inquart informing him of Goering’s instructions and relaying Goering’s request not to give up the mandate under any circumstances without discussing the matter with Goering. (_3473-PS_; _3397-PS_)

Despite assertions, in statements since his arrest and indictment, to the effect that he desired a union of Austria and Germany in an evolutionary manner and by legal means, Seyss-Inquart has on other occasions made statements to the contrary. His letter of 14 July 1939 to Goering is particularly illuminating on this point:

“I told myself in July 1934 that we must fight this clerical
regime on its own ground in order to give the Fuehrer a chance
to use whatever method he desires. I told myself that this
Austria was worth a mass. I have stuck to this attitude with an
iron determination because I and my friends have had to fight
against the whole political church, and Free Masonry, the Jewry,
in short, against everything in Austria. The slightest weakness
which we might have displayed would undoubtedly have led to our
political annihilation; it would have deprived the Fuehrer of
the means and tools to carry out his ingenious political
solution for Austria as became evident in the days of March
1938. I have been fully conscious of the fact that I am
following a path which is not comprehensible to the masses and
also not to my party comrades. I have followed it calmly and
would without hesitation follow it again because I am satisfied
that at one point I could serve the Fuehrer as a tool in his
work, even though my former attitude, even now, gives occasion
to very worthy and honorable Party comrades to doubt my
trustworthiness. I have never paid attention to such things
because I am satisfied with the opinion which the Fuehrer and
the men close to him have of me.” (_2219-PS_)

Another statement of the defendant, which throws some light on this point, is found in his letter to Himmler dated 19 August 1939:

“On November 8, 1938, the Fuehrer invited several political
leaders for supper. The Fuehrer asked me to be next to him. We
discussed the situation in Ostmark. I told him that in
accordance with his order, we started to dissolve the competence
of the Austrian government by giving the powers partly to the
Gauen and partly to the central leaders. But there still would
remain certain affairs which would be common for all Gauen.”
(_3271-PS_)

Furthermore, Seyss-Inquart has made the following statement:

“I was happy that the Anschluss of Austria with the German Reich
had come at last after so many vain endeavors since 1918 because
I was in favor of the Anschluss of Austria with the Reich under
many conditions. I was aware at least to a certain extent of the
harshness of the National Socialist regime, but I was of the
opinion that these two German countries belonged together and
that the German people should solve their own internal affairs
and difficulties. I was convinced that the harshness of the
National Socialist regime chiefly because of its achievement of
the National aim—cancellation of discriminatory peace treaties
and achievement of the right of self-determination—would in
time be surmounted.” (_3425-PS_)

The subversive machinations of the Austrian Nazis to bring about the absorption of Austria by the Greater German Reich was described in detail by Dr. Friedrich Rainer, a leading Austrian Nazi and a collaborator of Seyss-Inquart who became one of Hitler’s Gauleiters, in a report prepared by him and forwarded to Buerckel. A copy of this report accompanied by a letter of transmittal was later sent to Seyss-Inquart by Dr. Rainer. In substance, the report related how the Nazi party lost a parliamentary battle in 1933, continued its efforts to force admission of its representatives into the Austrian government, and finally flowered into the unsuccessful “Putsch” of July 1934, which, in effect, destroyed the Nazi organization. Following the unsuccessful “Putsch”, Hitler liquidated the first stage of the battle, and instructed Franz von Papen to restore normal relationships between the two countries. Accordingly, a new method of political penetration was adopted. The result was that Hinterleitner, an Austrian Nazi got in touch with the lawyer Seyss-Inquart, who had connections with Dr. Wachter originating from Seyss-Inquart’s support of the July uprising. Seyss-Inquart also had a good position in the legal field and especially well established relations with Christian Social politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of the “Styrian Heimatschutz” and had become a Nazi party member when the entire “Styrian Heimatschutz” was incorporated in the NSDAP. The reason for utilizing Seyss-Inquart appears in the following excerpt from the covering letter which accompanied Dr. Rainer’s report to Reich Commissar Gauleiter Josef Buerckel, dated 6 July 1939:

“I think the main reason for the fact that the person of Dr.
Seyss-Inquart seemed to Hitler and to public opinion to have
stepped in the limelight in those March days, was that no
position existed in the party which one might have presented
oneself to the public, and that there was no man who had the
guts to let himself be presented. The actual reason was that the
party leadership had to remain secret during the whole illegal
fight, secret even from the Reich German public.” (_812-PS_)

Thus it is clear why Seyss-Inquart was surreptitiously a member of the Austrian Nazi Party after it was declared illegal in 1934.

Dr. Rainer goes on to report that full recognition of the party leadership was given by Seyss-Inquart and also that the defendant was in permanent contact with Captain Leopold, who became a member of the staff of Hess. After Hinterleitner was arrested, Dr. Rainer became his successor as leader of the Austrian Nazi Party, and, on 16 July 1936, Dr. Rainer and Globocnik visited Hitler at Obersalzburg, where they received a clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the Fuehrer. Subsequently, on 17 July 1936, all illegal Gauleiters met in Anif near Salzburg, where they received a complete report from Dr. Rainer on the statement of the Fuehrer and his political instructions for carrying out the fight. After the agreement between Germany and Austria on 11 July 1936, Hitler appointed Wilhelm Keppler as Chief of a mixed commission to supervise the execution of the agreement. At the same time Keppler was given full authority for the Nazi Party in Austria. (_812-PS_)

(6) _The activities of Seyss-Inquart and his fellow Nazi conspirators and collaborators forced the then Austrian government into a critical situation and a struggle for survival._ As the result of the plans, maneuvers, and disturbances created by the Nazis in Austria, Schuschnigg, Chancellor of Austria, accompanied by his State Secretary, Guido Schmid, conferred with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938. Dr. Muehlmann was also present but not as a member of the Schuschnigg delegation. At this meeting the possibilities for military action by Germany against Austria were demonstrated to the Chancellor. The ultimate result was that Chancellor Schuschnigg had no choice but to accept the demands of Hitler that the Austrian Nazi Party be legalized; that amnesty be granted to Austrian Nazis already convicted for illegal activities; and that Seyss-Inquart be appointed Minister of the Interior and Security in the Austrian cabinet, (_2995-PS_; _3254-PS_; _3425-PS_; _2469-PS_; _2464-PS_)

A few days after the Berchtesgaden meeting of Hitler and Schuschnigg, and immediately after his appointment as Minister of the Interior and Security of Austria, Seyss-Inquart went to Berlin for a conference with Hitler. Upon arrival in Berlin he was met by Keppler, Hitler’s special delegate on Austrian affairs, who took him to Himmler. After a short conference with Himmler, the defendant was conducted to Hitler, to whom he gave the Nazi salute and with whom he had a conference lasting two hours and ten minutes. Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Keppler waited in the ante-chamber during the conference. Seyss-Inquart first offered Hitler an explanation for greeting him with the Hitler salute, by saying: “I consider him as the Fuehrer of the German people who led us out of the discriminations of the peace treaties.” During the conference, he rendered a report to Hitler concerning the Austrian situation since June of 1934 and presented his own program for Hitler’s approval. Hitler expressed his approval of the plan but told Seyss-Inquart that he doubted whether Chancellor Schuschnigg would be willing to go so far. It seems clear that Hitler’s doubt concerning Schuschnigg’s approval of the Seyss-Inquart plan referred solely to Seyss-Inquart’s proposal to allow Austrian Nazis to “conduct their activities according to the Austrian Constitution and on those lines find their way to the Reich,” because all other portions of his plan had previously been adopted as a result of the Berchtesgaden Agreement. (_3254-PS_; _3425-PS_; _2484-PS_)

Seyss-Inquart has asserted that, upon his return to Vienna after his conference with Hitler, he reported to Chancellor Schuschnigg the content of his discussion and urged the Chancellor to make a decision about the Austrian National Socialist question. He then attended rallies of the Austrian National Socialists held in various places in Austria to inform them of the content of his conference with Hitler. Two of the principal meetings were held at Graz and Linz (_3425-PS_; _3254-PS_). Considerable doubt is cast upon the truth of Seyss-Inquart’s assertions that he reported the contents of his conference with Hitler to Chancellor Schuschnigg and in public meetings of the Austrian Nazis, by a statement contained in a letter written by Seyss-Inquart to Himmler on 19 August 1939. The statement is as follows:

“I had a conversation of over two hours with the Fuehrer on
February 17, 1938, in which I explained to him my point of view.
I would only be able to make statements about the content of
this conversation if the Fuehrer would grant me permission. I
left this discussion as a very sincere man and with a feeling of
great happiness to be of help to the Fuehrer.” (_3271-PS_)

(7) _Finally Chancellor Schuschnigg determined to go before the people for a decision on the question of Austrian independence._ Chancellor Schuschnigg planned to hold a plebiscite on that precise question and fixed 13 March 1938 as a date upon which the plebiscite would be held. The Chancellor took Seyss-Inquart into his confidence and discussed the matter of the plebiscite with him. The Chancellor requested Seyss-Inquart to keep the matter a secret until noon of the next day, and the defendant promised to do so. Thereafter, Seyss-Inquart prepared a letter to Schuschnigg objecting to the plebiscite on constitutional grounds and alleging that the manner in which the plebiscite was to be held would not allow the Austrians to express their own desires. Seyss-Inquart admits that a copy of his letter was delivered to Hitler in Berlin by Globotschnigg. (_3254-PS_; _3425-PS_)

On 9 March 1938, a meeting of the Austrian Nazis was held because they had learned, through an illegal information service, that a plebiscite was to be held. Dr. Rainer describes this meeting in the following language:

“The ‘_Landesleitung_’ received word about the planned
plebiscite through illegal information services on 9 March 1938
at 10 a. m. At the session, which was called immediately
afterwards, Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this
information only a few hours, but that he could not talk about
it because he had given his word to keep silent on this subject.
But during the talks he made us understand that the illegal
information we received was based on truth, and that in view of
the new situation, he had been cooperating with the
‘_Landesleitung_’ from the very first moment. Klausner, Jury,
Rainer, Globotschnigg, and Seyss-Inquart were present at the
first talks which were held at 10 a. m. There it was decided
that first, the Fuehrer had to be informed immediately;
secondly, the opportunity for the Fuehrer to intervene must be
given to him by way of an official declaration made by Minister
Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must
negotiate with the government until clear instructions and
orders were received from the Fuehrer. Seyss-Inquart and Rainer
together composed a letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of
it was brought to the Fuehrer by Globocnik, who flew to him on
the afternoon of 9 March 1938.” (_812-PS_).

Seyss-Inquart himself admits that he attended this meeting, which was held at the Regina Hotel, Vienna (_3425-PS_; _3254-PS_). The defendant was informed at this meeting that he would receive a letter from Hitler by messenger the next morning. (_3425-PS_; _3254-PS_).

Early on the morning of 11 March 1938, Seyss-Inquart received Hitler’s letter. He describes it as having contained several erroneous statements and containing a demand that a decision should be arrived at before noon; that in case of rejection the Reich Government would denounce the agreement of 12 February 1938 and military action must be understood. According to Seyss-Inquart, Hitler also gave expression to his belief that there would be disturbances in Austria if Chancellor Schuschnigg would not relent and that the Reich would come to the help of Austria if Austria demanded so. Glaise-Horstenau arrived by plane in Vienna early that same morning with the information that Berlin was greatly excited and that military steps were in preparation. (_3254-PS_; _3425-PS_)

(8) _Seyss-Inquart then proceeded to carry out Hitler’s orders and to fulfill the plans made by himself and his fellow Nazi conspirators._ Dr. Rainer in his report to Reich Commissar Gauleiter Josef Buerckel, and in his covering letter dated 6 July 1939, related his version of the sequence of events during this period and described the precise role of Seyss-Inquart, as he viewed it. He complained about the fact that Hitler and the general public seemed to give Seyss-Inquart all the credit for the annexation of Austria by Germany. The following quotation from this letter and report is significant:

“Soon after taking over in Austria, Klausner, Globocnik, and I
flew to Berlin to report to Hitler’s deputy, Hess, about the
events which led to our taking over the government. We did this
because we had the impression that the general opinion, perhaps
also Hitler’s own, was that the liberation depended more on
Austrian matters of state rather than the Party. To be more
exact, Hitler especially mentioned Dr. Seyss-Inquart alone; and
public opinion gave him alone credit for the change and thus
believed him to have played the sole leading role.” (_812-PS_)

Dr. Rainer then proceeded to describe just what happened in those critical days, and outlined the final instructions given by him for Friday, 11 March 1938. He explained that three situations might develop within the following days:

“1st Case: The plebiscite will not be held. In this case, a
great demonstration must be held.

“2nd Case: Schuschnigg will resign. In this case, a
demonstration was ordered in taking over the government power.

“3rd Case: Schuschnigg will take up the fight. In this case, all
party leaders were ordered to act upon their own initiative,
using all means to capture the position of power.” (_812-PS_)

Dr. Seyss-Inquart took part in these talks with the Gauleiters.

“On Friday, 11 March, the Minister Glaise-Horstenau arrived in
Vienna after a visit with the Fuehrer. After talks with
Seyss-Inquart he went to see the chancellor. At 11:30 a. m. the
‘_Landesleitung_’ had a meeting at which Klausner, Rainer,
Globocnik, Jury, Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, Fishboeck and
Muehlmann participated. Dr. Seyss-Inquart reported on his talks
with Dr. Schuschnigg which had ended in a rejection of the
proposal of the two ministers.

“In regard to Rainer’s proposal, von Klausner ordered that the
government be presented with an ultimatum, expiring at 1400
hours, signed by legal political, ‘Front’ men, including both
ministers and also State Councillors Fishboeck and Jury, for the
establishment of a voting date in three weeks and a free and
secret ballot in accordance with the constitution.

“On the basis of written evidence which Glaise-Horstenau had
brought with him, a leaflet, to be printed in millions of
copies, and a telegram to the Fuehrer calling for help, were
prepared.

“Klausner placed the leadership of the final political actions
in the hands of Rainer and Globocnik. Schuschnigg called a
session of all ministers for 2:00 p. m. Rainer agreed with
Seyss-Inquart that Rainer would send the telegram to the Fuehrer
and the statement to the population at 3:00 p. m. and at the
same time he would start all necessary actions to take over
power unless he received news from the session of the ministers’
council before that time. During this time all measures had been
prepared. At 2:30 Seyss-Inquart ’phoned Rainer and informed him
that Schuschnigg had been unable to take the pressure and had
recalled the plebiscite but that he had refused to call a new
plebiscite and had ordered the strongest police measures for
maintaining order. Rainer asked whether the two ministers had
resigned, and Seyss-Inquart answered: ‘No.’ Rainer informed the
‘Reichskanzlei’ through the German Embassy, and received an
answer from Goering through the same channels that the Fuehrer
will not consent to partial solutions and that Schuschnigg must
resign. Seyss-Inquart was informed of this by Globocnik and
Muehlmann; talks were had between Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg:
Schuschnigg resigned. Seyss-Inquart asked Rainer what measures
the party wished taken. Rainer’s answer: Reestablishment of the
government by Seyss-Inquart, legalization of the party, and
calling up of the SS and SA as auxiliaries to the police force.
Seyss-Inquart promised to have these measures carried out, but
very soon the announcement followed that everything might be
threatened by the resistance of Miklas. Meanwhile word arrived
from the German Embassy that the Fuehrer expected the
establishment of a government under Seyss-Inquart with a
national majority, the legalization of the party, and permission
for the legion to return, all within the specified time of 7:30
p. m.; otherwise, German troops would cross the border at 8:00
p. m. At 5:00 p. m. Rainer and Globocnik, accompanied by
Muehlmann, went to the Chancellor’s office to carry out this
errand.

“Due to the cooperation of the above-mentioned people with group
leader Keppler and other officials of the Reich and due to the
activities of other contact-men in Austria, it was possible to
obtain the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as ‘_Staatsrat_’
[councillor of State] in July 1937. Due to the same facts, the
Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg was forced to take a new so-called
‘satisfactory action’. Through all this a new and stronger
political position was won in the Austrian system. The
National-Socialist Party became acceptable again in the
political field and became a partner with whom one had to
negotiate, even when it was not officially incorporated into
internal Austrian political developments. This complicated
political maneuver, accompanied by the steadily increasing
pressure from the Reich, led to talks between the Fuehrer and
Schuschnigg at the Obersalzberg. Here Gruppenfuehrer Keppler
presented the concrete political demands of the fighting
underground movement, which he estimated according to his
personal experiences and the information he received. The
results of these talks were the right of a free acknowledgment
of the National Socialist movement on the one hand and the
recognition of an independent Austrian state on the other hand,
as well as the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister of
Interior and Public Safety, as a person who will guarantee to
both sides the proper carrying out of the agreements. In this
way Seyss-Inquart occupied the key position and was in the
center of all obvious political actions. A legal base in the
government was won for the party. This resulted in a paralysis
of the ‘system apparates’ [Schuschnigg government] at a time
when a revolution needed to be carried out. Through this, the
basis for a new attack on the Schuschnigg government was won.

“Situation: Miklas negotiated with Ender for the creation of a
government which included, blacks, reds and National Socialists,
and proposed the post of Vice-Chancellor to Seyss-Inquart. The
latter rejected it and told Rainer that he was not able to
negotiate by himself because he was personally involved, and
therefore a weak and unpleasant political situation might
result. Rainer negotiated with Zernette. Director of the cabinet
Huber, Guido Schmid, Glaise-Horstenau, Legation Councillor
Stein, Military Attache General Muffe, and the ‘Gruppenfuehrer’
Keppler, who had arrived in the meantime, were also negotiating.
At 7:00 Seyss-Inquart entered the negotiations again. Situation
at 7:30 p. m.: Stubborn refusal of Miklas to appoint
Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor; appeal to the world in case of a
German invasion.