Chapter XXXIV: Part 3: of the Japanese message quotes Ribbentrop as follows (1)

“In any event, Germany has absolutely no intention of entering
into any peace with England. We are determined to remove all
British influence from Europe. Therefore, at the end of this
war, England will have no influence whatsoever in international
affairs. The Island Empire of Britain may remain, but all of her
other possessions throughout the world will probably be divided
three ways by Germany, the United States, and Japan. In Africa,
Germany will be satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were
formerly German colonies. Italy will be given the greater share
of the African Colonies. Germany desires, above all else, to
control European Russia.” (_D-656_)

In reply the Japanese Ambassador said:

“‘I am fully aware of the fact that Germany’s war campaign is
progressing according to schedule smoothly. However, suppose
that Germany is faced with the situation of having not only
Great Britain as an actual enemy, but also having all of those
areas in which Britain has influence and those countries which
have been aiding Britain as actual enemies as well. Under such
circumstances, the war area will undergo considerable expansion,
of course. What is your opinion of the outcome of the war under
such an eventuality?’

“Ribbentrop: ‘We would like to end this war during next year
[1942]. However, under certain circumstances, it is possible
that it will have to be continued on to the following year.

‘Should Japan become engaged in war against the United States,
Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is
absolutely no possibility of Germany’s entering into a separate
peace with the United States under such circumstances. The
Fuehrer is determined on that point.’” (_D-656_)

Ribbentrop was thus associated in the closest possible way, with the aggression by Japan against the United States.

Another intercepted diplomatic message from the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin states (_D-657_):

“At 1 p. m. today [8 December 1941] I called on Foreign Minister
Ribbentrop and told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy
issue formal declarations of war on America at once. Ribbentrop
replied that Hitler was then in the midst of a conference at
general headquarters discussing how the formalities of declaring
war could be carried out so as to make a good impression on the
German people, and that he would transmit your wish to him at
once and do whatever he was able to have it carried out
promptly. At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of
the 8th Hitler issued orders to the entire German Navy to attack
American ships whenever and wherever they might meet them.

“It goes without saying that this is only for your secret
information.” (_D-657_)

Thus, Hitler ordered attacks on American ships before the German declaration of war.

Then on 11 December 1941 Ribbentrop, in the name of the German Government, announced a state of war between Germany and the United States.

Ribbentrop also made attempts to get Japan to attack the Soviet Union. In his conversations with Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador, in July 1942 and in March and April 1943, Ribbentrop continued to urge Japanese participation and aggression against the Soviet Union (_2911-PS_; _2954-PS_). The report of a discussion between Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima reads:

“Ambassador Oshima declared that he has received a telegram from
Tokyo, and he is to report, by order of his Government to the
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs the following:

“The suggestion of the German Government to attack Russia was
the object of a common conference between the Japanese
Government and the Imperial headquarters, during which the
question was discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The
result is the following: The Japanese Government absolutely
recognizes the danger which threatens from Russia and completely
understands the desire of its German ally that Japan on her part
will also enter the war against Russia. However, it is not
possible for the Japanese Government, considering the present
war situation, to enter into the war. It is rather of the
conviction that it would be in the common interest not to start
the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese
Government would never disregard the Russian question.”
(_2954-PS_)

Whereupon Ribbentrop returned to the attack:

“However, it would be more correct that all powers allied in the
Three Power Pact would combine their forces to defeat England
and America, but also Russia, together. It is not good when one
part must fight alone.” (_2954-PS_)

Ribbentrop’s pressure on Japan to attack Russia is shown in another report of Japanese-German discussions on 18 April 1943 (_2929-PS_):

“The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again that
without any doubt this year presented the most favorable
opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had
sufficient antitank weapons at her disposal, to attack Russia,
which certainly would never again be as weak as she is at the
moment * * *.” (_2929-PS_)

C. _RIBBENTROP’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY._

(The following discussion concerns only the planning of these crimes. The execution of the crimes was left to the French and Soviet prosecuting staffs for proof.)

(1) _The Killing of Allied Aviators._ With the increasing air raids on German cities in 1944 by the Allied Air Forces, the German Government proposed to undertake a plan to deter Anglo-American fliers from further raids on Reich cities. In a report of a meeting at which a definite policy was to be established, there is stated the point of view that Ribbentrop had been urging (_735-PS_). The meeting took place at the Fuehrer’s headquarters on 6 June 1944, and proceeded in part as follows:

“_Obergruppenfuehrer_ Kaltenbrunner informed the Deputy Chief of
WFSt in Klessheim, on the afternoon of the 6th of June, that a
conference on this question had been held shortly before between
the Reich Marshal [Goering], the Reich Foreign Minister
[Ribbentrop], and the Reichsfuehrer SS [Himmler]. Contrary to
the original suggestion made by the Reich Foreign Minister, who
wished to include every type of terror attack on the German
civilian population, that is, also bombing attacks on cities, it
was agreed in the above conference that merely those attacks
carried out with aircraft armament, aimed directly at the
civilian population and their property, should be taken as the
standard for the evidence of a criminal action in this sense.
Lynch law would have to be the rule. On the contrary, there has
been no question of court martial sentence or handing over to
the police.” (_735-PS_)

That is, Ribbentrop was pressing that even where there was an attack on a German city, the airmen who crash-landed should be handed over to be lynched by the crowd.

The minutes of the conference report further as follows:

“Deputy Chief of the WFSt mentioned that apart from lynch law, a
procedure must be worked out for segregating those enemy
aviators who are suspected of criminal action of this kind until
they are received into the reception camp for aviators at
Oberursel; if the suspicion was confirmed, they would be handed
over to the SD for special treatment.” (_735-PS_)

The sense of this seems to be that if they were not lynched under the first scheme, by the crowd, then they were to be kept from prisoners of war, where they would be subject to the protecting power’s intervention. And if the suspicion was confirmed, they would be handed over to the SD to be killed.

The conference reached a decision on what would be regarded as justifying lynch law:

“At a conference with Colonel von Brauchitsch, representing the
C-in-C, Air Force, on the 6th of June, it was settled that the
following actions were to be regarded as terror actions
justifying lynch law:

“Low-level attacks with aircraft armament on the civilian
population, single persons as well as crowds.

“Shooting our own men in the air who had bailed out.

“Attacks with aircraft armament on passenger trains in the
public service.

“Attacks with aircraft armament on military hospitals,
hospitals, and hospital trains, which are clearly marked with
the Red Cross.” (_735-PS_)

These were to be the subject of lynching and not, as Ribbentrop had suggested, the case of the bombing of a city.

In the latter part of this report there occurs a somewhat curious comment from Keitel:

“If one allows the people to carry out lynch law, it is
difficult to enforce rules!

“Minister Director Berndt got out and shot the enemy aviator on
the road. I am against legal procedure. It doesn’t work out.”
(_735-PS_)

That is signed by Keitel.

The remarks of Jodl then appear:

“This conference is insufficient. The following points must be
decided quite definitely in conjunction with the Foreign Office:

“1. What do we consider as murder?
“Is RR in agreement with point 3_b_?
“2. How should the procedure be carried out?
“_a._ By the people?
“_b._ By the authorities?
“3. How can we guarantee that the procedure be not also carried out
against other enemy aviators?
“4. Should some legal procedure be arranged or not?

“(Signed) Jodl” (_735-PS_).

It is important to note that Ribbentrop and the Foreign Office were fully involved in these breaches of the laws and usages of war. The clarity with which the Foreign Office perceived that there were such violations is indicated by a document from the Foreign Office, approved of by Ribbentrop and transmitted by one of his officials, Ritter (_728-PS_). The approval of Ribbentrop is specifically stated in a memorandum of 30 June 1944 (_740-PS_). The Foreign Office document reads:

“In spite of the obvious objections, founded on international
law and foreign politics, the Foreign Office is basically in
agreement with the proposed measures.

“In the examination of the individual cases, a distinction must
be made between the cases of lynching and the cases of special
treatment by the Security Service, SD.

“1. In the cases of lynching, the precise establishment of the
circumstances deserving punishment, according to points 1-4 of
the communication of 15 June, is not very essential. First, the
German authorities are not directly responsible, since death had
occurred before a German official became concerned with the
case. Furthermore, the accompanying circumstances will be such
that it will not be difficult to depict the case in an
appropriate manner upon publication. Hence, in cases of
lynching, it will be of primary importance correctly to handle
the individual case upon publication.

“2. The suggested procedure for special treatment by the S.D.,
including subsequent publication, would be tenable only if
Germany, on this occasion, simultaneously would openly repudiate
the commitment of International Law, presently in force, and
still recognized by Germany. When an enemy aviator is seized by
the Army or by the Police, and is delivered to the Air Forces
(P.W.) Reception Camp Oberursel, he has received, by this very
fact, the legal status of a prisoner of war.

“The Prisoner of War Treaty of 27 July 1929 establishes definite
rules on the prosecution and sentencing of the Prisoner of War,
and the execution of the death penalty, as for example in
Article 66: Death sentences may be carried out only three months
after the protective power has been notified of the sentence; in
Article 63: a prisoner of war will be tried only by the same
courts and under the same procedure as members of the German
Armed Forces. These rules are so specific, that it would be
futile to try to cover up any violation of them by clever
wording of the publication of an individual incident. On the
other hand the Foreign Office cannot recommend on this occasion
a formal repudiation of the Prisoner of War Treaty.

“An emergency solution would be to prevent suspected fliers from
ever attaining a legal Prisoner of War status, that is, that
immediately upon seizure they be told that they are not
considered Prisoners of War but criminals; that they would not
be turned over to the agencies having jurisdiction over
Prisoners of War; hence not go to a Prisoner of War Camp; but
that they would be delivered to the authorities in charge of the
prosecution of criminal acts and that they would be tried in a
summary proceeding. If the evidence at the trial should reveal
that the special procedure is not applicable to a particular
case, the fliers concerned may subsequently be given the status
of Prisoner of War by transfer to the Air Forces (P.W.)
Reception Camp Oberursel.

“Naturally, not even this expedient will prevent the possibility
that Germany will be accused of the violation of existing
treaties, and maybe not even the adoption of reprisals upon
German prisoners of war. At any rate this solution would enable
us clearly to define our attitude, thus relieving us of the
necessity of openly having to renounce the present agreements or
of the need of having to use excuses, which no one would
believe, upon the publication of each individual case.”

* * * * * *

“It follows from the above, that the main weight of the action
will have to be placed on lynchings. Should the campaign be
carried out to such an extent that the purpose, to wit ‘the
deterrence of enemy aviators’, is actually achieved, which goal
is favored by the Foreign Office, then the strafing attacks by
enemy fliers upon the civilian populations must be stressed in a
completely different propagandist manner than heretofore.”
(_728-PS_).

Those words show clearly Ribbentrop’s point of view:

“Ambassador Ritter has advised us by telephone on 29 June that
the Minister for Foreign Affairs has approved this draft.”
(_740-PS_)

Thus, on the treatment of aviators, Ribbentrop furthered the deliberate adoption of a procedure evading International Law.

(2) _The Destruction of the Peoples in Europe._ With regard to Poland, the affidavit of Lahousen reports Ribbentrop participation in a discussion on 12 September 1939 on the Fuehrer’s train concerning the extermination of Poles and Jews (_Affidavit A_).

With regard to Bohemia and Moravia, on 16 March 1939 there was promulgated the decree of the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor, signed by Ribbentrop, establishing the protectorate (_TC-51_). The effect of that decree was to place the Reich Protector in a position of supreme power over Bohemia and Moravia, subordinate only to the Fuehrer. Article 5 of that decree provides:

“* * * 2. The Reich Protector, as representative of the Fuehrer
and Chancellor of the Reich, and as commissioner of the Reich
Government, is charged with the duty of seeing to the observance
of the political principles laid down by the Fuehrer and
Chancellor of the Reich.

“3. The members of the government of the Protectorate shall be
confirmed by the Reich Protector. The confirmation may be
withdrawn.

“4. The Reich Protector is entitled to inform himself of all
measures taken by the government of the Protectorate and to give
advice. He can object to measures calculated to harm the Reich,
and, in case of danger, issue ordinances required for the common
interest.” (_TC-51_)

It is further provided that the promulgation of laws and the execution of certain judgments shall be annulled if the Reich Protector enters an objection (_TC-51_).

In part as a result of the sweeping terms of this law, the two Reich Protectors of Bohemia and Moravia and their various deputies were able to commit numerous violations of the laws of war, and crimes against humanity. (Discussion of these matters was assumed as the responsibility of the Soviet prosecuting staff.)

Similarly, with regard to the Netherlands, on 18 May 1940 a decree of the Fuehrer concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands was signed by Ribbentrop. Section 1 of that decree provided (_D-639_):

“The occupied Netherlands territories shall be administered by
the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands territories
* * * the Reich Commissioner is guardian of the interests of the
Reich and vested with supreme civil authority.

“Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart is hereby appointed Reich Commissioner
for the Occupied Netherlands Territories.” (_D-639_)

On the basis of this decree, the Reich Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart, promulgated such orders as that of 4 July 1940, confiscating the property of those who had, or might have, furthered activities hostile to the German Reich (_2921-PS_). Tentative arrangements were also made for the resettlement of the Dutch population (_1520-PS_). (This part of the proof was assumed as the responsibility of the French prosecuting staff.)

With regard to Bohemia and the Netherlands, the charge against Ribbentrop is laying the basis and erecting the governmental structure under which the war crimes and crimes against humanity were directed and facilitated.

(3) _Persecution of the Jews._ In December 1938 Ribbentrop, in a conversation with M. Bonnet, who was then Foreign Minister of France, expressed his opinion of the Jews. That was reported by the United States Ambassador, Mr. Kennedy, to the State Department as follows (_L-205_):

“During the day we had a telephone call from Berenger’s office
in Paris. We were told that the matter of refugees had been
raised by Bonnet in his conversation with von Ribbentrop. The
result was very bad. Ribbentrop, when pressed, had said to
Bonnet that the Jews in Germany without exception were
pickpockets, murderers and thieves. The property they possessed
had been acquired illegally. The German Government had therefore
decided to assimilate them with the criminal elements of the
population. The property which they had acquired illegally would
be taken from them. They would be forced to live in districts
frequented by the criminal classes. They would be under police
observation like other criminals. They would be forced to report
to the police as other criminals were obliged to do. The German
Government could not help it if some of these criminals escaped
to other countries which seemed so anxious to have them. It was
not, however, willing for them to take the property which had
resulted from their illegal operations with them. There was in
fact nothing that it could or would do.” (_L-205_)

That succinct statement of Ribbentrop’s views on Jews is elaborated in a long document which he had sent out by the Foreign Office (_3358-PS_). This document, entitled “The Jewish Question As A Factor In German Foreign Policy in the year 1938” contains the following:

“It is certainly no coincidence that the fateful year 1938 has
brought nearer the solution of the Jewish question
simultaneously with the realization of the ‘idea of Greater
Germany’, since the Jewish policy was both the basis and
consequence of the events of the year 1938.”

* * * * * *

“The final goal of German Jewish policy is the emigration of all
Jews living in Reich territory.”

* * * * * *

“These examples from reports from authorities abroad can, if
desired, be amplified. They confirm the correctness of the
expectation that criticism of the measures for excluding Jews
from German _lebensraum_, which were misunderstood in many
countries for lack of evidence, would only be temporary and
would swing in the other direction the moment the population saw
with its own eyes and thus learned what the Jewish danger was to
them. The poorer and therefore the more burdensome the immigrant
Jew to the country absorbing him, the stronger this country will
react and the more desirable is this effect in the interest of
German propaganda. The object of this German action is to be the
future international solution of the Jewish question, dictated
not by false compassion for the ‘United Religious Jewish
minority’ but by the full consciousness of all peoples of the
danger which it represents to the racial composition of the
nations.” (_3358-PS_)

This document was widely circulated by Ribbentrop’s ministry, to all senior Reich authorities and to numerous other people on 25 January 1939, just after the statement to M. Bonnet. Apparently Ribbentrop’s anti-Semitic incitements grew stronger, for in June 1944 Rosenberg made arrangements for an international anti-Jewish Congress to be held in Krakow on 11 July 1944. The honorary members were to be Ribbentrop, Himmler, Goebbels, and Frank. The Foreign Office was to take over the mission of inviting prominent foreigners from Italy, France, Hungary, Holland, Arabia, Iraq, Norway etc. in order to give an international aspect to the Congress. However, the military events of June 1944 prompted Hitler to call off the Congress, which had lost its significance by virtue of the Allied landing in Normandy (_1752-PS_).

It is clear that Ribbentrop supported and encouraged the Nazi program against the Jews, which resulted in their transportation to concentration camps, where things went on which he, as a minister in special touch with the head of the government must have known about. As one who preached this doctrine and was in a position of authority, Ribbentrop cannot suggest that he was ignorant of how the policy was carried out.

D. _CONCLUSION_

Hitler summed up Ribbentrop’s contribution to the Nazi conspiracy for aggression, as follows:

“In the historic year of 1938 the Foreign Minister, von
Ribbentrop, was of great help to me, in view of his accurate and
audacious judgment and the exceptionally clever treatment of all
problems of foreign policy.”

During the course of the war, Ribbentrop was in close liaison with the other Nazi conspirators. He advised them and made available to them, through his foreign embassies and legations abroad, information which was required. He at times participated in the planning of war crimes and crimes against humanity. His guilt is clear.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO JOACHIM VON
RIBBENTROP

│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 57
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*004-PS │Report submitted by Rosenberg to │ │
│Deputy of the Fuehrer, 15 June 1940, │ │
│on the Political Preparation of the │ │
│Norway Action. (GB 140) │ III │ 19
│ │ │
*388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan│ │
│for the attack on Czechoslovakia), │ │
│kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │
│April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305
│ │ │
*728-PS │Letter of Foreign Office to Chief of │ │
│Supreme Command of Armed Forces, 20 │ │
│June 1944, concerning treatment of │ │
│enemy terror aviators. (GB 152) │ III │ 526
│ │ │
*735-PS │Minutes of meeting, 6 June 1944, to │ │
│fix the cases in which the application│ │
│of Lynch Law against Allied airmen │ │
│would be justified. (GB 151) │ III │ 533
│ │ │
*740-PS │Letter from Warlimont, 30 June 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of enemy terror │ │
│aviators. (GB 153) │ III │ 537
│ │ │
*957-PS │Rosenberg’s letter to Ribbentrop, 24 │ │
│February 1940. (GB 139) │ III │ 641
│ │ │
*1014-PS │Hitler’s speech to │ │
│Commanders-in-Chief, 22 August 1939. │ │
│(USA 30) │ III │ 665
│ │ │
1039-PS │Report concerning preparatory work │ │
│regarding problems in Eastern │ │
│Territories, 28 June 1941, found in │ │
│Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 146) │ III │ 695
│ │ │
*1195-PS │Keitel Order, 12 April 1941, for │ │
│provisional directions for partition │ │
│of Yugoslavia. (GB 144) │ III │ 838
│ │ │
*1337-PS │Hitler’s decree electing Ribbentrop │ │
│member of Secret Cabinet Council, 4 │ │
│February 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│Part I, p. 112. (GB 129) │ III │ 913
│ │ │
*1439-PS │Treaty of Protection between Slovakia │ │
│and the Reich, signed in Vienna 18 │ │
│March and in Berlin 23 March 1939. │ │
│1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│606. (GB 135) │ IV │ 18
│ │ │
*1520-PS │Memorandum of conference, 8 May 1942 │ │
│between Hitler, Rosenberg, Lammers, │ │
│Bormann. (GB 156) │ IV │ 65
│ │ │
*1746-PS │Conference between German and │ │
│Bulgarian Generals, 8 February 1941; │ │
│speech by Hitler to German High │ │
│Command on situation in Yugoslavia, 27│ │
│March 1941; plan for invasion of │ │
│Yugoslavia, 28 March 1941. (GB 120) │ IV │ 272
│ │ │
*1752-PS │Preparation for International │ │
│Anti-Jewish Congress, 15 June 1944. │ │
│(GB 159) │ IV │ 280
│ │ │
*1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │
│Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. │ │
│(USA 72) │ IV │ 360
│ │ │
*1834-PS │Report on conference between │ │
│Ribbentrop and Oshima, 23 February │ │
│1941. (USA 129) │ IV │ 469
│ │ │
1842-PS │Meeting of Mussolini and Ribbentrop in│ │
│Rome, 19 September 1940. (GB 143) │ IV │ 477
│ │ │
*1866-PS │Record of conversation between Reich │ │
│Foreign Minister and the Duce, 13 May │ │
│1941. (GB 273) │ IV │ 499
│ │ │
*1871-PS │Report on Hitler and Ciano meeting, 12│ │
│August 1939. (GB 142) │ IV │ 508
│ │ │
*1881-PS │Notes on conference between Hitler and│ │
│Matsuoka in presence of Ribbentrop in │ │
│Berlin, 4 April 1941. (USA 33) │ IV │ 522
│ │ │
*1882-PS │Notes on conference between Ribbentrop│ │
│and Matsuoka in Berlin, 5 April 1941. │ │
│(USA 153) │ IV │ 526
│ │ │
*2307-PS │Law concerning reunion of Austria with│ │
│German Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 237. (GB│ │
│133) │ IV │ 997
│ │ │
*2357-PS │Speech by Hitler before Reichstag, 20 │ │
│February 1938, published in Documents │ │
│of German Politics, Part VI, 1, pp. │ │
│50-52. (GB 30) │ IV │ 1099
│ │ │
*2360-PS │Speech by Hitler before Reichstag, 30 │ │
│January 1939, from Voelkischer │ │
│Beobachter, Munich Edition, 31 January│ │
│1939. (GB 134) │ IV │ 1101
│ │ │
*2450-PS │Two letters from Ribbentrop to Prime │ │
│Minister of Yugoslavia, as published │ │
│in Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich │ │
│Edition, 26 March 1941. (GB 123) │ V │ 186
│ │ │
*2461-PS │Official German communique of meeting │ │
│of Hitler and Schuschnigg, 12 February│ │
│1938, published in Documents of German│ │
│Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part I. (GB │ │
│132) │ V │ 206
│ │ │
2508-PS │German-Japanese Agreement against the │ │
│Communist International, 25 November │ │
│1936, signed by Ribbentrop. Documents │ │
│of German Politics, Vol. 4. (GB 147) │ V │ 242
│ │ │
*2530-PS │Ribbentrop’s speech in Warsaw, 25 │ │
│January 1939, published in Voelkischer│ │
│Beobachter, 1 February 1939. (GB 36) │ V │ 267
│ │ │
*2643-PS │Announcement concerning Three-Power │ │
│Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan,│ │
│27 September 1940, signed by │ │
│Ribbentrop for Germany. 1940 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, No. 41, p.│ │
│279. (USA 149) │ V │ 355
│ │ │
*2786-PS │Letter from Ribbentrop to Keitel, 4 │ │
│March 1938. (USA 81) │ V │ 419
│ │ │
*2788-PS │Notes of conference in the Foreign │ │
│Office between Ribbentrop, Konrad │ │
│Henlein, K. H. Frank and others on │ │
│program for Sudeten agitation, 29 │ │
│March 1938. (USA 95) │ V │ 422
│ │ │
*2789-PS │Letter from Konrad Henlein to │ │
│Ribbentrop, 17 March 1938. (USA 94) │ V │ 424
│ │ │
*2790-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of │ │
│conference between Hitler, Ribbentrop,│ │
│Tuca and Karmasin, 12 February 1939. │ │
│(USA 110) │ V │ 425
│ │ │
*2791-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of │ │
│conversation between Ribbentrop and │ │
│Attolico, the Italian Ambassador, 23 │ │
│August 1938. (USA 86) │ V │ 426
│ │ │
*2792-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of │ │
│conversations between Ribbentrop and │ │
│Attolico, 27 August 1938 and 2 │ │
│September 1938. (USA 87) │ V │ 426
│ │ │
*2796-PS │German Foreign Office notes on │ │
│conversations between Hitler, │ │
│Ribbentrop and von Weizsacker and the │ │
│Hungarian Ministers Imredy and von │ │
│Kanya, 23 August 1938. (USA 88) │ V │ 430
│ │ │
2797-PS │German Foreign Office memorandum of │ │
│conversation between Ribbentrop and │ │
│von Kanya, 25 August 1938. (USA 89) │ V │ 432
│ │ │
*2798-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of the │ │
│meeting between Hitler and President │ │
│Hacha of Czechoslovakia, 15 March │ │
│1939. (USA 118; GB 5) │ V │ 433
│ │ │
*2800-PS │German Foreign Office notes of a │ │
│conversation with Attolico, the │ │
│Italian Ambassador, 18 July 1938. (USA│ │
│85) │ V │ 442
│ │ │
*2802-PS │German Foreign Office notes of │ │
│conference on 13 March 1939 between │ │
│Hitler and Monsignor Tiso, Prime │ │
│Minister of Slovakia. (USA 117) │ V │ 443
│ │ │
*2815-PS │Telegram from Ribbentrop to the German│ │
│Minister in Prague, 13 March 1939. │ │
│(USA 116) │ V │ 451
│ │ │
*2829-PS │Affidavit of von Ribbentrop, 9 │ │
│November 1945, concerning positions │ │
│held by him. (USA 5) │ V │ 496
│ │ │
*2853-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to│ │
│German Legation in Prague, 24 │ │
│September 1938. (USA 100) │ V │ 521
│ │ │
*2854-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to│ │
│German Legation in Prague, 17 │ │
│September 1938. (USA 99) │ V │ 521
│ │ │
*2855-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to│ │
│German Legation in Prague, 16 │ │
│September 1938. (USA 98) │ V │ 522
│ │ │
2856-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to│ │
│German Legation in Prague, 24 │ │
│September 1938. (USA 101) │ V │ 522
│ │ │
*2858-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to│ │
│German Legation in Prague, 19 │ │
│September 1938. (USA 97) │ V │ 523
│ │ │
*2896-PS │Telegram from Ribbentrop to German │ │
│Ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, 10 July │ (USA │
│1941. │ 155) │ V
│ │ │
*2897-PS │Telegram from German Ambassador in │ │
│Tokyo, Ott, to Ribbentrop, 13 July │ │
│1941. (USA 156) │ V │ 566
│ │ │
*2911-PS │Notes on conversation between │ │
│Ribbentrop and Oshima, 9 July 1942. │ │
│(USA 157) │ V │ 580
│ │ │
*2921-PS │Decree of Reich Commissar for Occupied│ │
│Dutch Territories concerning │ │
│confiscation of property, 4 July 1940.│ │
│(GB 155) │ V │ 590
│ │ │
*2929-PS │Notes on conversation between │ │
│Ribbentrop and Oshima, 18 April 1943. │ │
│(USA 159) │ V │ 603
│ │ │
*2949-PS │Transcripts of telephone calls from │ │
│Air Ministry, 11-14 March 1938. (USA │ │
│76) │ V │ 628
│ │ │
*2952-PS │Memorandum, 19 July 1939, signed │ │
│Doertenbach. (GB 137) │ V │ 655
│ │ │
*2953-PS │Letter from Heydrich to Ribbentrop, 29│ │
│June 1939, with enclosure. (GB 136) │ V │ 657
│ │ │
*2954-PS │Minutes of conversation between │ │
│Ribbentrop and Oshima, 6 March 1943. │ │
│(USA 158; GB 150) │ V │ 658
│ │ │
*2987-PS │Entries in diary of Count Ciano. (USA │ │
│166) │ V │ 689
│ │ │
3047-PS │File notes on conference in Fuehrer’s │ │
│train on 12 September 1939; report on │ │
│execution of Jews in Borrisow; and │ │
│entries from diary of Admiral Canaris.│ │
│(USA 80) (Referred to but not offered │ │
│in evidence.) │ V │ 766
│ │ │
*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │
│picture composed of captured German │ │
│film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801
│ │ │
*3059-PS │German Foreign Office memorandum, 19 │ │
│August 1938, on payments to Henlein’s │ │
│Sudeten German Party between 1935 and │ │
│1938. (USA 96) │ V │ 855
│ │ │
*3060-PS │Dispatch from German Minister in │ │
│Prague to Foreign Office in Berlin │ │
│about policy arrangements with │ │
│Henlein, 16 March 1938. (USA 93) │ V │ 856
│ │ │
*3061-PS │Supplement No. 2 to the Official │ │
│Czechoslovak Report entitled “German │ │
│Crimes Against Czechoslovakia” │ │
│(document 998-PS). (USA 126) │ V │ 857
│ │ │
*3308-PS │Affidavit by Paul Otto Gustav Schmidt,│ │
│28 November 1945. (GB 288) │ V │ 1100
│ │ │
*3319-PS │Foreign Office Correspondence and │ │
│reports on anti-Jewish action in │ │
│foreign countries. (GB 287) │ VI │ 4
│ │ │
*3358-PS │German Foreign Office circular, 31 │ │
│January 1939, “The Jewish Question as │ │
│a factor in German Foreign Policy in │ │
│the year 1938”. (GB 158) │ VI │ 87
│ │ │
3638-PS │Memorandum of Ribbentrop, 1 October │ │
│1938, concerning his conversation with│ │
│Ciano about the Polish demands made on│ │
│Czechoslovakia. │ VI │ 400
│ │ │
3688-PS │Notice from the Foreign Office, 24 │ │
│September 1942, concerning evacuation │ │
│of Jews from Occupied Territories. │ VI │ 403
│ │ │
*3817-PS │File of correspondence and reports by │ │
│Dr. Haushofer on Asiatic situation. │ │
│(USA 790) │ VI │ 752
│ │ │
*C-2 │Examples of violations of │ │
│International Law and proposed counter│ │
│propaganda, issued by OKW, 1 October │ │
│1938. (USA 90) │ VI │ 799
│ │ │
*C-77 │Memorandum from Chief of High Command │ │
│to Navy High Command, 18 May 1941. (GB│ │
│146) │ VI │ 908
│ │ │
*C-120 │Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 │ │
│for “Fall Weiss”, operation against │ │
│Poland. (GB 41) │ VI │ 916
│ │ │
*C-134 │Letter from Jodl enclosing memorandum │ │
│on conference between German and │ │
│Italian Generals on 19 January and │ │
│subsequent speech by Hitler, 20 │ │
│January 1941. (GB 119) │ VI │ 939
│ │ │
*C-137 │Keitel’s appendix of 24 November 1938 │ │
│to Hitler Order of 21 October 1938. │ │
│(GB 33) │ VI │ 949
│ │ │
*D-472 │Ribbentrop’s actions as Foreign │ │
│Minister, from International │ │
│Biographical Archives, 22 April 1943. │ │
│(GB 130) │ VII │ 59
│ │ │
*D-490 │Interrogation of Ribbentrop, 20 │ │
│September 1945. (GB 138) │ VII │ 66
│ │ │
*D-629 │Letter from Keitel to Ribbentrop, 3 │ │
│April 1940. (GB 141) │ VII │ 99
│ │ │
*D-636 │Extract from “Examination of Descent │ │
│of SS Leaders”, concerning von │ │
│Ribbentrop. (GB 131) │ VII │ 114
│ │ │
D-639 │Decree of the Fuehrer concerning │ │
│exercise of Governmental Authority in │ │
│Netherlands, 18 May 1940. 1940 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 778. (GB│ │
│154) │ VII │ 115
│ │ │
*D-656 │Extract of 29 November 1941 from │ │
│Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent │ │
│by Japanese Government between 1 July │ │
│and 8 December 1941. (GB 148) │ VII │ 160
│ │ │
*D-657 │Extract of 8 December 1941 from │ │
│Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent │ │
│by Japanese Government between 1 July │ │
│and 8 December 1941. (GB 149) │ VII │ 163
│ │ │
D-734 │Note of conversation between Reich │ │
│Foreign Minister and Duce in presence │ │
│of von Mackenson, Alfieri and │ │
│Bastianini, 25 February 1943. │ VII │ 188
│ │ │
*D-735 │Memorandum of conference between │ │
│German Foreign Minister and Count │ │
│Ciano in presence of Keitel and │ │
│Marshal Cavallero, 19 December 1942. │ │
│(GB 295) │ VII │ 190
│ │ │
*D-736 │Notes on discussion between Fuehrer │ │
│and Horthy on 17 April 1943. (GB 283) │ VII │ 190
│ │ │
*D-737 │Memorandum on reception of Hungarian │ │
│Prime Minister and Foreign Minister by│ │
│German Foreign Minister on 29 April │ │
│1939. (GB 289) │ VII │ 192
│ │ │
*D-738 │Memorandum on second conference │ │
│between German Foreign Minister with │ │
│Hungarian Prime and Foreign Minister │ │
│on 1 May 1939. (GB 290) │ VII │ 193
│ │ │
*D-740 │Minutes of conference between German │ │
│Foreign Minister and Secretary of │ │
│State Bastianini on 8 April 1943. (GB │ │
│297) │ VII │ 194
│ │ │
D-741 │Memorandum on conference between │ │
│German Foreign Minister and Ambassador│ │
│Alfieri on 21 February 1943 in Berlin.│ │
│(GB 296) │ VII │ 196
│ │ │
*D-744-A │File of the Reichsfuehrer-SS with │ │
│personal record of SS │ │
│Obergruppenfuehrer Ribbentrop. (GB │ │
│294) │ VII │ 197
│ │ │
*D-744-B │File of the Reichsfuehrer-SS with │ │
│personal record of SS │ │
│Obergruppenfuehrer Ribbentrop. (GB │ │
│294) │ VII │ 204
│ │ │
*D-775 │Draft of directive, 14 June 1944, from│ │
│OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │
│“Luftwaffe”, regarding treatment of │ │
│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 308) │ VII │ 232
│ │ │
*D-776 │Draft of directive of Chief of OKW, 15│ │
│June 1944, to German Foreign Office at│ │
│Salzburg, concerning treatment of │ │
│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 309) │ VII │ 233
│ │ │
*D-777 │Draft of directive, 15 June 1944, from│ │
│OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │
│“Luftwaffe” concerning treatment of │ │
│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 310) │ VII │ 234
│ │ │
*D-778 │Notes, 18 June 1944, concerning │ │
│treatment of Anglo-American │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 311) │ VII │ 235
│ │ │
*D-780 │Draft of communication from Ambassador│ │
│Ritter, Salzburg, to Chief of OKW, 20 │ │
│June 1944, on treatment of Allied │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 313) │ VII │ 236
│ │ │
*D-782 │Note from German Foreign Office, │ │
│Salzburg, 25 June 1944, to OKW. (GB │ │
│315) │ VII │ 239
│ │ │
D-784 │Note from Operation Staff of OKW │ │
│signed Warlimont, 30 June 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of Allied │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 317) │ VII │ 240
│ │ │
*D-786 │Note, 5 July 1944, on “Terror”-flyers.│ │
│(GB 319) │ VII │ 242
│ │ │
EC-265 │German Foreign Office telegram, 1 │ │
│October 1940, concerning the Jews in │ │
│Occupied French Territory. │ VII │ 375
│ │ │
L-74 │Letter from Ribbentrop to Churchill │ │
│with covering letter addressed to │ │
│Field Marshal Montgomery. │ VII │ 839
│ │ │
*L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │
│“Indoctrination on the political │ │
│situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847
│ │ │
L-202 │State Department dispatch from D. H. │ │
│Buffum, American Consul at Leipzig, 21│ │
│November 1938, concerning Anti-Semitic│ │
│Onslaught in Germany as seen from │ │
│Leipzig. │ VII │ 1037
│ │ │
*L-205 │Telegram from Kennedy to Department of│ │
│State, 8 December 1938. (GB 157) │ VII │ 1041
│ │ │
*M-158 │Telegram, 23 October 1939, regarding │ │
│location of Nazi organizations in │ │
│Madrid. (GB 285) │ VIII │ 51
│ │ │
*TC-23 │Agreement between Germany, the United │ │
│Kingdom, France and Italy, 29 │ │
│September 1938. (GB 23) │ VIII │ 370
│ │ │
*TC-24 │Treaty of non-aggression between │ │
│German Reich and Kingdom of Denmark, │ │
│31 May 1939. (GB 77) │ VIII │ 373
│ │ │
*TC-25 │Non-aggression Treaty between Germany │ │
│and USSR and announcement of 25 │ │
│September 1939 relating to it. (GB │ │
│145) │ VIII │ 375
│ │ │
TC-51 │Decree establishing the Protectorate │ │
│of Bohemia and Moravia, 16 March 1939.│ │
│(GB 8) │ VIII │ 404
│ │ │
*TC-53-A │Marginal note to decree of final │ │
│incorporation of Memel with German │ │
│Reich, 23 March 1939, from Documents │ │
│of German Politics, Part VII, p. 552. │ │
│(GB 4) │ VIII │ 408
│ │ │
TC-73 │No. 37 Polish White Book. Hitler’s │ │
│Reichstag speech, 20 February 1938. │ VIII │ 481
│ │ │
TC-73 │No. 40 Polish White Book. Lipski and │ │
│Ribbentrop, 10 September 1938. │ VIII │ 481
│ │ │
TC-73 │No. 42 Polish White Book. Extracts │ │
│from speech by Hitler at Sportz │ │
│Palast, 26 September 1938. │ VIII │ 482
│ │ │
*TC-73 │No. 44 Polish White Book. Lipski, │ │
│Ribbentrop luncheon, conversation, 24 │ │
│October 1938. (GB 27-A) │ VIII │ 483
│ │ │
*TC-73 │No. 45 Polish White Book. Beck’s │ │
│instructions to Lipski, 31 October │ │
│1938. (GB 27-B) │ VIII │ 484
│ │ │
*TC-73 │No. 48 Polish White Book. Beck and │ │
│Hitler conversation, 5 January 1939. │ │
│(GB 34) │ VIII │ 486
│ │ │
*TC-73 │No. 49 Polish White Book. Beck and │ │
│Ribbentrop conversation, 6 January │ │
│1939. (GB 35) │ VIII │ 488
│ │ │
*TC-73 │No. 57 Polish White Book. Hitler’s │ │
│Reichstag speech, 30 January 1939. (GB│ │
│37) │ VIII │ 488
│ │ │
*TC-73 │No. 61 Polish White Book. Ribbentrop │ │
│and Lipski conversation, 21 March │ │
│1939. (GB 38) │ VIII │ 489
│ │ │
TC-73 │No. 147 Polish White Book. Final │ │
│report of former Polish Ambassador in │ │
│Berlin, 10 October 1939. │ VIII │ 499
│ │ │
*TC-76 │Note for Reichsminister, 26 August │ │
│1938. (GB 31) │ VIII │ 515
│ │ │
Affidavit A │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 │ │
│January 1946, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg 30 November and 1│ │
│December 1945. │ VIII │ 587
│ │ │
Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770

4. WILHELM KEITEL

A. _POSITIONS HELD BY KEITEL._

Chief of the Armed Forces Department in the Reichs Ministry of War (_Wehrmachtsamt in Reichskriegsministerium_), 1 October 1935 to 4 February 1938. (_3019-PS_)

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Chief of OKW), equal in rank to a Reichs Minister. (_1915-PS_)

Member of the Secret Cabinet Council, 4 February 1938 to 1945. (_2031-PS_)

Member of Ministerial Council for the defense of the Reich, 30 August 1939 to 1945. (_2018-PS_)

Member of Reichs Defense Council, 4 September 1938 to 1945. (_2194-PS_)

Field Marshal, July 1940 to 1945. (_3020-PS_)

B. _FUNCTIONS OF KEITEL._

As Chief of the _Wehrmachtsamt_ in the Ministry of War, Keitel was Chief of Staff for von Blomberg, who was both Minister of War and Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.

On 4 February 1938 Hitler abolished the Ministry of War, assumed direct command of the Armed Forces himself, and created the OKW (_Oberkommando der Wehrmacht_). The OKW advised Hitler on the most important military questions, and prepared and transmitted directives to the Armed Forces. Thus it exercised great influence on the formation of the German military policy and the conduct of military affairs.

Keitel was made Chief of the OKW, with rank equal to that of Reichsminister. He was also given authorities of the former Minister of War, and continued to perform the administrative duties of that position. (_1915-PS_; _1954-PS_; _3704-PS_)

In addition to its ministerial functions, the OKW was Hitler’s military staff. Its most important duty was the development of strategic and operational plans. Such plans were worked out by the OKW Operations Staff in broad outline, and then in more detail by the commanders and chiefs of staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. After Hitler had approved the plans they were transmitted by the OKW to the respective military authorities. (_3705-PS_; _3702-PS_; _3707-PS_).

C. _KEITEL’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CRIMES AGAINST PEACE._

Keitel’s conspiratorial activities started immediately after the Nazis came to power. As early as in May 1933, when Germany was still a member of the League of Nations, Keitel gave directives for deceiving “Geneva” in rearmament matters.

At the second meeting of the Working Committee of the Councillors for Reich Defense on 22 May 1933, Colonel Keitel emphasized that the supreme consideration guiding the work of the committee was to be secrecy. “No document”, he said, “ought to be lost, since otherwise it may fall into the hands of the enemy’s intelligence service. Orally transmitted matters are not provable; they can be denied by us in Geneva.” He requested that written documents not be sent through the mails, or, if it was absolutely necessary to do so, that they be addressed, not to a government agency or office (where they might be opened by the mail clerks) but to the recipient personally. (_EC-177_)

The fact that Keitel was a member of the Nazi conspiracy in good standing is apparent from his statement that he held the Golden Party Badge, and that consequently the Party considered him a member as from the autumn of 1944, when the law against military personnel being members of the Party was changed (1944 RGBl. I, 317). His political convictions were those of National Socialism, and he was a loyal follower of Hitler. (_1954-PS_)

At the second meeting of the Working Committee of the Councillors for Reich Defense held on 26 April 1933, the chairman, Colonel Keitel, pointed out the necessity and desirability for the creation of the Reich Defense Council which had been determined on by a cabinet decision of 4 April 1933. He said that a general program for the creation of a war economy had already been completed, but that it would take a long time to carry out the program. He explained that it was the purpose and objective of the Working Committee of the new Defense Council to overcome these difficulties. (_EC-177_)

On 6 December 1935 General Major Keitel, chairman of the eleventh meeting of the Reich Defense Council, pointed out that the mobilization year was to begin on 1 April and to end on 31 March of the following year. For the first time, a “Mobilization Book for Civilian Agencies” was to be issued on 1 April 1936. Keitel said that this day, to the extent possible, should find the nation ready and prepared. He declared that, according to the will of the Fuehrer, the economic management of the country should put the enhancement of military capacity above all other national tasks. Keitel emphasized that it was the function of all members of the Reich Defense Council to use all available resources economically and to ask for only such funds and raw materials as were absolutely and exclusively needed for the defense of the Reich.

In the presence of Keitel, Colonel Jodl said that the “Mobilization Book for the Civilian Agencies” constituted the unified basis for the carrying out of mobilization outside of the Army. (_EC-406_)

The twelfth meeting of the Working Committee of the Reich Defense Council, held on 14 May 1936, was opened by Field Marshal von Blomberg, War Minister and Supreme Army Commander. He stressed the necessity for a total mobilization, including the drafting of the necessary laws, preparations in the re-militarized Rhineland zone, financing and rearmament. Lt. General Keitel, in his capacity as chairman of the Working Committee of the Reich Defense Council, again stressed the necessity for secrecy. Ministerial Director Wohlthat pointed out that, in order to guarantee rearmament and an adequate food supply, an increase in production and utmost economy were necessary, a postulate that had led to the special mandate given by the Fuehrer to Minister President Goering. (_EC-407_)

Keitel participated also in the activities of the conspirators to re-militarize the Rhineland. At that time he was Chief of the _Wehrmachtsamt_ under von Blomberg and signed, on the latter’s behalf, the order for naval participation in the operation. (_C-194_)

Keitel also took part in the war-planning activities of the Reich Cabinet, of which he was a member. The cabinet consulted by meetings, and by the circulation of decrees among its members for their approval or disapproval. (See generally Section 3 of Chapter XV on the Reich Cabinet.) Keitel was a member of the Secret Cabinet Council, which has been described as “a select committee” of the cabinet for deliberation on foreign affairs. (_1774-PS_)

A Reich Defense Council was established by the ordinary cabinet in 1933. It was a war-planning group, and Keitel took part in the meetings of its working committee. (_EC-177_; _EC-406_; _EC-407_)

On 4 December 1938 a Secret Defense Law was passed, which defined the duties of the Reich Defense Council. As Chief of OKW, Keitel was a member of the council, and he also presided over the Council’s Working Committee (_Reichsverteidigungsausschuss_). (_2194-PS_)

The Secret Defense Law of 1938 provided for a Plenipotentiary for Economy, whose task was to “put all economic forces into the service of the Reich defense, and to safeguard economically the life of the German nation”, and for a Plenipotentiary for Administration, whose duties were to take over “the uniform leadership of the non-military administration with exception of the economic administration” upon the declaration of a “state of defense”. Certain ministries were, in peace-time, bound by the directives of the plenipotentiaries. The latter were bound, in turn, under certain conditions, together with the ministries subordinate to them, to take directions from the Chief of OKW. Keitel could also, in a state of defense, issue orders to the Minister of Transport and the Minister of Posts. In addition, he presided over the Council’s Working Committee, which prepared the Council’s decisions, saw that they were executed, and obtained collaboration between the armed forces, the chief Reich offices, and the Party. Keitel regulated the activities of this committee and issued directions to the plenipotentiaries and certain Reich ministries to assure uniform execution of the council’s decisions. (_2194-PS_)

The two plenipotentiaries and the OKW formed what was known as a “Three Man College” (_2608-PS_). This system of a three man college functioned as follows, from a legislative point of view: The Plenipotentiary for Economy was empowered by paragraph 4 of the Secret Defense Law of 4 September 1938 to issue laws within his sphere, with the consent of the OKW and the Plenipotentiary for Administration, which differed from existing laws. Similarly, the Plenipotentiary for Administration was empowered by paragraph 3 of the same law to issue laws within his sphere, with the consent of the OKW and the Plenipotentiary for Economy, which differed from existing laws.

In the spheres of the Reich Minister of Posts, the Reich Minister of Transport and of the General Inspector for German roads (_Generalinspektor fuer die Strassenwesen_), the Chief of the OKW had the right, under paragraph 5 of the same law, to issue laws, in agreement with the Plenipotentiaries for Administration and Economy, which differed from existing laws. (_2194-PS_)

The legislative function of the three man college, prior to 9 September 1939 was one of drafting decrees to be used in time of war.

The Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich was established by a decree of Hitler on 30 August 1939. It was formed out of the Reich Defense Council, and included among its members the two plenipotentiaries of the council and the Chief of OKW. (_2018-PS_)

The Council had the power to pass decrees with the force of law, and to legislate for the occupied Eastern Territories (1939 RGBl, I, 2077). Decrees of the council were circulated, before enactment, among all the members by written communication from Dr. Lammers, who was also on the Council. (_2231-PS_)

Frick has referred to the Council of Ministers as “the highest permanent organ of the Reich with comprehensive jurisdiction, responsible only to the Fuehrer”. “The composition of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich”, he added, “shows the real concentration of power in it”. He said also that Keitel was liaison between the council and the armed forces, it being primarily his duty to coordinate the measures for civilian defense in the area of administration and economy with the genuine military measures for the defense of the Reich. (_2608-PS_)