Chapter II: Front Matter (2)

About one o'clock, on the morning of the 22d, (Sunday,) it was discovered that the mob had a field piece on Liberty street, ready to fire on the round house. By General Brinton's orders his men were stationed at the windows ready to fire, and the mob were notified to abandon the gun and not attempt to fire it, or they would be fired on. They paid no attention to the warning, and when one of them was seen with the lanyard in his hand ready to discharge the piece, orders were given the troops to fire, and several of the mob fell, and the rest ran away. Several attempts were made by the mob during the night to creep up and discharge the gun, but the soldiers kept close watch on it and allowed them no opportunity to do so. General Brinton succeeded in communicating with General Latta during the night by sending out one of his men, Sergeant Joseph F. Wilson, who, by disguising himself, succeeded in getting out and back twice, but would not undertake it again. He brought orders from General Latta to hold on as long as possible, that Guthrie had been ordered to report to him, and ought to reach him at five or six o'clock, but if compelled to escape at last, to do so to the eastward, to take Penn avenue if possible, and make for Colonel Guthrie, at Torrens. The scout, Wilson, brought in the last dispatch about two o'clock, A.M., the 22d, and this was the last communication that reached General Brinton while in the round house. The ordeal through which these men passed that night was fearful. Tired, hungry, worn out, surrounded by a mob of infuriated men, yelling like demons, fire on nearly all sides of them, suffocated and blinded by smoke, with no chance to rest, and but little knowledge of what efforts were being made for their relief, with orders not to fire on the mob unless in necessary self defense, the wonder is that they were not totally demoralized; but the evidence of all the officers is that the men behaved like veterans, obeyed all orders cheerfully and with promptness, and during the whole night but one company manifested any spirit of insubordination, and these proposed to lay down their arms and quit, as they were not allowed to use them on the mob, while the latter were taking every opportunity of shooting down the soldiers. This insubordination was quickly brought to an end as soon as the attention of the proper officer was called to it, and when the troops marched out in the morning, no one could tell by their actions which of the men had wavered during the night. About half-past seven, Sunday morning, the 22d instant, the machine shop caught fire in many places, the roof of the round house also was on fire, and it became necessary to evacuate the buildings. The two Napoleon guns could not be removed, and were spiked, and about eight, A.M., the command marched out into the street in good, order, taking their Gatling guns with them. The mob scattered in every direction at sight of the troops coming out, and no attempt was made to molest the soldiers until they began their march eastward by Penn avenue, in pursuance of the orders received from General Latta.

After marching two or three squares, the troops were harassed by a fire in their rear. They were fired at from second story windows, from the corners of the streets, and from every place where one of the mob could fire from under cover so as to be safe himself from a return fire. They were also fired at from a police station, where eight or ten policemen stood in uniform, as they passed, and when they were a convenient distance from the station, shots were fired at them from the crowd there assembled. It is hard to believe charges of this kind, but the evidence is too positive and circumstantial to leave room for doubt. At one point, just before reaching the United States arsenal, there was some confusion among the men in the rear of the column, caused by an attack by the mob that was following up, and a halt was made, and the Gatling guns used on the attacking party, which dispersed them, and this ended all attacks on the troops. In this retreat, three of the soldiers were killed and several wounded, one of whom, Lieutenant Ashe, died a few days afterwards, at the United States arsenal. On arriving at the arsenal several of the soldiers climbed over the fence, into the grounds, and General Brinton called on the commandant, Major Buffington, for leave to feed and shelter his troops there. General Brinton and Major Buffington disagreed as to what occurred between them at that time, which question of veracity the purposes of this report does not require us to decide, but General Brinton is corroborated by the testimony of one of his officers, and Major Buffington has no corroborating witness. The result of the conference was, that General Brinton and his well men went on, and his wounded were left, and well cared for, at the arsenal. General Brinton, hearing nothing from Colonel Guthrie, continued his march out to and through Sharpsburg, and finally brought up in the vicinity of the work-house, and encamped on the grounds near that institution, where he was furnished with rations for his men, and gave them a chance to get the rest they so much needed. These rations reached General Brinton's command during Sunday afternoon, through the personal exertions of A. J. Cassatt, who, from the time of the occupation of the round-house by the troops, had been unwearied in his endeavors to get provisions to them. The command was also furnished with blankets and other necessary camp equipments, by Colonel Thomas A. Scott, who had also been vigilant in looking after the welfare of the men, and all necessary transportation needed on their behalf, after their departure from Philadelphia, unprepared for a campaign, on account of the brief notice given them. To these two gentlemen, the friends of the National Guard owe a debt of gratitude for the personal interest taken by them, at all times, during the campaign, to render any service that lay in their power to make the men comfortable.

The destruction of the railroad property by the mob had been continued all night, the cars and goods contained in them that could not be carried off being burned as fast as they could be broken open, the goods thrown out and the cars set on fire. Crowds of men, women, and children were engaged in the work of pillage, and everything portable, of any value, was seized as fast as thrown from the cars, and carried away and secreted. One feature of the mob at Pittsburgh is new in this country. A large number of women were in the crowd at Twenty-eighth street, on Saturday, the 21st instant, and according to testimony, they talked to the sheriff, and others who tried to get the crowd to disperse, worse than the men, used viler epithets, and more indecent language, and did everything in their power to influence and excite the mob to resistance. They also, during Saturday night and Sunday, brought out tea and coffee for the men engaged in the destruction of property, and were the most active in carrying away the goods taken from the cars. This work of pillage and destruction continued all day Sunday, and the actual destruction was participated in by only thirty to fifty men, the citizens in the meantime standing looking helplessly on, and no effort made to stay the damage by the bystanders. There was a very large crowd in the vicinity of the burning, who were supposed to be in sympathy with the destruction, and this probably deterred anyone from interfering to put a stop to it. The police, on Sunday, arrested some seventy-five persons who were carrying off goods, the arrests being made some distance from the place where the articles were taken. Those arrested were taken before Deputy Mayor Butler, and most of them were by him discharged. This seems to be all that the police did to restrain the rioting that day, and it is in evidence that one policeman in uniform got into one of the cars and threw goods out to the mob.

On Saturday morning, General Latta had sent written orders by Captain Aull to General Brinton, for the latter to make a junction with Colonel Guthrie, at Torrens, and with the whole force to march to Pittsburgh, and fearing that Captain Aull might fail to reach General Brinton, the order was read to Colonel Norris, who volunteered to go in search of General Brinton.

Colonel Norris, in company with J. M. Stewart, overtook General Brinton's command a little beyond Sharpsburg, and they both testify that Colonel Norris told General Brinton that Captain Aull had been sent by General Latta in search of him with orders, and communicated to him, (General Brinton,) the substance of the orders, and that General Brinton refused to go back, saying that his men had been fired at from houses, street crossings, and police stations, and were almost famished for want of food, and he was going into the open country where he could intrench and defend himself, and procure food for his men, but that if he received positive orders he might return.

General Brinton and several of his officers testify that although Colonel Norris visited him at the time and place stated, yet that he delivered no orders whatever, and stated that his errand was to find out where the command was. In regard to these counter-statements your committee will have something to say under the head of "conduct of the militia." It is proper to state here, however, that the written order given to Captain Aull to take to General Brinton was not delivered to him till the 1st day of August, a week from its date.

Soon after the first car was set on fire, Saturday night, the alarm of fire was given, and the firemen with their engines at once turned out and arrived in the vicinity of the fire about eleven o'clock, but were not allowed to attempt to stop the destruction of the railroad company property. They tried several times to lay their hose, so as to play on the fire, but the mob cut their hose and threatened them with death if they persisted. Some of the police testify that they cleared away the mob at one place and notified the firemen that they were ready to protect them if they would go to work and put out the fire; but the firemen deny this, and testify that no such offer was made, and that at no time did they see half a dozen police together.

In view of the general failure of the police to do what must be considered their duty in regard to the rioters, during the whole time of the trouble, they need not think it strange if the majority of people are inclined to believe the statements of the firemen. The officers of the fire department testify that the firemen were well organized at the place of danger, ready to do their duty at all times, and that this department was the only one in the city that was organized trying to do its duty during the time of the riot. The firemen, after some remonstrance on the part of a portion of the rioters, were allowed to save private property, and to this fact may be ascribed the safety of a good portion of the city; for the fire from the railroad property communicated to the adjoining property of individuals, and but for the labors of the firemen there must have been a very extensive conflagration throughout Pittsburgh. The destruction of property did not cease until about five o'clock, P.M., on Sunday, the 22d, and then only when the limit of the corporation property had been reached at Seventh street by the destruction of the Union depot, Union depot hotel, and the grain elevator. The latter did not belong to the railroad company, but it was believed by the mob to be owned by a corporation, and therefore it was doomed to destruction with the rest. Several times during the day--Sunday--the cry of "police" was made by some one in the crowd, and whenever this was done the mob would scatter in all directions, but as soon as it was ascertained to be a false alarm they would again return to the work of destruction. It was demonstrated also that whenever any citizen gave a determined and positive order to any of the mob it was usually obeyed.

A notice had been published in the Sunday morning papers, and had also been given out in the various churches, that a meeting of the citizens would be held at the old city hall, at noon, for the purpose of organizing to protect the city. Some citizens met at the old city hall, according to notice, but there seemed to be no head to the movement, and it adjourned to meet at the new city hall immediately. At this place a committee of safety was appointed, and a sort of an organization for defense commenced, but in the language of a prominent witness engaged in the movement: "They were all day doing very little; there was no head anywhere; the mayor did nothing, and seemed to be powerless, and the sheriff had run away. The mayor seemed to be confused; he ran around some, but really did nothing." A nucleus for an organization of the responsible citizens of the city was formed, however, which on the following day developed into vigorous action, and the best men of the city came forward and subscribed liberally to a fund to pay an extra police force, and pledged themselves to subscribe any amount necessary to put the city in a complete state of defense against the mob element. Some sixty thousand dollars was actually subscribed, of which about fifteen thousand dollars was used to pay the extra police force called into existence by the action of the citizens during the emergency.

About four to five o'clock, P.M., a body of fifty or sixty men, composed of professional and business men, were organized under the lead of Doctor Donnelly, and armed at first with ax-helves, and afterwards with some old muskets and no ammunition, and with white handkerchiefs on their left arms, appeared at the scene of the trouble, near the Union depot and elevator, but it was too late to save these buildings, as they were already burned. The crowd gave way to this force, but as the destruction was completed here but little could be accomplished. The doctor ordered the mob to take hold and tear down a fence so as to stop the spread of the fire, and they obeyed orders.

There was such an apathy among the citizens, that it took all the day to raise this force led by Doctor Donnelly, and after being on the ground a short time, and finding nothing for them to do, they disbanded.

During the day (Sunday) a car load of whisky or high wines was broken open by the mob, and they drank very freely of it, and towards night, at the time the Union depot and elevator were burned, most of the active rioters were so drunk as to be unable to continue the work of destruction, if they had been so disposed. Whisky had done good service in this case, if never before. The fatigue consequent upon the labors of Saturday night and Sunday was also producing its effect upon the rioters, and taken in connection with the fact, that most of them must have been filled to satiety with rioting and destruction of property, shows a good cause for the waning of the riot on Sunday afternoon. A few of the rioters, between five and six o'clock, P.M., went to the Duquesne depot, (the property of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company,) at the junction of the Allegheny and Monongahela rivers, with the intention of burning it and the cars in the vicinity. One car was set on fire and an attempt made to set the depot on fire, but some six or eight of the citizens' safety committee arrived there about the time the rioters did, and they interfered at once to put a stop to destruction, and had no difficulty in doing so, as the rioters desisted and left as soon as they saw any authority exerted in opposition to their schemes.

The Eighteenth regiment (Colonel Guthrie) had remained at Torrens station, keeping the track clear at that point, and waiting for the expected trains. The crowd at that place numbered about fifteen hundred men, composed of mill men, some railroad men, boys, roughs, and tramps. The passenger trains were allowed to run by the mob, but between Pittsburgh and Torrens they were filled to overflowing by the roughest of the crowd, who traveled backwards and forwards between those places on the trains at their pleasure, and no one dared to interfere with them. They even climbed on the engine and tender, and roofs of the cars, and controlled the movements of the trains whenever they chose so to do between those two points. At Torrens, the crowd would occasionally become demonstrative and defiant, and Colonel Guthrie was obliged to charge bayonets on them several times, and each time had no difficulty in dispersing them. Twice he ordered his men to load in presence of the crowd, and this of itself dispersed them. Colonel Guthrie's troops were not allowed to fraternize with the mob, but were kept entirely aloof from them, and this regiment does not seem to have become demoralized, as the Fourteenth and Nineteenth regiments were. About four o'clock, P.M., Sunday, Colonel Guthrie, hearing that the Fourteenth and Nineteenth regiments had been disbanded, and being unable to ascertain the exact condition of affairs at Pittsburgh, went there and consulted with General Latta, and his regiment was ordered to march to that place, where they arrived about dark, and, of course, too late to be of any service in stopping the destruction of property, which had all taken place before their arrival. They marched to the armory and stayed all night, and on Monday forenoon, the Twenty-third, together with the Fourteenth and Nineteenth regiments, which had been ordered to reassemble that morning, marched through the principal streets of the city for the purpose of overawing any riotous disposition that might still remain in those who had been engaged in the work of destruction the day before. Colonel Guthrie assumed command of the division, his commission being older than Colonel Gray's or Colonel Howard's, and when General Brown wished to assume command Colonel Guthrie refused to recognize his authority, on account of the manner in which he had managed matters on Saturday, the 21st. On Saturday night, a few of the leading citizens had suggested to the mayor that it would be well to call out all of the old police force that had been discharged, and in accordance with this suggestion the chief of police caused a notice to be published, calling on them to report at his office and they would be assigned to duty. During the day several reported and were employed, and afterwards most of the old force were taken back and assigned to duty for a time. This extra force, together with the force of citizens organized for the purpose, patrolled the city that Sunday night, and succeeding nights, until the danger had passed.

From the first commencement of the strike, the strikers had the active sympathy of a large portion of the people of Pittsburgh. The citizens had a bitter feeling against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company on account of, as they believed, an unjust discrimination by the railroad company against them in freight rates, which made it very difficult for their manufacturers to compete successfully with manufacturers further west, and this feeling had existed and been intensified for years, and pervaded all classes. A large portion of the people also believed that the railroad company was not dealing fairly by its men in making the last reduction in wages, and the tradesmen with whom the trainmen dealt also had a direct sympathy with the men in this reduction, for its results would affect their pockets.

The large class of laborers in the different mills, manufactories, mines, and other industries in Pittsburgh and vicinity, were also strongly in sympathy with the railroad strikers, considering the cause of the railroad men their cause, as their wages had also been reduced for the same causes as were those of the railroad men, and they were not only willing but anxious to make a common fight against the corporations. This feeling of aversion to the railroad company and sympathy with the strikers was indulged in by the Pittsburgh troops to the same extent that it was by the other classes, and as many of them had friends and relatives in the mob, it is not much to be wondered at that they did not show much anxiety to assist in dispersing the crowd and enforcing the law.

With the repulse of the attempt to set fire to the Duquesne depot ended all active efforts by the mob to destroy property, and after that Sunday night no mob of any size was again assembled, although it was several days before complete order was fully restored, as the people had lost confidence in all the laboring men, and no one knew who to trust or what to expect from others on account of the extent to which the demoralization had gone.

About sixteen hundred cars, (mostly freight,) including passenger and baggage cars, with such of their contents as were not carried away by the thieves; one hundred and twenty-six locomotives, and all the shops' materials and buildings, except one or two small ones, of the railroad company, from above Twenty-eighth street to the Union depot, were burned on that Saturday night and Sunday.

It has been estimated, by a competent person, that the damage, including loss of property and loss of business, consequent upon the interruption of business, which was inflicted by the mob, at Pittsburgh alone, was $5,000,000. This may be a large estimate, but if the consequential damages could be correctly arrived at, the total damage would fall but little short of the figures given. The actual loss of property by the railroad company alone, not including the freight they were transporting, is estimated at two million dollars, by the officers of the company, from actual figures made. The authorities of Allegheny county adopted thorough measures to ascertain the extent of the loss of property, and to that end appointed a committee to investigate claims of those claiming damage. One hundred and sixty-nine claims were settled by the committee, that is, the amount of each claim of this number was adjusted and agreed upon by the committee and the parties, and the total amount thus adjusted is about one hundred and sixty thousand dollars, and all this is strictly private property. Some persons refused to adjust the amount of their claims with the committee, among which is the claim of the elevator company, amounting to the sum of two hundred thousand dollars. Property that was stolen was also recovered and returned to the railroad company, amounting in value to at least sixty thousand dollars.

The tracks from Union depot out to and beyond Twenty-eighth street were nearly all ruined by the fire, the rails being warped and twisted and the ties burned; they were also covered with the debris of the burned cars, and it was about a week after the destruction, or until July 30th, before the railroad company were enabled to get their trains all running regularly again over this portion of the track.

During the troubles of the 20th and 21st, efforts were made by the strikers to come to an understanding or compromise with the railroad officials, and a committee to confer with the officials was appointed.

Some time on Friday, the 20th, the committee met Mr. Pitcairn, the superintendent of the Pittsburgh division, and presented him with a written statement of the demand made by the strikers, of which the following is a copy, viz:

"BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS,
PITTSBURGH DIVISION, NO. 50,
PITTSBURGH, PA., _July 20, 1877_.

_To the Superintendent Western Division, Pennsylvania Railroad_:

_First._ We, the undersigned committee appointed by the employés of
the western division of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, do
hereby demand from the said company, through the proper officers of
said company, the wages as per department of engineers, firemen,
conductors, brakemen, and flagmen as received prior to June 1,
1877.

_Second._ That each and every employé that has been dismissed for
taking part or parts in said strikes to be restored to their
respective positions.

_Third._ That the classification of each of said department be
abolished now and forever hereafter.

_Fourth._ That engineers and conductors receive the wages as
received by said engineers and conductors of the highest class
prior to June 1, 1877.

_Fifth._ That the running of double trains be abolished, excepting
coal trains.

_Sixth._ That each and every engine, whether road or shifting,
shall have its own fireman.

Respectfully submitted to you for immediate consideration.

J. S. MCCAULEY,
D. H. NEWHARD,
JOHN SHANA,
G. HARRIS,
J. P. KESSLER,
_Committee_."

Mr. Pitcairn informed the committee, that these terms could not be accepted by the railroad company, and that he could not send such a proposition to Colonel Scott, the president of the company, and the negotiations were broken off. An attempt was made on Sunday, by some of the citizens, to induce the railroad officials to submit some proposition for a compromise to the strikers, but the officials refused, saying that the men had taken the law into their own hands, and that no proposition could be made to them until their property was restored, and all opposition had ceased, and that it was now a matter of law, and the State authorities must settle the question with the men first.

The propositions embraced in the papers submitted by the committee of engineers, proposed that the railroad company should make concessions that had never been asked before. The first and second explain themselves fully, and had been grounds of complaint before. The third, requiring the abolishment of the classification of conductors and engineers, had never been a ground of complaint by the men. The conductors were divided into three classes: The first of which received a certain rate of pay per month the first year of service; an addition of ten per cent. for the second year, and another addition of the ten per cent. for the third year. The engineers were divided into four classes, and received an advance of ten per cent. for each year of service after the first until the fourth class was reached. This classification was adopted at the request of the men themselves, some years previous, and no complaint in regard to it had ever reached the officers of the company.

This principle of classification had been practiced by other railroads, and has worked well, and is a good rule for both the men and the railroads, as its tendency is to secure and retain better men to run the trains.

The fourth proposition, if accepted, would have placed the new, inexperienced men on the same footing as the men of experience, and to give them at once the highest wages paid the older and more experienced men.

The fifth proposition was for the railroad company to back down and rescind the order made to run double-headers and the sixth that the company should employ a fireman on all shifting engines, a place where they are not usually needed, as the engine is not engaged in steady work, and the engineer can do his own firing without trouble or over-work. No proposition of compromise was submitted to the strikers on the part of the railroad company, and what would have been the result if one had been made, it is useless to speculate about.

As tending to show the feeling of the people of Pittsburgh on the subject of the difficulties between the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and its employés and in regard to the strike, some copies of editorials from several of the newspapers of the city, written and published at the time of the strike, have been inserted in the evidence accompanying their report.

More space has been given to the history of the riots at Pittsburgh than to any other place, as it was here the troubles first commenced in this State; here was the greatest loss of life, and it was here that, by far, the greatest destruction of property took place. We turn now to Allegheny City, just across the river from Pittsburgh, and the termini of the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago railroad, the Allegheny Valley railroad, the Pan Handle railroad, and the Connellsville division of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. On Friday morning, July 20th, the freight conductors and brakemen on the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago railroad refused to go out with their trains, and the railroad officers, fearing trouble, sent up to the mayor's office for some policemen to preserve the peace, and ten were sent them. The mayor was not at his office at the time, but, on his return, he immediately went up to the depot to look after the troubles himself. At the time the mayor arrived on the ground there was a crowd of two hundred and fifty to three hundred and fifty men assembled and no man could be found to man the trains. One engineer came out with his engine, which was surrounded by the crowd, but no violence was used and there is no evidence of any threats being made at the time, but he returned with his engine to the round house. After this time no attempt to run a freight train was made on this road until the troubles were all over and the men had given up the strike.

The strikers here were under the leadership of one R. A. Ammon, better known as Boss Ammon, and declared their intention to use no violence to prevent trains from running; that if the railroad company could get "scabs" (as the strikers called any man who was willing to work during a strike) to run their trains, they were willing the trains should run, but as the company was unable to find men willing to go out on the trains, the good intentions of the strikers were not tested. As this road was run directly in connection with the Pennsylvania railroad on the general western through traffic, it was but little object to force the freight trains out as long as the Pennsylvania railroad was blockaded, and, hence, no effort was made, after the first day, to run freight trains. The main efforts were in the direction of keeping the peace and preventing the destruction of property. The strikers declared their intentions to keep the peace, and prevent the destruction of property, and not interfere with the running of passenger trains, and they were told that so long as they did this in good faith, they would not be interfered with. Mayor Phillips immediately ordered out all his police to patrol the city, organized an extra force of citizens, and swore them in, made a requisition on the Secretary of War for five hundred guns, and got them, and placed them in the hands of the citizens, and generally had everything so well organized and arranged that any attempt at a riot could have been met and quelled at once. It was rumored that the mob had broken, or was going to break, into the armory and get the guns (about forty) stored there, and the mayor at once sent and had the guns all removed to a place of safety. It was also rumored that the mob from Pittsburgh intended to come over into Allegheny City, and destroy the railroad property there, and the mayor had the bridges all guarded by armed men, with two field pieces at the principal ones, which he was enabled to get, and there being no balls with them, he caused them to be loaded with square iron burs, an inch or so in size.

The city had fifty-five policemen, and these were kept on duty as much of the time as it was possible for men to be out, and no opportunity was given any of the Pittsburgh mob to cross over to Allegheny.

At the time it was alleged that the Pittsburgh mob was coming to Allegheny City, to destroy the property of the railroad company there, an arrangement was made with Ammon and his men to take the freight cars out of the city, which was accordingly done, and ten miles of cars were hauled out from the city some miles, and stowed away on the side tracks, until the troubles were over, when the same men brought them back and turned them over, in good order, to the railroad authorities. It was also arranged with Ammon and his men, that as long as the men behaved themselves and protected the property of the company, no soldier should be brought there to interfere with them, and if, at any time, they found themselves unable to preserve the peace and take care of the property, they were to notify the mayor, who would then furnish a force to preserve order. The mayor also, at the commencement of the troubles, sent his policemen around to notify the saloon-keepers, and others, to close their bars, and sell no strong drink to any one, and afterwards sent the force around to see that the order was obeyed. Although not legally binding, the order was very generally observed, and no trouble was experienced on account of the crowd using strong drink. The mayor had notices posted throughout the city that, if necessity required it, ten taps of the bell was to be the signal for the general assembling of the citizens at a given place for defense, which signal, fortunately, was not required to be given.

Mayor Phillips considered himself as the chief peace officer of the city, and if the sheriff or military had been called on for assistance, he did not consider either or both superseded him, but that it would have been his duty to have cooperated with them to the full extent of his power.

"Boss" Ammon and his party, which consisted of about one hundred railroad men and a crowd of two or three hundred outsiders, roughs, and laborers, continued to run the Pittsburgh division of the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago road until Tuesday evening, the 24th instant, at which time Governor Hartranft arrived from the West. When Ammon heard that the Governor was on the train, coming to Pittsburgh, he telegraphed him, welcoming him to the State, and assuring him a safe passage. On the Governor's arrival he was met by Ammon and introduced to the crowd, and gave them a short talk, counseling obedience to the laws, which was well received. It was now felt by all that the strike must come to an end immediately; that there was a man at the head of affairs who knew his duty and would not be trifled with, and that all parties would be fairly and justly treated. Boss Ammon immediately made arrangements to turn over the railroad to the proper authorities, he seeing very clearly that the proper time to do so had now come, and that further delay was dangerous. Some of his men could not agree with him that it was best to make terms while they could, and, at a meeting of the men, he was hissed, and they refused to hear him speak.

Thus fell from his position of boss the man who, with only eleven months' experience as a brakeman, for four or five days successfully ran one division of a great railroad.

It has by some been considered an extraordinary performance for a young man of twenty-five, with the small experience he had, to control the men he did, and keep the passenger trains running regularly without accident on such a railroad; but when the circumstances are considered it is nothing wonderful. In the first place, a mob or crowd are always willing to follow any person who has nerve, and is willing to assume the responsibility and take the lead. Ammon had the nerve; was naturally shrewd and sharp, and knew how to control men, and they had been used to look up to him as the organizer of the Trainmen's Union. The mob always wants a dictator, and in Ammon they had one. In the next place, the great railroads of the country are so organized, and their trains are run by such a regular system in connection with the telegraph, that the trains can be run for days without a break if the superintendent should abandon the road entirely. Ammon was a king so long as he led in the direction the crowd wished to go; when he undertook to put on the brakes and get them to reason about their situation, and ran counter to their opinions, he was dethroned with as little ceremony or compunction as one school boy shows in knocking off the hat of another.

Human nature is the same everywhere; in politics, society, or with the mob, the leader must go in the direction his followers would have him go, or he is replaced for one more subservient. From Wednesday, the 25th of July, the officers of the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago railroad began to be able to get control of their road, and in a few days all the trains were running regularly. The other railroads running into Allegheny City had nearly the same difficulty with their men as did the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago railroad, and their trains for a few days were not regularly run, but they got along without any rioting or destruction of property, and were soon able to start all their trains again.

On Friday, July 20th, the freight conductors and brakemen on the Pennsylvania railroad, at Philadelphia, began to be uneasy, and on Saturday, the 21st, a strike was in full operation among them. They gathered in crowds at the yards of the company where the freight trains were made up to start out, and they, as in other places, were joined by a large crowd of idle men, tramps, and vagabonds, such as are found around a large city, and who scent out a chance for trouble or a riot, as a crow scents carrion. The officials called on Mayor Stokley for policemen to keep the peace, and protect the property of the company. The mayor at once acted vigorously; sent out his police with orders to disperse any crowd that might gather on the grounds of the railroad company, and, on advising with the citizens, he was authorized to call out an extra force, which he did at once. His action was so thorough and efficient, that no serious interruption of traffic was experienced at that place, although crowds of rough men had gathered to the number of two or three thousand, and at one time, as estimated, to the number of four thousand to five thousand. They were dispersed by the prompt and vigorous action of the police, who would charge into the crowd, using their clubs freely and scattered them at once. It was the policy of the mayor not to allow a mob to collect, and this prevented a serious rioting.

To Mayor Stokley and his police force, the State, as well as the city of Philadelphia, is greatly indebted, and to their efforts may be ascribed the salvation of that city from the disgraceful scenes enacted at Pittsburg.

On Saturday, July 21st, an uneasiness among the trainmen at Harrisburg and Scranton was observed, which, within the following two or three days, ripened into a strike. The first crowd which gathered in Harrisburg was on Saturday evening, the 21st of July, at the Pennsylvania railroad depot, to prevent the shipping of ammunition to Pittsburgh. The mayor was notified about ten o'clock, P.M., of what was going on, and he immediately sent for the chief of police, to make arrangements to meet the threatened danger. A lieutenant of police and another policeman being the only members of the force then available for prompt service, were sent to the scene of the trouble, and, by arrangement, arrested a man and started for the mayor's office with him, to draw the crowd from the depot. This ruse proved successful, and the ammunition was shipped before the crowd returned. Some three hundred or four hundred persons followed the policemen with their prisoner to the mayor's office, and, on their arrival there, the mayor went out and asked them to disperse, when about one half of the crowd left. The person arrested then appeared at the door, and informed the crowd that he had been arrested for drunkenness and disorderly conduct, and the balance of them dispersed.

On Sunday, the 22d, the trainmen, whose head-quarters were at Harrisburg, struck, and in consequence thereof a large crowd gathered on the common, and listened to harangues from some of their number, among whom was an insane man from the lunatic asylum. From the common, the mob went to the Pennsylvania railroad depot, and prevented a train from going out, and the mayor, having notice of their movements, appeared upon the scene and found some boys uncoupling an engine from the train, which the mayor put a stop to, and requested the engineer to move on, which he refused to do, giving as an excuse that he was told there were obstructions on the track a short distance out of town. The crowd at this time was composed of all kinds of citizens, good, bad, and indifferent, and they soon dispersed, and no violence took place. On Monday, the 23d, the mob gathered in large force about the railroad premises, and there being a larger number of roughs and tramps, became more turbulent and interfered with the running of the trains. The mayor consulted the leading men about raising a posse to assist the police, there being only seventeen in the service of the city, and it was determined to raise a force of citizens, to be called the "law and order posse," who were to assemble at the mayor's office, on a given signal from the court-house bell.

The sheriff of the county was at Atlantic City at the commencement of the trouble, and was telegraphed to when matters began to assume a serious aspect, and he arrived at Harrisburg on the evening of the 23d. At this time the mob had increased largely, and was becoming demonstrative. The sheriff was informed as to what measures had been taken so far, and the mayor requested him to take charge of the situation and control the movements generally, which the sheriff assented to, and at once prepared a proclamation, ordering all good citizens to turn out and assist in enforcing law and order, which proclamation was published in the papers the next morning. In the evening of the 23d a portion of the mob had gone to Aultmeyer's gun store, on Second street, and demanded admittance, and the proprietor had opened the doors to them. Word was sent to the mayor of the occurrence, and he took his police and repaired to the place immediately. He found the store full of men and boys, who had helped themselves to guns and knives. The mayor formed his police in front of the store and went in and talked with them, and after a little parleying they delivered up the weapons they had seized and left. About eleven o'clock, P.M., the mob gathered in large numbers on Market street, where it crosses the railroad, and working up Market street they broke into two or three stores. The signal for the assembling of the citizens was given, and they assembled immediately at the corner of Third and Market streets to the number of three hundred to four hundred, together with the sheriff, the mayor, and the police. The sheriff being a man of considerable military experience, had caused the citizens to adopt company and regimental organizations, by reason of which they were more quickly assembled and more easily handled and moved. The sheriff and mayor went down to the mob and ordered them to disperse, which they refused to do, and then the police and citizens, armed with pistols and clubs, were marched toward the mob, the police and mayor at the head of the column. The mob numbered from seven hundred to one thousand, and two thirds of them dispersed on seeing the force marching against them, but some two hundred stood their ground. The force in command of the mayor and sheriff marched into this body, using their clubs freely, and completely dispersed them without firing a shot. Several of the rioters were arrested at the time, and quite a number during the week; in all some forty-five or fifty of the leaders were arrested, many of them being taken in their beds that night.

This determination on the part of the civil authorities, backed by the citizens, broke the spirit of the mob, and they did not again assemble in any great number, or commit any further breaches of the peace, although the citizens' organization was kept up for several days, and a special force of some fifty men was employed to be on the watch for some time, and until matters became quiet throughout the State. The whole number of citizens enrolled was about fifteen hundred, and more than one thousand were out on a parade at one time. On receiving news of the uneasiness manifested at Harrisburg, General Latta, then at Pittsburgh, telegraphed Major General J. K. Sigfried, commanding Fourth division National Guard, with head-quarters at Pottsville, to put the City Grays, of Harrisburg, on duty at the arsenal at once, and order his whole division under arms, and move to Harrisburg. He also received a similar telegram from Governor Hartranft, from Medicine Bow, Wyoming Territory. The telegrams were dated July 22d. General Sigfried had, on the previous day, as a precautionary measure, ordered Captain Maloney, of the Harrisburg City Grays, to ship his arms and ammunition to the State arsenal, located just outside of the city, and to stay there and guard the same, to prevent it from falling into the hands of any mob that might undertake to capture it. General Sigfried arrived at Harrisburg with nine companies of the Seventh and Eighth regiments on the 23d, and was there joined by eight other companies, making a force under his command of some eight hundred men. These troops were stationed at the arsenal at the time the mob was dispersed by the police and sheriff's posse, on the night of the 23d, but were not called on by the civil authorities, they evidently understanding their duty, which was to attempt to enforce the law by the means within their power, before calling on the military for assistance. Had this been done as promptly in some other places, much expense to the State might have been saved, and the riot nipped in the bud, instead of being allowed to become strong and organized, while waiting for troops to arrive. The mayor testified that when the disturbance first commenced the citizens were lukewarm, and seemed to have considerable sympathy with the strikers, but as soon as affairs began to assume a serious aspect, they came forward and enrolled themselves freely in the law and order posse, and urged prompt and vigorous action, and by so doing they no doubt prevented the enacting at this place of the terrible destruction of life and property which took place in other localities.

At Reading, on Saturday, July 21st, the idle men began to gather in small bodies and talk of strikes, and showed a disposition to interfere with railroad property, but no overt act was committed until Sunday the 22d. The mob at this place was composed primarily of discharged employés of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, who had been discharged in the month of April preceding. The officers of that road learning that the society called the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers intended to make the company trouble, commenced preparing for it, and when in April the engineers demanded an advance in wages of twenty per centum, they were notified that any person who belonged to the brotherhood could not remain in the employ of the company unless he severed his connection with that society, and that, as the society was a beneficial one, and had a fund for its members to draw on in ease of sickness, the company would establish such a fund for its engineers. In consequence of this demand, and the circular of the company, some four hundred engineers, firemen, and brakemen left the service of the company, whose places were filled by promoting firemen and hiring new men, and those coming from other roads who held certificates of competency and good behavior. Many of these men who left the employ of the company had remained in and about Reading, and on hearing of the riots at Pittsburgh, thought it would be a good time to take their revenge on the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, and these, with other idle men, composed the nucleus of the mob, and were, as in other places, soon joined by all the tramps and criminals in the vicinity. None of the regular employés of the railroad company struck at that time, nor were they engaged in the riots. On Sunday trains were interfered with near the depot, and one or two cars burned, and on Sunday night, the 22d, the Lebanon Valley railroad bridge, which is a very high one, crossing the Schuylkill at Reading, and costing a large sum of money, was burned. On the evening of July 22d, Adjutant General Latta telegraphed to Major General William J. Bolton, commanding the Second division National Guard, with head-quarters at Norristown, to concentrate the Sixteenth regiment, under arms, at once at Norristown, and the Fourth regiment, at Allentown, which was done as soon as possible, and the Fourth regiment, General Reeder, reported on the morning of the 23d, that all the companies were in hand except company A, which was in the hands of the mob at Reading.

At 3.50, P.M., of that day, J. E. Wootten, general manager of the Reading Railroad Company, telegraphed General Bolton, that they were in need of protection at Reading, and asked that General Reeder be sent to that place with his command, which request was complied with, and General Reeder ordered to proceed to Reading at once. General Reeder, with the Fourth regiment, Colonel Good, arrived at Reading about seven o'clock, P.M., of the 23d, and instead of finding the mob in possession of the depot of the Philadelphia and Reading railroad, as he expected, found it in possession of a squad of the coal and iron police. The mob had had pretty much its own way all day, and had stopped the running of all freight trains, and interfered with the passenger trains. The sheriff of the county, George R. Yorgey, who was out of the city, had been telegraphed to by the chief of police, in regard to the trouble, and having been furnished an extra train, arrived in the city about five, A.M., of the 23d.

On his arrival, he refused to take any steps to raise a posse, although men were offered him by the railroad officials, and the only step taken by him to disperse the rioters, and preserve order during the troubles, was to issue a proclamation at night, on the 23d, requesting all good citizens to remain at their homes. When the chief executive officer of the county, so fails in his duty, it is no wonder that mobs become defiant and destroy life and property.

The mayor was absent from the city, and the chief of police, Peter Cullen, was the only civil officer who did any thing to preserve order. He, with the police force of twenty-seven men, did all that men could do under the circumstances. On Sunday night, with a few police, he tried to prevent the burning of the cars, and stopped it after a short time. On Monday, with his force he cleared the crossing at Seventh and Penn streets, so that the street cars and people could pass, although the crowd numbered several thousands. He also sent out his men to raise a posse of two hundred men among the citizens, but they all refused, and laughed at the police, and he did not consider that he had the authority to summon them or order them out.