Chapter XII: on Persecution of the Jews.) (6)

The Prosecution does not complain against attacks on rescue ships. They are not entitled to protection. But the point of the foregoing order to U-boats was that priority in attack should be given to rescue ships. This order, therefore, is closely allied with the order of 17 September 1942 (_D-630_): in view of the Allied shipbuilding program the German Navy had resolved to take all means to prevent Allied ships from being manned.

To summarize, it would appear from the War Diary entry of 17 September that orders on the lines discussed between Hitler and Oshima were, in fact, issued. They have not, however, been captured. It may be that they were issued orally, and that Doenitz awaited a suitable opportunity before confirming them. The incident of the bombing of the U-boats detailed to rescue the Italian survivors from the “_Laconia_” afforded the opportunity, and the order to all commanders was issued. Its intent is clear when it is considered in the light of the War Diary entry. The wording is, of course, extremely careful, but to any officer of experience its intention was obvious: he would know that deliberate action to annihilate survivors would be approved under that order.

It may be contended that this order, although perhaps unfortunately phrased, was merely intended to stop a commander from jeopardizing his ship by attempting a rescue, which had become increasingly dangerous as a result of the extended coverage of the ocean by Allied aircraft; and that the notorious action of U-Boat Commander Eck in sinking the Greek steamer “_Peleus_” and then machine-gunning the crew on their rafts in the water, was an exception; and that, although it may be true that a copy of the order was on board, this action was taken solely, as Eck himself swore, on his own initiative.

In reply it may be said that if the intention of this order was to stop rescue attempts, in the interests of the preservation of the U-boat, it would have been done by calling attention to Standing Order 154. Secondly, this very fact would have been prominently stated in the order. Drastic orders of this nature are not drafted by experienced staff officers without the greatest care and an eye to their possible capture by the enemy. Thirdly, if it was necessary to avoid the risks attendant on surfacing, not only would this have been stated but there would have been no question of taking any prisoners at all except possibly in circumstances where virtually no risk in surfacing was to be apprehended. Fourthly, the final sentence of the first paragraph would have read very differently. And fifthly, if in fact—and the Prosecution does not accept it—Doenitz did not mean to enjoin murder, his order was so worded that he cannot escape the responsibility which attaches to such a document.

The instructions given by Admiral Doenitz with regard to the murder of shipwrecked Allied seamen are described in an affidavit by _Oberleutnant Zur See_ Peter Josef Heisig (_D-566_). (Heisig was called as a prosecution witness in the case against Doenitz and testified on direct examination to the same effect, in substance, as the statements in his affidavit.) In September 1942 Heisig was a Midshipman in a training course for U-boat officers of the watch. On the last day of the course Grand Admiral Doenitz, who was then Commander-in-Chief, U-boats, held an inspection tour and made a speech to the officers in training. Heisig describes the content of Doenitz’s speech as follows:

“* * * According to news received from America we were bound to
reckon with the possibility that in the Allied countries more
than 1,000,000 net registered tons of new merchant shipping
space would be brought into service monthly. This was more
shipping space than would be sunk even with good U-boat
successes. The bottleneck of the Allies lay only in the problem
of personnel for these newly built ships. The Atlantic route was
too dangerous for seamen so that they even had to be brought
aboard ship under compulsion. This was the point where we, the
U-boat crews, had to take a hand. He therefore demanded that we
should from now on carry on total warfare against ship and crew.
That meant: so far as possible, no seaman from a sunk ship was
to get home any more. Only thus could the supply line of the
British Isles be seriously endangered and only thus in the long
run could we strike a noticeable blow at Allied merchant
shipping traffic. In this way it would be impossible for the
opponent even to make use of his newly built ships, since no
more crews would be available to him. After the sinking of a
ship, every possibility of rescue must be denied to the crew,
through the destruction of every means of saving life.

“I later discussed these remarks of Admiral Doenitz’s with the
others, and all present unanimously and unambiguously took them
to mean that after the sinking of a ship, all possibility of
escape, whether in boats, on rafts, or by any other means, must
be denied to the crew and the destruction of the crew was to be
attempted by every means. This mode of warfare was for me as for
most of my comrades completely new. Owing to Admiral Doenitz’s
authoritative position, it was nevertheless fully and completely
accepted by many of them. He sought to invalidate in advance any
doubts which might arise, by pointing to the air war and the
bombing.” (_D-566_)

Further light on the real meaning of the Top Secret radio message sent by the Commander in Chief, U-boats, to all U-boat and operational flotillas in September 1942 (_D-630_) is contained in the statement of _Korvettenkapitaen_ Karl Heinz Moehle (_382-PS_). (Moehle was called as a Prosecution witness in the case against Doenitz and testified on direct examination to the same effect, in substance, as the statements in his affidavit.) Concerning this order which was couched in terms of a prohibition against the rescue of survivors, Moehle states as follows:

“This W/T message was without any doubt, sent out at the
instigation of the Commander in Chief U-boats himself, i.e.
Grand Admiral Doenitz. In view of my knowledge of the way in
which the Staff of the Chief Command U-boats worked, I consider
it quite impossible that an order of such importance could have
been given without his knowledge.”

* * * * * *

“So far as concerns the order itself, it undoubtedly states, and
in particular for those who know the manner in which Commander
in Chief U-Boats is wont to give his orders, that the High
Command regard it as desirable that not only ships but also
their crews should be regarded as objects of attack, i.e. that
they should be destroyed; at that time German propaganda was
continually stressing the shortage of crews for enemy merchant
ships and the consequent difficulties. I too understood this
order in that way.

“Had the point of view of the High Command been otherwise the
order would undoubtedly have been expressed in different words.
It would then only have stated that for reasons of security
rescue measures were to cease and this order would have passed
as a normal secret W/T message. It was perhaps even the
intention that this order could be interpreted in two ways and
the reason may be that in the first place, it contravenes
international laws of warfare and secondly, that it was an order
which must give rise to serious conflicts of conscience in
commanding officers.”

* * * * * *

“To conclude, I can only stress that the order of September 1942
appeared to me personally to go too far and I am in total
disagreement with it at heart. As a serving officer I had
however to carry out the command to pass on this order to
commanding officers for their instruction.

“During the long time that I was senior officer of the Flotilla
no single commanding officer mentioned to me that he could not
reconcile obedience to this order with his conscience and that
he was therefore unable to carry it out.” (_382-PS_)

Moehle graphically describes Doenitz’s incitement of his men to the murder of survivors:

“A type VII boat (500-tonner) reported in her war log that when
outward bound from a base in France she met far out in the Bay
of Biscay a raft with five enemy airmen, but was not able to
take them on board owing to shortage of room (she had a
complement of 54 and carried full provisions for 14 weeks). The
boat therefore proceeded without taking any notice of the
survivors.

“This action of the U-boat was vehemently denounced by the
Commander in Chief U-boats’ staff. It was stated that she would
have acted more correctly in destroying this raft since it was
highly probably that the enemy air crew would be rescued by the
enemy and in the meantime might once more have destroyed a
German U-boat.

“This occurrence made the views of the Commander in Chief
U-boats clear to me.” (_382-PS_)

As senior officer of the Fifth U-boat Flotilla, it was Moehle’s duty to transmit orders from the Commander in Chief, U-boats, to commanding officers of U-boats. In this connection, Doenitz’s ambiguous order against the rescue of survivors caused difficulties.

“I was wont to pass on this controversial and serious order with
more or less the following words:—‘I have now to inform you of
a High Command order concerning conduct towards survivors. It is
a very ticklish matter. Commander in Chief U-boats in September
1942 gave the following order in an ‘officers only’ signal (* *
* the exact words of the order were then read out).’

“Since I am myself in my innermost conscience in disagreement
with this order, I was very glad that in most cases commanding
officers raised no queries and I was therefore relieved of any
further discussion on this point.

“Sometimes however queries were raised and I was wont to answer
somewhat as follows:—

“‘I will explain the viewpoint of the High Command, which gave
this order, by reference to the following event:’ I then
mentioned the example of the Type VII boat in the Bay of Biscay
together with the explanation and viewpoint expressed to me by
Commander in Chief U-boats’ staff. I then went on to say,
‘Gentlemen, you must yourselves decide what is compatible with
your own consciences. The safety of your own boat must always
remain your prime consideration.’”

* * * * * *

“I also remember that many commanding officers after the order
of September 1942 had been read said, ‘That is quite clear and
unequivocal however hard it may be.’ Had this order been given
to me as a commanding officer I would have taken note of it in
silence but in practice would always have been able with a clear
conscience not to carry it out since I consider I would endanger
my own boat by acting in this way, (i.e., by shooting at
lift-boats).” (_382-PS_)

Finally, Moehle describes the orders to omit from U-boat logs the notation of any actions in violation of International Law:

“There was an order—I do not remember whether it was in the
form of a written or verbal instruction—that no events during a
war patrol which contravened established international
agreements should be entered in the war log. I believe that the
reason for this order was that eight copies were made of war
logs and were available to many authorities; there was always
the danger therefore that events of this nature would become
known and it was undoubtedly undesirable for reasons of
propaganda that this should be so.

“Events of this nature were only to be reported if asked for
when commanding officers made their personal reports; these were
invariably made after every patrol to Commander in Chief U-boats
or later in certain instances to Captain U-boats.” (_382-PS_)

Two cases may be noted in which the order of 17 September 1942 (_D-630_) was apparently put into effect. The first case is the sinking of a steam trawler, the “_Noreen Mary_,” which was sunk by U-247 on 5 July 1944. The log of the U-Boat shows that at 1943 hours two torpedoes were fired, which missed (_D-645_).

At 2055 hours the log reads:

“Surfaced.

“Fishing Vessels: [Bearings of 3 ships given].

“Engaged the nearest. She stops after three minutes.” (_D-645_)

There follows an account of a shot fired as the trawler lay stopped, and then, the final entry:

“Sunk by flak, with shots into her side. Sank by the stern.”
(_D-645_)

The U-Boat Command made this comment on the action:

“Recognized success: Fishing vessel ‘_Noreen Mary_’ sunk by
flak.” (_D-645_)

An affidavit by James MacAlister, who was a deck-hand on board the “_Noreen Mary_” at the time of the sinking, describes the torpedo tracks which missed the trawler, and continues as follows:

“At 2110 hours, while we were still trawling, the submarine
surfaced on our starboard beam, about 50 yards to the northeast
of us, and without any warning immediately opened fire on the
ship with a machine gun. We were 18 miles west from Cape Wrath,
on a north-westerly course, making 3 knots. The weather was fine
and clear, sunny, with good visibility. The sea was smooth, with
light airs.”

* * * * * *

“When the submarine surfaced I saw men climbing out of the
conning tower. The skipper [of the trawler] thought at first the
submarine was British, but when she opened fire he immediately
slackened the brake to take the weight off gear, and increased
to full speed, which was about 10 knots. The submarine chased
us, firing her machine gun, and with the first rounds killed two
or three men, including the skipper, who were on deck and had
not had time to take cover. The submarine then started using a
heavier gun from her conning tower, the first shot from which
burst the boiler, enveloping everything in steam and stopping
the ship.

“By now the crew had taken cover, but in spite of this all but
four were killed. The submarine then commenced to circle round
ahead of the vessel, and passed down her port side with both
guns firing continuously. We were listing slowly to port all the
time but did not catch fire.

“The Mate and I attempted to release the lifeboat, which was
aft, but the Mate was killed whilst doing so, so I abandoned the
attempt. I then went below into the pantry, which was below the
water line, for shelter. The ship was listing more and more to
port, until finally at 2210 she rolled right over and sank, and
the only four men left alive on board were thrown into the sea.
I do not know where the other three men had taken cover during
this time, as I did not hear or see them until they were in the
water.

“I swam around until I came across the broken bow of our
lifeboat, which was upside down, and managed to scramble on top
of it. Even now the submarine did not submerge, but deliberately
steamed in my direction and when only 60 to 70 yards away fired
directly at me with a short burst from the machine gun. As their
intention was quite obvious, I fell into the water and remained
there until the submarine ceased firing and submerged, after
which I climbed back on to the bottom of the boat. The submarine
had been firing her guns for a full hour.” (_D-645_)

The affidavit goes on to describe the attempts of the Second Engineer and others to rescue themselves and to help each other; they were later picked up by another trawler. The affidavit continues:

“Whilst on board the ‘_Lady Madeleine_’ the Second Engineer and
I had our wounds dressed. I learned later that the Second
Engineer had 48 shrapnel wounds, also a piece of steel wire 2½
inches long embedded in his body. * * * I had 14 shrapnel
wounds.”

* * * * * *

“This is my fourth wartime experience, having served in the
whalers ‘_Sylvester_’ (mined) and ‘_New Seville_’ (torpedoed),
and the Trawler ‘_Ocean Tide_’, which ran ashore.

“As a result of this attack by U-boat, the casualties were six
killed, two missing, two injured.” (_D-645_).

The next case is that of the ship “_Antonico_”, which was torpedoed, set afire, and sunk on 28 September 1942, off the coast of French Guiana. The date of the incident is some eleven days after the issue of the order (_D-630_). A statement given by the Second Officer describes the attack on the ship, which by then was on fire (_D-647_):

“* * * That the witness saw the dead on the deck of the
‘_Antonico_’ as he and his crew tried to swing out their
lifeboat; that the attack was fulminant, lasting almost 20
minutes; and that the witness already in the lifeboat tried to
get away from the side of the ‘_Antonico_’ in order to avoid
being dragged down by the same ‘_Antonico_’ and also because she
was the aggressor’s target; that the night was dark, and it was
thus difficult to see the submarine, but that the fire aboard
the ‘_Antonico_’ lit up the locality in which she was
submerging, facilitating the enemy to see the two lifeboats
trying to get away; that the enemy ruthlessly machined-gunned
the defenseless sailors in No. 2 lifeboat, in which the witness
found himself, and killed the Second Pilot Arnaldo de Andrade de
Lima, and wounded three of the crew; that the witness gave
orders to his company to throw themselves’ overboard to save
themselves from the bullets; in so doing, they were protected
and out of sight behind the lifeboat, which was already filled
with water; even so the lifeboat continued to be attacked. At
that time the witness and his companions were about 20 meters in
distance from the submarine.” (_D-647_)

The U-boat’s log in that case is not available, but it may be surmised, in view of the order that nothing compromising should be included in entries in logs, that it would be no more helpful than in the case of the previous incident.

A broadcast by a German Naval War Reporter on the long wave propaganda service from Friesland, (_D-646-A_) in English, on 11 March 1943, stated:

“Santa Lucia, in the West Indies, was an ideal setting for
romance, but nowadays it was dangerous to sail in these
waters—dangerous for the British and Americans and for all the
colored people who were at their beck and call. Recently a
U-boat operating in these waters sighted an enemy windjammer.
Streams of tracer bullets were poured into the sails and most of
the Negro crew leaped overboard. Knowing that this might be a
decoy ship, the submarine steamed cautiously to within 20 yards,
when hand grenades were hurled into the rigging. The remainder
of the Negroes then leaped into the sea. The windjammer sank.
There remained only wreckage. Lifeboats packed with men, and
sailors swimming. The sharks in the distance licked their teeth
in expectation. Such was the fate of those who sailed for
Britain and America.” (_D-646-A_)

This statement shows that it was the policy of the enemy to seek to terrorize crews. It is a part with the order with regard to rescue ships and with the order on the destruction of steamers.

After Doenitz succeeded Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he presumably also succeeded to the equivalent rank of a Minister of the Reich, which Raeder had held (_2098-PS_).

An official report certified by an official of the British Admiralty sets out the number of meetings, the dates of the meetings, and those present, on the occasion of meetings between Doenitz or his representative with Hitler from the time that he succeeded Raeder until the end (_D-648_). The certificate states:

“* * * I have compiled from them [captured documents] the
attached list of occasions on which Admiral Doenitz attended
conferences at Hitler’s headquarters. The list of other senior
officials who attended the same conferences is added when this
information was contained in the captured documents concerned. I
certify that the list is a true extract from the collective
documents which I have examined, and which are in the possession
of the British Admiralty, London.”

Either Admiral Doenitz or his deputy, Konteradmiral Voss, was present at each of the numerous meetings listed. Among those who were also constantly present were Speer, Keitel, Jodl, Ribbentrop, Goering, and Himmler or his lieutenants, Fegelein or Kaltenbrunner. The inference is clear that from the time that he succeeded Raeder, Doenitz was one of the rulers of the Reich and was undoubtedly aware of all major decisions of policy.

(3) _The Order to Kill Commandos._ An internal memorandum of the Naval War Staff, written by the division dealing with International Law to another division, discusses the order of 18 October 1942, with regard to the shooting of Commandos (_C-178_).

Doubt appears to have arisen in some quarters with regard to the understanding of this order. Accordingly, in the last sentence of the memorandum it is suggested:

“As far as the Navy is concerned, it remains to be seen whether
or not this case should be used to make sure, after a conference
with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, that all departments
concerned have an entirely clear conception regarding the
treatment of members of commando units.” (_C-178_)

Whether that conference took place or not is not known. The document is dated some 11 days after Doenitz had taken over command from Raeder.

But in July 1943, the Navy handed over to the SD Norwegian and British Navy personnel, whom the Navy decided came under the terms of the order, for shooting. An affidavit by a British Barrister-at-Law who served as judge advocate at the trial of the members of the SD who executed the order states (_D-649_):

“The accused were charged with committing a war crime, in that
they at Ulven, Norway, in or about the month of July 1943, in
violation of the laws and usages of war, were concerned in the
killing of * * *” [there follow the names of six personnel of
the Norwegian Navy, including one officer, and one telegraphist
of the British Navy, prisoners of war.].

* * * * * *

“There was evidence before the Court, which was not challenged
by the Defense, that Motor Torpedo Boat No. 345 set out from
Lerwick in the Shetlands on a naval operation for the purpose of
making torpedo attacks on German shipping off the Norwegian
coast, and for the purpose of laying mines in the same area. The
persons mentioned in the charge were all the crew of the Torpedo
Boat.

“The defense did not challenge that each member of the crew was
wearing uniform at the time of capture, and there was abundant
evidence from many persons, several of whom were German, that
they were wearing uniform at all times after their capture.

“On 27th July, 1943, the Torpedo Boat reached the island of Aspo
off the Norwegian coast, north of Bergen. On the following day
the whole of the crew were captured and were taken on board a
German naval vessel which was under the command of Admiral von
Schrader, the Admiral of the west coast. The crew were taken to
the Bergenhus, where they had arrived by 11 p. m. on 28th July.
The crew were there interrogated by Leut. H. P. W. W. Fanger, a
Naval Leutnant of the Reserve, on the orders of
Korvettenkapitaen Egon Drascher, both of the German Naval
Intelligence Service. This interrogation was carried out upon
the orders of the staff of the Admiral of the west coast. Leut.
Fanger reported to the Officer in Charge of the Intelligence
Branch at Bergen that in his opinion all the members of the crew
were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, and that
officer in turn reported both orally and in writing to the Sea
Commander, Bergen, and in writing to the Admiral of the west
coast.

“The interrogation by the Naval Intelligence Branch was
concluded in the early hours of 29th July, and almost
immediately all the members of the crew were handed over on the
immediate orders of the Sea Commander, Bergen, to
Obersturmbannfuehrer of the SD, Hans Wilhelm Blomberg, who was
at that time Kommandeur of the Sicherheitspolizei at Bergen.
This followed a meeting between Blomberg and Admiral von
Schrader, at which a copy of the Fuehrer order of the 18th
October 1942 was shown to Blomberg. This order dealt with the
classes of persons who were to be excluded from the protection
of the Geneva Convention and were not to be treated as prisoners
of war, but when captured were to be handed over to the SD.
Admiral von Schrader told Blomberg that the crew of this Torpedo
Boat were to be handed over in accordance with the Fuehrer
order, to the SD.” (_D-649_)

The affidavit goes on to describe the interrogation by officials of the SD. These officials took the same view as the Naval Intelligence officers, that the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war. Nevertheless, the crew were taken out and shot by an execution squad composed of members of the SD. The affidavit concludes as follows:

“It appeared from the evidence that in March or April, 1945, an
order from the Fuehrer Headquarters, signed by Keitel, was
transmitted to the German authorities in Norway. The substance
of the order was that members of the crew of commando raids who
fell into German captivity were from that date to be treated as
ordinary prisoners of war. This order referred specifically to
the Fuehrer order referred to above.” (_D-649_)

The date mentioned is important; it was time “in March or April, 1945,” for these men to put their affairs in order.

(4) _Reasons for Not Renouncing the Geneva Convention._ The minutes of conferences on 19 and 20 February 1945 between Doenitz and Hitler read as follows:

“The Fuehrer is considering whether or not Germany should
renounce the Geneva Convention * * *” [the 1929 Prisoners of War
Convention].

* * * * * *

“The Fuehrer orders the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to
consider the pros and cons of their step and to state his
opinion as soon as possible.” (_C-158_)

Doenitz then stated his opinion in the presence of Jodl and a representative of Ribbentrop:

“* * * On the contrary, the disadvantages [of renouncing the
convention] outweigh the advantages. It would be better to carry
out the measures considered necessary without warning, and at
all costs to save face with the outer world.” (_C-158_)

An extract from the minutes of another meeting between Doenitz and Hitler, on 1 July 1944,—the extract is signed by Doenitz—states:

“* * * Regarding the General Strike in Copenhagen, the Fuehrer
says that the only weapon to deal with terror is terror. Court
martial proceedings create martyrs. History shows that the names
of such men are on everybody’s lips, whereas there is silence
with regard to the many thousands who have lost their lives in
similar circumstances without court martial proceedings.”
(_C-171_)

(5) _Use of Concentration Camp Labor in Shipyards._ In a memorandum signed by Doenitz sometime late in 1944, which was distributed to Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, Speer, and the Supreme Command of the Air Force, Doenitz reviews German shipping losses, and concludes:

“Furthermore, I propose reinforcing the shipyard working parties
by prisoners from the concentration camps and as a special
measure for relieving the present shortage of coppersmiths,
especially in U-boat construction, I propose to divert
coppersmiths from the construction of locomotives to
shipbuilding.” (_C-195_)

In dealing with sabotage, Doenitz has this to say:

“Since, elsewhere, measures for exacting atonement taken against
whole working parties amongst whom sabotage occurred, have
proved successful, and, for example, the shipyard sabotage in
France was completely suppressed, possibly similar measures for
the Scandinavian countries will come under consideration.”
(_C-195_)

Item 2 of the summing-up reads:

“12,000 concentration camp prisoners will be employed in the
shipyards as additional labor (security service [SD] agrees to
this)” (_C-195_).

It was not for nothing that at these meetings Himmler and his Lieutenants, Fegelein and Kaltenbrunner, were present.

They were not there to discuss U-boats or the use of battleships. It is clear from this document that Doenitz knew all about concentration camps and concentration camp labor, and as one of the rulers of Germany he must bear his full share of that responsibility.

(6) _Doenitz’s Incitement of Ruthless Conduct By His Men._ The orders issued by Doenitz in April 1945 (_D-650_) show his fanatical adherence to the Nazi creed, and his preparedness even at that stage to continue a hopeless war at the expense of human life, and with the certainty of increased destruction and misery to his country:

“I therefore demand of the commanding officers of the Navy: That
they clearly and unambiguously follow the path of military duty,
whatever may happen. I demand of them that they stamp out
ruthlessly all signs and tendencies among the men which endanger
the following of this path.

“I demand from Senior Commanders that they should take just as
ruthless action against any commander who does not do his
military duty. If a commander does not think he has the moral
strength to occupy his position as a leader in this sense, he
must report this immediately. He will then be used as a soldier
in this fateful struggle in some position in which he is not
burdened with any tasks as a leader.” (_D-650_)

In the secret Battle order of the day of 19 April 1945, Doenitz gives an example of the type of under-officer who should be promoted:

“An example: In a prison camp of the auxiliary cruiser
‘_Cormorau_’, in Austria, a petty officer acting as camp senior
officer, had all communists who made themselves noticeable among
the inmates of the camp systematically done away with in such a
way that the guards did not notice. This petty officer is sure
of my full recognition for his decision and his execution. After
his return, I shall promote him with all means, as he has shown
that he is fitted to be a leader.” (_D-650_)

E. _CONCLUSION._

Doenitz was no plain sailor, playing the part of a service officer, loyally obedient to the orders of the government of the day. He was an extreme Nazi who did his utmost to indoctrinate the Navy and the German people with the Nazi creed. It is no coincidence that it was he—not Goering, not Ribbentrop, not Goebbels, not Himmler—who was chosen to succeed Hitler. He played a large part in fashioning the U-boat fleet, one of the most deadly weapons of aggressive war. He helped to plan and execute aggressive wars, which he knew well were in deliberate violation of treaties. He was ready to stoop to any ruse where he thought he would not be found out: breaches of the Geneva Convention or of neutrality, where it might be asserted that sinking was due to a mine. He was ready to order, and did order, the murder of helpless survivors of sunken ships, an action only paralleled by that of his Japanese ally.

There can be few countries which do not mourn for men of the merchant navies whose destruction was due to the callow brutality with which, at the orders of this man, the German U-boats did their work.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO KARL DOENITZ

│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 67
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*382-PS │Affidavit of Korvettenkapitaen Moehle,│ │
│England, 19 July 1945, concerning the │ │
│interpretation of Doenitz’s order of │ │
│September 1942. (GB 202) │ III │ 290
│ │ │
*498-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing │ │
│of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA │ │
│501) │ III │ 416
│ │ │
503-PS │Letter signed by Jodl, 19 October │ │
│1942, concerning Hitler’s explanation │ │
│of his commando order of the day │ │
│before (Document 498-PS). (USA 542) │ III │ 426
│ │ │
*526-PS │Top secret notice, 10 May 1943, │ │
│concerning saboteurs captured and shot│ │
│in Norway. (USA 502) │ III │ 434
│ │ │
*1463-PS │Diary of the Navy, 1944, by Admiral │ │
│Doenitz. (GB 184) │ IV │ 45
│ │ │
*2098-PS │Decree relating to Status of Supreme │ │
│Commanders of Army and Navy, 25 │ │
│February 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│Part I, p. 215. (GB 206) │ IV │ 725
│ │ │
*2878-PS │Extracts from The Archive. (GB 187) │ V │ 540
│ │ │
*2887-PS │Certificate of positions held by │ │
│Doenitz, 8 November 1945. (USA 12) │ V │ 552
│ │ │
2988-PS │Affidavit of Gerhard Wagner, Nurnberg,│ │
│19 November 1945, who identified │ │
│document C-158 as expressing opinion │ │
│of Doenitz and initialled by him. │ V │ 693
│ │ │
3150-PS │Interrogation of Doenitz, 3 November │ │
│1945. │ V │ 911
│ │ │
3151-PS │Interrogation of Falkenhorst, 24 │ │
│October 1945. │ V │ 912
│ │ │
*3260-PS │“Churchill Sank the Athenia”, │ │
│published in Voelkischer Beobachter, │ │
│23 October 1939. (GB 218) │ V │ 1008
│ │ │
*C-5 │Memorandum to Supreme Command of the │ │
│Navy by Doenitz, 9 October 1939, │ │
│concerning base in Norway. (GB 83) │ VI │ 815
│ │ │
*C-21 │Extracts from file on Intensification │ │
│of U-boat warfare. (GB 194) │ VI │ 825
│ │ │
*C-105 │Extract from German Naval War Diary, │ │
│21 December 1940, p. 252. (GB 455) │ VI │ 913
│ │ │
C-118 │Extract from German Naval file, 18 │ │
│July 1941, concerning authorization of│ │
│attacks on U. S. Merchantmen. (GB 195)│ VI │ 916
│ │ │
*C-120 │Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 │ │
│for “Fall Weiss”, operation against │ │
│Poland. (GB 41) │ VI │ 916
│ │ │
*C-122 │Extract from Naval War Diary. │ │
│Questionnaire on Norway bases, 3 │ │
│October 1939. (GB 82) │ VI │ 928
│ │ │
*C-126 │Preliminary Time Table for “Fall │ │
│Weiss” and directions for secret │ │
│mobilization. (GB 45) │ VI │ 932
│ │ │
*C-151 │Details for execution of operation │ │
│“Weseruebung”, 3 March 1940, signed by│ │
│Doenitz. (GB 91) │ VI │ 965
│ │ │
*C-158 │Minutes of conference of C-in-C of │ │
│Navy with Hitler, 19 and 20 February │ │
│1945. (GB 209) │ VI │ 971
│ │ │
*C-171 │Minutes of conference between Hitler │ │
│and C-in-C of Navy regarding │ │
│Copenhagen General Strike, 1 July │ │
│1944. (GB 210) │ VI │ 1002
│ │ │
*C-172 │Order No. 1 for “Fall Weiss” signed by│ │
│Doenitz. (GB 189) │ VI │ 1002
│ │ │
*C-178 │Order of Navy concerning treatment of │ │
│saboteurs, 11 February 1943. (USA 544)│ VI │ 1012
│ │ │
*C-179 │Hitler’s second decree, 18 October │ │
│1942, regarding annihilation of terror│ │
│and sabotage units. (USA 543) │ VI │ 1014
│ │ │
*C-191 │Demands by defendant Doenitz on │ │
│sinking of merchant ships, 22 │ │
│September 1939. (GB 193) │ VI │ 1018
│ │ │
*C-195 │Report signed by Doenitz, 1944, giving│ │
│support to Navy and Merchant Marine. │ │
│(GB 211) │ VI │ 1022
│ │ │
D-423 │Memorandum of conversation between │ │
│Hitler and Oshima, 3 January 1942. (GB│ │
│197) │ VII │ 53
│ │ │
*D-436 │Citation on promotion of Doenitz to │ │
│Vice Admiral, published in The │ │
│Archive, 27 September 1940. p. 550. │ │
│(GB 183) │ VII │ 54
│ │ │
*D-443 │Speech by Doenitz to Naval officers at│ │
│Weimar, 17 December 1943. (GB 185) │ VII │ 54
│ │ │
*D-444 │Order of day and speech of Doenitz on │ │
│death of Hitler, 1 May 1945. (GB 188) │ VII │ 55
│ │ │
*D-446 │Extract from B.d.U. War Diary, 16 │ │
│September 1942. (GB 198) │ VII │ 57
│ │ │
*D-566 │Affidavit by Peter-Joseph Heisig, 27 │ │
│November 1945. (GB 201) │ VII │ 72
│ │ │
*D-630 │Extracts from B.d.U. War Diary and │ │
│Order to all U-boat commanders; │ │
│telegram from Schacht and in reply to │ │
│Schacht. (GB 199) │ VII │ 100
│ │ │
*D-638 │Affidavit of Doenitz concerning │ │
│sinking of Athenia, 17 November 1945. │ │
│(GB 220) │ VII │ 114
│ │ │
*D-640 │Speech by C-in-C of Navy to Commanders│ │
│in Chief, 15 February 1944. (GB 186) │ VII │ 116
│ │ │
*D-641-A │Extracts from official reports │ │
│concerning German attacks on merchant │ │
│shipping, 3 September 1939 to │ │
│September 1940. (GB 191) │ VII │ 116
│ │ │
*D-641-B │Extracts from official reports │ │
│concerning German attacks on merchant │ │
│shipping, 1 September 1940 to 28 │ │
│February 1941. (GB 191) │ VII │ 120
│ │ │
*D-641-C │Sinkings by U-boats during the war, │ │
│1939-1945. (GB 191) │ VII │ 124
│ │ │
*D-642 │Extract from Befehlshaber der │ │
│U-bootes; Secret Standing Order No. │ │
│154 signed by Doenitz. (GB 196) │ VII │ 124
│ │ │
D-644 │Report of sinking of “Sheaf Mead”. (GB│ │
│192) │ VII │ 124
│ │ │
*D-645 │Report on sinking of “Noreen Mary”; │ │
│affidavit by survivor. (GB 203) │ VII │ 128
│ │ │
*D-646-A │Wireless talk by German naval reporter│ │
│concerning Windjammer sunk by U-boat. │ │
│(GB 205) │ VII │ 133
│ │ │
D-646-B │Extract from War Diary of U-105, 12 │ │
│January 1943. │ VII │ 133
│ │ │
*D-647 │Statement on sinking of SS “Antonico”,│ │
│which was torpedoed, set afire and │ │
│sunk, 28 September 1942. (GB 204) │ VII │ 134
│ │ │
*D-648 │List of Hitler-Doenitz meetings. (GB │ │
│207) │ VII │ 136
│ │ │
*D-649 │Affidavit by Judge Advocate, 28 │ │
│December 1945. (GB 208) │ VII │ 145
│ │ │
*D-650 │Orders issued by Doenitz, 11 April │ │
│1945. (GB 212) │ VII │ 148
│ │ │
*D-663 │Operation Order “Atlantic” No. 56 for │ │
│U-boats in Atlantic, 7 October 1943. │ │
│(GB 200) │ VII │ 170
│ │ │
Statement I │The Laconia Case and German Submarine │ │
│Warfare, by Karl Doenitz, Nurnberg, 7 │ │
│and 19 October 1945. │ VIII │ 657
│ │ │
Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │
│the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │
│fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707

15. ERICH RAEDER

A. _POSITIONS HELD BY RAEDER._

Erich Raeder was born in 1876 and joined the German Navy in 1896. By 1915 he had become commander of the Cruiser _Koeln_. In 1928 he became an admiral, Chief of Naval Command, and head of the German Navy. In 1935 he became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. In 1936 he became General Admiral, a creation of Hitler’s, on his forty-seventh birthday. In 1937 he received the golden badge of honor of the Nazi Party. In 1938 he became a member of the Secret Cabinet Council. In 1939 he was made Grand Admiral, a rank created by Hitler, who presented Raeder with a marshal’s baton. In 1943 he became Admiral Inspector of the German Navy, which was a kind of retirement into oblivion, since after January 1943 Doenitz was the effective commander of the German Navy. (_2888-PS_)

B. _RAEDER’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO PLAN AND WAGE WARS OF
AGGRESSION._

During the years of Raeder’s command of the German Navy, from 1928 to 1943, he played a vital role in building up the Navy as an instrument of war, to implement the Nazis’ general plan of aggression.

(1) _Concealed rearmament in violation of the Treaty of Versailles._ In successive and secret steps, the small Navy permitted to Germany under the Treaty of Versailles was enormously expanded under the guidance of Raeder.

The story of Germany’s secret rearmament in violation of the Treaty of Versailles is told in a history of the fight of the German Navy against Versailles, 1919 to 1935, which was published secretly by the German Admiralty in 1937 (_C-156_). This history shows that before the Nazis came to power the German Admiralty was deceiving not only the governments of other countries, but its own legislature and at one stage its own government, regarding the secret measures of rearmament ranging from experimental U-Boat and E-Boat building to the creation of secret intelligence and finance organizations. Raeder’s role in these developments are described as follows:

“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, had
received hereby a far-reaching independence in the building and
development of the Navy. This was only hampered insofar as the
previous concealment of rearmament had to be continued in
consideration of the Versailles Treaty.” (_C-156_)

An illustration of Raeder’s concealment of rearmament is contained in his statement that:

“In view of Germany’s treaty obligations and the disarmament
conference, steps must be taken to prevent the first E-boat
Half-Flotilla from appearing openly as a formation of
torpedo-carrying boats, as it was not intended to count these
E-boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed
them.” (_C-141_)

It appears that even in 1930 the intention ultimately to attack Poland was already current in German military circles. An extract from the History of War Organization and of the Scheme for Mobilization (_C-135_) which is headed “All 850/38”, suggesting that the document was written in 1938, reads:

“Since under the Treaty of Versailles all preparations for
mobilization were forbidden, these were at first confined to a
very small body of collaborators and were at first only of a
theoretical nature. Nevertheless, there existed at that time an
‘Establishment Order’ and ‘Instructions for Establishment,’ the
forerunners of the present-day scheme for Mobilization.

“An ‘establishment organization’ and ‘adaptable instructions for
establishment’ were drawn up for each A-year, the cover name for
a mobilization year.

“As stated, the ‘Establishment Organizations’ of that time were
to be judged purely theoretically, for they had no positive
basis in the form of men and materials. They provided,
nevertheless, a valuable foundation for the establishment of a
War Organization as our ultimate aim.”

* * * * * *

“The crises between Germany and Poland, which were becoming
increasingly acute, compelled us, instead of making theoretical
preparations for war, to prepare in a practical manner for a
purely German-Polish conflict.

“The strategic idea of a rapid forcing of the Polish base of
Gdynia was made a basis, and the fleet on active service was to
be reinforced by the auxiliary forces which would be
indispensable to attain this strategic end, and the essential
coastal and flak batteries, especially those in Pillau and
Swinemuende were to be taken over. Thus in 1930 the
Reinforcement Plan was evolved.” (_C-135_)

The extract further shows that Hitler had made a clear political request to build up for him in five years, that is, by April 1938, armed forces which he could place in the balance as an instrument of political power. (_C-135_)

The Nazi seizure of power in 1933 was a signal to Raeder to go full speed ahead on rearmament. In June 1934 Raeder told Hitler that the German fleet must be developed to oppose England, and that therefore from 1936 on, the big ships must be armed with big guns to match the British “_King George_” class of battleship. Raeder also went along with Hitler’s demand that the construction of U-Boats should be kept completely secret, especially in view of the Saar plebiscite (_C-189_). In November 1934 Raeder had a further talk with Hitler on the financing of naval rearmament, and on that occasion Hitler told him that in case of need he would get Doctor Ley to put 120,000,000 to 150,000,000 RM. from the Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy. (_C-190_)

Another example of the deceit used by Raeder in building up the German Navy is the fact that the true displacement of certain German battleships exceeded by twenty percent the displacement which the Nazis had reported to the British (_C-23_). In similar vein, it was ordered that auxiliary cruisers, which were being secretly constructed, should be referred to as “transport ships O.” (_C-166_)

The support given by the German Navy to the German Armament Industry illustrates Raeder’s concern with the broader aspects of Nazi policy and of the close link between Nazi politicians, German Service Chiefs, and German armament manufacturers. (_C-29_)

A commentary on post-1939 naval rearmament is contained in a letter from Raeder to the German Navy, dated 11 June 1940. This letter was given extensive distribution; in fact there is provision in the distribution list for 467 copies. This letter of Raeder’s, which is marked with both self-justification and apology, reads:

“The most outstanding of the numerous subjects of discussion in
the Officer Corps are the Torpedo position and the problem
whether the naval building program, up to Autumn 1939, envisaged
the possibility of the outbreak of war as early as 1939, or
whether the emphasis ought not to have been laid, from the
first, on the construction of U-boats.

“If the opinion is voiced in the Officer Corps that the entire
naval building program has been wrongly directed, and that, from
the first, the emphasis should have been on the U-boat weapon
and, after its consolidation, on the large ships, I must
emphasize the following matters:

“The building up of the Fleet was directed according to the
political demands, which were decided by the Fuehrer. The
Fuehrer hoped, until the last moment, to be able to put off the
threatening conflict with England until 1944-45. At that time
the Navy would have had available a fleet with a powerful U-boat
superiority and a much more favorable ratio as regards strength
in all other types of ships, particularly those designed for
warfare on the high seas.

“The development of events forced the Navy, contrary to the
expectation even of the Fuehrer, into a war, which it had to
accept while still in the initial stage of its rearmament. The
result is that those who represent the opinion that the emphasis
should have been laid, from the start, on the building of the
U-boat arm, appear to be right. I leave undiscussed, how far
this development, quite apart from difficulties of personnel,
training and dockyards, could have been appreciably improved in
any way in view of the political limits of the Anglo-German
Naval Treaty. I leave also undiscussed, how the early and
necessary creation of an effective Air Force slowed down the
desirable development of the other branches of the forces. I
indicate, however, with pride the admirable and, in spite of the
political restraints in the years of the Weimar Republic,
far-reaching preparation for U-boat construction, which made the
immensely rapid construction of the U-boat arm, both as regards
equipment and personnel, possible immediately after the
assumption of power.” (_C-155_)

This letter shows no trace of reluctance in cooperating with the Nazi program. On the contrary, it is evident that Raeder welcomed and became one of the pillars of the Nazi power.

(2) _Conversion of the Navy into a tool of the Nazi conspiracy._ Raeder, more than anyone else, was responsible for securing the unquestioned allegiance of the German Navy to the Nazi movement—an allegiance which Doenitz was to make even more firm and fanatical.

Raeder’s approval of Hitler was shown particularly clearly on 2 August 1934, the day of Hindenburg’s death, when Raeder and all the men under him swore a new oath of loyalty with considerable ceremony, this time to Adolf Hitler and no longer to the Fatherland (_D-481_). The new oath ran as follows:

“I swear this holy oath by God that I will implicitly obey the
Leader of the German Reich and people, Adolf Hitler, the Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces and that, as a brave soldier, I
will be willing to stake my life at any time for this oath.”
(_D-481_)

For his fatherland, Raeder substituted the Fuehrer.

There is no need to elaborate upon the step by which the German Navy was progressively drawn into the closest alliance with the Nazi Party. The facts of history—such as the incorporation of the swastika into the ensign under which the German Fleet sailed, and the wearing of the swastika on the uniform of naval officers and men—these facts speak for themselves.

The Nazis, for their part, were not ungrateful for Raeder’s obeisance and collaboration. His services in rebuilding the German Navy were widely recognized by Nazi propagandists and by the Nazi press. On his 66th birthday, the Chief Party Organ, the “_Voelkischer Beobachter_,” published a special article about him, which summed up Raeder’s contribution to Nazi development:

“It was to Raeder’s credit to have already built up by that time
a powerful striking force from the numerically small fleet,
despite the fetters of Versailles.

“With the assumption of power through National Socialism began,
too, the most fruitful period in the reconstruction of the
German Fleet.

“The Fuehrer openly expressed his recognition of Raeder’s
faithful services and unstinted cooperation, by appointing him
General Admiral on the 20th of April, 1936”.

* * * * * *

“As a soldier and a seaman, the General-Admiral has proved
himself to be the Fuehrer’s first and foremost naval
collaborator.” (_D-448_)

(3) _Raeder’s political activities and responsibilities._ Raeder’s personal part in the Nazi conspiracy arises from the fact that, from the time of the Nazi seizure of power, he became increasingly involved in responsibility for the general policies of the Nazi State.

Long before he was promoted to General-Admiral in 1936, he had become a member of the secret Reich Defense Council, joining it when it was founded, on 4 April 1933. Thus, at an early date, he was involved, both militarily and politically, in the Nazi conspiracy. These facts are contained in a document which contains the classic Nazi directive:

“Matters communicated orally cannot be proven; they can be
denied by us in Geneva.” (_EC-177_)

On 4 February 1938, Raeder was appointed to be a member of a newly formed Secret Advisory Council for Foreign Affairs (_2031-PS_). Three weeks later, a decree of Hitler’s stated that, as well as being equal in rank with a Cabinet Minister, Raeder was also to take part in the sessions of the Cabinet (_2098-PS_). It is thus clear that Raeder’s responsibility for the political decisions of the Nazi State was steadily developed from 1933 to 1938, and that in the course of time he had become a member of all the main political advisory bodies. He was a member of the inner councils of the conspirators.

As an illustration, Raeder was present at two of the key meetings at which Hitler openly declared his intention of attacking neighboring countries. The first of these was Hitler’s conference at the Reichs Chancellery on 5 November 1937, concerning matters which were said to be too important to discuss in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet. The minutes of this meeting establish conclusively that the Nazis premeditated their crimes against peace (_386-PS_). The second meeting which Raeder attended was Hitler’s conference on 23 May 1939 (_L-79_). This was the conference at which Hitler confirmed his intention to make a deliberate attack upon Poland at the first opportunity, well knowing that this must cause widespread war in Europe.

In addition to those two key conferences, Raeder was also present at many others, where he placed his knowledge and professional skill at the service of the Nazi war machine. Raeder’s promotion of the military planning and preparation for the Polish campaign is discussed in Section 8 of Chapter IX.

(4) _The “Athenia Case”._ Once the war was underway, Raeder also showed himself to be a master of one of the conspirators’ favorite techniques—deceit on the grand scale. His handling of the case of the “_Athenia_” is a case in point.

The “_Athenia_” was a passenger liner which was sunk in the evening of 3 September 1939, when she was outward bound to America. About one hundred lives were lost.