Chapter XXVI: Section 2: of Chapter IX. Chief among these were the secret expansion of (3)

“6. The C-in-Cs of the Army Groups may by agreement with the
competent Naval and Air Force Commanders reintroduce _military
jurisdiction for civilians_, in areas which are sufficiently
settled.

“For the _area of the_ ‘_Political Administration_’ this order
will be given by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces.

“II. _Treatment of offences committed against inhabitants by
members of the Armed Forces and its employees._

“1. With regard to offences committed against enemy civilians by
members of the Wehrmacht and its employees _prosecution is not
obligatory_ even where the deed is at the same time a military
crime or offence.

“2. When judging such offences, it must be borne in mind,
whatever the circumstances, that the collapse of Germany in
1918, the subsequent sufferings of the German people and the
fight against National Socialism which cost the blood of
innumerable supporters of the movement, were caused primarily by
Bolshevik influence and that no German has forgotten this fact.

“3. Therefore the judicial authority will decide in such cases
whether a disciplinary penalty is indicated, or whether _legal
measures_ are necessary. In the case of offences against
inhabitants it will order a _court martial_ only if _maintenance
of discipline_ or _security of the Forces_ call for such a
measure. This applies for instance to serious offences
originating in lack of self control in sexual matters, or in a
criminal disposition, and to those which indicate that the
troops are threatening to get out of hand. Offences which have
resulted in senseless destruction of billets or stores or other
captured material to the disadvantage of our Forces should as a
rule be judged no less severely.

“_The order to institute proceedings_ requires in every single
case the signature of the Judicial Authority.

“4. _Extreme caution_ is indicated in assessing the credibility
of statements made by enemy civilians.

“III. _Responsibility of the Military Commanders._

“Within their sphere of competence Military Commanders are
_personally_ responsible for seeing that:

“1. Every commissioned officer of the units under their command
is instructed promptly and in the most emphatic manner on
principles set out under I above.

“2. Their legal advisers are notified promptly of these
instructions and of _verbal information in which the political
intentions of the High Command were explained to C-in-Cs_.

“3. Only those court sentences are confirmed which are in
accordance with the political intentions of the High Command.

“IV. _Security._

Once the camouflage is lifted this decree will be treated as
“Most Secret”:

“By order
“Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
“(signed) Keitel” (_C-50_)

Less than three months after the invasion of the Soviet Union, these instructions were amplified and made even more drastic. An order dated 16 September 1941 and signed by Keitel, was widely distributed (_C-148_). This order was of general application in all theaters of war, but was clearly of primary importance for the Eastern Front:

“_Subject_: Communist Insurrection in occupied territories.

“1. Since the beginning of the campaign against Soviet Russia,
Communist insurrection movements have broken out everywhere in
the areas occupied by Germany. The type of action taken is
growing from propaganda measures and attacks on individual
members of the Armed Forces, into open rebellion and widespread
guerilla warfare.

“It can be seen that this is a _mass movement centrally directed
by Moscow_, who is also responsible for the apparently trivial
isolated incidents in areas which up to now have been otherwise
quiet.

“In view of the many political and economic crises in the
occupied areas, it must, moreover, be anticipated, that
_nationalist and other circles_ will make full use of this
opportunity of making difficulties for the German occupying
forces by associating themselves with the Communist
insurrection.

“This creates an increasing _danger to the German war effort_,
which shows itself chiefly in general insecurity for the
occupying troops, and has already led to the withdrawal of
forces to the main centers of disturbance.

“2. _The measures taken up to now_ to deal with general
insurrection movement _have proved inadequate_. The Fuehrer has
now given orders that we take action _everywhere with the most
drastic means_ in order to crush the movement in the shortest
possible time.

“Only this course, which has always been followed successfully
throughout the history of the extension of influence of great
peoples, can restore order.

“3. Action taken in this matter should be in accordance with the
following _general directions_:

“_a._ It should be inferred, in _every case_ of resistance to
the German occupying Forces, no matter what the individual
circumstances, that it is of _Communist origin_.

“_b._ In order to nip these machinations in the bud, the most
drastic measures should be taken immediately on _the first
indication_, so that the authority of the occupying Forces may
be maintained, and further spreading prevented. In this
connection it should be remembered that a human life in
unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing and a
deterrent effect can be attained only by unusual severity. The
death penalty for 50-100 Communists should generally be regarded
in these cases as suitable atonement for one German soldier’s
life. The way in which sentence is carried out should still
further increase the deterrent effect.

“The reverse course of action, that of imposing relatively
lenient penalties, and of being content, for purposes of
deterrence, with the threat of more severe measures, does not
accord with these principles and should therefore not be
followed.”

* * * * * *

“4. _The Commanding Officers in the occupied territories_ are
seeing to it that these principles are made known without delay
to all military establishments concerned in dealing with
Communist measures of insurrection.”

“[Indecipherable initial]
“Keitel” (_C-148_)

The German military leaders took up, sponsored, and instructed their troops to practice the racial policies of the Nazis. On 10 October 1941 a directive was issued by Field Marshal von Reichenau, the Commander-in-Chief (_Oberbefehlshaber_) of the German 8th Army, then operating on the Eastern Front (_UK-81_). Reichenau (who died in 1942) was therefore a member of the group, and here is what he had to say:

“Subject: Conduct of Troops in Eastern Territories.

“Regarding the conduct of troops towards the bolshevistic
system, vague ideas are still prevalent in many cases. The most
essential aim of war against the Jewish-bolshevistic system is a
complete destruction of their means of power and the elimination
of Asiatic influence from the European culture. In this
connection the troops are facing tasks which exceed the
one-sided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the eastern
territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of
the art of war but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology
and the avenger of bestialities which have been inflicted upon
German and racially related nations.

“Therefore the soldier must have full understanding for the
necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry. The
Army has to aim at another purpose, i.e., the annihilation of
revolts in hinterland which, as experience proves, have always
been caused by Jews.

“The combatting of the enemy behind the front line is still not
being taken seriously enough. Treacherous, cruel partisans and
unnatural women are still being made prisoners of war and
guerilla fighters dressed partly in uniforms or plain clothes
and vagabonds are still being treated as proper soldiers, and
sent to prisoner of war camps. In fact, captured Russian
officers talk even mockingly about Soviet agents moving openly
about the roads and very often eating at German field kitchens.
Such an attitude of the troops can only be explained by complete
thoughtlessness, so it is now high time for the commanders to
clarify the meaning of the present struggle.

“The feeding of the natives and of prisoners of war who are not
working for the Armed Forces from Army kitchens is an equally
misunderstood humanitarian act as is the giving of cigarettes
and bread. Things which the people at home can spare under great
sacrifices and things which are being brought by the Command to
the front under great difficulties, should not be given to the
enemy by the soldier not even if they originate from booty. It
is an important part of our supply.

“When retreating the Soviets have often set buildings on fire.
The troops should be interested in extinguishing of fires only
as far as it is necessary to secure sufficient numbers of
billets. Otherwise the disappearance of symbols of the former
bolshevistic rule even in the form of buildings is part of the
struggle of destruction. Neither historic nor artistic
considerations are of any importance in the eastern territories.
The command issues the necessary directives for the securing of
raw materials and plants, essential for war economy. The
complete disarming of the civil population in the rear of the
fighting troops is imperative considering the long and
vulnerable lines of communications. Where possible, captured
weapons and ammunition should be stored and guarded. Should this
be impossible because of the situation of the battle so the
weapons and ammunition will be rendered useless. If isolated
partisans are found using firearms in the rear of the army
drastic measures are to be taken. These measures will be
extended to that part of the male population who were in a
position to hinder or report the attacks. The indifference of
numerous apparently anti-Soviet elements which originates from a
‘wait and see’ attitude, must give way to a clear decision for
active collaboration. If not, no one can complain about being
judges and treated a member of the Soviet System.

“The fear of the German countermeasures must be stronger than
the threats of the wandering bolshevistic remnants. Being far
from all political considerations of the future the soldier has
to fulfill two tasks:

“1. _Complete annihilation of the false bolshevistic doctrine of
the Soviet State and its armed forces._

“2. _The pitiless extermination of foreign treachery and cruelty
and thus the protection of the lives of military personnel in
Russia._

“This is the only way to fulfill our historic task to liberate
the German people once for ever from the Asiatic-Jewish danger.

“Commander-in-Chief
“(Signed) von Reichenau
“Field Marshal.” (_UK-81_)

Immediately preceding Reichenau’s order is a memorandum, dated 28 October 1941, which shows that Reichenau’s order met with Hitler’s approval and was thereafter circulated by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the German Army. It is also clear that Reichenau’s order was thereafter circulated down to divisional level, and was received by the 12th Infantry Division on 27 November 1941. (_UK-81_)

These being the directives and policies prescribed by the German military leaders, it is no wonder that the _Wehrmacht_ joined in the monstrous behavior of the SS and SD on the Eastern Front. Units (known as _Einsatzgruppen_) were formed by the SIPO and SD and sent out to operate in and behind the operational areas on the Eastern Front, in order to combat partisans and to “cleanse” and “pacify” the civilian population.

In a directive dated 19 March 1943, the Commanding Officer of one of these units praised and justified such activities as the shooting of Hungarian Jews, the shooting of children, and the total burning down of villages (_3012-PS_). The officer directed that in order not to obstruct the procuring of slave labor for the German armament industry,

“as a rule no more children will be shot” (_3012-PS_).

A report covering the work of the _Einsatzgruppen_ in the German occupied territories of the Soviet Union during the month of October 1941 disregards every vestige of decency (_R-102_). It states cynically that, in the Baltic areas,

“spontaneous demonstrations against Jewry followed by pogroms on
the part of the population against the remaining Jews have not
been recorded, on account of the lack of adequate
indoctrination” (_R-102_).

This report shows clearly that “pacification” and “anti-partisan activity” are mere code words for “extermination of Jews and Slavs” just as much as “_Weserubung_” was a code word for the invasion and subjugation of Norway and Denmark.

Documents quoted earlier show that the German Army was operating under similar policies and directives. It only remains to show that, in these practices, the Army and the SS worked hand in glove. The report describing the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto (_1061-PS_) stresses the close cooperation between the SS and the Army:

“The longer the resistance lasted, the tougher the men of the
_Waffen SS_, Police and _Wehrmacht_ became; they fulfilled their
duty indefatigably in faithful comradeship and stood together as
models and examples of soldiers. Their duty hours often lasted
from early morning until late at night. At night, search patrols
with rags wound round their feet remained at the heels of the
Jews and gave them no respite. Not infrequently they caught and
killed Jews who used the night hours for supplementing their
stores from abandoned dugouts and for contacting neighboring
groups or exchanging news with them.” (1061-PS)

To the same general effect is a report dated 5 June 1943 by the German General Commissioner for Minsk (_R-135_). This report describes an anti-partisan operation in which 4,500 “enemies” were killed, 5,000 suspected partisans were killed, and 59 Germans were killed. The cooperation in this adventure by the German Army is shown in the following excerpt:

“The above mentioned figures show, that we have to count with a
strong annihilation of the population. The fact that only 492
rifles were found on the 4,500 enemy dead, demonstrates that the
numerous peasants from the country were also among the enemy
dead. The battalion _Direwanger_ is particularly known to have
destroyed numerous human lives. Among the 5,000 partisan
suspects who were shot, are numerous women and children.

“Units of the troops [_Wehrmannschaften_] also took part in the
action, by order of SS Lt. General [_Obergruppenfuehrer_] von
dem Bach. SA Colonel [_Standartenfuehrer_] Kunze led the troops
[Wehrmannschaften], who included also 90 members of my authority
and of the district-commissarate Minsk-Stadt. Our men returned
yesterday from the action without any losses. I refuse the use
of officials and Reich-Employees of the General Commissarate in
the rear areas. The men who work for me have not been classified
as essential, after all in order to fight the partisans actively
in the place of the Armed Forces and the Police.

“Of the troops [_Wehrmannschaften_], one railroad employee had
been wounded (shot through the lung). The political effect of
this large scale action on the peaceful population had been
disastrous, because of the numerous executions of women and
children. The town BEGOMIE was cleared by the Armed Forces and
the Police in December. The population of Begomie was
predominantly favorable to us. Begomie, which has been fortified
as a strong point by the partisans, has been destroyed by German
Air Attacks during the fighting.” (_R-135_)

The _SS Obergruppenfuehrer_ von dem Bach referred to in this quotation is mentioned in Himmler’s speech to a gathering of SS generals at Posen on 4 October 1943 (_1919-PS_). In this speech Himmler announced the appointment of von dem Bach to be Chief of all anti-partisan units:

“In the meantime I have also set up the department of Chief of
the Anti-partisan Units” [_Bandenkampf-Verbunde_]. Our comrade
_SS-Obergruppenfuehrer_ von dem Bach is Chief of the
anti-partisan units. I considered it necessary for the
Reichsfuehrer SS to be in authoritative command in all these
battles, for I am convinced that we are best in a position to
take action against this enemy struggle, which is a decidedly
political one. Except where the units which had been supplied
and which we had formed for this purpose were taken from us to
fill in gaps at the front, we have been very successful.

“It is notable that, by setting up this department we have
gained (p. 58) for the SS in turn a division, a corps, an army,
and the next step, which is the High Command of an army or even
of a group—if you wish to call it that.” _(1919-PS_)

The report of _Einsatzgruppe A_, (_L-180_) covering the period up to 15 October 1941, makes clear beyond doubt the participation of the German military leaders and Armed Forces in these extermination policies:

“Action-Group A, after preparing their vehicles for action
proceeded to their area of concentration as ordered on 23 June
1941, the second day of the campaign in the East. Army Group
North consisting of the 16th and 18th Armies and Panzer-Group 4
had left the day before. Our task was to hurriedly establish
personal contact with the commanders of the Armies and with the
commander of the army of the rear area. It must be stressed from
the beginning that cooperation with the Armed Forces was
generally good, in some cases, for instance with Panzer-Group 4
under Col. Gen. Hoeppner, it was very close, almost cordial.
Misunderstandings which cropped up with some authorities in the
first days, were cleared up mainly through personal
discussions.”

* * * * * *

“Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were induced to start
pogroms against Jews during the first hours after capture,
though this inducement proved to be very difficult. Following
out orders, the Security Police was determined to solve the
Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively. But
it was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an
immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the
extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German
circles. It had to be shown to the world that the native
population itself took the first action by way of natural
reaction against the suppression by Jews during several decades
and against the terror exercised by the Communists during the
preceding period.”

* * * * * *

“After the failure of purely military activities such as the
placing of sentries and combing through the newly occupied
territories with whole divisions, even the Armed Forces had to
look out for new methods. The Action-Group undertook to search
for new methods. Soon therefore the Armed Forces adopted the
experiences of the Security Police and their methods of
combatting the partisans. For details I refer to the numerous
reports concerning the struggle against the partisans.”

* * * * * *

“1. _Instigation of self-cleansing actions._

“Considering that the population of the Baltic countries had
suffered very heavily under the government of Bolshevism and
Jewry while they were incorporated in the USSR, it was to be
expected that after the liberation from that foreign government,
they (i.e., the population themselves) would render harmless
most of the enemies left behind after the retreat of the Red
Army. It was the duty of the Security Police to set in motion
these self-cleansing movements and to direct them into the
correct channels in order to accomplish the purpose of the
cleansing operations as quickly as possible. It was no less
important in view of the future to establish the unshakable and
provable fact that the liberated population themselves took the
most severe measures against the Bolshevist and Jewish enemy
quite on their own, so that the direction by German authorities
could not be found out.

“In Lithouania this was achieved for the first time by partisan
activities in Kowno. To our surprise it was not easy at first to
set in motion an extensive pogrom against Jews. KLIMATIS, the
leader of the partisan unit, mentioned above, who was used for
this purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the
basis of advice given to him by a small advanced detachment
acting in Kowno, and in such a way that no German order or
German instigation was noticed from the outside. During the
first pogrom in the night from 25. to 26.6 the Lithouanian
partisans did away with more than 1,500 Jews, set fire to
several Synagogues or destroyed them by other means and burned
down a Jewish dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses.
During the following nights about 2,300 Jews were made harmless
in a similar way. In other parts of Lithouania similar actions
followed the example of Kowno, though smaller and extending to
the Communists who had been left behind.

“These self-cleansing actions went smoothly because the Army
authorities who had been informed showed understanding for this
procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only the first
days after the occupation would offer the opportunity for
carrying out pogroms. After the disarmament of the partisans the
self-cleansing actions ceased necessarily.

“It proved much more difficult to set in motion similar
cleansing actions in _Latvia_. Essentially the reason was that
the whole of the national stratum of leaders had been
assassinated or destroyed by the Soviets, especially in Riga. It
was possible though through similar influences on the Latvian
auxiliary to set in motion a pogrom against Jews also in Riga.
During this pogrom all synagogues were destroyed and about 400
Jews were killed. As the population of Riga quieted down
quickly, further pogroms were not convenient.”

* * * * * *

“5. _Other jobs of the Security Police._

“1. Occasionally the conditions prevailing in the lunatic
asylums necessitated operations of the Security Police. Many
institutions had been robbed by the retreating Russians of their
whole food supply. Often the guard and nursing personnel had
fled. The inmates of several institutions broke out and became a
danger to the general security; therefore

in Aglona (Lithouania) 544 lunatics in Mariampol (Lithouania) 109 lunatics and in Magutowo (near Luga) 95 lunatics

were liquidated.”

* * * * * *

“When it was decided to extend the German operations to
Leningrad and also to extend the activities of Action Group A to
this town, I gave orders on 18 July 1941 to parts of Action
Detachments 2 and 3 and to the Staff of the Group to advance to
Novosselje, in order to prepare these activities and to be able
to advance as early as possible into the area around Leningrad
and into the city itself. The advance of the forces of Action
Group A which were intended to be used for Leningrad, was
effected in agreement with and on the express wish of
Panzer-Group 4.”

* * * * * *

“Action detachment of Action Group A of the Security Police
participated from the beginning in the fight against the
nuisance created by partisans. Close collaboration with the
Armed Forces and the exchange of experiences which were
collected in the fight against partisans, brought about a
thorough knowledge of the origin, organization, strength,
equipment and system used by the Red partisans as time went on.”
(_L-180_).

Certain affidavits, furnished by responsible officials in both the _Wehrmacht_ and the SS, fill in much of the background for the documents quoted above. An affidavit (_3710-PS_) by Walter Schellenberg who, at the time under discussion, was an important official in the RSHA, states:

“In the middle of May 1941, as far as I remember, the Chief of
Amt 4 of the RSHA (SS-Brigadefuehrer Mueller), in the name of
the Chief of the RSHA (SS-Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich), held
discussions with the Generalquartiermeister of the Army (General
Wagner) about questions connected with the operations of the
SIPO and SD within the bounds of the Field Army during the
imminent campaign against Russia. Wagner could come to no
agreement with Mueller and therefore asked Heydrich to send
another representative. I was at that time Chief of Section E in
Amt 4 of the RSHA under Chief of Amt Mueller and was sent by
Heydrich to Wagner because of my experience in matters of
protocol for the purpose of drawing up the final agreement.
According to the instructions given to me, I was supposed to
make sure that this agreement would provide that the responsible
headquarters in the Army would be firmly obligated to give
complete support to all activities of the Combat Groups and
Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD. I discussed the problem of
this mutual relationship in great detail with Wagner. In
accordance with this discussion I then presented him with the
completed draft of an agreement, which met with his full
approval. This draft of an agreement was the basis for a final
discussion between Wagner and Heydrich towards the end of May
1941.

“The contents of this agreement, as far as I remember, were
substantially as follows. Its basis was the Fuehrer’s command,
mentioned at the very beginning of the agreement, that the SIPO
and SD should operate within the combat elements of the Field
Army, with the mission of utterly smashing all resistance in
conquered front-line areas as well as in conquered rear supply
zones by every means and as quickly as possible. The various
areas were then set down in which the SIPO and SD were to be
active and operating. The individual Combat Groups were then
assigned to the army groups which were to take part in the
campaign and the individual Combat Commandos to the respective
armies which were to take part in the campaign.

“The Combat Groups and Combat Commandos were to operate in
detail:

“1. In front-line areas: in complete subordination to the Field
Army, tactically, functionally and administratively;

“2. In rear operational areas: in merely administrative
subordination to the Field Army, but under command and
functional control of the RSHA;

“3. In rear Army areas: arrangement as in 2;

“4. In areas of the civil administration in the East: same as in
the Reich.

“The tactical and functional authority and responsibility of
front-line headquarters of the Field Army over the Combat
Commandos found no limitation in the agreement and therefore
needed no further clarification.

“The agreement made it clear that the administrative
subordination embraced not only disciplinary subordination but
also the obligation for rear headquarters of the Field Army to
support the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos in matters of
supply (gasoline, rations, etc.) as well as in the use of the
communications network.

“This agreement was signed by Heydrich and Wagner in my
presence. Wagner signed it either ‘acting for’ or ‘by order of’
the OKH.

“After Wagner and Heydrich had affixed their signatures, both of
them asked me to leave the room for half an hour. Just while
leaving I heard how they both wanted to discuss in complete
privacy the Fuehrer’s command, which was apparently known in
advance by each of them personally, and its far-reaching
implications. After the half hour was over I was called in once
more just to say goodbye.

“Today I read the ‘Operational and Situational Report No. 6 of
the Combat Groups of the SIPO and SD in the USSR (covering the
period from 1 to 31 October 1941),’ as well as the
‘Comprehensive Report of Combat Group A up to 15 October 1941.’
The whole substance of these reports shows that the prime
mission of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO
and SD was to undertake and carry out mass executions of Jews,
Communists and other elements of resistance. It is also clear
from the above-cited ‘Comprehensive Report,’ which embraces no
more than the first four months of these operations, that the
cooperation of the respective _Oberbefehlshabers_ with Combat
Group A was ‘in general good and in individual instances, for
instance that of Panzergruppe 4 under Colonel General Hoeppner,
very close, in fact almost cordial’ (page 1). From an inclosure
to this same report, bearing the title ‘Summary of the Number of
Executed Persons,’ particularly from the figures arranged
according to the successively conquered areas, it is evident
that the SIPO and SD operated in front-line areas so as fully to
carry out their prime function of conducting mass executions of
all elements of resistance even from the very beginning of the
advance against Russia. I acknowledge the reliability and
authenticity of both of the above cited reports. Therefore I
must today express my firm conviction that the Oberbefehlshabers
of the army groups and armies which were to take part in the
Russian campaign were accurately informed through the normal OKH
channels of communication about the extensive future mission of
the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD as
including planned mass executions of Jews, Communists and all
other elements of resistance.

“In the beginning of June 1941 all of the Ic
counter-intelligence officers, and, as far as I remember, all of
the Ic officers of all army groups, armies, army corps and some
of the divisions which were to take part in the coming Russian
campaign were called in by Wagner, together with Heydrich and
the Chief of the Amt for Counter-Intelligence Abroad in the OKW
(Admiral Canaris) for a general conference in the OKW Building
at Berlin. The responsible leaders of the Combat Groups and
Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD were for the most part
likewise present. I was also there. The essential substance and
purpose of this meeting was to outline the military strategy
against Russia and to announce the above-mentioned details of
the written agreement reached by Wagner and Heydrich.

“This group of Ic counter-intelligence officers and Ic officers
remained at Berlin a few days longer and was carefully
instructed in several additional conferences, at which I was not
present, about further details of the coming Russian campaign. I
assume that these discussions were concerned with the exact
delineation of the Fuehrer’s command ‘to smash utterly all
resistance in occupied areas by every means and as quickly as
possible,’ including even planned mass executions of all
elements of resistance. Otherwise the cooperation between the
Field Army and the Combat Groups, which in the above-cited
documents is clearly revealed as existing but a few weeks
thereafter, could not in my opinion have been forthcoming. In
any event there is hardly any reason to doubt that these Ic
counter-intelligence officers, immediately upon their return
from Berlin, accurately informed their own superiors, including
all Oberbefehlshabers of the army groups and armies which were
to march against Russia, about the full extent of the
agreement.”

“(signed) Walter Schellenberg
“26. XI. 45” (_3710-PS_)

Another affidavit which sheds light on the relations between the _Wehrmacht_ and the SS at the top level with respect to anti-partisan warfare (_3711-PS_) is sworn to by Wilhelm Scheidt, a retired captain of the German Army who worked in the War History Section of OKW from 1941 to 1945:

“I, Wilhelm Scheidt, belonged to the War History Section of the
OKW from the year 1941 to 1945.

“Concerning the question of partisan warfare I state that I
remember the following from my knowledge of the documents of the
Operations Staff of the OKW as well as from my conversations in
the Fuehrer’s headquarters with Generalmajor Walter Scherff, the
Fuehrer’s appointee for the compilation of the history of the
war.

“Counter-partisan warfare was originally a responsibility of
Reichsfuehrer-SS Heinrich Himmler, who sent police forces to
handle this matter.

“In the years 1942 and 1943 however counter-partisan warfare
developed to such an extent that the Operations Staff of the OKW
had to give it particular attention. In the Army Operations
Section of the Operations Staff of the OKW a specific officer
was assigned the development of counter-partisan warfare as his
special job. It proved necessary to conduct extensive operations
against the partisans with _Wehrmacht_ troops in Russian as well
as Yugoslavian territory. Partisan operations for a long while
threatened to cut off the lines of communication and transport
routes that were necessary to support the German _Wehrmacht_.
For instance, a monthly report concerning the attacks on the
railroad lines in occupied Russia revealed that in the Russian
area alone from 800 to 1,000 attacks occurred each month during
that period, causing among other things, the loss of from 200 to
300 locomotives.

“It was a well-known fact that partisan warfare was conducted
with cruelty on both sides. It was also well-known that
reprisals were inflicted on hostages and communities whose
inhabitants were suspected of being partisans or of supporting
them. It is beyond question that these facts must have been
known to the leading officers in the Operations Staff of the OKW
and in the Army’s General Staff. It was further well-known that
Hitler believed that the only successful method of conducting
counter-partisan warfare was to employ cruel punishments as
deterrents.

“I remember that at the time of the Polish revolt in Warsaw,
SS-Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein reported to Generaloberst Guderian
and Jodl about the atrocities of the Russian SS-Brigade
Kaminski, which fought on the German side.”

“(Signed) Wilhelm Scheidt
“Retired Captain of the Reserve” (_3711-PS_)

The foregoing documents show the arrangements which were made between the OKW, OKH and Himmler’s headquarters with respect to anti-partisan warfare. They show conclusively that the plans and arrangements were made jointly, and that the High Command of the Armed Forces was not only fully aware of but an active participant in these plans. The same is true of the field commanders. General Roettiger, who attained the rank of General of Panzer Troops (the equivalent of a Lt. General in the American Army), has made three statements (_3713-PS_; _3714-PS_). Roettiger was Chief of Staff of the German 4th Army, and later of Army Group Center, on the Eastern Front during the period of which he speaks:

“As Chief of Staff of the 4th Army from May 1942 to June 1943,
to which was later added the area of the 9th Army, I often had
occasion to concern myself officially with anti-partisan
warfare. During these operations the troops received orders from
the highest authority, as for example even the OKH, to use the
harshest methods. These operations were carried out by troops of
the Army Group and of the Army, as for example security
battalions.

“At the beginning, in accordance with orders which were issued
through official channels, only a few prisoners were taken. In
accordance with orders, Jews, political commissars and agents
were delivered up to the SD.

“The number of enemy dead mentioned in official reports was very
high in comparison with our own losses. From the documents which
have been shown to me I have now come to realize that the order
from highest authorities for the harshest conduct of the
anti-partisan war can have been intended to make possible a
ruthless liquidation of Jews and other undesirable elements by
using for this purpose the military struggle of the army against
the partisans.” (_3713-PS_)

Roettiger’s second statement reads:

“Supplementary to my above declaration I declare:

“As I stated orally on 28 November, my then Commander-in-Chief
of the Fourth Army instructed his troops many times not to wage
war against the partisans more severely than was required at the
time by the position. This struggle should only be pushed to the
annihilation of the enemy after all attempts to bring about a
surrender failed. Apart from humanitarian reasons we necessarily
had an interest in taking prisoners since very many of them
could very well be used as members of native volunteer units
against the partisans.

“Alongside the necessary active combatting of partisans there
was propaganda directed at the partisans and also at the
population with the object, by peaceful means, of causing them
to give up partisan activities. For instance, in this way the
women too were continually urged to get their men back from the
forests or to keep them by other means from joining the
partisans. And this propaganda had good results. In the spring
of 1943 the area of the 4th Army was as good as cleared of
partisans. Only on its boundaries and then from time to time
were partisans in evidence at times when they crossed into the
area of the 4th Army from neighboring areas. The army was
obliged on this account on the orders of the Army Group to give
up security forces to the neighboring army to the south.

“(signed) Roettiger” (_3713-PS_)

Roettiger’s third statement reads:

“During my period of service in 1942/3 as chief of staff of the
4th Army of the Central Army Group, SD units were attached in
the beginning, apparently for the purpose of
counter-intelligence activity in front-line areas. It was clear
that these SD units were causing great disturbances among the
local civilian population with the result that my commanding
officer therefore asked the commander-in-chief of the army
group, Field Marshal von Kluge, to order the SD units to clear
out of the front-line areas, which took place immediately. The
reason for this first and foremost was that the excesses of the
SD units by way of execution of Jews and other persons assumed
such proportions as to threaten the security of the Army in its
combat areas because of the aroused civilian populace. Although
in general the special tasks of the SD units were well known and
appeared to be carried out with the knowledge of the highest
military authorities, we opposed these methods as far as
possible, because of the danger which existed for our troops.

“(Signed) Roettiger” (_3714-PS_)

An extract from the War Diary of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff (Warlimont), dated 14 March 1943, deals with the problem of shipping off suspected partisans to concentration camps in Germany (_1786-PS_). It appears clearly from this extract that the Army was chiefly concerned with preserving a sufficient severity of treatment for suspected partisans, without at the same time obstructing the procurement of labor from the occupied territories:

“The General Quartermaster [_General Quartiermeister_] together
with the Economic Staff (East) [_Wirtschaftsstab Ost_] has
proposed that the deportees should be sent either to prison
camps or to ‘training centres in their own area,’ and that
deportation to Germany should take place only when the deportees
are on probation and in less serious cases.

“In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff
[_Wehrmachtfuehrungstab_] this proposal does not take sufficient
account of the severity required and leads to a comparison with
the treatment meted out to the ‘peaceful population’ which has
been called upon to work. He recommends therefore transportation
to concentration camps in Germany which have already been
introduced by the Reichsfuehrer SS for his sphere and which he
is prepared to introduce for the Armed Forces [_Wehrmacht_] in
the case of an extension to the province of the latter. The High
Command of the Armed Forces [_Oberkommando der Wehrmacht_]
therefore orders that partisan helpers and suspects who are not
to be executed should be handed over to the competent Higher SS
and Police Leader [_Hoehrer SS und Polizeifuehrer_] and orders
that the difference between ‘punitive work’ and ‘work in
Germany’ is to be made clear to the population.” (_1786-PS_)

A final group of four affidavits show that the SD _Einsatzgruppen_ on the Eastern Front operated under the command and with the necessary support of the _Wehrmacht_, and that the nature of their activities were fully known to the _Wehrmacht_. The first of these is a statement (_3715-PS_) by Ernst Rode, who was an SS Brigadefuehrer and Generalmajor of the Police, and was head of Himmler’s personal command staff from 1943 to 1945:

STATEMENT

“I, Ernst Rode, was formerly chief of the Command Staff of the
Reichsfuehrer-SS, having taken over this position in the spring
of 1943 as successor to former SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Kurt
Knoblauch. My last rank was Generalmajor of Police and of the
Waffen-SS. My function was to furnish forces necessary for
anti-partisan warfare to the higher SS and police leaders and to
guarantee the support of army forces. This took place through
personal discussions with the leading officers of the Operations
Staff of the OKW and OKH, namely with General Warlimont, General
von Buttlar, Generaloberst Guderian, Generaloberst Zeitzler,
General Heusinger, later General Wenk, Colonel Graf Kielmannsegg
and Colonel v. Bonin. Since anti-partisan warfare also was under
the sole command of the respective Army commander-in-chief in
operational areas (for instance in the Central Army Group under
Field Marshal Kluge and later Busch) and since police troops for
the most part could not be spared from the Reichscommissariates,
the direction of this warfare lay practically always entirely in
the hands of the army. In the same way orders were issued not by
Himmler but by the OKH. SS and police troops transferred to
operational areas from the Reichscommissariates to support the
army groups were likewise under the latter’s command. Such
transfers often resulted in harm to anti-partisan warfare in the
Reichscommissariates. According to a specific agreement between
Himmler and the OKH, the direction of individual operations lay
in the hands of the troop leader who commanded the largest troop
contingent. It was therefore possible that an army general could
have SS and police under him, and on the other hand that army
troops could be placed under a general of the SS and police.
Anti-partisan warfare in operational areas could never be
ordered by Himmler. I could merely request the OKH to order it,
until 1944 mostly through the intervention of
Generalquartiermeister Wagner or through State Secretary
Ganzenmueller. The OKH then issued corresponding orders to the
army groups concerned, for compliance.

“The severity and cruelty with which the intrinsically
diabolical partisan warfare was conducted by the Russians had
already resulted in Draconian laws being issued by Hitler for
its conduct. These orders, which were passed on to the troops
through the OKW and OKH, were equally applicable to army troops
as well as to those of the SS and police. There was absolutely
no difference in the manner in which these two components
carried on this warfare. Army soldiers were exactly as
embittered against the enemy as those of the SS and police. As a
result of this embitterment orders were ruthlessly carried out
by both components, a thing which was also quite in keeping with
Himmler’s desires or intentions. As proof of this the order of
the OKW and OKH can be adduced, which directed that all captured
partisans, for instance such as Jews, agents and political
commissars, should without delay be handed over by the troops to
the SD for special treatment. This order also contained the
provision that in anti-partisan warfare no prisoners except the
above named be taken. That anti-partisan warfare was carried on
by army troops mercilessly and to every extreme I know as the
result of discussions with army troop leaders, for instance with
General Herzog, Commander of the XXXVIII Army Corps and with his
chief of staff, Colonel Pamberg in the General Staff, both of
whom support my opinion. Today it is clear to me that
anti-partisan warfare gradually became an excuse for the
systematic annihilation of Jewry and Slavism.

“(Signed) Ernst Rode” (_3715-PS_)

Another and shorter statement by Rode reads:

“As far as I know, the SD Combat Groups with the individual army
groups were _completely subordinate_ to them, that is to say
tactically as well as in every other way. The
commanders-in-chief were therefore thoroughly cognizant of the
missions and operational methods of these units. They approved
of these missions and operational methods because apparently
they never opposed them. The fact that prisoners, such as Jews,
agents and commissars, who were handed over to the SD underwent
the same cruel death, as victims of so-called ‘purifications,’
is a proof that the executions had their approval. This also
corresponded with what the highest political and military
authorities wanted. Frequent mention of these methods were
naturally made in my presence at the OKW and OKH, and they were
condemned by most SS and police officers, just as they were
condemned by most army officers. On such occasions I always
pointed out that it would have been quite within the scope of
the authority of the commanders-in-chief of army groups to
oppose such methods. I am of the firm conviction that an
energetic and unified protest by all field marshals would have
resulted in a change of these missions and methods. If they
should ever assert that they would then have been succeeded by
even more ruthless commanders-in-chief, this, in my opinion,
would be a foolish and even cowardly dodge.

“(Signed) Ernst Rode” (_3716-PS_)

In an affidavit by Colonel Bogislav von Bonin, who at the beginning of the Russian campaign was a staff officer with the 17th Panzer Division, the following statement is made:

“At the beginning of the Russian campaign I was the first
General Staff officer of the 17th Panzer Division which had the
mission of driving across the Bug north of Brest-Litovsk.
Shortly before the beginning of the attack my division received
through channels from the OKW a written order of the Fuehrer.
This order directed that Russian commissars be shot upon
capture, without judicial process, immediately and ruthlessly.
This order extended to all units of the Eastern Army. Although
the order was supposed to be relayed to companies, the
Commanding General of the XXXVII Panzer Corps (General of Panzer
Troops Lemelsen) forbade its being passed on to the troops
because it appeared unacceptable to him from military and moral
points of view.

“(Signed) Bogislav v. Bonin
“Colonel” (_3718-PS_)

Finally an affidavit (_3717-PS_) by Heusinger, who was a Generalleutnant in the German Army, and who from 1940 to 1944 was Chief of the Operations Section at OKH, states as follows:

“1. From the beginning of the war in 1939 until autumn 1940 I
was Ia of the Operations Section of the OKH, and from autumn
1940 until 20 July 1944 I was chief of that section.

“When Hitler took over supreme command of the Army, he gave to
the chief of the General Staff of the Army the function of
advising him on all operational matters in the Russian theater.

“This made the chief of the General Staff of the Army
responsible for all matters in the operational areas in the
east, while the OKW was responsible for all matters outside the
operational areas, for instance, all troops (security units, SS
units, police) stationed in the Reichscommissariates.

“All police and SS units in the Reichscommissariates were also
subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer-SS. When it was necessary to
transfer such units into operational areas, this had to be done
by order of the chief of the OKW. On the other hand,
corresponding transfers from the front to the rear were ordered
by the OKW with the concurrence of the chief of the General
Staff of the Army.

“The high SS and police leaders normally had command of
operations against partisans. If stronger army units were
committed together with the SS and police units within
operational areas, a high commander of the army could be
designated commander of the operation.

“During anti-partisan operations _within_ operational areas all
forces committed for these operations were under the command of
the respective commander-in-chief of the army group.

“2. Directives as to the manner and methods of carrying on
counter-partisan operations were issued by the OKW (Keitel) to
the OKH upon orders from Hitler and after consultation with
Himmler. The OKH was responsible merely for the transmission of
these orders to army groups, for instance such orders as those
concerning the treatment to be accorded to commissars and
communists, those concerning the manner of prosecuting by courts
martial army personnel who had committed offenses against the
population, as well as those establishing the basic principles
governing reprisals against the inhabitants.

“3. The detailed working out of all matters involving the
treatment of the local populace as well as anti-partisan warfare
in operational areas, in pursuance of orders from the OKW, was
the responsibility of the Generalquartiermeister of the OKH.

“4. It had always been my personal opinion that the treatment of
the civilian population and the methods of anti-partisan warfare
in operational areas presented the highest political and
military leaders with a welcomed opportunity of carrying out
their plans, namely the systematic extermination of Slavism and
Jewry. Entirely independent of this, I always regarded these
cruel methods as military insanity, because they only helped to
make combat against the enemy unnecessarily more difficult.

“(Signed) Heusinger
“Generalleutnant.” (_3717-PS_)

(At this point, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski was called upon for oral testimony. His testimony on direct examination was substantially to the same effect as his affidavit _3712-PS_.)

(_c_) _Responsibility of the Group for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment._ The foregoing evidence against the General Staff and High Command Group is such that no German soldier can view it with anything but shame. The German High Command developed and applied a policy of terror against commandos and paratroopers, in violation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, on the Western Front. On the Eastern Front it descended to savagery. In advance of the attack against the Soviet Union, the High Command ordered the troops to take “ruthless action”, left it to the discretion of any officer to decide whether suspected civilians should be immediately shot, and empowered any officer with the powers of a Battalion Commander to take “collective despotic measures” against localities. Offenses committed against civilians by German soldiers, however, were not required to be prosecuted, and prosecution was suggested only where desirable in order to maintain discipline and security from a military standpoint.

Soon after the invasion of the Soviet Union, German troops were told by the OKW that “a human life in unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing” and were encouraged to observe a punitive ratio of 50 to 100 Communists for one German soldier. German troops were told that they were to take “revenge on sub-human Jewry” and that they were not merely soldiers but “bearers of ruthless national ideology and avengers of bestialities”. The High Command and the chief lieutenants of Himmler jointly planned the establishment of the _Einsatzgruppen_, the behavior of which has been shown in detail. These groups when in operational areas were under the command of the German Army, and German soldiers joined in their savagery. The _Einsatzgruppen_ were completely dependent upon the Armed Forces for supplies with which to carry out their atrocities. The practices employed against the civilian population and against partisans were well known to all high ranking German officers on the Eastern Front. No doubt some of them disapproved of what was going on. Nonetheless, the full support of the military leaders continued to be given to these activities.

The record is clear that the General Staff and High Command Group, including the defendants, who were members of the Group and numerous other members ordered, directed, and participated in war crimes and crimes against humanity as specified in counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment.

C. _Conclusion._

The world must bear in mind that the German High Command is not an evanescent thing, the creature of a decade of unrest, or a school of thought or tradition which is shattered or utterly discredited. The German High Command and military tradition have in the past achieved victory and survived defeat. They have met with triumph and disaster, and have survived through a singular durability not unmixed with stupidity. An eminent American statesman and diplomat, Mr. Sumner Welles, has written (“The Time for Decision”, 1944, pp. 261-262) that:

“* * * the authority to which the German people have so often
and so disastrously responded was not in reality the German
Emperor of yesterday, or the Hitler of to-day, but the German
General Staff.

“It will be said that this insistence that the German General
Staff has been the driving force in German policy is a dangerous
oversimplification. I am not disposed to minimize the importance
of other factors in German history. They all have their place.
But I am convinced that each of them has played its part only in
so far as it was permitted to do so by the real master of the
German race, namely, German militarism, personified in, and
channelled through, the German General Staff.”

* * * * * *

“Whether their ostensible ruler is the Kaiser, or Hindenburg, or
Adolf Hitler, the continuing loyalty of the bulk of the
population is given to that military force controlled and guided
by the German General Staff. To the German people, the army
to-day, as in the past, is the instrument by which German
domination will be brought about. Generations of Germans may
pass. The nation may undergo defeat after defeat. But if the
rest of the world permits it, the German General Staff will
continue making its plans for the future.”

The German General Staff and High Command is indicted not now at the bar of history, but on specific charges of crimes against International Law and the dictates of the conscience of mankind as embodied in the Charter. The picture that emerges from the evidence is that of a group of men with great powers for good or ill who chose the latter; who deliberately set out to arm Germany to the point where the German will could be imposed on the rest of the world; and who gladly joined with the most evil forces at work in Germany. “Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired”, Blomberg and Blaskowitz say, and that is obviously the truth. The converse is no less clear; the military leaders furnished Hitler with the means and might which were necessary to his mere survival, to say nothing of the accomplishment of those purposes which seem to the world so ludicrously impossible in 1932 and so fearfully imminent in 1942.